Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design	 
Efforts (23-JUN-06, GAO-06-764).				 
                                                                 
The Coast Guard has been pursing a replacement vessel for its	 
aging and deteriorating patrol boats as part of the Integrated	 
Deepwater System (or Deepwater) acquisition. Originally, all 49  
of the Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats were to be converted  
into 123-foot patrol boats as a bridging strategy until a	 
replacement vessel, the 140-foot Fast Response Cutter (FRC) came 
on line beginning in 2018. The initial conversions of the	 
110-foot patrol boats proved unsuccessful, though, and this	 
prompted the Coast Guard to cancel further patrol boat		 
conversions and accelerate the design and delivery of the FRC	 
from 2018 to 2007. Early design efforts called for the FRC's	 
hull, decks, and bulkheads to be made from composite materials	 
rather than steel. Recently, design problems with the FRC's hull 
shape and weight have raised questions about the viability of the
FRC design and use of composite materials. This report examines  
(1) the factors that went into the decision to use composite	 
materials for the FRC hull, (2) the types of composite materials 
that have been selected for the FRC hull, (3) the extent of	 
contingency plans developed for use if the prototype hull fails  
to meet Coast Guard performance requirements, and (4) the status 
of design efforts for the FRC.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-764 					        
    ACCNO:   A55901						        
  TITLE:     Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter    
Design Efforts							 
     DATE:   06/23/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Equipment upgrades 				 
	     Materials research 				 
	     Research and development				 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems design					 
	     Fast Response Cutter				 
	     Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System		 

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GAO-06-764

GAO

                                   June 2006

COAST GUARD

            Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts

GAO-06-764

COAST GUARD

Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts

What GAO Found

The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, decided
to use composite materials for the FRC's hull because, according to
contractor analyses, use of such materials instead of steel generally
offers several advantages, including lower maintenance and life cycle
costs, a longer service life, and reduced weight. Other potential
advantages, according to the Office of Naval Research, include corrosion
prevention and decreased damage from impacts.

The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite
materials: (1) a solid laminate form to be used for the hull and (2) a
"sandwich" form which is to be used on decks and bulkheads. Composite
materials are not commonly used for vessels with comparable naval
operations and have not been used on any prior Coast Guard vessels.

The Coast Guard does not have a formal, documented contingency plan should
the FRC fail to meet performance requirements. However, Coast Guard
officials said it plans to pursue certain mitigation strategies, such as
repairing deteriorated hull structures and replacing obsolete or
unsupportable equipment and systems, to keep the current patrol boats
operating longer.

The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 because of
design risks, such as excessive weight and horsepower requirements. To
address these and other risks, the Coast Guard is pursuing three
strategies. The first strategy involves the system integrator purchasing
design plans for and building an off-the-shelf patrol boat that could be
adapted for Coast Guard use as a way to increase patrol hours until the
FRC design is finalized. The first of these replacement patrol boats is to
be operational in late 2009. The second strategy is to revise the
necessary capabilities of the FRC in order to allow for modifications to
the current FRC design. The third strategy is to have a third party
reassess the analyses used in the decision to use composite materials for
the FRC to determine if the use of composite materials will, in fact,
reduce total ownership costs.

    One of the Current Patrol Boats to Be Replaced by a Fast Response Cutter

Contents

  Letter 1

Results 3
Concluding Observations 5
Agency Comments 5

  Appendix I Briefing Section 7

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 27
Related GAO Products 28

[IMG]

                                 Abbreviations

FRC           Fast Response Cutter                                         
GAO           Government Accountability Office                             
ICGS          Integrated Coast Guard Systems                               
RFI           request for information                                      

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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separately.

The Coast Guard converted 8 of the 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot
boats, but discontinued further conversions because the patrol boats were
experiencing technical difficulties, such as hull buckling on the
Matagorda, and were not able to meet post-September 11, 2001 mission
requirements.

Page 1 GAO-06-764 Co

During the early design efforts, the Deepwater program's system
integrator2 proposed building the FRC's hull, decks, and bulkheads out of
composite materials rather than steel. Composite materials, as used in
shipbuilding, are typically fiber-reinforced plastic laminates consisting
of plies of various reinforcing fabrics laminated together. While design
problems with the FRC's hull shape and weight have only recently been made
public, Coast Guard engineering officials raised concerns about the
viability of the FRC design beginning in January 2005.

