    Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
    Investment in the Joint National Training Capability (11-AUG-06,
    GAO-06-802).

    The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training
    Transformation Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces
    deploying to their theaters have had experience operating
    jointly. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint National
    Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which accounts for 84
    percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest by 2011
    to provide a persistent global network that will increase the
    level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which (1)
    JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant
    commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are
    benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces
    Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate
    program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and
    analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and
    analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in 2005 as JNTC training events,
    and observed 2 of those events firsthand.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-802
        ACCNO:   A58559
      TITLE:     Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance
    DOD's Investment in the Joint National Training Capability
         DATE:   08/11/2006
      SUBJECT:   Armed forces reserve training
    	     Armed forces reserves
    	     Certification and accreditation
    	     Evaluation criteria
    	     Military training
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Standards
    	     Performance measures
    	     Joint forces
    	     Program goals or objectives
    	     DOD Joint National Training Capability
    	     DOD Training Transformation Program

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    GAO-06-802

         * Results in Brief
         * Background
         * DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiat
              * DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiat
              * Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improv
         * Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but
              * Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events
              * Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relations
         * JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Pr
              * Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process
              * JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasiz
              * Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring U
              * No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for
         * Conclusions
         * Recommendations for Executive Action
         * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * GAO Contact
         * Acknowledgments
         * GAO's Mission
         * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
              * Order by Mail or Phone
         * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * Congressional Relations
         * Public Affairs
         * GAO's Mission
         * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
              * Order by Mail or Phone
         * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * Congressional Relations
         * Public Affairs

    GAO

    August 2006

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
    House of Representatives

    MILITARY TRAINING

    Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint
    National Training Capability

    GAO-06-802

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 6
    DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on
    Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements 9
    Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces
    Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training Needs 18
    JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to New
    and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, or
    Include the National Guard 22
    Conclusions 30
    Recommendations for Executive Action 30
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34
    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 37
    Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41
    Related GAO Products 42

    Tables

    Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined 13
    Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in Joint
    Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005 15
    Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for
    Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006 26
    Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment 36

    Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense

    JNTC Joint National Training Capability

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    August 11, 2006

    The Honorable Joel Hefley

    Chairman

    The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz

    Ranking Minority Member

    Subcommittee on Readiness

    Committee on Armed Services

    House of Representatives

    Effective joint operations are fundamental to the ability of the U.S.
    military to decisively defeat its adversaries, and the Secretary of
    Defense has stated that in the new and evolving security environment,
    "Achieving jointness in wartime requires building jointness in peacetime."
    In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,1 Department of Defense
    (DOD) leadership emphasized that meeting the challenges of an uncertain
    security environment would require transformations in education and
    training. The Defense Planning Guidance 2003-2007 directed the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to work with the
    services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant
    Commander of the Joint Forces Command to develop a plan for transforming
    military training that would better enable joint force operations.
    Consequently, the department created the Training Transformation Program,
    which is focused on providing dynamic, capabilities-based education and
    training for DOD in support of national security requirements across the
    full spectrum of service (active and reserve components), joint,
    interagency, intergovernmental (state and local), and multinational
    operations. The ultimate goal of DOD's training transformation is to
    provide combatant commanders with better-prepared individuals, units,
    staffs, and organizations that are aligned with their joint operational
    needs.

    DOD plans to invest almost $2 billion in the Training Transformation
    Program by 2011. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint Forces
    Command's Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which
    accounts for 84 percent of the department's planned spending. The primary
    goal of the initiative is to provide a persistent global network of live,
    virtual, and constructive capabilities2 that will enhance the level of
    joint training in existing service and combatant command training
    programs. The JNTC initiative is expected to enhance the joint operational
    environment by providing more specific guidance on conducting joint
    mission essential tasks,3 creating a persistent joint communication
    network to support joint training with more virtual and constructive
    capability, and accrediting training programs to ensure the appropriate
    joint environment exists. The initiative expects to have established a
    global network of accredited joint training programs across the services
    and combatant commands by 2010.

    1 The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD effort
    to be conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals.

    You asked us to review the JNTC initiative's implementation. Specifically,
    we assessed (1) the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the
    ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the
    extent to which the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC
    initiative, and (3) the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has
    developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals.

    To address the above objectives, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
    documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised
    Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC initiative
    strategic plan. We reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 combatant command and
    service training events that were selected in 2005 as JNTC training
    events. Our analysis evaluated a number of attributes for each of these
    training events to determine the extent to which the JNTC initiative
    enhanced their joint training capability. Additionally, we observed two of
    the selected events firsthand to obtain a real-time assessment of the past
    and planned evolution of the exercises and feedback from exercise
    participants, including the planners, on the extent of joint training. We
    also met with key officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Staff, as well as officials from the combatant commands and
    service organizations that are affected by the JNTC initiative.
    Additionally, we examined the extent to which the reserve components
    participated in selected training events enhanced by the JNTC initiative
    and formal collaboration mechanisms, as well as the development and
    initial implementation of the JNTC initiative's accreditation process. We
    also interviewed key National Guard and reserve component officials to
    further evaluate the benefits that the reserve components derive from the
    JNTC initiative. We discussed our methods and assumptions with agency
    officials to obtain their input, and we also assessed the quality of
    information and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our
    purposes. We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further
    information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.

    2 "Live training" refers to live simulations involving real people
    operating real systems in a live environment. "Virtual training" involves
    virtual simulations using real people operating simulated systems.
    "Constructive training" refers to simulated people operating simulated
    systems, often referred to as war games.

    3 Joint mission essential tasks are tasks selected by a joint force
    commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the
    common, universal language.

                                    Results in Brief

    DOD does not know the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the
    services' and combatant commands' ability to train jointly because it has
    not yet assessed the program's impact. Our analysis of five service and
    combatant command training events selected to be enhanced by the JNTC
    initiative provided some indications of potential improvements in joint
    training. However, the department's first assessment of the Training
    Transformation Program in 2005 did not include an evaluation of the
    collective impact of the JNTC initiative on joint training because the
    initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, the department
    has established a basic framework for measuring the performance of joint
    training in future assessments. However, the department has not finalized
    a plan for its 2007 training transformation assessment that includes
    metrics, processes it will employ, and time frames for obtaining data. Our
    prior work has stressed the importance of performance metrics that set up
    time frames and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program's
    implementation. The department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
    also emphasizes that to ensure the department's objectives are being met,
    each organization is accountable for measuring performance and delivering
    results that support the departmentwide strategy. Furthermore, the
    Training Transformation Plan requires periodic reviews to measure the
    impact of training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC
    initiative, on joint training. The training events we analyzed from fiscal
    year 2005 provided indications of improved joint training, such as more
    joint objectives than the prior year's exercises and more participation by
    other services. For example, one Air Force exercise we reviewed focused on
    achieving service-specific objectives before being enhanced by the JNTC
    initiative. Since then, these objectives were modified to include some
    joint training objectives. However, without a strategy that clearly
    identifies how the department's next training transformation assessment
    will evaluate the impact the JNTC initiative is having on military joint
    training, the department will not be in a position to know whether the
    money invested in the initiative will produce the desired results or
    maximize the benefit for the investment. To support the efforts of the
    Joint Forces Command to enhance the level of joint training, we recommend
    that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the next training
    transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC
    initiative's implementation on joint training, including time frames,
    outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, and
    outcomes. DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated it is taking
    actions to implement it.

