Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More	 
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and		 
Implementation Plans (06-SEP-06, GAO-06-745).			 
                                                                 
The Army considers its modular force transformation its most	 
extensive restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units  
from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will
require an investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion 
for equipment, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011,	 
according to the Army. Because of broad congressional interest in
this initiative, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller  
General's authority and assessed (1) the Army's progress and	 
plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2) progress made	 
and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the modular 
force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an	 
approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and
the need for further changes to designs or implementation plans. 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-745 					        
    ACCNO:   A60326						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress  
More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and	 
Implementation Plans						 
     DATE:   09/06/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Army modularity					 
	     Army personnel					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense conversion 				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transparency					 
	     Army Future Combat Systems 			 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 

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GAO-06-745

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Convers
          * Army Faces Difficulty Meeting Its Goals for Equipping Active
          * Equipment Shortages Include Key Items the Army Identified as
          * National Guard Faces Significant Equipping Challenges
          * To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipm
     * Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel
     * Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity,
          * Army Lacks Performance Metrics to Measure the Results of Mod
          * Army Lacks a Plan for Comprehensively Evaluating Modular Des
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Actions
     * Matter for Congressional Consideration
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
     * Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2006

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular
Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans

GAO-06-745

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 7
Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but Its
Ability to Meet Near- and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear 10
Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel Requirements
for Its New Modular Force Structure 18
Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but Lacks a
Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and Monitor
Implementation 21
Conclusions 26
Recommendations for Executive Actions 26
Matter for Congressional Consideration 28
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 36
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41

Tables

Table 1: Planned Numbers of Modular Combat Brigades in the Active
Component and National Guard as of March 2006 8
Table 2: Army Schedule for Creating Active Component and National Guard
Modular Combat Brigades as of March 2006 9
Table 3: Modular Force Cost Estimates for the Entire Army by Function 10
Table 4: Army's End-strength Authorization History and Modular Force Goal
20

Figures

Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Combat Brigades 8
Figure 2: Army's Force Rotation Model 17

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 6, 2006

Congressional Committees

In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure
itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force-an
undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force
since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will
require a significant investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal year
2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in a high pace of
operations and is facing many other demands for funding such as the Future
Combat System program, now expected to cost over $160 billion.1 The
foundation of the modular force is the creation of standardized modular
combat brigades in both the active component and National Guard. The new
modular brigades are designed to be stand-alone, self-sufficient units
that are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint and
expeditionary operations than their larger division-based predecessors.
The Army plans to achieve its modular restructuring without permanently
increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, in accordance
with a Department of Defense (DOD) decision reached during the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It plans to achieve this primarily by
eliminating some noncombat positions in which military personnel currently
serve, and transferring these positions to its operational combat forces.2
The February 2006 QDR also specified that the Army would create 70 modular
combat brigades in its active component and National Guard. This
represents a 7-brigade reduction from the Army's original plan of having
77 modular combat brigades. However, according to Army officials,
resources from the 7 brigades that were part of the original plan will be
used to increase support units in the reserve component, and DOD officials
believe that 70 brigades will be sufficient to execute the defense
strategy.

1 The Future Combat System (FCS) is a family of weapons and other systems
including manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and
munitions linked by an information network. The FCS cost estimate is in
then-year dollars as of January 2006.

2 Army personnel assigned to noncombat positions provide management,
administrative, training, and other support. Operational combat forces
include personnel assigned to the Army's combat, combat support, and
combat service support units.

Because of the cost and magnitude of the Army's transformation plans, and
broad congressional interest, we have initiated a body of work on both the
force structure and cost implications of the Army's transformation to a
modular force under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. We
presented our preliminary observations on the Army's plan in a March 2005
hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House
Committee on Armed Services.3 In our September 2005 report on the cost of
the modular force conversion, we reported that the Army's $48 billion
total modular force conversion cost estimate was evolving and included
uncertainties that may drive costs higher. We recommended that the Army
clarify its definition of modular force costs including equipment costs,
which constituted $41 billion of the $48 billion estimate.4 In our April
2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
House Committee on Armed Services, we observed that the Army's cost
estimate through fiscal year 2011 had increased from the earlier $48
billion estimate to $52.5 billion, and that the Army faces significant
challenges in executing its modularity plans to fully achieve planned
capabilities within this current estimate and the time frames it has
established for the modular conversion.5 This report focuses on the Army's
plans for implementing the modular force initiatives, with an emphasis on
active combat brigades, since the Army has already begun to restructure
its active divisions to the new brigade-based designs.

We are sending this report to you because of your oversight
responsibilities on defense matters. Specifically for this report we
assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat
brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel
requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army
has developed an approach for assessing the results of the modular
conversions and for further adjusting designs or implementation plans.

To assess the Army's progress and plans for equipping active component
modular combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on selected
equipment that the Army identified as essential for achieving the modular
combat brigades' intended capabilities. For these selected items, we
analyzed the Army's active component equipment requirements obtained from
the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Training for each of the three brigade variants-heavy,
light, and Stryker. We compared the equipment requirements of the brigades
to data we obtained from officials from the Department of the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff G-86 on the levels of equipment expected to be on hand in
2007 and discussed plans for meeting key equipment requirements with these
officials. We also reviewed unit readiness reports from those brigades
that had completed or were in the process of completing their modular
conversion as of February 2006. In addition, we visited the first three
Army divisions undergoing modular conversions to obtain information on the
plans for organizing, staffing, and equipping the modular brigades. To
assess progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of
the modular force, we reviewed documents and discussed the implications of
force structure requirements with officials from the Department of Army
Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, and
Operations and Training, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We also reviewed the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report. Finally, to assess the extent to
which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results of the
modular conversions and for further adjusting designs or implementation
plans, we examined key Army planning documents and discussed objectives,
performance metrics, and testing plans with officials in the Department of
the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training,
and the Training and Doctrine Command. Also, we met with a panel of
retired senior Army general officers at the Association of the U.S. Army
Institute of Land Warfare. In addition, we relied on our past reports
assessing organizations undertaking significant reorganizations. We
conducted our work from September 2004 through March 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards and determined that
the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and
methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix
I.

3 GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,
2005).

4 GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight
of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926 (Washington,
D.C.: Sep. 29, 2005).

5 GAO, Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain
Uncertain, GAO-06-548T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).

6 This office is responsible for programming, materiel integration, and
management of Department of the Army studies and analyses.

                                Results in Brief

While the Army is well under way in creating active component modular
combat brigades, it is not meeting its equipping goals for these brigades
and has not yet completed its equipping strategy, which raises
considerable uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades
will be equipped both in the near and longer term and the ultimate
equipment cost. The Army established equipping goals in its Campaign Plan
in which converting units are expected to receive most of the major
equipment items required by the new modular design within specified time
frames. However, although the Army is procuring billions of dollars of new
equipment required by its new modular design, units undergoing their
modular conversions are not meeting these equipping goals due to several
factors, including the challenges of undertaking such an extensive
restructuring while managing equipment requirements for ongoing
operations. In addition, brigades will initially lack planned quantities
of items such as communications and surveillance systems necessary to
provide the enhanced intelligence, situational awareness, and network
capabilities that are essential for creating smaller, more flexible and
mobile combat brigades. Moreover, the Army will likely face even greater
challenges fully equipping 28 planned National Guard modular combat
brigades since National Guard units have historically been underequipped
and have transferred large quantities of equipment to deploying units. To
mitigate equipment shortages, the Army is developing a force rotation
model that will provide varying levels of equipment to brigades depending
on how close they are to deployment. However, this strategy is not yet
complete because key details have not been decided, including the types
and quantities of equipment for brigades in each of the various phases of
the model. Until the Army completes the development of its equipping
strategy, it will not be possible to determine which units will be
equipped, or how this strategy may affect the Army's equipment funding
plans. It is also unclear how well units with low priority for equipment
will be able to respond to unforeseen crises.