In response to your request, we have been reviewing and analyzing the
design efforts for the FRC. This is part of a large body of work GAO has
undertaken since 1998 regarding the Deepwater program.3 On April 12, 2006,
we briefed your offices on four topics, as follows:

     o the factors that went into the decision to use composite materials for
       the FRC hull,
     o the types of composite materials that have been selected for the FRC
       hull,
     o the extent of contingency plans developed for use if the prototype
       hull fails to meet Coast Guard performance requirements, and
     o the status of design efforts on the FRC.

This report summarizes the findings we addressed at that briefing, as well
as provides more current information on the Coast Guard's FRC design
efforts to supplement the detailed briefing slides that we presented to
your offices. Appendix I provides a copy of those slides.

In addressing the four topics, we reviewed and analyzed a variety of Coast
Guard and contractor documents, briefings, and studies. We supplemented
these document reviews by holding discussions with officials from the
Coast Guard, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Surface Warfare
Center. We conducted our work from February 2006 through May 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

2

Under the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard is relying on a prime
contractor-called the system integrator-to identify and deliver the assets
needed to meet Coast Guard mission requirements.

3

Please see the Related Products section for a list of prior GAO products
on the Deepwater program.

    Page 2 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard

Results

The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)4
decided to use composite materials for the FRC's hull form after an
analysis of alternatives found that the use of such materials instead of
steel generally offers several advantages, such as lower maintenance and
life cycle costs, a longer service life, and reduced weight. While these
were the main reasons given for considering composites, the Coast Guard
and ICGS have also leveraged information from research performed by the
U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Research, which shows other potential
advantages, such as corrosion prevention and decreased damage from
impacts.

The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite
materials: (1) a solid laminate form consisting of layers of
glass-reinforced plastic and (2) a "sandwich" form consisting of two
thinner layers of glassreinforced plastic surrounding a core of either
balsa wood or synthetic foam. The solid laminate form is to be used for
the hull, which is to be constructed from a mold in a single process. The
sandwich form, which weighs less than the solid form, is to be used on
decks and bulkheads. Composite materials are not commonly used for vessels
with comparable

U.S. naval operations and have not been used on any prior Coast Guard
vessels.

Even though composite materials are not commonly used in the construction
of U.S. naval vessels used in military operations, the Coast Guard does
not have a formal, documented contingency plan should the FRC fail to meet
performance requirements. However, according to Coast Guard officials, the
Coast Guard plans to pursue certain mitigation strategies to keep the
current patrol boats operating longer, such as repairing deteriorated hull
structures and replacing obsolete or unsupportable equipment and systems.
Coast Guard officials also stated that they are pursuing the option of
selecting design plans for a patrol boat that is already on the market
that could be adapted for Coast Guard use as an interim measure until the
FRC design is finalized. In addition, according to Coast Guard officials,
the Coast Guard has taken steps designed to help ensure the FRC's
reliability. First, because the FRC is to employ composite materials for
the hull, the Coast Guard undertook a series of risk mitigation efforts,
which are often part of a naval shipbuilding program, during the FRC's
preliminary design phase. These efforts included fatigue

4

In 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a contract to ICGS as the system
integrator for the Deepwater program. ICGS is a joint venture between two
contractors-Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman-that in turn contract
with other subcontractors.

    Page 3 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard

testing of composite material panels and joint configurations, as well as
testing a scale model of the hull, and conducting a third-party design
review. Second, the Coast Guard intends to conduct a 12-month performance
evaluation when the first FRC is delivered, though there are currently no
detailed plans as to what the evaluation will entail.

