Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the  
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters (25-MAY-06,
GAO-06-808T).							 
                                                                 
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in	 
U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all	 
levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate.	 
GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal		 
government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. This statement summarizes key points from GAO's report on  
the military's response to Katrina (GAO-06-643), which was issued
earlier this month. It addresses (1) the support that the	 
military provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with  
some of the challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions
needed to address these lessons, including GAO's recommendations 
to the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the extent to which the	 
military is taking actions to identify and address the lessons	 
learned. In its report, GAO made several recommendations to	 
improve the military response to catastrophic disasters. The	 
recommendations called for updating the National Response Plan to
reflect proactive functions the military could perform in a	 
catastrophic incident; improving military plans and exercises;	 
improving National Guard, Reserve, and active force integration; 
and resolving response problems associated with damage		 
assessment, communication, search and rescue, and logistics	 
issues. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred with 
all of the recommendations.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-808T					        
    ACCNO:   A54740						        
  TITLE:     Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to    
Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters  
     DATE:   05/25/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     National response plan				 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     National Guard					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Civil support					 
	     National Response Plan				 

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GAO-06-808T

     

     * Summary
     * Background
     * The Military Response Was Massive but Faced Several Challeng
          * The Military Response Was Massive
          * Challenges Provide Lessons for the Future
     * Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Define and Guide Future
     * DOD Is Taking Steps to Address Lessons Learned
     * Concluding Observations
     * Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
     * Appendix I: GAO's Recommendations to the Secretary of Defens
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Statement for the Record to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, May 25, 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA

Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military's Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters

Statement of the Record by Sharon Pickup, Director Defense Capabilities
and Management

GAO-06-808T

Mr. Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for your hearing
on how the Department of Defense (DOD) is preparing for the upcoming
hurricane season and applying lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's
history and, because of its size and strength, will have long-standing
effects for years to come. Prior catastrophic disasters and the actual
experience after Katrina have shown the need for DOD to contribute
substantial support to state and local authorities given its extensive
capabilities and expertise in key areas such as damage assessment and
communications. As you know, under the National Response Plan, DOD is
generally assigned a supporting role in disaster response but, even in
this role, has specific planning responsibilities in anticipation of being
called upon in a disaster. Within DOD, the 2005 Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support envisioned a reliance on National Guard and
Reserve forces for homeland missions, including disaster response, but
recognized that active duty forces may also play a role depending on the
nature of the event. Individual states have their own disaster response
plans which typically include substantial supporting roles for their
National Guards.

In anticipation of and in the days following Hurricane Katrina's landfall,
the military1 took many proactive steps and mobilized significant
resources-both active duty and National Guard forces-that saved many lives
and greatly enhanced response efforts. At the same time, as local, state,
and federal governments responded in the days following Katrina, confusion
surfaced as to what responsibilities the military has and what
capabilities it would provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic
event. While this experience underscored the importance of the military,
especially in the wake of a catastrophe, it also identified some areas
requiring more attention to enhance future military responses. As the
nation is quickly approaching the 2006 hurricane season, sorting out the
relevant lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina for the military,
putting them in the context of the military's role in the complex disaster
response mission, and then following though with needed changes is vital.

1Throughout this statement, we use the term military to refer to the
combined efforts of the National Guard and the federal military force. We
use the term DOD to distinguish between the federal military response
commanded by the U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard response.
During Katrina, DOD's federal military response consisted of active duty
military personnel and reservists who volunteered to be part of the
federal response.

This statement is based on our report issued earlier this month, entitled
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters ( GAO-06-643 ), and
summarizes the key points from that report, including (1) the support that
the military provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with some
of the challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions needed to
address these lessons, including our recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense; and (3) the extent to which the military is taking actions to
identify and address the lessons learned. The work supporting our report
reflects our travel to the affected areas, interviews with officials who
led the response efforts at both the federal and state levels, and
extensive analysis of data and documents from numerous military
organizations that provided support to the Hurricane Katrina response
operations. We conducted our review from September 2005 through April 2006
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In
addition to our recently completed review of the military response, we
have published several products2 on Hurricane Katrina and prior disasters,
and currently have a large body of ongoing work to address preparation,
response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.

