Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the	 
Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season	 
(08-JUN-06, GAO-06-712).					 
                                                                 
The Red Cross played a key role in providing relief to victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, mounting its largest ever disaster  
response. Under the National Response Plan, and its emergency	 
support function-6 (ESF-6), the Red Cross and FEMA are tasked	 
with working together to coordinate federal mass care assistance 
in support of voluntary organizations, as well as state and local
governments, as they meet mass care needs--such as shelter, food,
and first aid. Questions have been raised about how the Red Cross
and FEMA operated following the Gulf Coast hurricanes and what	 
improvements can be made for the 2006 hurricane season. This	 
report includes GAO's interim findings on the Red Cross and	 
FEMA's hurricane operations. GAO will continue to analyze federal
and charitable hurricane relief efforts.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-712 					        
    ACCNO:   A55318						        
  TITLE:     Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA   
and the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane	 
Season								 
     DATE:   06/08/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Disaster relief aid				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     National response plan				 
	     Performance management				 
	     Relief agencies					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     National Response Plan				 

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GAO-06-712

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

GAO

June 2006

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

  Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006
                                Hurricane Season

GAO-06-712

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006
Hurricane Season

  What GAO Found

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Red Cross- working
together for the first time as co-primary agencies for ESF-6 under the
National Response Plan-disagreed about their roles and responsibilities,
and this disagreement strained working relationships and hampered their
efforts to coordinate relief services for hurricane victims. Specifically,
FEMA and the Red Cross disagreed about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator,
a FEMA official charged with leading mass care, housing, and human
services assistance. FEMA officials told us that the Red Cross should
direct all requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator,
while Red Cross officials stated that the organization should be able to
take requests directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief-not the ESF-6
coordinator. As a result, the two organizations spent time negotiating
operating procedures, rather than focusing solely on coordinating mass
care services in the early days of the hurricane response effort. FEMA and
the Red Cross have noted that they are working to clarify their roles and
responsibilities under ESF-6, but as of May 24, 2006, had not reached
agreement on these responsibilities, including the role of the ESF-6
coordinator.

Red Cross staff assigned to perform ESF-6 functions, such as working with
FEMA to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of sheltering
and feeding, rotated frequently-often every 2 to 3 weeks-making it
difficult for them to maintain strong working relationships and gain
expertise. These short rotations hindered communications among staff, thus
making it more difficult to mobilize resources. Additionally, government
officials stated that these short rotations led to the loss of
institutional knowledge about ESF-6 processes, such as how to collect
shelter data correctly. Red Cross officials said that 2- to 3- week
rotations are standard because most disasters do not require longer
rotations, but acknowledged that short rotations were a problem. Red Cross
officials also told us they are hiring permanent staff at the state level
to help coordinate relief services, including mass care under ESF-6, and
are also considering staffing options for national-level positions.
However, as of May 24, 2006, the Red Cross has not implemented policies
that would address the issue at the national or local level.

FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to track requests for assistance
it received from the Red Cross on behalf of voluntary organizations and
state and local governments for items such as water, food, and cots; the
absence of such a system created more work for the Red Cross and slowed
the delivery of relief services. These organizations often did not know
when, or if, they would be receiving needed supplies and, as a result,
scaled back relief services in some instances. The Red Cross was only able
to follow up on these requests informally-a process that took time and was
often ineffective.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 Background 6 Disagreement about Roles and
Responsibilities Strained Working

Relationships between FEMA and the Red Cross 12 Short Rotations Made It
Difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 Staff to

Develop Effective Working Relationships and Gain Expertise 13 FEMA's
Inability to Track Requests Created More Work for the Red

Cross and Slowed Relief Services 15 Conclusions 17 Recommendations for
Executive Action 18 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

  Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III Comments from the Red Cross

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products

  Figures

Figure 1: Comparison between the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and

the 2004 Hurricane Season 7 Figure 2: Comparison of Services Provided by
the Red Cross:

Hurricane Season 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 8 

Figure 3: Emergency Support Function-6 10 

Figure 4: Standard Process for Requesting
Assistance 11 Figure 5: Process for Submitting Action Request Forms 15

         Page i GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Abbreviations

DHS                             Department of Homeland Security            
ESF                   emergency support function                           
FEMA                                   Federal Emergency Management Agency 
ICRC                              International Committee of the Red Cross 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

         Page ii GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 1 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victimsims

In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, which officially began on
June 1, this interim report focuses on how FEMA and the Red Cross
fulfilled their responsibilities under ESF-6 and identifies immediate
improvements both organizations can make to better coordinate federal mass
care assistance in the event that another devastating hurricane hits the
United States. This report-which builds on GAO's previously issued work
related to disasters, including a report about the coordination of
voluntary assistance following the events of September 11, 2001-presents
the initial findings of GAO's ongoing work on how voluntary organizations
coordinated with the government to provide mass care services following
the Gulf Coast hurricanes. We issued preliminary observations in a
December 2005 testimony, finding that voluntary organizations took steps
following September 11 to improve coordination of relief efforts but still
faced challenges coordinating service delivery following the Gulf Coast
hurricanes.1 We anticipate releasing a final report later in 2006.