    Through the participation of selected units and individuals in
    JNTC-enhanced events, the reserve components have benefited from the JNTC
    initiative, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have
    not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not established
    an ongoing working relationship with them. According to Joint Forces
    Command officials, the command has not established a liaison position for
    any of the reserve components and has not included the reserve components
    in working groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active
    service components and the combatant commands. According to service and
    reserve officials, the initiative's process action teams, which are
    responsible for joint program coordination, are composed of
    representatives from the services and combatant commands but do not
    receive input from any of the reserve components. The Training
    Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve components face
    several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be
    considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through
    implementation. For example, compared to active duty service members,
    reservists and National Guard members generally have less time to train,
    less access to current technologies, and an additional responsibility to
    conduct joint domestic missions related to homeland defense. Until the
    Joint Forces Command incorporates the reserve components more fully into
    the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have limited
    ability to enhance their joint training skills. To increase the benefits
    of joint training programs for the reserve components, we recommend that
    the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Forces Command to establish
    liaison officers for the reserve components and include representatives
    from the reserve components as active participants in JNTC initiative
    working groups and planning sessions. DOD partially concurred with this
    recommendation, agreeing a liaison position was needed for the National
    Guard, but that the current service liaison structure was adequate to
    represent the other reserve components. We continue to believe that the
    entire reserve component would benefit if they had a more active voice in
    JNTC working groups and planning sessions.

    The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process for accrediting
    active service and combatant command training programs to facilitate the
    goals of the JNTC initiative, but it has not emphasized new and emerging
    missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will continue
    to be incorporated into future training rotations after programs complete
    initial accreditation, or accredited any National Guard-specific training
    programs. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that
    training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas,
    such as irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating
    weapons of mass destruction, and information operations. The JNTC
    accreditation process is intended to ensure that all units participating
    in joint training, regardless of location, experience a recurring,
    consistent, realistic training environment. The Joint Forces Command has
    allowed active services and combatant commands to nominate specific joint
    tasks within their existing training programs to be accredited. During
    fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command conditionally accredited joint
    tasks in 4 training programs and plans to grant accreditation to tasks in
    as many as 23 additional programs during 2006. However, the Joint Forces
    Command's nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit
    service and combatant commander training programs that will improve
    proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Currently, in some
    instances, nominations for accreditation are based on the services' needs
    to enhance joint training for the maximum number of participants. In
    addition, the Joint Forces Command plans to reaccredit programs every 3
    years, but the command has not established standards or a process for
    reaccreditation that would ensure that service and combatant command
    training programs continuously incorporate and expand upon previously
    accredited joint training tasks. Further, no training programs specific to
    the National Guard are currently being considered for accreditation by the
    Joint Forces Command because there is no mechanism in place for nominating
    them. For example, the National Guard has approached the Joint Forces
    Command to accredit its Vigilant Guard exercise program outside the normal
    nomination process because there is not a mechanism in place that allows
    the National Guard to nominate programs. Currently, this request is being
    discussed by Joint Forces Command and National Guard leadership. Until the
    department establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards,
    JNTC events may not reflect DOD's training priorities and the services and
    combatant commands may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into
    future rotations of their training exercises. Additionally, until Joint
    Forces Command incorporates the National Guard into the accreditation
    process, the National Guard training programs may not be able to take full
    advantage of JNTC resources, such as participation from other components,
    access to new technologies and modeling, and training environments that
    realistically portray overseas and domestic joint operations. To support
    the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to enhance the level of joint
    training and to increase the benefits of joint training programs for the
    reserve components, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to (1) establish
    guidelines for the services and combatant commands to follow when
    nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the importance
    of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DOD's 2006 Quadrennial
    Defense Review Report; (2) establish reaccreditation standards and
    criteria that will ensure that a recurring, consistent, realistic joint
    training environment exists for all units participating in future
    rotations of accredited joint training programs; and (3) expand the
    accreditation process to include National Guard training programs. DOD
    agreed with these recommendations and is planning actions to implement
    them.

                                       Background

    The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall
    responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the
    use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the
    Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution of
    three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge Development
    and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and Enabling
    Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation Implementation
    Plan,4 these 3 initiatives are designed to prepare individuals, units, and
    staff for the new strategic environment and to provide enabling tools and
    processes to carry out joint missions. Specifically:

               o  The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to
               prepare forces by providing units and command staff with
               integrated live, virtual, and constructive training environments.
               This initiative would add enhanced service and combatant command
               training that emphasizes jointness and enables global training and
               mission rehearsal in support of combatant command operations.
               o  The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability,
               which focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare
               future decision makers and leaders to better understand joint
               operations and the common operational picture, as well as to
               respond innovatively to adversaries. It develops and distributes
               joint knowledge via a dynamic, global-knowledge network that
               provides immediate access to joint education and training
               resources.
               o  The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to
               assist leaders in assessing the value of transformational training
               initiatives to individuals, organizations, and processes, and to
               link the impact of the Training Transformation Program to
               combatant commanders' readiness requirements. This initiative is
               also supposed to provide the processes and tools to continuously
               improve joint training.

    4 Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan, 2006
    - 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).

    The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training transformation,
    is managed by a Joint Management Office within the Joint Forces Command's
    Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management Office, which was
    established in 2003, manages the operational, technical and program
    resources necessary to implement the initiative. The Joint Management
    Office coordinates its management efforts of the initiative with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior and executive advisory
    groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC initiative is to provide a
    persistent capability to combatant command and service training programs
    to create an appropriate, realistic joint operating environment within
    their existing training activities. To accomplish this, DOD plans to spend
    about $1.5 billion on the JNTC initiative through fiscal year 2011, or 84
    percent of training transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative was
    deemed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to be
    operationally capable in October 2004-indicating that the initial
    infrastructure of networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint
    environment of training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005,
    16 combatant command and service training events were selected by the
    Joint Forces Command to enhance their joint training environment through
    the JNTC initiative.

    The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint
    training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts
    include the following:

               o  Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to
               enhance the level of details associated with joint mission
               essential tasks that are identified by the combatant commands as
               critical to joint operations, and to provide joint trainers
               specific guidance for developing exercises and other joint
               training activities. These task articles are a set of processes,
               procedures, or actions that address critical horizontal (actions
               between services) and vertical (actions between a service and a
               higher joint force command) elements of interoperability for
               specific joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC
               initiative has developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under
               various stages of development.
               o  Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network
               is intended to be a large-capacity communications network that
               will provide persistent support to joint training exercises,
               service stand-alone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal,
               experimentation, evaluation of advanced training technologies, and
               evaluation of new warfighting concepts. The network, when
               complete, will enable the Joint Forces Command to use live,
               virtual, and constructive simulations in concert to enhance the
               joint training environment for combatant commands and services. By
               the end of fiscal year 2005, the joint network had been expanded
               to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii and one in Germany.
               o  Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC
               accreditation program works toward ensuring that combatant command
               and service joint training programs include the appropriate joint
               environment for the joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is
               program-centric, whereby entire service and combatant command
               training programs are evaluated and accredited for training
               selected joint tasks in a joint environment that meets specific
               joint standards or conditions. The intent of this effort is to
               establish a process that ensures delivery of a recurring,
               consistent, realistic training environment for all units
               participating in joint training, regardless of the locations from
               which they are participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited
               4 training programs during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to
               accredit 23 more programs during 2006. JNTC's certification effort
               concurrently ensures that the technical aspects of the training
               programs-the sites and the systems comprising the training
               infrastructure, networks, and ranges-support the accredited
               training program.

