Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success  
and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement (09-MAY-06,  
GAO-06-746T).							 
                                                                 
The size and strength of hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the
largest natural disasters in our nation's history and raised	 
major questions about our nation's readiness and ability to	 
respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO has a large body of	 
completed and ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all  
phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding	 
efforts related to hurricane Katrina as well as a wealth of	 
historical experience in reviewing the federal government's	 
response to disasters and catastrophic events. A great deal of	 
attention has been focused on lessons learned from the 2005	 
hurricane season and many recommendations have been advanced on  
how to improve the nation's preparedness and ability to 	 
effectively respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO's testimony	 
today describes some factors for success and other issues that	 
Congress may wish to consider as it determines what changes to	 
make, including those of the Federal Emergency Management	 
Agency's (FEMA) organizational placement, to improve the nation's
readiness and ability to respond effectively to major disasters, 
including catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-746T					        
    ACCNO:   A53619						        
  TITLE:     Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future  
Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement	 
     DATE:   05/09/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Staff utilization					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Agency organizational structure			 

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GAO-06-746T

     

     * Clarity of FEMA's Mission and Related Responsibilities and A
     * Experience and Training of FEMA Leadership
     * Adequacy of FEMA's Human, Financial, and Technological Resou
     * Effectiveness of FEMA's Planning, Exercises, and Related Par
     * Mission relevancy and shared goals
     * Leverage Effectiveness and Gains Through Consolidation
     * Order by Mail or Phone

Testimonybefore the Committee on Homeland Security,

U.S. House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, May 9, 2006

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational
Placement

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO-06-746T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the future of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). My remarks
today are grounded in the work GAO has done to date on FEMA's performance
in the days, weeks, and months after hurricane Katrina as well as our
completed work on FEMA's role in responding to and recovering from prior
disasters and catastrophes before and after its incorporation into the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). My remarks are also fully
consistent with Comptroller General Walker's previous testimony on this
subject matter.

The events of hurricane Katrina graphically demonstrated the limitations
of the nation's ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster. FEMA,
within DHS, has the primary responsibility for coordinating and
implementing key aspects of the federal emergency response and, as a
result, has come under fire for shortcomings in its mission performance
after the disaster. Reports from the House, Senate, White House, DHS
Inspector General, and FEMA all identified problems in FEMA's leadership
and capabilities in the preparation for, response to, and short-term
recovery from hurricane Katrina.1 These reports, along with our own
observations, indicate that there were concerns about FEMA's leadership of
the federal response and questions regarding the missions, roles, and
responsibilities of FEMA and other federal, state, and local officials and
organizations in preparing for and responding to hurricane Katrina. FEMA's
capabilities were stretched to the limit and beyond, as reflected by, for
example, a limited ability to marshal, transport, and track the delivery
of commodities to areas of greatest need; difficulties in providing the
number of emergency response staff with the knowledge and experience to
meet the needs of thousands of disaster victims; and the inadequate
capacity of FEMA's information systems. Finally, the reports and our own
work identified concerns regarding the effectiveness of planning,
exercises, and related partnerships, functions traditionally supported by
FEMA emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs.

1These reports are: House Select Committee, A Failure of Initiative: Final
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
For and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: February 2006);
The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned
(Washington, D.C.: February 2006); DHS Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial
Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana (Washington, D.C.:
February 2006); and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).

The observations in this statement are based on prior GAO reports, our
ongoing work on hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and GAO field visits to the
affected Gulf Coast areas. We also have done a great deal of work on prior
disasters. In 1993, we conducted several reviews examining the federal
response to hurricane Andrew. All of these reviews focused on the unique
challenges involved in responding to catastrophic disasters. These reviews
defined catastrophic disasters as a subset of other disasters requiring
federal assistance. Unlike the bulk of disasters requiring FEMA to
respond, catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the ability of state, local,
and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with essential
services, such as food and water, within 12 to 24 hours. We also conducted
extensive work following the events of September 11, 2001.2 These prior
GAO reports focused on improving the immediate response to catastrophic
disasters, and we made various recommendations within this context, many
of which continue to apply and help form the basis of our views on the
issue of FEMA's future organizational placement today.

