Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success
and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement (09-MAY-06,
GAO-06-746T).
The size and strength of hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the
largest natural disasters in our nation's history and raised
major questions about our nation's readiness and ability to
respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO has a large body of
completed and ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all
phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding
efforts related to hurricane Katrina as well as a wealth of
historical experience in reviewing the federal government's
response to disasters and catastrophic events. A great deal of
attention has been focused on lessons learned from the 2005
hurricane season and many recommendations have been advanced on
how to improve the nation's preparedness and ability to
effectively respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO's testimony
today describes some factors for success and other issues that
Congress may wish to consider as it determines what changes to
make, including those of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA) organizational placement, to improve the nation's
readiness and ability to respond effectively to major disasters,
including catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-746T
ACCNO: A53619
TITLE: Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future
Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement
DATE: 05/09/2006
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Disaster planning
Disaster recovery
Disaster recovery plans
Emergency preparedness
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Rita
Hurricanes
Interagency relations
Lessons learned
Natural disasters
Performance measures
Staff utilization
Strategic planning
Agency organizational structure
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GAO-06-746T
* Clarity of FEMA's Mission and Related Responsibilities and A
* Experience and Training of FEMA Leadership
* Adequacy of FEMA's Human, Financial, and Technological Resou
* Effectiveness of FEMA's Planning, Exercises, and Related Par
* Mission relevancy and shared goals
* Leverage Effectiveness and Gains Through Consolidation
* Order by Mail or Phone
Testimonybefore the Committee on Homeland Security,
U.S. House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, May 9, 2006
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational
Placement
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director
Homeland Security and Justice Issues
GAO-06-746T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the future of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). My remarks
today are grounded in the work GAO has done to date on FEMA's performance
in the days, weeks, and months after hurricane Katrina as well as our
completed work on FEMA's role in responding to and recovering from prior
disasters and catastrophes before and after its incorporation into the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). My remarks are also fully
consistent with Comptroller General Walker's previous testimony on this
subject matter.
The events of hurricane Katrina graphically demonstrated the limitations
of the nation's ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster. FEMA,
within DHS, has the primary responsibility for coordinating and
implementing key aspects of the federal emergency response and, as a
result, has come under fire for shortcomings in its mission performance
after the disaster. Reports from the House, Senate, White House, DHS
Inspector General, and FEMA all identified problems in FEMA's leadership
and capabilities in the preparation for, response to, and short-term
recovery from hurricane Katrina.1 These reports, along with our own
observations, indicate that there were concerns about FEMA's leadership of
the federal response and questions regarding the missions, roles, and
responsibilities of FEMA and other federal, state, and local officials and
organizations in preparing for and responding to hurricane Katrina. FEMA's
capabilities were stretched to the limit and beyond, as reflected by, for
example, a limited ability to marshal, transport, and track the delivery
of commodities to areas of greatest need; difficulties in providing the
number of emergency response staff with the knowledge and experience to
meet the needs of thousands of disaster victims; and the inadequate
capacity of FEMA's information systems. Finally, the reports and our own
work identified concerns regarding the effectiveness of planning,
exercises, and related partnerships, functions traditionally supported by
FEMA emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs.
1These reports are: House Select Committee, A Failure of Initiative: Final
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
For and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: February 2006);
The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned
(Washington, D.C.: February 2006); DHS Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial
Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana (Washington, D.C.:
February 2006); and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
The observations in this statement are based on prior GAO reports, our
ongoing work on hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and GAO field visits to the
affected Gulf Coast areas. We also have done a great deal of work on prior
disasters. In 1993, we conducted several reviews examining the federal
response to hurricane Andrew. All of these reviews focused on the unique
challenges involved in responding to catastrophic disasters. These reviews
defined catastrophic disasters as a subset of other disasters requiring
federal assistance. Unlike the bulk of disasters requiring FEMA to
respond, catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the ability of state, local,
and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with essential
services, such as food and water, within 12 to 24 hours. We also conducted
extensive work following the events of September 11, 2001.2 These prior
GAO reports focused on improving the immediate response to catastrophic
disasters, and we made various recommendations within this context, many
of which continue to apply and help form the basis of our views on the
issue of FEMA's future organizational placement today.