    The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially operational
    capable, is expected to reach full operational capability in 2010 when it
    will provide a global joint training network that allows live, virtual,
    and constructive participation by services, combatant commands, and
    coalition and interagency partners in accredited training programs.

      DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training
              Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements

    The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of
    the services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear because
    DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative efforts on
    joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such an assessment.
    Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005 exercises that
    the Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC
    initiative, we found indications that the JNTC initiative has begun to
    improve joint training. Examples we found include increases in the use of
    joint objectives and increases in participation by other services. Without
    a comprehensive assessment of the JNTC initiative's enhancement of joint
    training programs, DOD has no assurance that its investment in the
    initiative will produce the desired results.

    DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training
    Programs

    DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint
    training; therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is having
    on joint training programs and the extent to which it is achieving the
    program's goals are unclear. The Training Transformation Implementation
    Plan does not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint Management Office
    to assess whether the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the
    services and combatant commands to train jointly. The JNTC Joint
    Management Office receives feedback through working with the services and
    combatant commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC efforts has been
    conducted. The individual services and combatant commanders are aware of
    JNTC enhancements to their specific training programs and resulting
    improvements and are documenting some of these enhancements in after
    action reports and lessons learned reports. For example, the Navy's
    preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint 05-2
    exercise stated that the value added through rapid delivery and improved
    interoperability and repeatability of the Fleet Synthetic training
    capability and the joint network will save operating costs while providing
    quality joint and coalition training to the warfighter. Additionally, as a
    result of a lesson learned during Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used
    to develop an analytical tool that enabled analysts to search through
    recorded exercise model data and replay selected training exercises, which
    helped explain to the exercise control group and the training audience how
    and why a particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do
    not provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts
    are having on joint training.

    DOD's most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts,
    conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of
    the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
    is known as the training transformation block assessment. This block
    assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the primary mechanism
    for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on how well DOD is meeting
    its training transformation goals. The block assessment is to provide an
    assessment every 2 years that measures, guides, and evaluates the progress
    of the training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC initiative.
    These evaluations are intended by DOD to be an innovative use of
    performance assessment tools, techniques, and policies, using well-defined
    metrics to provide a feedback capability to the leadership. Additionally,
    DOD recently announced its plans to conduct a Joint Training Program
    Review during mid-2006 to examine training transformation efforts and to
    realign these efforts with the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report
    and program strategic guidance.

    Our prior work,5 the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and DOD's
    Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the importance of
    establishing performance metrics that set up time frames and measurable
    outcomes to gauge the success of a program implementation. GAO's Human
    Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training Programs and Development
    Efforts in the Federal Government emphasizes the importance of using
    program performance information to assess the progress that training and
    development programs make toward achieving results. The guide states that
    agencies should keep in mind that they need to collect data corresponding
    to established training objectives throughout the implementation process
    to refine and continually improve, deliver, and enhance learning.
    Furthermore, the guide asserts that it is important for agencies to
    develop and use outcome-oriented performance measures to ensure
    accountability and to assess progress toward achieving results aligned
    with the agencies' missions and goals. The Quadrennial Defense Review
    Report emphasizes that each initiative is accountable for measuring
    performance and delivering results that support the departmentwide
    strategy. DOD's Training Transformation Implementation Plan requires
    periodic reviews to assess the success of its Training Transformation
    Program. According to the plan, every 2 years, a formal program assessment
    should be conducted to measure the impact of training transformation
    initiatives on joint force readiness. The results of those assessments are
    intended to help leaders decide strategy modifications and subsequent
    investments.

    5 GAO, Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training Programs and
    Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington,
    D.C.: March 2004).

    DOD's initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not
    evaluate the JNTC initiative's collective impact on joint training.
    According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide a
    comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative's impact on joint training
    because the initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, it
    served as a baseline or framework for identifying joint training
    measurements for future assessments, and provided a status of the JNTC
    initiative's efforts implemented to date. However, the 2005 assessment did
    not address training efficiency measured by specific cost, schedule, and
    outcome-oriented performance metrics. Specifically, the 2005 assessment
    highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative is providing more joint
    training through accreditation and certification; (2) combatant command
    joint mission essential tasks are addressed in events and integrated into
    training objectives for each event; and (3) rapidly configurable,
    persistent training networks, such as the Joint Training and
    Experimentation Network, are a current reality and are being improved.
    However, the 2005 Training Transformation Assessment Report noted that
    because of a wide variation of joint training activities, the task of
    developing metrics that supported effective assessment and corresponding
    program status progress was unduly complicated.

    The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering for
    its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These metrics
    include the percentage of combatant command joint mission essential tasks
    trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs accredited and
    certified; and the number of participants using JNTC resources. However,
    many of these metrics are output oriented and not outcome performance
    measures, which are necessary to gauge the success of program
    implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment's
    recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for
    training transformation exercises for use in future assessments. However,
    it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be assessed or
    identified the time frames and processes it will employ for obtaining
    data. Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified a process to
    collect the data, training transformation officials stated that it may be
    difficult to show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint training even in the
    2007 block assessment. Without a comprehensive assessment of JNTC's
    enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that the
    money invested in the JNTC initiative will produce the desired results of
    providing combatant commanders with better prepared forces aligned with
    their joint operational needs or maximize the benefit for DOD's
    investment.

    Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improve Joint Training

    Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC
    initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of potential
    improvements, such as events that include more joint objectives and allow
    for more joint participation.

    According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,6 joint
    training is defined as "Military training based on joint doctrine or joint
    tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint
    staff to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed
    necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions.
    Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments
    interacting with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force
    commander; involves joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted
    using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures."

    Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate the
    effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we
    determined whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the
    following:

               o  increased use of joint training objectives,
               o  increased use of joint task articles,
               o  increased involvement of other services,
               o  increased use of virtual and constructive training
               capabilities, and
               o  persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
               initiative.

    DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use
    was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on joint
    training.

    We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the Joint
    Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC initiative.
    Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis.

    6 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C, Joint Training
    Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States.

    Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined

    Exercise                 Description
    Terminal Fury            Terminal Fury is a combatant command exercise
                                designed to train and evaluate the staff of the
                                Pacific Command Headquarters and one of its joint
                                task forces in conducting crisis action planning.
                                The exercise makes extensive use of constructive
                                models. The only live participants in the
                                exercise are the staff of the Pacific Command
                                Headquarters and the staff of the Joint Task
                                Force.
    Air Warrior I            Air Warrior I is a live exercise designed to
                                train aircrews and ground personnel in the
                                planning and execution of close air support. The
                                Air Force's aircraft deploy to and operate from
                                Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada . The Air Force
                                ground units involved in coordinating the close
                                air support attacks deploy to and operate with
                                their associated Army units at Fort Irwin,
                                California .
    Fleet Synthetic Training Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint is a virtual and
    - Joint                  constructive exercise designed to develop and
                                maintain warfighting proficiency of naval units
                                through tactical exercises conducted by ships
                                while they are in port. It uses shore-based and
                                ship-embedded simulation, stimulation systems,
                                and distribution networks to conduct the
                                exercise.
    National Training Center The Army conducts several live exercises each
                                year at the National Training Center that are
                                designed to prepare brigade combat teams for
                                operations. While historically these exercises
                                have involved armored tank units clashing in the
                                desert, over the past 3 years training has
                                changed to meet the demands of ongoing operations
                                in Operation Iraq Freedom and Operation Enduring
                                Freedom. The National Training Center is located
                                at Fort Irwin, California, and the Army holds the
                                exercises in conjunction with the Air Force's Air
                                Warrior I exercises. (See above.)
    Marine Corps Weapons and The Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor
    Tactics Instructors      Course is a graduate level course of instruction,
    Course                   which is required for the Marine Corps' aviation
                                squadron weapons and tactics instructors. The
                                7-week class involves academics, a flight phase,
                                and live exercises. The course is taught at the
                                Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona.

    Source: DOD.

    Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were
    many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC funds7
    included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat emitters that imitated
    ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile simulators. The Air Force used
    JNTC funds to help establish an Air Support Operations Center that
    improved the realism of the Air Warrior I exercise by including real-world
    joint operational organizations. The Joint Forces Command also used JNTC
    funds to make improvements in computer models used in the Terminal Fury
    exercise. Aircraft, including former Russian aircraft, were obtained with
    JNTC funds to act as opposing forces in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor
    course. JNTC funds were also used to hire personnel and place them at
    service and combatant command headquarters to assist in improving the
    joint environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint network is
    supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number of simulators
    and constructive models from around the country to connect and interact in
    support of training programs.

    7 JNTC funds were distributed between the Joint Forces Command and the
    services. These funds were channeled through the Operations and
    Maintenance; Other Procurement; and Research, Development, Test and
    Evaluation appropriations.

    To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis8 based on
    the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to determine the
    measure of change in attributes for each selected training exercise prior
    to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise
    documentation, such as exercise planning documents and after action
    reports for selected exercises to determine the measure of change in the
    exercise based on our attributes. Our analysis revealed indications that
    some joint training improvements were made in each of the exercises we
    assessed. Table 2 summarizes the results of our analysis.

    8 A cost analysis was not done because the data needed were not readily
    available. Specifically, the JNTC funds resided in different
    appropriations; the source of cost information was spread over a number of
    organizations; and some fixed costs, such as installation of the joint
    network, sustainment of the joint network, and maintenance of existing
    exercise infrastructure, represented a number of exercises and other
    activities.

    Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in Joint
    Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005

                                                   Fleet              Weapons and
                                                   Synthetic National Tactics
                                Terminal Air       Training  Training Instructor
                                Furya    Warrior I -Joint    Center   Course
    Increased use of joint            X         X         X        X
    training objectives
    Increased use of joint            X         X
    task articles
    Increased involvement of          X         X         X        X
    other services
    Increased use of virtual X                  X                  X
    and constructive
    training capabilities
    Persistent capabilities  X        X         X         X        X
    added to exercises
    funded by the JNTC
    initiative

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD information and documents.

    Note: An X indicates where the JNTC initiative has improved the joint
    training to some degree.

    a Terminal Fury is a historical joint combatant command exercise;
    therefore the level of increase in its joint training environment was not
    as apparent as it was for service exercises.

    Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise
    planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which
    indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint
    training.

               o  Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found
               that for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the
               services increased the number of joint training objectives to
               which they trained. For example, prior to being enhanced by the
               JNTC initiative, Air Warrior I's exercise objectives were
               determined by the squadron commanders and were focused on
               achieving service-specific objectives. After JNTC,
               service-specific training objectives were modified to include some
               joint training objectives, such as conducting a joint, live-fire
               event within a realistic combat scenario and employing real-time
               joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to the
               exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic
               Training - Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in
               its exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force
               units, the Navy began including joint interoperability training
               objectives in exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet
               Synthetic Training - Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training
               Center's primary focus, both before and after the JNTC initiative,
               has been on accomplishing service-specific training objectives.
               However, after the JNTC initiative's involvement, the National
               Training Center has added some joint and interoperability tasks in
               its exercises, although these tasks are subordinate to the
               service-specific training objectives. Prior to the JNTC
               initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course
               trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had
               some joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps
               continued to train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation,
               but it began using several joint tactical tasks and joint training
               objectives in the exercise.
               o  Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the
               Navy used joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and
               Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercises. Joint task articles
               detail the integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a
               specific warfighting capability to a joint force commander and are
               based on the joint mission essential tasks. Air Force officials
               compared the task article for close air support with current
               practices at Air Warrior I and identified deficiencies in the
               procedures used during these exercises prior to 2005. Steps were
               then taken to correct the deficiencies which included adding an
               Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air Warrior I
               exercises are now conducted more in line with close air support
               joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task
               articles in preparing for its accreditation review.
               o  Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five
               exercises we examined showed that participation had expanded to
               include more services when compared to years before the JNTC
               enhancements were included. The fifth exercise was a combatant
               command exercise that was already joint and did not show an
               increase in the participation of other services as a result of
               JNTC efforts. Joint training requires the involvement of two or
               more services; therefore the JNTC initiative used a variety of
               means, such as additional funding and the Joint Training and
               Experimentation Network, to increase the participation of other
               services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and Marine air units
               and the staff of the Commander, Third Fleet, participated in the
               National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in 2005. Army and
               Air Force units participated in the Navy's Fleet Synthetic
               Training - Joint in 2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne Warning and
               Control aircraft joined the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics
               Instructor course exercise in 2005, and a similar unit from the
               United Kingdom plans to participate in 2006.
               o  Increased use of virtual and constructive training
               capabilities. Our analysis showed that key virtual and
               constructive training capabilities made possible by the use of the
               Joint Training and Experimentation Network have had a positive
               impact on three of the five exercises we examined. The joint
               network is a persistent, rapidly reconfigurable communications
               network that connects multiple training sites. According to Navy
               training exercise planners, the joint network is what allowed the
               Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercises to include Army and Air
               Force simulators to participate in the exercise. For example, we
               observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint
               exercise, Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive
               capabilities, track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a
               joint response. Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic
               Training - Joint exercises would likely have remained solely a
               Navy exercise. According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the
               joint network improved Terminal Fury by increasing the capacity to
               include a larger number of constructive models in the exercise.
               For example, Tactical Simulation is a very large intelligence
               model used to simulate the entire spectrum of intelligence
               operations. Prior to the joint network, the Tactical Simulation
               model was not included in the exercise because the model was too
               large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided the means
               to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise from its
               home station in the continental United States. In addition,
               Terminal Fury participants are spread out over a wide area,
               including several sites in Hawaii and the continental United
               States. According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, two tools
               made possible by the joint network, Video Teleconferencing and
               Voice Over Internet Protocol, provided the means by which these
               geographically separated sites could coordinate the execution of
               the exercise. Finally, according to a Marine Corps official, the
               joint network has aided the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics
               Instructor Course in developing exercise scenarios, executing the
               exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to the
               exercise.
               o  Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
               initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that
               will continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each
               exercise received a persistent link to the joint network and
               embedded Support Element staff hired to assist service and
               combatant command headquarters in adding joint capabilities to
               their exercises. In addition, the Air Force received radios and
               aircraft instrument pods for Air Warrior I, computer model
               improvements were made for Terminal Fury, and the National
               Training Center received surrogate weapons for its opposing force.
               All these persistent capabilities were procured with JNTC funds.