GAO teams have visited the areas most affected by hurricanes Katrina and
Rita-Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We interviewed officials
and analyzed information from the various involved federal agencies, such
as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and local
organizations, including state emergency management agencies; state
adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from
nongovernmental agencies. Additionally, we have closely followed the
hearings conducted by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, the House's Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, and other congressional
committees on hurricane Katrina issues. We have studied the House Select
Committee report, the White House report on lessons learned from the
federal response to hurricane Katrina, the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, FEMA's initial
response assessment of the agency's performance during hurricane Katrina,
as well as the report released last week by the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We discussed our preliminary
observations with the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security in March 2006 before testifying on our observations of federal
preparation, response, and recovery efforts related to hurricane Katrina.3

2GAO, Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA's Post 9/11 Public
Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-03-926 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
29, 2003) and GAO, September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance
to the New York City Area, GAO-04-72 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003).

                                    Summary

A catastrophic disaster, such as hurricane Katrina, almost immediately
overwhelms state and local response capacity, degrading the ability of
state and local personnel to respond effectively. Hurricane Katrina
destroyed or crippled essential communications infrastructure in the
hardest-hit areas, further exacerbating the ability of state and local
personnel to respond. In preparing for and responding to any major
disaster, but particularly a catastrophic one, the roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the preparation and response
at all levels of government must be clearly defined and communicated in
order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. At the same time,
effective decision making depends on having trained and experienced
leaders equipped with the resources and capabilities needed to implement
those decisions. Capabilities-the ability to carry out specific tasks with
desired results-are built upon the appropriate combination of resources
including people, processes, funds, and technology. Ensuring that those
capabilities are available and effective requires planning, coordination,
training, and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically
tested, problems identified, and issues subsequently addressed in
partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders.

Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina, questions
have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement,
including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved to other
agencies, remain within DHS, or again become an independent agency. In our
view, taking actions to improve the weaknesses identified in
after-the-fact analyses of FEMA's performance before, during, and after
hurricane Katrina may be more important to FEMA's success in responding to
and aiding the recovery from future disasters, most importantly the 2006
hurricane season, than its organizational placement. Factors that might
affect performance include

3GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
8, 2006).

           o  the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities
           and authorities;
           o  the experience of, and training provided to, FEMA leadership;
           o  the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological
           resources; and
           o  the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related
           partnerships.

           If a change in FEMA's organizational placement is considered, we
           believe certain other issues should be considered to assess
           alternative approaches. These include issues such as mission
           relevancy and shared goals and objectives, as well as leveraging
           effectiveness and gains through consolidation.

           In considering FEMA's future, it is useful to understand its past.
           Before the establishment of FEMA and its placement within DHS,
           federal disaster response and recovery was also managed by an
           agency within an executive department. The 1960s and early 1970s
           brought massive disasters requiring major federal response and
           recovery operations by the Federal Disaster Assistance
           Administration, established within the Department of Housing and
           Urban Development. Hurricane Carla struck in 1962, hurricane Betsy
           in 1965, hurricane Camille in 1969, and hurricane Agnes in 1972.
           The San Fernando earthquake rocked Southern California in 1971,
           and the Alaskan earthquake hit in 1964. To respond to national
           concern regarding these events, the Congress passed the 1974
           Disaster Relief Act that established the process of Presidential
           disaster declarations.

           However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented.
           Many parallel programs and policies existed at the state and local
           level, compounding the complexity of federal disaster relief
           efforts. In 1979, President Carter issued an executive order that
           merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into
           a new, independent Federal Emergency Management Agency. Among
           other agencies, FEMA absorbed the Federal Insurance
           Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control
           Administration, the National Weather Service Community
           Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the
           General Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster
           Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense
           responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the
           Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

           FEMA led the federal response to hurricane Andrew, which slammed
           into and leveled much of South Florida in August 1992. In 1993, we
           conducted several reviews examining the federal response. The
           reviews focused on the unique challenges involved in responding to
           catastrophic disasters and raised questions about whether and how
           national disaster response efforts had incorporated lessons from
           experiences with hurricane Hugo in 1989.4 These prior GAO reports
           focused on improving the immediate response to catastrophic
           disasters, and we made various recommendations within this
           context. While some of our prior recommendations were acted upon,
           others were not. For example, President Clinton elevated the FEMA
           director to cabinet status in 1996, providing the type of direct
           communication and lines of responsibility we had recommended.
           However, we also recommended that FEMA improve its catastrophic
           disaster response capability by using existing authority to
           aggressively respond to catastrophic disasters, assessing the
           extent of the damage, and then advising state and local officials
           of identified needs and the federal resources available to address
           them. One criticism of the FEMA response to hurricane Katrina was
           that FEMA officials were more reactive than proactive in
           identifying the emergency needs of communities in the immediate
           days after the disaster.