While the Army has several initiatives under way to manage its modular
force personnel requirements, it faces significant challenges achieving
its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active
component end strength above 482,400, as specified by DOD's 2006 QDR
report. The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force
from 315,000 to 355,000, but doing so without permanently increasing its
active component end strength is an ambitious undertaking that will
require the Army to eliminate many positions in its noncombat force.
Effective strategic workforce planning includes the development of
strategies to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving goals.
However, the Army has not provided DOD or Congress with detailed
information on the status of its various personnel initiatives and
progress towards meeting its modular force personnel goals. We found some
of the Army's personnel realignment and reduction initiatives may not meet
the Army's initial goals or expectations. For example during fiscal year
2005, the Army converted approximately 8,000 military positions to
civilian-staffed positions within the Army's noncombat force. However,
Army officials believe additional conversions to achieve the 19,000
planned reductions in the noncombat force will be significantly more
challenging to achieve. Also, the Army expected that the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure decisions would free up approximately 2,000 to
3,000 positions in the noncombat force, but it is revisiting this
assumption based upon updated manpower levels at the commands and
installations approved for closure or consolidation. As a result, it is
not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its modular force
requirements within its end-strength goal and what risks exist if these
goals are not met. Furthermore, without information on the status and
progress of these personnel initiatives, the Secretary of Defense and
Congress lack the visibility necessary to assess the challenges and
effectively address problems when they arise.

While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for
modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach to
effectively measure progress against stated modularity objectives, assess
the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and monitor
implementation plans. GAO and DOD have identified the importance of
establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics,
which in turn provide accountability for results. The Army has identified
objectives and a timeline for modularity, but metrics for assessing the
Army's progress on modularity-specific, quantifiable goals are extremely
limited. Moreover, in 2004, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) conducted a wide-ranging baseline analysis of the modular design
using measures of combat effectiveness against simulated threats; however,
the Army does not have a long-term plan to conduct a similar analysis so
that it can compare the performance of actual modular units with the
TRADOC-validated design. Army officials maintain that ongoing assessments
such as observations of training events provide sufficient validation that
the modularity concept works in practice. However, while these assessments
are useful, they do not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the modular
design as a whole. In November 2005, we reported that methodically
testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and concepts are
important and established practices throughout the military, and that
particularly large and complex initiatives may require long-term testing
and evaluation guided by study plans.7 Without performance metrics and a
comprehensive testing plan, neither the Army nor Congress will be able to
assess the capabilities of and risks associated with the modular force as
it is organized, staffed, and equipped.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to develop and provide Congress with detailed information about
the modular force equipping strategy, the status of its various personnel
initiatives, and plans for developing an approach for measuring and
assessing implementation progress. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD fully or partially agreed with our recommendations to develop
and provide information on its equipping strategy and personnel
initiatives and to develop expanded performance metrics for assessing
progress. However, DOD disagreed with our recommendations to develop and
provide assessments of the risk associated with its equipping strategy and
plans for staffing its modular operational combat force. It also disagreed
with our recommendation to develop a testing plan for further assessing
modular unit designs. DOD stated that it is assessing equipment risk and
is continuing to evaluate all aspects of modular units' performance on a
continuous basis. However, while Army officials are managing risk in
allocating currently available equipment to Army units based on scheduled
overseas deployments, the Army had not yet completed its equipping
strategy for its new force rotation model at the time of our review and
therefore had not conducted and documented a formal risk assessment of its
equipping plans for implementing the new model. In addition, although the
Army is conducting further evaluation of its modular forces through
training exercises and modular unit deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan,
it has not developed a plan to further test modular unit designs under a
range of operational scenarios, such as major offensive combat operations.
Moreover, it is not clear how and to what extent the Army is integrating
lessons learned from training exercises and deployments into periodic
evaluations to assess the need for further changes to the designs. Because
of the significance, cost, scope, and potential for risk associated with
the Army's modularity initiative along with the lack of transparency
regarding these risks, we continue to believe our recommendations that the
Army develop and provide Congress with additional plans and risk
assessments are needed. Therefore, to facilitate greater transparency and
improve accountability for results, we have included a matter for
congressional consideration that Congress require the Secretary of Defense
to submit more specific and complete information regarding the modular
force equipping strategy, the status of its various personnel initiatives,
risks associated with its plans, and efforts to measure and assess its
progress in implementing modularity.

7 GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a
Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, GAO-06-84
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005).

DOD's comments are in appendix II and our evaluation of its comments is on
page 28.

                                   Background

The Army's conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army's total
force-active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve-and directly
affects not only the Army's combat units, but related command and support
organizations. A key to the Army's new modular force design is embedding
within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other support units
that previously made up parts of division-level and higher-level command
and support organizations, allowing the brigades to operate independently.
Restructuring these units is a major undertaking because it requires more
than just the movement of personnel or equipment from one unit to another.
The Army's new modular units are designed, equipped, and staffed
differently than the units they replace; therefore, successful
implementation of this initiative will require changes such as new
equipment and a different mix of skills and occupational specialties among
Army personnel. By 2011, the Army plans to have reconfigured its total
force-to include active and reserve components and headquarters, combat,
and support units-into the modular design. The foundation of the modular
force is the creation of modular brigade combat teams-combat maneuver
brigades that will have a common organizational design and are intended to
increase the rotational pool of ready units. Modular combat brigades
(depicted in fig. 1) will have one of three standard designs-heavy
brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade.8

8 The Army began the formation of Stryker brigades in 2002 and completed
the formation of the first two Stryker brigades in fiscal year 2003.

Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Combat Brigades

Until it revised its plans in early 2006, the Army had planned to have a
total of 77 active component and National Guard modular combat brigades by
expanding the Army's existing 33 combat brigades in the active component
into 43 modular combat brigades by 2007, and by creating 34 modular combat
brigades in the National Guard by 2010 from existing brigades and
divisions that have historically been equipped well below requirements. To
rebalance joint ground force capabilities, the 2006 QDR determined the
Army should have a total of 70 modular combat brigades-42 active brigades
and 28 National Guard brigades. Table 1 shows the Army's planned numbers
of heavy, infantry, and Stryker combat brigades in the active component
and National Guard.

Table 1: Planned Numbers of Modular Combat Brigades in the Active
Component and National Guard as of March 2006

Modular combat brigades Active component National Guard Total 
Heavy                                 19              6    25 
Infantry                              17             21    38 
Stryker                                6              1     7 
Total                                 42             28    70 

Source: U.S. Army.

At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of revising its
modular combat brigade schedule to convert its active component combat
brigades by fiscal year 2010 instead of 2007 as previously planned, and
convert National Guard combat brigades by fiscal year 2008 instead of
2010. Table 2 shows the Army's schedule that reflects these changes as of
March 2006.

Table 2: Army Schedule for Creating Active Component and National Guard
Modular Combat Brigades as of March 2006

                                FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 Total 
Active component combat         2   11    8   14    3    2    1    1    42 
brigades                                                             
National Guard combat           -    -    7    7    7    7    -    -    28 
brigades                                                             
Total                           2   11   15   21   10    9    1    1    70 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

According to the Army, this larger pool of available combat units will
enable it to generate both active and reserve component forces in a
rotational manner. To do this, the Army is developing plans for a force
rotation model in which units will rotate through a structured progression
of increased unit readiness over time. Units will progress through three
phases of operational readiness cycles, culminating in full mission
readiness and availability to deploy. For example, the Army plans for
active service members to be at home for 2 years following each deployment
of up to 1 year.

The Army's objective is for the new modular combat brigades, which will
include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, to have at least the same combat
capability as a brigade under the current division-based force, which
range from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel. Since there will be more combat
brigades in the force, the Army believes its overall combat capability
will be increased as a result of the restructuring, providing added value
to combatant commanders. Although somewhat smaller in size, the new
modular combat brigades are expected to be as capable as the Army's
existing brigades because they will have different equipment, such as
advanced communications and surveillance equipment, and a different mix of
personnel and support assets. The Army's organizational designs for the
modular brigades have been tested by its Training and Doctrine Command's
Analysis Center against a variety of scenarios, and the Army has found the
new designs to be as capable as the existing division-based brigades in
modeling and simulations.