    In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the JNTC
    initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs
    associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a
    number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise are
    based in the continental United States. In prior years, the hardware and
    supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to participate in the
    exercise. Since the joint network connected these models to the exercise
    from their home stations, there was no need to move the hardware and
    support staff to Hawaii for the exercise.

    Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further improve
    joint training. For example, in future iterations of the National Training
    Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would like to use the joint
    network to include a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
    aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint environment. Due to their
    limited number and the high demand for these aircraft, the planes are not
    always available to participate in the exercises. The joint network will
    allow the use of these aircraft simulators in the National Training
    Center/Air Warrior I exercise by having them participate virtually from
    their home stations. In addition to increasing the availability of these
    aircraft virtually in future exercises, the joint network will also reduce
    the travel, transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the
    actual aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises.

    Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces
           Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training Needs

    Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced training
    events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not
    been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not established
    an ongoing working relationship with them.

    Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events

    Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from
    JNTC-enhanced training when they participate in active service- and
    combatant command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by the JNTC
    initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise programs.
    For example, based on our analysis of five training events enhanced by the
    JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and individuals have participated
    to a limited extent in all but one of the five events. Specifically, Air
    National Guard personnel participated in a fiscal year 2005 Air Warrior I
    exercise, Army reservists participated in a fiscal year 2005 National
    Training Center exercise, Navy reservists participated in a fiscal year
    2005 Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint exercise, and Marine Corps reservists
    participated in a fiscal year 2006 Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course
    exercise. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs
    officials stated that reserve participation in many of these events
    occurred, in part, because active duty units were unavailable to fully
    participate and reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC and
    service officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit from
    many of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training environment as do
    active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials said they have
    relied on active service components and combatant commands to involve the
    reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training.

    Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relationship with the Reserve
    Components

    In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant command
    training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed formal
    coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning conferences,
    and process action teams that involve numerous participants from various
    organizations within the active service and combatant commands, but these
    coordination mechanisms do not include reserve personnel. For example, the
    Joint Forces Command has established on-site liaison officer positions to
    serve as the active service representative on a daily basis to communicate
    with the JNTC officials and aid in the development of the business and
    operational processes related to the JNTC initiative. Currently, all
    liaison officer positions include representatives from the active services
    with no representatives from the reserve components. According to Joint
    Forces Command officials and service liaison officers, these active
    service liaison officers primarily represent their respective active
    service components' needs and issues and do not specifically communicate
    the needs of the reserve component to Joint Forces Command officials.

    Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend
    planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These
    meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final
    planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command has
    not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include them in
    these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also established
    nine process action teams organized by functional areas in operations,
    technical, and program management to discuss JNTC implementation and
    development. These process action teams perform a vast array of
    responsibilities, such as

               o  developing JNTC event requirements and timelines;
               o  defining required operational capabilities in order to fully
               coordinate live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into
               joint training;
               o  defining technical goals for data systems that will enable
               joint distributed training;
               o  selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration
               of live, virtual, and constructive components into a seamless
               joint training environment; and
               o  developing all JNTC budget and program activities.

    According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are
    not formally invited to participate in these process action teams.

    DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires full
    integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each stage of
    the overall process in developing a joint training initiative. For
    example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically
    highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve components
    in ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition, the Training
    Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve components face
    several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be
    considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through
    implementation. Further, the 2005 training transformation block assessment
    calls for including the reserve components' training in transformation
    training events. Specifically, the assessment states that the reserve
    components (1) should participate in training transformation events in
    order to integrate the reserve component with the active component and (2)
    may have special needs for training, and training events should be
    tailored to meet these needs.

    During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
    Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve
    training circumstances that should be considered when developing the JNTC
    enhancements:

               o  Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are
               often not physically located at their respective home duty
               stations, the scheduling of training is more complex.
               o  Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39
               training days per year. Only if a reservist is activated or
               volunteers can he/she exceed this limitation.
               o  Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training
               requirements similar to the active core training requirements,
               such as general military training and physical training, as well
               as satisfying any other reserve requirements. Reservists must also
               consider and manage their civilian careers along with their
               military obligations.
               o  Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and
               computer simulation systems and networks for joint training (such
               as those that enable live, virtual, and constructive
               participation), are not readily available to National Guard
               members and reservists.
               o  Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are
               currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events,
               planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult
               and erratic.

    Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau
    officials stated that some of the National Guard's missions, such as
    homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be included
    as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not.

    As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation in
    the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics of the
    reserve component have not been incorporated into the initiative's
    development of joint training requirements. According to Joint Forces
    Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve component training
    needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal. To date, there has
    been no specific effort made by the Joint Forces Command to develop joint
    tasks or technical enhancements associated with the needs and missions of
    the reserve components.

    The JNTC initiative's priority remains on active services and combatant
    commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements has
    been primarily for existing active service and combatant command training
    programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the process for the
    development of joint articles has involved the active services and
    combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for combat missions,
    such as close air support, joint force targeting, and joint fires.
    Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations are expected to
    perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces Command officials
    have stated that the development of joint articles has not significantly
    focused on tasks unique to the reserve components, such as disaster relief
    and homeland defense. Further, the reserve components were not included in
    the team responsible for the development of joint articles. Additionally,
    the development of the Joint Training and Experimentation Network has
    established permanent capability throughout the continental United States
    at active service and combatant command facilities. The joint network has
    been coordinated with existing active training networks, such as the
    Navy's Continuous Training Environment, according to Navy officials, and
    the Air Force's Distributed Mission Operations Center. According to Office
    of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials,
    interfaces with reserve and guard networks have not yet occurred. The
    continued lack of focus on the joint training needs of the reserve
    components will limit their ability to enhance their joint training
    skills.

     JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to New and
     Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, or Include the
                                     National Guard

    The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting
    training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals. However,
    the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting training programs
    related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted in the most recent
    Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps to ensure that
    accredited joint training will continue to occur after initial
    accreditation; and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific training
    programs.

    Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process

    In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of
    accrediting active services' and combatant commands' training programs on
    specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the JNTC
    initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate that
    the training programs can provide the training audience, regardless of
    location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic environment for the
    joint tasks being trained. An accreditation review is not an inspection or
    a report card, but can be compared to accrediting a university, where
    individual courses of instruction are officially approved.9 Initially, the
    JNTC initiative used an event-centric approach that focused on enhancing
    single designated training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint
    Forces Command began employing a program-centric approach that focused on
    establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all
    rotations of active service and combatant command training programs.
    Previously, the event-centric approach only provided a limited number of
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to experience a
    JNTC-enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one rotation of the
    Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercise would have been enhanced
    by the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have incorporated enhanced
    joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric approach, the number
    of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements significantly increases.
    Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercise has
    the opportunity to include enhanced joint training.

    The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the
    nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command's
    recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are summarized
    below:

               o  The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services
               and combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training
               programs and joint tasks to be accredited.
               o  Once the active services and combatant commands submit their
               training programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews
               and selects these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a
               master schedule of those nominated programs to include joint tasks
               to be performed by each program.
               o  To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with
               the accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command's
               Accreditation Review Team develops a Web site for each training
               program and provides training for the services and combatant
               commands.
               o  The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant
               active service and combatant command officials to perform its
               accreditation review.
               o  The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a
               recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate
               level of accreditation status to that training program on specific
               joint tasks, in the final accreditation report.10

    9 Similar to the accrediting of a university, a training program is
    accredited, not the training audience. As the accrediting agency, the
    Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center ensures that the training
    program has the required resources and addresses key elements to provide
    quality joint training to the training audience.

    JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize Priorities
    Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

    Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process to
    facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training
    programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed in
    the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and emerging mission
    areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations,
    combating weapons of mass destruction, and information operations, which
    may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive combat operations, such
    as cultural awareness training and coordination with other agencies. In
    the past nomination cycles, there has been no guidance that provides
    criteria for nominating training programs and joint tasks. In lieu of
    established nomination guidance, we found that the active services
    nominated training programs based on several reasons. For example, Army
    and Marine Corps officials told us they selected programs based on their
    need to enhance joint tasks for the maximum number of participants. The
    Navy nominated programs based on their ability to provide joint and
    coalition training. The Air Force nominated programs based on their
    perceived gains from adding jointness to the training environment. While
    there have been no specific nomination criteria, the Joint Forces Command
    has established criteria it uses for selecting programs once nominated.
    These criteria focus on (1) programs that address critical joint training
    issues that are affecting warfighting capabilities; (2) the mission of
    organizations that will receive joint training; (3) programs that provide
    predeployment training; and (4) joint throughput, or the number of
    multi-service and joint units that can be trained on required joint
    training. These criteria do not emphasize skill sets required for new and
    emerging mission areas.

    Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing
    guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating
    programs. These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to
    nominate programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training
    audience composed of units or staff; (2) established system for providing
    training feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or exercise control
    structure; and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e., opposing forces)
    within the training programs. Additionally, it provides nomination
    criteria for accrediting the joint tasks within the program. The criteria
    requires that the joint tasks (1) come from the Universal Joint Task
    List11 or the latest approved list of joint tasks, and (2) fall within the
    normal core competencies and normal training environment of the nominated
    training programs. Although the Joint Forces Command has proposed
    nomination guidance, its draft guidance still has not emphasized the need
    to accredit tasks within active service and combatant command training
    programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas.
    Until DOD establishes such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions
    will not be given priority in the accreditation process and thus be able
    to incorporate the JNTC enhancements.

    10 When the Joint Forces Command considers a training program for
    accreditation, it assesses the program and determines if it merits being
    fully accredited, conditionally accredited, or not qualified to be
    accredited.

    By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had conditionally
    accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant accreditation to
    joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by the end of 2006. Most
    of these training programs focus primarily on traditional combat missions.
    For example, the Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint program has been
    conditionally accredited on seven joint tasks, including developing and
    sharing intelligence, conducting joint fires, conducting air and missile
    defense operations, and conducting defensive counter air operations.
    Additionally, the Joint Forces Command anticipates that the active
    services and combatant commands will nominate 3 or 4 additional programs
    for accreditation in 2007. Table 3 shows the total nominated programs,
    including the 4 programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and
    the 23 programs planned to be accredited for 2006.

    11 The Universal Joint Task List is a menu of capabilities that may be
    selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission.

    Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for
    Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006

    Active service/combatant command Training program
    Army                             Battle Command Training Programa

                                        Joint Readiness Training Center

                                        National Training Center

                                        Combat Maneuver Training Center
    Air Force                        Blue Flaga

                                        Air Warrior I

                                        Air Warrior II

                                        Virtual Flag

                                        Red Flag

                                        Cope Thunder

                                        Warrior Prep Center (nominated by
                                        European Command)
    Navy                             Fleet Synthetic Training - Jointa

                                        Joint Task Force Exercise
    Marine Corps                     Marine Aviation Weapons Training Squadron
                                        1

                                        Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff
                                        Training Program

                                        Marine Air Ground Task Force Training
                                        Center

                                        Mountain Warfare Training Center
    Joint Forces Command             Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal
                                        Programa
    Pacific Command                  Pacific Command Joint Task Force Training
                                        Program
    Central Command                  Internal Look
    Northern Command                 Ardent Sentry
    European Command                 Joint Training Requirements and Exercise
                                        Division

                                        Warrior Prep Center
    Strategic Command                Strategic Command Training Program
    Special Operations Command       Able Warrior/Able Focus
    Southern Command                 Southern Command Joint Exercise Program
    Transportation Command           Turbo Challenge

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.

    aIndicate training programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005
    by Joint Forces Command.

    Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring Use of JNTC
    Capabilities

    The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited
    joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and combatant
    command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of the
    accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in joint
    training, regardless of location, experience a recurring, consistent,
    realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed the services to
    conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible in accredited
    exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces
    Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an event-centric
    approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing on establishing
    permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of
    training events, not just a single designated training event.

    However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that joint
    tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in future
    service and combatant commander training events. According to DOD
    officials, the services and combatant commands should participate in the
    accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their nominated
    training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces Command official,
    the command cannot require the services and combatant commands to train to
    the joint tasks that have been accredited. Service officials we spoke with
    stated that currently there are no consequences for them not continuing to
    include accredited joint tasks in future training rotations. While service
    officials recognized the value of training to accredited joint tasks, they
    also recognized that there are competing demands for their time and
    resources that may preclude them from training to joint tasks. Situations
    that compete for their time and resources include service-specific unit
    training requirements, shortage of training funds, and the deployment of
    personnel and equipment to overseas operations. While the Joint Forces
    Command provides financial contributions to the services to help offset
    the costs associated with incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not
    clear if the JNTC initiative's financial contributions are significant
    enough to function as leverage to encourage the repeated training of
    accredited joint tasks. For example, an Army official stated that the Army
    has budgeted $640 million to support its combat training centers in fiscal
    year 2006, and that the Joint Forces Command's support for the Army's
    combat training centers amounts to $11.6 million.

