Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters (15-MAY-06,
GAO-06-643).
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in
U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all
levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate.
GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal
government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. Due to widespread congressional interest, this review was
performed under the Comptroller General's authority. It examined
(1) the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises
reflected the military assistance that might be required during a
catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, (2) the military
support provided in response to Katrina and factors that affected
that response, and (3) the actions the military is taking to
address lessons learned from Katrina and to prepare for the next
catastrophe.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-643
ACCNO: A53941
TITLE: Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to
Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters
DATE: 05/15/2006
SUBJECT: Disaster planning
Disaster recovery
Disaster recovery plans
Emergency preparedness
Hurricane Katrina
Lessons learned
Military forces
National Guard
National response plan
Natural disasters
Strategic planning
National Response Plan
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GAO-06-643
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to the Congressional Committees
GAO
May 2006
HURRICANE KATRINA
Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters
GAO-06-643
HURRICANE KATRINA
Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters
What GAO Found
The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved
many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts but many lessons are
emerging. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not
incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the
military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the
government's National Response Plan made little distinction between the
military response to a smaller regional disaster and its response to a
catastrophic natural disaster. In addition, DOD's emergency response plan
for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters
lacked adequate detail. The plan did not: account for the full range of
assistance that might be provided by DOD, divide tasks between the
National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response time
frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not
account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a
catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover,
plans had not been tested with a robust exercise program. None of the
exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina called for a major
deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. As
a result, a lack of understanding exists within the military and among
federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and
capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a catastrophe, the
timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the
active-duty and National Guard forces.
Despite the lack of planning, the military took proactive steps and
responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal
personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD relied
heavily on the Guard during the initial response. Active duty forces were
alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical,
and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the
magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground
units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall.
Several factors affected the military's ability to gain situational
awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of
timely damage assessments, communications difficulties, force integration
problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, and unexpected
logistics responsibilities. Without detailed plans to address these
factors, DOD and the federal government risk being unprepared for the next
catastrophe.
DOD is examining the lessons learned from its own reviews and those of the
White House and the Congress, and it is beginning to take actions to
address the lessons and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early
to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some
issues identified after Katrina such as damage assessments are
long-standing problems that were identified by GAO after Hurricane Andrew
in 1992. They will be difficult to address because they are complex and
cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require
sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD, and across
the government.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 9
Pre-Katrina Preparations Did Not Fully Address the Military Capabilities
Needed during a Catastrophic Natural Disaster 14
The Military's Response to Hurricane Katrina was Massive but Faced Several
Challenges 20
DOD Has Begun Taking Actions to Address Catastrophic Disaster Response
Problems, Some of Which are Complex and Longstanding 31
Conclusions 34
Recommendations for Executive Action 35
Matter for Congressional Consideration 36
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 42
Office of The Secretary Of Defense 42
DOD Agencies 42
Commands 42
Military Services 43
Task Forces 44
National Guard 44
Appendix II NRP Emergency Support Function Responsibilities Appendix III
Comments From the Department of Defense Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments Related GAO Products 67
Preparedness 67
Federal Response 67
Command and Control 67
Recovery 67
Page i GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Figure
Figure 1: Buildup of Military Forces Supporting Hurricane Katrina
Operations
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency NRP
National Response Plan
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
May 15, 2006
Congressional Committees
When Hurricane Katrina made its final landfall along the
Louisiana/Mississippi border on August 29, 2005, it quickly became one of
the largest natural disasters in the history of the United States. Despite
a massive deployment of resources and support from both military and
civilian agencies, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate.
As local, state, and federal governments responded in the days following
Katrina, confusion surfaced as to what responsibilities the military1 has
and what capabilities it would provide in planning and responding to a
catastrophic event. As recovery operations continue, the nation is quickly
approaching the 2006 hurricane season, and faces other natural and manmade
threats that could result in a catastrophe at any instant.
About 9 months prior to Katrina's landfall, the National Response Plan
(NRP) was issued to frame the federal response to domestic emergencies
ranging from smaller, regional disasters to incidents of national
significance. The plan generally calls for a reactive federal response
following specific state requests for assistance. However, the NRP also
contains a catastrophic incident annex that calls for a proactive federal
response when catastrophes overwhelm local and state responders. The NRP
generally assigns the Department of Defense (DOD) a supporting role in
disaster response, but even in this role, DOD has specific planning
responsibilities. For example, the NRP requires federal agencies to
incorporate the accelerated response requirements of the NRP's
catastrophic incident annex into their own emergency response plans.
Within DOD, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was
issued in June 2005, envisions a greater reliance on National Guard and
Reserve forces for homeland missions. The military response to domestic
disasters typically varies depending on the severity of an event. During
smaller disasters, an affected state's National Guard may provide a
sufficient response but larger disasters and catastrophes that overwhelm
the state may require assistance from out-of-state National Guard or
1
Throughout this report, we use the term military to refer to the combined
efforts of the National Guard and the federal military force. We use the
term DOD to distinguish between the federal military response commanded by
Northern Command and the National Guard response. During Katrina, DOD's
federal military response consisted of active-duty military personnel and
reservists who volunteered to be part of the federal response.
Page 1 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
federal troops. For Katrina, the response was heavily reliant on the
National Guard, which is consistent with DOD's Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support. This represents a departure from past
catastrophes when active-duty forces played a larger role in the response.
During disaster response missions, National Guard troops typically operate
under the control of the state governors. However, the National Guard
Bureau has responsibility for formulating, developing, and coordinating
policies, programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National Guard
personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between the
United States Army, the United States Air Force, and the National Guard in
U.S. states and territories. Although the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau does not have operational control of National Guard forces in the
states and territories, he has overall responsibility for National Guard
Military Support to Civil Authorities programs. The United States Northern
Command also has a support to civil authorities mission. Because of this
mission, Northern Command was responsible for commanding the federal
military response to Hurricane Katrina.
Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews related to disaster
preparedness and response. Our past work has shown that both DOD and
National Guard forces play key roles in the wake of catastrophic
disasters.2 Our recent Katrina testimony and statement,3 along with White
House and congressional reports,4 have highlighted deficiencies in the
NRP's implementation and thoroughness. For example, the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security did not implement the NRP's Catastrophic
Incident Annex during Katrina. In addition, the plan's catastrophic
incident supplement, which was supposed to have listed specific proactive
actions agencies would take in response to a
2 GAO, Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki
and Typhoon Omar, GAO/NSIAD-93-180 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 18, 1993).
3
GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D. C.: Mar.
8, 2006) and GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on
GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 1,
2006).
4
White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,
(Feb. 23, 2006), House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Feb. 15, 2006), and Senate,
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, (May 2006).
Results in Brief
catastrophe, had not been approved during the 9 months between the plan's
issuance and Katrina's landfall.
We currently have a large body of ongoing work to address preparation,
response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. Due to the widespread congressional interest in these subjects,
our work is being completed under the Comptroller General's authority.
This report presents the results of our review of the military response to
Hurricane Katrina, which examined (1) the extent to which pre-Katrina
plans and training exercises reflected the military assistance that might
be required during a catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, (2) the
support that the military provided in responding to Katrina and factors
that affected that response, and (3) the actions the military is taking to
address lessons learned from Katrina and to prepare for the next
catastrophic event.
To address our first two objectives, we traveled to the affected areas,
interviewed officials who led the response efforts, and collected,
compared, and analyzed data from numerous military organizations that
provided support to the Hurricane Katrina response operations. We also
reviewed the military responses to prior catastrophes and analyzed
disaster planning documents and exercise reports. To determine the actions
that the military is taking to address lessons learned from Katrina and to
prepare for the next catastrophic event, we collected and analyzed after
action and lessons learned documents from a wide range of military and
civilian organizations, and we interviewed responsible officials and
reviewed available documentation on DOD's actions to address lessons
learned and prepare for the next catastrophic event. A detailed discussion
of our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We determined the
reliability of the military response data we obtained by interviewing DOD
officials knowledgeable about the data and corroborating the information
with information gathered from other DOD and military service
organizations. We conducted our review from September 2005 through April
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and training exercises
involving the military did not sufficiently incorporate lessons learned
from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities that
could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. Pre-Katrina
plans involving the military were inadequate at multiple levels: (1) at
the federal government level, through the NRP (2) at the DOD level, and
(3) at the
Page 3 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
state level through National Guard plans. First, the NRP made little
distinction between the military response to smaller, regional disasters
and the military response to large-scale, catastrophic, natural disasters
even though past disasters had shown that the military tends to play a
much larger role in catastrophes. Second, DOD, in its own emergency
response plan, did not fully address the military capabilities that could
be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. DOD has
procedures to develop specific detailed operations and contingency plans
for its missions, but opted to use its least detailed type of plan, a
functional plan, as its emergency response plan to provide defense
assistance to civil authorities during disasters or catastrophes. This
plan was adequate for most disasters, but did not account for the full
range of tasks and missions the military could be expected to provide in
the event of a catastrophe, despite the NRP requirement that agencies
incorporate the accelerated response requirements of the NRP's
catastrophic incident annex into their emergency response plans. Another
significant shortfall of DOD's pre-Katrina planning was that the
department did not fully address the division of tasks between National
Guard resources under the governors' control and federal resources under
Presidential control, nor did it establish time frames for the response.
Third, Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were not
synchronized with DOD plans and were inadequate for a catastrophe of
Katrina's magnitude. For example, the plans did not adequately account for
the outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. In
addition, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, who has overall
responsibility for military support to civil authorities programs in the
National Guard, had not coordinated in advance with the Adjutants General
in the states and territories to develop plans to identify the types of
units that were likely to be available to respond to disasters across the
country. Moreover, disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a
robust exercise program. The Homeland Security Council has issued planning
scenarios-including a major hurricane scenario-that provide the basis for
disaster exercises throughout the nation. However, few exercises led by
the Department of Homeland Security or DOD focused on catastrophic natural
disasters and none of the exercises called for a major deployment of DOD
capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. In addition, a 2004
catastrophic hurricane exercise had revealed problems with situational
awareness and operational control of forces that still had not been
resolved when Katrina made landfall in August 2005. As a result of the
inadequate plans and exercises, when Hurricane Katrina struck, a lack of
understanding existed within the military and among federal, state, and
local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that the
military might provide, the timing of this assistance, and the respective
contributions of the National Guard and federal military forces.
Page 4 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Even though there was a lack of detailed planning, the military mounted a
massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly
assisted recovery efforts, but several factors affected this response. The
military proactively took steps and supported the Katrina response with
more than 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 federal military personnel.
This heavy reliance on the National Guard was based on DOD's Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was issued in June 2005.
However, it represents a departure from past catastrophes such as
Hurricane Andrew, when the National Guard constituted less than 20 percent
of the military response. For Katrina, active-duty forces were alerted
prior to landfall and after landfall key capabilities such as aviation,
medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns
about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large
activeduty ground units to supplement the National Guard, beginning about
5 days after landfall. However, a number of interrelated factors affected
the military's ability to leverage its resources to gain situational
awareness and effectively organize and execute its Katrina response
efforts. Without detailed plans to address each of the following factors,
the military risks being unprepared for the next catastrophe that strikes
the United States.
o Lack of timely damage assessment. As with Hurricane Andrew, an
underlying problem was the failure to quickly assess damage and gain
situational awareness. The NRP notes that local and state officials
are responsible for damage assessments during a disaster, but it also
notes that state and local officials could be overwhelmed in a
catastrophe. Despite this incongruous situation, the NRP did not
specify the proactive means necessary for the federal government to
gain situational awareness when state and local officials are
overwhelmed. Moreover, DOD's planning did not call for the use of the
military's extensive reconnaissance assets to meet the NRP
catastrophic incident annex's requirement for a proactive response to
catastrophic incidents. Because state and local officials were
overwhelmed and the military's extensive reconnaissance capabilities
were not effectively leveraged as part of a proactive federal effort
to conduct timely comprehensive damage assessments, the military began
organizing and deploying its response without fully understanding the
extent of the damage or the required assistance. According to military
officials, available reconnaissance assets could have provided
additional situational awareness.