The Army's cost estimate for modularity through fiscal year 2011 is $52.5
billion as of April 2006. Of this $52.5 billion estimate, $41 billion, or
78 percent, is planned to be spent on equipment for active and reserve
units, with the remaining $11.5 billion allocated to military
construction, facilities, sustainment, and training (see table 3). In
addition, Army leaders have recently stated they may seek additional funds
after 2011 to procure more equipment for modular restructuring.

Table 3: Modular Force Cost Estimates for the Entire Army by Function

Dollars in billions                             
                          2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Percentage 
Equipping              $4.7 $5.8 $5.4 $5.9 $6.5 $6.7 $6.0 $41.0         78 
Military construction/  0.3  0.0  0.5  0.5  1.5  1.5  1.5   5.8         11 
facilities                                                      
Sustainment and         0.0  0.7  0.7  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.0   5.7         11 
training                                                        
Total                  $5.0 $6.5 $6.6 $7.6 $9.1 $9.2 $8.5 $52.5        100 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but Its
         Ability to Meet Near- and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear

The Army has made progress in creating active component modular combat
brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these brigades and
has yet to complete the development of its rotational equipping strategy,
which raises concerns about the extent to which brigades will be equipped
in the near and longer term. Moreover, brigades will initially lack
planned levels of key equipment, including items that provide enhanced
intelligence, situational awareness, and network capabilities needed to
help the Army achieve its objective of creating combat brigades that are
able to operate on their own as part of a more mobile, rapidly deployable,
joint, expeditionary force. In addition, because of existing equipment
shortages, the Army National Guard will likely face even greater
challenges providing the same types of equipment for its 28 planned
modular combat brigades. To mitigate equipment shortages, the Army has
developed a strategy to provide required levels of equipment to deploying
active component and National Guard units, while allocating lesser levels
of remaining equipment to other nondeploying units. However, the Army has
not yet completed key details of this strategy, including determining the
levels of equipment it needs to support this strategy, assessing the
operational risk of not fully equipping all units, or providing to
Congress information about these plans so it can assess the Army's current
and long-term equipment requirements and funding plans.

Army Faces Difficulty Meeting Its Goals for Equipping Active Modular Combat
Brigades

The Army faces challenges meeting its equipping goals for its active
modular combat brigades both in the near and longer term. As of February
2006, the Army had converted 19 modular combat brigades in the active
force.9 According to the Army Campaign Plan, which established time frames
and goals for the modular force conversions, each of these units is
expected to have on hand at least 90 percent of its required major
equipment items within 180 days after its new equipment requirements
become effective.10 We reviewed data from several active brigades that had
reached the effective date for their new equipment requirements by
February 2006, and found that all of these brigades reported significant
shortages of equipment 180 days after the effective date of their new
equipment requirements, falling well below the equipment goals the Army
established in its Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Army is having
difficulty providing equipment to units undergoing their modular
conversion in time for training prior to operational deployments, and
deploying units often do not receive some of their equipment until after
their arrival in theater. At the time of our visits, officials from three
Army divisions undergoing modular conversion expressed concern over the
lack of key equipment needed for training prior to deployment.

The Army already faced equipment shortages before it began its modular
force transformation and is wearing out significant quantities of
equipment in Iraq, which could complicate plans for fully equipping new
modular units. By creating modular combat brigades with standardized
designs and equipment requirements, the Army believed that it could
utilize more of its total force, thereby increasing the pool of available
and ready forces to meet the demands of sustained rotations and better
respond to an expected state of continuous operations. Also, by comparably
equipping all of these units across the active component and National
Guard, the Army further believes it will be able to discontinue its
practice of allocating limited resources, including equipment, based on a
system of tiered readiness,11 which resulted in lower priority units in
both active and reserve components having significantly lower levels of
equipment and readiness than the higher priority units. However, because
of the need to establish a larger pool of available forces to meet the
current high pace of operational commitments, the Army's modular combat
brigade conversion schedule is outpacing the planned acquisition or
funding for some equipment requirements. The Army has acknowledged that
funding does not match its modular conversion schedule and that some units
will face equipment shortages in the early years of transformation.
According to Army officials, the Army may continue to seek funding to
better equip its modular forces beyond 2011.

9 This number does not include the formation of two Stryker brigades in
fiscal year 2003.

10 The Army defines this in its Campaign Plan as the effective date on
which the new modular organizational designs' equipment requirements
formally apply to converting brigades. The Army calls this a Modified
Table of Organization and Equipment, which documents the specific types
and amounts of equipment Army units are authorized to have.

For example, according to Army officials, funds programmed for the Army's
tactical wheeled vehicle modernization strategy will not meet all of its
requirements for light, medium, and heavy tactical vehicles and trucks
through fiscal year 2011. In 2007, when 38 of 42 planned active component
brigades are expected to complete their modular conversions, the Army
expects to have only about 62 percent of the heavy trucks it needs to meet
its requirements for these brigades.12 New higher requirements for trucks
for the modular brigades added to an existing shortage of trucks in the
Army's inventory. In addition, battle damage and losses along with
higher-than-normal wear and tear on Army vehicles from current operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan are contributing to this shortfall. While the Army
plans to eventually fill these shortages through a combination of new
procurement and modernization of its existing truck fleet, Army officials
told us that the higher requirement for trucks is currently unaffordable
within its near-term budget authority. Until the Army is able to meet its
modular combat brigade design requirement for trucks, these brigades will
not have their envisioned capability to conduct their own logistical
support operations if necessary without requiring the augmentation of
external combat and combat-service support forces.

11 Under this model, which the Army calls its tiered readiness system,
high-priority or first-to-deploy units in the active component received
much higher levels of resources than lower priority or later-deploying
active and reserve component units. While some units maintained high
levels of readiness, a large part of both the active and reserve
components were in a low state of readiness, with the expectation that
there would be sufficient time to add the required resources prior to
deployment.

12 At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of revising its
equipment requirements based on the planned reduction in the number of
modular combat brigades from 43 to 42 in the active component.

Equipment Shortages Include Key Items the Army Identified as Essential for
Achieving Modular Force Capabilities

Active modular combat brigades will initially lack required numbers of
some of the key equipment that Army force design analyses determined
essential for achieving their planned capabilities. Two primary objectives
underlying the Army's modular force designs and concepts are to (1) create
more combat forces within the Army's current end strength that are as
lethal as the division-based brigades they are replacing and (2) organize,
staff, and equip these units to be more responsive, rapidly deployable,
and better able to operate on their own compared to division-based
brigades. Army force designers identified a number of key organizational,
personnel, and equipment enablers they determined must be present for the
modular combat brigades to be as lethal as the division-based brigades
they are replacing. They include key battle command systems that are
intended to provide modular combat brigades the latest command and control
technology for improved situational awareness; advanced digital
communications systems to provide secure high-speed communications links
at the brigade level; and advanced sensors to provide modular combat
brigades with their own intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, and
target-acquisition capabilities.

