Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to
Future Olympic Games (30-JUN-06, GAO-06-753).
The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic
Games to take place overseas since September 11, 2001. The United
States worked with Italy to ensure the security of U.S. citizens,
and it expects to continue such support for future Games,
including the 2008 Games in Beijing, China. GAO was asked to (1)
discuss the U.S. approach for providing security support for the
2006 Winter Games and how such efforts were coordinated, (2)
identify the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security support
for the Games and how they financed their activities, (3) review
lessons learned in providing security support and the application
of prior lessons learned, and (4) identify U.S. efforts under way
for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-753
ACCNO: A56201
TITLE: Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S.
Support to Future Olympic Games
DATE: 06/30/2006
SUBJECT: Americans abroad
International cooperation
International relations
Lessons learned
Physical security
Interagency relations
Antiterrorism
Security operations
2006 Winter Olympic Games
2008 Summer Olympic Games
Beijing (China)
Turin (Italy)
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GAO-06-753
* Results in Brief
* Background
* U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabili
* U.S. Security Support Informed by an Understanding of Italia
* U.S. Olympic Security Support Was Coordinated by the U.S. Em
* Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 20
* Several U.S. Agencies Provided Security Support for the 2006
* United States Spent Millions, but Lacks a Formal Mechanism f
* Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and
* U.S. Government Agencies Applied Key Lessons Learned from th
* Planning Early for U.S. Security Support Activities
* Designating Key U.S. Officials to Lead Efforts and Present U
* Centralizing U.S. Activities in One Location
* U.S. Agencies Identified Additional Lessons Learned in Turin
* Establishing a U.S. Operations Center at the Location of Gam
* Establishing Clear Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Agenc
* Planning Early for Several Years of Olympic-Related Costs
* Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Sup
* Conclusions
* Recommendations
* Agency Comments
* Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
* Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Staff Acknowledgments
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
June 2006
OLYMPIC SECURITY
Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games
GAO-06-753
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2
Background 4
U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities,
Supported by Coordinated U.S. Government Effort 9
Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter
Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but
Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements 14
Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional
Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games 20
Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for 2008
Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges 26
Conclusions 29
Recommendations 29
Agency Comments 30
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32
Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 35
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38
Table
Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Roles and the Activities Provided for the 2006
Winter Games 15
Figures
Figure 1: Venue Locations of 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy 7
Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. Security Support Activities for the 2006 Winter
Games 11
Figure 3: Key Agency Expenditures for the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006
Winter Games 19
Figure 4: Venue Locations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics 28
Abbreviations
DCI data collection instrument
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
OSAC Overseas Security Advisory Council
TSA Transportation Security Administration
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
June 30, 2006
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking
Minority Member Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives
The 2006 Winter Games1 in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games to
take place overseas since September 11, 2001, in a climate of heightened
concerns about international terrorism. A variety of factors created a
challenging threat environment for the 2006 Winter Games, including
increased security tension worldwide due to the Iraq war; the known
presence of Italy-based international terrorist cells; past al-Qaeda
threats to coalition partners, of which Italy is one; and recent terrorist
incidents in Europe. Despite such security concerns, Italy hosted a safe
and secure event with no terrorist incidents. Although the host government
is responsible for the overall security of the Olympic Games, the United
States worked with the Italian government, in advance of and throughout
the Games, to ensure the security of U.S. athletes, spectators, and
commercial investors. The U.S. government expects to continue working with
host governments to ensure the security of U.S. citizens and interests at
future Games, including the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics and Paralympics
in Beijing, China.
This report (1) discusses the U.S. approach for providing security support
for the 2006 Winter Games and how such security efforts were coordinated,
(2) identifies the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security support to
the 2006 Winter Games and reviews how they financed their activities, (3)
reviews lessons learned in providing security support and the application
of prior lessons learned, and (4) identifies U.S. efforts under way for
providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
1For the purpose of this report, the term "2006 Winter Games" refers to
the 2006 Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. The 2006 Turin Winter
Olympic Games were held February 10 to 26, 2006, and the 2006 Turin
Paralympic Games were held March 10 to 19, 2006, in Turin, Italy.
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available
interagency and agency-specific operations plans for the 2006 Winter Games
and documentation on the U.S. support provided for the 2006 Winter Games.
In addition, we interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State),
Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE),
and at certain intelligence agencies, and attended interagency
coordination meetings. Also, we traveled to Italy in November 2005 to
observe U.S. planning efforts for providing security support to the 2006
Winter Games. While in Italy, we interviewed U.S. officials in Rome,
Milan, and Turin and met with Italian officials in Rome to obtain their
perspective on the security support provided by the United States. Lastly,
we also interviewed an official of a U.S. corporate sponsor of the
Olympics and participated in a security briefing for corporate sponsors to
gain their perspectives on the security support provided by the United
States. Appendix I contains additional details on our objectives, scope,
and methodology. We conducted our review between September 2005 and May
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
The U.S. government, led by State, assisted in the protection of U.S.
athletes, spectators, and commercial investors during the 2006 Winter
Games in Turin through a U.S. security presence in Italy and security
support to the Italian government. In October 2004, the United States
began planning its approach for providing security support to the 2006
Winter Games. The United States based much of its security strategy on its
understanding of Italy's security capabilities, gained through its
counterterrorism and military partnership with the country. On the basis
of this understanding, the United States provided the Italian government
with an offer of security assistance in the spring of 2005, and the
Italian government accepted some of this assistance-mostly in the form of
crisis management and response support. To support U.S. efforts at the
2006 Winter Games, the U.S. government established a coordination office
in Turin as a central point for security information and logistical
support, and to provide consular services to U.S. citizens during the
Games. Security support for the 2006 Winter Games was coordinated by the
U.S. Embassy in Rome, which delegated the coordination of many interagency
efforts in-country to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Moreover, these
efforts in Italy were supported by a State-chaired interagency working
group-the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group-in
Washington, D.C., which conducted the domestic side of coordinating
agencies' contributions to the U.S. effort. While the interagency working
group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. efforts in providing
security support for overseas athletic events, State and DOJ officials
have indicated that formal guidance that articulates a charter; a mission;
and agencies' authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in
planning for security support to future Games.
Approximately 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies
provided more than $16 million in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for security
support activities for the 2006 Winter Games. The roles of these
agencies-which included State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ-included crisis
management support through personnel, equipment, and training and
providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes,
spectators, and commercial investors. U.S. government agencies identified
specific costs for the Turin Games, including more than $5 million for
travel and lodging expenses for U.S. personnel who were temporarily
assigned to Turin and about $720,000 for activities associated with joint
U.S. agency operations, including the establishment of an interagency
operations center in Turin. Funds providing security support to the 2006
Winter Games came from agencies' existing accounts over a 2-year period,
and agencies did not receive specific Olympic-related appropriations. In
addition, the reported costs do not capture the entirety of costs for
supporting the 2006 Winter Games, particularly the salaries of many U.S.
officials who worked to support the U.S. effort. The U.S. Embassy in Rome
initially paid for agencies' shared costs, such as those associated with
the establishment of a U.S. operations center in Turin, which were later
reimbursed by the participating agencies. Although the U.S. Embassy in
Rome paid for lodging and administrative support, it struggled to do so,
particularly as costs rose due to changing requirements. The interagency
working group coordinates agencies' support to U.S. efforts at these
Games, but the group does not have a mechanism for identifying costs,
coordinating budget requests, and addressing potential funding issues for
U.S. security support to future Games. State and DOJ officials indicated
that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs and addressing
potential funding issues would be useful in providing U.S. security
support to future Olympic Games.