           The Homeland Security Act of 2002,5 which established DHS, created
           new requirements for emergency preparedness and response,
           including developing a comprehensive National Incident Management
           System (NIMS) and a comprehensive National Response Plan (NRP).
           NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for incident
           management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause,
           size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles and
           responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments and
           various first responder disciplines at each level during an
           emergency event. NIMS established the Incident Command System
           (ICS) as a standard incident management organization with five
           functional areas-command, operations, planning, logistics, and
           finance/administration-for management of all major incidents. It
           also prescribes interoperable communications systems and
           preparedness before an incident happens, including planning,
           training, and exercises. The NRP is intended to be an
           all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
           comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents
           where federal involvement is necessary. It is to operate within
           the framework of NIMS.

           On March 1, 2003, FEMA became part of DHS pursuant to the Homeland
           Security Act of 2002. FEMA retained its authority to administer
           the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
           Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act),6 which sets forth the
           primary programs and processes for the federal government to
           provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local
           governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private
           nonprofit organizations. Among its missions within DHS, FEMA is to
           lead the effort to prepare the nation for natural and man-made
           disasters and effectively manage federal response and recovery
           efforts following any presidentially declared incident. FEMA is
           also to initiate proactive mitigation activities, train first
           responders, and manage the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA
           shares responsibility for preparing the nation for natural and
           man-made disasters with other organizations within DHS, including
           the Office of Grants and Training that administers federal
           homeland security grants for state and local first responders.

           Organizational changes, such as separating FEMA from DHS, are
           often viewed as a fix to address performance issues. Our
           institutional knowledge regarding organizational performance
           factors suggests that organizational changes alone may not
           adequately address underlying systemic conditions that result in
           an organization's performance problem. Hurricane Katrina was one
           of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history; its size
           and strength will have effects for years to come. It exacted
           terrible human costs with the loss of significant numbers of lives
           and resulted in billions of dollars in property damage, clearly
           overwhelming the capabilities of several federal, state, and local
           agencies. Nevertheless, after-the-fact analyses point to
           improvements needed in (1) the clarity of FEMA's mission and
           related responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission
           performance expectations; (2) the experience and training of FEMA
           leadership; (3) the adequacy of FEMA's human, financial, and
           technological resources; and (4) the effectiveness of FEMA's
           planning, exercises, and related partnerships. If successfully
           implemented, such improvements may obviate the need for major
           organizational changes.

           In the event of a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles,
           responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all
           levels must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in
           order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making,
           especially in preparing for and in the early hours and days after
           the disaster. In the aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 1992, we
           discussed the critical importance of clearly defining and
           communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of
           authority for catastrophic response in advance of such events.
           Based on our assessments of the federal response, we recommended
           that in a catastrophic disaster a single individual directly
           responsible and accountable to the President should be designated
           to act as the central focal point to lead and coordinate the
           overall federal response when a catastrophic disaster has happened
           or is imminent. President Clinton's elevation of the position of
           FEMA director to cabinet status in 1996 provided the direct lines
           of communication and accountability envisioned in our
           recommendation. The subsequent incorporation of FEMA into DHS
           changed the direct reporting relationship between FEMA and the
           President. With the passage and subsequent implementation of the
           Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of DHS, rather than
           the FEMA Director, became the cabinet-level focal point for
           natural and man-made crises and emergency planning. The
           incorporation of FEMA into DHS raised questions during hurricane
           Katrina regarding lines of authority with respect to not only the
           DHS Secretary and the FEMA Director, but also the key officials
           reporting to them, the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the
           Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), respectively.

           During incidents of national significance, including catastrophic
           disasters, the overall coordination of federal incident management
           activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security
           under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security
           Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), and the NRP. There are three
           key leadership roles defined under the NRP needed to manage a
           catastrophic disaster. First, the role of the Secretary of
           Homeland Security is to provide strategic, national leadership as
           the focal point for federal response and coordination. Second, the
           role of the PFO is to act as the Secretary of Homeland Security's
           formally designated representative locally to oversee, coordinate,
           and execute the secretary's incident management responsibilities.
           Third, the FCO is a position created by the Stafford Act and is
           appointed by the FEMA Director to manage federal resource support
           activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The
           FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal
           disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected
           localities by making mission assignments to specific federal
           agencies that have needed resources and capabilities.