To gain a better understanding of how FEMA and the Red Cross worked
together following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we visited Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas in January and March of 2006. During these site
visits, we toured federal disaster operations centers and distribution
centers that the Red Cross and other national and local voluntary
organizations established to provide services to hurricane victims. We
also met with representatives from federal, state, and local governments
and held discussion groups with officials from both national and local
voluntary organizations. In addition to conducting site visits, we
analyzed FEMA and Red Cross documents, including documented requests for
assistance that the Red Cross, as the primary agency for mass care under
ESF-6, had placed to FEMA and the operating procedures that the Red Cross
and FEMA said they used to carry out its ESF-6 responsibilities. We
interviewed officials from DHS's Office of Inspector General and FEMA's
national headquarters, as well as representatives from national voluntary
organizations, including the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the
Southern Baptist Convention. Finally, we reviewed reports on the response
to the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued by the DHS Office of

GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance,
GAO-06-297T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).

Page 2 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

                                Results in Brief

Inspector General,2 the House of Representatives,3 the White House,4 The
International Committee of the Red Cross, the British Red Cross, and the
American Bar Association.5

We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

FEMA and the Red Cross's differing views about their roles and
responsibilities under ESF-6 hampered efforts to coordinate federal mass
care assistance. The two organizations differed in their understanding of
the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a key FEMA official tasked with
providing strategic vision and leading efforts to coordinate federal mass
care, housing, and human services assistance. FEMA officials said that the
Red Cross should direct all requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF6
coordinator, while Red Cross officials stated that the Red Cross needed to
communicate directly with the FEMA Operations Section Chief--not the ESF-6
coordinator. This difference in expectations about the role of the ESF-6
coordinator created tension between FEMA and the Red Cross and affected
the organizations' working relationship. Although Red Cross and FEMA
officials have stated they are working to clarify future roles and
responsibilities, they had not reached agreement on these roles and
responsibilities as of May 24, 2006.

Red Cross staff assigned to fulfill specific ESF-6 functions rotated
frequently, making it difficult for these staff to develop strong working
relationships and gain specific knowledge about ESF-6 processes. In
general, Red Cross staff who worked for ESF-6 rotated every 2 to 3 weeks.
Officials from FEMA and state and local governments told us that these
short rotations presented two problems during Gulf Coast hurricane relief

2

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina. OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).

3

United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative. (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).

4 The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned. (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2006).

5 American Bar Association. In the Wake of the Storm: The ABA Responds to
Hurricane Katrina. (Chicago, Illinois: 2006).

         Page 3 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

efforts. First, these short rotations hampered the ability of Red Cross
staff to establish and maintain relationships with officials from FEMA and
other government agencies. Maintaining strong relationships was
particularly important following the hurricanes because normal
communication channels were disrupted and staff needed to rely on personal
contact to call upon needed resources. Second, these short rotations made
it difficult for Red Cross staff to gain institutional knowledge about
processes and procedures, such as data collection procedures, that were
part of their ESF-6 roles. The International Committee of the Red Cross,
in its review of various aspects of the American Red Cross's response to
the hurricanes, also cited short rotations as problematic, stating that
rapid volunteer turnover resulted in the loss of knowledge volunteers had
acquired on the job. Officials from the Red Cross said that 2- to 3- week
rotations are standard because most disasters do not require longer
rotations, but acknowledged that short rotations were a problem after the
Gulf Coast hurricanes. In addition, Red Cross officials stated that they
are hiring permanent staff at the state level to help coordinate relief
services, including mass care under ESF-6, and are also considering
staffing options to address this issue at the national level. However, as
of May 24, 2006, the Red Cross had not yet implemented staffing strategies
to address this issue at the national or local level.

FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to determine the status of
official requests for assistance it had received, which slowed service
delivery and required the Red Cross to expend resources trying to
determine when and if mass care service providers would receive promised
goods. As the DHS Office of Inspector General noted in its review of
FEMA's response to Katrina, FEMA did not have a system in place to track
requests for assistance, including those requests it received from the Red
Cross in its ESF-6 capacity. FEMA officials therefore were often unable to
provide the Red Cross with accurate information about when expected items
would be delivered, or if FEMA would be able to fulfill a request, causing
many requests to go unfilled or be filled too late to be of use. The
unreliability of FEMA's supply systems required the Red Cross to try to
follow up on requests through other informal channels-a process the Red
Cross reported as being inefficient and only marginally effective. Other
voluntary organizations also told us that in many cases the unreliability
of FEMA's supply systems challenged their attempts to provide mass care
services, and as a result they had to scale back on their service
provision.

To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006 hurricane
season, we are recommending that FEMA work with the Red Cross as

Page 4 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

soon as possible to reach agreement on the operating procedures that they
will both use in the event of an incident of national significance. We are
also recommending that the Red Cross implement ESF-6 staffing strategies
that would enable them to better facilitate the development of working
relationships and retain institutional knowledge. In addition, to help
ensure that FEMA's resource tracking system will meet the needs of those
requesting FEMA assistance, we are recommending that FEMA obtain input
from the Red Cross to aid in the system's design.