Key lessons learned from the 2004 Athens Summer Games were applied in the
planning efforts for Turin, and additional lessons were identified for
future Games. These lessons from Athens included the importance of
planning early for U.S. security support activities; designating key U.S.
officials to serve as point persons for political, security, and logistics
arrangements and for the delivery of unified messages; and establishing a
colocation of intelligence and interagency operations. Following the 2006
Winter Games, the U.S. agencies involved with providing security support
identified a number of additional lessons learned, such as establishing a
fully equipped, temporary operations center at the location of the
Olympics if no embassy or consulate is nearby; establishing clear roles
and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and crisis
response efforts; and planning for Olympic-related costs over several
fiscal years. Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel communicated
these lessons learned to their counterparts who are preparing for the 2008
Summer Games in Beijing.
State, through the U.S. Mission in Beijing, is taking steps to identify
the types of security support that the United States may be able to
provide to support China's security efforts for the 2008 Beijing Games and
to ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial
investors. For example, in January 2006, a U.S. official was appointed to
the U.S. mission in Beijing to serve as a U.S. government point person on
Olympic security with the Chinese government. As of April 2006, the United
States and China were discussing a possible joint assessment to identify
security needs for the 2008 Beijing Games.
To enhance future planning for U.S. security support for overseas Olympic
and Paralympic Games, we are recommending in this report that the
Secretary of State, in consultation with members of the interagency
working group-the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating
Group, develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security
support to future Games. We are also recommending that the Secretary of
State, in consultation with members of the interagency working group,
develop a finance subgroup within the working group to help agencies
identify and plan for anticipated resource needs, coordinate their budget
requests, and address potential funding issues for U.S. security support
to future Games.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed with our findings
and recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to begin
implementing them. State, DOD, and DOJ also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated where appropriate.
Background
Since the first Winter Olympic Games in 1924, the event has grown from 258
athletes representing 16 countries to, in the case of the 2006 Turin
Olympics, approximately 5,000 athletes and coaches from 85 countries. In
addition, an estimated 1.5 million spectators and 10,000 media personnel
attended the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. While the stated goal of the
Olympic movement is "to contribute to building a peaceful and better
world," its history includes tragedy and terror as well. At the 1972
Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic team,
resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. The 1996 Atlanta Olympic
Games were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed 1 person and
injured 110 others.
One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries
bidding to host the Games is to ensure the security of the participating
athletes and spectators, which is an increasingly challenging task in
today's environment of terrorist threats. According to State documents,
Italy spent approximately $110 million on security operations for the 2006
Winter Games. In addition, the Italian government designated 15,000 law
enforcement personnel, along with military and intelligence support, to
provide for overall security for the Winter Games. Italy's Ministry of
Interior designated the Prefect of Turin as the local government authority
responsible for providing security inside the official venues of the
Winter Games.
Italy faced the challenge of hosting an Olympics amid a heightened
terrorist threat environment. Al-Qaeda has made threats to coalition
partners in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Moreover, in March 2004, a
terrorist attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200
people, and, in July 2005, a terrorist attack on commuter trains and a bus
in London, England, killed over 50 people and injured more than 700. In
addition, there is a known presence of Italy-based international terrorist
cells and domestic anarchist groups that actively target multinational
corporations, critical infrastructure, and government facilities. Italy
has highly advanced antiterrorism capabilities and has recently taken
additional antiterrorism measures, such as enactment of improved
antiterrorism laws and increased physical security measures. Since 2001,
several extremist plots in Milan and Rome have been detected and
prevented. In addition to these explicit terror threats, Italy has faced
difficult security challenges at other recent major events, such as the
meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa in 2001, at which activists clashed
violently with Italian police forces, and the funeral of Pope John Paul II
in April 2005.
In planning for the 2006 Winter Games, winter conditions presented another
set of challenges. The Winter Games were located in the remote, northwest
corner of Italy, with venues spread over an extensive land area. Although
smaller in scale than the 2004 Athens Summer Games, the 2006 Winter
Olympic venues included mountain locations that were as far as 60 miles
away from Turin, with limited access routes to these mountain sites. (See
fig. 1 for locations of venues for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin,
Italy.) Locating suitable lodging for U.S. security and support personnel
near key venues was necessary. Furthermore, the distance from the nearest
U.S. presence-the U.S. Consulate in Milan, which is located about a
90-minute drive from Turin-required the establishment of a temporary U.S.
post in Turin to support U.S. security efforts and serve as a platform for
U.S. activities.
Figure 1: Venue Locations of 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy
Although the host government has the ultimate responsibility for providing
security for the Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in
ensuring the safety of its citizens in all Olympic locations. In 2001, the
United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Athens
Summer Olympics, responding both to the heightened worldwide anxiety
following the September 11 attacks and to Greece's request for
international advice on its security plan. Despite widespread fears of a
potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and
secure event with no terrorist incidents. With the conclusion of the
Athens Games, the United States began planning for security support to the
2006 Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. This security support is
provided by the United States under general executive branch policy
guidance and individual agency authorities. For example, State officials
cited the use of Presidential Decision Directive 62, which extends the
U.S. counterterrorism policy in Presidential Decision Directive 39 to the
protection of Americans overseas. State is the lead agency for ensuring
the protection of American citizens overseas. According to U.S. officials
in Italy, up to 20,000 Americans attended the 2006 Turin Olympics daily.
The next Olympics will be the Summer Games in Beijing, China, August 8 to
24, 2008; followed by the Paralympics, September 6 to 17, 2008. Venues for
these Games will be spread out across seven cities in China, presenting
unique logistical and coordination challenges for security support
efforts. According to State officials, over 1 million spectators are
expected to attend the 2008 Beijing Games, including a large number of
Americans. The next Winter Olympic Games will be held in Vancouver,
Canada, February 12 to 28, 2010, followed by the Paralympics on March 12
to 21, 2010. The close proximity of these Games to the United States
presents distinctive challenges, such as border security issues. In 2012,
the United Kingdom will host the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in
London. Past terrorist incidents in London and an ongoing terrorist threat
climate are likely to present security challenges for these Games.
U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities, Supported by
Coordinated U.S. Government Effort
The security support that the United States provided for the 2006 Winter
Games was largely based on an understanding of Italy's advanced security
capabilities gained through a long-standing, U.S.-Italian counterterrorism
and military partnership. The U.S. Embassy in Rome led the coordinated
governmentwide effort-delegating responsibility for the coordination of
U.S. activities in Turin to the U.S. Consulate in Milan-and was supported
by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency group.
U.S. Security Support Informed by an Understanding of Italian Security
Capabilities, but without a Formal Assessment of Italy's Olympic Security Plans
Following the Athens Games in the summer of 2004, the United States began
planning for (1) the security support it would provide to the Italian
government and (2) the protection of U.S. citizens who would be
participating in or attending the 2006 Winter Games. In October 2004, the
United States held a 3-day interagency conference in Milan for Italy- and
U.S.-based officials who would be working on the 2006 Winter Games to
share lessons learned from the U.S. effort in Athens and to begin
determining U.S. security support for Turin.