The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 because of
high technical risks associated with the emerging design. In particular,
an independent design review by third-party consultants preliminarily
demonstrated, among other things, that the FRC would be far heavier and
less efficient than a typical patrol boat of similar length, in part,
because it would need four engines to meet Coast Guard speed requirements.
As a result, the Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies for moving
forward with the FRC acquisition. The first strategy involves ICGS
purchasing design plans for and building an "off-the-shelf" patrol boat as
a way to increase patrol hours currently unmet by the patrol boat fleet.
The first of these boats is projected to be ready for Coast Guard
operations in 2009. However, according to Coast Guard officials, the
off-the-shelf patrol boat may not meet Coast Guard performance
requirements. The Coast Guard issued a request for information (RFI) in
April 2006 to assess the off-the shelf options. According to Coast Guard
Deepwater Program Officials, in response to the RFI, the Coast Guard
received 26 distinct patrol boat design submissions from 17 vendors and is
currently in the process of reviewing these submissions. They further
stated that its senior leadership plans to make a decision regarding the
off-the-shelf design in September 2006. According to the Coast Guard, a
second strategy it is pursuing is to revise the necessary capabilities of
the FRC in order to allow for modifications to the current FRC design.
Concurrent with the first two strategies, the Coast Guard's third strategy
is to have a third party reassess the analyses used in the decision to use
composite materials for the FRC to determine if the use of composite
materials will, in fact, reduce total ownership costs. The result of the
Coast Guard pursuing these strategies is that the Coast Guard would end up
with two classes of FRCs. The first class of FRCs to be built would be
based on an adapted design from a patrol boat already on the market, to
expedite delivery, and a follow-on class that would be based on revisions
made to address the problems identified in the original FRC design plans.

Pursuant to these three strategies, Coast Guard officials now estimate
that the first FRC will likely not be delivered until late fiscal year
2009, at the earliest, rather than 2007 as outlined in the 2005 Revised
Deepwater Implementation Plan. Coast Guard officials have not yet
determined how changes in the design and delivery date for the FRC will
affect the overall

Page 4 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard

Concluding Observations

system of systems approach. However, because the delivery of Deepwater
assets are interdependent within this acquisition approach, schedule
slippages and uncertainties associated with potential changes in the
design and capabilities of the new assets have increased the risks that
the Coast Guard may not meet its expanded homeland security performance
requirements within given budget parameters and milestone dates.

A number of factors are tied to the uncertainty surrounding the FRC
program. First, the unanticipated problems associated with the 110-foot to
123-foot patrol boat conversion program prompted the Coast Guard to
accelerate the FRC program by more than a decade. In addition, the system
integrator has chosen to use a relatively new technology, namely composite
materials, for the FRC hull form. As of May 2006, the Coast Guard has
spent approximately $26.7 million for design and test efforts on the FRC,
although it has yet to produce a viable design. Because of this, the first
FRC will not be delivered until late fiscal year 2009, at the earliest,
rather than in fiscal year 2007 as outlined in the 2005 Deepwater Revised
Implementation Plan. This means the Coast Guard will have to continue to
rely on its aging and deteriorating patrol boats. Moreover, because of the
schedule slippage and uncertainties associated with potential changes in
the design and capabilities of the FRC, the Coast Guard has increased the
risks associated with the system-of-systems concept.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of

Homeland Security. The Department referred to the U.S. Coast Guard which
generally concurred with the findings of the report and provided technical
comments, which have been incorporated into the report as appropriate.

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and
interested congressional committees. This report will also be made
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

For information about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9610, or
[email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.

Stephen L. Caldwell

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

This appendix contains the briefings slides presented to your staffs on
April 12, 2006. While we have not modified the briefing slides, we have
provided updated information in the accompanying letter regarding the
Coast Guard's three strategies and cost information in an effort to
provide the most current information. For example, slides 17 and 18
provide information on the Coast Guard's strategies to move forward with
the FRC acquisition and associated program cost data but the letter
provides updated information.

                        U.S. Coast Guard's Fast Response
                            Cutter: Status of Design

                       Presented to House Appropriations
                       Subcommittee on Homeland Security

                                 April 12, 2006

                                  Introduction

The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) is slated to replace the 110' and 123'
patrol boats under the Deepwater system

The FRC is projected to provide greater speed, endurance, and operational
hours than current patrol boats

As of the 2006 update submitted with the Administration's fiscal year 2007
budget request, the Coast Guard plans to acquire 58 FRCs

                             Researchable Questions

     o What factors went into the decision to use composite materials for the
       FRC hull form?
     o What types of composite materials have been selected for the FRC hull
       form?
     o What contingency plans have been formulated should the prototype hull
       form fail to meet Coast Guard performance requirements?
     o What is the status of the FRC design?