GAO teams have visited the areas most affected by hurricanes Katrina and
Rita-Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We interviewed officials
and analyzed information from the various involved federal agencies, such
as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and local
organizations, including state emergency management agencies; state
adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from
nongovernmental agencies. Additionally, we have closely followed the
hearings conducted by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, the House's Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, and other congressional
committees on hurricane Katrina issues. We have studied the House Select
Committee report, the White House report on lessons learned from the
federal response to hurricane Katrina, the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, FEMA's initial
response assessment of the agency's performance during hurricane Katrina,
as well as the report released last week by the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We discussed our preliminary
observations with the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security in March 2006 before testifying on our observations of federal
preparation, response, and recovery efforts related to hurricane Katrina.3
2GAO, Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA's Post 9/11 Public
Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-03-926 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
29, 2003) and GAO, September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance
to the New York City Area, GAO-04-72 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003).
Summary
A catastrophic disaster, such as hurricane Katrina, almost immediately
overwhelms state and local response capacity, degrading the ability of
state and local personnel to respond effectively. Hurricane Katrina
destroyed or crippled essential communications infrastructure in the
hardest-hit areas, further exacerbating the ability of state and local
personnel to respond. In preparing for and responding to any major
disaster, but particularly a catastrophic one, the roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the preparation and response
at all levels of government must be clearly defined and communicated in
order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. At the same time,
effective decision making depends on having trained and experienced
leaders equipped with the resources and capabilities needed to implement
those decisions. Capabilities-the ability to carry out specific tasks with
desired results-are built upon the appropriate combination of resources
including people, processes, funds, and technology. Ensuring that those
capabilities are available and effective requires planning, coordination,
training, and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically
tested, problems identified, and issues subsequently addressed in
partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders.
Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina, questions
have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement,
including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved to other
agencies, remain within DHS, or again become an independent agency. In our
view, taking actions to improve the weaknesses identified in
after-the-fact analyses of FEMA's performance before, during, and after
hurricane Katrina may be more important to FEMA's success in responding to
and aiding the recovery from future disasters, most importantly the 2006
hurricane season, than its organizational placement. Factors that might
affect performance include
3GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
8, 2006).
o the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities
and authorities;
o the experience of, and training provided to, FEMA leadership;
o the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological
resources; and
o the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related
partnerships.
If a change in FEMA's organizational placement is considered, we
believe certain other issues should be considered to assess
alternative approaches. These include issues such as mission
relevancy and shared goals and objectives, as well as leveraging
effectiveness and gains through consolidation.
In considering FEMA's future, it is useful to understand its past.
Before the establishment of FEMA and its placement within DHS,
federal disaster response and recovery was also managed by an
agency within an executive department. The 1960s and early 1970s
brought massive disasters requiring major federal response and
recovery operations by the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration, established within the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Hurricane Carla struck in 1962, hurricane Betsy
in 1965, hurricane Camille in 1969, and hurricane Agnes in 1972.
The San Fernando earthquake rocked Southern California in 1971,
and the Alaskan earthquake hit in 1964. To respond to national
concern regarding these events, the Congress passed the 1974
Disaster Relief Act that established the process of Presidential
disaster declarations.
However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented.
Many parallel programs and policies existed at the state and local
level, compounding the complexity of federal disaster relief
efforts. In 1979, President Carter issued an executive order that
merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into
a new, independent Federal Emergency Management Agency. Among
other agencies, FEMA absorbed the Federal Insurance
Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration, the National Weather Service Community
Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the
General Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster
Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense
responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the
Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.
FEMA led the federal response to hurricane Andrew, which slammed
into and leveled much of South Florida in August 1992. In 1993, we
conducted several reviews examining the federal response. The
reviews focused on the unique challenges involved in responding to
catastrophic disasters and raised questions about whether and how
national disaster response efforts had incorporated lessons from
experiences with hurricane Hugo in 1989.4 These prior GAO reports
focused on improving the immediate response to catastrophic
disasters, and we made various recommendations within this
context. While some of our prior recommendations were acted upon,
others were not. For example, President Clinton elevated the FEMA
director to cabinet status in 1996, providing the type of direct
communication and lines of responsibility we had recommended.
