    Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase
    the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and
    Disease (19-MAY-06, GAO-06-644).

    U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in annual economic
    activity, but concerns exist about the sector's vulnerability to
    a natural or deliberate introduction of foreign livestock,
    poultry, and crop pests and disease. Under the Agricultural
    Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, international passengers and
    cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to seize prohibited
    material and intercept foreign agricultural pests. The Homeland
    Security Act of 2002 transferred AQI inspections from the U.S.
    Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) and left certain other AQI responsibilities at
    USDA. GAO examined (1) the extent to which USDA and DHS have
    changed the inspection program since the transfer, (2) how the
    agencies have managed and coordinated their responsibilities, and
    (3) how funding for agricultural inspections has been managed
    since the transfer.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-644
        ACCNO:   A54361
      TITLE:     Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems
    Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests
    and Disease
         DATE:   05/19/2006
      SUBJECT:   Agricultural pests
    	     Agricultural policies
    	     Agricultural programs
    	     Federal agency reorganization
    	     Inspection
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Performance measures
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     User fees
    	     USDA Agricultural Quarantine Inspection
    	     Program

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-06-644

         * Report to Congressional Requesters
              * May 2006
         * HOMELAND SECURITY
              * Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability
                of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
              * CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Strengthen the Agricultural
                Quarantine Inspection Program
                   * CBP and APHIS Have Expanded Training on Agriculture Issues
                   * CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Improve Targeting of
                     Agricultural Inspections
                   * CBP and APHIS Have Established a Review Process for
                     Assessing Port Compliance with Agricultural Inspection
                     Policy
                   * CBP Has Established New Agriculture Liaisons to Advise
                     Regional Directors
              * Management and Coordination Problems May Leave U.S. Agriculture
                Vulnerable to Foreign Pests and Disease
                   * CBP Lacks Adequate Performance Measures for Agricultural
                     Quarantine Inspections
                   * CBP Made Progress Hiring Agriculture Specialists but Still
                     Lacks a Risk-Based Staffing Model
                   * CBP Has Not Used Key Data to Evaluate Effectiveness of AQI
                     Program
                   * Information Sharing and Coordination between CBP and APHIS
                     Have Been Problematic
                   * Agriculture Canine Program Has Deteriorated
              * Financial Management Issues at CBP and APHIS Adversely Affect the
                AQI Program
                   * User Fees Have Not Been Sufficient to Cover AQI Program
                     Costs
                   * CBP Could Not Provide APHIS with the Actual Cost Information
                   * APHIS Did Not Always Make Regular Transfers of AQI Funds to
                     CBP
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendations for Executive Action
              * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Scope and Methodology
         * Results of GAO Survey of CBP Agricultural Specialists
         * Comments from the Department of Agriculture
              * GAO Comments
         * Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
              * GAO Comments
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    May 2006

    HOMELAND SECURITY

    Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S.
    Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    May 19, 2006Letter

    The Honorable Robert F. Bennett Chairman The Honorable Herb Kohl Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development,      and
    Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations United States Senate

    The Honorable Henry Bonilla Chairman The Honorable Rosa DeLauro Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
    Drug      Administration, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Tom Harkin Ranking Democratic Member Committee on
    Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry United States Senate

    Agriculture-the largest industry and employer in the United States,
    generating more than $1 trillion in economic activity annually-is
    threatened by the entry of foreign pests and disease that can harm the
    economy, the environment, plant and animal health, and public health. The
    U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that these biological
    invaders cost the American economy tens of billions of dollars annually in
    lower crop values, eradication programs, and emergency payments to
    farmers. As we reported in 2005, the terrorist attacks of September 11,
    2001, have heightened concerns about agriculture's vulnerability to
    terrorism, including the deliberate introduction of livestock, poultry,
    and crop diseases.1 To safeguard U.S. agriculture from the catastrophic
    economic losses that would likely result from accidental or deliberate
    introduction of a foreign pest or disease such as avian influenza or
    foot-and-mouth disease, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agriculture
    specialists work at ports of entry to inspect passengers, baggage, cargo,
    and mail entering the country in airplanes, ships, trucks, and railcars
    for prohibited agricultural materials that may serve as carriers of these
    pests and disease.

    Since the early 1900s, USDA was responsible under its Agricultural
    Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program for inspecting agricultural products
    entering the country. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the
    Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, transferring USDA's
    Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) port inspection
    activities and those of other federal inspection agencies responsible for
    monitoring the entry of passengers and cargo into the United States-the
    Department of the Treasury's U.S. Customs Service and the Department of
    Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service-to the newly created
    Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection (CBP).2

    Beginning in March 2003, more than 1,800 frontline agriculture
    specialists3 who had formerly reported to APHIS became CBP employees, as
    CBP incorporated the protection of U.S. agriculture into its primary
    antiterrorism mission.4 Unlike the other former federal inspection
    agencies, which were moved to DHS in their entirety, APHIS continues to
    exist within USDA and retains responsibility for domestic animal and plant
    programs and several AQI program activities, such as setting inspection
    policy, providing training, and collecting AQI user fees.

    Responding to concerns that the transfer of agricultural inspections from
    APHIS to CBP could shift the focus away from agriculture to other DHS
    priorities, the conference report accompanying the Consolidated
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requested that we report on
    coordination between USDA and DHS to ensure that U.S. agriculture is
    protected from accidentally or intentionally introduced pests and
    disease.5 We also received a request from the Ranking Member of the Senate
    Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee to evaluate AQI inspection
    issues. As agreed with your offices, we are presenting our responses to
    both requests in this report.

    This report assesses (1) the extent to which USDA and DHS have changed the
    Agricultural Quarantine Inspection program since the transfer of
    responsibilities from USDA to DHS, (2) how the departments have managed
    and coordinated their responsibilities, and (3) how funding for
    agricultural inspections has been managed since the transfer from USDA to
    DHS.

    To address these objectives, we surveyed a nationally representative
    sample of agriculture specialists about their work experiences since the
    transfer; analyzed APHIS's inspection and interception data for fiscal
    years 2000 through 2005; visited agriculture training facilities in
    Florida, Georgia, and Maryland; and reviewed interagency agreements
    related to the AQI program and other documentation, such as staffing
    information, training materials, budget information, and financial systems
    that CBP uses to track AQI-related costs. We also interviewed key program
    officials at APHIS and CBP headquarters and field offices. We performed a
    reliability assessment of the data we analyzed and determined that the
    data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More
    details on our scope and methodology appear in appendix I. We conducted
    our review from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    Since the transfer of AQI responsibilities from APHIS to CBP, the two
    agencies have taken several steps to strengthen the agricultural
    quarantine inspection program and integrate agriculture issues into CBP's
    passenger and cargo inspection programs. First, CBP has undertaken several
    training initiatives for CBP officers, whose primary duty is customs and
    immigration inspection. Newly hired officers are trained in agricultural
    issues at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and at their
    respective ports of entry. The training provides them with basic
    agriculture knowledge to help them determine when to refer passengers and
    cargo to CBP agriculture specialists for in-depth inspections. Second, CBP
    agriculture specialists now have access to CBP's classified data systems,
    which enables them to better target for inspection passengers and cargo
    posing the greatest risk of introducing pests and disease into the United
    States. For example, agriculture specialists now use CBP's Automated
    Targeting System to identify high-risk shipments before they enter the
    United States. Third, in fiscal year 2005, CBP and APHIS established a
    formal assessment process to ensure that ports continue to carry out
    agricultural inspections in accordance with APHIS's regulations, policies,
    and procedures. Finally, to help ensure that agriculture issues are
    sufficiently addressed, CBP recently established agriculture liaisons in
    each of its 20 district field offices to provide input to operational
    decisions made by CBP field office directors-who oversee ports of
    entry-and provide senior-level leadership for agriculture specialists.

    Despite efforts to improve the AQI program, key management and
    coordination challenges exist that increase the vulnerability of U.S.
    agriculture to foreign pests and disease. First, CBP has not adopted
    sufficient performance measures for AQI. Instead, it carried over the two
    performance measures that APHIS used before the transfer, which neither
    take into account CBP's expanded mission nor consider other important
    pathways-commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo-that may pose a
    risk to U.S. agriculture. Second, although APHIS updated a staffing model
    shortly after the transfer with recommendations for the number of
    agriculture specialists necessary to staff the various ports, CBP did not
    use it, or any other model, when determining where to assign the more than
    600 agriculture specialists hired since the transfer. As a result, CBP
    does not have reasonable assurance that these specialists are staffed to
    areas of greatest vulnerability. Although CBP officials told us the agency
    is planning to develop its own staffing model, it has not yet done so.
    Third, agriculture specialists routinely input data on inspection
    activities and outcomes, but CBP has not used these data to evaluate the
    performance of the AQI program. Our analysis of this data indicates that
    performance varies significantly across different regions of the United
    States. Fourth, despite an interagency agreement intended to facilitate
    coordination and communication between CBP and APHIS, agriculture
    specialists are not consistently receiving notifications of changes to
    inspection policies and urgent inspection alerts, in large part because of
    problems with dissemination of information down the CBP chain of command.
    For example, on the basis of our survey results, we estimate that only 21
    percent of agriculture specialists always receive urgent alerts in a
    timely manner. Finally, CBP has allowed the agriculture canine program-a
    key tool for targeting passengers and cargo for detailed inspections-to
    deteriorate. Currently, dozens more agriculture canine units are vacant,
    and the proficiency scores of the remaining canine units have declined,
    limiting the essential contributions these dogs can make to preventing
    entry of prohibited agricultural items.

    Financial management issues at CBP and APHIS adversely affect the AQI
    program's ability to perform border inspections. First, although the law
    authorizes (but does not require) user fees to cover all costs of the AQI
    program, in the 3 years since the transfer, user fees have not been
    sufficient to cover program costs. Consequently, in fiscal years 2003
    through 2005, the agencies had to use AQI fees collected in previous
    fiscal years or other available appropriations to pay for the program. CBP
    has stated that without increasing current user-fee rates, AQI program
    costs will continue to exceed user-fee collections. APHIS and CBP plan to
    address the funding issue, but they have only recently begun to work
    together to reassess user-fee rates. Second, because of a weakness in the
    design of CBP's new financial management system, CBP was unable to provide
    APHIS with information on the actual costs of the AQI program broken out
    by user-fee type-for example, fees paid by international air
    passengers-for fiscal year 2005. As a result, APHIS was not able to
    evaluate the extent to which individual user fees cover program costs. CBP
    officials told us that, for fiscal year 2006, CBP is working to correct
    this weakness. Finally, although APHIS agreed to transfer funds to CBP on
    a regular basis during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, these transfers were
    often delayed and their amounts varied from what was agreed to. This is
    partly due to APHIS making errors in processing some transfers. As a
    result, some ports had to reduce spending for needed supplies or delay
    hiring personnel in fiscal year 2005, according to CBP officials. In
    October 2005, the agencies signed a revised agreement specifying the
    schedule and amounts to be transferred, which, according to APHIS and CBP
    officials, will help address some of these problems. However, of the three
    scheduled payments APHIS has made so far this fiscal year, one was $20,000
    less than the agreed upon amount.

    We are making several recommendations aimed at helping the agencies ensure
    the effectiveness of agricultural quarantine inspection programs and
    protect U.S. agriculture from accidental or deliberate introduction of
    foreign pests and disease. For example, we recommend that the Secretary of
    Homeland Security address financial management issues to ensure financial
    accountability for AQI funds. We also recommend that the Secretary of
    Agriculture ensure the timely and accurate transfer of AQI user fees to
    DHS. Finally, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
    Agriculture work together to revise AQI program performance measures,
    develop a risk-based staffing model, improve interagency communication to
    ensure that agriculture specialists receive important information,
    strengthen the canine program, and address user-fee issues that threaten
    the viability of the AQI program.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA and DHS generally agreed
    with the report's recommendations and noted that various initiatives are
    either planned or under way to address our recommendations. USDA's
    comments and our response are contained in appendix III, and DHS's
    comments and our response are contained in appendix IV. The departments
    also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into this
    report, as appropriate.