o Communications difficulties. Hurricane Katrina caused significant
damage to the communication infrastructure in Louisiana and
Mississippi, which further contributed to a lack of situational
Page 5 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
awareness for military and civilian officials. Even when local officials
were able to conduct damage assessments, the lack of communications assets
caused delays in transmitting the assessments. Under the NRP, the
Department of Homeland Security has responsibility for coordinating the
communications portion of disaster response operations. However, neither
the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security, nor DOD fully identified the
extensive military communication capabilities that could be leveraged as
part of a proactive federal response to a catastrophe. DOD's plan
addressed internal military communications requirements but not the
communication requirements of communities affected by the disaster.
Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the Department of
Homeland Security and DOD waited for requests for assistance rather than
deploying a proactive response, some of the military's available
communication assets were never requested or deployed. In addition, some
deployed National Guard assets were underutilized because the sending
states placed restrictions on their use. Communications problems, like
damage assessment problems, were also highlighted following Hurricane
Andrew.
o Problems with integrating military forces. The military did not
adequately plan for the integration of large numbers of deployed troops
from different commands during disaster response operations. For example,
a Louisiana plan to integrate military responders from outside the state
called for the reception of not more than 300 troops per day. However, in
the days following Hurricane Katrina, more than 20,000 National Guard
members from other states arrived in Louisiana to join the response
effort. In addition, the National Guard and federal responses were
coordinated across several chains of command but not integrated, which led
to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort. Because military plans
and exercises had not provided a means for integrating the response, no
one had the total picture of the forces on the ground, the forces that
were on the way, the missions that had been resourced, and the missions
that still needed to be completed. Also, a key mobilization statute5
limits DOD's Reserve and National Guard units and members from being
involuntarily ordered to federal active duty for disaster response. As a
result, all the reservists who responded to Hurricane Katrina were
volunteers. The process of lining up volunteers can be time consuming and
is more appropriate for mobilizing individuals than it is for mobilizing
entire units or
10 U.S.C. S:12304.
capabilities that may be needed during a catastrophe. After Hurricane
Andrew, we identified this issue in two 1993 reports,6 but it has not been
resolved.
o Uncoordinated search and rescue efforts. While tens of thousands of
people were rescued after Katrina, the lack of clarity in search and
rescue plans led to operations that, according to aviation officials,
were not as efficient as they could have been. The NRP addressed only
part of the search and rescue mission, and the National Search and
Rescue Plan had not been updated to reflect the NRP. As a result, the
search and rescue operations of the National Guard and federal
military responders were not fully coordinated, and military
operations were not integrated with the search and rescue operations
of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. At least two different
locations were assigning search and rescue tasks to military
helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans, and no one had the total
picture of the missions that had been resourced and the missions that
still needed to be performed.
o Logistics challenges. DOD had difficulty gaining visibility over
supplies and commodities when the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) asked DOD to assume a significant portion of its logistics
responsibilities. Under the NRP, FEMA is responsible for coordinating
logistics during disaster response efforts, but during Hurricane
Katrina, FEMA quickly became overwhelmed. Four days after Katrina's
landfall, FEMA asked DOD to take responsibility for procurement,
transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and
medical supplies. However, because FEMA lacked the capability to
maintain visibility-from order through final delivery-of the supplies
and commodities it had ordered, DOD did not know the precise locations
of the FEMA-ordered supplies and commodities when it assumed FEMA's
logistics responsibilities. As a result of its lack of visibility over
the meals that were in transit, DOD had to airlift 1.7 million meals
to Mississippi to respond to a request from the Adjutant General of
Mississippi, who was concerned that food supplies were nearly
exhausted.
DOD is beginning to take actions to address lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. The
GAO/NSIAD-93-180, and GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's
Response to Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.:
July 23, 1993).
Page 7 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
department has been conducting its own lessons learned reviews and is also
examining the lessons and recommendations in reports from a White House
review panel and congressional oversight committees, and it is beginning
to take actions to address them. While it is too early to fully evaluate
the effectiveness of the DOD actions, many appear to hold promise for
improving future responses. For example, to improve interagency
coordination, DOD is placing specially trained military personnel into
FEMA regional offices. It is also establishing two command posts capable
of deploying as joint task forces for catastrophes. In addition, DOD
officials stated that the department is currently updating its emergency
response plan and plans to use a contingency plan rather than a less
detailed functional plan to guide its military support to civil authority
missions. However, some problems, like the damage assessments and
logistics visibility are long-standing, and were reported after Hurricane
Andrew in 1992. Addressing these problems will be difficult because they
are complex and cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial
improvement will occur only if the actions receive sustained management
attention at the highest levels of DOD, and from the key officials from
across the government.
We are making four recommendations to improve the military's response to
catastrophic events. First, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with proposed
revisions to the NRP that will fully address the proactive functions the
military will be expected to perform during a catastrophic incident, for
inclusion in the next NRP update. Second, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense establish milestones and expedite the development of detailed
plans and exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and
support that the military is likely to provide to civil authorities in
response to the full range of domestic disasters, including catastrophes.
The plans and exercises should specifically address the
o use of reconnaissance capabilities to assess damage,
o use of communications capabilities to facilitate support to civil
authorities,
o integration of active component and National Guard and Reserve forces,
o use of search and rescue capabilities and the military's role in
search and rescue, and
o role the military will be expected to play in logistics.