           FEMA's incorporation into DHS appears to have introduced some
           uncertainty regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of
           the DHS secretary and the PFO relative to the FEMA director and
           the FCO. The questions raised by the various assessments of the
           federal response during hurricane Katrina highlight the importance
           of clarity in FEMA's mission and related responsibilities and
           authorities, as the following examples illustrate:

           o  The White House report recommended that the PFO be given
           operational authority to manage and coordinate federal response,
           assets and, in a multi-state disaster, to oversee the multiple
           federal coordinating officers operating in the various states and
           make any operational decisions necessary, within the law, without
           having to obtain approval from headquarters.

           o  The DHS OIG recommended that FEMA clarify the roles of the PFO,
           the FCO, the Federal Resource Coordinator, and the Disaster
           Recovery Manager to provide a clear distinction for the types and
           levels of response activities that warrant a combination or
           modification to those roles; develop procedures for the timely
           activation of each role; and, ensure that these officials be
           provided with the necessary training to complement their
           qualifications for serving in these positions. Similarly, the OIG
           recommended that FEMA establish clear roles and responsibilities
           for the Housing Area Command and define its reporting requirements
           and chain of command relationships with the FEMA headquarters,
           Joint Field Offices, and Technical Assistance Contractors.

           o  FEMA's internal assessment identified the need for senior
           management to develop doctrine to provide a single, simplified
           command structure for operations in temporary joint field offices
           created to lead federal response and recovery efforts.

           o  The Senate report recommended that the Stafford Act should be
           amended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and
           the NRP should be revised to eliminate the PFO position for
           Stafford Act-declared emergencies and disasters.

           More explicit authority is needed to enhance federal leadership in
           situations when it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to
           catastrophic magnitude in a more proactive manner. In our July
           1993 report on the federal response to hurricane Andrew, we also
           noted that encouraging agencies to do as much catastrophic
           disaster preparation as possible in advance of a Stafford Act
           declaration could reduce the federal response time to the ensuing
           catastrophe. We stated that when there is early warning, as there
           usually is with hurricanes, federal agencies must mobilize
           resources and deploy personnel before the catastrophe strikes.
           However, the Stafford Act did not, and still does not, explicitly
           authorize such predeclaration activities. As a result, federal
           agencies may fail to undertake extensive predeclaration
           preparations because of uncertainty over whether FEMA will request
           their assistance under the Stafford Act and ultimately reimburse
           their predeclaration costs. Therefore, we continue to believe that
           Congress should consider giving federal agencies, including FEMA,
           explicit authority under the Stafford Act to take actions to
           prepare for a catastrophic disaster when there is warning.

           In order to effectively fulfill the leadership roles and
           responsibilities and to exercise lines of authority for the
           response at all levels to facilitate rapid and effective decision
           making in the event of a catastrophic disaster, leaders should
           have the experience and training needed to perform effectively,
           especially in the early hours and days after the disaster. In the
           aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 1992, we discussed the critical
           importance of the quality of leadership during catastrophic
           disasters. For example, we noted that leadership creates a
           powerful, meaningful perception that the federal government
           recognizes an event is catastrophic, is in control, and is going
           to use every means necessary to meet the immediate mass-care needs
           of disaster victims. Assessments of FEMA's performance during and
           after hurricane Katrina have raised similar issues and resulted in
           recommendations related to the experience and training of FEMA
           leadership, as illustrated in the following examples:

           o  The House Select Committee concluded that federal agencies,
           including DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their
           roles and responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. According to
           the Committee's report, senior officials were ill-prepared due to
           their lack of experience and knowledge of the required roles and
           responsibilities prescribed by the NRP, and FEMA lacked adequately
           trained and experienced staff for the hurricane Katrina response.
           The report noted that, since 2002, FEMA had lost a number of its
           top disaster specialists, senior leaders, and experienced
           personnel and that even before hurricane Katrina, FEMA suffered
           from a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals.

           o  The White House report included recommendations to enhance DHS
           expertise and experience and to develop DHS regions that would be
           fully staffed, trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all
           preparedness activities and any emergency that may require a
           substantial federal response. The report also recommended the
           establishment of a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP for
           all department and agency personnel with incident management
           responsibilities, noting that each Regional Director should have
           significant expertise and experience, core competency in emergency
           preparedness and incident management, and demonstrated leadership
           ability.

           o  FEMA's assessment of the agency's performance during and after
           hurricane Katrina resulted in a recommendation that emergency
           management personnel at all levels should be required to have
           training on ICS and the NRP and recommended the creation of a
           rotational training program for field personnel to spend time at
           FEMA headquarters and for FEMA managers at headquarters to train
           in the field on simulated and actual disaster events. The
           assessment also recommended that FEMA identify and name qualified
           personnel with leadership ability and emergency response
           experience as FEMA liaison officers for counties, parishes, or
           boroughs in advance of disasters. Further, it recommended a more
           comprehensive training program to prepare existing and new
           personnel for Disaster Recovery Center assignments.

           o  The Senate report concluded that training and exercises were
           needed to ensure that everyone involved in disaster response
           understands their roles and responsibilities and is prepared to
           carry them out.