    Background

    Agricultural inspections at U.S. ports of entry had been the
    responsibility of USDA since 1913. Following the events of September 11,
    2001, the Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which
    combined the inspection activities of the Department of the Treasury's
    Customs Service, the Department of Justice's Immigration and
    Naturalization Service, and APHIS into the newly created DHS Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP). Among other things, the act (1) transferred, to
    the Department of Homeland Security, APHIS's responsibility for inspecting
    passenger declarations and cargo manifests, international air passengers,
    baggage, cargo, and conveyances and holding suspect articles in quarantine
    to prevent the introduction of plant or animal diseases; and (2)
    authorized USDA to transfer up to 3,200 agricultural quarantine inspection
    (AQI) personnel to DHS.

    The Secretaries of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
    United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) signed a memorandum of
    agreement in February 2003, agreeing to work cooperatively to implement
    the relevant provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and to ensure
    necessary support for and coordination of the AQI program functions.6 The
    agreement detailed how the AQI program was to be divided, with some
    functions transferred to DHS and others retained by USDA. Agricultural
    import and entry inspection functions transferred to DHS included (1)
    reviewing passenger declarations and cargo manifests and targeting for
    inspection high-risk agricultural passenger/cargo shipments; (2)
    inspecting international passengers, luggage, cargo, mail, and means of
    conveyance; and (3) holding suspect cargo and articles for evaluation of
    plant and animal health risk in accordance with USDA regulations,
    policies, and guidelines. Functions remaining in USDA included (1)
    providing risk-analysis guidance, including in consultation with DHS, and
    the setting of inspection protocols; (2) applying remedial measures other
    than destruction and re-exportation, such as fumigation, to commodities,
    conveyances, and passengers; and (3) providing pest identification
    services at plant inspection stations and other facilities. The parties
    agreed to cooperate in the financial management functions, including
    development of annual plans and budgets, AQI user fees, and funds control
    and financial reporting procedures.

    To carry out its new inspection responsibilities, CBP established a "One
    Face at the Border" initiative, which unified the customs, immigration,
    and agricultural inspection processes by cross-training CBP officers and
    agriculture specialists to (1) prevent terrorists, terrorist weapons, and
    contraband from entering the United States; (2) identify people seeking to
    enter the United States illegally and deny them entry; and (3) protect
    U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases.

    Unlike the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
    which were moved to DHS in their entirety, APHIS continues to exist within
    USDA and retains responsibility for conducting veterinary inspections of
    live imported animals; establishing policy for inspections and
    quarantines; providing risk analysis; developing and supervising training
    on agriculture for CBP agriculture specialists; conducting specialized
    inspections of plant or pest material; identifying agricultural pests; and
    collecting AQI user fees. CBP and APHIS agreed to support their respective
    AQI duties by sharing funds from USDA-collected AQI user fees levied on
    international air passengers, commercial aircraft, ships, trucks, and
    railroad cars.

    CBP agriculture specialists are assigned to 161 of the 317 ports of entry
    that CBP staffs.7 As shown in figure 1, these ports collectively handle
    thousands of sea containers and aircraft and over a million passengers
    each day.

    Figure 1: CBP Activity at U.S. Ports of Entry, 2005

    Each port of entry can comprise one or more facilities-airports, seaports,
    or land border crossings-where CBP officers and agriculture specialists
    process arriving passengers and cargo. For example, the port of Buffalo,
    New York, has an airport and land border inspection facilities, whereas
    the Port of Atlanta has only the Atlanta Hartsfield/Jackson International
    Airport. Individual port directors are responsible for overseeing port
    operations and assigning agriculture specialists to specific port
    facilities. The ports are organized into 20 district field offices, each
    with a director of field operations who is responsible for the operation
    of multiple ports in a given geographic area and serves as a liaison
    between CBP headquarters and port management.

    Day-to-day operations for agriculture specialists may include inspecting
    pedestrians, passengers, cargo, and vehicles for pests and contraband.
    Such inspections generally follow a two-stage process-primary and
    secondary inspections. Figure 2 shows the passenger inspection process at
    an international airport, as an example.

    [This page left intentionally blank]

    Figure 2: Example of Primary and Secondary Inspection Procedures at
    Airport

    aAfter material has been seized, the agriculture specialist either sends
    an unknown detected pest to the APHIS pest identifiers or the material is
    sent to the incinerator to be destroyed.

    A primary inspection could include questioning passengers about their
    origin and destination, reviewing their written declarations, and
    screening their baggage with detector dogs to determine whether to refer
    the passengers for a secondary inspection. A secondary inspection involves
    a more detailed questioning of the passenger and an examination of their
    baggage by X-ray and, if necessary, by hand search. Procedures for
    inspecting commercial shipments vary according to factors such as the type
    of agricultural product, risk level associated with the product, and
    country of origin. To reduce the risk of foreign pests and disease
    entering the United States, agriculture specialists review cargo documents
    to select shipments for more detailed physical inspection.

    The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as amended
    (FACT Act), authorizes APHIS to set and collect user fees for AQI services
    provided in connection with the arrival of international air passengers
    and conveyances (e.g., commercial aircraft and trucks) at a port in the
    customs territory of the United States.8 The six AQI user fees are
    assessed on international air passengers, commercial aircraft, commercial
    vessels, commercial trucks, commercial truck decals, and commercial
    railroad cars.9 These user fees are paid directly by shipping companies or
    indirectly by air passengers through taxes on tickets. The international
    passenger and commercial aircraft fees are calculated and remitted
    quarterly by the individual airline companies to USDA, while rail car fees
    are remitted monthly. CBP collects the commercial vessel, truck, and truck
    decal fees at the time of inspection. International air passengers and
    commercial conveyances entering the United States from Canada are exempt
    from the user fees. The FACT Act authorizes user fees for (1) providing
    AQI services for the conveyances, cargo, and passengers listed above; (2)
    providing preclearance or preinspection at a site outside the customs
    territory of the United States to international airline passengers,
    commercial vessels, commercial trucks, commercial railroad cars, and
    commercial aircraft; and (3) administering the AQI user-fee programs.

    AQI user fees have been revised several times since the FACT Act was
    passed in 1990. In November, 1999, APHIS published a final rule in the
    Federal Register that amended the user-fee regulations by adjusting the
    fees charged for certain AQI services for part of fiscal year 2000 and for
    fiscal years 2001 and 2002.10 The user-fee adjustments were intended to
    ensure that APHIS covered the anticipated actual cost of providing AQI
    services. Subsequent rule making, culminating in a final rule published in
    the Federal Register on January 24, 2003, extended the adjusted fees

    indefinitely, beyond fiscal year 2002, until the fees are revised again.11
    On December 9, 2004, APHIS published an interim rule to raise user fees,
    effective January 1, 2005.12

    CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Strengthen the Agricultural Quarantine
    Inspection Program

    Since the transfer of agricultural quarantine inspections to CBP, the
    agency has increased training in agricultural issues for CBP officers and
    developed a national standard for in-port training. In addition, CBP and
    APHIS have enhanced the ability of agriculture specialists to better
    target inspections at the ports. The two agencies also established a joint
    program to review the agricultural inspections program on a port-by-port
    basis, and CBP created new agricultural liaison positions at the field
    office level to advise regional port directors on agricultural issues.

    CBP and APHIS Have Expanded Training on Agriculture Issues

    CBP has undertaken several training initiatives for CBP officers, whose
    primary duty is customs and immigration inspection. Under CBP, newly hired
    CBP officers receive 16 hours of training on agricultural issues at the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. Under
    APHIS, agriculture courses for Customs and Immigrations officers had been
    limited to 4 hours and 2 hours, respectively, of classroom overviews on
    agriculture issues. The revamped training provides the newly hired CBP
    officers with basic agriculture information so they know when to either
    prohibit entry or refer potential agricultural threats to CBP agriculture
    specialists. In addition to a more comprehensive course, the curriculum
    provides for additional testing on AQI knowledge. For example, classroom
    simulations include agricultural items, and CBP officers' written
    proficiency tests now include questions on agricultural inspections.

    In addition, CBP and APHIS have undertaken an initiative to expand
    agriculture training for all CBP officers at their respective ports of
    entry. The purpose of these modules-designed for Customs and Immigration
    officers-was to provide officers with the ability to make informed
    decisions on agricultural items at high-volume border traffic areas or to
    facilitate the clearance of travelers and cargo at ports without
    agriculture specialists, such as some ports of entry along the Canadian
    border. According to agency officials, the agencies have now expanded
    training to 16 hours of lecture and 8 hours of on-the-job training,
    including environment-specific modules for six inspection environments:
    northern border, southern border, international mail/expedited courier,
    maritime, airport processing, and preclearance (i.e., inspections of
    passengers and cargo prior to arrival in the United States).

    Additionally, CBP and APHIS have formalized the in-port training program
    and have developed a national standard for agriculture specialists. Under
    APHIS, depending on the port to which they were assigned, newly hired
    agriculture specialists spent anywhere from 1 week to 1 year shadowing
    senior agriculture specialists. After the transfer, CBP formalized this
    process to ensure all agriculture specialists were receiving the necessary
    on-the-job training. This formalized process includes a checklist of
    activities for agriculture specialists to master and is structured in two
    modules: an 8-week module on passenger inspection procedures and a 10-week
    module on cargo inspection procedures.

    Based on our survey of agriculture specialists, we estimate that 75
    percent of specialists hired by CBP believe that they received sufficient
    training (on the job and at the Professional Development Center) to enable
    them to perform their agriculture inspection duties. An estimated 13
    percent of specialists believe that they probably or definitely did not
    receive adequate training, and another 13 percent either were uncertain or
    did not answer the question. (See app. II, survey question 12.)

    CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Improve Targeting of Agricultural
    Inspections

    CBP and APHIS have also taken steps to better identify and target
    shipments and passengers that present potentially high risk to U.S.
    agriculture. Under CBP, some agriculture specialists receive training and
    access to computer applications such as CBP's Automated Targeting System
    (ATS), which is a computer system that, among other things, is meant to
    (1) identify high-risk inbound and outbound passengers and cargo for
    terrorist links, smuggling of WMD, drugs, currency, and other contraband;
    (2) focus limited inspection resources on higher-risk passengers and
    cargo; (3) facilitate expedited clearance or entry for low-risk passengers
    and cargo; and (4) enable users to create ad-hoc queries to

    filter data to meet specific research needs.13 ATS helps agriculture
    specialists select which cargo shipments to inspect based on detailed
    information contained in the cargo manifests and other documents that
    shipping companies are required to submit before the ship arrives in a
    port. CBP and APHIS headquarters personnel also use ATS data to identify
    companies that have violated U.S. quarantine laws. For example, recently
    the two agencies used ATS to help identify companies that have smuggled
    poultry products in seafood containers from Asia, according to a senior
    APHIS official. The U.S. currently bans uncooked poultry products from
    Asian countries because of concerns over avian influenza.