However, we also recommended that FEMA improve its catastrophic
disaster response capability by using existing authority to
aggressively respond to catastrophic disasters, assessing the
extent of the damage, and then advising state and local officials
of identified needs and the federal resources available to address
them. One criticism of the FEMA response to hurricane Katrina was
that FEMA officials were more reactive than proactive in
identifying the emergency needs of communities in the immediate
days after the disaster.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002,5 which established DHS, created
new requirements for emergency preparedness and response,
including developing a comprehensive National Incident Management
System (NIMS) and a comprehensive National Response Plan (NRP).
NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for incident
management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause,
size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles and
responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments and
various first responder disciplines at each level during an
emergency event. NIMS established the Incident Command System
(ICS) as a standard incident management organization with five
functional areas-command, operations, planning, logistics, and
finance/administration-for management of all major incidents. It
also prescribes interoperable communications systems and
preparedness before an incident happens, including planning,
training, and exercises. The NRP is intended to be an
all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents
where federal involvement is necessary. It is to operate within
the framework of NIMS.
On March 1, 2003, FEMA became part of DHS pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. FEMA retained its authority to administer
the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act),6 which sets forth the
primary programs and processes for the federal government to
provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local
governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private
nonprofit organizations. Among its missions within DHS, FEMA is to
lead the effort to prepare the nation for natural and man-made
disasters and effectively manage federal response and recovery
efforts following any presidentially declared incident. FEMA is
also to initiate proactive mitigation activities, train first
responders, and manage the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA
shares responsibility for preparing the nation for natural and
man-made disasters with other organizations within DHS, including
the Office of Grants and Training that administers federal
homeland security grants for state and local first responders.
Organizational changes, such as separating FEMA from DHS, are
often viewed as a fix to address performance issues. Our
institutional knowledge regarding organizational performance
factors suggests that organizational changes alone may not
adequately address underlying systemic conditions that result in
an organization's performance problem. Hurricane Katrina was one
of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history; its size
and strength will have effects for years to come. It exacted
terrible human costs with the loss of significant numbers of lives
and resulted in billions of dollars in property damage, clearly
overwhelming the capabilities of several federal, state, and local
agencies. Nevertheless, after-the-fact analyses point to
improvements needed in (1) the clarity of FEMA's mission and
related responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission
performance expectations; (2) the experience and training of FEMA
leadership; (3) the adequacy of FEMA's human, financial, and
technological resources; and (4) the effectiveness of FEMA's
planning, exercises, and related partnerships. If successfully
implemented, such improvements may obviate the need for major
organizational changes.
In the event of a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all
levels must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in
order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making,
especially in preparing for and in the early hours and days after
the disaster. In the aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 1992, we
discussed the critical importance of clearly defining and
communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of
authority for catastrophic response in advance of such events.
Based on our assessments of the federal response, we recommended
that in a catastrophic disaster a single individual directly
responsible and accountable to the President should be designated
to act as the central focal point to lead and coordinate the
overall federal response when a catastrophic disaster has happened
or is imminent. President Clinton's elevation of the position of
FEMA director to cabinet status in 1996 provided the direct lines
of communication and accountability envisioned in our
recommendation. The subsequent incorporation of FEMA into DHS
changed the direct reporting relationship between FEMA and the
President. With the passage and subsequent implementation of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of DHS, rather than
the FEMA Director, became the cabinet-level focal point for
natural and man-made crises and emergency planning. The
incorporation of FEMA into DHS raised questions during hurricane
Katrina regarding lines of authority with respect to not only the
DHS Secretary and the FEMA Director, but also the key officials
reporting to them, the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), respectively.
During incidents of national significance, including catastrophic
disasters, the overall coordination of federal incident management
activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), and the NRP. There are three
key leadership roles defined under the NRP needed to manage a
catastrophic disaster. First, the role of the Secretary of
Homeland Security is to provide strategic, national leadership as
the focal point for federal response and coordination. Second, the
role of the PFO is to act as the Secretary of Homeland Security's
formally designated representative locally to oversee, coordinate,
and execute the secretary's incident management responsibilities.
Third, the FCO is a position created by the Stafford Act and is
appointed by the FEMA Director to manage federal resource support
activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The
FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal
disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected
localities by making mission assignments to specific federal
agencies that have needed resources and capabilities.
