Budget Process: Better Transparency, Controls, Triggers, and	 
Default Mechanisms Would Help to Address Our Large and Growing	 
Long-term Fiscal Challenge (25-MAY-06, GAO-06-761T).		 
                                                                 
The nation's long-term fiscal outlook is daunting. While the	 
budget process has not caused the problems we face, the absence  
of meaningful budget controls and other mechanisms has served to 
compound our fiscal challenge. Conversely, a process that	 
illuminates the looming fiscal pressures and provides appropriate
incentives can at least help decision makers focus on the right  
questions. Meaningful budget controls and other mechanisms can	 
also help to assure that difficult but necessary choices are	 
made. The budget process needs to provide incentives and signals 
to address commitments the government has already made and better
transparency for and controls on the long-term fiscal exposures  
being considered. Improvements would include the restoration of  
realistic discretionary caps; application of pay-as-you-go	 
(PAYGO) discipline to both mandatory spending and revenue	 
legislation; the use of "triggers" for some mandatory programs;  
and better reporting of fiscal exposures.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-761T					        
    ACCNO:   A54719						        
  TITLE:     Budget Process: Better Transparency, Controls, Triggers, 
and Default Mechanisms Would Help to Address Our Large and	 
Growing Long-term Fiscal Challenge				 
     DATE:   05/25/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Budget controllability				 
	     Budget deficit					 
	     Budgets						 
	     Deficit reduction					 
	     Fiscal policies					 
	     Future budget projections				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transparency					 

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GAO-06-761T

     

     * The Long-term Fiscal Challenge
     * What Can Be Done?
          * Better Incentives and Signals
          * Increased Transparency and Disclosure of Long-term Costs
     * Concluding Observations
     * Contacts and Acknowledgments
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government
Information, and International Security, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT

Thursday, May 25, 2006

BUDGET PROCESS

Better Transparency, Controls, Triggers, and Default Mechanisms Would Help
to Address Our Large and Growing Long-term Fiscal Challenge

Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

GAO-06-761T

Mr. Chairman, Senator Carper, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today about a budget
process that can help Congress deal with the large and growing fiscal
challenges facing our nation. As you know, I have been vocal about our
long-term fiscal imbalance and the need to make difficult but necessary
choices soon so that we do not burden our children and grandchildren with
a crushing debt. While the budget process has not caused the problems we
face, the absence of meaningful budget controls and other mechanisms has
served to compound our fiscal challenge. Conversely, a process that
illuminates the looming fiscal pressures and provides appropriate
incentives, transparency and control mechanisms can help decision makers
to slow the bleeding and put us on a more prudent and sustainable
long-range fiscal path.

When updating the budget process, you face a two-pronged challenge:

           o  the need to reinstitute and strengthen controls to deal with
           both near-term and longer-term deficits and
           o  the need to design a process that helps Congress tackle our
           large and growing long-term fiscal challenges facing this nation
           by, among other things, improving the transparency of the
           long-term costs of current decisions.

           Today I want to focus on the long-term budget challenge and what
           role the budget process can play in helping to deal with it. Since
           at its heart the budget debate is about the allocation of limited
           resources, the budget process can and should play a key role in
           helping to address our broader challenge of modernizing government
           for the 21st century.

           The nation's long-term fiscal outlook is daunting under any
           realistic policy scenarios and assumptions. For over 14 years, GAO
           has periodically prepared various long-term budget simulations
           that seek to illustrate the likely fiscal consequences of our
           coming demographic challenges and rising health care costs.
           Indeed, the health care area is especially important because the
           long-term fiscal challenge is largely a health care challenge.
           While Social Security is important because of its size, health
           care spending is both large and projected to grow much more
           rapidly.

           Our most recent simulation results illustrate the importance of
           health care in the long-term fiscal outlook as well as the
           imperative to take action soon. These simulations show that over
           the long term we face large and growing structural deficits due
           primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care
           costs. These trends are compounded by the presence of near-term
           deficits arising from new discretionary and mandatory spending as
           well as lower federal revenues as a percentage of the economy.
           Continuing on this imprudent and unsustainable fiscal path will
           gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard
           of living, and ultimately our national security. Our current path
           will also increasingly constrain our ability to address emerging
           and unexpected budgetary needs and increase the burdens that will
           be faced by our children, grandchildren, and future generations of
           Americans.