           Even trained and experienced leaders who share a clear and common
           understanding of their mission and authorities across a community
           of federal, state, and local emergency management officials cannot
           effectively implement those authorities or exercise leadership
           without access to the human, financial, and technological
           resources needed to take action. For noncatastrophic disasters,
           the federal government should be in a support and assist role,
           providing resources and other assistance to enable state and local
           governments to carry out their responsibilities. However, for
           catastrophic disasters that can overwhelm the ability of state and
           local and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with
           essential services, the federal government should be more
           proactive, anticipating state and local needs, pre-positioning
           resources, and providing selected resources where they are needed
           or likely to be needed. The federal government must develop more
           capabilities and expertise to respond proactively when a
           catastrophic disaster is imminent or occurs.

           When we reviewed FEMA's response to hurricane Andrew in 1992, we
           concluded that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate had many
           of the people and resources needed, with people skilled in such
           areas as strategic and tactical planning, logistics, command and
           control, and communications, and resources including
           communications, transportation, life support, as well as
           sophisticated computer-modeling equipment. At that time we
           reported that, through constant planning and exercising, the
           directorate had maintained a high level of readiness and was able
           to quickly deploy people and resources from a number of locations
           to anywhere in the United States (although we identified a number
           of shortcomings in FEMA's response that primarily reflected the
           magnitude of the disaster.) Unfortunately, the various reports and
           our own work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after
           hurricane Katrina suggest that FEMA's human, financial, and
           technological resources were insufficient to meet the challenges
           posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting
           number of disaster victims of the hurricane, as the following
           examples illustrate:

           o  The Senate's report concluded that FEMA did not have the
           resources to fulfill the mission and respond effectively in a
           catastrophic event and recommended that DHS must develop the
           national capabilities-especially surge capacity-it needs to
           respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has sufficient
           full-time staff, response teams, contracting personnel, and
           adequately trained and sufficiently staffed reserve corps to ramp
           up capabilities, as needed. In terms of technology, the Senate
           report recommended that DHS complete and/or adopt technology and
           information management systems to effectively manage
           disaster-related activities and develop an efficient ordering
           system that minimizes delays and provides order status and
           accurate, timely commodity tracking as well as a transportation
           protocol that moves commodities and resources directly from the
           supplier to the users. The report concluded that resources are
           needed for staffing and preparation of regional strike teams,
           better development of a trained cadre of reservists, and the
           development of new logistics capabilities.

           o  DHS's OIG report included a number of recommendations related
           to enhancing human and technological resources and capabilities.
           The recommendations directed FEMA to:

                        o  develop a disaster workforce plan for standing
                        capability for permanent, temporary, and reserve
                        staff responsive to previous disaster needs and also
                        develop a plan that is scalable to other events
                        irrespective of cause, size, or complexity;

                        o  provide training to additional National Processing
                        Service Center staff and contractors to enhance
                        FEMA's capability to perform applicant assistance and
                        case management activities responsive to the needs of
                        applications;

                        o  develop a more comprehensive program to recruit,
                        train, and retain local hires for use in augmenting
                        FEMA's disaster assistance employees and permanent
                        staff;

                        o  determine and fill requirements to provide
                        emergency responders with communications equipment
                        capable of performing in austere conditions; and

                        o  develop and implement a resource-tracking system
                        that is capable of documenting whether resources were
                        delivered and the efficiency with which the resource
                        was provided.

           o  FEMA's initial response assessment concluded that the agency
           needs to lead an audit of current staffing capability and
           workforce demands for staff in a severe or catastrophic event and
           determine the number of personnel available to serve in each
           position or unit for such a disaster. This information is to be
           used to develop and implement a strategy for addressing any
           identified staffing gaps. The assessment also concluded that FEMA
           needs to develop a communications suite that operates
           independently of normal communications infrastructure and is able
           to be moved into disaster locations.

           o  The White House report identified the need for each homeland
           security region to have access to the resources, equipment, and
           personnel needed to establish a self-sufficient temporary Joint
           Field Office to direct response and recovery efforts anywhere
           within the region.

           o  The House Select Committee also concluded that despite
           extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to
           respond to the catastrophic effects of hurricane Katrina. For
           example, the report noted that FEMA's logistics and contracting
           systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained
           provision of commodities; long-standing weaknesses and the
           magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA's ability to provide
           emergency shelter and temporary housing; and the readiness of
           FEMA's national emergency response teams was inadequate and
           reduced the effectiveness of the federal response.