FEMA's incorporation into DHS appears to have introduced some
uncertainty regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of
the DHS secretary and the PFO relative to the FEMA director and
the FCO. The questions raised by the various assessments of the
federal response during hurricane Katrina highlight the importance
of clarity in FEMA's mission and related responsibilities and
authorities, as the following examples illustrate:
o The White House report recommended that the PFO be given
operational authority to manage and coordinate federal response,
assets and, in a multi-state disaster, to oversee the multiple
federal coordinating officers operating in the various states and
make any operational decisions necessary, within the law, without
having to obtain approval from headquarters.
o The DHS OIG recommended that FEMA clarify the roles of the PFO,
the FCO, the Federal Resource Coordinator, and the Disaster
Recovery Manager to provide a clear distinction for the types and
levels of response activities that warrant a combination or
modification to those roles; develop procedures for the timely
activation of each role; and, ensure that these officials be
provided with the necessary training to complement their
qualifications for serving in these positions. Similarly, the OIG
recommended that FEMA establish clear roles and responsibilities
for the Housing Area Command and define its reporting requirements
and chain of command relationships with the FEMA headquarters,
Joint Field Offices, and Technical Assistance Contractors.
o FEMA's internal assessment identified the need for senior
management to develop doctrine to provide a single, simplified
command structure for operations in temporary joint field offices
created to lead federal response and recovery efforts.
o The Senate report recommended that the Stafford Act should be
amended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and
the NRP should be revised to eliminate the PFO position for
Stafford Act-declared emergencies and disasters.
More explicit authority is needed to enhance federal leadership in
situations when it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to
catastrophic magnitude in a more proactive manner. In our July
1993 report on the federal response to hurricane Andrew, we also
noted that encouraging agencies to do as much catastrophic
disaster preparation as possible in advance of a Stafford Act
declaration could reduce the federal response time to the ensuing
catastrophe. We stated that when there is early warning, as there
usually is with hurricanes, federal agencies must mobilize
resources and deploy personnel before the catastrophe strikes.
However, the Stafford Act did not, and still does not, explicitly
authorize such predeclaration activities. As a result, federal
agencies may fail to undertake extensive predeclaration
preparations because of uncertainty over whether FEMA will request
their assistance under the Stafford Act and ultimately reimburse
their predeclaration costs. Therefore, we continue to believe that
Congress should consider giving federal agencies, including FEMA,
explicit authority under the Stafford Act to take actions to
prepare for a catastrophic disaster when there is warning.
In order to effectively fulfill the leadership roles and
responsibilities and to exercise lines of authority for the
response at all levels to facilitate rapid and effective decision
making in the event of a catastrophic disaster, leaders should
have the experience and training needed to perform effectively,
especially in the early hours and days after the disaster. In the
aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 1992, we discussed the critical
importance of the quality of leadership during catastrophic
disasters. For example, we noted that leadership creates a
powerful, meaningful perception that the federal government
recognizes an event is catastrophic, is in control, and is going
to use every means necessary to meet the immediate mass-care needs
of disaster victims. Assessments of FEMA's performance during and
after hurricane Katrina have raised similar issues and resulted in
recommendations related to the experience and training of FEMA
leadership, as illustrated in the following examples:
o The House Select Committee concluded that federal agencies,
including DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their
roles and responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. According to
the Committee's report, senior officials were ill-prepared due to
their lack of experience and knowledge of the required roles and
responsibilities prescribed by the NRP, and FEMA lacked adequately
trained and experienced staff for the hurricane Katrina response.