The United States largely based its security support approach on its
understanding of Italian security capabilities, gained from long-standing
counterterrorism and military relationships with Italy. In particular, the
United States and Italy have an established partnership as members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, more recently, as coalition
partners in Iraq. According to U.S. officials, the Italian government's
sensitivities about formally sharing certain information limited the
United States' ability to formally assess Italy's operational plans for
providing security for the 2006 Winter Games. Agency officials noted that
this made U.S. efforts to plan security and emergency contingencies during
the Games more difficult. However, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator
and other key officials were able to use established relationships with
their Italian counterparts to develop a working knowledge of Italy's plans
and capabilities for providing security to the 2006 Winter Games and to
plan U.S. security efforts. For example, U.S. officials met with their
Italian security and law enforcement counterparts to receive information
on Italy's security structure and Olympic security integration plan.
In addition, over several months in 2005, State reported that more than 20
technical meetings were held between Italian authorities and U.S.
representatives from the U.S. Mission in Italy and various federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to coordinate bilateral cooperation
during the Games. Moreover, Italian government representatives held
meetings in 2005 with representatives from the United States and other
interested governments to discuss Italy's security plans for the Games.
For example, in September 2005, the Italian government hosted an
international seminar on security concepts for the management of major
sporting events, with law enforcement representatives from 11 countries.
Furthermore, in October 2005, U.S. representatives were invited by the
Italian government to observe its antiterrorism drills testing the
efficiency and response capability of the local law enforcement,
emergency, and rescue systems in four Italian cities.
On the basis of its understanding of Italy's security capabilities, the
United States identified specific training and security support that could
be provided to support Italy's security efforts. In March 2005, the
Italian government requested a consolidated list of the offers of U.S.
security assistance, and the interagency working group in Washington
identified the available sources and capabilities among the represented
agencies to prevent duplication of efforts. In the spring of 2005, this
interagency working group provided a comprehensive offer of security
support for the 2006 Winter Games, comprising a variety of specific offers
from several U.S. agencies. Italy accepted a number of these offers,
including crisis management expertise, an assessment of Turin's
international airport, and mapping assistance.
In addition to direct security assistance to Italy, the United States
conducted several exercises to test its own strategies for supporting
Italy's security efforts and ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens
during the 2006 Winter Games. In November and December 2005, the United
States conducted several tabletop exercises to test strategies for
ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens, including a joint crisis
management exercise that focused on a theoretical terrorist attack in
Italy and a crisis management exercise held over several days in Rome,
Milan, and Turin to test U.S. crisis planning and execution in preparation
for the Games. Figure 2 provides a timeline of U.S. security support
activities for the 2006 Winter Games.
Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. Security Support Activities for the 2006 Winter
Games
U.S. Olympic Security Support Was Coordinated by the U.S. Embassy in Rome and
Supported by Interagency Efforts
The U.S. Embassy in Rome-under the leadership of the U.S. Ambassador to
Italy-led the coordinated interagency efforts in Italy under one
centralized U.S. government mission. The U.S. Ambassador delegated the
responsibility for coordinating and overseeing U.S. interagency efforts in
Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Located approximately
90-minutes away from Turin, the Consulate in Milan oversaw the
establishment of a temporary U.S. presence in Turin to centralize U.S.
agency operations and the efforts of key U.S. officials serving as
designated point persons for coordinating security and logistical
arrangements.
To centralize all U.S. activities in Turin leading up to and during the
Games, the U.S. Mission in Italy established a U.S. Olympic Coordination
Office in Turin to coordinate U.S. security support activities. Under the
direction of the U.S. Ambassador and through the U.S. Consul General in
Milan, this office served as the center for U.S. security operations and
other activities. In particular, during the Games, this office housed a
U.S. Olympic command group, comprising senior representatives from State,
DOD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The U.S. command group
was responsible for providing-in the event of a request for assistance by
the Italian government-specialized expertise in a variety of areas,
including security operations, crisis operations, terrorism
investigations, consequence management, and intelligence collection and
dissemination. In addition, this office provided limited consular services
to American citizens and included a public diplomacy office to liaison
with press and support VIP visits during the Games.
U.S. efforts in Italy were supported by a Washington, D.C.-based
interagency working group-the International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group-which included representatives from the intelligence
community, State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ, among others.2 Specifically,
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism serve as cochairs of this interagency working group.
Chaired by State, the interagency working group facilitated and
coordinated, on the domestic side, agencies' contributions for the 2006
Winter Games. While this interagency working group has been a useful forum
for coordinating the domestic side of U.S. efforts in providing security
support to overseas athletic events, it operates without written
operational guidance and without the authority for tasking participating
agencies in planning for future Olympic Games, according to State and DOJ
officials. Specifically, the interagency working group does not have a
charter or mission statement that establishes the roles and
responsibilities of this group and its members.
U.S officials from State and DOJ indicated that, although U.S. support for
Turin was coordinated through the interagency working group, the group's
lack of clear authority presents confusion over what direction and
guidance it can provide for U.S. operations in support of future Olympic
Games. This confusion has impacted the efforts of some subgroups formed,
in late 2004, by the interagency working group to provide guidance in
several key areas. For example, of the subgroups that focus on logistics,
transportation security, law enforcement, and intelligence support, only
the intelligence support subgroup meets on a regular basis. The subgroup
for law enforcement support met only a few times, in part due to the lack
of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of participating members.
According to a State official from DS, the interagency working group
relied on U.S. officials in Italy to inform the group of what support was
needed. The same official indicated that clearly defined authorities and
responsibilities for the group's participating agencies may support the
implementation of effective subgroups in the future. In addition, DS
established a major events coordination unit after the 2004 Athens Summer
Games, in part to coordinate U.S. security support for major sporting
events overseas, according to a State official. However, this unit does
not have written guidance for implementing coordination responsibilities
for future Olympic events and other major sporting events.3 Without formal
guidance, planning for future Olympic events could be complicated, as
roles and responsibilities will have to be redefined on a case-by-case
basis. Moreover, given the regular turnover of key staff, such written
guidance could facilitate the continuity of future planning efforts.
2Established in December 2001, the interagency working group serves to
coordinate U.S. government security support efforts to U.S. embassies and
host governments sponsoring major international sporting events. The
interagency working group aims to keep all participating agencies informed
and prevent duplicative or conflicting efforts by those involved.
To plan and coordinate U.S. security support operations, State and DOJ
officials in Turin worked closely with representatives from the
interagency working group. However, these officials in Turin experienced
difficulties in planning for interagency operations, in part due to
problems in obtaining timely information and decisions from the agencies.
For example, State and DOJ officials had difficulty identifying
requirements for operations, such as space and classification
requirements, due to communication challenges with the interagency
community in Washington. According to State officials in Italy and
Washington, the lack of proper communication capabilities in the U.S.
Olympic Coordination Office in Turin made it difficult to obtain timely
information from the agencies. The interagency working group worked to
coordinate responses to these officials in Turin. However, State and FBI
officials in Turin indicated that many of the agencies did not fully
understand the communication infrastructure and logistical requirements
until they sent representatives to Turin in the fall of 2005. FBI
officials have stated that although the interagency working group works to
support the needs of the U.S. effort overseas, it has no authority to task
agencies to meet deadlines, which leads to confusion over what direction
and guidance should be followed or given by this group.