                                    Summary

The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved
many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts but faced several
challenges from which many lessons are emerging. The military took
proactive steps and responded with over 50,000 National Guard and 20,000
active federal personnel. Consistent with its June 2005 civil support
strategy-but unlike past catastrophes-DOD relied heavily on the National
Guard during the response. Active duty forces were also alerted prior to
landfall, and key capabilities, such as aviation, medical, and engineering
forces, were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of
the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to
supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. However, like
other responders, the military faced challenges in its response that
affected its ability to gain situational awareness and organize and
execute its response. These challenges included obtaining timely damage
assessments; restoring and maintaining interoperable communications;
coordinating search and rescue efforts; and assuming unexpected
responsibilities for logistics support, which led to limited visibility of
items that had been ordered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and were in transit to the affected areas. Moreover, integrating
the large numbers of active and Guard forces from many parts of the
country was at times problematic. In addition, a key mobilization statute,
which limits a unit or member of a reserve component from being
involuntarily ordered to federal active duty for disaster response, also
affected the integration.3 Reservists who responded to Katrina were
volunteers, and they constituted a relatively small portion of the
response when compared to the National Guard and active component portions
of the response. While the military clearly provided vital support, no one
had the total picture of the situation on the ground, the capabilities
that were on the way, the missions that had been resourced, and the
missions that still needed to be completed. Unfortunately, many of these
problems are long-standing, and we reported similar issues after Hurricane
Andrew hit south Florida in 1992. Therefore, the key lesson learned is
that while the military has significant and sometimes unique capabilities
that can be brought to bear, additional actions are needed to ensure that
its contributions are clearly understood and well planned and integrated.

2For example, see GAO, Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes
Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar, GAO/NSIAD-93-180 (Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 1993); Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2006); and
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006).

Many of the challenges faced in the response point to the need for better
plans and more robust exercises, as we outlined in our recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense. Such plans are needed to better define the
military's role in a catastrophic natural disaster, identify capabilities
that could be available and provided by the military, and integrate the
response of the active and reserve components. Robust exercises are then
needed to test those plans and allow planners to refine them. Prior to
Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and exercises were insufficient and did
not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate
the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example,
the government's National Response Plan (NRP) made little distinction
between the military response to a smaller regional disaster and its
response to a catastrophic natural disaster. In addition, DOD's emergency
response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities
during disasters did not account for the full range of assistance that
might be provided by DOD, address the respective contributions of the
National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response time
frames. National Guard state plans did not account for the level of
outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe and were not
synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, plans had not been tested with
a robust exercise program in that none of the exercises that were
conducted prior to Katrina called for a major deployment of DOD
capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. As a result, a lack
of understanding exists within the military and among federal, state, and
local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD
might provide in the event of a catastrophe, the timing of this
assistance, and the respective contributions of the active duty and
National Guard forces. We recommended that DOD take a number of actions to
help address planning and exercise inadequacies, including fully
addressing the proactive functions the military will be expected to
perform under the NRP in the event of a catastrophe and improving military
plans and exercises so that these plans specifically address the potential
contributions of the military in key areas-such as damage assessment,
communications, search and rescue, and logistics support-as well as the
integration of the military's active duty and Reserve and National Guard
forces.

3Section 12304 of Title 10 of the United States Code prohibits the
involuntary activation of National Guard and Reserve members for domestic
disaster operations. While this restriction applies to both National Guard
and Reserve forces, National Guard forces were mobilized under both state
active duty and Title 32 for Hurricane Katrina. No similar provisions
exist to specifically mobilize Reserve forces for disaster response,
although it is conceivable that if the President declares a national
emergency and invokes 10 U.S.C. S: 12302 reserve component forces could
become available for involuntary activation. Under 10 U.S.C. S: 12301 (d),
the President can activate National Guard and Reserve volunteers for any
purpose.