We reviewed equipping plans for several command and control,
communications, and reconnaissance systems to determine the Army's
timelines for providing active modular combat brigades some of the key
equipment they need to achieve their planned capabilities and function as
designed. According to Army officials responsible for managing the
distribution and fielding of equipment, the Army will not have all of this
equipment on hand to meet the new modular force design requirements by
2007, when 38 of 42 active component modular combat brigades are to
complete their modular conversions. These shortfalls are due to a range of
reasons, but primarily because the modular conversion schedule is
outpacing the planned acquisition or funding. For example,

           o  The Army does not expect to meet until at least 2012 its
           modular combat brigade requirements for Long-Range Advanced Scout
           Surveillance Systems, an advanced visual sensor that provides
           long-range surveillance capability to detect, recognize, and
           identify distant targets.
           o  The Army decided that it cannot meet design requirements within
           its current budget for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
           (FBCB2), a battle command component that provides real-time
           situational awareness information through identification and
           tracking of friendly forces to control battlefield maneuvers and
           operations. Moreover, because it has been in full production for
           less than 2 years, FBCB2 production has not kept pace with the new
           higher modular force FBCB2 requirements. As a result, the Army
           plans to provide active heavy and infantry brigades with less than
           half of their design requirement for FBCB2 through at least 2007.
           o  The Army plans to meet only 85 percent of its requirements
           across the force for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
           Systems, a command and control network radio system that provides
           voice and data communications capability in support of command and
           control operations, due to a funding decision.
           o  The Army's design requirement for Shadow tactical unmanned
           aerial vehicle systems was to have one system composed of seven
           air vehicles per modular combat brigade, but because the Army
           lacks adequate numbers of air vehicle operators and maintainers,
           it decided to field the Shadow systems with four air vehicles
           instead.
           o  The Army's schedule for the acquisition of Joint Network Node-a
           key communications system that provides secure high-speed computer
           network connection for data transmission down to the battalion
           level-could be delayed. According to Army officials, DOD recently
           decided to require the Army to have Joint Network Node undergo
           developmental and operational testing prior to further
           acquisition, which could delay equipping modular combat brigades.

           The systems discussed above are key to achieving the benefits Army
           officials expect to achieve with a modular force. For example, the
           Army decided to structure its new modular combat brigades with two
           maneuver battalions each instead of three battalions each, even
           though Army analysis showed that brigades with three maneuver
           battalions have several advantages and the Army's former
           division-based brigades have three battalions. The Army's decision
           to approve a brigade design with two maneuver battalions was made
           largely because of affordability concerns. However, the Army
           determined that brigades with two maneuver battalions could be as
           effective in combat as its division-based brigades provided they
           have the right mix of maneuver companies and enablers such as the
           systems discussed above. Until the Army is able to provide modular
           units with required quantities of these enablers, it is not clear
           whether the new brigades are as capable as the division-based
           brigades they are replacing.

           National Guard Faces Significant Equipping Challenges
			  
			  In addition to the challenges the Army faces in providing active
           component modular combat brigades the equipment necessary for
           meeting expected capabilities, the Army will face greater
           challenges meeting its equipping requirements for its 28 planned
           National Guard combat brigades. The Army's modular force concept
           is intended to transform the National Guard from a strategic
           standby force to a force that is to be organized, staffed, and
           equipped comparable to active units for involvement in the full
           range of overseas operations. As such, National Guard combat units
           will enter into the Army's new force rotational model in which,
           according to the Army's plans, Guard units would be available for
           deployment 1 year out of 6 years. However, Guard units have
           previously been equipped at less than wartime readiness levels
           (often at 65 to 75 percent of requirements) under the assumption
           that there would be sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain
           additional equipment prior to deployment. Moreover, as of July
           2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000
           pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to support Guard
           units' deployments overseas. As we noted in our 2005 report on
           National Guard equipment readiness,13 National Guard Bureau
           officials estimated that the Guard's nondeployed units had only
           about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of
           July 2005 and had exhausted inventories of 220 critical items.
           Although the Army says it will invest $21 billion into equipping
           and modernizing the Guard through 2011, Guard units will start
           their modular conversions with less and much older equipment than
           most active units. This will add to the challenge the Army faces
           in achieving its plans and timelines for equipping Guard units at
           comparable levels to active units and fully meeting the equipping
           needs across both components. Moreover, the Army National Guard
           believes that even after the Army's planned investment, the Army
           National Guard will have to accept risk in certain equipment, such
           as tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, and force protection
           equipment.

           To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipment among
			  Units Based on Their Movement through Training, Readiness, and
			  Deployment Phases
			  
			  Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment
           in the near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades
           at 100 percent of their requirements, the Army is developing a new
           equipping strategy as part of its force rotation model; however,
           this strategy is not yet completed because the Army has not
           finalized equipping requirements for this new strategy or assessed
           the operational risk of not fully equipping all units. Under the
           force rotation model, the Army plans to provide increasing amounts
           of equipment to units as they move through training phases and
           near readiness for potential deployment so they would be ready to
           respond quickly if needed with fully equipped forces. The Army
           believes that over time, equipping units in a rotational manner
           will enable it to better allocate available equipment and help
           manage risk associated with specific equipment shortages.

           Under this strategy, brigades will have three types of equipment
           sets-a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The
           baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the
           equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from amounts
           the modular brigades are designed to have. Training sets would
           include more of the equipment units will need to be ready for
           deployment, but units would share the equipment that would be
           located at training sites throughout the country. The deployment
           set would include all equipment needed for deployment, including
           theater-specific equipment, high-priority items provided through
           operational needs statements, and equipment from Army
           prepositioned stock. With this rotational equipping approach, the
           Army believes it can have up to 14 active combat brigades and up
           to 5 Army National Guard combat brigades equipped and mission
           ready at any given time.

           While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip both
           active and Army National Guard units within the force rotation
           model, it has not yet fully developed specific equipment
           requirements, including the types and quantities of items,
           required in each phase of the model. As of March 2006, the Army
           was still developing proposals for what would be included in the
           three equipment sets as well as the specific equipping
           requirements for units. Figure 2 shows the Army's three-phase
           force rotation model.

           Figure 2: Army's Force Rotation Model

           aThe Army's force rotation model proposes that active component
           units in the Available phase will be available for deployment 1
           year in every 3 years, and reserve component units will be
           available for deployment 1 year in every 6 years.

           The Reset/Train phase will include modular units that redeploy
           from long-term operations and are unable to sustain ready or
           available capability levels. The Ready phase will include those
           modular units that have been assessed as ready at designated
           capability levels, may be mobilized if required, and can be
           equipped if necessary to meet operational surge requirements. The
           Available phase will include those modular units that have been
           assessed as available at designated capability levels to conduct
           missions. In this last phase, active units are available for
           immediate deployment and reserve component units are available for
           mobilization, training, and validation for deployment. However,
           this strategy is not yet complete because the Army has not yet
           defined specific equipping requirements for units as they progress
           through the force rotation model. Therefore, it is difficult to
           assess the risk associated with decreasing nondeploying units'
           readiness to perform other missions or the ability of units in the
           Reset/Train and Ready phases of the force rotation model to
           respond to an unforeseen conflict or crisis, if required.

           Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel
			  Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure
			  
			  The Army has made some progress toward meeting modular personnel
           requirements in the active component, but faces significant
           challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without
           permanently increasing its active component end strength above
           482,400, as specified by the QDR. The Army plans to increase the
           size of its modular combat force but doing so without permanently
           increasing its overall end strength is an ambitious undertaking
           that will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions
           in its noncombat force. While the Army is moving forward with its
           personnel reduction and realignment plans through a variety of
           initiatives, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able
           to meet its overall end-strength goals and what risks to meeting
           modular force personnel requirements exist if these goals are not
           met. We have found that strategic workforce planning is one of the
           tools that can help agencies develop strategies for effectively
           implementing challenging initiatives. Effective strategic
           workforce planning includes the development of strategies to
           monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving goals. Without
           information on the status and progress of its personnel
           initiatives, Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the data
           necessary to identify challenges, monitor progress, and
           effectively address problems when they arise.

           The Army accounts for its congressionally authorized active
           component personnel end strength in three broad categories-the
           operational combat force, the institutional noncombat force, and
           personnel who are temporarily unavailable for assignment. The
           operational combat force consists of personnel who are assigned to
           deployable combat, combat support, and combat service support
           units; these include modular combat brigades and their supporting
           units such as logistics, medical, and administrative units. The
           Army's institutional noncombat force consists of personnel
           assigned to support and training command and headquarters units,
           which primarily provide management, administrative, training, and
           other support, and typically are not deployed for combat
           operations. This includes personnel assigned to the Department of
           the Army headquarters and major commands such as the Training and
           Doctrine Command. In addition, the Army separately accounts for
           personnel who are temporarily unavailable for their official
           duties, including personnel who are in transit between
           assignments, are temporarily not available for assignment because
           of sickness or injury, or are students undergoing training away
           from their units. The Army refers to these personnel as
           transients, transfers, holdees, and students.