Background
The National Response Plan
Third, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau to work with the state governors and adjutants
general to develop and maintain a list of the types of capabilities the
National Guard will likely provide in response to domestic natural
disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements, along with
the associated units that will provide these capabilities. In addition, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau to make this information available to Northern Command,
U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other organizations with federal military
support to civil authority planning responsibilities. Finally, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish milestones and identify
the types of scalable federal military capabilities and the units that
will provide those capabilities in response to the full range of domestic
disasters and catastrophes covered by DOD's military support to civil
authorities plans.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations and stated that the report was thorough and made a
significant contribution to DOD's plans to improve the department's
support to civil authorities during domestic disaster incidents. In
addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
The National Response Plan (NRP) was issued in December 2004 to establish
a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic
incidents, including natural disasters. The NRP is the federal
government's plan to coordinate its resources and capabilities across
agencies and integrate them with other levels of government, as well as
private sector organizations, for prevention of, preparedness for,
response to, and recovery from natural disasters, terrorism, or other
emergencies. According to the plan, the NRP serves as the foundation for
the development of detailed supplemental plans and procedures to
effectively and efficiently implement federal assistance for specific
types of incidents.
The heart of the NRP is its base plan, which outlines planning
assumptions, roles and responsibilities, and incident management actions.
The NRP also contains 15 emergency support function annexes, which
describe the mission, policies, structure, and responsibilities of federal
agencies in an incident. Appendix II contains a table that shows
Page 9 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Catastrophic Incidents
organizational responsibilities for the 15 emergency response functions.
It shows that DOD does not have sole primary responsibility for any
emergency function, and its role is primarily that of a supporting agency.
While multiple agencies support each emergency support function, DOD is
the only agency with supporting responsibilities for all 15 emergency
support functions.7 The NRP also contains seven incident annexes
describing responsibilities, processes, and procedures for specific types
of incidents. One of these annexes addresses catastrophic incidents.
The catastrophic incident annex establishes the strategy for implementing
an accelerated, proactive response when a catastrophic incident occurs.
The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as any natural or manmade incident
that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or
disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,
economy, national morale, or government functions.
In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and disruption to the
population, environment, and economy, Hurricane Katrina was clearly a
catastrophe and it was arguably the most devastating natural disaster in
United States' history. More than 1,300 people lost their lives; damage
stretched over a 90,000 square mile area; more than a million people were
driven from their homes; buildings, bridges, roads, and power and
communications infrastructure were destroyed or severely damaged; and
millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the environment. We may never
fully know the financial cost of Hurricane Katrina but one projection has
put it at more than $200 billion.
Military Support During disasters and catastrophes, the military may
provide support at two different levels. First, the military may provide
support at the state level through its National Guard personnel and units.
The governor of a state may call the National Guard forces within that
state to active duty in response to a local or statewide emergency. In
these cases, the state pays
7
Other agencies have supporting responsibilities for most of the emergency
support functions. For example, both the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Commerce have supporting responsibilities for 13 of
the 15 functions. The Department of Homeland Security is also involved in
the remaining two functions where it is not a supporting agency. It is the
coordinating agency for the external affairs function, and is the
departmental head of FEMA, which is a supporting agency for the
firefighting emergency support function.
the salaries of the National Guard members. Under an existing Emergency
Management Assistance Compact that establishes a framework for mutual
assistance, governors may also call their National Guard forces to active
duty in a state status and then send them to another state that is facing
a disaster.8 The governor of the affected state, through the state's
adjutant general, commands both the National Guard forces from the
affected state and the out-of-state National Guard forces that may flow
into the affected state under emergency management assistance compacts.
National Guard troops also respond to disasters under Title 32 of the
United States Code.9 Under Title 32, National Guard troops continue to
report to the governor of the affected state but they receive federal pay
and benefits. In response to Hurricane Katrina, National Guard forces were
generally activated in a state active-duty status and then eventually
placed in Title 32 status.10
The military can also respond to disasters at the federal level. The
federal military response can consist of active component or Reserve or
National Guard personnel. Active component troops that deploy to disaster
areas remain under the control of the President and the Secretary of
Defense, but they usually deploy in response to a request from an affected
state. The President can also send Reserve and National Guard troops to a
disaster area in a federal status under Title 10 of the United States
Code. However, federal laws place certain limitations on the use of
federal troops.11 For Hurricane Katrina, the federal military response
consisted of active component troops and Reserve volunteers.
The use of the military for disaster relief is authorized by the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.12 Under
8
Before the National Guard troops are actually sent to another state, the
emergency management assistance compact is generally implemented through a
specific memorandum of agreement that is signed by the sending and
receiving states.
9
Title 32 U.S.C. S:502(f).
10
On September 7, 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the
placement of National Guard personnel into Title 32 status, retroactive to
August 29, 2005.
11
Section 12304 of Title 10 of the United States Code prohibits the
involuntary activation of National Guard and Reserve members for domestic
disaster operations. Under 10 U.S.C. S:12302, the President must declare a
national emergency before he can involuntarily activate National Guard and
Reserve members, but under 10 U.S.C. S:12301 (d) he can activate National
Guard and Reserve volunteers for any purpose. The Posse Comitatis Act and
DOD policy prohibit the use of federal military forces to perform law
enforcement functions. 18 U.S.C. S:1385, DOD Directive 5525.5.
12
Title 42 U.S.C. S: 5170b(c).
Military Roles and Responsibilities
procedures to implement the Stafford Act, the military provides support to
civil authorities through a specific request process. However, under its
immediate response authority, which is outlined in DOD directives, a local
military commander can assist civil authorities or the public without
prior approval if the action is necessary to save lives, prevent human
suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious
conditions.
On March 25, 2003, DOD established the office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense to oversee homeland defense activities for
DOD, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and
as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. This office develops policies, conducts analysis, provides advice,
and makes recommendations on homeland defense, support to civil
authorities, emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management matters
within the department. Specifically, the assistant secretary assists the
Secretary of Defense in providing policy direction to the United States
Northern Command and other applicable commands to guide the development
and execution of homeland defense plans and activities.13 This direction
is provided through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense also serves as the DOD
Domestic Crisis Manager. In this capacity, he represents the department on
all homeland-defense-related matters with all levels of government,
ranging from state and local officials to the Department of Homeland
Security and the Executive Office of the President.