In comments on a draft of this report, DHS officials indicated that they
had no comments on the draft, except for a few technical clarifications,
which we incorporated as appropriate in this report. The Red Cross also
provided comments on the draft and expressed general agreement with our
conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross could be
improved for the 2006 hurricane season. The Red Cross highlighted actions
it is taking with respect to our first two recommendations, and said that
it heartily endorsed our third recommendation. Additionally, the Red Cross
provided important contextual information about its role under the
National Response Plan and the length of its ESF-6 staff rotations. We
incorporated this information into the final report. Finally, the Red
Cross maintained that our draft report's characterization of problems
pertaining to the operating procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross
following the hurricanes was not fully accurate, and specifically that the
versions of procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross were the same in
every relevant respect. In response to the Red Cross's comments, we again
requested FEMA's operating procedures, which we received. We compared the
operating procedures FEMA and the Red Cross said they used and determined
the wording was the same in relevant respects. Specifically, the versions
stated that the Red Cross would not be precluded from taking priorities
directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief, as necessary, but that the
Red Cross would coordinate with other designated FEMA officials.
Subsequently, we modified the report to focus on disagreements between
FEMA and the Red Cross regarding their roles and responsibilities during
the relief efforts, rather than specific versions of operating procedures.
Even though the wording of the operating procedures the Red Cross and FEMA
said they used during hurricane relief efforts was the same, it is clear
that they disagreed about their roles and responsibilities, and
specifically the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, following the hurricanes.
Additionally, our evidence indicates that this disagreement strained FEMA
and Red Cross working relationships and may have led to breakdowns in the
provision of mass care services. Both FEMA and Red Cross officials have
confirmed they are working to finalize a memorandum of understanding to
clarify ESF-6 roles and

Page 5 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

                                   Background

responsibilities for future incidents of national significance. As both
organizations work to finalize this memorandum, they need to clearly
define key terms pertaining to their roles and responsibilities that may
be ambiguous to avoid future confusion resulting from differing
interpretations of the same document.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused extensive human suffering and damage in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
Mississippi and Louisiana on August 29, 2005, and alone caused more damage
than any other single natural disaster in the history of the United
States. Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated
300,000 homes-more than three times the total number of homes destroyed by
the four major hurricanes that hit the continental United States in August
and September 2004. Hurricane Rita followed on September 24, 2005, making
landfall in Texas and Louisiana and adding to the devastation. Hurricane
Katrina alone caused $96 billion in property damage, more than any other
natural disaster in the history of the United States. (See fig. 1.)

         Page 6 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Figure 1: Comparison between the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and the 2004
Hurricane Season

    Deaths Homes destroyed or made uninhabitable Property damage (in billions of
    dollars)

1,400 400,000 120

    350,000

      1,200

100

    300,000

1,000 80 250,000 800

60

    200,000

600

150,000

    40 400 100,000

20

200

    50,000

0

          Hurricane Katrina Hurricane season and season 2004 Rita 2004

0 Katrina Hurricane Katrina season 2004

0

Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross documents and the White House report The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.

Note: Hurricane season 2004 refers to the four major hurricanes that
struck the continental United States in August and September 2004:
Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne. Regarding the 2005 Gulf Coast
Hurricanes, we were unable to obtain comparable home and property damage
for Hurricane Rita.

                                 The Red Cross

The Red Cross provides relief services after disasters, such as hurricanes
or terrorist attacks, and is the nation's largest disaster relief
organization. Since its founding in 1881, the Red Cross has offered
humanitarian care to the victims of war and devastating natural disasters.
The organization is unique in that it is a private nonprofit entity but,
since 1905, has had a congressional charter. The congressional charter
requires that the organization provide volunteer humanitarian assistance
to the armed forces, serve as a medium of communication between the people
of the United States and the armed forces, and provide disaster prevention
and relief services. Eight of the 50 members of the Red Cross Board of
Governors are appointed by the President of the United States, and 7 of
these individuals must be federal officials.

Following an incident of national significance, the Red Cross serves as a
direct service provider to disaster victims. In this capacity, the
organization provides services that include

Page 7 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

     o feeding,
     o sheltering,
     o financial assistance, and
     o emergency first aid.

After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross estimated that it will
have provided more than 3.7 million hurricane victims with financial
assistance, 3.4 million overnight stays in almost 1,100 shelters, and more
than 27.4 million hot meals and 25.2 million snacks for survivors of the
Gulf Coast hurricanes. According to the Red Cross, its efforts after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were larger than for any previous disaster
relief effort. For example, the Red Cross provided more than six times the
number of shelter nights after Katrina and Rita than it did in the entire
2004 hurricane season. (See fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Comparison of Services Provided by the Red Cross: Hurricane
Season 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Number of families provided with financial support by Red Cross Shelter
nights provided by Red Cross Meals and snacks provided by Red Cross

1,400,000 4,000,000 60,000,000

      3,500,000

        1,200,000

        50,000,000

      3,000,000 1,000,000

        40,000,000 2,500,000

800,000

30,000,000

2,000,000

      600,000 1,500,000

        20,000,000

400,000

      1,000,000

10,000,000 200,000

      500,000

0

          Hurricane Katrina Hurricane season and season 2004 Rita 2004

0 Katrina Hurricane Katrina and season and Rita 2004 Rita

Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross documents.

Note: Hurricane season 2004 refers to the four major hurricanes that
struck the continental United States in August and September 2004:
Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne.