                                 GAO's Approach

        * Reviewed the decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull
          form, to include:
             o Relevant Coast Guard and contractor documents, trade studies,
               and briefings
             o Discussions with staff from the Coast Guard's Deepwater
               Program and the Engineering Logistics Center, the Office of
               Naval Research, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center
        * Reviewed the decision regarding the types of composites to be used
          on the FRC hull form, to include:
             o Relevant Coast Guard and contractor documents and trade
               studies
             o Discussions with staff from the Coast Guard's Deepwater
               Program, as well as an Office of Naval Research official
     o Discussed Coast Guard mitigation efforts and contingency plans with
       relevant Coast Guard Deepwater Program and test and evaluation
       officials

                                 GAO's Approach

        * Reviewed the current status of the FRC design effort, to include:
             o Coast Guard documents, studies, briefings; contractor
               documents and briefings; and independent design review
               materials
             o Discussions with Coast Guard Deepwater Program and Engineering
               and Logistics Center officials
     o We conducted our work between February and April 2006 in accordance
       with generally accepted governmental auditing standards

                               Briefing Overview

     o Decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull form
     o Types of composite materials planned for use on the FRC hull form
     o Risk mitigation and contingency plans should the first hull form fail
       to meet Coast Guard's performance requirements
     o Recent history of FRC design concerns
     o FRC re-design options
     o FRC program costs to date

Decision to use Composite Materials for the FRC

In July 2004, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) decided to use
composite materials for the FRC hull form

o  ICGS's analysis of alternatives for the FRC found that the use of
composite materials instead of steel offered advantages such as:

     o Reduced Total Ownership Costs
     o Increased operational availability (extended time between depot-level
       maintenance, decreased maintenance requirements)
     o Increased performance through weight savings (higher speed, extended
       range)

An official with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) also cited additional
advantages such as:

     o Corrosion prevention
     o Impact damage - less likely than steel to result in a hole in the
       cutter

Decision to use Composite Materials for the FRC

        * According to ONR, some examples of successful use of composite
          material hulls include:
             o European naval vessels including British, Dutch, Swedish
             o U.S. Navy Minesweepers
        * However, a Naval Surface Warfare Center official also cited the
          following disadvantages of using composite versus steel materials:
             o Far less stiff than a steel hull, thereby making it more
               likely to bend under weight
             o Level of confidence in performance and service experience less
               than that of steel

                     Risk Mitigation and Contingency Plans

Risk mitigation efforts during the Preliminary Design Phase (January
2005-February 2006) included:

     o Model testing of the current design
     o Independent Design Review (IDR) of the FRC design
     o Testing of proposed composite material panels and joint configurations

Because of potential use of composite materials, Coast Guard intends to

conduct a 12-month performance evaluation on the first FRC before

ordering follow-on cutters

o  Although the first FRC was to be delivered in 2007, per the revised
2005

Deepwater plan, there are currently no detailed plans as to what this

evaluation will entail

While there is no documented contingency plan, according to a Coast

      Guard Deepwater Program official, should the first FRC fail to meet

performance requirements, the Coast Guard would pursue further

sustainment of the current 110-ft patrol boat fleet while reviewing

other alternatives to reduce risk by exploring existing designs

                     Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

Concerns about the FRC design have been raised since January 2005

o  January 2005

o  Coast Guard Engineering Logistics Center (ELC) provided significant

comments to ICGS's initial Concept Design Report, outlining concerns about

the hull form, potential speed, and propulsion plant studies, among others

o  April 2005

        * Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office and ICGS held a Systems
        * Requirements Review
     o Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office focused on weight reduction

strategies, with little to no attention on design concerns

o  May 2005

o  Coast Guard ELC published a white paper formally outlining design
concerns,

such as the design process, estimated weight increases, hull form and

propulsion

o  According to Deepwater Program officials, they acknowledged ELC's
concerns

and determined further testing was necessary to validate them

                     Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

        * August 2005
             o Due to its continued design concerns, Coast Guard Deepwater
               Program Office asked for an IDR
             o ICGS contracted with John J. McMullen & Associates to perform
               an IDR
        * September 2005
             o Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office and ICGS held a
               Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and ICGS was authorized to
               award a contract for detailed design
             o PDR considered by Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office to be
               "successful" because ICGS met contractual requirements
     o October 6, 2005

o  After PDR, Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office sent a letter to ICGS
highlighting design concerns such as the hull design and inconsistent
total ownership cost data, to be addressed prior to Critical Design Review

                     Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

o  January 2006

    o  Due to preliminary model test observations ICGS identified cavitation

(which can lead to engine inefficiencies and potential structural damage)

as a concern with the FRC's hull form and presented an issue paper and

briefing to Coast Guard officials

  o  Coast Guard authorized additional testing to explore potential cavitation

problems

o  February 14, 2006

    o  John J. McMullen & Associates provided a briefing on preliminary IDR

results that, among other things, noted:

o  FRC preliminary design was unlike those typically found for patrol

boats. For example, at 330 tons, FRC is 52% heavier than a standard

patrol boat of similar length; thereby driving hull proportions, required

power, structural design, fuel load and costs.