In 2002, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the
United States, DOD established the United States Northern Command with a
dual mission of homeland defense and civil support. Northern Command
receives policy direction on both missions from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense. Northern Command's civil support activities
are triggered by the President or the Secretary of Defense, generally in
response to requests for federal assistance. Following a catastrophic
incident, DOD may provide extensive lifesaving and sustaining support to
civil authorities. However, DOD may also provide smaller scale support for
other incidents such as wild fires, floods,
13
Northern Command has responsibility for the major homeland defense and
military support to civil authorities plans for the 48 contiguous states
and Alaska. However, other commands have responsibilities for the military
support to civil authorities plans that cover Hawaii, U.S. territories,
and some specific functional areas, such as medical support.
Page 12 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
tornados, blizzards, or other disasters. The United States Joint Forces
Command generally provides Northern Command the military resources and
forces it needs to assist civil authorities.
The National Guard Bureau is the federal military coordination,
administrative, policy, and logistical center for the Army and Air
National Guard and serves as the channel of communication between the
United States Army, the United States Air Force, and the National Guard in
54 states and territories. The Bureau is responsible for formulating,
developing, and coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army
and Air National Guard personnel. However, the Bureau does not have
operational control over National Guard forces that are operating in
either a state or federal status.
The governor is the commander in chief of all National Guard units within
the state's jurisdiction that are not in active federal service. Command
is normally exercised through the state's adjutant general. During
military support to civil authority operations, the National Guard Bureau
provides policy guidance and facilitates assistance, when needed, by
locating and coordinating out-of-state National Guard assistance. However,
the actual execution of mutual assistance agreements between the states
does not involve the National Guard Bureau.
Past GAO Work Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews
related to disaster preparedness and response, and a list of our related
reports and testimonies is included at the end of this report. Two reports
that we issued in 1993 following Hurricane Andrew are of particular
note.14 In the first, we identified problems related to inadequate damage
assessments and coordination. In the second, we also addressed
coordination issues. In both, we suggested that to improve DOD's ability
to respond to catastrophic events, the Congress might wish to consider
amending Title 10 of the United States Code to allow reserve component
units to be involuntarily activated to provide military assistance during
catastrophes.
14
GAO/NSIAD-93-180 and GAO/RCED-93-186.
Pre-Katrina Preparations Did Not Fully Address the Military Capabilities
Needed during a Catastrophic Natural Disaster
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and training exercises
involving the military were insufficient, and did not incorporate lessons
learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military
capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural
disaster. The military had responded to numerous natural disasters and
catastrophes in the past but these prior experiences were not reflected in
key planning documents or in the disaster exercises that had been
conducted prior to Hurricane Katrina. For example, the NRP contained few
details about the specific military capabilities that would likely be
needed in a natural disaster, even if the natural disaster were
catastrophic. DOD's emergency response plan also did not fully address the
military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic
natural disaster. DOD's primary planning document, Functional Plan 2501,
was inadequate because it did not address the functions DOD could be asked
to perform as a supporting agency for all 15 NRP emergency support
functions. National Guard state plans, which had been sufficient for past
smaller disasters, were also insufficient for large-scale catastrophes and
did not adequately account for the outside assistance that could be needed
during a catastrophe. Moreover, disaster plans had not been tested and
refined with a robust exercise program. As a result of the inadequate
plans-and the lack of realistic exercises to test those plans-a lack of
understanding existed within the military and among federal, state, and
local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that the
military might provide, the timing of this assistance, and the respective
contributions of the activeduty and National Guard components.
Disaster Experience Was Not Reflected in the NRP's Planned Use of Military
Capabilities during Catastrophes
Disaster plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina did not adequately
delineate military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a
catastrophic event. Over the years, the military has been frequently
called upon to provide assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes and other
disasters. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest disaster-relief
deployment of military forces was in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew swept
across south Florida. The military also provided extensive support to
civil authorities following other catastrophes, such as the 1989
earthquake in the San Francisco area and the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The National Guard has even more experience, albeit
typically with smallerscale disasters. In fiscal year 2001, the National
Guard responded to 365 requests for disaster assistance following
hurricanes, floods, fires, ice storms, tornadoes, and the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
None of these prior disasters compared to the devastation wrought by
Katrina, and the military was not prepared for what would be needed in her
wake. Overall, plans proved to be insufficient because they did not
identify the military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a
catastrophic natural disaster of this magnitude. The NRP, which guides
planning of supporting federal agencies, lacks specificity as to how DOD
should be used and what resources it should provide in the event of a
domestic natural disaster. For example, the NRP makes little distinction
between the military response to smaller, regional disasters and the
military response to large-scale, catastrophic natural disasters, even
though past disasters have shown that the military tends to play a much
larger role in catastrophes. The NRP states that DOD has significant
resources that may be available to support the federal response to an
incident of national significance, but it lists very few specific DOD
resources that should be called upon even in the event of a catastrophic
natural disaster. Given the substantial role the military is actually
expected to play in a catastrophe-no other federal agency brings as many
resources to bear-this lack of detailed planning represents a critical
oversight.
The NRP contains a catastrophic incident annex that addresses the need for
accelerated, proactive federal responses during catastrophic incidents.
The annex contains principles and guidelines but few details about the
anticipated proactive federal response. The details were to be contained
in the NRP's catastrophic incident supplement and in detailed supplemental
plans and procedures. A draft version of the NRP catastrophic incident
supplement was released in September 2005, but it still has not been
finalized. It contained a 12-page execution schedule with many details
about the tasks that many agencies are expected to accomplish in response
to a catastrophic event. However, despite extensive deployments of
military capabilities for past catastrophes like Hurricane Andrew, the
draft supplement lists very few specific tasks that DOD should perform
during a catastrophe. The only specific DOD actions it addresses are
deploying a coordinating officer and team to the affected region, making
bases available as operational staging areas, and preparing for medical
evacuation missions. The additional detailed planning was left for DOD to
develop.