National Response Plan The National Response Plan is designed to provide
the structure for the coordination of federal support for disaster
response, including support

Page 8 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Emergency Support Function-6

for voluntary organizations providing shelter, food, and other mass care
services. Major federal government agencies, the Red Cross, and an
umbrella organization of voluntary organizations are signatories to the
plan. DHS released the plan in December 2004, and Hurricane Katrina was
the first time the plan was used in response to an incident of national
significance. The plan incorporates and replaces several previous plans
for disaster management, including the Federal Response Plan, which was
originally signed in 1992. The Red Cross is the only voluntary
organization named as a primary agency under both the Federal Response
Plan and the National Response Plan. One way the National Response Plan
changed the Federal Response Plan was by incorporating the services of
other voluntary organizations under an umbrella organization, National
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster.

The National Response Plan is designed on the premise that disaster
response is generally handled by local jurisdictions. In the vast majority
of disasters, local emergency personnel, such as police, fire, public
health, and emergency management personnel, act as first responders and
identify needed resources to aid the community. Local jurisdictions can
also call on state resources to provide additional assistance. If an
incident is of such severity that it is deemed an incident of national
significance, DHS and FEMA coordinate with other federal agencies to
provide the affected state and local governments with additional resources
and supplemental assistance. In these instances, state and local
governments can request federal assistance for needed items.

In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond to
disasters, the National Response Plan designates 15 emergency support
functions that address specific disaster response needs. ESF-6, the
function most relevant to voluntary organizations involved in disaster
relief, creates a working group of key federal agencies and voluntary
organizations to coordinate federal assistance in support of state and
local efforts to provide

     o mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid;
     o housing, both short- and long-term; and
     o human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and
       identifying support for persons with special needs.

Under the Federal Response Plan, ESF-6 included only the mass care
function. The National Response Plan marks the first time these three
functions were included under one emergency support function.

Page 9 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

FEMA and the Red Cross both serve important leadership roles in ESF-6.
FEMA-an agency within DHS-serves as both the ESF-6 coordinator and as the
primary agency for housing and human services. (See fig. 3.) In its role
as ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the implementation of ESF-6 and
ensures coordination among mass care, housing, and human services. In its
role as primary agency for housing and human services, FEMA has
responsibility for leading and coordinating federal efforts to provide
these services to the victims of disasters.

                     Figure 3: Emergency Support Function-6

Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Plan.

In addition to its role as a direct service provider, the Red Cross serves
as the primary agency for mass care under ESF-6, which includes
sheltering, feeding, and the provision of emergency first aid. In this
role, the Red Cross is responsible for coordinating federal mass care
assistance in support of state and local efforts. Red Cross staff work at
FEMA headquarters and field offices to help coordinate ESF-6 relief
efforts across organizations. In this role, the Red Cross takes requests
for assistance from state governments to meet the needs of state or local
governments or voluntary organizations. The Red Cross then identifies
resources to meet those needs or calls upon FEMA to meet those needs with
federal resources. (See fig. 4.) In addition to being the only voluntary
organization to serve as a primary agency in the National Response Plan,
the Red Cross also has responsibilities under other emergency support
functions, such as providing counseling services under ESF-8, Public
Health and Medical Services.

         Page 10 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

              Figure 4: Standard Process for Requesting Assistance

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act) specifies additional roles for the Red Cross-and other
voluntary organizations-after a disaster. 6 The Stafford Act authorizes
FEMA-under a delegation from the President-to coordinate the relief
activities of government and private disaster assistance organizations
(including the Red Cross). These organizations agree to operate under a
federal coordinating officer, who coordinates relief following major
disasters and emergencies declared by the President. The Stafford Act also
specifies that in providing relief and assistance, FEMA may use-with
consent-the personnel and facilities of disaster relief organizations in
the distribution of medicine, food, supplies, or other items, and in the
restoration, rehabilitation, or reconstruction of community services
housing and essential facilities. Specifically named in the statute are
the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the Mennonite Disaster Service.

Disagreement about Roles and Responsibilities Strained Working
Relationships between FEMA and the Red Cross

Before the hurricanes made landfall, FEMA and the Red Cross-working
together under ESF-6 for the first time-disagreed about their roles and
responsibilities under the National Response Plan. This disagreement
strained working relationships both before and during the response effort.
Immediately following the hurricanes, each organization had a different
understanding of certain ESF-6 operating procedures, according to both
FEMA and Red Cross officials. This disagreement was primarily about the
role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a FEMA official tasked with providing
strategic vision and leading efforts to coordinate mass care, housing, and
human services assistance. FEMA officials told us that according to their
understanding of the operating procedures, the Red Cross should direct all
requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator. The Red Cross
maintained that the operating procedures permitted it to take priorities
directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief-not the ESF-6 coordinator.

Tensions resulting from this disagreement negatively affected the working
relationship between FEMA and the Red Cross. Because of the lack of
clarity about roles and responsibilities, the agencies spent time during
the response effort trying to establish operations and procedures, rather
than focusing solely on coordinating services. For example, FEMA and the
Red Cross debated if the Red Cross would attend and present information at
daily FEMA policy meetings. Specifically, Red Cross officials reported
that

6

42 U.S.C. S:S: 5121-5201.

Page 12 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Short Rotations Made It Difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 Staff to Develop
Effective Working Relationships and Gain Expertise

in the early days of the response effort, the ESF-6 coordinator informed
the Red Cross that she would represent all components of ESF-6 at FEMA
policy meetings. Under this model, the Red Cross attended but did not
present information. Red Cross officials expressed concern with this model
because they indicated that it undermined their authority as the primary
agency for mass care. The Red Cross additionally told us that FEMA's
vision of the ESF-6 coordinator did not best use the Red Cross's expertise
in mass care service provision. FEMA officials have argued that the ESF-6
coordinator role is important because the coordinator can provide a broad
vision for all of ESF-6, which includes housing and human services as well
as mass care. Additionally, FEMA officials have reported that confusion
about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator may have led to breakdowns in
service provision.