3The major events coordination unit within DS is responsible for drawing
on resources throughout State to coordinate overseas security support
provided to foreign governments and U.S. missions for major events and
State's support provided to domestic events, according to a State official
and agency documents.
Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter Games;
United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but Lacks Formal
Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements
Several U.S. agencies contributed to the U.S. security support effort in
Turin, identifying more than $16 million in costs-over fiscal years 2005
and 2006-to arrange and provide for this support. State initially paid for
agencies' shared costs, which were reimbursed by funds from the
participating agencies; however, no formal mechanism exists for
coordinating financial requirements associated with providing security
support.
Several U.S. Agencies Provided Security Support for the 2006 Winter Games
Approximately 20 U.S. agencies, or their component entities, contributed
to security efforts for the 2006 Winter Games. These contributions ranged
from crisis management and investigative expertise to the provision of
equipment, training, and communications and logistical support. Key
agencies that contributed to the U.S. effort in Turin included State, DHS,
DOD, DOE, DOJ, and intelligence agencies. State coordinated the U.S.
interagency efforts in both Italy and Washington, D.C., and also provided
security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and
commercial investors.4 See table 1 for key contributions of U.S. agencies
for the 2006 Winter Games.
4Other U.S. assistance for U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial
investors included protection services, consular and public diplomacy
services, and security-related information.
Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Roles and the Activities Provided for the 2006
Winter Games
Agency/Entity or office Role/Security support activity
Department of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security Protects U.S. personnel and missions
(DS) overseas, advising U.S. ambassadors on
all security matters and providing a
security program against terrorist,
espionage, and criminal threats at U.S.
diplomatic facilities.
For the Games, DS planned, developed,
implemented, and coordinated with the
Italian government to ensure that the
appropriate assistance and protection was
provided to U.S. athletes and all U.S.
interests during the Games. DS assigned
agents to serve in a liaison role at each
of the major sporting venues and at each
official and nonofficial Olympic site,
and provided a security liaison official
to work with the Italian government.
Office of the Coordinator for Heads U.S. government efforts to improve
Counterterrorism counterterrorism cooperation with foreign
governments.
The office led the Foreign Emergency
Support Team, which is an interagency
rapid-response team, to assist the
Italian government should it request such
support in the event of a terrorist
attack.
Consular Affairs Assists American citizens traveling or
living abroad.
Consular Affairs increased its outreach
to American spectators attending the
Games and provided various services, such
as replacing lost passports. Consular
Affairs also provided support to Mission
Italy's crisis preparedness measures.
Overseas Security Advisory Facilitates the timely exchange of
Council (OSAC) information between the U.S. government
and the U.S. private sector on security
issues.
OSAC served as the lead agency for all
actions concerning private sector
sponsors. During the Games, OSAC served
as the primary U.S. government point of
contact for the U.S. private sector on
security concerns.
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation Conducts investigations and intelligence
(FBI) collection commensurate with the FBI's
roles and responsibilities to identify
and counter the threat posed by domestic
and international terrorists and their
supporters within the United States, and
to pursue extraterritorial criminal
investigations to bring the perpetrators
of terrorist acts to justice.
The FBI provided training, as requested
by the Italian government. During the
Games, FBI agents were prestaged in Turin
to provide crisis management assistance
in the event of a terrorist attack.
Criminal Division Provides training and assistance to
foreign law enforcement and develops and
prosecutes cases against perpetrators of
extraterritorial terrorist acts.
The Criminal Division offered training,
coordinated with the lead terrorism
prosecutor/magistrate for the Turin area,
and prestaged a prosecutor in Turin
during the Games to provide assistance
and fulfill case development
responsibilities in the event of a
terrorist act.
Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Aims to prevent and deter terrorist
Administration (TSA) attacks and protect against and respond
to threats and hazards to the nation,
including safeguarding the American
people; their freedoms, critical
infrastructure, and property; and the
economy.
During the Games, TSA ensured compliance
to federal aviation security regulations,
conducted Federal Air Marshal missions,
and acted as an advisory body both to the
Italian and the U.S. governments for
transportation security issues.
Federal Air Marshal Service Protects U.S. air carriers and passengers
against hostile acts.
For the Games, the service provided
additional air marshals to accompany
U.S.-based carriers traveling to and from
Italy for the Games.
U.S. Secret Service Provides protection services for its
protectees.
During the Games, the Secret Service
provided protection for their protectees
that attended.
Department of Defense
European Command Protects and advances U.S. national
interests, such as the safety of U.S.
citizens at home and abroad and the
security and well-being of allies.
Provided personnel and equipment to
support U.S. security efforts in Turin.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Provides imagery, imagery intelligence,
Agency and geospatial data and information for
planning, decision making, and action in
support of national security.
This agency, in collaboration with Italy,
provided detailed geospatial information
to Italian and U.S. government agencies
to assist with their security,
consequence management, and emergency
response planning efforts.
Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Promotes international nuclear safety and
Administration nonproliferation to reduce global danger
from weapons of mass destruction.
Provided personnel in support of the
Foreign Emergency Support Team, a
State-led interagency rapid-response
team.
Other agencies The National Counterterrorism Center, the
Central Intelligence Agency, among
others, provided additional security
support for the 2006 Winter Games.
Source: GAO.
State operated under Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 39, which
extend U.S. responsibility for protection of Americans overseas and direct
State as the lead agency to ensure the protection of American citizens
overseas. Furthermore, the Omnibus and Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986 directs DS to develop and implement policies and
programs for the security of U.S. government operations, including the
protection of all U.S. government personnel (other than those under
military command) on official duty abroad, and the establishment and
operation of security functions at all U.S. government missions.5 DS is
responsible for the establishment and operation of post security and
protective functions abroad,6 and for liaisons with host nation officials
to ensure the safety of official U.S. citizens. The Bureau of Consular
Affairs is responsible for assisting private Americans traveling and
residing abroad. Under State's leadership, other agencies' individual
authorities were used to provide specific assistance to the Italian
government. For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
has the authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to
deploy federal air marshals on all select flights from the United States
to Italy, and TSA did so for the 2006 Winter Games.
522 U.S.C. 4802 (a)(1)(2).
6Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 214, 59 FR 50790; 1
Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 261.1 - 261.3; 12 FAM 011, 012.
United States Spent Millions, but Lacks a Formal Mechanism for Coordinating
Financial Requirements for Security Support
We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security support
in advance of and during the 2006 Winter Games. These agencies identified
more than $16 million in costs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to arrange
and provide security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games,7 with
funds from multiple accounts.8 U.S. agencies did not receive specific
Olympic-related appropriations during this period. Of the $16 million,
agencies reported to us that they spent more than $5 million in travel
costs, including airfare, lodging, and per diem costs for staff who
traveled overseas in 2005 and 2006 to provide security support for the
2006 Winter Games. The reported costs during this period do not capture
the entirety of costs for activities in support of the 2006 Winter Games.
For example, while reported costs include the salaries of key personnel
who filled Olympic-related coordination roles, they do not capture the
salaries and benefits of other U.S. officials who worked to support the
U.S. effort for the Games, as part of their regular duties.
State paid for lodging and other administrative support needs associated
with establishing U.S. operations in Turin in advance, often to secure
limited housing at a lower rate, and these costs were later reimbursed by
the participating agencies. Specifically, the U.S. Embassy in Rome paid
for initial deposits on hotels because some agencies in Athens had
struggled to identify available funding-often, several years in advance of
the Games-for their housing and logistics needs. For Turin, some agencies
provided funds to State in advance of the Games, particularly for lodging
deposits, while additional reimbursements were made after the Games.