The report noted that, since 2002, FEMA had lost a number of its
top disaster specialists, senior leaders, and experienced
personnel and that even before hurricane Katrina, FEMA suffered
from a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals.
o The White House report included recommendations to enhance DHS
expertise and experience and to develop DHS regions that would be
fully staffed, trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all
preparedness activities and any emergency that may require a
substantial federal response. The report also recommended the
establishment of a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP for
all department and agency personnel with incident management
responsibilities, noting that each Regional Director should have
significant expertise and experience, core competency in emergency
preparedness and incident management, and demonstrated leadership
ability.
o FEMA's assessment of the agency's performance during and after
hurricane Katrina resulted in a recommendation that emergency
management personnel at all levels should be required to have
training on ICS and the NRP and recommended the creation of a
rotational training program for field personnel to spend time at
FEMA headquarters and for FEMA managers at headquarters to train
in the field on simulated and actual disaster events. The
assessment also recommended that FEMA identify and name qualified
personnel with leadership ability and emergency response
experience as FEMA liaison officers for counties, parishes, or
boroughs in advance of disasters. Further, it recommended a more
comprehensive training program to prepare existing and new
personnel for Disaster Recovery Center assignments.
o The Senate report concluded that training and exercises were
needed to ensure that everyone involved in disaster response
understands their roles and responsibilities and is prepared to
carry them out.
Even trained and experienced leaders who share a clear and common
understanding of their mission and authorities across a community
of federal, state, and local emergency management officials cannot
effectively implement those authorities or exercise leadership
without access to the human, financial, and technological
resources needed to take action. For noncatastrophic disasters,
the federal government should be in a support and assist role,
providing resources and other assistance to enable state and local
governments to carry out their responsibilities. However, for
catastrophic disasters that can overwhelm the ability of state and
local and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with
essential services, the federal government should be more
proactive, anticipating state and local needs, pre-positioning
resources, and providing selected resources where they are needed
or likely to be needed. The federal government must develop more
capabilities and expertise to respond proactively when a
catastrophic disaster is imminent or occurs.
When we reviewed FEMA's response to hurricane Andrew in 1992, we
concluded that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate had many
of the people and resources needed, with people skilled in such
areas as strategic and tactical planning, logistics, command and
control, and communications, and resources including
communications, transportation, life support, as well as
sophisticated computer-modeling equipment. At that time we
reported that, through constant planning and exercising, the
directorate had maintained a high level of readiness and was able
to quickly deploy people and resources from a number of locations
to anywhere in the United States (although we identified a number
of shortcomings in FEMA's response that primarily reflected the
magnitude of the disaster.) Unfortunately, the various reports and
our own work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after
hurricane Katrina suggest that FEMA's human, financial, and
technological resources were insufficient to meet the challenges
posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting
number of disaster victims of the hurricane, as the following
examples illustrate:
o The Senate's report concluded that FEMA did not have the
resources to fulfill the mission and respond effectively in a
catastrophic event and recommended that DHS must develop the
national capabilities-especially surge capacity-it needs to
respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has sufficient
full-time staff, response teams, contracting personnel, and
adequately trained and sufficiently staffed reserve corps to ramp
up capabilities, as needed. In terms of technology, the Senate
report recommended that DHS complete and/or adopt technology and
information management systems to effectively manage
disaster-related activities and develop an efficient ordering
system that minimizes delays and provides order status and
accurate, timely commodity tracking as well as a transportation
protocol that moves commodities and resources directly from the
supplier to the users. The report concluded that resources are
needed for staffing and preparation of regional strike teams,
better development of a trained cadre of reservists, and the
development of new logistics capabilities.
o DHS's OIG report included a number of recommendations related
to enhancing human and technological resources and capabilities.
The recommendations directed FEMA to:
o develop a disaster workforce plan for standing
capability for permanent, temporary, and reserve
staff responsive to previous disaster needs and also
develop a plan that is scalable to other events
irrespective of cause, size, or complexity;
o provide training to additional National Processing
Service Center staff and contractors to enhance
FEMA's capability to perform applicant assistance and
case management activities responsive to the needs of
applications;
o develop a more comprehensive program to recruit,
train, and retain local hires for use in augmenting
FEMA's disaster assistance employees and permanent
staff;
o determine and fill requirements to provide
emergency responders with communications equipment
capable of performing in austere conditions; and
o develop and implement a resource-tracking system
that is capable of documenting whether resources were
delivered and the efficiency with which the resource
was provided.
o FEMA's initial response assessment concluded that the agency
needs to lead an audit of current staffing capability and
workforce demands for staff in a severe or catastrophic event and
determine the number of personnel available to serve in each
position or unit for such a disaster. This information is to be
used to develop and implement a strategy for addressing any
identified staffing gaps. The assessment also concluded that FEMA
needs to develop a communications suite that operates
independently of normal communications infrastructure and is able
to be moved into disaster locations.