           The Army plans to reduce its current temporary end-strength
           authorization of 512,40014 to 482,400 by 2011 in order to help
           fund the Army's priority programs. Simultaneously, the Army plans
           to increase the number of soldiers in its operational combat force
           from its previous level of approximately 315,000 to 355,000 in
           order to meet the increased personnel requirements of its new
           larger modular force structure. The Army plans to utilize several
           initiatives to reduce and realign the Army with the aim of meeting
           these planned personnel levels. For example, the Army has
           converted some noncombat military positions into civilian
           positions, thereby freeing up soldiers to fill modular combat
           brigades' requirements. During fiscal year 2005, the Army
           converted approximately 8,000 military positions to
           civilian-staffed positions within the Army's noncombat force.
           However, Army officials believe additional conversions to achieve
           the 19,000 planned reductions in the noncombat force will be
           significantly more challenging to achieve. In addition to its
           success with the military-to-civilian conversions, the Army has
           been given statutory authority to reduce active personnel support
           to the National Guard and reserve by 1,500.15 However, the Army
           must still eliminate additional positions, including reducing
           transients, transfers, holdees, and student personnel utilizing
           these and other initiatives, so it can reduce its overall end
           strength while filling requirements for modular units. As shown in
           table 4, the Army's goal is to reduce overall active component end
           strength from the current temporary authorization level while
           increasing the size of its operational combat force.

           Table 4: Army's End-strength Authorization History and Modular
           Force Goal			  
			  
                                   End-strength authorizations (in thousands)
                                     Fiscal year       Current  Modular force 
                                            2000   (temporary)           goal 
Operational combat force                315.0         355.0          355.0 
Noncombat force                         102.0          94.0           75.0 
Other (transients, transfers,            63.0          63.4           52.4 
holdees, students)                                          
Total                                   480.0         512.4          482.4 

           Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

           Note: End-strength authorizations account for the maximum numbers
           of positions available in which to assign personnel, but do not
           account for the numbers of personnel actually assigned to those
           positions.

           While the Army is attempting to reduce end strength in its
           noncombat force and realign positions to the combat force via
           several initiatives, it may have difficulty meeting its
           expectations for some initiatives. For example, the Army expected
           that the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions of 2005
           could free up approximately 2,000 to 3,000 positions in its
           noncombat force, but the Army is revisiting this assumption based
           upon updated manpower levels at the commands and installations
           approved for closure and consolidation. Army officials believe
           they will be able to realign some positions from BRAC, but it is
           not clear whether the reductions will free up 2,000 to 3,000
           military personnel that can be reassigned to modular combat units.
           In the same vein, Army officials expected to see reductions of
           several hundred base support staff resulting from restationing
           forces currently overseas back to garrisons within the United
           States. However, Army officials are still attempting to determine
           if the actual savings will meet the original assumptions. As a
           result, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to
           meet its overall end-strength goals and what risks exist if these
           goals are not met.

           Furthermore, the Army will face challenges in meeting its new
           modular force requirements for military intelligence specialists.
           The Army's new modular force structure significantly increases
           requirements for military intelligence specialists. In late 2005,
           Army intelligence officials told us that the modular force would
           require approximately 8,400 additional active component
           intelligence specialist positions, but the Army planned to fill
           only about 57 percent of these positions by 2013, in part because
           of efforts to reduce overall end strength. In May 2006, Army
           officials told us that the Army had completed its most recent
           Total Army Analysis (for fiscal years 2008-2013), which balances
           Army requirements within a projected end-strength authorization of
           482,400. Accordingly, the Army revised its earlier estimate of
           intelligence specialist position requirements and determined that
           its increased active component requirement for intelligence
           specialists was only 5,600 and that it planned to fill all of
           these positions by 2013.16 However, Army officials acknowledge
           that meeting modular force requirements for intelligence
           specialists is a significant challenge because it will take a
           number of years to recruit and train intelligence soldiers.

           According to Army intelligence officials, intelligence capability
           has improved over that of the previous force; however, any
           shortfalls in filling intelligence requirements would further
           stress intelligence specialists with a high pace of deployments.
           Since intelligence is considered a key enabler of the modular
           design-a component of the new design's improved situational
           awareness-it is unclear to what extent any shortages in planned
           intelligence capacity will affect the overall capability of
           modular combat brigades. Without continued, significant progress
           in meeting personnel requirements, the Army may need to accept
           increased risk in its ability to conduct operations and support
           its combat forces or it may need to seek support for an
           end-strength increase from DOD and Congress.

           Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but
			  Lacks a Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and
			  Monitor Implementation
			  
			  While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames
           for modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent
           approach to effectively measure its progress against stated
           modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to its
           modular unit designs, and monitor implementation plans. A
           comprehensive approach includes performance measures and a plan to
           test changes to the design of the modular combat brigades. The
           Army has not developed a comprehensive approach because senior
           leadership has focused attention on developing broad guidance and
           unit conversion plans for modularity while focusing less attention
           on developing ways to measure results. Without such an approach,
           neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full
           visibility into the capabilities of the modular force and the
           Army's implementation plans.

           Army Lacks Performance Metrics to Measure the Results of Modularity
			  
			  While the Army has identified objectives for modularity, it has
           not developed modular-specific quantifiable goals or performance
           metrics to measure its progress. GAO and DOD, among others, have
           identified the importance of establishing objectives that can be
           translated into measurable, results-oriented metrics, which in
           turn provide accountability for results. In a 2003 report we found
           that the adoption of a results-oriented framework that clearly
           establishes performance goals and measures progress toward those
           goals was a key practice for implementing a successful
           transformation.17 DOD has also recognized the need to develop or
           refine metrics so it can measure efforts to implement the defense
           strategy and provide useful information to senior leadership.

           The Army considers the Army Campaign Plan to be a key document
           guiding the modular restructuring. The plan provides broad
           guidelines for modularity and other program tasks across the
           entire Army. However, modularity-related metrics within the plan
           are limited to a schedule for creating modular units and an
           associated metric of achieving unit readiness goals for equipment,
           training, and personnel by certain dates after unit creation.
           Moreover, a 2005 assessment by the Office of Management and Budget
           identified the total number of brigades created as the only metric
           the Army had developed for measuring the success of its modularity
           initiative. Another key planning document, the 2005 Army Strategic
           Planning Guidance, identified several major expected advantages of
           modularity, including an increase in the combat power of the
           active component force by at least 30 percent, an increase in the
           rotational pool of ready units by at least 50 percent, the
           creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters, the
           development of a force design upon which the future
           network-centric developments can be readily applied, and reduced
           stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle.
           However, these goals have not translated into outcome-related
           metrics that are reported to provide decision makers a clear
           status of the modular restructuring as a whole. Army officials
           stated that unit-creation schedules and readiness levels are the
           best available metrics for assessing modularity progress because
           modularity is a reorganization encompassing hundreds of individual
           procurement programs that would be difficult to collectively
           assess in a modularity context. However, we believe that
           results-oriented performance measures with specific, objective
           indicators used to measure progress toward achieving goals are
           essential for restructuring organizations.