    CBP and APHIS are working together to further refine ATS's effectiveness
    in identifying and targeting shipments of agricultural products.
    Specifically, APHIS assigned a permanent liaison to the CBP National
    Targeting Center in April 2005 to help develop a rule set (a computerized
    set of criteria) that will automate the process of identifying companies
    or individuals that pose a significant agroterrorism risk to U.S.
    agriculture. According to the APHIS liaison, the rule set will eventually
    be applicable to nonagroterrorism events, such as smuggling and shipments
    that are not compliant with U.S. quarantine regulations. CBP officials
    told us that the agency has set a September 2006 release date for the
    first version of the rule set. CBP officials also told us that the agency
    is testing an interim rule set for high-risk commodities regulated by
    USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) that they expect to release
    in July 2006.14

    In addition to ATS, agriculture specialists now also have access to the
    Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS)-a computerized
    information system for identifying individuals and businesses suspected of
    violating federal law. TECS serves as a communications system between
    Treasury law enforcement offices and other federal, state, and local law
    enforcement agencies.

    ATS and TECS complement other targeting tools already used by agriculture
    specialists under APHIS. Specifically, agriculture specialists continue to
    use CBP's Automated Commercial System to review the manifests of incoming
    shipments. At select ports, agriculture specialists also continue to use
    APHIS's Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM) system to
    estimate the amount of quarantine items or pests entering the country. CBP
    agriculture specialists submit AQIM data to APHIS, where it is used to
    estimate the extent to which agricultural pests and diseases approach the
    United States through various pathways (e.g., international air
    passengers).

    CBP and APHIS Have Established a Review Process for Assessing Port
    Compliance with Agricultural Inspection Policy

    In fiscal year 2005, CBP and APHIS established a formal assessment process
    to ensure that ports of entry continue to carry out agricultural
    inspections in accordance with APHIS's regulations, policies, and
    procedures. According to an APHIS official, the new formal assessment
    process is a means for APHIS to gather some of the information necessary
    to formulate agricultural inspection policy. The assessments, called Joint
    Agency Quality Assurance Reviews, entail a visit to ports by APHIS and CBP
    officials, who complete a questionnaire based on interviews with the port
    director and other CBP personnel and through direct observation of port
    operations by the review team. The reviews cover topics such as (1)
    coordination with other federal agencies, (2) training for agriculture
    specialists, (3) access of agriculture specialists to regulatory manuals,
    and (4) processes for handling violations at the port, inspecting
    passenger baggage and vehicles, and intercepting, seizing, and disposing
    of confiscated materials.

    The review teams report on best practices and deficiencies at each port
    and make recommendations for corrective actions. For example, a review of
    two ports found that they were both significantly understaffed, and that
    CBP agriculture specialists at one of the ports were conducting
    superficial inspections on commodities that should have been inspected
    more intensely. At the same ports, the review identified best practices in
    the placing of personnel from CBP, APHIS, and FDA in the same facility and
    the targeting of tile imports from Italy and Turkey for possible
    agroterrorism risks.15 As of February 2006, the joint review team has
    conducted reviews of nine ports, and the agencies plan to complete seven
    additional reviews in fiscal year 2006, according to a senior APHIS
    official.

    CBP Has Established New Agriculture Liaisons to Advise Regional Directors

    In May 2005, CBP required that each director in its 20 field offices
    identify and appoint an agriculture liaison, with background and
    experience as an agriculture specialist, to provide CBP field office
    directors with agriculture-related input for operational decisions and
    provide agriculture specialists with senior-level leadership. CBP
    officials told us that all district field offices had established the
    liaison position as of January 2006. The CBP agriculture liaison duties
    include, among other things, advising the director of the field office on
    agricultural functions; providing oversight for data management,
    statistical analysis, and risk management; and providing oversight and
    coordination for agriculture inspection alerts.

    Since the creation of the position, agriculture liaisons have begun to
    facilitate the dissemination of urgent alerts from APHIS to CBP. For
    example, following a large increase in the discovery of plant pests at a
    port in November 2005, the designated agriculture liaison sent notice to
    APHIS, which then issued alerts to other ports. Subsequent communications
    between APHIS and CBP identified the agriculture liaison at the initial
    port as a contact for providing technical advice for inspecting and
    identifying this type of plant pest.

    Management and Coordination Problems May Leave U.S. Agriculture Vulnerable
    to Foreign Pests and Disease

    Several management and coordination problems exist that may leave U.S.
    agriculture vulnerable to foreign pests and disease. CBP has not developed
    sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program.
    CBP also has not developed a staffing model to determine how to allocate
    newly hired agriculture specialists or used available data to evaluate the
    effectiveness of the AQI program. In addition, information sharing and
    coordination between CBP and APHIS has been problematic. Finally, the
    agriculture canine program has deteriorated.

    CBP Lacks Adequate Performance Measures for Agricultural Quarantine
    Inspections

    The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal
    agencies to develop and implement appropriate measures to assess

    program performance.16 Yet, 3 years after the transfer, CBP has yet to
    develop and implement its own performance measures for the AQI program
    despite changes in the program's mission. Instead, according to senior CBP
    officials, CBP carried over two measures that APHIS used to assess the AQI
    program before the transfer: the percentage of (1) international air
    passengers and (2) border vehicle passengers that comply with AQI
    regulations. However, these measures address only two pathways, neglecting
    commercial aircraft, vessel, and truck cargo pathways. CBP's current
    performance measures also do not provide information about changes in
    inspection and interception rates, which could prove more useful in
    assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of agriculture inspections in
    different regions of the country or at individual ports of entry. They
    also do not address the AQI program's expanded mission-to prevent
    agroterrorism while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
    CBP officials told us that the agency recognizes that the current
    performance measures are not satisfactory and is planning new performance
    measures for the fiscal year 2007 performance cycle. However, such
    measures had not yet been developed at the time of our review.

    CBP Made Progress Hiring Agriculture Specialists but Still Lacks a
    Risk-Based Staffing Model

    To accomplish the split in AQI responsibilities in March 2003, APHIS
    transferred a total of 1,871 agriculture specialist positions, including
    317 vacancies, and distributed these positions across CBP's 20 district
    field offices.17 According to senior officials involved with the transfer,
    APHIS's determinations were made under tight time frames and required much
    guess work. As a result, from the beginning, CBP lacked adequate numbers
    of agriculture specialists and had little assurance that the appropriate
    numbers of specialists were staffed at the ports of entry. Since then, CBP
    has hired more than 630 specialists, but the agency has not yet developed
    or used a risk-based staffing model for determining where to assign its
    agriculture specialists.

    Our guidelines for internal control in the federal government state that
    agencies should have adequate mechanisms in place to identify and analyze
    risks and determine what actions should be taken to mitigate them.18 One
    such risk involves the changing nature of international travel and
    agricultural imports, including changes to the (1) volume of passengers
    and cargo, (2) type of agricultural products, (3) countries of origin, and
    (4) ports of entry where passengers and cargo arrive in the United States.
    One action to mitigate risk is development and implementation of a
    staffing model to help determine appropriate staffing levels to address
    these changing operating conditions.

    APHIS developed a staffing model, prior to the transfer of AQI functions
    to CBP, to calculate the number of agriculture specialists necessary to
    staff the various ports according to work load. However, according to
    APHIS officials, the model was no longer useful because it had not
    considered the split of inspectors between the two agencies. Although
    APHIS updated the model in June 2004 at CBP's request, CBP still did not
    use this or any other staffing model when assigning the newly hired
    specialists to the ports. According to CBP officials, the agency did not
    use APHIS's model because it did not consider some key variables, such as
    the use of overtime by staff.19 CBP officials also told us the agency is
    planning to develop its own staffing model, but they were unable to
    provide us with planned milestones or a timeline for completion. Until
    such a risk-based model is developed and implemented, CBP does not know if
    it has an appropriate number of agriculture specialists at each port.

    An area of potential vulnerability that should be considered in staffing
    the ports relates to the experience level of agriculture specialists at
    the ports. More than one-third of CBP agriculture specialists were hired
    since the transfer-and most within the last year. For example, San
    Francisco lost 19 specialists since 2003 but gained only 14 new hires or
    transfers, leaving 24 vacancies as of the end of fiscal year 2005. APHIS
    officials expressed concern about the turnover of staff at some ports
    because many of the newly hired CBP agriculture specialists "will need
    time to get up to speed and do not possess the institutional knowledge
    related to agricultural issues that the more seasoned specialists had."
    The official added that the experience level of specialists is of
    particular concern at ports of entry staffed by only 1 or 2 agriculture
    specialists.

    CBP Has Not Used Key Data to Evaluate Effectiveness of AQI Program

    According to APHIS, data in its Work Accomplishment Data System (WADS) can
    help program managers evaluate the performance of the AQI program by
    indicating changes in a key measure-the frequency with which prohibited
    agricultural materials and reportable pests are found (intercepted) during
    inspection activities. CBP agriculture specialists routinely record data
    in WADS for each port of entry, including monthly counts of (1) arrivals
    of passengers and cargo to the United States via airplane, ship, or
    vehicle; (2) agricultural inspections of arriving passengers and cargo;
    and (3) inspection outcomes (i.e., seizures or detections of prohibited
    (quarantined) agricultural materials and reportable pests). However, CBP
    has not used this data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program.
    Our analysis of the data shows that average inspection and interception
    rates have changed significantly in some geographical regions of the
    United States, with rates increasing in some regions and decreasing in
    others (see tables 1 and 2).

    Table 1 compares average inspection rates-the number of passenger and
    cargo inspections relative to the total number of arrivals in each CBP
    district field office-for the 42 months before and 31 months after the
    transfer. Average inspection rates declined significantly in five district
    field offices (Baltimore, Boston, Miami, San Francisco, and "Preclearance"
    in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland), whereas rates increased
    significantly in seven other districts (Buffalo, El Paso, Laredo, San
    Diego, Seattle, Tampa, and Tucson).

    Table 1: Average Inspection Rates before and after the Transfer from APHIS
    to CBP

    Percent
    District field           Average         Average Differencea   Statistical
    office           inspection rate inspection rate             significanceb
                        before (October    after (March
                          1999-February  2003-September
                                  2003)           2005)
    Atlanta                      9.7             8.8        -0.9            No
    Baltimore                   18.2            10.0        -8.2           Yes
    Boston                      30.9            13.0       -17.9           Yes
    Buffalo                      0.1             0.5         0.3           Yes
    Chicago                     18.0            18.5         0.5            No
    Detroit                      3.1             2.9        -0.2            No
    El Paso                      2.9             4.4         1.5           Yes
    Houston                     13.2            12.1        -1.1            No
    Laredo                       7.7             8.8         1.1           Yes
    Los Angeles                 12.5            10.4        -2.1            No
    Miami                       35.8            23.1       -12.7           Yes
    New Orleans                 37.6            41.8         4.3            No
    New York                    12.0            11.8        -0.2            No
    Preclearancec                7.8             3.4        -4.4           Yes
    Portland                    13.0            12.6        -0.4            No
    San Diego                   12.6            16.3         3.6           Yes
    San Francisco               40.4            19.0       -21.4           Yes
    San Juan                    62.4            57.6        -4.8            No
    Seattle                      2.3             3.1         0.8           Yes
    Tampa                       19.6            30.7        11.1           Yes
    Tucson                       2.6             4.0         1.4           Yes

    Source: GAO calculations of APHIS's Work Accomplishment Data System,
    fiscal years 2000-2005.

    aBecause of rounding, values in the difference column may not equal the
    difference between rounded inspection rates.

    bStatistical significance for each field office was calculated at the
    99.75 percent confidence level so that the confidence level of all 21
    statistical significance outcomes, collectively, is about 95 percent.

    cPreclearance inspections were conducted at 14 locations in Canada, the
    Caribbean, and Ireland. Individuals arriving in the U.S. from those
    locations did not undergo another inspection upon arrival in the United
    States. According to CBP, preclearance inspections were done only as a
    pilot and not as an ongoing program within the agency.