    The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the
    active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC enhancements in
    their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements-JNTC
    representatives placed permanently at service and combatant command
    training programs-to help ensure that the program officials implement the
    JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship between
    organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist program
    officials with joint training planning and executions at their locations
    and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation reviews.
    However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone may not be
    able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur.
    Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services will continue to
    include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the Joint Forces Command
    only began the accreditation process in 2005 and only recently established
    positions to be filled by Support Element representatives.

    The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3
    years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation process
    that would ensure that services and combatant commanders continue to
    incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint tasks. According to
    the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a reaccreditation process
    will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon expiration (following 3
    years) or determine the status of a training program that has undergone
    such significant change that the existing program is considerably
    different from the program that last received accreditation status.
    However, this concept of operations does not address what standard of
    training needs to be accomplished or what level of accredited tasks should
    be trained to receive reaccreditation. Without providing adequate
    reaccreditation guidance, the Joint Forces Command may risk not
    accomplishing the intent of JNTC's accreditation efforts. Moreover, until
    DOD establishes standards for reaccrediting training programs that ensure
    the consistent incorporation of JNTC enhancement in future training
    rotations, DOD risks not maximizing its investment in the JNTC initiative.

    No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for JNTC Accreditation

    DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint
    training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
    reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve components
    in ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD directive on
    military training12 says that to the maximum extent possible, all
    components shall conduct joint training in accredited events. Our analysis
    found that the National Guard has developed joint training exercise
    programs dealing with missions involving homeland defense and security.
    However, no National Guard training programs have currently been
    considered for JNTC accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated
    they have not placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the
    JNTC accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the
    JNTC initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command.
    The Joint Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking nominations
    for joint training accreditation to the National Guard as it has done for
    the active services and combatant commands. In addition, we found that the
    Joint Forces Command has not established a process for nominating and
    accrediting National Guard-specific training programs.

    12 Department of Defense Directive, 1322.18, Military Training.

    The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command about
    considering the Vigilant Guard training program-a series of training
    exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the National Guard
    to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland defense and
    defense support to civil authorities-for the JNTC accreditation process.
    The training program involves 4 to 6 states per event  with a focus on the
    training and coordination of the newly established state joint force
    headquarters and state joint task forces.  Vigilant Guard  provides the
    National Guard the opportunity to execute core joint tasks, such as (1)
    acquire and communicate operational-level information and maintain status;
    (2) establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters; and (3)
    provide theater support to other DOD and government agencies.  However,
    National Guard officials stated that Vigilant Guard has not yet been
    considered for accreditation by the Joint Forces Command.

    National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the
    Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National
    Guard's GuardNet network to JNTC's joint network. GuardNet is a network
    for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard users in 54
    U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It
    consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training,
    mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in
    addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These
    telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the
    National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home
    station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials
    stated that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC's joint network
    design. Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have
    had meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and GuardNet
    into the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials stated that
    no action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC-accredited training
    programs and linkages with JNTC's joint network, National Guard training
    programs may not be able to take full advantage of JNTC resources, such as
    participation from other components, access to new technologies and
    modeling, and training environments that realistically portray overseas
    and domestic joint operations.

                                      Conclusions

    In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting significantly
    more complex operations requiring increased joint interoperability among
    participants in the theater and on the battlefield. DOD's JNTC initiative
    is designed to help the services and combatant commands meet these
    challenges. Without thoroughly assessing the progress of the Joint Forces
    Command's training transformation efforts, DOD does not know the value
    added to the readiness of services and combatant commands resulting from
    the significant investment of resources devoted to the JNTC initiative.
    Furthermore, recent domestic events and ongoing overseas operations have
    placed extremely high demands on the reserve components, which play a
    critical role in executing our national defense strategy. Once mobilized,
    reservists and National Guard members operate in the same joint
    environment as active service members. Unless the reserve components
    receive the training necessary to allow them to operate seamlessly in this
    environment, reservists may be unprepared to face the full range of
    responsibilities they are called upon to perform both at home and abroad.
    Until the Joint Forces Command embraces the reserve components,
    incorporating their unique training needs into the development of the JNTC
    initiative's joint training enhancements, the reserve and the National
    Guard forces will not be able to take full advantage of the enhanced joint
    training offered through this initiative. Additionally, without clear
    criteria to guide the accreditation and reaccreditation process, DOD will
    have no assurance that the joint training initiative reflects DOD's
    training priorities on new and emerging threats or that the services and
    combatant commands will continually take advantage of the resources and
    capabilities provided by the JNTC initiative. Without consistently
    training its forces in a recurring, realistic, joint operating
    environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed to its theaters
    will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in today's complex,
    multinational, interagency operations. Also, without incorporating the
    National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD has no assurance that
    the National Guard will experience realistic overseas and domestic joint
    operational training environments portrayed by JNTC enhancements.
    Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues highlighted above in order to
    ensure that the joint training benefits from its $1.5 billion investment
    in the JNTC initiative are being optimized.

                          Recommendations for Executive Action

    To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the
    benefits of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we recommend
    that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:

               o  direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
               Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the next training
               transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the
               JNTC initiative's implementation on joint training, including time
               frames, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and
               responsibilities, and outcomes;
               o  direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers
               for the reserve components and include representatives from the
               reserve components as active participants in JNTC working groups
               and planning sessions;
               o  direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
               Readiness to establish guidelines for the services and combatant
               commands to follow when nominating programs for future
               accreditation that reflect the importance of new and emerging
               missions, as emphasized by DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
               Report;
               o  direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
               Readiness to establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that
               will ensure that a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training
               environment exists for all units participating in accredited joint
               training programs; and
               o  direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
               Readiness to expand the accreditation process to include National
               Guard training programs.

                           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four
    recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to
    establish reserve liaisons. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.

    Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department
    develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC
    initiative as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD
    stated that it is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007
    assessment that will include detailed metrics and roles and
    responsibilities and will address the impact of transformation initiatives
    on DOD-wide training.

    DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines that
    emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to consider new
    and emerging issues when nominating programs for accreditation, (2)
    establish reaccreditation standards and criteria, and (3) expand the
    accreditation process to include National Guard training programs. DOD
    stated that its accreditation guidance will be refined to include
    consideration of new and emerging missions during the next phase of
    accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that the Joint Forces
    Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of operations is
    strengthened to include specific reaccreditation standards. Further, DOD
    stated it will add National Guard training programs with the appropriate
    joint environment to the accreditation nomination list. Moreover, it noted
    that the JNTC Joint Management Office is actively discussing this action
    with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National
    Guard joint training programs.

    Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint
    Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components and
    include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC working
    groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should establish
    liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard representatives
    as participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions. However, DOD
    stated that the joint training requirements of the other reserve
    components are adequately addressed through the current service liaison
    officer structure within JNTC and the assigned reserve Joint Warfighting
    Center. DOD's approach would require that the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
    Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their training needs indirectly
    through their respective service headquarters rather than through direct
    participation. However, as discussed in this report, Training
    Transformation documents and officials from the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense's Office of Reserve Affairs have recognized that the reserve
    components have some unique training requirements and that these
    requirements have yet to receive priority in the Joint Forces Command's
    JNTC initiative. We continue to believe that all reserve components would
    benefit if the Joint Forces Command would establish liaison officers for
    both the National Guard and the service reserve components and include
    them as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions
    to allow them to voice their unique training needs and enhance their
    awareness of new developments and opportunities in joint training.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander
    of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to others
    upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the
    GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

    Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov . Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
    the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed
    in appendix III.

    Janet A. St. Laurent, Director

    Defense Capabilities and Management

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability
    (JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant
    commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training exercises
    selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC enhancements in
    fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise planning documents
    pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements. We also discussed the
    impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of officials in the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, combatant commands, and
    Joint Chiefs of Staff who were involved in this effort. Additionally, we
    discussed our methods, the attributes to be assessed, and the information
    collected with agency officials and determined that they were sufficiently
    reliable for our purposes. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be
    used to make inferences about a population, because some elements of the
    population have no chance of being selected. Specifically, we did the
    following:

               o  To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and
               training profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in
               consultation with these officials, we identified one event
               selected by the Joint Forces Command to be enhanced by the JNTC
               initiative from each of the military services and one sponsored by
               a combatant command.
               o  To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would
               allow us to quantitatively discern the differences in selected
               exercises prior to their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then
               developed a detailed data collection instrument to precisely and
               consistently gather attribute information for comparative
               analysis. Our analysis of these attributes allowed us to determine
               the measure of change in a selected fiscal year 2005 training
               exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and
               reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise planning
               documents, and after action reports for selected exercises to
               determine the measure of change in the exercises based on our
               attributes.
               o  To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative's
               impact on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with
               service, combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their
               perspectives on the overall value added to joint training by the
               JNTC initiative. We then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises
               to obtain a real-time assessment of the past and planned evolution
               of the exercises and feedback from exercise participants,
               including the planners.

    To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the full
    impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first training
    transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
    documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised
    Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005 Training
    Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative's strategic
    plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense
    officials directly involved in conducting the training transformation
    assessment to discuss the methodology for the current assessment and plans
    for future assessments.

    To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting
    from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
    documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006
    revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006 Quadrennial
    Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and implementation plans, to
    identify program guidance on the inclusion of the reserve components in
    training transformation initiatives and assess the level of coordination
    established between the JNTC initiative and the reserve components. We
    also examined the extent to which the reserve components participated in
    JNTC current events and formal collaboration mechanisms to further
    evaluate the effectiveness of the program to benefit the reserve
    components. Additionally, we conducted interviews with key reserve,
    National Guard, Office of the Secretary of Defense, service, and JNTC
    representatives to discuss the overall impact of the JNTC initiative on
    the reserve components.

    To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has developed an
    accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we obtained and
    reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the Accreditation
    Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing slides, the
    draft accreditation handbook and DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
    Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents,
    including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised Training
    Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC strategic plan, to
    identify program guidance and critical milestones. Additionally, we
    reviewed selected training programs' JNTC accreditation reports. To
    augment our documentation review, we met with service, combatant command,
    and JNTC officials to discuss the status and intent of the accreditation
    process. Specifically, we inquired about the status of the accreditation
    effort, the nomination process, and the reaccreditation process. We also
    examined to what extent the reserve components participated in the JNTC
    initiative's accreditation process. Table 4 lists the organizations and
    locations we visited during the course of this review.

    Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment

    Organization        Locations
    Army                Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Training,
                           Collective Training Division, Washington, D.C.
                           Army National Guard, Readiness Center, Arlington,
                           Virginia
    Air Force           Headquarters Air Force, Joint Exercises and Training
                           Innovation, Washington, D.C.
                           Air Combat Command, Joint Training and Exercise
                           Directorate, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
    Marine Corps        Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education
                           Command, Quantico, Virginia
                           U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
    Navy                Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet
                           Training Branch, Arlington, Virginia
                           Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
                           Tactical Training Group, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia
                           USS McFaul, (DDG-74), Norfolk, Virginia
    National Guard      National Guard Bureau, Alexandria, Virginia
    Joint organizations Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve
                           Affairs, Washington D.C.
                           Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and
                           Training Policy and Programs, Washington, D.C.

                           - Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint
                           Management Office, Alexandria, Virginia
                           Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

                           - Operational Plans and Joint Force Development
                           Directorate, Washington, D.C.
                           U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

                           - Joint National Training Capability Joint Management
                           Office, Suffolk, Virginia

                           - Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting
                           Center, Suffolk, Virginia
                           U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii

                           - Headquarters, Joint Training Directorate, Camp
                           Smith,

                           Hawaii
                           U.S. Pacific Air Force, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
                           U.S. Pacific Fleet, Makalapa Compound, Hawaii
                           Headquarters, Joint Task Force 519, Hawaii

    Source: GAO.

    We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

                                      GAO Contact

    Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

                                    Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director;
    Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson; Yong Song; Kevin
    Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major contributions to this
    report.

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    (350724)

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    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-802 .

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    Highlights of GAO-06-802 , a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
    Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

    August 2006

    MILITARY TRAINING

    Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint
    National Training Capability

    The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation
    Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their
    theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this
    effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which
    accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest
    by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will increase the
    level of joint training.

    GAO assessed the extent to which (1) JNTC has improved the ability of the
    services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve
    components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint
    Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate
    program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key
    DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events
    selected in 2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events
    firsthand.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take a number of actions to
    further enhance the quality of joint training for active and reserve
    components. In response to a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
    with GAO's recommendations.

    The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training
    overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program's results;
    however, GAO's review of five JNTC-enhanced training events found
    indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work and the
    2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the importance of
    performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD's initial training
    transformation assessment set a basic framework for measuring future
    program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy to evaluate the
    overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes metrics, time frames,
    and processes for gathering data. Without such a plan, DOD will not know
    whether the money invested in the initiative will produce desired results
    or maximize the benefit for the investment.

    Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique
    training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered
    because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working
    relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan
    recognizes that the reserve components face unique training requirements
    and circumstances that must be considered. However, the command has not
    established a liaison position for any of the reserve components and has
    not included the reserve components in working groups and planning
    sessions, as it has done with the active service components and the
    combatant commands. Until the command incorporates the reserves more fully
    into the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have
    limited ability to enhance their joint training skills.

    The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process to
    facilitate the JNTC initiative's goals, but it has not emphasized new and
    emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will
    continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the National Guard.
    The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that training
    transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas, such as
    irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass destruction. The Joint
    Forces Command has allowed services and combatant commands to nominate
    existing training programs to be accredited, but these programs may not
    reflect the priorities established in the Quadrennial Defense Review
    Report because nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit
    programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas.
    Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard are currently
    being considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes
    nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the
    National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not reflect
    DOD's training priorities, the services may not continually incorporate
    JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the National Guard
    will continue to have limited ability to enhance its joint training
    skills.
    *** End of document. ***