           A major Air Force transformation initiative may provide insights
           on how the Army could develop performance metrics for a widespread
           transformation of a military force. In 1998, the Air Force adopted
           the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept as a way to help manage
           its deployments and commitments to theater commanders and reduce
           the deployment burden on its people. Like the Army's modular
           restructuring, the Air Force's restructuring was fundamental to
           the force, and according to the Air Force, represented the largest
           transformation of its processes since before the Cold War. In our
           2000 report,18 we found that the Air Force expected to achieve
           important benefits from the Expeditionary Concept, but had yet to
           establish specific quantifiable goals for those benefits, which
           included increasing the level of deployment predictability for
           individual service members. We recommended that the Air Force
           develop specific quantifiable goals based on the Expeditionary
           Concept's broad objectives, and establish needed metrics to
           measure progress toward these goals. In a January 2001 report to
           Congress on the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation, the
           Air Force identified 13 metrics to measure progress in six
           performance areas. For example, to better balance deployment
           taskings in order to provide relief to heavily tasked units, the
           Air Force developed 4 metrics, including one that measures active
           duty personnel available to meet Expeditionary Force requirements.
           The Air Force described each metric and assigned either a
           quantitative goal (such as a percentage) or a trend goal
           indicating the desired direction the metric should be moving over
           time. These results were briefed regularly to the Air Force Chief
           of Staff. The Army's transformation is more extensive than the Air
           Force's in that the Air Force did not change traditional command
           and organizational structures under its Expeditionary Concept,
           while the Army modular force has made extensive changes to these
           structures, and the Air Force did not plan for nearly the same
           implementation costs as the Army. Nonetheless, we believe some of
           the goals and challenges faced by the Air Force that we reported
           in August 2000 may have relevance to the Army today.

           While we recognize the complexity of the Army's modular
           restructuring, without clear definitions of metrics, and periodic
           communication of performance against these metrics, the Secretary
           of Defense and Congress will have difficulty assessing the impact
           of refinements and enhancements to the modular design-such as
           DOD's recent decision to reduce the number of modular combat and
           support brigades reported in the QDR, as well as any changes in
           resources available to meet modular design requirements.

           Army Lacks a Plan for Comprehensively Evaluating Modular Designs
			  
			  Since 2004, when the Army approved the original designs for its
           modular brigades, it has made some refinements to those designs
           but does not have a comprehensive plan for evaluating the effect
           of these design changes or the need for additional design changes
           as the Army gets more operational experience using modular
           brigades and integrating command and control headquarters, combat
           support units, and combat brigades. In fiscal year 2004, TRADOC's
           Analysis Center concluded that the modular combat brigade designs
           would be more capable than division-based units based on an
           integrated and iterative analysis employing computer-assisted
           exercises, subject matter experts, and senior observers. This
           analysis culminated in the approval of modular brigade-based
           designs for the Army. The assessment employed performance metrics
           such as mission accomplishment, units' organic lethality, and
           survivability, and compared the performance of variations on
           modular unit designs against the existing division-based designs.
           The report emphasized that the Chief of Staff of the Army had
           asked for "good enough" prototype designs that could be quickly
           implemented, and the modular organizations assessed were not the
           end of the development effort.

           Since these initial design assessments, the Army has been
           assessing implementation and making further adjustments in designs
           and implementation plans through a number of venues, to include

           o  unit readiness reporting on personnel, equipment, and training;
           o  modular force coordination cells to assist units in the
           conversion process;
           o  modular force observation teams to collect lessons during
           training; and
           o  collection and analysis teams to assess units' effectiveness
           during deployment.

           Based on data collected and analyzed through these processes,
           TRADOC has approved some design change recommendations and has not
           approved others. For example, TRADOC analyzed a Department of the
           Army proposal to reduce the number of Long-Range Advanced Scout
           Surveillance Systems, but recommended retaining the higher number
           in the existing design in part because of decreases in units'
           assessed lethality and survivability with the reduced number of
           surveillance systems.

           Army officials maintain that ongoing assessments described above
           provide sufficient validation that the modularity concept works in
           practice. However, these assessments do not provide a
           comprehensive evaluation of the modular designs. Further, the Army
           does not plan to conduct a similar overarching analysis to assess
           the modular force capabilities to perform operations across the
           full spectrum of potential conflict. In November 2005, we reported
           that methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new
           doctrines and concepts is an important and established practice
           throughout the military, and that particularly large and complex
           issues may require long-term testing and evaluation that is guided
           by study plans.19 We believe the evolving nature of the design
           highlights the importance of planning for broad-based evaluations
           of the modular force to ensure the Army is achieving the
           capabilities it intended, and to provide an opportunity to make
           course corrections if needed. For example, one controversial
           element of the design was the decision to include two maneuver
           battalions instead of three in the modular combat brigades.
           TRADOC's 2004 analysis noted that the modular combat brigade
           designs with the two maneuver battalion organization did not
           perform as well as the three maneuver battalion design, and cited
           this as one of the most significant areas of risk in the modular
           combat brigade design. Nonetheless, because of the significant
           additional cost of adding a third combat battalion the Army
           decided on a two-battalion design for the modular combat brigades
           that included key enabling equipment such as communications, and
           surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Some defense
           experts, including a current division commander and several
           retired Army generals, have expressed concerns about this aspect
           of the modular design. In addition, some of these experts have
           expressed concerns about whether the current designs have been
           sufficiently tested and whether they provide the best mix of
           capabilities to conduct full-spectrum operations. In addition, the
           Army has recently completed designs for support units and
           headquarters units. Once the Army gets more operational experience
           with the new modular units, it may find it needs to make further
           adjustments to its designs. Without a comprehensive testing plan,
           neither the Army nor congressional decision makers will be able to
           sufficiently assess the capabilities of the modular combat
           brigades as they are being organized, staffed, and equipped.

           Conclusions
			  
			  The fast pace, broad scope, and cost of the Army's effort to
           transform into a modular force present considerable challenges for
           the Army, and for Congress as well in effectively overseeing a
           force restructuring of this magnitude. The Army leadership has
           dedicated considerable attention, energy, and time to achieving
           its modularity goals under tight time frames. However, the lack of
           clarity in equipment and personnel plans raises considerable
           uncertainty as to whether the Army can meet its goals within
           acceptable risk levels. For example, until the Army defines and
           communicates equipment requirements for all modular units and
           assesses the risk associated with its plan to not equip brigades
           with all of their intended capabilities, it will remain unclear
           the extent to which its new modular combat brigades will be able
           to operate as stand-alone, self-sufficient units-a main goal of
           the Army's modular transformation. With respect to personnel, the
           Army's goal to increase its operational force while not
           permanently increasing its current end strength will require it to
           make the most efficient use of its personnel. Until the Army
           communicates the status of its various ongoing personnel
           initiatives, the Army's ability to meet personnel requirements of
           its new modular force will also remain unclear. Finally, until the
           Army develops a long-term comprehensive approach for measuring
           progress and a plan for evaluating changes, it remains uncertain
           how the Army will determine whether it is achieving its goal of
           creating a more rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force.
           Without such an approach, and clearly defined and communicated
           plans, the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have the
           information needed to weigh competing funding priorities and
           monitor the Army's progress in its over $52 billion effort to
           transform its force.

           Recommendations for Executive Actions
			  
			  We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
           the Army to take the following actions.

           First, in order for decision makers to better assess the Army's
           strategy for equipping modular combat brigades, we recommend the
           Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress
           with

           o  details about the Army's equipping strategy, to include the
           types and quantities of equipment active component and National
           Guard modular units would receive in each phase of the force
           rotation model, and how these amounts compare to design
           requirements for modular units; and
           o  an assessment of the operational risk associated with this
           equipping strategy.

           Second, in order for decision makers to have the visibility needed
           to assess the Army's ability to meet the personnel requirements
           for its new modular operational forces while simultaneously
           managing the risk to its noncombat forces, we recommend that the
           Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress
           with

           o  a report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including
           executable milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat
           forces; and
           o  an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular
           operational combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat
           supporting force structure.

           Third, to improve information available for decision makers on
           progress of the Army's modular force implementation plans, we
           recommend that the Army develop and provide the Secretary of
           Defense and Congress with a comprehensive plan for assessing the
           Army's progress toward achieving the benefits of modularity to
           include

           o  specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress
           toward meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army
           Campaign Plan; and
           o  plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of
           modular unit designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs
           provide sufficient capabilities needed to execute National Defense
           Strategy and 2006 QDR objectives for addressing a wider range of
           both traditional and irregular security challenges.

           Finally, the Secretary of the Army should provide a testing plan
           as part of its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for
           conducting comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is
           being implemented so that decision makers--both inside and outside
           the Army--can assess the implications of changes to the Army force
           structure in terms of the goals of modular restructuring. The
           results of these assessments should be provided to Congress as
           part of the Army's justification for its annual budget through
           fiscal year 2011.