    Similarly, table 2 compares average interception rates-the number of pest
    interceptions relative to the total number of passenger and cargo
    inspections in each CBP district field office-for the two periods of time.
    The average rate of interceptions decreased significantly at ports in six
    district field offices-El Paso, New Orleans, New York, San Juan, Tampa,
    and Tucson-while average interception rates have increased significantly
    at ports in the Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Portland, and Seattle
    districts. Decreases in interception rates, in particular, may indicate
    that some CBP districts are less effective at preventing entry of
    prohibited materials since the transfer from APHIS to CBP.

    Table 2: Average Interception Rates before and after the Transfer from
    APHIS to CBP

          Percent
    District field            Average        Average Differencea   Statistical
    office          interception rate   interception             significanceb
                         before (October     rate after
                           1999-February         (March
                                   2003) 2003-September
                                                  2005)
    Atlanta                      10.7           11.5         0.8            No
    Baltimore                     7.6           10.4         2.8           Yes
    Boston                        3.9           12.4         8.5           Yes
    Buffalo                      15.4           30.2        14.8            No
    Chicago                       6.8            5.6        -1.3            No
    Detroit                       7.7           20.7        13.0           Yes
    El Paso                       9.4            5.7        -3.7           Yes
    Houston                       7.9            8.4         0.4            No
    Laredo                        4.4            3.9        -0.5            No
    Los Angeles                   7.4            8.7         1.3            No
    Miami                         5.3            5.8         0.4            No
    New Orleans                   5.9            3.5        -2.4           Yes
    New York                     18.1           10.2        -7.9           Yes
    Preclearancec                10.1           24.4        14.2           Yes
    Portland                      9.6           14.9         5.3           Yes
    San Diego                     1.3            1.4         0.2            No
    San Francisco                10.5           10.6         0.1            No
    San Juan                      6.1            3.5        -2.5           Yes
    Seattle                      30.1           46.5        16.4           Yes
    Tampa                         8.3            3.0        -5.2           Yes
    Tucson                        9.0            7.0        -2.0           Yes

    Source: GAO calculations of APHIS's Work Accomplishment Data System,
    fiscal years 2000-2005.

    aBecause of rounding, values in the difference column may not equal the
    difference between rounded interception rates.

    bStatistical significance for each field office was calculated at the
    99.75 percent confidence level so that the confidence level of all 21
    statistical significance outcomes, collectively, is about 95 percent.

    cPreclearance inspections were conducted at 14 locations in Canada, the
    Caribbean, and Ireland. Individuals arriving in the United States from
    those locations did not undergo another inspection upon arrival in the
    United States. According to CBP, preclearance inspections were done only
    as a pilot and not as an ongoing program within the agency.

    Of particular note are three districts that have experienced a significant
    increase in their rate of inspections and a significant decrease in their
    interception rates since the transfer. Specifically, since the transfer,
    ports in the Tampa, El Paso, and Tucson districts appear to be more
    efficient at inspecting (e.g., inspecting a greater proportion of arriving
    passengers or cargo) but less effective at interceptions (e.g.,
    intercepting fewer prohibited agricultural items per inspection). Also of
    concern are three districts-San Juan, New Orleans, and New York-that are
    inspecting at about the same rate, but intercepting less, since the
    transfer.

    When we showed the results of our analysis to senior CBP officials, they
    were unable to provide an explanation for these changes or to determine
    whether the current rates were appropriate relative to the risks, staffing
    levels, and staffing expertise associated with individual districts or
    ports of entry. These officials also noted that CBP has had problems
    interpreting APHIS data reports because CBP lacks staff with expertise in
    agriculture and APHIS's data systems in some district offices. CBP is
    working on a plan to collect and analyze agriculture-related data in the
    system it currently uses for customs inspections, but the agency has yet
    to complete or implement the plan.

    Information Sharing and Coordination between CBP and APHIS Have Been
    Problematic

    CBP and APHIS have an interagency agreement for sharing changes to APHIS's
    policy manuals and agriculture inspection alerts, which impact CBP's
    agricultural mission. APHIS maintains several manuals on its Web site that
    are periodically updated for agriculture specialists' use. These manuals
    include directives about current inspection procedures as well as policies
    about which agricultural items from a particular country are currently
    permitted to enter the United States. When APHIS updates a manual, the
    agency sends advance notice to CBP headquarters personnel, but agriculture
    specialists in the ports frequently do not receive these notices. Before
    the transfer of agriculture specialists to CBP, APHIS e-mailed policy
    manual updates directly to specialists, according to a senior APHIS
    official. However, since the transfer, CBP has not developed a list of all
    agriculture specialists' e-mail addresses. As a result, APHIS uses an
    "ad-hoc e-mail list" to notify CBP agriculture specialists of policy
    manual updates. When an agriculture specialist or supervisor sends an
    e-mail to the APHIS official who maintains the contact list, that person's
    e-mail address is then manually added to the list. The official also noted
    he has added e-mail addresses sent in by former APHIS personnel who
    noticed that they were no longer receiving manual update notifications, as
    they had prior to the transfer to CBP. However, the official also stated
    that his list is not an official mailing list and is not representative of
    all of the ports.20 CBP also could not tell us if the list was accurate or
    complete.

    Several agriculture specialists we spoke with indicated that they (1)
    frequently did not receive any notification from APHIS or CBP when manuals
    were updated, (2) received updates sporadically, or (3) were unsure
    whether they received all of the relevant updates. Moreover, based on our
    survey of agriculture specialists, we estimate that 20 percent of
    agriculture specialists do not regularly receive notices that the manuals
    have been updated. According to our survey, 50 percent of agriculture
    specialists always have access to the online manuals. However, according
    to specialists we spoke with, it is difficult to keep up with changes to
    the manuals without being notified as to which policies or procedures are
    updated by APHIS. One inspector expressed dismay that specialists at the
    port to which he had recently transferred were unaware of new regulations
    for conducting inspections to safeguard against avian influenza.
    Agriculture specialists at a different port told us that they continue to
    refer to the hard copies of APHIS's manuals, which APHIS has not updated
    since it stopped producing hard copies in 2003.

    In addition, although CBP and APHIS have established a process to transmit
    inspection alerts down the CBP chain of command to agriculture
    specialists, many frontline specialists we surveyed or interviewed at the
    ports were not always receiving relevant agriculture alerts in a timely
    manner. They identified the time required for dissemination of agriculture
    alerts down the CBP chain of command as an issue of concern. Specifically,
    based on our survey, we estimate that only 21 percent of specialists
    always received these alerts in a timely manner. The level of information
    sharing appears to be uneven between ports and pathways at ports. For
    example, an agricultural specialist at one port told us that he received
    information directly from APHIS on pest movements and outbreaks. An
    agriculture supervisor at a second port noted that information sharing had
    improved after port officials established a plant pest risk committee
    comprising local officials from APHIS, CBP, and other agencies. However,
    an agriculture specialist at a third port we visited told us that
    specialists there did not receive any information on pests from APHIS,
    while a second specialist at the same port expressed concern that alerts
    on disease outbreaks such as avian influenza arrive many days after the
    outbreaks are first reported.

    With regard to coordination between CBP and APHIS, we found that APHIS
    officers responsible for tracing the pathways of prohibited agricultural
    items into the United States have experienced difficulty or delays in
    gaining access to some ports of entry. After the transfer, APHIS and CBP
    agreed to restrict APHIS officials' access to ports of entry to ensure
    clear separation of responsibilities between the two agencies. Under the
    memorandum of agreement, CBP may grant or refuse access to ports by APHIS
    personnel, but APHIS officials noted that the difficulties and delays in
    getting information from the ports has made some of APHIS's Smuggling
    Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC) activities difficult, if not
    impossible. Per the agreement, APHIS personnel-including SITC
    inspectors-are to make advance arrangements with local CBP port directors
    for access to agriculture inspection areas. CBP agreed to provide APHIS
    with a written response to any request for access to ports of entry but
    did not specify a time frame for this response.

    Prior to the transfer, APHIS SITC inspectors regularly worked with APHIS
    agriculture inspectors to (1) trace the movement of prohibited
    agricultural items found in U.S. markets back to ports of entry
    (traceback), (2) identify parties responsible for importing prohibited
    items, and (3) determine which weaknesses in inspection procedures allowed
    the items to enter the United States. Currently, SITC inspectors are still
    responsible for tasks such as surveying local markets for prohibited
    agricultural products and gathering information to identify and intervene
    in the movement of smuggled agricultural commodities that could
    potentially harm U.S. agriculture. According to SITC officials, their
    ability to gather timely information at ports of entry is extremely
    important to SITC's mission. They added that delays in special operations
    or port visits following the discovery of prohibited items make it much
    harder to trace the pathway of such items into the United States.

    Although SITC officials noted that their inspectors have received access
    to some ports to perform their duties, they added that CBP has delayed or
    denied access to SITC inspectors at other ports in both the eastern and
    western United States. The SITC officials stated that there have been
    incidents in which CBP did not respond to requests for access until months
    after APHIS made them. For example, in 2005, SITC requested permission to
    conduct two special operations at U.S. international airports to help
    determine whether passengers or cargo from certain countries posed a risk
    in importing or smuggling poultry products that could be infected with
    avian influenza. In justifying the operations, SITC wrote, "Many illegal
    and possibly smuggled avian products have been seized" in several states
    surrounding the airports. In one case, CBP took 3 months to approve the
    request; however, SITC had already canceled the operation 2 months earlier
    because of CBP's lack of response. CBP approved another special operation
    several months after SITC's request, but later canceled it because SITC
    uniforms did not match CBP specialists' uniforms, according to senior SITC
    officials. They added that CBP's other reasons for delaying or canceling
    joint operations and visits included (1) inadequate numbers of CBP
    specialists to participate in operations, (2) scheduling conflicts
    involving CBP port management, and (3) concerns about SITC inspectors'
    lack of security clearances.

    Agriculture Canine Program Has Deteriorated

    Agriculture canines are a key tool for targeting passengers and cargo for
    inspection, but we found that the program has deteriorated since the
    transfer. The number and proficiency of canine teams has decreased
    substantially over the last several years. Specifically, APHIS had
    approximately 140 canine teams nationwide at the time of the transfer, but
    CBP currently has approximately 80 such teams, about 20 percent of which
    are newly hired, according to agency officials. They added that, although
    CBP has authorized the hiring of 15 more agriculture canine teams, the
    positions remain vacant as of the end of 2005. According to APHIS, CBP has
    not been able to fill available APHIS agriculture specialist canine
    training classes. After consulting with CBP, APHIS scheduled 7 agriculture
    canine specialist training classes in fiscal year 2005 but canceled 2
    because CBP did not provide students. Similarly, in fiscal year 2006,
    APHIS scheduled 8 classes, but, as of April, had to cancel 3 for lack of
    students to train. In 2005, 60 percent of the 43 agriculture canine teams
    tested failed the USDA proficiency test, and APHIS officials told us
    proficiency has declined since the transfer. These proficiency tests,
    administered by APHIS, require the canine to respond correctly in a
    controlled, simulated work environment and ensure that canines are working
    effectively to catch potential prohibited agricultural material.