According to a State finance official in Rome, State provided $140,000 on
lodging contracts and $720,000 on joint administrative services associated
with U.S. interagency operations in Turin.9 The U.S. Embassy in Rome was
later reimbursed by participating agencies, including State, for their
portion of these joint administrative services.
7This total includes National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency costs for
security support provided for the 2006 Winter Games, but does not include
the costs incurred by other entities of the U.S. intelligence community.
8Entities within each agency used their program accounts to fund their
specific activities.
According to State officials in Italy, although the U.S. Embassy in Rome
was able to fund these expenses, it struggled to cover them, particularly
as costs rose due to the changing requirements of the agencies in
outfitting suitable space for their operations. These changing
requirements made it difficult for budget personnel at the U.S. Embassy in
Rome to identify total joint administrative costs in order to obtain funds
from State and other agencies in a timely manner. Although the interagency
working group coordinates the domestic side of agency support for U.S.
efforts at major international sporting events, it does not have a formal
mechanism for addressing funding issues associated with providing this
support. State and DOJ officials told us that it would be easier to plan
and budget for future Olympic-security support activities overseas, which
often begin several years in advance of the Games, if a framework were
available for identifying costs and determining how these costs will be
funded as early as possible. Such a framework would also be useful for
anticipating resource needs, coordinating budgetary requests, and
addressing potential funding issues associated with providing U.S.
security support to future overseas Games.10
Agencies have reported their expenditures associated with providing
security support for both the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006
Winter Games in Turin.11 Although the total reported expenditures for
providing security support to these overseas Games are not directly
comparable, in part due to the differing sizes of the Games and the
differing nature of U.S. security support, they can be helpful in
identifying future costs.12 For both Games, State and DOD reported the two
largest portions of costs associated with providing U.S. security support.
For the 2004 Summer Games, State and DOD spent $15 million and $12.2
million, respectively. For the 2006 Winter Games, State and DOD spent $6.9
million and $6.6 million, respectively. See figure 3 for key agencies'
reported expenditures for security support to the 2004 Summer Games and
the 2006 Winter Games.
9U.S. joint operations included the following: rental fees, commissioning
and decommissioning of the U.S. operations center, vehicle rentals,
facility maintenance services, administrative support, communication and
other equipment, and medical supplies.
10Pursuant to an annual appropriations restriction enacted by Congress,
agencies may not contribute to the interagency financing of boards,
committees, or similar groups that do not have prior and specific
statutory approval to receive financial support from multiple agencies.
See section 810 of Public Law 109-115. This provision, however, would not
preclude agencies from providing reimbursement to State for goods and
services provided to those agencies under the authority of the Economy
Act, or other appropriate authority, such as section 23 of State's Basic
Authorities Act 22 U.S.C. 2695.
11GAO, Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for
Future Olympics, GAO-05-547 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005).
Figure 3: Key Agency Expenditures for the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006
Winter Games
The nature of U.S. security support provided by key agencies differed
between the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 Winter Games in
Turin. For the Athens Games, the majority of costs identified by the
agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting the Games and for
training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel.
Agencies reported that they spent more than $9 million on training
programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel, including the
costs for building and executing the consequence management military
exercises and FBI forensics training as well as for translating training
materials and providing translators at the training sessions. For the
Turin Games, U.S. agencies reported that they spent $95,000 on training
programs for Italian officials and security personnel. As previously
mentioned, the majority of the Turin Games costs identified by the
agencies were for U.S. personnel travel and salary, benefits, and related
expenditures for staff who were hired to fill Olympic-related coordination
roles.
12Except for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, costs from the
intelligence community entities were not included in the reported costs
for U.S. security support to the 2006 Winter Games.
Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional Lessons
Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games
Key lessons learned from the 2004 Summer Games were applied in the
planning efforts for Turin, including (1) planning early for U.S. security
support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead and deliver unified
messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. resources and interagency operations.
U.S. agencies are currently collecting lessons learned from the Turin
Games, for distribution to agencies involved in security planning for the
Beijing Games and other future Olympic Games. According to U.S. officials
involved in the Turin Games, these lessons include the importance of (1)
establishing a fully equipped, temporary operations center at the location
of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby; (2) establishing clear
roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and crisis
response efforts; and (3) planning for Olympic-related expenditures over
several fiscal years.
U.S. Government Agencies Applied Key Lessons Learned from the Athens Games to
the Turin Games
As we reported in 2005, key lessons learned from the Athens Games that
were highlighted in numerous agency after-action reports and in an
interagency "lessons learned" conference in Milan were applied to the
security planning for the Turin Games.13 These lessons included the
importance of (1) planning early for U.S. security support, (2)
designating key U.S. officials to lead efforts and deliver unified
messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. agency operations and intelligence
activities.
Planning Early for U.S. Security Support Activities
Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials' comments
indicated the importance of planning early-for providing crisis response
support, counterterrorism and intelligence support, and other
capabilities-coupled with an understanding of host country security
capabilities that an existing and cooperative bilateral relationship
affords. Such early insight enables advance planning of baseline support,
including logistics as well as training and military exercises to enhance
the host country's capabilities. Furthermore, early planning of baseline
U.S. support enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more
efficiently and effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle
rentals, and communications infrastructure. For example, advance
notification of the expected U.S. agency presence would allow for planning
of support infrastructure, including the operations and intelligence
center. U.S. officials planning for the Turin Games identified the
importance of this lesson and began planning immediately after the Athens
Games, almost 1 1/2 years in advance of the Turin Games.
13 GAO-05-547 .
This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games as the United
States has already begun its planning efforts over 2 years in advance of
the Games. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, U.S. officials in
Greece; Italy; and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with their
counterparts in Beijing. The U.S. Mission in Beijing is taking steps to
plan for baseline support and identify the types of security support that
the United States may provide for the Beijing Games. While U.S. agencies
are focusing on the Beijing Games, they also are beginning to assess
potential roles for U.S. security support for the 2010 Vancouver Winter
Games. These plans are still in the early stages, although bilateral
U.S.-Canada state and federal security and transportation officials have
already met to discuss Canada's Olympic planning process. The Vancouver
Games, located in close proximity to the U.S. border, will present new and
different challenges for U.S. security support, such as cross-border
security issues.
Designating Key U.S. Officials to Lead Efforts and Present Unified Message
The designation of certain U.S. officials to serve as point persons for
U.S. security support efforts is another key lesson from Athens that was
applied in Turin. In Athens, the U.S. Embassy had designated individuals
to be responsible for political, security, and logistics arrangements,
which helped to avoid separate requests for assistance from U.S. agencies
and minimized overlap among and overreach by participating U.S. agencies.
Athens- and Washington-based officials recommended this strategy for
future use. In September 2004, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy delegated
organizational responsibility and overall coordination authority for U.S.
efforts in Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. In November 2004,
State appointed an U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator to serve in Turin as
a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host government and to work with
the Consul General to develop and communicate a coordinated U.S. message,
specifically on matters related to security support. This individual was
tasked with crafting and ensuring a consistent message and setting
consistent expectations for the host country and multilateral community
regarding planned U.S. security support efforts. In addition, in January
2005, an FBI liaison arrived in Italy to serve as the FBI's point of
contact for its security support efforts in Turin. According to State and
FBI officials, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and FBI liaison
worked closely together in Turin to plan for and coordinate U.S. security
support operations in Turin.