In its review of operations following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, the DHS
Office of Inspector General also noted that FEMA and the Red Cross held
different expectations of their responsibilities. To address this issue,
the Inspector General recommended that the FEMA director establish an ESF6
working group to define the explicit roles and responsibilities of FEMA
and the Red Cross, develop standard operating procedures, and implement a
concept of operations plan. FEMA and the Red Cross have stated they are
working to clarify future roles and responsibilities, but as of May 24,
2006, had not reached agreement on these responsibilities, including the
role of the ESF-6 coordinator.

Red Cross staff assigned to perform ESF-6 functions rotated frequently,
often working from several different locations in the aftermath of the
Gulf Coast hurricanes. These staff-who were responsible for coordinating
federal mass care assistance in support of state and local efforts to
provide shelter and food to evacuees-generally rotated every 2 to 3 weeks.
For example, one Red Cross employee told us that in a 3 1/2-month period,
which began immediately before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, he rotated
on seven occasions to different ESF-6 offices in Washington, D.C.,
Atlanta; New Orleans; and Baton Rouge. During this time, he also worked
for short periods at Red Cross headquarters on five separate occasions.

Short rotations made it difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 staff to develop and
maintain effective working relationships with staff from other
organizations, which were critical to relief efforts. Specifically, FEMA
officials told us that short rotations hindered coordination by requiring
that Red Cross ESF-6 staff members develop new working relationships every
time they rotated. For example, when rotating into a new state, ESF-

Page 13 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

6 staff would have to form new working relationships with the FEMA
officials in that state, state and local government officials, and
officials from various local voluntary organizations. These short
rotations were problematic because strong relationships between ESF-6
workers and other organizations facilitate communication between workers
and ensure that individuals are aware of the roles and capacities of other
disaster response organizations. In addition, officials told us that
following the hurricanes, strong relationships were particularly important
because usual communication channels were often not functioning and people
needed to rely on personal relationships to mobilize resources.

Short rotations also limited Red Cross ESF-6 staff members' knowledge of
ESF-6 processes. For example, FEMA officials said that frequent rotations
resulted in Red Cross staff sometimes not knowing how to correctly fill
out forms and collect shelter data. FEMA officials said that
inconsistencies in data collected by Red Cross ESF-6 staff made it
difficult to track trends in mass care and identify where additional
services were needed. Red Cross officials noted that FEMA processes and
procedures were not always clear and required time to learn. Although not
specifically addressing ESF-6, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), a humanitarian nongovernmental agency based in Geneva,
Switzerland, also found that short rotations by Red Cross volunteers in
various positions were problematic. According to an ICRC review of the
American Red Cross's overall response to the hurricanes, "the volunteers
remain normally for a period between 2-3 weeks...Due to the rapid
change-over training is difficult and acquired knowledge is lost."

Red Cross officials gave several reasons for using short rotations after
the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Officials told us that short rotations for
ESF-6 staff are standard because most disasters are not large enough to
require an ESF-6 role for more than 2 or 3 weeks. In contrast, the Gulf
Coast hurricanes required that Red Cross staff fill ESF-6 functions from
August 27, 2005, until December 16, 2005, a period of approximately 3 1/2
months. In addition, Red Cross officials said that short rotations made it
easier to fill ESF-6 staff positions because volunteers were more likely
to accept work for a short time period than for a long period.

Officials from the Red Cross have recognized the problems posed by short
rotations by ESF-6 staff-who included both paid employees and trained
volunteers-and stated that they are working to resolve the problem. The
Red Cross told us that it is hiring 14 additional employees at the state
level who will work with state emergency management agencies to help
coordinate relief services, including mass care under ESF-6. Red Cross

Page 14 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

FEMA's Inability to Track Requests Created More Work for the Red Cross and
Slowed Relief Services

officials also told us that they are considering hiring reserve staff that
could fill ESF-6 positions at the national level for longer periods.
However, as of May 24, 2006, no new staffing policies had been implemented
to resolve the problem of frequent rotations at the national or local
levels.

FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to track the requests for
assistance that the Red Cross submitted-in its official ESF-6 role-on
behalf of state and local governments and other voluntary organizations.
(See fig. 5.) Red Cross records indicate that it submitted 16 requests to
FEMA headquarters and dozens more to field offices in Atlanta, Georgia;
Denton, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Jackson, Mississippi; and Austin,
Texas during the response effort. According to the Red Cross, FEMA
approved the majority of these requests for assistance such as requests
for water, fuel, and cots for shelters, but did not have a system in place
to determine whether

     o the appropriate FEMA unit received the request,
     o the requested items had been located,
     o these items had been loaded and shipped to the intended location, and
     o these items had been delivered.