o The White House report identified the need for each homeland
security region to have access to the resources, equipment, and
personnel needed to establish a self-sufficient temporary Joint
Field Office to direct response and recovery efforts anywhere
within the region.
o The House Select Committee also concluded that despite
extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to
respond to the catastrophic effects of hurricane Katrina. For
example, the report noted that FEMA's logistics and contracting
systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained
provision of commodities; long-standing weaknesses and the
magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA's ability to provide
emergency shelter and temporary housing; and the readiness of
FEMA's national emergency response teams was inadequate and
reduced the effectiveness of the federal response.
Fewer federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic
disaster if state and local governments' response capabilities are
greater. The goal of emergency planning is simple: to have the
skills and resources to respond, when needed, with well-planned,
well-coordinated, and effective efforts to save lives and property
and aid recovery from the emergency or disaster-regardless of the
size or nature of the emergency. However, because FEMA is not a
first responder, state and local government officials and
emergency and homeland security managers must take the lead in
developing strategic and operational plans and identifying the
basic capabilities each jurisdiction might need to meet local,
regional, and state prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery
expectations-whether defined by federal guidance or by state and
local assessments. That is because local officials are most
knowledgeable of their communities, including their needs and
capabilities. In addition, local emergency first
responders-police, fire fighters, emergency medical personnel, and
others such as public health and hospital personnel-will still be
the first on the scene of an incident.
Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to
test emergency management plans. It is important that exercises be
designed to be both as realistic as possible and stress the
emergency management system as almost any major event will. The
training should also be linked to the essential capabilities and
emphasize identifying, developing, and sustaining baseline
capabilities for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
This would involve defining baseline capabilities at each level of
government-federal, regional, state, and local-and surge
capabilities in the event of a catastrophic disaster, based on
risk to an individual jurisdiction and what would be required to
support mutual aid compacts.
In our previous work on hurricane Andrew, we identified the
critical importance of conducting strong advance planning and
robust training and exercise programs and the need for the federal
government to upgrade training and exercises for state and local
governments specifically geared toward catastrophic disaster
response. Our review uncovered shortcomings both in the way FEMA
helps state and local governments train and conduct exercises in
anticipation of catastrophic disasters and in the way it monitors
state and local preparedness. Thus, we concluded that FEMA could
do more to ensure that state and local governments prepare for
catastrophic disaster response.
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the potential benefits of applying
lessons learned from training exercises and experiences with
actual hurricanes as well as the dangers of ignoring them. For
example, confusion with emergency plans complicated the
evacuations and everything that followed. Clearly, plans were not
implemented or were only partially implemented, and state
officials requested aid early but in some cases were slow to
deploy their own resources. Our own work and assessments of FEMA's
performance during and after hurricane Katrina have made a variety
of recommendations intended to improve the effectiveness of
federal planning, exercises, and related partnerships, as the
following examples show:
o The White House report recommended that DHS (1) develop and
implement homeland security regions that are fully staffed,
trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all preparedness
activities and any emergency that may require a substantial
federal response and (2) conduct training and exercises for key
state and local officials.
o The Senate report recommended that (1) national emergency
response plans be reviewed and coordinated with the states and on
a regional basis to ensure the plans are understood, trained, and
exercised prior to an emergency; (2) officials in emergency
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as
well as first responder groups outside of government receive
regular training on NRP and NIMS; (3) DHS consider tying future
cost-share requirements for preparedness grant funds to
performance and results of these exercises; (4) DHS establish
regional strike teams and enhance regional operations-building on
FEMA's 10 existing regional offices-to provide better coordination
between federal agencies and the states in preparing for and
responding to disasters; and (5) resources be provided for
additional planning and more frequent and ambitious training and
exercises.
o The DHS OIG report recommended that FEMA (1) develop and
implement a system that automates and tracks the selection,
deployment, training, and demobilization of responders; (2)
develop more effective and efficient plans for the delivery of
assistance to address long-term housing issues, and test these
plans in a simulated environment before application in actual
disasters; (3) request an appropriation or provide other funding,
resources, and institutional support to agency components and to
state and local partners to complete draft or proposed
catastrophic planning initiatives for natural disasters; (4)
develop a formal mechanism to ensure continuity between
preparedness, response, and recovery by including FEMA regional
staff in the Preparedness Directorate's relationships with state
emergency management agencies for grants, exercises, planning,
technical assistance, and training.
o The House report observed that the hurricane Pam exercise
reflected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers
of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans.