To coordinate the logistical arrangements and needs for U.S. operations in
Turin, State appointed a U.S. Olympic Coordinator who arrived in April
2005. This individual served as a U.S. focal point for contacts with the
host government, the Turin Olympic Organizing Committee, and the U.S.
Olympic Committee and worked with the U.S. Consul General in Milan to
develop and communicate interagency information in a coordinated and
understandable way. In addition, a dedicated Web site was developed as a
ready source of information for Americans on security matters, while also
offering helpful advice on other matters, such as how to replace lost
passports and locate English-speaking pharmacies.
This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games through State's
appointment of an Olympic Coordinator in June 2005, a Minister Counselor
for Olympic Coordination in December 2005, a Deputy Olympic Security
Coordinator in January 2006, and the U.S. Ambassador's designation of an
Olympic Coordination Office at the U.S. Mission in Beijing to coordinate
all arrangements-including political, security, and logistical-for U.S.
security support to the 2008 Summer Games. According to U.S. officials
involved in planning for the 2008 Summer Games, providing consistent,
clear, and targeted information for Beijing is needed to avert possible
confusion within the Chinese government regarding which U.S. agency to
speak with to obtain specific assistance. The strategy also will help
ensure that U.S. citizens and interests receive consistent information on
security and other critical issues.
Centralizing U.S. Activities in One Location
Many U.S. officials noted that the key lesson from Athens that was applied
in Turin was the centralization of all U.S. activities in one location.
U.S. officials involved in the Athens Games recommended that operations
and intelligence centers for future Olympics be colocated to ensure the
efficient delivery and dissemination of information among U.S. agencies.
U.S. officials planning for Turin identified the importance of this lesson
and planned to better centralize resources by colocating all participating
U.S. agencies and their functions in one facility in Turin, including
operations and intelligence activities and consular services for U.S.
citizens. According to U.S. officials who worked on the Turin Games, the
colocation of all U.S. agencies and activities in one facility resulted in
good coordination, and eliminated many planning and operations problems
that had been experienced in Athens.
This lesson has been communicated by Washington-, Athens-, and Italy-based
personnel to their counterparts in China and has been incorporated into
planning efforts for the Beijing Games. According to U.S. officials in
Beijing, they are following the Turin model of centralizing U.S.
resources, to coordinate interagency needs that will be specific to the
Beijing Games and to identify any training or security support that may be
provided to the Chinese government. By July 2006, U.S. officials in
Beijing plan to have established a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office
outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to coordinate U.S. operations
leading up to and during the Beijing Games.
U.S. Agencies Identified Additional Lessons Learned in Turin
U.S. agencies have begun to collect lessons learned from the Turin Games
and disseminate them to their Beijing Games counterparts. According to
U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, key lessons from Turin
included the importance of (1) establishing a temporary, fully equipped,
operations center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is
not nearby; (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S.
agencies in event planning and operations; and (3) planning early for
Olympic-related costs. Officials at State, DOJ, and other key agencies are
currently completing after-action reports that are expected to highlight
aspects of security support that went well and should be replicated in the
future, where feasible, and what aspects could be improved upon. At the
time of our review, State and DOJ expected to complete their after-action
reports in June 2006. In addition, the Washington-based interagency
working group is completing an after-action report that is expected to
discuss issues specific to the support provided by this group. According
to State, the interagency working group's after-action report is expected
to be completed later this year.
Establishing a U.S. Operations Center at the Location of Games
The lack of a U.S. presence in Turin demonstrated the importance of
establishing a fully equipped operations center at the location of the
Games. Acquiring and outfitting suitable space for an interagency
operations center require advance planning, particularly when a U.S.
presence is not nearby. In Turin, which is a 90-minute drive from the
nearest U.S. Consulate, the U.S. Mission faced unique challenges in
establishing a temporary but suitable space for centralizing interagency
operations, particularly those related to logistics, communications, and
resources. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Milan used its staff to
provide logistical support to the U.S. coordinators in Turin, such as the
establishment of work space and other administrative support services.
Since the U.S. Olympic Coordination Office was not established until July
2005, the U.S. coordinators in Turin worked from their homes and traveled
between Milan and Turin to coordinate the U.S. efforts.
In addition, proper space and classification requirements of participating
agencies were difficult to identify in early planning efforts, in part due
to the lack of proper communication capabilities between U.S. officials in
Turin and U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C. Agency officials in Italy and
Washington attributed this difficulty, in part, to this being the first
time that the United States had attempted to establish a temporary U.S.
facility to coordinate security support provided by all participating U.S.
agencies. Although these challenges were resolved in time for the Turin
Games, U.S. officials in Italy and Washington stated that authoritative
decision making is necessary for budgeting and identifying requirements
for setting up an interagency operation center.
Due to the presence of a U.S. Embassy in Beijing and three U.S. Consulates
near other Olympic venues, U.S. operations in Beijing will not require the
establishment of a fully equipped U.S. operations center. However,
shortage of space at the U.S. Mission requires the establishment of a U.S.
Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. U.S.
officials in Beijing and at the interagency working group in Washington
have begun discussing the communication, infrastructure, and other
logistical requirements for centralizing and coordinating U.S. agency
security support efforts before and during the Beijing Games. In addition,
U.S. officials have held preplanning discussions for the 2010 Vancouver
Games regarding work space and operating requirements.
Establishing Clear Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Agencies
The Turin Games and, to some degree, the Athens Games demonstrated the
importance of establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S.
agencies in the planning and operational stages of U.S. security support
efforts. While security support for the Turin Games was generally
well-coordinated, U.S. agency officials at State and DOJ have stated that
the overall U.S. effort lacks a clear strategy for security support
operations at future overseas sporting events. These officials indicated
that clear guidance for U.S. agencies' roles and responsibilities would
identify authorities for decision making and responsibilities during both
the planning and operational stages of the U.S. efforts. U.S. officials in
Turin prepared an operational plan that was approved by the U.S. Mission
in Rome, which outlined the missions of all participating agencies and
identified reporting authorities for U.S. operations. However, according
to State and DOJ officials, although State is the lead agency for ensuring
the protection of American citizens overseas, the United States does not
have a strategy that clearly outlines the authorities responsible for
planning operations at future Olympic Games.
Planning Early for Several Years of Olympic-Related Costs
U.S. support for the Turin Games demonstrated the importance of planning
early for Olympic-related costs. In particular, State and DOJ officials
noted the importance of identifying early funding sources to make advance
payments on housing and logistical needs. In Turin, State struggled to
identify funds to secure space, communication, and transportation
arrangements, among other expenses, for interagency operations. Although
U.S. officials in Italy were able to secure funding for housing and space
for U.S. operations, they indicated that it was difficult to obtain timely
decisions from the interagency to budget and identify requirements for the
establishment of a U.S. presence in Turin. State officials in Italy
indicated that they were unable to address these issues until the fall of
2005, when agency representatives came to Italy for operational planning
meetings. According to a State finance official in Italy, funds for the
joint administrative costs were easier to obtain once the U.S.
coordinators in Turin and the interagency were able to identify
operational requirements. In addition, several U.S. officials in Italy and
Washington, D.C., stated that, for future overseas Games, it would be
easier for agencies to identify and plan for their portion of
Olympic-related expenditures if a framework were available for identifying
costs and addressing funding issues associated with providing security
support.