             Figure 5: Process for Submitting Action Request Forms

Source: GAO analysis of FEMA and Red Cross interviews.

Without a comprehensive system to keep track of requests for assistance,
many requests were lost before FEMA could fill them. For example, FEMA
officials were only able to provide us with records of less than one-third
of the 16 requests that Red Cross documents indicate were submitted to
FEMA headquarters. Additionally, other voluntary organizations and state

Page 15 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

and local government officials have told us that because of FEMA's
inability to track requests, they did not know when, or if, they would
receive the supplies that they needed to continue providing mass care
services. The DHS Office of Inspector General noted this problem in its
report, indicating that FEMA's inability to monitor requests for
assistance often resulted in requests being lost or filled too late. In
some instances, lost requests resulted in duplicate requests being
submitted to FEMA. The DHS Office of Inspector General has recommended
that FEMA develop a means to standardize and streamline the resource
ordering and tracking process as well as develop and implement a
resource-tracking system that is capable of documenting whether resources
were delivered and the efficiency with which the resource was provided.
The Under Secretary for Preparedness of DHS has stated that FEMA is
working on the development of a resource-tracking system. However, FEMA
officials told us they would not be able to create such a system before
the 2006 hurricane season.

Red Cross officials have reported that often, the only way for them to
determine the status of previously submitted requests was through informal
channels, a situation that created more work for Red Cross staff. Because
there was no comprehensive system in place to formally track the status of
requests, Red Cross staff followed up on requests primarily through
telephone calls, a procedure that was particularly challenging because the
Gulf Coast hurricanes compromised communication systems. Furthermore, when
the Red Cross officials were able to follow up on requests by telephone,
FEMA officials were often not able to provide the needed information,
according to Red Cross officials.

State and local governments that submitted requests for assistance to FEMA
through the Red Cross and ESF-6 reported service delivery problems as a
result of FEMA's inability to track and meet requests. For example, the
city of Austin, Texas, had difficulties meeting the needs of evacuees when
FEMA did not fill its request for 6,000 cots as expected. According to
Austin officials, FEMA had indicated that it had processed the request and
shipped the cots, which would arrive the same day. However, the cots did
not arrive until much later in the response effort, and in the interim,
FEMA was unable to determine where they were. As a result, the city of
Austin needed to develop alternate sheltering strategies and later had to
redirect the cots, which arrived too late to be of use to the city. An
official from the state of Texas reported similar fulfillment and
reliability problems with FEMA's system and stated that in preparation for
the next hurricane season, the state is developing alternate plans with
the

Page 16 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

                                  Conclusions

private sector to reduce its dependency on FEMA to meet its mass care
needs.

Voluntary organizations also reported that, in many cases, the
unreliability of FEMA's supply systems challenged their attempts to
provide mass care services. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention
submitted several requests to FEMA through the Red Cross on September 1,
2005, for items such as refrigerated vehicles, forklifts, and hand washing
stations to establish 13 large-scale kitchens that would serve Southern
Baptist Convention and Red Cross shelters in Mississippi. A Southern
Baptist Convention official told us that FEMA was unable to provide
information about these requests after the requests had been submitted.
Consequently, the organization's ability to continue providing food for
hurricane evacuees was compromised because most of the supplies it
requested did not arrive until approximately September 10-a week and a
half after placing the requests.

In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought widespread devastation and
challenged all levels of government and voluntary organizations to help
thousands of victims get food, medical help, shelter, and other
assistance. As we and others have reported, the agencies responsible for
disaster relief after the Gulf Coast hurricanes were clearly overwhelmed,
and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of preparedness
and the collective response. The Red Cross and FEMA-the two organizations
responsible for working together to coordinate federal mass care
assistance under the National Response Plan-also faced challenges
coordinating with each other to ensure that critical aid and resources
from the federal government reached workers on the ground in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas.

As the 2006 hurricane season begins, these two organizations, with their
access to vast resources and long histories of providing disaster relief
services, are uniquely positioned to improve the level of care provided
following a disaster. But this partnership cannot function efficiently in
the aftermath of a disaster without improved working relationships.
Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross will continue to be difficult
unless they reach agreement on their respective roles and responsibilities
and find ways to ensure that staff in critical positions serve at sites
long enough to make contacts and retain on-the-job experience.
Furthermore, as FEMA works to develop a system to track requests for
assistance, it has an opportunity to improve service delivery by engaging
the Red Cross. As the primary agency for mass care under the National

Page 17 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Response Plan and the entity charged with submitting mass care-related
requests to FEMA, the Red Cross could provide valuable input in
identifying end user needs of a resource-tracking system and aiding in the
design of system capabilities. The DHS Office of Inspector General has
made longer-term recommendations for improving ESF-6 processes. However,
changes are needed to enable this partnership to function more effectively
as the 2006 hurricane season is beginning.

To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006 hurricane
season, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to work with
the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross as soon
as possible to reach agreement on the operating procedures that they will
both use in the event of an incident of national significance. Given the
lack of progress FEMA and the Red Cross have made thus far in reaching
agreement on the operating procedures and that the new hurricane season is
beginning, they may wish to use mediation to speed the agreement.

We recommend that the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Red Cross implement ESF-6 staffing strategies that better facilitate the
development of working relationships and retain institutional knowledge.
For example, such strategies might include lengthening ESF-6 staff
rotations in incidents of national significance or primarily using
permanent staff to fill ESF-6 positions.