           Fewer federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic
           disaster if state and local governments' response capabilities are
           greater. The goal of emergency planning is simple: to have the
           skills and resources to respond, when needed, with well-planned,
           well-coordinated, and effective efforts to save lives and property
           and aid recovery from the emergency or disaster-regardless of the
           size or nature of the emergency. However, because FEMA is not a
           first responder, state and local government officials and
           emergency and homeland security managers must take the lead in
           developing strategic and operational plans and identifying the
           basic capabilities each jurisdiction might need to meet local,
           regional, and state prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery
           expectations-whether defined by federal guidance or by state and
           local assessments. That is because local officials are most
           knowledgeable of their communities, including their needs and
           capabilities. In addition, local emergency first
           responders-police, fire fighters, emergency medical personnel, and
           others such as public health and hospital personnel-will still be
           the first on the scene of an incident.

           Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to
           test emergency management plans. It is important that exercises be
           designed to be both as realistic as possible and stress the
           emergency management system as almost any major event will. The
           training should also be linked to the essential capabilities and
           emphasize identifying, developing, and sustaining baseline
           capabilities for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
           This would involve defining baseline capabilities at each level of
           government-federal, regional, state, and local-and surge
           capabilities in the event of a catastrophic disaster, based on
           risk to an individual jurisdiction and what would be required to
           support mutual aid compacts.

           In our previous work on hurricane Andrew, we identified the
           critical importance of conducting strong advance planning and
           robust training and exercise programs and the need for the federal
           government to upgrade training and exercises for state and local
           governments specifically geared toward catastrophic disaster
           response. Our review uncovered shortcomings both in the way FEMA
           helps state and local governments train and conduct exercises in
           anticipation of catastrophic disasters and in the way it monitors
           state and local preparedness. Thus, we concluded that FEMA could
           do more to ensure that state and local governments prepare for
           catastrophic disaster response.

           Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the potential benefits of applying
           lessons learned from training exercises and experiences with
           actual hurricanes as well as the dangers of ignoring them. For
           example, confusion with emergency plans complicated the
           evacuations and everything that followed. Clearly, plans were not
           implemented or were only partially implemented, and state
           officials requested aid early but in some cases were slow to
           deploy their own resources. Our own work and assessments of FEMA's
           performance during and after hurricane Katrina have made a variety
           of recommendations intended to improve the effectiveness of
           federal planning, exercises, and related partnerships, as the
           following examples show:

           o  The White House report recommended that DHS (1) develop and
           implement homeland security regions that are fully staffed,
           trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all preparedness
           activities and any emergency that may require a substantial
           federal response and (2) conduct training and exercises for key
           state and local officials.

           o  The Senate report recommended that (1) national emergency
           response plans be reviewed and coordinated with the states and on
           a regional basis to ensure the plans are understood, trained, and
           exercised prior to an emergency; (2) officials in emergency
           agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as
           well as first responder groups outside of government receive
           regular training on NRP and NIMS; (3) DHS consider tying future
           cost-share requirements for preparedness grant funds to
           performance and results of these exercises; (4) DHS establish
           regional strike teams and enhance regional operations-building on
           FEMA's 10 existing regional offices-to provide better coordination
           between federal agencies and the states in preparing for and
           responding to disasters; and (5) resources be provided for
           additional planning and more frequent and ambitious training and
           exercises.

           o  The DHS OIG report recommended that FEMA (1) develop and
           implement a system that automates and tracks the selection,
           deployment, training, and demobilization of responders; (2)
           develop more effective and efficient plans for the delivery of
           assistance to address long-term housing issues, and test these
           plans in a simulated environment before application in actual
           disasters; (3) request an appropriation or provide other funding,
           resources, and institutional support to agency components and to
           state and local partners to complete draft or proposed
           catastrophic planning initiatives for natural disasters; (4)
           develop a formal mechanism to ensure continuity between
           preparedness, response, and recovery by including FEMA regional
           staff in the Preparedness Directorate's relationships with state
           emergency management agencies for grants, exercises, planning,
           technical assistance, and training.

           o  The House report observed that the hurricane Pam exercise
           reflected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers
           of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans.
           Implementation of lessons learned from hurricane Pam was
           incomplete.

           o  FEMA's initial assessment concluded that FEMA must develop a
           concept of operations for logistically supporting Emergency
           Management Assistance Compact resources that are requested for
           disaster response efforts.