           Matter for Congressional Consideration
			  
			  Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the
           Army's plans for creating modular forces, Congress should consider
           requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide the information
           outlined in our recommendations including;

           o  details about the Army's equipping strategy and an assessment
           of the operational risk associated with this equipping strategy;
           o  the status of the Army's personnel initiatives and an
           assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular
           operational combat force and manage the risk to its noncombat
           force structure; and
           o  the Army's plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the
           benefits of modularity, plans and milestones for conducting
           further evaluation of modular unit designs, and a testing plan for
           conducting comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is
           being implemented.

           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
			  
			  In written comments on a draft of this report provided by the Army
           on behalf of DOD, the department noted that the report adequately
           reflects the challenges associated with transforming the Army to
           modular force designs while at war, but stated that the report
           fails to recognize ongoing efforts and accomplishments to date.
           (DOD's comments are reprinted in app. II). DOD also stated that
           citing the views of unnamed sources regarding the modular combat
           brigade design does not contribute to an accurate, balanced
           assessment of the Army's progress. DOD agreed or partially agreed
           with our recommendations to develop and provide information on its
           equipping strategy and personnel initiatives and to develop
           expanded performance metrics for assessing progress. However, DOD
           disagreed with three recommendations regarding the need for risk
           assessments and a testing plan to further assess designs for
           modular units. As discussed below, because of the significance,
           cost, scope, and potential for risk associated with the Army's
           modularity initiative, we continue to believe that more
           transparency of the Army's plans and risk assessments is needed in
           light of the limited amount of information the Army has provided
           to Congress. Therefore, we have included a matter for
           congressional consideration to require the Secretary of Defense to
           provide more detailed plans and assessments of modularity risks.
           Our specific comments follow.

           First, we strongly disagree with DOD's assertion that GAO used
           anonymous and unverifiable sources which detracted from an
           accurate and balanced assessment of the Army's progress in
           implementing modularity. Our analysis of the Army's progress and
           potential for risk in implementing modular units is primarily
           based on our independent and thorough analysis of Army plans,
           reports, briefings, and readiness assessments, which we used to
           compare the Army's goals for modularity against its actual plans
           for equipping and staffing modular units. We sought views on
           modular unit designs to supplement our analysis from a diverse
           group of knowledgeable people both inside and outside the Army and
           DOD, including Army headquarters officials, division and brigade
           commanders, Army officials who played key roles in developing and
           assessing modular unit designs, and retired generals and defense
           experts who have studied and written about Army transformation.
           Our long-standing policy is not to include the names of
           individuals from whom we obtained information but to use
           information and evidence from appropriate and relevant sources and
           provide balance in our report. We integrated evidence and
           information from all sources to reach conclusions and formulate
           the recommendations included in this report. Our report recognizes
           the Army's progress in implementing modular units while fully
           engaged in ongoing operations but also identifies and provides
           transparency regarding a number of risks inherent in the Army's
           plans so that Congress will have better information with which to
           make decisions on funding and oversight. The discussion we present
           highlighting the concerns of some current and retired senior Army
           officers and defense experts regarding certain aspects of modular
           designs is used to illustrate the need for further evaluation of
           modular units as they move from concept to reality-an approach
           consistent with DOD policy and best practice in transforming
           defense capabilities.

           DOD also stated that the report inaccurately (1) asserts that
           Shadow tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems will be fielded
           with fewer air vehicles due to a shortage of operators and
           maintainers, and (2) depicts the growth of Army Intelligence
           positions. We disagree with DOD's assessment. As our report
           clearly points out, based on documentation obtained from the Army,
           the Army's approved modular combat brigade design was for seven
           air vehicles per Shadow system, which would provide 24-hour per
           day aerial surveillance, but the Army opted to field Shadow
           systems with four air vehicles instead, primarily because it lacks
           adequate numbers of air vehicle operators and maintainers.
           Although the Army believes that Shadow systems with four air
           vehicles are adequate at this time, we believe it is important to
           provide transparency by presenting information which shows that
           modular combat brigades will not have all of the capabilities
           intended by the original modular combat brigade designs (i.e.,
           brigade-level 24-hour per day surveillance operations) without
           Shadow systems composed of seven air vehicles.

           With regard to the number of intelligence positions, our report
           accurately notes that the Army decided to increase its
           intelligence positions by 5,600 in the active force. However, we
           also note that this was a revision of an earlier higher estimate
           of 8,400 positions projected by Army intelligence officials.
           Therefore, we do not agree with the department's comment that the
           report inaccurately depicts the growth of Army intelligence
           positions, nor do we agree with its characterization that the
           report inappropriately focuses on the Army's manning challenges.
           We believe that it is important for the Secretary of Defense and
           Congress to have a clear and transparent picture of the personnel
           challenges the Army faces in order to fully achieve the goals of
           modular restructuring and make informed decisions on resources and
           authorized end strength.

           DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and
           provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details about
           the Army's equipping strategy. DOD commented that the Army
           recently completed development of the equipping strategy for
           modular forces and that the Army has conducted equipping
           conferences to ensure that soldiers have the best equipment
           available as they train and deploy. We requested a copy of the
           Army's recently completed equipping strategy but did not receive a
           copy prior to publication and therefore have not been able to
           assess how and to what extent it meets the intent of our
           recommendation. Moreover, DOD did not indicate what, if any,
           actions it planned to take to provide Congress with specific
           details about the Army's equipping strategy, as we recommended.
           Therefore, we have highlighted the need for more complete
           information on the Army's equipping strategy in a matter for
           congressional consideration.

           DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and
           provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an assessment
           of the risk associated with the Army's rotational equipping
           strategy and said in its comments that this action is already
           occurring on a regular basis. Although the Army is considering
           risk in managing existing equipment, at the time of our review the
           Army had not finished developing its equipping strategy for its
           new rotational force model. Therefore, we continue to believe that
           the Army needs to document and provide risk assessments to
           Congress based on its newly completed equipping strategy. This is
           particularly important given other Army priorities such as the
           Future Combat System and near-term equipping needs for Iraq that
           will compete for funding and may cause changes to the Army's
           current equipping strategy for modular units.

           DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army
           develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a
           report on the status of its personnel initiatives. However, DOD
           commented that adding another report on this issue would be
           duplicative and irrelevant and said this action is already
           occurring on a regular basis. However, while Army documents
           present an overview of how the Army is allocating military
           personnel to operational and nonoperational positions, they do not
           provide specific information on the Army's progress in
           implementing personnel initiatives. Moreover, the department's
           comments did not address whether the Army plans to provide
           additional information to Congress. We continue to believe that
           such information is needed by Congress to inform their decisions
           on Army personnel levels.

           DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and
           provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a risk
           assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular
           operational combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat
           supporting force structure. DOD commented that the Army provided
           the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a plan for reshaping
           the Army, including increasing the active operating force and
           downsizing overall active end strength by fiscal year 2011, based
           on several assumptions. However, this document, which Army
           officials provided to us, does not highlight potential risks in
           executing the Army's plan. Moreover, DOD's comments did not
           address the intent of our recommendation that the Army improve
           transparency by providing Congress with additional information on
           its plans and assessment of risk.

           DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop
           and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a
           comprehensive plan for assessing the Army's progress toward
           achieving modularity goals and said the Army will explore the
           development of expanded performance metrics. However, DOD stated
           that plans and milestones for measuring progress are unwarranted
           as such evaluations occur continuously. We commend DOD for
           agreeing to develop expanded performance metrics. However, because
           of the cost and magnitude of the Army's transformation plans, we
           continue to believe that developing and disseminating a
           comprehensive and formal evaluation plan are critical for
           providing transparency and accountability for results. As
           discussed in the report, the Army is collecting some data on the
           performance of modular units that attend training events and
           deploy overseas, but lacks a long-term comprehensive and
           transparent approach for integrating the results of these
           assessments to measure overall progress.