The NRP represents a planning framework, not the detailed planning that
would be necessary to support the plan. In addition to designating primary
agencies for each of its 15 emergency support functions, the NRP
designates an emergency function coordinator. The coordinator, which is
also a primary agency, is responsible for coordinating all activities
related
Page 15 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
DOD's Supporting Plan Lacked Details About the Military Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters
to catastrophic incident planning. Since the NRP generally places DOD in a
supporting role rather than in a coordinator role, DOD relied on other
agencies to take the lead in coordinating the overall response within each
functional area. However, according to DOD officials, coordinated
emergency support function plans were generally not completed when Katrina
struck. Lacking coordinated plans to clearly identify the capabilities
that other agencies would provide during a catastrophe, DOD was forced to
anticipate which capabilities the primary agencies and other supporting
agencies would provide as it developed the details in its supporting plan.
After evaluating the use of military capabilities during Hurricane
Katrina, the White House report recommended, among other things, that DOD
plan and prepare to have a significant role during catastrophes, and
develop plans to lead the federal response for events of extraordinary
scope and nature.
While the military's approach to planning is well defined, prior to
Hurricane Katrina, DOD did not develop a detailed plan to account for the
full range of tasks and missions the military could need to provide in the
event of a catastrophe. DOD planners typically use one of three different
types of plans for its missions. From most to least detailed, they are
operations plans, contingency plans, and functional plans. Combatant
commanders, like Northern Command, have some discretion to determine what
type of planning is necessary for their assigned missions. For its
emergency response plan to provide defense assistance to civil authorities
during disasters or catastrophes, DOD opted to use its least detailed type
of plan, the functional plan. Functional plans are generally used to
address peacetime operations in permissive environments. DOD's plan is
called Functional Plan 2501.15 Even though functional plans are less
detailed than the two other types of plans, according to DOD's joint
planning guidance, a functional plan must be adequate and feasible.
Adequate means that the scope and concept of the plan satisfy the
specified task and accomplish the intended mission, and feasible means the
plan accomplishes the assigned tasks with resources that are available
within the time frames contemplated.
15
The United States Northern Command Functional Plan 2501 was originally
issued by the United States Atlantic Command as Commander, United States
Atlantic Command Functional Plan 2501-97, Military Support to Civil
Authorities, on February 2, 1998.
Page 16 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
While Functional Plan 2501 was adequate for most disasters, it was not
adequate or feasible for a catastrophe. The existing plan was nearly 9
years old, and was undergoing revision when Katrina struck. It had not
been updated since the Northern Command was established in 2002, nor was
it aligned with the recently published NRP. Just as the NRP did not
differentiate between military tasks in a disaster and a catastrophe,
Northern Command's Functional Plan 2501 lacked the details necessary to
address issues that emerge in a catastrophe but not in smaller-scale
disasters. The plan did not account for the full range of tasks and
missions the military could need to provide in the event of a catastrophe,
despite the NRP requirement that agencies incorporate the accelerated
response requirements of the NRP's catastrophic incident annex into their
emergency response plans. It did not anticipate that DOD, as a supporting
agency for the 15 emergency support functions outlined in the NRP, could
be called upon by the primary agencies to assume significant
responsibilities for those functions-from search and rescue to
communications to transportation and logistics.
In addition, DOD's plan had little provision for integrating active and
reserve component forces. In general, a feasible plan would anticipate the
personnel and resources that might be required in response to a
catastrophic event. This would include the emergency support function
tasks to which DOD was committed in a supporting role. Resources likely to
be employed in a catastrophic event include reserve component forces- the
National Guard and Reserves-and yet the plan did not fully address the
division of tasks between National Guard resources under the governors'
control and federal resources under Presidential control. The 2005 DOD
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support called for focused
reliance on reserve component capabilities for civil support missions, but
Functional Plan 2501 did not envision the large-scale employment of
National Guard and Reserve assets and did not outline a concept of
operations using National Guard/Reserve capabilities. It did not address
key questions of integration, command and control, and the division of
tasks between National Guard resources under state control and federal
resources under U.S. Northern Command's control. Moreover, the functional
plan did not establish time frames for the response.
Functional Plan 2501, created in 1997, was written without the benefit of
numerous strategies, directives, and publications that directly bear upon
military support to civil authorities. For example, the 2005 DOD Strategy
for Homeland Defense and Civil Support identified the need for improved
communications capabilities in domestic incidents, but Functional Plan
2501 does not specifically address this issue. Furthermore, the strategy
Page 17 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
National Guard Plans Were Also Inadequate
envisions effective surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in
support of homeland defense operations and again, the functional plan does
not sufficiently address this capability. In contrast, the Northern
Command has more detailed and operationally specific plans for other
homeland defense missions, like its response missions following a
terrorist attack. Understandably, development of these plans was given
priority after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While
specifics about these plans are classified for national security reasons,
DOD officials told us that many of the capabilities and procedures used in
these plans could be adopted for civil support operations conducted after
natural disasters.
Two related problems were evident with respect to the National Guard's
planning prior to Katrina. First, the National Guard Bureau and Northern
Command had not planned a coordinated response. Second, at the state
level, the plans of the National Guard in Louisiana and Mississippi were
inadequate for a catastrophic natural disaster.
The National Guard civil support plans were not integrated with DOD's
Functional Plan 2501. While the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does
not have operational control of National Guard personnel in the states and
territories, he does have overall responsibility for military support to
civil authorities programs in the National Guard. However, the bureau had
not coordinated in advance with the governors and adjutants general in the
states and territories to develop plans to provide assistance for
catastrophic disasters across the country. Specifically, the bureau had
not identified the types of units that were likely to be needed during a
catastrophe or worked with the state governors and adjutants general to
develop and maintain a list of National Guard units from each state that
would likely be available to meet these requirements during catastrophic
natural disasters. In addition, the Northern Command and the National
Guard Bureau had not planned which disaster response missions would be
handled by National Guard members and which would be handled by reservists
and active component members.