           Figures 1 and 2 present our long-term simulations under two
           different sets of assumptions. For both simulations, Social
           Security and Medicare spending is based on the 2006 Trustees'
           intermediate projections, and we assume that benefits continue to
           be paid in full after the trust funds are exhausted, although
           current law does not provide for such. Medicaid spending is based
           on the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) December 2005 long-term
           projections under its midrange assumptions. In figure 1, we start
           with CBO's 10-year baseline, constructed according to the
           statutory requirements for that baseline. Consistent with these
           specific yet unrealistic requirements, discretionary spending is
           assumed to grow with inflation for the first 10 years and tax cuts
           scheduled to expire are assumed to expire. After 2016,
           discretionary spending and revenue are held constant as a share of
           gross domestic product (GDP) at the 2016 level. Under this
           fiscally restrained scenario, spending for Social Security and
           health care programs would grow to consume over three-quarters of
           federal revenues by 2040.

                         The Long-term Fiscal Challenge

Figure 1: Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP under Baseline
Extended

Note: Importantly, this simulation does not include the "Tax Increase
Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005" (P.L. 109-222) enacted on May
17, 2006. Under this scenario, in addition to the expiration of tax cuts,
revenue as a share of GDP increases through 2016 due to (1) real bracket
creep, (2) more taxpayers becoming subject to the alternative minimum tax
(AMT), and (3) increased revenue from tax-deferred retirement accounts.
After 2016, revenue as a share of GDP is held constant.

In figure 2, two assumptions are changed: (1) discretionary spending is
assumed to grow with the economy after 2006 rather than merely with
inflation, and (2) all expiring tax provisions are extended. In this less
restrained but possibly more realistic scenario, federal revenues will
cover little more than interest on the large and growing federal debt by
2040.

Figure 2: Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP Assuming Discretionary
Spending Grows with GDP after 2006 and All Expiring Tax Provisions Are
Extended

Note: This includes certain tax provisions that expired at the end of
2005, such as the increased AMT exemption amount.

While many alternative scenarios could be developed incorporating
different combinations of possible policy choices and economic
assumptions, these two scenarios can be viewed as possible "bookends" to a
range of possible outcomes.

Budget flexibility-the ability to respond to unforeseen events-is key to
being able to successfully deal with the nation's and the world's
uncertainties. By their very nature, mandatory spending
programs-entitlement programs like Medicare and Social Security-limit
budget flexibility.1 They are governed by eligibility rules and benefit
formulas, which means that funds are spent as required to provide benefits
to those who are eligible and wish to participate. As figure 3 shows,
mandatory spending has grown as a share of the total federal budget. For
example, mandatory spending on programs (i.e., mandatory spending
excluding interest) has grown from 27 percent in 1965-the year Medicare
was created-to 42 percent in 1985 to 53 percent last year. (Total spending
not subject to annual appropriations-mandatory spending and net
interest-has grown from 34 percent in 1965 to 61 percent last year.) Under
both the CBO baseline estimates and the President's Budget, this spending
would grow even further.

1Similarly, tax expenditures-subsidies provided through the tax system-may
limit flexibility on the revenue side; there is a trade-off between tax
rates and revenue lost through tax expenditures. In order to raise a given
amount of federal revenue, tax rates must be raised higher than they
otherwise need to be due to revenue losses from tax expenditures.

Figure 3: Federal Spending for Mandatory and Discretionary Programs

Figure 3 illustrates that while it is important to control discretionary
spending, the real challenge is mandatory spending. Accordingly,
substantive reform of the major health programs and Social Security is
critical to recapturing our future fiscal flexibility.

The aging population and rising health care costs will have significant
implications not only for the budget but also our economy and competitive
posture. Figure 4 shows the total future draw on the economy represented
by Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Under the 2006 Trustees'
intermediate estimates and CBO's 2005 midrange and long-term Medicaid
estimates, spending for these entitlement programs combined will grow to
over 15 percent of GDP in 2030 from today's 8.9 percent. It is clear that
taken together, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid represent an
unsustainable burden on the federal budget and future generations.
Ultimately, the nation will have to decide what level of federal benefits
and spending it wants and how it will pay for these benefits.

Figure 4: Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid Spending as a Percentage
of GDP

Note: Social Security and Medicare projections are based on the
intermediate assumptions of the 2006 Trustees' reports. Medicaid
projections are based on CBO's January 2006 short-term Medicaid estimates
and CBO's December 2005 long-term Medicaid projections under midrange
assumptions.

While Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are the major drivers of the
long-term spending outlook in the aggregate, they are not the only
promises the federal government has made for the future.2 The federal
government undertakes a wide range of responsibilities, programs, and
activities that may either obligate the government to future spending or
create an expectation for such spending. Specific fiscal exposures vary
widely as to source, likelihood of occurrence, magnitude, and strength of
the government's legal obligations. If we think of fiscal exposures as
extending from explicit liabilities (like military and civilian pensions)
to specific contingencies (like pension, flood, and other federal
insurance programs) to the commitments implicit in current policy and/or
public expectations (like the gap between the present value of future
promised and funded Social Security and Medicare benefits), the federal
government's fiscal exposures totaled more than $46 trillion at the end of
2005, up from about $20 trillion in 2000. This translates into a burden of
about $156,000 per American, or approximately $375,000 per full-time
worker-more than double what it was in 2000. These amounts are growing
every second of every minute of every day due to continuing deficits,
known demographic trends and compounding interest costs.

                               What Can Be Done?

Many are beginning to realize that difficult choices must be made, and
soon. A crucial first step in acting to improve our long-term fiscal
outlook will be to face facts and identify the many significant
commitments already facing the federal government. If citizens and
government officials come to better understand our nation's various fiscal
exposures and their implications for the future, they are more likely to
insist on prudent policy choices today and sensible levels of fiscal risk
in the future.

How do we get started? Today you are focusing on budget process
improvements. That's a good start. While the process itself cannot solve
the problem, it is important. It can help policymakers make tough but
necessary choices today rather than defer them until tomorrow. Restoration
of meaningful budget controls-budgetary caps and a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
rule on both the tax and spending side of the ledger-is a start toward
requiring that necessary trade-offs be made rather than delayed. Although
the restoration of caps and a PAYGO rule are important, they are not
enough. Among the characteristics a budget process needs for that to
happen are

2While interest is a large and growing share of the budget, it does not
directly drive the fiscal outlook in that interest is the result of other
decisions affecting spending and tax policy.

           o  increased transparency and better incentives, signals, triggers
           and default mechanisms to address the fiscal exposures/commitments
           the federal government has already made and
           o  better transparency for and controls over the long-term fiscal
           exposures/commitments that the federal government is considering.

           Let me elaborate.

           There is broad consensus among observers and analysts who focus on
           the budget that the controls contained in the expired Budget
           Enforcement Act constrained spending for much of the 1990s. In
           fact, annual discretionary budget authority actually declined in
           real terms during the mid-1990s. I endorse the restoration of
           realistic discretionary caps and PAYGO discipline applied to both
           mandatory spending and revenue legislation. But the caps can only
           work if they are realistic; while caps may be seen as tighter than
           some would like, they are not likely to bind if they are seen as
           totally unreasonable given current conditions. While PAYGO
           discipline constrained the creation or legislative expansion of
           mandatory spending and tax cuts, it accepted the existing
           provisions of law as given. Looking ahead, the budget process will
           need to go beyond limiting expansions. Cost increases in existing
           mandatory programs cannot be ignored and the base of existing
           spending and tax programs must be reviewed and re-engineered to
           address our long-range fiscal gap.

           Specifically, as I have said before, I would like to see a process
           that forces examination of "the base" of the federal
           government-for major entitlements, for other mandatory spending,
           and for so-called "discretionary" spending (those activities
           funded through the appropriations process).

           Reexamining "the base" is something that should be done
           periodically regardless of fiscal condition-all of us have a
           stewardship obligation over taxpayer funds. As I have said before,
           we have programs still in existence today that were designed 20 or
           more years ago-and the world has changed. I would suggest that as
           constraints on discretionary spending continue to tighten, the
           need to reexamine existing programs and activities becomes
           greater. One of the questions this Congress is grappling
           with-earmarks-can be seen in this context. Whatever the
           agreed-upon level for discretionary spending, the allocation
           within that total will be important. How should that allocation be
           determined? What sort of rules will you want to impose on both the
           allocation across major areas (defense, education, etc.) and
           within those areas? By definition, earmarks specify how some funds
           will be used. How will the process manage them? After all, not all
           earmarks are bad but many are highly questionable. It is not
           surprising that in times of tight resources, the tension between
           earmarks and flexibility will likely rise.