U.S. officials in Italy and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with
their counterparts in Beijing. According to U.S. officials in Beijing,
they have already begun to address housing and logistics needs, such as
planning to make initial deposits on hotels early to avoid high costs for
accommodations as the Games draw nearer. However, these officials
indicated potential problems with identifying funds early enough to cover
expenditures for this fiscal year.
Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for 2008
Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges
The United States is currently taking steps to coordinate a U.S. security
presence and identify the types of security support that the United States
may provide for the 2008 Beijing Games. U.S.-Chinese counterterrorism
cooperation is limited, and U.S. officials have stated that they lack
knowledge of China's capabilities to handle security for the Olympics. In
addition, technology transfer and human rights issues present new and
different challenges for U.S. security support to these Games.
The U.S. government, led by State, is actively working to identify and
establish a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its
athletes, spectators, and commercial investors during the Games. The U.S.
Ambassador to China has designated a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office to
be responsible for all arrangements-including political, security, and
logistical-of U.S. efforts for the Beijing Games. In January 2006, State
appointed a U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator to serve-in this new
office-as a U.S. government point person for U.S. security support for the
Beijing Games. In addition, the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the Minister
Counselor for Olympic Coordination, appointed by State in June and
December 2005, respectively, serve as the point persons for logistic
arrangements of U.S. efforts. Both the U.S. Deputy Olympic Security
Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator were in Turin to participate
in U.S. security support for the 2006 Winter Games and to learn from their
counterparts in Turin. To ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators,
and commercial investors, State has taken steps to identify and secure
logistical support. To help identify necessary housing and mitigate high
prices on accommodations, State has begun to identify housing options for
U.S. personnel, coordinating through the interagency group for estimates
of personnel to be temporarily assigned to Beijing during the Games.
While China has not yet requested U.S. security assistance as of May 2006,
State officials have received inquiries from Chinese officials regarding
Olympic security. As of April 2006, discussions between the United States
and China were under way for an assessment to identify security needs and
U.S. security support for the Beijing Games, according to U.S. officials
in Beijing and Washington, D.C. In addition, a working group has been
established between U.S. and Chinese counterparts to discuss issues
related to the operational and intelligence side of security. U.S.
officials have stated that the Chinese have recognized the large size of
the U.S. team and its associated security risks and concerns.
Although recent steps have been taken, U.S. officials have stated that
they lack knowledge of China's advanced capabilities to handle security
for the 2008 Summer Games. In addition, U.S. officials from State and DOJ
have stated that they are uncertain about the extent of assistance China
may request or permit from outside sources. Moreover, U.S. and Chinese
counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and military relations have only
recently resumed. In July 2003, China joined the U.S. Container Security
Initiative, and, in November 2005, the United States and China signed an
agreement related to the U.S. Megaports Initiative, allowing for the
installation of special equipment at Chinese ports to detect hidden
shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The United States
has recently resumed, under the current administration,
military-to-military contacts with China.
In planning for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, logistical challenges
and technology transfers and human rights issues present unique challenges
for U.S. security support. The location of the Beijing Games presents
unique logistical challenges in coordinating U.S. security support.
Whereas past Summer Games have been centered in and around the host city,
the venues for the Beijing Games will be spread across seven Chinese
cities along the country's eastern border, presenting potential
communication challenges for interagency operations between the U.S.
Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulates located near Olympic venue sites.
Figure 4 presents the seven venue cities for the Beijing Games-Beijing,
Qingdao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao-and the
U.S. embassy and three consulates located at Olympic venue cities. Unlike
the 2004 Summer Games in Athens, U.S. officials have stated the Chinese
are much further ahead in planning for the 2008 Summer Games, and these
officials anticipate that the venues will be completed on time or ahead of
schedule. To prepare for the 2008 Beijing Games, China is planning to host
several events in 2007 to test its preparations for major event
operations.
Figure 4: Venue Locations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics
In addition, any requests for equipment or technology to support security
efforts in China must be addressed under U.S. requirements for the
protection against sensitive technology transfers, because U.S. sanctions
deny the export of defense articles/services, crime control equipment, and
satellites to China. A presidential waiver for exports of equipment for
security of the Beijing Olympics may be considered.14 U.S. policy makers
and human rights groups have also expressed concern with several human
rights issues in China, including freedom of information, freedom of
religion, and protection of ethnic and minority groups.
Conclusions
In a climate of increased concerns about international terrorism, ensuring
the protection of U.S. interests at future Olympic Games overseas will
continue to be a priority for the United States. For such future Games,
U.S. agencies are likely to continue providing support to host governments
in identifying potential security threats and developing strategies to
protect U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors several years
in advance of and throughout the Olympics. Although each Olympic Games has
its own set of unique security requirements, future coordination of U.S.
security support efforts for Games-under the leadership of State-should
efficiently and effectively capture the expertise, knowledge, and resource
requirements of all U.S. agencies. However, there is currently no formal
framework for guiding the development and implementation of U.S. security
support for such Games, particularly the coordinated financing of U.S.
security support and operations.
Recommendations
To enhance planning and preparations for future overseas Olympic and
Paralympic Games, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in
consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group, take the following two actions:
o Develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security
support to future Games. This guidance should identify key
personnel and target dates for their assignment and roles and
responsibilities, and key steps for the U.S. Mission and regional
bureau to undertake in preparing for and leading the U.S. efforts
at future Games. To formalize the process for providing security
support overseas, we also recommend that State, in consultation
with members of the International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group, consider establishing a charter and mission
statement for this group that identifies authorities and
responsibilities for coordinating and supporting U.S. security
efforts at future Games.
o Develop a finance subgroup as part of the International
Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group, which would bring
together budgetary personnel from the various agencies or
component entities that contribute to security efforts for
overseas Games. A formal mechanism, such as a finance subgroup
with established responsibilities, would help the agencies plan
for anticipated resources needs, coordinate their budget requests,
and address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at
future Games.
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
Energy, Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General
for their review and comment. The Department of State provided
written comments on the draft report, which are reprinted in
appendix II. State said that it agreed with our findings and
recommendations, and that it is working to develop a more
efficient plan for coordinating the planning and implementation of
U.S. security support at future major events overseas-including
the development of written guidance and identified roles and
responsibilities for interagency working group members-through an
after-action review of the International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group and by working with the National Security
Council, Counterterrorism Security Group. Furthermore, State said
that the interagency working group has expanded its working
subgroups and is considering the inclusion of a budget subgroup to
address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at
future Olympic Games. State also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated where appropriate.
The Departments of Defense and Justice did not provide written
comments on the draft report; however, they provided technical
comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The Departments
of Energy and Homeland Security did not provide written or
technical comments.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the
Attorney General. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected] . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies
in providing security support for the 2006 Winter Games, the
various roles and additional costs of the U.S. agencies involved,
and the lessons they learned in supporting the Games, we
specifically obtained and reviewed several documents, such as
available operations and mission plans, security situation
reports, and monthly activity reports. In addition, we interviewed
officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ),
Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at
certain intelligence agencies. We also conducted fieldwork in
Rome, Milan, and Turin, Italy.