Since Hurricane Katrina, DOD has analyzed the military response and is
taking several actions to address the lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina and prepare for the next catastrophic event. In addition to
conducting its own lessons-learned reviews, DOD is also examining the
lessons and recommendations from other sources, including GAO. DOD
generally concurred with the recommendations we made in our recent report
and is taking actions to address catastrophic disaster response problems
that we and others have identified. While it is too early to evaluate
DOD's actions, many appear to hold promise, such as the efforts to refine
the NRP complete its operational plan, and embed defense officials into
FEMA regional offices. However, such DOD actions are only first steps.
Some issues identified after Katrina are long-standing problems that we
identified after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Moreover, they will be
difficult to address because they are complex and cut across agency
boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention
from the highest management levels in DOD and from leaders across the
government.

                                   Background

About 9 months prior to Katrina's landfall, the NRP was issued to frame
the federal response to domestic emergencies ranging from smaller,
regional disasters to incidents of national significance. The plan
generally calls for a reactive federal response following specific state
requests for assistance. However, the NRP also contains a catastrophic
incident annex that calls for a proactive federal response when
catastrophes overwhelm local and state responders. The NRP generally
assigns DOD a supporting role in disaster response, but even in this role,
DOD has specific planning responsibilities. For example, the NRP requires
federal agencies to incorporate the accelerated response requirements of
the NRP's catastrophic incident annex into their own emergency response
plans.

Within DOD, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was
issued in June 2005, envisions a greater reliance on National Guard and
Reserve forces for homeland missions. The military response to domestic
disasters typically varies depending on the severity of an event. During
smaller disasters, an affected state's National Guard may provide a
sufficient response, but larger disasters and catastrophes that overwhelm
the state may require assistance from out-of-state National Guard or
federal troops. For Katrina, the response heavily relied on the National
Guard, which is consistent with DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and
Civil Support. This represents a departure from past catastrophes when
active duty forces played a larger role in response efforts.

During disaster response missions, National Guard troops typically operate
under the control of the state governors. However, the National Guard
Bureau has responsibility for formulating, developing, and coordinating
policies, programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National Guard
personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between the U.S.
Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the National Guard in U.S. states and
territories. Although the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not have
operational control of National Guard forces in the states and
territories, he has overall responsibility for National Guard Military
Support to Civil Authorities programs. The U.S. Northern Command also has
a mission to provide support to civil authorities. Because of this
mission, U.S. Northern Command was responsible for commanding the federal
military response to Hurricane Katrina.

 The Military Response Was Massive but Faced Several Challenges, Which Provide
                             Lessons for the Future

During its massive response to Hurricane Katrina the military faced many
challenges, which provide lessons for improving the future military
response to catastrophic natural disasters. Issues arose with damage
assessments, communications, search and rescue efforts, logistics, and the
integration of military forces.

The Military Response Was Massive

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the military mounted a massive response
that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. Military
officials began tracking Hurricane Katrina when it was an unnamed tropical
depression and proactively took steps that led to a Katrina response of
more than 50,000 National Guard and more than 20,000 federal military
personnel, more than twice the size of the military response to 1992's
catastrophic Hurricane Andrew. By the time Katrina made landfall in
Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, the military was positioned
to respond with both National Guard and federal forces.

Prior to Katrina's landfall, active commands had published warning and
planning orders and DOD had already deployed Defense Coordinating Officers
to all the potentially affected states. DOD also deployed a joint task
force; medical personnel; helicopters; ships from Texas, Virginia, and
Maryland; and construction battalion engineers. Many of these capabilities
were providing assistance or deploying to the area within hours of
Katrina's landfall. DOD also supported response and recovery operations
with communications equipment and many other critically needed
capabilities. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster
prompted DOD to deploy large active duty ground units beginning on
September 3, 2005, 5 days after Katrina's landfall.