To help ensure that FEMA's resource tracking system will meet the needs of
those requesting FEMA assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS
direct FEMA to ensure that it obtains input from the Red Cross as it
develops a resource tracking system.

Recommendations for Executive Action

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. DHS officials indicated that they had no comments on
the draft, except for a few technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate in this report. DHS did not provide a response
to our recommendations, noting that FEMA was actively preparing for the
hurricane season. DHS's written comments are reproduced in appendix II at
the end of this report.

We also provided a draft of this report to the Interim President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Red Cross. The Red Cross's written comments on
the draft are reproduced in appendix III. Overall, the Red Cross agreed
with our conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross

Page 18 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

could be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. The Red Cross also
highlighted actions under way with respect to our first two
recommendations. For example, the Red Cross said it has been working
closely with FEMA in recent months to develop and finalize a memorandum of
understanding that outlines areas of mutual support and cooperation with
respect to response and recovery in presidentially declared disasters and
emergencies. With respect to our recommendation about staffing strategies,
the Red Cross said that it is in the process of hiring ESF-6 reservists
who will be deployed for extended periods of time to perform Red Cross
ESF-6 mass care functions at the federal level. Additionally, the Red
Cross said that it heartily endorsed our third recommendation about FEMA's
resource tracking system.

In its response, the Red Cross also provided additional information to
help clarify the Red Cross's role under the National Response Plan and its
ESF6 operations. Specifically, the Red Cross maintained that in several
places in the draft, our characterization of its role under the National
Response Plan and ESF-6 was too broad. In response, we revised the report
to clarify that under the National Response Plan, the Red Cross is
responsible for coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of
state and local mass care efforts. The Red Cross also provided additional
information about the length of ESF-6 staff rotations, which we
incorporated into the final report.

Finally, in its written comments, the Red Cross maintained that in our
draft report the manner in which we characterized problems pertaining to
the operating procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross following the
hurricanes was not fully accurate. FEMA and Red Cross officials had
previously told us that the organizations used different versions of the
operating procedures. However, in its comments on our draft report, the
Red Cross said that statements we made in the draft regarding differences
in the versions of the operating procedures it and FEMA used were not
accurate, as the versions were the same in every relevant respect.
Further, the Red Cross stated that that the use of two different versions
of operating procedures by FEMA and the Red Cross-if it ever occurred- did
not result in negative consequences, as our draft reported. In response to
the Red Cross's comments, we again requested the version of the operating
procedures used by FEMA during hurricane relief efforts. We subsequently
received a version of the operating procedures from FEMA; our review of
this document indicated that the versions the Red Cross and FEMA said they
used were the same in relevant respects. Specifically, the versions stated
that the Red Cross would not be precluded from taking priorities directly
to the FEMA Operations Section Chief, as necessary, but

Page 19 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

that the Red Cross would coordinate with other designated FEMA officials.
As such, we modified the report to focus on disagreements between FEMA and
the Red Cross regarding their roles and responsibilities during the relief
efforts, rather than specific versions of operating procedures. Even
though the wording of the operating procedures the Red Cross and FEMA said
they used during hurricane relief efforts was the same, it is clear that
FEMA and the Red Cross disagreed about their roles and responsibilities
following the hurricanes and specifically the role of the ESF-6
coordinator. Further, our evidence indicates this difference strained
their working relationships. High-ranking officials from both the Red
Cross and FEMA confirmed to us on numerous occasions that there was
confusion and differing views over how the agencies should operate under
ESF-6 and specifically how the role of the ESF-6 coordinator should be
defined. After reviewing our draft, FEMA officials did not disagree with
our characterization that disagreement over the operating procedures and
the role of the ESF-6 coordinator may have led to breakdowns in the
provision of mass care services. Further, both FEMA and Red Cross
officials have confirmed they are working to finalize the aforementioned
memorandum of understanding to clarify ESF-6 roles and responsibilities
for future incidents of national significance. As both organizations work
to finalize this memorandum, they need to clearly define key terms
pertaining to their roles and responsibilities that may be ambiguous to
avoid future confusion resulting from differing interpretations of the
same document.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Red Cross, appropriate congressional committees,
and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215
if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.

Cynthia M. Fagnoni

Managing Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues

Page 20 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

List of Committees

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman The Honorable Max Baucus
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Finance United States Senate

The Honorable Michael B. Enzi Chairman The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions United States Senate

The Honorable Susan Collins Chairwoman The Honorable Joseph Lieberman
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs United States Senate

The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

The Honorable Peter T. King Chairman The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Homeland Security House of
Representatives

The Honorable William M. Thomas Chairman The Honorable Charles B. Rangel
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Ways and Means House of
Representatives

Page 21 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

As part of GAO's ongoing body of work examining the response of the
federal government and others to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we conducted
a review of how Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and voluntary
organizations operated in concert with one another after the Gulf Coast
hurricanes. To obtain information about coordination between FEMA and the
voluntary organizations during the response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes,
we interviewed officials from FEMA's national headquarters and from
national offices of voluntary organizations, including the Red Cross,
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, the Salvation Army,
the United Way, Habitat for Humanity, the Southern Baptist Convention, and
Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations. Additionally, to better
understand two key tools used in coordination, we observed a National
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster conference call in November
2005. These conference calls took place daily after the Gulf Coast
hurricanes and included representatives from local and national voluntary
organizations, as well as federal agencies, such as FEMA. We also observed
the Coordinated Assistance Network database, a database that allowed
multiple organizations to access information about the services provided
to evacuees. To coordinate efforts with other oversight entities, we met
in person and by telephone with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Office of Inspector General, Congressional Research Service, Congressional
Budget Office, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation. Finally, we
reviewed reports on the response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued by
the DHS Office of Inspector General, the House of Representatives, the
White House, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the British Red
Cross, and the American Bar Association.