           In summary, the difficulties described above would not, we
           believe, be fixed by simply moving FEMA to an independent status.
           Indeed, we know that many of lessons learned from hurricane
           Katrina were acted on for hurricane Rita, with a much better
           response effort, indicating that organizational change is not the
           primary key to success.

           Taking actions to improve these operational weaknesses in FEMA's
           performance before, during, and after hurricane Katrina may be
           more important to FEMA's success in responding to and recovering
           from the next hurricane season, than its organizational placement.
           Of course, FEMA will need financial and other resources to address
           the problems that have been identified in the wake of hurricane
           Katrina.

           A number of alternative organizational changes are now being
           considered in response to hurricane Katrina. For example, the
           White House report recommended keeping FEMA within DHS, but would
           preserve FEMA as an independent operating agency to perform its
           response and recovery mission while making other organizational
           changes, such as transferring the National Disaster Medical System
           from DHS to the Department of Health and Human Services. The
           Senate report recommended creation of a new, comprehensive
           emergency management organization within DHS that would fuse DHS's
           emergency management, preparedness, and critical infrastructure
           assets into a new organization. Other observers have proposed
           removing FEMA from DHS completely.

           If an organizational change remains under consideration, our past
           work could be helpful. Before the formation of DHS, the
           Comptroller General testified before the House Select Committee on
           Homeland Security that reorganizations of government agencies
           frequently encounter start-up problems and unanticipated
           consequences and are unlikely to fully overcome obstacles and
           challenges and may require additional modifications in the
           future.7 He also asked a number of questions related to mission
           relevancy and shared goals and leveraging effectiveness and gains
           through consolidation that could be used to evaluate whether
           individual agencies or programs should be included or excluded
           from the proposed department. Some of these questions are
           appropriate today for discussing FEMA's future, and I would
           suggest that they might be useful if a change in FEMA's
           organizational placement is under consideration.

           o  Is homeland security a major part of the agency or program
           mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?

           o  Does the agency or program being considered for the new
           department share primary goals and objectives with the other
           agencies or programs being consolidated?

           Congress might consider whether or how moving FEMA out of DHS
           would impact DHS's mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act
           of 2002, of acting as a focal point for natural and man-made
           crises and emergency planning. DHS's Emergency Preparedness and
           Response Directorate- primarily FEMA-was to help ensure the
           effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist
           attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Removing FEMA
           from DHS might impact the ability of the department and its
           remaining components and FEMA itself in fully addressing the close
           links between preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery for
           all hazards.

           o  Does the agency or program being considered for the new
           department create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness
           of other agencies and programs or the new department as a whole?

           o  Does the agency or program being considered for the new
           department improve the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland
           security missions through eliminating duplications and overlaps,
           closing gaps, and aligning or merging common roles and
           responsibilities?

           The dispersion of responsibility for preparedness and response
           across more than one federal agency was a problem we identified
           during the formation of DHS.8 As I mentioned earlier, FEMA was
           established in 1979 to consolidate federal emergency preparedness
           mitigation and response in a single federal agency. Its
           responsibilities were to include, among other things, the
           coordination of civil defense and civil emergency planning and the
           coordination of federal disaster relief. FEMA was responsible for
           responding to a wide range of disasters, including floods,
           hurricanes, earthquakes, hazardous material accidents, nuclear
           accidents, and biological, chemical, and nuclear attacks.9
           However, when Congress created DHS, it separated FEMA's
           responsibilities for preparedness and response activities into two
           directorates. Responsibility for preparedness for terrorism
           disasters was placed in the department's Border and Transportation
           Security Directorate, which included FEMA's Office of National
           Preparedness. Other types of FEMA disaster preparedness and
           response efforts were transferred to the department's Emergency
           Preparedness and Response Directorate. In January 2003, we
           observed that this organizational arrangement would challenge FEMA
           in ensuring the effective coordination of preparedness and
           response efforts and enhancing the provision and management of
           disaster assistance for efficient and effective response.10

           A division of responsibility remains under the recent DHS
           reorganization resulting from Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage
           Review with preparedness efforts-including planning, training,
           exercising, and funding-consolidated into a Preparedness
           Directorate. FEMA reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland
           Security for response and recovery missions. Secretary Chertoff
           has stated the reorganization would focus FEMA on its historic
           mission of response and recovery. We believe this division of
           responsibility should be reconsidered.