Prior to Katrina, the Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were
not synchronized with DOD's plans, and they were also inadequate for a
catastrophe of Katrina's magnitude. Like DOD's Functional Plan 2501, the
Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were adequate for smaller
disasters but insufficient for a catastrophe, and did not adequately
account for the outside assistance that could be needed during a
catastrophe. For example, Joint Forces Headquarters Louisiana modified its
plan and reassigned disaster responsibilities when thousands of Louisiana
National
Page 18 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Exercise Programs Did Not Adequately Test Disaster Plans
Guard personnel were mobilized for federal missions prior to Hurricane
Katrina. However, the Louisiana plan did not address the need to bring in
thousands of military troops from outside the state during a catastrophe.
Similarly, Mississippi National Guard officials told us that even their
1969 experience with Hurricane Camille, a category 5 storm that hit the
same general area, had not adequately prepared them for a catastrophic
natural disaster of Katrina's magnitude. For example, the Mississippi
National Guard disaster plan envisioned the establishment of commodity
distribution centers but it did not anticipate the number of centers that
could be required in a catastrophic event or following a nearly complete
loss of infrastructure.
Disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust exercise
program. The Homeland Security Council has issued 15 national planning
scenarios-including a major hurricane scenario-that provide the basis for
disaster exercises throughout the nation. While DOD sponsors or
participates in no less than two major interagency field exercises per
year, few exercises led by the Department of Homeland Security or DOD
focused on catastrophic natural disasters and none of the exercises called
for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic
hurricane. According to DOD officials, DOD has been involved in only one
catastrophic hurricane exercise since 2003-Unified Defense 2004. This
exercise, which simulated a nuclear detonation along with a category 4
hurricane, revealed problems with situational awareness and operational
control of forces that still had not been resolved when Katrina made
landfall in August 2005. In addition, although DOD has periodically held
modest military support to civil authorities exercises, the exercises used
underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in preparing for a
catastrophe. For example, DOD assumed that first responders and
communications would be available and that the transportation
infrastructure would be navigable in a major hurricane scenario. Finally,
the First U.S. Army conducted planning and exercises in response to six
hurricanes in 2005. These exercises led to actions, such as the early
deployment of Defense Coordinating Officers, which enhanced disaster
response efforts. However, DOD's exercise program was not adequate for a
catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina's magnitude.
As a result of the inadequate plans and exercises, when Hurricane Katrina
struck, a lack of understanding existed within the military and among
federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and
capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this
assistance,
Page 19 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
The Military's Response to Hurricane Katrina was Massive but Faced Several
Challenges
and the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal
military forces.
Even though there was a lack of detailed planning, the military mounted a
massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly
assisted recovery efforts, but several factors affected this response.
During the response to Katrina, a number of interrelated factors affected
the military's ability to leverage its resources to gain situational
awareness and effectively organize and execute its response efforts. Some
factors that affected the military response were: a lack of timely damage
assessments, communications difficulties, problems integrating the use and
capabilities of active-duty and National Guard forces, uncoordinated
search and rescue efforts, and challenges with the significant logistics
functions that FEMA unexpectedly turned over to DOD.
The Military Response Was Massive
The military response to Hurricane Katrina reached more than twice the
size of the military response to the catastrophic Hurricane Andrew in
1992. Military officials began tracking Hurricane Katrina when it was an
unnamed tropical depression and took steps to proactively respond as the
storm strengthened to a category 5 hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. Prior
to landfall, anticipating the disruption and damage that Hurricane Katrina
could cause, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi activated their
National Guard units. In addition, National Guard officials in Louisiana
and Mississippi began to contact National Guard officials in other states
to request assistance. By the time Katrina made landfall on August 29,
2005, the military was positioned to respond with both National Guard and
federal forces. For example, commands had published warning and planning
orders and DOD had already deployed Defense Coordinating Officers to all
the potentially affected states. After landfall, the governors and
National Guard officials in Louisiana and Mississippi requested additional
support from other states. The governor of Louisiana also requested
federal military assistance to help with response and recovery efforts.
Figure 1 shows the buildup of forces as the military supported response
and recovery operations with engineering, communication, and military
police units as well as helicopter search-and-rescue and ship crews, and
personnel with many other critically needed capabilities. Active-duty
forces were alerted prior to landfall and the initial buildup of
active-duty forces shown in figure 1 reflects the deployment of key
active-duty capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering
forces. Growing
Page 20 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large
active-duty ground units beginning on September 3, 2005, 5 days after
Katrina's landfall.
Thu Fri
Sat
Sun
Mon Thu Fri
Sat
Sun on
Sun
Mon
d
edd
e
e
e
ue
u
ue
T
W T
WT
W M
Sep 2,
Sep 9,
Sep 3,
Sep 10,
Sep 6,
Sep 13,g 30,
Sep 1,
Sep 8,
Sep 4,
Sep 11,
g 28,
Sep 5,
Sep 12,
g 29,
Sep 7,
Sep 14,g 31,
u
u
u
u
A
A
A
A
Active duty National Guard
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Figure 1 also indicates that the military response, which began prior to
Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005, peaked at more than 70,000 troops-
over 50,000 National Guard and over 20,000 active federal personnel. This
reliance on the National Guard was based on DOD's Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support, which was issued in June 2005. The strategy
called for a focused reliance on the National Guard and Reserves for civil
support missions because, among other things, they have key civil support
capabilities and are located in 3,200 communities throughout the nation.
The reliance on the National Guard and Reserves represents a departure
from past catastrophes when active-duty forces played a larger role in the
response. For example, during the military response to Hurricane Andrew,
the National Guard provided less than 20 percent of the more than 30,000
military responders.