Prior to landfall, anticipating the disruption and damage that Hurricane
Katrina could cause, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi activated
their National Guard units. In addition, National Guard officials in
Louisiana and Mississippi began to contact National Guard officials in
other states to request assistance. While National Guard forces from
Louisiana and Mississippi provided the bulk of the military support in the
first days after landfall, most of the Guard response to Hurricane Katrina
came later from outside the affected states. The National Guard Bureau
acted as a conduit to communicate requirements for assistance in Louisiana
and Mississippi to the adjutants general in the rest of the country. The
adjutants general of other states, with the authorization of their state
governors, then sent their National Guard troops to Louisiana and
Mississippi under emergency assistance agreements between the states.
Requirements for out-of-state National Guard or federal assistance were
increased because thousands of National Guard personnel from Mississippi
and Louisiana were already mobilized for other missions and thus
unavailable when Hurricane Katrina struck their states. The National Guard
troops that had been mobilized from within the affected states were able
to quickly deploy to where they were needed because they had trained and
planned for disaster mobilizations within their states. The deployment of
out-of-state forces, though quick when compared to past catastrophes, took
longer because mobilization plans were developed and units were identified
for deployment in the midst of the crisis. At the peak of the military's
response, however, nearly 40,000 National Guard members from other states
were supporting operations in Louisiana and Mississippi-an unprecedented
domestic mobilization.

Challenges Provide Lessons for the Future

While the military response to Katrina was massive, it faced many
challenges, which provide lessons for the future, including the need for
the following:

           o  Timely damage assessments. As with Hurricane Andrew, an
           underlying problem in the response was the failure to quickly
           assess damage and gain situational awareness. The NRP notes that
           local and state officials are responsible for damage assessments
           during a disaster, but it also notes that state and local
           officials could be overwhelmed in a catastrophe. Despite this
           incongruous situation, the NRP did not specify the proactive means
           necessary for the federal government to gain situational awareness
           when state and local officials are overwhelmed. Moreover, DOD's
           planning did not call for the use of the military's extensive
           reconnaissance assets to meet the NRP catastrophic incident
           annex's requirement for a proactive response to catastrophic
           incidents. Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and
           the military's extensive reconnaissance capabilities were not
           effectively leveraged as part of a proactive federal effort to
           conduct timely, comprehensive damage assessments, the military
           began organizing and deploying its response without fully
           understanding the extent of the damage or the required assistance.
           According to military officials, available reconnaissance assets
           could have provided additional situational awareness during
           Hurricane Katrina, and in September 2005, considerable
           surveillance assets were made available to assess damage from
           Hurricane Rita, primarily because of the lessons learned from
           Hurricane Katrina.

           o  Improved communications. Hurricane Katrina caused significant
           damage to the communication infrastructure in Louisiana and
           Mississippi, which further contributed to a lack of situational
           awareness for military and civilian officials. Even when local
           officials were able to conduct damage assessments, the lack of
           communication assets caused delays in transmitting the
           assessments. Under the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security
           has responsibility for coordinating the communications portion of
           disaster response operations. However, neither the NRP, the
           Department of Homeland Security, nor DOD fully identified the
           extensive military communication capabilities that could be
           leveraged as part of a proactive federal response to a
           catastrophe. DOD's plan addressed internal military communications
           requirements but not the communication requirements of communities
           affected by the disaster. Because state and local officials were
           overwhelmed and the Department of Homeland Security and DOD waited
           for requests for their assistance rather than deploying a
           proactive response, some of the military's available communication
           assets were never requested or deployed. In addition, some
           deployed National Guard assets were underutilized because the
           sending states placed restrictions on their use. Communications
           problems, like damage assessment problems, were also highlighted
           following Hurricane Andrew.

           o  Coordinated search and rescue efforts. While tens of thousands
           of people were rescued after Katrina, the lack of clarity in
           search and rescue plans led to operations that according to
           aviation officials, were not as efficient as they could have been.
           The NRP addressed only part of the search and rescue mission, and
           the National Search and Rescue Plan had not been updated to
           reflect the NRP. As a result, the search and rescue operations of
           the National Guard and federal military responders were not fully
           coordinated, and military operations were not integrated with the
           search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and other
           rescuers. At least two different locations were assigning search
           and rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots operating over New
           Orleans, and no one had the total picture of the missions that had
           been resourced and the missions that still needed to be performed.

           o  Clear logistics responsibilities. DOD had difficulty gaining
           visibility over supplies and commodities when FEMA asked DOD to
           assume a significant portion of its logistics responsibilities.
           Under the NRP, FEMA is responsible for coordinating logistics
           during disaster response efforts, but during Hurricane Katrina,
           FEMA quickly became overwhelmed. Four days after Katrina's
           landfall, FEMA asked DOD to take responsibility for procurement,
           transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and
           medical supplies. However, because FEMA lacked the capability to
           maintain visibility-from order through final delivery-of the
           supplies and commodities it had ordered, DOD did not know the
           precise locations of the FEMA-ordered supplies and commodities
           when it assumed FEMA's logistics responsibilities. As a result of
           its lack of visibility over the meals that were in transit, DOD
           had to airlift 1.7 million meals to Mississippi to respond to a
           request from the Adjutant General of Mississippi, who was
           concerned that food supplies were nearly exhausted.