           Although mandatory spending is not amenable to caps, such spending
           need not-and should not-be permitted to be on autopilot and grow
           to an unlimited extent. Since the spending for any given
           entitlement or other mandatory program is a function of the
           interaction between eligibility rules and the benefit
           formula-either or both of which may incorporate exogenous factors
           such as economic downturns-the way to change the path of spending
           for any of these programs is to change their rules or formulas. We
           recently issued a report on "triggers"-some measure that when
           reached or exceeded, would prompt a response connected to that
           program.3 By identifying significant increases in the spending
           path of a mandatory program relatively early and acting to
           constrain it, Congress may avert much larger and potentially
           disruptive financial challenges and program changes in the future.

           A trigger is a measure and a signal mechanism-like an alarm clock.
           It could trigger a "soft" response-one that calls attention to the
           growth rate of the level of spending and prompts special
           consideration when the threshold or target is breached. The
           Medicare program already contains a "soft" response trigger: the
           President is required to submit a proposal for action to Congress
           if the Medicare Trustees determine in 2 consecutive years that the
           general revenue share of Medicare spending is projected to exceed
           45 percent during a 7-fiscal-year period.4 The most recent
           Trustees' report to Congress for the first time found that the
           general revenue share of financing is projected to exceed that
           threshold in 2012.5 Thus, if next year's report again concludes
           that it will exceed the threshold during the 7-fiscal-year period,
           the trigger will have been tripped and the President will be
           required to submit his proposal for action.

           Soft responses can help in alerting decision makers of potential
           problems, but they do not ensure that action to decrease spending
           or increase revenue is taken. In contrast, a trigger could lead to
           "hard" responses under which a predetermined, program-specific
           action would take place, such as changes in eligibility criteria
           and benefit formulas, automatic revenue increases, or automatic
           spending cuts. With hard responses, spending is automatically
           constrained, revenue is automatically increased, or both, unless
           Congress takes action to override-the default is the constraining
           action. For example, this year the President's Budget proposes to
           change the Medicare trigger from solely "soft" to providing a
           "hard" (automatic) response if Congress fails to enact the
           President's proposal.6

           Any discussion to create triggered responses and their design must
           recognize that unlike controls on discretionary spending, there is
           some tension between the idea of triggers and the nature of
           entitlement and other mandatory spending programs. These
           programs-as with tax provisions such as tax expenditures-were
           designed to provide benefits based on eligibility formulas or
           actions as opposed to an annual decision regarding spending. This
           tension makes it more challenging to constrain costs and to design
           both triggers and appropriate responses. At the same time, with
           less than 40 percent of the budget under the control of the annual
           appropriations process, considering ways to increase transparency,
           oversight, and control of mandatory programs must be part of
           addressing the nation's long-term fiscal challenges.

           Besides triggers, transparency of existing commitments would be
           improved by requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
           report annually on fiscal exposures-the more than $46 trillion
           figure7 I mentioned earlier-including a concise list, description,
           and cost estimates, where possible. OMB should also ensure that
           agencies focus on improving cost estimates for fiscal exposures.
           This should complement and support continued and improved
           reporting of long-range projections and analysis of the budget as
           a whole to assess fiscal sustainability and flexibility.

           Others have embraced this idea for better reporting of fiscal
           exposures. Senator Voinovich has proposed that the President
           report each January on the fiscal exposures of the federal
           government and their implications for the long-term financial
           health and Senator Lieberman introduced legislation to require
           better information on liabilities and commitments. This year
           Representatives Cooper, Chocola, and Kirk have sponsored
           legislation also aimed at improving the attention paid to our
           growing federal commitments. And, in his last few budgets the
           President has proposed that reports be required for any proposals
           that would worsen the unfunded obligations of major entitlement
           programs. These proposals provide a good starting point for
           discussion. Reporting is a critical first step-but, as I noted
           above, it must cover not only new proposals but also existing
           commitments, and it should be accompanied by some incentives and
           controls. We need both better information on existing commitments
           and promises and information on the long-term costs of any new
           significant proposed spending increases or tax cut. Ten-year
           budget projections have been available to decision makers for many
           years. We must build on that regime but also incorporate
           longer-term estimates of net present value (NPV) costs for major
           spending and tax commitments comprising longer-term exposures for
           the federal budget beyond the 10-year window. Current budget
           reporting does not always fully capture or require explicit
           consideration of some fiscal exposures. For example, when Medicare
           Part D was being debated, much of the debate focused on the
           10-year cost estimate-not on the long-term commitment that was
           obviously much greater. While the budget was not designed to and
           does not provide complete information on long-term cost
           implications stemming from some of the government's commitments
           when they are made, progress can and should be made on this front.
           For example, we should require NPV estimates for major
           proposals-whether on the tax side or the spending side-whose costs
           escalate outside the 10-year window. And these estimates should be
           disclosed and debated before the proposal is voted on.