    Potential reasons for the deterioration in proficiency scores include CBP
    not following policy and procedures for the canine program and changes in
    the program management structure. The policy manual for the canine program
    states that canines should (1) receive about 4 hours of training per week
    and (2) have minimal down time in order to maintain their effectiveness.
    In general, canine specialists we interviewed expressed concern that the
    proficiency of their canines was deteriorating due to a lack of working
    time. That is, the dogs were sidelined while the specialist was assigned
    to other duties. Furthermore, based on results of our survey, we estimate
    that 46 percent of canine specialists were directed to perform duties
    outside their primary canine duties several times a week or every day.
    Additionally, an estimated 65 percent of canine specialists sometimes or
    never had funding for training supplies. Another major change to the
    canine program, following the transfer, was CBP's elimination of all
    former APHIS canine management positions. In some cases, agriculture
    canine teams now report to supervisory agriculture specialists, who may
    not have any canine experience. Formerly, canine teams reported to both
    the in-port management and regional canine program coordinators, who were
    experienced canine managers. The program coordinators monitored the canine
    teams' proficiency and ensured that teams maintained acceptable
    performance levels. According to CBP, the agency is considering developing
    a new management structure to improve the effectiveness of its canine
    program. However, little progress has been made to date.

    Financial Management Issues at CBP and APHIS Adversely Affect the AQI
    Program

    The law authorizes user fees to cover the costs of the AQI program.
    However, in the 3 years since the transfer, user fees have not been
    sufficient to cover AQI program costs.21 CBP believes that unless the
    current user-fee rates are increased, the program will continue to face
    annual shortfalls to the detriment of the AQI program. In addition, CBP
    underwent a financial management system conversion for fiscal year 2005
    and was unable to provide APHIS with actual cost information needed to
    evaluate the extent to which individual user fees cover program costs.
    Furthermore, APHIS did not always make regular transfers of funds to CBP
    as it had agreed to, causing CBP to use other funding sources or to reduce
    spending.

    User Fees Have Not Been Sufficient to Cover AQI Program Costs

    The Secretary of Agriculture has the discretion to prescribe user fees to
    cover the costs of the AQI program, but program costs have exceeded
    user-fee collections since the transfer of AQI inspection activities to
    CBP. Following the events of September 11, 2001, a sharp drop in the
    number of international airline passengers entering the United States
    caused a drop in AQI revenue (approximately 80 percent of total AQI
    user-fee collections come from fees on international airline passengers).
    Despite the drop in revenue, APHIS had to increase AQI inspection
    activities because of post-September 11 concerns about the threat of
    bioterrorism. According to USDA, agriculture specialists began inspecting
    a greater volume of cargo entering the United States and a greater variety
    of types of cargo than they had in prior years. Such operations are
    personnel-intensive and, therefore, costly. Consequently, when the
    transfer occurred in fiscal year 2003, AQI program costs exceeded revenues
    by almost $50 million. The shortfall increased to almost $100 million in
    the first full fiscal year after the transfer. Table 3 provides AQI
    user-fee collections and program costs for fiscal years 2001 through 2005.

    Table 3: AQI User-Fee Collections and Program Costs, Fiscal Years 2001
    through 2005

          Dollars in thousands
                                  Fiscal year
                                         2001     2002     2003     2004     2005
    User-fee collections          $255,141 $208,688 $227,823 $256,104 $331,636
    Total program costsa           222,707  250,810  279,150  355,521  357,403
    APHIS costs                    222,707  250,810  194,030  133,000  134,995
    CBP costs                            b        b  85,120c  222,521  222,408
    Total program costs in       ($32,434)  $42,122  $51,327  $99,417  $25,767
    excess of user-fee
    collections

    Sources: APHIS and CBP.

    Notes: Negative values shown in parentheses.

    aProgram costs as reported by the agencies.

    bNot applicable because CBP did not incur program costs until March 1,
    2003.

    cCBP costs for fiscal year 2003 began on March 1, 2003, when AQI
    inspections were transferred to CBP.

    For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the 2 full fiscal years since the
    transfer, total AQI costs exceeded user-fee collections by more than $125
    million. Consequently, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, APHIS used AQI
    user-fee collections from previous years, and CBP used another available

    appropriation to cover AQI costs.22 In October 2004, APHIS's Associate
    Deputy Administrator of Plant Protection and Quarantine wrote to the
    Executive Director of CBP's Office of Budget, noting, "We are in dire need
    of generating increased revenue for the AQI program; without an increase,
    the AQI account could run out of money on or about July 19, 2005." The
    letter also discussed a three-phase approach to ensuring fiscal solvency
    for the AQI program. The first phase consisted of establishing increased
    interim user-fee rates to cover costs of pay raises and inflation. The
    second phase involved removing the exemption from paying AQI user fees
    granted to passengers, cargo, and commercial vehicles at ports of entry
    along the U.S.-Canada border. The third phase included identifying all
    current and future needs of the AQI program, not just pay raises and
    inflation, to ensure that user fees fully cover AQI program costs. APHIS
    estimated that it would take up to 2 years to complete the entire Federal
    Register process and make new phase-three fees effective.

    On December 9, 2004, APHIS proceeded with the first phase by publishing an
    interim rule to raise user fees, effective January 1, 2005, through
    2010.23 However, because of the method APHIS used to estimate AQI program
    costs, this phase-one increase in user-fee revenues is not likely to be
    enough to cover program costs through fiscal year 2010. Specifically,
    APHIS used estimated fiscal year 2004 program costs-$327 million-plus 1.5
    percent of these costs for pay raises and inflation (or about $4.9
    million) to set the fiscal year 2005 user fees. However, APHIS's base
    calculation used CBP's estimated share of fiscal year 2004 user-fee
    funds-totaling $194 million-but not CBP's actual reported costs for fiscal
    year 2004-totaling $222.5 million. Thus, the difference between CBP's
    actual and estimated costs of $28.5 million was not included in the base
    calculation, resulting in less revenue for the program.24 CBP subsequently
    acknowledged that APHIS's decision not to include CBP's actual fiscal year
    2004 costs in the user-fee increase "has put CBP in the position where
    incoming APHIS user-fee revenues fall short of the expected cost of
    operating the [AQI] program." CBP finance officials also told us that
    because the costs of performing AQI activities was approximately $222
    million in each of the previous 2 years, it is unlikely that the projected
    $211 million to be transferred to CBP for fiscal year 2006 will be
    sufficient to cover program costs for fiscal year 2006 and beyond.

    Despite the shortfall between user-fee collections and program costs,
    APHIS has not completed the second or third phases of its proposal. As of
    May 2006, the Secretary of Agriculture had not made a decision whether to
    proceed with the proposal to lift the Canadian exemption.25 CBP officials
    told us that unless the Canadian exemption is lifted, the agency cannot
    hire the over 200 additional agriculture specialists that it has
    determined are needed to perform additional inspections on the northern
    border. APHIS officials told us that because lifting the Canadian
    exemption will affect estimates of future revenue used in calculating new
    user-fee rates, APHIS and CBP have not begun the third phase of revising
    user fees, which APHIS estimates will take approximately 2 years.

    CBP Could Not Provide APHIS with the Actual Cost Information

    CBP is required by the interagency agreement to establish a process in its
    financial management system to report expenditures by each AQI fee type,
    such as those paid by international passengers and commercial aircraft.
    APHIS uses this information to set user-fee rates and to audit user-fee
    collections. Although CBP provided detailed cost information by activity
    and user-fee type to APHIS for fiscal year 2004, CBP provided only
    estimated cost information for fiscal year 2005 because of a weakness in
    the design of the agency's new financial management system. In November
    2005, CBP conducted an internal review and determined that its reported
    costs of almost $208 million did not include about $15 million in
    additional salary costs for CBP agriculture supervisors. CBP officials
    told us that these costs were not included, in large part, because the
    agency adopted a new financial management system in fiscal year 2005 that
    allowed agriculture supervisors to record their time spent on AQI
    activities in a joint account that combined customs, immigration, and
    agricultural quarantine inspection activities. Thus, the costs related to
    only agricultural activities could not be segregated.

    A senior CBP finance official told us that CBP's Office of Finance could
    have provided rough estimates of costs by activity to APHIS but chose not
    to do so because they did not want to combine actual and estimated costs
    in the same document. Instead, CBP provided estimates of cost by user-fee
    type in January 2006. CBP did provide APHIS with the required accounting
    of obligations incurred by program office (e.g., Office of Training and
    Development, Applied Technology Division, Office of Asset Management, and
    Office of Chief Counsel) and budget codes (e.g., salary, overtime, and
    office supplies) for fiscal year 2005. However, a senior APHIS budget
    official told us that this cost information was not helpful to APHIS for
    reviewing the user-fee rates because they needed the breakdown of actual
    costs by user-fee type and because APHIS could not determine if the costs
    were accurate. Until CBP's financial management system can provide actual
    costs by activity and AQI user-fee type, APHIS will not be able to
    accurately determine the extent to which the user fees need to be revised.
    In addition, without such information, APHIS does not know whether
    inspections of international airline passengers and commercial aircraft,
    vessels, trucks, and railroad cars are being funded by revenue from the
    appropriate user fee.

    APHIS Did Not Always Make Regular Transfers of AQI Funds to CBP

    Although many of the AQI functions were transferred to CBP when the
    Department of Homeland Security was formed, APHIS continues to collect
    most user fees and transfers a portion of the collections to CBP on a
    periodic basis.26 For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, these transfers were
    often delayed and their amounts were sometimes less than expected, which
    adversely affected CBP agricultural inspection activities. In February
    2004, USDA and DHS agreed that APHIS would transfer one-fourth of the
    annual amount of estimated user-fee collections to CBP at the beginning of
    each quarter, or if the balance in the account was not sufficient to
    transfer the full quarterly amount in advance, APHIS could make monthly
    transfers. APHIS officials told us, however, that the agency chose to
    transfer funds to CBP every other month because the AQI account would not
    always have had sufficient funds to make quarterly transfers, and monthly
    transfers would have been administratively burdensome. Nevertheless, as
    table 4 shows, CBP frequently did not receive the transfers at the time
    specified or for the agreed upon amount in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
    Consequently, according to CBP officials, the agency's finance office had
    to use funding sources that they had planned to use for other purposes. In
    addition, CBP officials told us some ports had to reduce spending for
    supplies needed for inspection activities or delay hiring personnel or
    purchasing equipment. Then, for the last transfer of the fiscal year,
    APHIS did not notify CBP until August 2005 that the transfer would total
    $43.9 million, about $11 million more than expected (see table 4). As a
    result, CBP's budget plans had to be revised late in the year to
    accommodate this additional funding.

    Table 4: AQI User-Fee Funds Transferred from APHIS to CBP during Fiscal
    Years 2004 and 2005

        Dollars in thousands
    Month                      Agreed upon quarterly transfer Actual transfers
                                                        schedule
          Fiscal year 2004
    October 2003                                      $48,500               $0
    November 2003                                           0                0
    December 2003                                           0                0
    January 2004                                       48,500                0
    February 2004                                           0                0
    March 2004                                              0                0
    April 2004                                         48,500          118,000
    May 2004                                                0                0
    June 2004                                               0           29,500
    July 2004                                          48,500                0
    August 2004                                             0           29,500
    September 2004                                          0           17,000
    Total, fiscal year 2004                          $194,000         $194,000
          Fiscal year 2005
    October 2004                                      $48,814               $0
    November 2004                                           0           32,820
    December 2004                                           0                0
    January 2005                                       48,814                0
    February 2005                                           0           65,640
    March 2005                                              0                0
    April 2005                                         48,814           32,820
    Month                      Agreed upon quarterly transfer Actual transfers
                                                        schedule
    May 2005                                                0                0
    June 2005                                               0           32,820
    July 2005                                          48,814                0
    August 2005                                             0           43,900
    September 2005                                          0                0
    Total, fiscal year 2005                         $195,257a         $208,000

    Sources: APHIS and CBP budget offices.

    aTotals may not be exact due to rounding.