Implementation of lessons learned from hurricane Pam was
incomplete.
o FEMA's initial assessment concluded that FEMA must develop a
concept of operations for logistically supporting Emergency
Management Assistance Compact resources that are requested for
disaster response efforts.
In summary, the difficulties described above would not, we
believe, be fixed by simply moving FEMA to an independent status.
Indeed, we know that many of lessons learned from hurricane
Katrina were acted on for hurricane Rita, with a much better
response effort, indicating that organizational change is not the
primary key to success.
Taking actions to improve these operational weaknesses in FEMA's
performance before, during, and after hurricane Katrina may be
more important to FEMA's success in responding to and recovering
from the next hurricane season, than its organizational placement.
Of course, FEMA will need financial and other resources to address
the problems that have been identified in the wake of hurricane
Katrina.
A number of alternative organizational changes are now being
considered in response to hurricane Katrina. For example, the
White House report recommended keeping FEMA within DHS, but would
preserve FEMA as an independent operating agency to perform its
response and recovery mission while making other organizational
changes, such as transferring the National Disaster Medical System
from DHS to the Department of Health and Human Services. The
Senate report recommended creation of a new, comprehensive
emergency management organization within DHS that would fuse DHS's
emergency management, preparedness, and critical infrastructure
assets into a new organization. Other observers have proposed
removing FEMA from DHS completely.
If an organizational change remains under consideration, our past
work could be helpful. Before the formation of DHS, the
Comptroller General testified before the House Select Committee on
Homeland Security that reorganizations of government agencies
frequently encounter start-up problems and unanticipated
consequences and are unlikely to fully overcome obstacles and
challenges and may require additional modifications in the
future.7 He also asked a number of questions related to mission
relevancy and shared goals and leveraging effectiveness and gains
through consolidation that could be used to evaluate whether
individual agencies or programs should be included or excluded
from the proposed department. Some of these questions are
appropriate today for discussing FEMA's future, and I would
suggest that they might be useful if a change in FEMA's
organizational placement is under consideration.
o Is homeland security a major part of the agency or program
mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?
o Does the agency or program being considered for the new
department share primary goals and objectives with the other
agencies or programs being consolidated?
Congress might consider whether or how moving FEMA out of DHS
would impact DHS's mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, of acting as a focal point for natural and man-made
crises and emergency planning. DHS's Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate- primarily FEMA-was to help ensure the
effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Removing FEMA
from DHS might impact the ability of the department and its
remaining components and FEMA itself in fully addressing the close
links between preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery for
all hazards.
o Does the agency or program being considered for the new
department create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness
of other agencies and programs or the new department as a whole?
o Does the agency or program being considered for the new
department improve the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland
security missions through eliminating duplications and overlaps,
closing gaps, and aligning or merging common roles and
responsibilities?
The dispersion of responsibility for preparedness and response
across more than one federal agency was a problem we identified
during the formation of DHS.8 As I mentioned earlier, FEMA was
established in 1979 to consolidate federal emergency preparedness
mitigation and response in a single federal agency. Its
responsibilities were to include, among other things, the
coordination of civil defense and civil emergency planning and the
coordination of federal disaster relief. FEMA was responsible for
responding to a wide range of disasters, including floods,
hurricanes, earthquakes, hazardous material accidents, nuclear
accidents, and biological, chemical, and nuclear attacks.9
However, when Congress created DHS, it separated FEMA's
responsibilities for preparedness and response activities into two
directorates. Responsibility for preparedness for terrorism
disasters was placed in the department's Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, which included FEMA's Office of National
Preparedness. Other types of FEMA disaster preparedness and
response efforts were transferred to the department's Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate. In January 2003, we
observed that this organizational arrangement would challenge FEMA
in ensuring the effective coordination of preparedness and
response efforts and enhancing the provision and management of
disaster assistance for efficient and effective response.10
A division of responsibility remains under the recent DHS
reorganization resulting from Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage
Review with preparedness efforts-including planning, training,
exercising, and funding-consolidated into a Preparedness
Directorate. FEMA reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland
Security for response and recovery missions. Secretary Chertoff
has stated the reorganization would focus FEMA on its historic
mission of response and recovery. We believe this division of
responsibility should be reconsidered.