           o  Better integration of military forces. The military did not
           adequately plan for the integration of large numbers of deployed
           troops from different commands during disaster response
           operations. For example, a Louisiana plan to integrate military
           responders from outside the state called for the reception of not
           more than 300 troops per day. However, in the days following
           Hurricane Katrina, more than 20,000 National Guard members from
           other states arrived in Louisiana to join the response effort. In
           addition, the National Guard and federal responses were
           coordinated across several chains of command but not integrated,
           which led to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort.
           Because military plans and exercises had not provided a means for
           integrating the response, no one had the total picture of the
           forces on the ground, the forces that were on the way, the
           missions that had been resourced, and the missions that still
           needed to be completed. Also, a key mobilization statute limits
           DOD's Reserve and National Guard units and members from being
           involuntarily ordered to federal active duty for disaster
           response. As a result, all the reservists who responded to
           Hurricane Katrina were volunteers, and they made up a relatively
           small portion of the response compared to the National Guard and
           active component members. Moreover, the process of lining up
           volunteers can be time-consuming and is more appropriate for
           mobilizing individuals than it is for mobilizing entire units or
           capabilities that may be needed during a catastrophe. After
           Hurricane Andrew, we identified this issue in two 1993 reports.4

           Operational challenges are inevitable in any large-scale military
           deployment, but the challenges that the military faced during its
           response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrate the need for better
           planning and exercising of catastrophic incidents in order to
           clearly identify military capabilities that will be needed and the
           responsibilities that the military will be expected to assume
           during these incidents. Prior to Katrina, plans and exercises were
           generally inadequate for a catastrophic natural disaster.

           o  The National Response Plan. The NRP, which guides planning of
           supporting federal agencies, lacks specificity as to how DOD
           should be used and what resources it should provide in the event
           of a domestic natural disaster. The NRP makes little distinction
           between the military response to smaller, regional disasters and
           the military response to large-scale, catastrophic natural
           disasters. Even though past catastrophes, such as Hurricane Andrew
           in 1992 and the 1989 earthquake in the San Francisco area, showed
           that the military tends to play a much larger role in
           catastrophes, the NRP lists very few specific DOD resources that
           should be called upon in the event of a catastrophic natural
           disaster. Given the substantial role the military is actually
           expected to play in a catastrophe-no other federal agency brings
           as many resources to bear-this lack of detailed planning
           represents a critical oversight.

           o  The DOD plan. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall, DOD's plan
           for providing defense assistance to civil authorities was nearly 9
           years old and was undergoing revision. The plan had not been
           aligned with the NRP and had been written before the 2005 Strategy
           for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which called for a focused
           reliance on the reserve components for civil support missions. The
           plan did not account for the full range of tasks and missions the
           military could need to provide in the event of a catastrophe and
           had little provision for integrating active and reserve component
           forces. It did not address key questions of integration, command
           and control, and division of tasks between National Guard
           resources under state control and federal resources under U.S.
           Northern Command's control. Moreover, the plan did not establish
           time frames for the response.