    In addition, technical difficulties in the fund transfer process also
    delayed the transfer of funds to CBP, and at one point during fiscal year
    2004, CBP did not have available funding from user fees for over 6 months.
    In this instance, APHIS transferred $88.5 million from October 2003 to
    February 2004 into a DHS Treasury account used for fiscal year 2003
    transfers. However, APHIS officials told us that the Office of Management
    and Budget had established a new Treasury account for CBP, and CBP
    officials did not advise APHIS of the change. Ultimately, APHIS withdrew
    the funds from the original account and transferred them as part of the
    April 2004 transfer, which totaled $118 million, but it took longer than 5
    months to resolve the issue. Similarly, two other fund transfers were
    delayed in fiscal year 2005 because APHIS did not comply with a Treasury
    rule requiring that agencies cite the relevant statutory authority when
    submitting a request to transfer funds to another agency. In one instance,
    APHIS ultimately transferred $65.6 million to CBP in February 2005 rather
    than transferring one payment in January 2005 for $32.8 million and
    another payment in February 2005 for $32.8 million.

    In October 2005, APHIS and CBP revised their agreement, which outlined the
    process the agencies would follow for transferring user fees and the
    financial reporting on the use of those funds. Under the revised
    agreement, APHIS, beginning in November 2005, is to make 6 bimonthly
    transfers to CBP in fiscal year 2006 totaling $211.1 million. Figure 3
    illustrates the process APHIS uses to collect user fees and transfer funds
    to CBP for fiscal year 2006.

    Figure 3: Collection and Transfer of User Fees from APHIS to CBP for
    Fiscal Year 2006

    aThe six AQI user fees are assessed on international air passengers,
    commercial aircraft, commercial vessels, commercial trucks, commercial
    truck decals, and commercial railroad cars.

    As shown in figure 3, APHIS was to transfer $35,186,667 to CBP in November
    2005. However, contrary to the new agreement, APHIS transferred
    $35,166,667-$20,000 less than CBP expected-on November 30, 2005. When
    asked why they did not receive the correct amount in accordance with the
    revised agreement, CBP officials agreed to investigate the discrepancy and
    found that their staff was working to correct the problem. APHIS officials
    told us that their budget office used a rounded amount of $211 million for
    the fiscal year to distribute the payments, resulting in the $20,000
    shortage for the distribution. APHIS officials told us that the budget
    office did not have a copy of the current distribution schedule from the
    revised agreement and did not know the exact amount of the required
    payment. They also stated that the budget office now has the agreement and
    will make the proper bimonthly transfers going forward. According to APHIS
    officials, the January 2006 transfer included an additional $20,000 to
    address the discrepancy we identified with the November transfer. APHIS
    and CBP believe that the revised agreement, which also provides for
    quarterly face-to-face meetings between the agencies, should improve
    communication, assure transparency in the transfer process, and prevent
    future problems in the transfer of funds.

    Conclusions

    The global marketplace and increased imports of agricultural products and
    international travelers into the United States have increased the number
    of pathways for the movement and introduction of foreign, invasive
    agricultural pests and diseases, such as avian influenza and
    foot-and-mouth disease. Maintaining the effectiveness of federal programs
    to prevent accidental or deliberate introduction of potentially
    destructive organisms is critical given the importance of agriculture to
    the U.S. economy. Accordingly, effective management of AQI programs is
    necessary to ensure that agriculture issues receive appropriate attention
    in the context of CBP's overall missions of detecting and preventing
    terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States and
    facilitating the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate trade and
    travel.

    Although the transfer of agricultural quarantine inspections from USDA's
    APHIS to DHS's CBP has resulted in some improvements as a result of the
    integration of agriculture issues into CBP's overall antiterrorism
    mission, significant coordination and management issues remain that leave
    U.S. agriculture vulnerable to the threat of foreign pests and disease.
    Because the Homeland Security Act of 2002 divided AQI responsibilities
    between USDA and DHS, the two departments must work more closely to
    address key coordination weaknesses, including enhancing communication
    between APHIS's AQI policy experts and CBP's agriculture specialists in
    the field, to ensure that critical inspection information reaches these
    frontline inspectors; to review policies and procedures for the
    agriculture canine program to improve the effectiveness of this key
    inspection tool; and to revise AQI user fees. Furthermore, both
    departments must work to address key management weaknesses in their
    respective areas of responsibility. Specifically, in light of the AQI
    program's expanded mission, DHS needs to develop and adopt meaningful
    performance measures to assess the AQI program's effectiveness at
    intercepting prohibited agricultural materials; implement a national
    risk-based staffing model to ensure that adequate numbers of agriculture
    specialists are staffed to areas of greatest vulnerability; and review its
    financial management systems to ensure financial accountability for funds
    allocated to the AQI program. It is also important that user fees be
    adjusted to meet the program's costs, as authorized (but not required) by
    law. Without decisive action, APHIS and CBP could be forced to cut back on
    agriculture inspections if costs continue to exceed program revenues. Such
    cutbacks could increase the potential for animal and plant pests and
    diseases to enter the United States and could disrupt trade if agriculture
    specialists were not available to inspect and clear passengers and cargo
    on a timely basis. By overcoming these challenges, the United States would
    be in a better position to protect agriculture from the economic harm
    posed by foreign pests and disease.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To ensure the effectiveness of CBP and APHIS agricultural quarantine
    inspection programs designed to protect U.S. agriculture from accidental
    or deliberate introduction of foreign pests and disease, we are making the
    following seven recommendations:

    We recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture
    work together to

    o adopt meaningful performance measures for assessing the AQI program's
    effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and disease on agricultural
    materials entering the country by all pathways-including commercial
    aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo-and posing a risk to U.S. agriculture;

    o establish a process to identify and assess the major risks posed by
    foreign pests and disease and develop and implement a national staffing
    model to ensure that agriculture staffing levels at each port are
    sufficient to meet those risks;

    o ensure that urgent agriculture alerts and other information essential to
    safeguarding U.S. agriculture are more effectively shared between the
    departments and transmitted to DHS agriculture specialists in the ports;

    o improve the effectiveness of the agriculture canine program by reviewing
    policies and procedures regarding training and staffing of agriculture
    canines and ensure that these policies and procedures are followed in the
    ports; and

    o revise the user fees to ensure that they cover the AQI program's costs.

    We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security undertake a full
    review of its financial management systems, policies, and procedures for
    the AQI program to ensure financial accountability for funds allocated for
    agricultural quarantine inspections.

    We recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture take steps to assess and
    remove barriers to the timely and accurate transfer of AQI user fees to
    DHS.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    We provided USDA and DHS with a draft of this report for their review and
    comment. We received written comments on the report and its
    recommendations from both departments.

    USDA commented that the report accurately captures some of the key
    operational challenges facing the two departments as they work to protect
    U.S. agriculture from unintentional and deliberate introduction of foreign
    agricultural pests and diseases. USDA generally agreed with the report's
    recommendations, adding that APHIS has already made some improvements to
    address our recommendations. For example, the department reported that
    APHIS has made improvements in the transfer of funds to CBP as a result of
    revisions to the interagency agreement with CBP. We had noted these
    changes in the report. In addition, USDA offered to work with DHS on our
    recommendations that DHS (1) adopt meaningful performance measures to
    assess AQI program's effectiveness and (2) establish a process to identify
    and assess the major risks posed by foreign pests and disease and develop
    and implement a national staffing model to address those risks. We
    modified the recommendations to involve USDA accordingly. USDA's written
    comments and our detailed response appear in appendix III. USDA also
    provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate,
    throughout the report.

    DHS commented that the report was balanced and accurate and agreed with
    its overall substance and findings. DHS generally agreed with our
    recommendations and indicated that CBP has begun the process of
    implementing, or has implemented parts of, our recommendations. For
    example, as we note in the report, CBP has begun the process of creating
    new performance measures for assessing the AQI program's effectiveness.
    DHS stated that the new measures are scheduled to be in place by the
    beginning of fiscal year 2007. Also, DHS commented that CBP has developed
    a prototype staffing model methodology that it intends to develop into a
    final model to monitor and track the evolving staffing needs and
    priorities of the agency. With regard to our recommendation that DHS
    review its financial management systems to ensure accountability for AQI
    funds, DHS stated that it believes actions taken over the course of our
    review have addressed our concerns. We continue to believe that DHS needs
    to monitor outcomes of these recent changes during the coming fiscal year
    to ensure that they provide necessary accountability for the use of AQI
    funds. DHS's written comments and our detailed response appear in appendix
    IV. DHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as
    appropriate, throughout the report.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland
    Security and Agriculture and interested congressional committees. We will
    also make copies available to others on request. In addition, this report
    will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841 or bertonid@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices
    of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
    page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report
    are listed in appendix V.

    Daniel Bertoni Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    Appendix I  Scope and Methodology

    To assess the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
    and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have changed the
    Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program since the transfer of
    responsibilities from USDA to DHS, we reviewed the 2003 Memorandum of
    Agreement between the United States Department of Homeland Security and
    the United States Department of Agriculture, dated February 28, 2003, and
    the associated appendixes governing how USDA and DHS are to coordinate
    inspection responsibilities. We also reviewed agency documentation,
    including training materials for newly hired Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP) officers, information on databases used by CBP agricultural
    specialists to target agriculture inspections, joint-agency reports on
    port compliance with agricultural inspection policy, and information
    related to CBP's establishment and utilization of new agriculture liaison
    positions. In addition, we interviewed key program officials at USDA's
    Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and CBP to discuss
    changes to the AQI program, including officials responsible for training,
    implementing inspection targeting initiatives, conducting port reviews,
    and overseeing communication of agricultural issues within CBP.

    To assess how the departments have managed and coordinated their
    agriculture inspection responsibilities, we reviewed the interagency
    memorandum of agreement between DHS and USDA and its associated
    appendixes. We also reviewed agency documentation, including DHS's
    Performance and Accountability Reports, APHIS's model for staffing
    agriculture specialists at ports, data from APHIS's Work Accomplishment
    Data System for fiscal years 2000 through 2005, agency e-mails
    communicating agriculture alerts and policy information, proposals for
    joint-agency special operations at ports, and agency policy governing
    agriculture inspection training and the agriculture canine program. We
    performed a reliability assessment of the data we analyzed for fiscal
    years 2000 through 2005 and determined that the data were sufficiently
    reliable for the purposes of this report. We also visited all three
    training centers for port of entry staff that conduct agricultural
    training-the USDA Professional Development Center, in Frederick, Maryland;
    the USDA National Detector Dog Training Center in Orlando, Florida; and
    the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia-to
    observe training and interview current students, instructors, and staff.
    In addition, we interviewed key program officials at CBP and APHIS with
    knowledge of AQI management issues, such as performance measures,
    staffing, interagency coordination, training, and the agriculture canine
    program.

    Furthermore, to ascertain agricultural specialists' assessment of the
    agriculture quarantine inspection program since the transfer of inspection
    responsibilities from USDA to DHS, we drew a stratified random probability
    sample of 831 agriculture specialists from the approximately 1,800
    specialists (current as of Oct. 14, 2005) in the Department of Homeland
    Security's Customs and Border Protection. All canine specialists were
    placed in one stratum; other strata were defined by the number of
    specialists at the respective ports. We conducted a Web-based survey of
    all specialists in the sample. Each sampled specialist was subsequently
    weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all specialists in
    the population. We received a response rate of 76 percent. We chose to
    sample agriculture specialists who had recently been hired by CBP, as well
    as former APHIS employees who had been transferred to CBP, including
    agriculture supervisors, to get their various perspectives on the AQI
    program.