           Regarding tax provisions, it is important to recognize that tax
           policies and programs financing the federal budget can be reviewed
           not only with an eye toward the overall level of revenue provided
           to fund federal operations and commitments, but also the mix of
           taxes and the extent to which the tax code is used to promote
           overall economic growth and broad-based societal objectives. In
           practice, some tax expenditures are very similar to mandatory
           spending programs even though they are not subject to the
           appropriations process or selected budget control mechanisms. Tax
           expenditures represent a significant commitment and are not
           typically subject to review or reexamination. This should not be
           allowed to continue nor should they continue to be largely in the
           dark and on autopilot.

           Finally, the growing use of emergency supplemental appropriations
           raises concerns that an increasing portion of federal spending is
           exempt from the discipline and trade-offs of the regular budget
           process.8 Some have expressed concern that these "emergency"
           supplementals are not always used just to meet the needs of
           unforeseen emergencies but also include funding for activities
           that could be covered in regular appropriation acts. According to
           a recent Congressional Research Service report, after the
           expiration of discretionary limits and PAYGO requirements at the
           end of fiscal year 2002, supplemental appropriations net of
           rescissions increased the budget deficit by almost 25 percent per
           year.9 On average, the use of supplemental appropriations for all
           purposes has grown almost 60 percent each year, increasing from
           about $17 billion in fiscal year 2000 to about $160 billion in
           fiscal year 2005. Constraining emergency appropriations to those
           which are necessary (not merely useful or beneficial), sudden,
           urgent, unforeseen, and not permanent has been proposed in the
           past. The issue of what constitutes an emergency needs to be
           resolved and discipline exerted so that all appropriations for
           activities that are not true emergencies are considered during
           regular budget deliberations.

           We cannot grow our way out of our long-term fiscal challenge. We
           have to make tough choices and the sooner the better. A
           multi-pronged approach is necessary: (1) revise existing budget
           processes and financial reporting requirements, (2) restructure
           existing entitlement programs, (3) reexamine the base of
           discretionary and other spending, and (4) review and revise tax
           policy and enforcement programs. Everything must be on the table.
           Fundamentally, we need to undertake a top-to-bottom review of
           government activities to ensure their relevance and fit for the
           21st century and their relative priority. Our report entitled 21st
           Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
           Government10 presents illustrative questions for policymakers to
           consider as they carry out their responsibilities. These questions
           look across major areas of the budget and federal operations,
           including discretionary and mandatory spending and tax policies
           and programs. We hope that this report, among other things, will
           be used by various congressional committees as they consider which
           areas of government need particular attention and reconsideration.

           The understanding and support of the American people will be
           critical in providing a foundation for action. The fiscal risks I
           have discussed, however, are a long-term problem whose full impact
           will not likely be felt for some time. At the same time, they are
           very real and time is currently working against us. The difficult
           but necessary choices we face will be facilitated if the public
           has the facts and comes to support serious and sustained action to
           address the nation's fiscal challenges. That is why if an
           Entitlement and Tax Reform Commission is created to develop
           proposals to tackle our long-term fiscal imbalance, its charter
           may have to include educating the public as to the nature of the
           problem and the realistic solutions. While public education may be
           part of a Commission's charge, we cannot wait for it to begin. As
           you may know, the Concord Coalition is leading a public education
           effort on this issue and I have been a regular participant.
           Although along with Concord the core group is the Heritage
           Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and the Committee for
           Economic Development, others are also actively supporting and
           participating in the effort-the state treasurers, auditors and
           comptrollers, the American Institute of Certified Public
           Accountants, AARP, and the National Academy of Public
           Administration. I am pleased to take part in this national
           education and outreach effort to help the public understand the
           nature and magnitude of the long-term financial challenge facing
           this nation. This is important because while process reform can
           structure choices and help, broad understanding of the problem is
           also essential. After all, from a practical standpoint, the public
           needs to understand the nature and extent of our fiscal challenge
           before their elected representatives are likely to act.

           Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my prepared remarks. I
           would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

           Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
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           Assistant Director; Carlos Diz, Assistant General Counsel; and
           Melissa Wolf, Senior Analyst.

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Better Incentives and Signals

3GAO, Mandatory Spending: Using Budget Triggers to Constrain Growth,
GAO-06-276 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2006).

4For the purpose of the Medicare trigger, general revenue Medicare funding
is defined as the difference between Medicare program outlays and
dedicated Medicare financing sources. Dedicated Medicare financing sources
are defined as Hospital Insurance (HI) payroll taxes; the HI share of
income taxes on Social Security benefits; state transfers for Part D
prescription drug benefits; premiums paid under Parts A, B, and D; and any
gifts received by the trust funds.

5The Boards of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal
Supplementary Insurance Trust Funds, The 2006 Annual Report of the Boards
of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary
Medical Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, D.C.: May 2006), 27.

6The response would include a sequester if Congress did not act on the
President's proposal. The proposed sequester would result in a four-tenths
of a percent reduction in all payments to providers beginning in the year
the threshold is exceeded. Each year the shortfall continues to occur the
reduction would grow by an additional four-tenths of a percent. We have
not yet analyzed how this would work.

Increased Transparency and Disclosure of Long-term Costs

7This figure is as of the end of 2005-it will be higher at the end of this
year.

8While most budget enforcement mechanisms expired in fiscal year 2002,
Congress generally includes overall limits on discretionary spending and
PAYGO points of order in its budget resolution to manage its internal
budget process.

9Congressional Research Service, Supplemental Appropriations: Trends and
Budgetary Impacts Since 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2, 2005).

                            Concluding Observations

10GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).

                          Contacts and Acknowledgments

(450497)

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For more information, contact Susan J. Irving at (202) 512-9142 or
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Highlights of GAO-06-761T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

May 25, 2006

BUDGET PROCESS

Better Transparency, Controls, Triggers, and Default Mechanisms Would Help
to Address Our Large and Growing Long-term Fiscal Challenge

The nation's long-term fiscal outlook is daunting. While the budget
process has not caused the problems we face, the absence of meaningful
budget controls and other mechanisms has served to compound our fiscal
challenge. Conversely, a process that illuminates the looming fiscal
pressures and provides appropriate incentives can at least help decision
makers focus on the right questions. Meaningful budget controls and other
mechanisms can also help to assure that difficult but necessary choices
are made.

The budget process needs to provide incentives and signals to address
commitments the government has already made and better transparency for
and controls on the long-term fiscal exposures being considered.
Improvements would include the restoration of realistic discretionary
caps; application of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) discipline to both mandatory
spending and revenue legislation; the use of "triggers" for some mandatory
programs; and better reporting of fiscal exposures.

Over the long term we face a large and growing structural deficit due
primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care costs.
Continuing on this imprudent and unsustainable fiscal path will gradually
erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and
ultimately our national security. Our current path will also increasingly
constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs
and increase the burdens that will be faced by our children,
grandchildren, and future generations.

The budget process itself cannot solve this problem, but it can help
policymakers make tough but necessary choices. If citizens and government
officials come to better understand various fiscal exposures and their
implications for the future, they are more likely to insist on prudent
policy choices today and sensible levels of fiscal risk in the future.

Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP Assuming Discretionary Spending
Grows with GDP after 2006 and All Expiring Tax Provisions Are Extended

Note: This includes certain tax provisions that expired at the end of
2005, such as the increased alternative minimum tax exemption amount.

We cannot grow our way out of our long-term fiscal challenge. We must make
tough choices and the sooner the better. A multi-pronged approach is
needed: (1) revise existing budget processes and financial reporting
requirements, (2) restructure existing entitlement programs, (3) reexamine
the base of discretionary and other spending, and (4) review and revise
tax policy and enforcement programs-including tax expenditures. Everything
must be on the table and a credible and effective Entitlement and Tax
Reform Commission may be necessary. Fundamentally we need a top-to-bottom
review of government activities to ensure their relevance and fit for the
21st century and their relative priority.
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