           o  National Guard plans. At the state level, the plans of the
           Louisiana and Mississippi National Guards were inadequate for
           Katrina and not well coordinated with those of other National
           Guard forces across the country. The Mississippi and Louisiana
           National Guard plans appeared to be adequate for smaller
           disasters, such as prior hurricanes, but they were insufficient
           for a catastrophe and did not adequately account for the outside
           assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. For example,
           Joint Forces Headquarters Louisiana modified its plan and
           reassigned disaster responsibilities when thousands of Louisiana
           National Guard personnel were mobilized for federal missions prior
           to Hurricane Katrina. However, the Louisiana plan did not address
           the need to bring in thousands of military troops from outside the
           state during a catastrophe. Similarly, Mississippi National Guard
           officials told us that even their 1969 experience with Hurricane
           Camille, a category 5 storm that hit the same general area, had
           not adequately prepared them for a catastrophic natural disaster
           of Katrina's magnitude. For example, the Mississippi National
           Guard disaster plan envisioned the establishment of commodity
           distribution centers, but it did not anticipate the number of
           centers that could be required in a catastrophic event or
           following a nearly complete loss of infrastructure. In addition,
           the National Guard Bureau had not coordinated in advance with the
           governors and adjutants general in the states and territories to
           develop plans to provide assistance for catastrophic disasters
           across the country. Specifically, the bureau had not identified
           the types of units that were likely to be needed during a
           catastrophe or worked with the state governors and adjutants
           general to develop and maintain a list of National Guard units
           from each state that would likely be available to meet these
           requirements during catastrophic natural disasters.

           o  Exercises. An underlying reason that insufficient plans existed
           at all levels is that the disaster plans had not been tested and
           refined with a robust exercise program. Such exercises are
           designed to expose weaknesses in plans and allow planners to
           refine them. As a result, when Hurricane Katrina struck, a lack of
           understanding existed within the military and among federal,
           state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and
           capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this
           assistance, and the respective contributions of the National Guard
           and federal military forces. The Homeland Security Council has
           issued 15 national planning scenarios-including a major hurricane
           scenario-that provide the basis for disaster exercises throughout
           the nation. While DOD sponsors or participates in no less than two
           major interagency field exercises per year, few exercises led by
           the Department of Homeland Security or DOD focused on catastrophic
           natural disasters, and none of the exercises called for a major
           deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic
           hurricane. In addition, although DOD has periodically held modest
           military support to civil authorities exercises, the exercises
           used underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in preparing for
           a catastrophe. For example, DOD assumed that first responders and
           communications would be available and that the transportation
           infrastructure would be navigable in a major hurricane scenario.
           Finally, the First U.S. Army conducted planning and exercises in
           response to six hurricanes in 2005. These exercises led to
           actions, such as the early deployment of Defense Coordinating
           Officers, which enhanced disaster response efforts. However, DOD's
           exercise program was not adequate for a catastrophe of Hurricane
           Katrina's magnitude.

           Based on our evaluation of the aforementioned plans and exercises,
           we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
           First, we called for DOD to work with the Department of Homeland
           Security to update the NRP to fully address the proactive
           functions the military will be expected to perform during a
           catastrophic incident. Second, we recommended that DOD develop
           detailed plans and exercises to fully account for the unique
           capabilities and support that the military is likely to provide
           during a catastrophic incident, specifically addressing damage
           assessments, communication, search and rescue, and logistics as
           well as the integration of forces. Third, we called for the
           National Guard Bureau to identify the National Guard capabilities
           that are likely to respond to catastrophes in a state status and
           to share this information with active commands within DOD.
           Finally, we recommended that DOD identify the scalable federal
           military capabilities it will provide in response to the full
           range of domestic disasters and catastrophes. We also raised a
           matter for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress
           consider lifting or modifying the mobilization restriction-10
           U.S.C. S: 12304 (c)(1)-that limits reserve component participation
           in catastrophic natural disasters.

           DOD has collected lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina from
           a variety of sources. Within the department, DOD has a formal set
           of procedures to identify, capture, and share information
           collected as a result of operations in order to enhance
           performance in future operations. Even in the midst of the
           Hurricane Katrina response operation, officials from various
           military organizations were collecting information on lessons
           learned and this continued well after most operations had ceased.
           For example, communications issues that had surfaced were studied
           by both active and National Guard commands that had responded to
           Hurricane Katrina. DOD also formed a task force to study the
           response and is compiling and analyzing various military and other
           lessons-learned reports to help design an improved response to
           future natural catastrophic events. According to DOD officials,
           they have also reviewed White House and congressional reports
           identifying lessons to be applied or challenges to be addressed in
           future response operations.