           The next response and recovery challenge this nation will face,
           whether natural or man-made, will provide another important test
           of FEMA's efforts to improve its preparedness and capability. To
           encourage agility and innovation in preparing for the next major
           disaster event, focused, skilled leadership is essential, and
           these leaders must have clear operational plans, realistically
           exercised, evaluated, and adapted with key resources identified,
           provided, and appropriately deployed. Organizational changes,
           while important, may not by themselves necessarily produce these
           desired results. Incentives and sanctions are also important as
           well as the responsibilities and resource commitments of all
           levels of government and nongovernment entities.

           As the administration and the Congress assess if further
           organizational changes are immediately necessary, we suggest they
           use the questions discussed above as a basis for consideration to
           evaluate whether individual agencies or programs, including FEMA,
           should be included or excluded from DHS.

           This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
           questions that you or other members of the committee may have at
           this time.

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                                   Background

4See, for example, GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's
Response to Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23,
1993) and GAO, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need
to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO-93-46 (Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 1993).

5Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

Factors Other Than Organizational Placement May Affect FEMA's Performance

6 42 U.S.C. S:S: 5121-5206.

Clarity of FEMA's Mission and Related Responsibilities and Authorities

Experience and Training of FEMA Leadership

Adequacy of FEMA's Human, Financial, and Technological Resources

Effectiveness of FEMA's Planning, Exercises, and Related Partnerships

    Issues for Consideration of a Change in FEMA's Organizational Placement

Mission relevancy and shared goals

Leverage Effectiveness and Gains Through Consolidation

7 GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues,
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).

8GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).

9 GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993).

10 GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency, GAO-03-113 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).

                            Concluding Observations

(440516)

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Highlights of GAO-06-746T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives

May 9, 2006

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Factors for Success and Issues to Consider in Organizational Placement

The size and strength of hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the largest
natural disasters in our nation's history and raised major questions about
our nation's readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters.
GAO has a large body of completed and ongoing work on a range of issues
relating to all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and
rebuilding efforts related to hurricane Katrina as well as a wealth of
historical experience in reviewing the federal government's response to
disasters and catastrophic events.

A great deal of attention has been focused on lessons learned from the
2005 hurricane season and many recommendations have been advanced on how
to improve the nation's preparedness and ability to effectively respond to
catastrophic disasters. GAO's testimony today describes some factors for
success and other issues that Congress may wish to consider as it
determines what changes to make, including those of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's (FEMA) organizational placement, to improve the
nation's readiness and ability to respond effectively to major disasters,
including catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations at this time.

Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina, questions
have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement,
including whether FEMA should be disbanded and functions moved to other
agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or again
become an independent agency.

The history of the federal government's approach to emergency management
reflects experience with specific disasters and differences in opinion
regarding the most effective structure for this function. Prior to 1979,
emergency management was led by the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
FEMA was established as an independent agency in 1979. Based on
recommendations following the response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, FEMA
was elevated to a cabinet level agency whose director reported to the
President. In March 2003, FEMA became part of DHS.

As Comptroller General Walker has noted previously, a number of factors
may be ultimately more important to FEMA's success in responding to and
recovering from future disasters than its organizational placement. These
include

           o  the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities
           and authorities;
           o  the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership;
           o  the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological
           resources; and
           o  the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related
           partnerships.

As Congress considers changing FEMA's organizational placement, it may
also wish to consider key issues affecting organizational structure,
including

           o  the relevance of FEMA's mission to the broader organization in
           which it resides;
           o  the extent to which goals and objectives are shared;
           o  the ability to leverage effectively the resources of other
           agencies and programs; and
           o  gains in efficiency and effectiveness through eliminating
           duplications and overlaps.

The nation's next major response and recovery challenge, whether natural
or man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA's efforts to
improve its preparedness and capability. Although organizational structure
is important, future success is likely to principally depend upon focus,
skilled leadership, clear roles and responsibilities, operational plans
realistically exercised, and key resources appropriately and effectively
deployed.
*** End of document. ***