    The survey contained 31 questions that asked for opinions and assessments
    of (1) agriculture inspection training, (2) agriculture inspection duties,
    (3) communication and information sharing within CBP and between other
    agencies, and (4) changes in the number of agriculture inspections and
    interceptions since the transfer. In addition, the survey included
    questions specifically for canine handlers, agriculture supervisors, and
    former APHIS employees. In developing the questionnaire, we met with CBP
    and APHIS officials to gain a thorough understanding of the AQI program.
    We also shared a draft copy of the questionnaire with CBP officials, who
    provided us with comments, including technical corrections. We then
    pretested the questionnaire with CBP agriculture specialists at ports of
    entry in Georgia, Maryland, Texas, and Washington state. During these
    pretests, we asked the officials to complete the Web-based survey as we
    observed the process. After completing the survey, we interviewed the
    respondents to ensure that (1) questions were clear and unambiguous, (2)
    the terms we used were precise, (3) the questionnaire did not place an
    undue burden on CBP agriculture specialists completing it, and (4) the
    questionnaire was independent and unbiased. On the basis of the feedback
    from the pretests, we modified the questions, as appropriate.

    The questionnaire was posted on GAO's survey Web site. When the survey was
    activated, the officials who had been selected to participate were
    informed of its availability with an e-mail message that contained a
    unique user name and password. This allowed respondents to log on and fill
    out a questionnaire but did not allow respondents access to the
    questionnaires of others. The survey was available from November 17, 2005,
    until January 9, 2006. Results of the survey to CBP agriculture
    specialists are summarized in appendix II.

    Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections,
    our sample is only one of a large number of samples we might have drawn.
    Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our
    confidence in the precision of our particular sample's results as 95
    percent confidence intervals (e.g., plus or minus 7 percentage points).
    These are intervals that would contain the actual population values for 95
    percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent
    confident that each of the confidence intervals in this report from our
    survey of agriculture specialists will include the true values in the
    study population. All percentage estimates from the survey of agriculture
    specialists have margins of error (that is, confidence interval widths) of
    plus or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless otherwise noted. All
    numerical estimates other than percentages (e.g., means) have margins of
    error not exceeding plus or minus 15 percent of the value of those
    estimates, unless otherwise noted.

    To determine how funding for agriculture inspections has been managed
    since the transfer from USDA to DHS, we reviewed the interagency
    memorandum of agreement between DHS and USDA-specifically the appendix,
    Article 5: Transfer of Funds, originally signed on February 9, 2004, and
    revised on October 5, 2005. Further, we compared the amount of revenue
    generated from the user fees with program costs reported by CBP and APHIS
    on agriculture inspections in fiscal years 2001 through 2005. We also
    reviewed relevant agency documentation, including proposals for increasing
    user-fee collections, budget classification handbooks, cost analysis
    worksheets, and user-fee collection and expense analyses. In addition, we
    reviewed how funds were transferred between APHIS and CBP and the impact
    of these transfers on their operations. Lastly, we interviewed senior CBP
    and APHIS financial management officials concerning AQI user-fee
    collections, cost management, and the transfer of funds from APHIS to CBP.

    We conducted our review from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II  Results of GAO Survey of CBP Agricultural Specialists

    This appendix provides the results from our Web-based survey of CBP
    agriculture specialists. (App. I contains details of our survey
    methodology.) We selected a statistical sample of 831 specialists. Within
    this population, we asked questions of, and analyzed data for, three
    groups: (1) former APHIS inspectors-also referred to as plant protection
    and quarantine (PPQ) officers in the survey; (2) newly hired CBP
    agriculture specialists; and (3) canine agriculture specialists. The
    survey contained 31 questions about the experiences and opinions of the
    specialists. We omitted questions 3 and 23, which were used to help
    respondents navigate the survey. We received 628 completed surveys-an
    overall response rate of 76 percent. We indicate the number of respondents
    below each question because not every respondent answered every question.
    We also rounded the responses to the nearest whole percent, and,
    therefore, totals may not add to 100 percent.

    Part 1: Demographic Information

    1. What is your job title at CBP?

    Title                                                              Percent
    Agriculture Specialist                                                  80
    Agriculture Specialist/ Canine Handler                                   5
    Supervisory Agriculture Specialist                                      13
    Other                                                                    2

    n=626

    2. For which of the following pathways did you conduct agricultural
    inspections during the past year? (Please check all that apply.)

    Pathway                                                            Percent
    Did not conduct inspections                                              1
    Aircraft                                                                55
    Air passenger                                                           73
    Air cargo                                                               55
    Maritime ship                                                           34
    Maritime passenger                                                      18
    Maritime cargo                                                          32
    Pedestrian                                                              18
    Vehicles                                                                23
    Truck                                                                   22
    Bus                                                                     20
    USPS mail                                                               14
    Express mail                                                            16
    Inland inspection                                                        5
    Rail cargo                                                              17
    Rail passenger                                                           2
    Other                                                                    5

    n=624

    Part 2: Information from Former USDA PPQ Officers

    4. When did you begin working as a USDA PPQ Officer (not as an agriculture
    technician or aide)?

    Year                                                               Percent
    1960-1969                                                                1
    1970-1979                                                                5
    1980-1989                                                               22
    1990-1999                                                               29
    2000-2003                                                               44

    n=442

    5. During your first year working as a USDA PPQ Officer, about how many
    weeks did you spend in on-the-job (in port) training? (Please include such
    things as shadowing, observation, and coaching. Do not include time spent
    at the Professional Development Center. If you spent less than one week,
    please enter 1.)

    Type of training               Mean number of weeks  Number of respondents
    Agriculture inspections                          16                    443
    Not agriculture inspections                       3                    446

    6. Do you believe you received sufficient training (on-the-job and at the
    Professional Development Center) to enable you to perform your agriculture
    inspection duties?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Definitely yes                                                          58
    Probably yes                                                            32
    Uncertain                                                                1
    Probably not                                                             4
    Definitely not                                                           3
    No answer                                                                1

    n=448

    7. Are you, personally, doing more, about the same number, or fewer
    agriculture inspections compared to what you were doing before being
    transferred to CBP?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Many more                                                               10
    Somewhat more                                                           12
    About the same                                                          15
    Somewhat fewer                                                          24
    Many fewer                                                              35
    Not applicable                                                           5
    No answer                                                                0

    n=448

    8. Are you, personally, doing more, about the same number, or fewer
    agriculture interceptions compared to what you were doing before being
    transferred to CBP?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Many more                                                                5
    Somewhat more                                                            7
    About the same                                                          17
    Somewhat fewer                                                          19
    Many fewer                                                              41
    Not applicable                                                           9
    No answer                                                                1

    n=448

    9. Which of the following inspection activities did you regularly perform
    as a PPQ Officer prior to being transferred to CBP, and which do you
    regularly perform now? (Please check all that apply.)

    Inspection       Regularly         Not   Regularly         Not   Number of
    activity      performed as   regularly   performed   regularly respondents
                      PPQ Officer   performed      as PPQ   performed
                      but not now      as PPQ Officer and      as PPQ
                         as a CBP Officer but         CBP Officer and
                      Agriculture    now as a Agriculture         CBP
                       Specialist         CBP  Specialist Agriculture
                                  Agriculture              Specialist
                        (percent)  Specialist   (percent)
                                                            (percent)
                                    (percent)
    Boarding                59           3          32           5         405
    aircraft
    Boarding                40           4          27          30         350
    ships
    Compliance              43           3          22          32         363
    agreements
    Compliance              52           3          29          16         381
    checks
    Disinfection            49           1          41           9         380
    Fumigation              72           0           1          27         368
    Roving                  36           9          39          17         349
    Safeguarding            40           3          53           4         404
    Other                   57          14          25           4         164

    Part 3: Information from CBP Agriculture Specialists Hired After March 1,
    2003.

    10. When did you begin working as a CBP Agriculture Specialist?

    Year                                                               Percent
    2003                                                                     3
    2004                                                                    30
    2005                                                                    66

    n=173

    11. During your first year working as a CBP Agriculture Specialist, about
    how many weeks did you spend in on-the-job (in port) training? (Please
    include such things as shadowing, observation, and coaching. Do not
    include time spent at the Professional Development Center. If you spent
    less than one week, please enter 1.)

    Type of training        Began in 2003 or 2004 (mean number   Began in 2005
                                                        of weeks)
                                                                  (mean number of
                                                                           weeks)
    Agriculture inspections                                14a             12a
    Not agriculture                                          6               3
    inspections

    n=170 aThe sampling margins of error of these estimates do not exceed plus
    or minus 20 percent of the value of the estimates.

    12. Do you believe you received sufficient training (on-the-job and at the
    Professional Development Center) to enable you to perform your agriculture
    inspection duties?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Definitely yes                                                          36
    Probably yes                                                            39
    Uncertain                                                               11
    Probably not                                                             8
    Definitely not                                                           5
    No answer                                                                2

    n=174

    Part 4: Your Work at CBP

    13. During the past 6 months about what percentage of your time did you
    spend on agriculture and nonagriculture CBP duties? (Please enter
    percentages in boxes. If none, enter 0. Percentage total should be 100.)

    Duties                                                                Mean
    Agriculture inspections and associated activities                       62
    Customs and Immigration inspections and associated activities           14
    Work not related to inspections (e.g., administrative work, training)   21
    Work other than that listed above                                       3a

    n=615

    aThe sampling margins of error of this estimate is plus or minus 22
    percent of the value of the estimate.

    14. For each pay period, do you provide the number of hours you worked on
    agriculture inspection and the number of hours you worked on customs and
    immigration inspection to your supervisor or timekeeper?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Yes                                                                      9
    No                                                                      81
    No answer                                                               10

    n=626

    15. Are the following supplies readily available to you? (Please check one
    in each row. If you do not use a supply, please check `Do not Use.')

    Percent
    Supplies              Response
                               Always  Most of  Some of Never or Do not No answer
                                      the time the time   almost    use
                                                           never
    Collection vials for        43       29       18        6      3         1
    pest samples
    Forms for submitting        52       25       15        4      3         1
    pest samples
    Garbage bags for            43       28       17        8      4         1
    intercepted material
    Latex gloves                48       29       18        3      2         1

    n=626

    16. Do you have easy access to USDA regulatory manuals during inspections?
    (Please check one in each row.)

    Percent
    Type of manual        Response
                               Always  Most of Some of Never or        Not     No
                                      the time     the   almost applicable answer
                                                  time    never
    Online USDA                 50       23      16        9          2      1
    regulatory manuals
    Current (updated)           20       19      18       32          7      4
    printed USDA
    regulatory manuals

    n=626

    17. Do you have enough time to look for pests in agriculture materials
    intercepted from passengers?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Always                                                                  10
    Most of the time                                                        27
    Some of the time                                                        31
    Never or almost never                                                   15
    Not applicable                                                          15
    No answer                                                                2

    n=626

    18. How easy or difficult is it for you to get samples to a pest
    identifier?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Very easy                                                               29
    Somewhat easy                                                           31
    Neither easy nor difficult                                              14
    Somewhat difficult                                                      12
    Very difficult                                                           6
    Not applicable                                                           4
    No answer                                                                3

    n=626

    19. When you send a sample to a pest identifier, about how long does it
    usually take to get the results?

    Percent
    Length of time                         Type of sample
                                                          Urgent        Nonurgent
    One day or less                                        41                5
    2 to 3 days                                            24                9
    4 days to 1 week                                        6                8
    One week to 1 month                                     3               25
    More than 1 month                                       4               36
    Not applicable                                         11                6
    No answer                                              12               13

    n=626

    20. How are the following types of information delivered to you? If you do
    not receive a type of information on a regular basis, please indicate
    that. (Please check all that apply.)