           As of today, DOD has also begun taking actions to enhance the
           military's preparedness for future catastrophic events.
           Specifically, in responding to our recently issued report, DOD
           generally concurred with our recommendations for action and told
           us that it had developed plans to address them. DOD noted, for
           example, that the NRP would be revised to plan for a significant
           DOD role in a catastrophe and a more-detailed DOD operational plan
           that has been in draft would be finalized. Our recommendations and
           DOD's response to them are shown in appendix I.

           In addition, DOD said that it was taking several additional
           actions, including

           o  colocating specially trained defense department personnel at
           FEMA regional offices;
           o  folding support from federal reconnaissance agencies into the
           military's civil support processes;
           o  developing "pre-scripted" requests that would ease the process
           for civilian agencies to request military support;
           o  conducting extensive exercises, including the recently
           completed Ardent Sentry and other planned events, with FEMA; and
           o  delegating authority for deploying defense coordinating
           elements and placing on "prepare to deploy" orders communications,
           helicopter, aerial reconnaissance, and patient-evacuation
           capabilities.

           The department plans to complete many of these steps by June 1,
           2006-the start of the next hurricane season-but acknowledged that
           some needed actions will take longer to complete. Since details
           about many of the department's actions were still emerging as we
           completed our review, we were unable to fully assess the
           effectiveness of DOD's plans, but they do appear to hold promise.

           In conclusion, while DOD's efforts to date to address the
           Hurricane Katrina lessons learned are steps in the right
           direction-and the department deserves credit for taking them-these
           are clearly only the first steps that will be needed. The issues
           cut across agency boundaries, and thus they cannot be addressed by
           the military alone. The NRP framework envisions a proactive
           national response involving the collective efforts of responder
           organizations at all levels of government. Looking forward, part
           of DOD's challenge is the sheer number of organizations at all
           levels of government that are involved, both military and
           civilian. In addition, many of the problems encountered during the
           Katrina response are long-standing and were also reported after
           Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Because of the complexity and
           long-standing nature of these problems, DOD's planned and ongoing
           actions must receive sustained top-management attention, not only
           at DOD but across the government, in order to effect needed
           improvements in the military's support to civil authorities. While
           the issues are complex, they are also urgent, and experience has
           illustrated that the military has critical and substantial
           capabilities that will be needed in the wake of catastrophic
           events.

           For further information regarding this statement, please contact
           me at (202) 512-9619 or [email protected] . Individuals making key
           contributions to this statement include John Pendleton, Assistant
           Director, Michael Ferren, Kenya Jones, and Leo Sullivan.

           Source: GAO.

           Note: The recommendations are from GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Batter
           Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
           Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May
           15, 2006).

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4 GAO/NSIAD-93-180 and GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's
Response to Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.:
July 23, 1993).

Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Define and Guide Future Military Responses
                     during Catastrophic Natural Disasters

                 DOD Is Taking Steps to Address Lessons Learned

                            Concluding Observations

                       Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

Appendix I: GAO's Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to Improve
Military Support and DOD's Response