           Finally, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary
           of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide a testing
           plan that includes milestones for assessing modular unit designs
           as they are being implemented. DOD said the Army thoroughly
           evaluated modular force designs and continues to evaluate all
           facets of modular force performance both in training and combat
           operations. Nevertheless, we believe that the Army needs a more
           transparent, long-term, and comprehensive plan for evaluating the
           modular designs. The Army is still early in its implementation of
           modular support brigades and higher echelon command and control
           and support units and further evaluation of these designs based on
           actual experience may demonstrate that design refinements are
           needed. Furthermore, although the Army has gained some useful
           operational experience with modular combat units, this experience
           has been limited to stability operations and irregular warfare,
           rather than major combat operations or other operations across the
           full spectrum of potential conflict. To facilitate further
           assessment of unit designs, we have included this issue in our
           matter for congressional consideration.

           We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
           the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Secretary of
           the Army. We will also make copies available to others upon
           request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
           on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

           If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
           (202) 512-4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
           Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
           report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
           III.

           Janet A. St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

           List of Committees

           The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin
           Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
           Senate

           The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
           Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
           Appropriations United States Senate

           The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton
           Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
           Representatives

           The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P.
           Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee
           on Appropriations House of Representatives

           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
			  
			  To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data,
           obtained and reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials
           from Headquarters, Department of Army; U.S. Army Training and
           Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Forces Command; and the U.S. Army
           Center for Army Analysis. We supplemented this information with
           visits to the first three Army divisions undergoing modular
           conversions--the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions and the 101st
           Airborne Division-to gain an understanding of the Army's modular
           force implementation plans and progress in organizing, staffing,
           and equipping active modular combat brigades.

           To determine the Army's modular force organizational design
           requirements and supporting analysis, we analyzed Department of
           the Army guidance for creating modular forces, and briefings and
           other documents on the Army's modular force design and analytical
           process from the Training and Doctrine Command's Analysis Center.
           To determine the Army's progress and plans for equipping active
           component modular combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army
           data on selected equipment that Army analysis identified as
           essential for achieving the modular combat brigades' intended
           capabilities. For these selected items, we calculated the Army's
           equipment requirements for active component modular combat
           brigades by multiplying equipment requirements obtained from the
           Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
           Operations and Training (G-3) for each of the three brigade
           variants-heavy, light, and Stryker-by the planned number of
           brigades in each variant. We then compared the sum of equipment
           requirements in the active component to data we obtained from
           officials from the Department of the Army G-8 on the expected
           on-hand levels of equipment and assessed the reliability of the
           data by discussing the results with knowledgeable officials. We
           determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our
           objectives. We also reviewed unit readiness reports from those
           brigades that had completed or were in the process of completing
           their modular conversion as of February 2006. For our assessment
           of Army National Guard equipping challenges, we relied on past GAO
           reports and testimony.

           To determine the progress made and challenges to managing
           personnel requirements of the modular force, we reviewed documents
           and discussed the implications of force structure requirements
           with officials from the Department of Army Offices of the Deputy
           Chiefs of Staff for Personnel (G1) and Intelligence (G2). We also
           discussed key personnel-related concerns during our visits to the
           divisions undergoing modular conversion. To determine the Army's
           strategies and plans for meeting its modular force personnel
           requirements without permanently increasing overall end strength,
           we interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant
           Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the
           Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
           Operations and Training (G3). We also reviewed the 2006
           Quadrennial Defense Review as it pertained to Army personnel end
           strength, and the Army's Future Year Defense Program and
           supplemental budget requests for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to
           determine the Army's personnel funding plans.

           To determine the extent to which the Army has developed an
           approach for assessing implementation of modularity and for
           further adjusting designs or implementation plans, we reviewed our
           prior work on assessing organizations undertaking significant
           reorganizations. We reviewed and analyzed the Army Campaign Plan
           and discussed it with officials in the Department of Army
           Headquarters, especially officials from the Deputy Chief of Staff
           for Operations and Training (G3). To analyze the Army's approach
           for assessing the implementation of its modular conversion, we
           examined key Army planning documents and discussed objectives,
           performance metrics, and testing plans with appropriate officials
           in the Department of the Army Headquarters, and the Training and
           Doctrine Command's Analysis Center. In addition, we met with a
           panel of retired senior Army general officers at the Association
           of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia.
           We relied on past GAO reports assessing organizations undertaking
           significant reorganizations.

           We conducted our work from September 2004 through March 2006 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

           Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
			  
			  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact
			  
			  Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402

           Acknowledgments
			  
			  In addition to the person named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant
           Director; Margaret Best; Alissa Czyz; Christopher Forys; Kevin
           Handley; Joah Iannotta; Harry Jobes; David Mayfield; Jason Venner;
           and J. Andrew Walker made major contributions to this report.

           GAOï¿½s Mission
			  
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13 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005).

14 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, S: 401 (2006), sets the end-strength level for the Army at
512,400, but stipulates costs of active duty personnel of the Army for
that fiscal year in excess of 482,400 shall be paid out of funds
authorized to be appropriated for that fiscal year for a contingent
emergency reserve fund or as an emergency supplemental appropriation.

15 The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, S: 515 (2004) reduces the minimum number of
active component advisors required to be assigned to units of the selected
reserve from 5,000 to 3,500.

16 Army officials also told us that some of the earlier 8,400 intelligence
specialist positions have been reclassified as aviation specialist
positions.

17 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669  (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).

18 GAO, Force Structure: Air Force Expeditionary Concept Offers Benefits
but Effects Should Be Assessed, GAO/NSIAD-00-201 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
15, 2000).

19 GAO-06-84 .

(350707)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-745 .

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology,
click on the link above.

For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-745 , a report to congressional committees

September 2006

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular
Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans

The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive
restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a
division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an
investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from
fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army.

Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO prepared
this report under the Comptroller General's authority and assessed (1) the
Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2)
progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the
modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an
approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and the need
for further changes to designs or implementation plans.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army develop and submit to Congress information
about its modular force equipping strategy, personnel initiatives, and
plans for assessing implementation progress. DOD generally agreed with
three recommendations but disagreed to develop and provide to Congress
risk assessments and evaluation plans. GAO added a matter for
congressional consideration because it believes these actions are needed
to improve accountability and transparency.

The Army is making progress in creatingactive and National Guard modular
combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but it is not
meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not completed
development of an equipping strategy for its new force rotation model.
This raises uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades
will be equipped both in the near and longer term as well as the ultimate
equipping cost. The Army plans to employ a force rotation model in which
units nearing deployment would receive required levels of equipment while
nondeploying units would be maintained at lower readiness levels. However,
because the Army has not completed key details of the equipping
strategy-such as defining the specific equipping requirements for units in
various phases of its force rotation model-it is unclear what level of
equipment units will have, how this strategy may affect the Army's
equipment funding plans, and how well units with low priority for
equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises.

While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular force
personnel requirements in the active component, it faces challenges in
achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its
active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to increase its active combat
force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall active end
strength will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in
its noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military
personnel in noncombat positions by converting some to civilian positions
and pursuing other initiatives, but Army officials believe future
initiatives may be difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult
trade-offs. Without information on the progress of these initiatives and
what risks exist if the Army's goals are not met, Congress and the
Secretary of Defense lack the information they need to understand
challenges and risks.

Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach
to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess the need for
further changes to modular designs, and monitor implementation plans.
While GAO and DOD have identified the importance of establishing
objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics that in turn
provide accountability for results, the Army has not established
outcome-related metrics linked to most of its modularity objectives.
Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and
training events, the Army does not have a long-term comprehensive plan for
further analysis and testing of its modular combat brigade designs and
fielded capabilities. Without performance metrics and a comprehensive
testing plan, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full
visibility into how the modular force is currently organized, staffed, and
equipped. As a result, decision makers lack sufficient information to
assess the capabilities, cost, and risks of the Army's modular force
implementation plans.
*** End of document. ***