    Type of     Method of
    information delivery
                      E-mail    E-mail    Muster Other type of       Not   Number of
                    from CBP      from (percent) communication  received respondents
                   (percent)   another                              on a
                                agency               (percent)   regular
                             (percent)                             basis
                                                               (percent)
    Urgent             71        26        43            11        12         604
    agriculture
    alerts
    Pest alerts        65        31        35            10        13         599
    Regulatory         53        33        23            11        20         590
    changes
    Updated            40        36         7             9        29         524
    pages for
    regulatory
    manual

    21. Is the information delivered to you in a timely manner? (Please check
    one in each row.)

    Percent
    Type of information     Response
                                 Always  Most of  Some of Never or  Do not     No
                                        the time the time   almost receive answer
                                                             never
    Urgent agriculture            21       41       25        7       3      2
    alerts
    Pest alerts                   19       42       25        8       4      2
    Agriculture regulatory        17       38       26       12       5      2
    changes
    Updated pages for             18       31       17       18      14      2
    agriculture regulatory
    manual

    n=626

    22. During the past year, about how many hours per month did you spend
    compiling and entering data into the databases listed below? (Please check
    one in each row.)

    Percent
    Database Hours per month
                           Zero 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 Greater than No answer
                                                                     25
    AQIM                  39  27   11     3     3     1            6        11
    EAN                   47  22    8     1     2     0            2        18
    PPQ280                43  24    7     2     3     1            5        16
    WADS                  42  24    7     6     2     2            4        13

    n=626

    Part 5: Questions for Canine Handlers

    24. Are the following resources readily available to you? (Please check
    one in each row.)

    Percent
    Resources               Response
                                 Always Usually Sometimes Never        Not     No
                                                                applicable answer
    Funding for veterinary        45      33        13     0          1      8
    visits
    Funding for supplies           6      21        58     7          0      8
    (for example, training
    aids)
    Funding for kennel            60      19         6     0          6      9
    space
    Space for storage of          31      22        33     4          0      9
    supplies and practice
    materials
    Refrigerator(s) for           52      21        15     3          0      9
    perishable training
    materials

    n=62

    25. During the past year, have there been any instances when you thought
    it would be helpful to contact the National Detector Dog Training Center,
    but you were told by CBP management not to contact them?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Yes                                                                     65
    No                                                                      18
    Uncertain                                                                4
    No answer                                                               12

    n=62

    26. Does CBP management allow you enough time each month to schedule
    training with your dog?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Always                                                                  51
    Most of the time                                                        28
    Some of the time                                                        12
    Never or almost never                                                    1
    Not applicable                                                           0
    No answer                                                                8

    n=62

    27. During the past year, about how frequently have you been directed to
    perform duties outside your primary mission as a Canine Handler?

    Frequency                                                          Percent
    Every day                                                               22
    Several times a week                                                    24
    Once a week                                                              3
    Two to three times a month                                              21
    Once a month                                                             4
    Less than once a month                                                   7
    Never or almost never                                                    7
    No answer                                                               11

    n=62

    Part 6: Your Views and Opinions about Working at CBP

    28. Based on you own experiences, how would you describe the work-related
    communication between Agriculture Specialists and the others listed below?
    (Please check one in each row.)

    Percent
    Other agency personnel         Response
                                      Excellent Good Fair Poor No basis No answer

                                                               to judge
    Agriculture specialists at             8   28   23   29       11         1
    other ports
    CBP officers at your port              9   41   31   19        0         0
    CBP supervisors                        8   30   34   26        0         1
    CBP chiefs and port directors          7   20   33   37        2         1
    USDA PPQ and APHIS                    10   31   27   26        5         1
    USDA Veterinary Services              12   29   26   18       11         3
    USDA Food Safety and                   3   15   17   26       33         6
    Inspection Services
    USDA meat inspectors                   0    9    9   23       39        20
    Fish and Wildlife Services            11   34   21   20       10         3
    Centers for Disease Control            2    9   12   23       48         6
    Food and Drug Administration           4   17   19   21       32         7
    Public Health Service                  3   11   13   24       41         7

    n=626

    29. In your experience, does your port have enough Agriculture Specialists
    to carry out agriculture duties?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Definitely yes                                                          12
    Probably yes                                                            16
    Uncertain                                                                8
    Probably not                                                            21
    Definitely not                                                          42
    No answer                                                                1

    n=626

    30. How prepared do you feel for your duties as an Agriculture Specialist?

    Response                                                           Percent
    Very well prepared                                                      53
    Somewhat prepared                                                       33
    Neither prepared or unprepared                                           5
    Somewhat unprepared                                                      4
    Very unprepared                                                          3
    No answer                                                                2

    n=626

    31. In general, do you feel that your work as a CBP Agriculture Specialist
    is respected by CBP Officers and Management?

    Percent
    Other CBP          Response
    personnel         Definitely Probably Uncertain Probably Definitely     No
                                yes      yes                not        not answer
    CBP Officers               7       18        14       26         35      0
    CBP Management             6       14        15       22         42      1

    n=626

    Appendix III  Comments from the Department of Agriculture

    GAO Comments

    1.We agree with USDA's suggestion regarding two of our recommendations. We
    now recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security
    work together to (1) adopt meaningful performance measures for assessing
    the AQI program's effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and disease
    and (2) establish a process to identify and assess the major risks posed
    by foreign pests and disease and develop and implement a national staffing
    model to meet those risks.

    2.USDA noted that revisions to APHIS's agreement with CBP should address
    the concerns we raised in the report regarding the timely and accurate
    transfer of AQI funds to CBP. USDA states that APHIS made the first three
    transfers of fiscal year 2006 on time. We discuss these positive steps in
    our report and note a problem with one of APHIS's transfers. As USDA
    carries out its three-phase approach to revising user fees, and DHS works
    to advance proposed consolidation of customs, immigration, and agriculture
    user fees (see app. IV), we believe that USDA must ensure that it follows
    the revised agreement to ensure timely and accurate transfer of AQI user
    fees to DHS.

    Appendix IV  Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    GAO Comments

    1.We continue to believe that the title of the report reflects our
    conclusion that U.S. agriculture is vulnerable to the unintentional or
    deliberate introduction of foreign pests and diseases as a result of the
    management and coordination issues we raise in the report. Until DHS
    adopts and tracks meaningful performance measures to assess the
    effectiveness of the AQI program, DHS does not know the effectiveness of
    the AQI program at performing its mission. Further, until DHS implements a
    national risk-based staffing model for agriculture specialists, it does
    not know whether adequate numbers of agriculture specialists are staffed
    to ports of entry most vulnerable to the introduction of foreign pests and
    disease.

    2.We acknowledge, in the report, the steps that CBP has taken to improve
    communication and information sharing between headquarters and field
    offices. However, given the problems with information sharing that we
    identified in our survey of agriculture specialists, we continue to
    believe that additional actions are warranted to ensure that urgent
    agriculture alerts and other information are transmitted through the CBP
    chain of command to the agriculture specialists.

    3.We acknowledge the operational challenges facing CBP as a result of
    having to manage three different sets of user fees (i.e., agriculture,
    customs, and immigration) to support inspection functions at U.S. ports of
    entry. For example, we identified in the report some of the timekeeping
    issues surrounding the need to appropriately separate time spent on
    agriculture, customs, and immigration functions. We understand that CBP
    concluded that to adequately address these challenges, congressional
    action may be required to consolidate the different user fees and their
    associated spending, fee setting, and costs recovery authorities and
    exemptions.

    Appendix  GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Daniel Bertoni, (202) 512-3841 or bertonid@gao.gov

    In addition to the contact named above, Maria Cristina Gobin (Assistant
    Director), Terrance N. Horner Jr., Jeff Isaacs, Lynn Musser, Omari Norman,
    Minette Richardson, Steve Rossman, Sidney Schwartz, Robyn Trotter, and
    Diana Zinkl made key contributions to this report. Other contributors
    included Nancy Crothers, Casey Keplinger, and Kim Raheb.

    (360553)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-644.

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Daniel Bertoni at (202) 512-3841 or
    bertonid@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-644, a report to congressional requesters

    May 2006

    HOMELAND SECURITY

    Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S.
    Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease

    transparent illustrator graphic

    U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in annual economic activity,
    but concerns exist about the sector's vulnerability to a natural or
    deliberate introduction of foreign livestock, poultry, and crop pests and
    disease. Under the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program,
    international passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to
    seize prohibited material and intercept foreign agricultural pests. The
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred AQI inspections from the U.S.
    Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) and left certain other AQI responsibilities at USDA. GAO examined
    (1) the extent to which USDA and DHS have changed the inspection program
    since the transfer, (2) how the agencies have managed and coordinated
    their responsibilities, and (3) how funding for agricultural inspections
    has been managed since the transfer.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS identify and assess the major
    risks posed by foreign pests and disease and develop and implement a
    national staffing model to ensure that staff levels are sufficient to meet
    those risks and that DHS and USDA analyze the full cost of performing AQI
    inspections and ensure that user fees cover the program's costs. USDA and
    DHS generally agreed with the report's recommendations.

    After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies' roles
    and responsibilities were modified to help protect agriculture. In March
    2003, more than 1,800 agriculture specialists within USDA's Animal and
    Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) became DHS Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) employees, while USDA retained responsibility for AQI
    activities such as setting inspection policy, providing training, and
    collecting user fees. Since the transfer, the agencies have expanded
    training on agriculture issues for CBP officers and agriculture
    specialists. CBP and APHIS also have taken steps to enable agriculture
    specialists to better target shipments and passengers for inspections and
    established a process to assess how CBP agriculture specialists are
    implementing AQI policy. Finally, CBP created a new agriculture liaison
    position in each of its district field offices to advise regional
    directors on agricultural issues.

    While these are positive steps, the agencies face management and
    coordination problems that increase the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture
    to foreign pests and disease. CBP has not developed sufficient performance
    measures that take into account the agency's expanded mission or consider
    all pathways by which prohibited agricultural items or foreign pests may
    enter the country. Specifically, although CBP's measures focus on two
    pathways that pose a risk to U.S. agriculture, they do not consider other
    key pathways such as commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo. Also,
    although CBP has hired more than 630 specialists since the transfer, it
    has not yet developed or used a risk-based staffing model to ensure that
    adequate numbers of agriculture specialists are staffed to areas of
    greatest vulnerability. CBP also has not used available inspection and
    interception data to evaluate the performance of the AQI program. CBP and
    APHIS also continue to experience difficulty in sharing information such
    as key policy changes and urgent inspection alerts, and CBP has allowed
    the number and proficiency of agriculture canine units to decline.

    Although APHIS is legally authorized (though not required) to charge AQI
    user fees to cover program costs, we found that the agencies have not
    taken the necessary steps to ensure that user fees cover AQI costs.
    Consequently, the agencies had to use other authorized funding sources to
    pay for the program. Also, because of weaknesses in the design of CBP's
    new financial management system, CBP was unable to provide APHIS with
    information on the actual costs of the AQI program by user-fee type-for
    example, fees paid by international air passengers. APHIS uses this
    information to set future user-fee rates. Finally, in fiscal years 2004
    and 2005, APHIS did not transfer AQI funds to CBP as agreed to by both
    agencies, causing some ports of entry to reduce spending on inspection
    activities in fiscal year 2005.
    *** End of document. ***