At State, we interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Coordinator for Counterterrorism office; Overseas
Security Advisory Council; Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs; Consular Affairs; and Public Affairs. We also interviewed
the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic
Coordinator. At DOJ, we interviewed officials in the Criminal
Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Counterterrorism Division, including the FBI's Olympic coordinator
who served as its liaison in Turin through the operational period
of the Games. At DHS, we met with officials from the
Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Secret Service,
and the Federal Air Marshal Service. At DOD, we spoke with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and European
Command. At DOE, we spoke with officials from the National Nuclear
Security Administration. Finally, we regularly attended and met
with the interagency working group-the International Athletic
Events Security Coordinating Group-that includes all agencies
involved in providing support to international sporting events
overseas.
During our fieldwork in Italy in November 2005, we obtained
documents and interviewed key U.S. officials from the previously
mentioned agencies. We obtained and reviewed key documents, such
as operational and mission plans. In Rome, we interviewed U.S.
officials, including the Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional
Security Officer, Minister Counselor for Management Affairs,
Financial Management Officer, Information Management Officer,
Legal Attache, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Attache, Transportation and Security Administration
representative, Defense Attache, and Consular officer.
Additionally, we attended an interagency operations and
capabilities presentation for the Chief of Mission. Also, we met
with representatives from the Italian Ministry of Interior to
obtain the Italian government's perspective on the security
support provided by the United States. During our fieldwork in
Milan, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the Consul
General, Milan; Management Officer; Vice Consul; Public Affairs
Officers; and Consular Officer. In Turin, we interviewed the U.S.
Olympic Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator. We
also visited the U.S. Olympic Coordination Center in Turin and
observed preparations for outfitting the center for the planned
operations and intelligence center. Additionally, to understand
the challenges associated with providing security support to the
distant Olympic venues, we visited several of the Olympics venue
sites in Turin, including in Palavela, Pragelato, Sestriere, and
Bardonecchia, Italy.
To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the 2006
Winter Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI),
based on the previous DCI we used to obtain cost estimates for the
2004 Athens Games, to survey agencies identified as contributing
to the U.S. effort. A draft DCI was pretested on two U.S.
government agencies. In November 2005, we sent a preliminary DCI
to agencies identified by State as being involved in the U.S.
security support effort and obtained 11 responses. In March 2006,
we sent a final DCI to the agencies previously identified and
obtained 20 responses. Except for the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the intelligence community
entities did not provide a response to our final DCI on costs for
the 2006 Winter Games. Our DCI requested agencies to identify how
they collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted
follow-ups with the agencies to clarify information in their
responses. We observed that not all agency components collect and
track data in a consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not
attempt to gather information on the costs of personnel salaries,
which are presumed to be a significant outlay for the agency
components involved. To assess the reliability of the estimates
provided, we compared the preliminary results with the final
results and compared this year's 2006 results with those for 2004.
In addition, we considered the cost factors cited by the agencies
in relation to the sums they reported and conducted follow-ups
with the agencies to clarify any questions that arose. We
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to be
reported in aggregated form, rounded to millions, and attributed
to the agencies, as estimated cost outlays and by category of
expenditure, but not in precise, detailed form.
To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece were applied to
the Turin Games, we gathered information from the various agencies
previously mentioned; reviewed operations plans; attended meetings
of the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington,
D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain
areas of Italy. To identify lessons learned from the Turin Games,
we gathered information from the various agencies and attended
meetings of the interagency working group. Although after-action
reports were not completed and available at the time of our audit,
to identify lessons learned, we interviewed key officials at
State, DOJ, the U.S. Consulate Milan, and the U.S. Coordination
Center in Turin and attended the interagency working group
meetings. To identify how lessons learned in Turin are being
applied to the 2008 Beijing Games, we interviewed U.S. officials
from State and DOJ and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and U.S.
Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in
Beijing.
To identify efforts under way for providing support to the 2008
Summer Games in Beijing, we gathered information from the various
agencies previously mentioned; reviewed China's Mission
Performance Plan; attended meetings of the State-chaired
interagency working group in Washington, D.C.; and interviewed the
Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator and Olympic Coordinator at the
U.S. Mission in Beijing.
We conducted our work from September 2005 to May 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Jess T. Ford, Director, (202) 512-4268
Staff Acknowledgments
Key contributors to this report included Diana Glod, Monica Brym,
and Dorian L. Herring. Technical assistance was provided by Jason
Bair, Joe Carney, Martin de Alteris, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson,
Jena Sinkfield, George Taylor, and Mike TenKate.
(320381)
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14The President recently signed a waiver for an one-time shipment of
equipment and technology for the construction of the new U.S. Embassy in
Beijing.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-753 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-753 , a report to the Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives
June 2006
OLYMPIC SECURITY
Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games
The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games to
take place overseas since September 11, 2001. The United States worked
with Italy to ensure the security of U.S. citizens, and it expects to
continue such support for future Games, including the 2008 Games in
Beijing, China.
GAO was asked to (1) discuss the U.S. approach for providing security
support for the 2006 Winter Games and how such efforts were coordinated,
(2) identify the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security support for
the Games and how they financed their activities, (3) review lessons
learned in providing security support and the application of prior lessons
learned, and (4) identify U.S. efforts under way for providing security
support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
members of the interagency working group, (1) develop written guidance for
providing U.S. government security support to future Games and (2) develop
a finance subgroup within the interagency working group to help agencies
plan and prepare for future support. State concurred with GAO's findings
and recommendations and stated that it has begun taking steps to implement
them.
In 2004, the United States beganplanning to provide a U.S. security
presence in Italy and security support to the Italian government, and
based much of its security strategy on its understanding of Italy's
advanced security capabilities. The United States provided Italy with some
security assistance, mostly in the form of crisis management and response
support. To coordinate U.S. efforts, the U.S. Mission in Italy established
an office in Turin as a central point for security information and
logistics, and to provide consular services to U.S. citizens during the
Games. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy, through the U.S. Consulate in Milan,
coordinated and led U.S. efforts in-country, while the Department of
State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated
domestic efforts. While the interagency working group has been a useful
forum for coordinating U.S. security support to overseas athletic events,
State and Department of Justice (DOJ) officials have indicated that formal
guidance that articulates a charter; a mission; and agencies' authorities,
roles, and responsibilities would help in planning for security support to
future Games.
Nearly 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies provided more
than $16 million for security support activities for the Turin Games. The
roles of these agencies-which included the Departments of State, Justice,
Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy-included providing crisis
management and response support through personnel, equipment, and training
and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes,
spectators, and commercial investors. The U.S. Embassy in Rome initially
paid for lodging and other administrative support needs, which were
reimbursed by the participating agencies, although it struggled to do so.
State and DOJ officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for
identifying costs and addressing potential funding issues would be useful
in providing U.S. security support to future Games.
For the Turin Games, agencies applied key lessons learned from the 2004
Athens Games and identified additional lessons for future Games. Key
lessons identified from the Turin Games included, the importance of
establishing an operations center at the location of the Games,
establishing clear roles and responsibilities for agencies in event
planning and crisis response efforts, and planning early for several years
of Olympic-related expenditures. These lessons learned were communicated
by Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel to their counterparts who
are preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The United States
is currently taking steps to identify the types of security support that
agencies may provide to support China's security efforts for the 2008
Summer Games and to ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and
commercial investors.
*** End of document. ***