GAO recommendation to the Secretary of   Department of Defense (DOD)       
Defense                                  Response (dated May 5, 2006)      
Provide the Secretary of the Department  DOD said that it is working with  
of Homeland Security with proposed       the Department of Homeland        
revisions to the National Response Plan  Security to revise the NRP. While 
(NRP) that will fully address the        DOD stated that the long-term     
proactive functions the military will be focus of the U.S. government      
expected to perform during a             should be to develop more robust  
catastrophic incident, for inclusion in  domestic disaster capabilities    
the next NRP update.                     within the Department of Homeland 
                                            Security, it acknowledged that    
                                            DOD will need to assume a more    
                                            robust response role in the       
                                            interim period and when other     
                                            responders lack the resources and 
                                            expertise to handle a particular  
                                            disaster.                         
Establish milestones and expedite the    DOD listed a number of steps it   
development of detailed plans and        is taking to improve its disaster 
exercises to fully account for the       response planning and exercises   
unique capabilities and support that the and said that consistent with its 
military is likely to provide to civil   Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
authorities in response to the full      Civil Support, the active         
range of domestic disasters, including   component should complement, but  
catastrophes. The plans and exercises    not duplicate, the National       
should specifically address the use of   Guard's likely role as an early   
reconnaissance capabilities to assess    responder. DOD also said that     
damage, use of communications            planning and exercises should     
capabilities to facilitate support to    include local, state, and federal 
civil authorities, integration of active representatives and should stress 
component and National Guard and Reserve the responders with the highest   
forces, use of search and rescue         degree of realism possible-to the 
capabilities and the military's role in  breaking point if possible.       
search and rescue, and role the military 
might be expected to play in logistics.  
Direct the Chief of the National Guard   DOD listed steps the U.S.         
Bureau to work with the state governors  Northern Command is taking to     
and adjutants general to develop and     better understand the             
maintain a list of the types of          capabilities of National Guard    
capabilities the National Guard will     units, and it stated that the     
likely provide in response to domestic   National Guard is creating a      
natural disasters under state-to-state   database to facilitate planning   
mutual assistance agreements along with  its employment in support of the  
the associated units that could provide  homeland.                         
these capabilities, and make this        
information available to the U.S.        
Northern Command, U.S. Joint Forces      
Command, and other organizations with    
federal military support to civil        
authority planning responsibilities.     
Establish milestones and identify the    DOD noted that it has developed   
types of scalable federal military       scalable capability packages in   
capabilities and the units that could    conjunction with pre-scripted     
provide those capabilities in response   requests for assistance and U.S.  
to the full range of domestic disasters  Northern Command's Contingency    
and catastrophes covered by DOD's        Plan 2501, which is scheduled to  
defense support to civil authorities     be signed in the spring of 2006.  
plans.                                   

(350876)

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Highlights of GAO-06-808T , a statement to Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives

May 25 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA

Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in U.S.
history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all levels, many have
regarded the federal response as inadequate. GAO has a body of ongoing
work that covers the federal government's preparedness and response to
hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This statement summarizes key points from
GAO's report on the military's response to Katrina (GAO-06-643), which was
issued earlier this month. It addresses (1) the support that the military
provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with some of the
challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions needed to address
these lessons, including GAO's recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense; and (3) the extent to which the military is taking actions to
identify and address the lessons learned.

In its report, GAO made several recommendations to improve the military
response to catastrophic disasters. The recommendations called for
updating the National Response Plan to reflect proactive functions the
military could perform in a catastrophic incident; improving military
plans and exercises; improving National Guard, Reserve, and active force
integration; and resolving response problems associated with damage
assessment, communication, search and rescue, and logistics issues. The
Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred with all of the
recommendations.

The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved
many lives, but it also faced several challenges that provide lessons for
the future. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD's initial
response relied heavily on the National Guard, but active forces were also
alerted prior to landfall. Aviation, medical, engineering, and other key
capabilities were initially deployed, but growing concerns about the
disaster prompted DOD to deploy active ground units to supplement the
Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Over 50,000 National Guard
and 20,000 active personnel participated in the response. However, several
factors affected the military's ability to gain situational awareness and
organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage
assessments, communications problems, uncoordinated search and rescue
efforts, unexpected logistics responsibilities, and force integration
issues. A key lesson learned is that additional actions are needed to
ensure that the military's significant capabilities are clearly
understood, well planned, and fully integrated.

As GAO outlined in its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, many
challenges that the military faced during Katrina point to the need for
better plans and more robust exercises. Prior to Katrina, disaster plans
and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes
to fully identify the military capabilities needed to respond to a
catastrophe. For example, the National Response Plan made little
distinction between the military response to smaller regional disasters
and catastrophic natural disasters. In addition, DOD's emergency response
plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during
disasters lacked adequate detail. It did not account for the full range of
assistance that DOD might provide, address the respective contributions of
the National Guard and federal responders, or establish response time
frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not
account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a
catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover,
none of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina had called for
a major deployment of DOD capabilities to respond to a catastrophic
hurricane. Without actions to help address planning and exercise
inadequacies, a lack of understanding will continue to exist within the
military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of
assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in response to a
catastrophe; the timing of this assistance; and the respective
contributions of the active, Reserve, and National Guard forces.

DOD is examining the lessons learned from a variety of sources and is
beginning to take actions to address them and prepare for the next
catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to
hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina, such as
damage assessments, are long-standing, complex problems that cut across
agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained
attention from the highest management levels in DOD and across the
government.
*** End of document. ***