o  IDR preliminary results validated concerns raised in ELC's May 2005
white

paper, as well as the initial concerns raised in early 2005

                     Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

o  February 28, 2006

        * According to Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, FRC design work
          has been temporarily suspended because of high technical risks
          associated with current design
        * o  Risks include excessive weight, excessive horse power, and the
          likelihood of additional problems
     o According to the Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, ICGS maintains
       that its FRC design has met contractual requirements and is
       withholding any judgment about the design until final IDR and model
       test results are available

                             FRC Re-design Options

The Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies to mitigate FRC design
technical risks

o  Market survey

        * ICGS would purchase an "off-the-shelf" patrol boat design and if
          necessary,
        * make modifications to meet Coast Guard requirements
     o The Coast Guard recently released a request for information to obtain
       data

about the state of the market for proven patrol boat designs

o  Modify current design

o  Coast Guard would revise planned FRC capabilities to allow for
alterations to

the FRC design

o  Re-assessment of the composite versus metal business case analysis

    o  Coast Guard would have a third party reassess the composite v. metal

business case analysis to determine if the use of composite materials is
still

appropriate in terms of Total Ownership Cost

Estimated delivery date of first FRC: 4th quarter fiscal year 2009 or 4th
quarter fiscal year 2010

             * Please see pages 1 and 4 for updated information. 17

                           FRC Program Costs To Date

     o Costs of FRC design efforts to date
     o Costs of all FRC test efforts to date
     o Fiscal Year 2007 budget request includes approximately $41.6 million
       for production of the first FRC

FRC design efforts                   Total Total expenditures      Percent 
                                  obligations                      unexpended 
Concept & preliminary design   $18,504,593        $17,250,000           7% 
Proposal preparation for Long                                              
Lead Time Materials                $76,380            $67,065          12%
Contract & detail design       $14,520,000         $6,390,000          56% 
Proposal preparation for                                                   
contract & detail design        $1,441,036           $611,991          58%
Total                          $34,542,009        $24,319,056          30% 

                                  Total              Total  Percent           
FRC test efforts         obligations       expenditures  unexpended        
Composite material                                                         
testing                   $1,830,289           $455,000                75%
Hydrodynamic model                                                         
testing                   $1,989,782           $230,000                88%
Total                     $3,820,071           $685,000                82% 

              * Please see page 3 for updated cost information. 18

                            Concluding Observations

     o The Coast Guard has expended about $25 million and does not have a
       viable FRC design to date
     o Because the first FRC may not be delivered until fiscal year 2009 or
       fiscal year 2010, the Coast Guard has lost time in acquiring the new
       capabilities it needs in a post 9/11 environment
     o The longer it takes for the Coast Guard and ICGS to get an acceptable
       replacement for the 110-ft and 123-ft patrol boat fleets, the more the
       Coast Guard will have to rely on aging, deteriorating vessels
     o The Coast Guard may have increased the risks associated with the
       "system of systems" concept due to schedule slippages and
       uncertainties associated with potential changes in the design and
       capabilities of the replacement assets

Steve Caldwell (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]

GAO Contact

In addition to the contact named above, Steve Calvo, Assistant Director;

Staff

Christopher Conrad, Adam Couvillion, Julie Leetch, and Acknowledgments
Stan Stenersen made key contributions to this report.

United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management & Oversight
of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006).

Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted,

GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006).

Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset
Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges
Remain, GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005).

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy
Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-651T (Washington,
D.C.: June 21, 2005).

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy
Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-307T (Washington,
D.C.: April 20, 2005).

Coast Guard: Observations and Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget
Request, GAO-05-364T (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005).

Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed,
GAO-04-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004).

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 and
Beyond, GAO-04-636T (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004).

Coast Guard: Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine, GAO-04-595
(Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2004).

Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380 (Washington,
D.C.: March 9, 2004).

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security, GAO- 03-594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T
(Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003).

Page 28 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002).

Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks,
GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).

Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks Remain,
GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001).

Coast Guard: Budget Challenges for 2001 and Beyond, GAO/T-RCED-00-103
(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000).

Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, GAO/ RCED-99-6
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998)

(440512)

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