The next response and recovery challenge this nation will face,
whether natural or man-made, will provide another important test
of FEMA's efforts to improve its preparedness and capability. To
encourage agility and innovation in preparing for the next major
disaster event, focused, skilled leadership is essential, and
these leaders must have clear operational plans, realistically
exercised, evaluated, and adapted with key resources identified,
provided, and appropriately deployed. Organizational changes,
while important, may not by themselves necessarily produce these
desired results. Incentives and sanctions are also important as
well as the responsibilities and resource commitments of all
levels of government and nongovernment entities.
As the administration and the Congress assess if further
organizational changes are immediately necessary, we suggest they
use the questions discussed above as a basis for consideration to
evaluate whether individual agencies or programs, including FEMA,
should be included or excluded from DHS.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or other members of the committee may have at
this time.
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Background
4See, for example, GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's
Response to Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23,
1993) and GAO, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need
to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO-93-46 (Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 1993).
5Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
Factors Other Than Organizational Placement May Affect FEMA's Performance
6 42 U.S.C. S:S: 5121-5206.
Clarity of FEMA's Mission and Related Responsibilities and Authorities
Experience and Training of FEMA Leadership
Adequacy of FEMA's Human, Financial, and Technological Resources
Effectiveness of FEMA's Planning, Exercises, and Related Partnerships
Issues for Consideration of a Change in FEMA's Organizational Placement
Mission relevancy and shared goals
Leverage Effectiveness and Gains Through Consolidation
7 GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues,
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
8GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
9 GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993).
10 GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency, GAO-03-113 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
Concluding Observations
(440516)
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Highlights of GAO-06-746T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives
May 9, 2006
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Factors for Success and Issues to Consider in Organizational Placement
The size and strength of hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the largest
natural disasters in our nation's history and raised major questions about
our nation's readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters.
GAO has a large body of completed and ongoing work on a range of issues
relating to all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and
rebuilding efforts related to hurricane Katrina as well as a wealth of
historical experience in reviewing the federal government's response to
disasters and catastrophic events.
A great deal of attention has been focused on lessons learned from the
2005 hurricane season and many recommendations have been advanced on how
to improve the nation's preparedness and ability to effectively respond to
catastrophic disasters. GAO's testimony today describes some factors for
success and other issues that Congress may wish to consider as it
determines what changes to make, including those of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's (FEMA) organizational placement, to improve the
nation's readiness and ability to respond effectively to major disasters,
including catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations at this time.
Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina, questions
have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement,
including whether FEMA should be disbanded and functions moved to other
agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or again
become an independent agency.
The history of the federal government's approach to emergency management
reflects experience with specific disasters and differences in opinion
regarding the most effective structure for this function. Prior to 1979,
emergency management was led by the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
FEMA was established as an independent agency in 1979. Based on
recommendations following the response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, FEMA
was elevated to a cabinet level agency whose director reported to the
President. In March 2003, FEMA became part of DHS.
As Comptroller General Walker has noted previously, a number of factors
may be ultimately more important to FEMA's success in responding to and
recovering from future disasters than its organizational placement. These
include
o the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities
and authorities;
o the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership;
o the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological
resources; and
o the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related
partnerships.
As Congress considers changing FEMA's organizational placement, it may
also wish to consider key issues affecting organizational structure,
including
o the relevance of FEMA's mission to the broader organization in
which it resides;
o the extent to which goals and objectives are shared;
o the ability to leverage effectively the resources of other
agencies and programs; and
o gains in efficiency and effectiveness through eliminating
duplications and overlaps.
The nation's next major response and recovery challenge, whether natural
or man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA's efforts to
improve its preparedness and capability. Although organizational structure
is important, future success is likely to principally depend upon focus,
skilled leadership, clear roles and responsibilities, operational plans
realistically exercised, and key resources appropriately and effectively
deployed.
*** End of document. ***