We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Site Visits To learn about the operations of voluntary organizations in
the field, we conducted site visits to Baton Rouge and New Orleans,
Louisiana, as well as Biloxi and Jackson, Mississippi, in January of 2006.
Additionally, we visited Austin and Houston, Texas, in March of 2006. We
toured damage caused by the hurricanes in New Orleans, Louisiana, and
Biloxi, Mississippi. Additionally we toured the FEMA Joint Field Offices
that were located in Baton Rouge, Biloxi, and Austin; local emergency
operations centers in Baton Rouge and Austin; as well as distribution
centers established by the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

         Page 22 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

                               Discussion Groups

We spoke with FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons in Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas. Additionally, we met with local chapters of the Red Cross, the
Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, and the United Way. In addition, we
spoke with key officials from the East Baton Rouge Parish Office of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Office of Homeland Security
and Public Safety: City of New Orleans, Texas Office of Homeland Security,
Austin/Travis County Health and Human Services Department, City of Austin
Office of Emergency Management, City of Houston Mayor's Office of Public
Safety and Homeland Security, the Harris County Citizen Corps, and the
Harris County Judge's office. We also met with representatives from the
OneStar Foundation, a charitable organization established in coordination
with Texas' Governor Perry's office.

To gain additional perspectives on disaster response, we conducted
discussion groups of voluntary organizations that responded to the
hurricanes. We attended the January Board of Directors meeting for the
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. At this meeting, we
observed the board members offering guidance to an organization that was
new to disaster response and conducted a discussion group with board
members, including representatives from the United Methodist Committee on
Relief, America's Second Harvest, and Lutheran Disaster Response. We held
two additional discussion groups-one in Jackson, Mississippi, and one in
Houston, Texas-to learn the perspectives of local voluntary organizations
that provided disaster relief. At these discussion groups, we heard from
representatives of local chapters of the United Way and Catholic Charities
USA, the Houston Food Bank, Independence Heights Ministerial Alliance,
community action agencies from two counties in Mississippi, and the
Christian Outreach Center.

Analysis of Red Cross Documents

To better understand the Red Cross's responsibilities and response to the
Gulf Coast hurricanes, we analyzed numerous documents provided to us by
the Red Cross. These documents included an August 2005 draft of the
Standard Operating Procedures for Emergency Support Function-6; the
American Red Cross Responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan; a
statement of understanding between FEMA and the Red Cross; key statements
of understanding between the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations
that pertain to the Gulf Coast Response-including memorandums with
Catholic Charities and the Salvation Army; training materials for Red
Cross Emergency Support Function-6 personnel and disaster operation
summary reports; after-action report by the Red Cross; and a spreadsheet
of all Red Cross shelters. We also reviewed a Red Cross

         Page 23 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Analysis of FEMA Documents

summary document that listed each action request form it, as a primary
agency for Emergency Support Function-6, submitted to FEMA between August
29, 2005, and September 30, 2005. Red Cross officials told us that they
created this document after the Gulf Coast hurricanes in response to
inquiries by us and others about their role as the primary agency for mass
care. Additionally, we reviewed documents that the Red Cross provided to
the Senate Committee on Finance, including documentation of Board of
Governors' meeting agendas from the years 2001 through 2005 and
communication from Red Cross executives to board members. As
aforementioned, we also reviewed mission reports of the response to the
Gulf Coast hurricanes by the International Committee of the Red Cross and
the British Red Cross.

To gain a better understanding of how FEMA worked with voluntary
organizations after the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we reviewed documents that
it provided to us. Specifically, we reviewed copies of the action request
forms that FEMA had records of the Red Cross submitting to FEMA
headquarters and a list documenting the status of these action request
forms. We also reviewed FEMA maps of shelter locations. Following agency
comments, we also reviewed a version of the ESF-6 standard operating
procedures FEMA said it used during hurricane relief efforts and compared
it to the version the Red Cross said that it used.

         Page 24 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

                   Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross

 Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross Appendix III: Comments from the Red
Cross Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross Appendix III: Comments from the
                                   Red Cross

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Cynthia M. Fagnoni, (202)512-7215, [email protected]

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

Andrew Sherrill, Assistant Director, and Tamara Fucile, Analyst in Charge,
managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects
of this report. Mallory Barg Bulman, Scott Spicer, and Matthew Kundinger
also made significant contributions. Additionally, Norm Rabkin, Bill
Jenkins, Gale Harris, Mike Brostek, Michael Zola, Brodi Fontenot, and
Walter Vance aided in this assignment. In addition, Jessica Botsford
assisted in the legal analysis, and Rachael Valliere assisted in the
message and report development.

         Page 31 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

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Page 34 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims

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