Most of the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina came from outside
Louisiana and Mississippi, with the National Guard Bureau acting as a
conduit to communicate requirements for assistance in Louisiana and
Mississippi to the adjutants general in the rest of the country. The
adjutants general of other states, with the authorization of their state
governors, then sent their National Guard troops to Louisiana and
Mississippi under emergency assistance agreements between the states.
Requirements for out-of-state National Guard or federal assistance were
increased because thousands of National Guard personnel from Mississippi
and Louisiana were already mobilized for other missions and thus
unavailable when Hurricane Katrina struck their states. The National Guard
troops that had been mobilized from within the affected states were able
to quickly deploy to where they were needed because they had trained and
planned for disaster mobilizations within their states. The deployment of
out-of-state forces, though quick when compared to past catastrophes, took
longer because mobilization plans were developed and units were identified
for deployment in the midst of the crisis. By Monday, September 5, 2005 (a
week after Katrina made landfall), over 13,800 out-of-state National Guard
troops were in Louisiana assisting with response and recovery efforts.
However, when the Superdome bus evacuations began on Thursday, September
1, 2005, only about 1,600 out-of-state National Guard troops were in
Louisiana, fewer than the number of Louisiana National Guard members who
were mobilized for other missions and unavailable when Katrina made
landfall. At the peak of the military's response, nearly 40,000 National
Guard members from other states were supporting operations in Louisiana
and Mississippi-an unprecedented domestic mobilization.
In the days after the hurricane passed, considerable confusion surrounded
the employment of military support and many questioned why more federal
ground troops were not sent sooner. According to senior DOD officials
involved in executing DOD's response to Katrina, DOD was aware that the
situation warranted significant military support and they noted that the
department took steps to proactively deploy federal military capabilities
from all the services to the region. For example, DOD deployed a joint
task force, medical personnel, helicopters, ships from Texas, Virginia,
and Maryland, and construction battalion engineers. Many of these
capabilities were providing assistance or deploying to the area within
hours of Katrina's landfall. Given the current DOD homeland
Page 22 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Several Factors Affected the Military Response
Comprehensive Damage Assessments Were Not Completed Promptly
defense strategy, which calls for "focused reliance" on the reserve
components for civil support missions, DOD officials told us that they
also began working with the National Guard Bureau to ensure the
mobilization of National Guard forces from across the country. As the
situation unfolded during the week, concerns about the magnitude of the
disaster led to discussions about the need to deploy additional
active-duty forces to supplement the National Guard forces. After visiting
the region and meeting with the Louisiana Governor on Friday, September 2,
2005, the President, on the next day, ordered the deployment of over 7,000
activeduty ground troops to the region.
Data concerning the military response were not always fully documented in
the midst of the Hurricane Katrina crisis, but it is clear that the
military had a huge impact on response and recovery operations. Data from
the active-duty military task force that headed the federal response
indicate that the military
o flew thousands of helicopter sorties, rescuing tens of thousands of
people and carrying thousands of tons of cargo, including sandbags to
repair breeches in the levees around New Orleans;
o delivered millions of meals ready to eat, gallons of water, and pounds
of ice;
o searched hundreds of thousands of houses in the affected regions;
o provided medical treatment to tens of thousands of civilians; and
o conducted mosquito spraying missions over more than 1 million acres.
Despite the significant contribution of its massive response, a number of
interrelated factors affected the military's ability to leverage its
resources to gain situational awareness and effectively organize and
execute its response efforts. Without detailed plans to address each of
the following factors, the military risks being unprepared for the next
catastrophe that strikes the United States.
Hurricane Katrina response efforts were hampered by the federal
government's failure to fully use its available assets to conduct timely,
comprehensive damage assessments in Louisiana and Mississippi. The failure
to quickly assess damage and gain situational awareness had also been a
problem during Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The NRP notes that following a
disaster, state and local governments are responsible for conducting
initial damage assessments, but it also notes that state and local
officials could be overwhelmed in a catastrophe. The NRP addresses
Communications Difficulties Affected the Military Response
this incongruous situation, where state and local officials who may be
overwhelmed have critical functions to perform during the initial stages
of disaster recovery efforts, by stating that the federal government
should provide a proactive response when state and local officials are
overwhelmed during a catastrophe. However, the NRP does not specify the
proactive means or capabilities the federal government should use to
conduct damage assessments and gain situational awareness when the
responsible state and local officials are overwhelmed.
The military has significant capabilities to conduct damage assessments
using reconnaissance aircraft and satellite imagery, but our analysis
shows that neither the NRP nor DOD's Functional Plan 2501 specifically
called for the proactive use of these assets to meet the NRP catastrophic
incident annex's requirement for a proactive response to catastrophic
incidents. In addition, DOD did not initially receive significant requests
for these capabilities. At FEMA's request, DOD initially provided three
helicopters to assist in damage assessments. About 4 days after Katrina's
landfall, the military began providing imagery data from some of its
reconnaissance assets to its forces and civilian agencies. However, the
process for sharing information proved difficult for several reasons. Some
information was classified due to its source and could not be shared
directly with civilian agencies. In addition, some agencies were not able
to access some of the available information because the data files were
too large to download to the agency computers. A National Guard Hurricane
Katrina after-action review reported that the adjutants general (in
Mississippi and Louisiana) required real time imagery that the military
community should have been able to provide, but did not.
Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the military's
extensive reconnaissance capabilities were not effectively leveraged as
part of a proactive federal effort to conduct timely, comprehensive damage
assessments, the military began organizing and deploying its response
without fully understanding the extent of the damage or the required
assistance. According to military officials, available reconnaissance
assets could have provided additional situational awareness. In contrast,
DOD officials told us that almost immediately after Hurricane Rita struck
Louisiana and Texas in September 2005, considerable surveillance assets
were made available to assess damage, primarily because of lessons learned
from Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to the communication
infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi, which further contributed to
a lack of situational awareness for military and civilian officials.
Katrina destroyed or severely degraded many commercial landline and
cellular telephone systems, and emergency radio systems were
oversubscribed, making it difficult to establish necessary connections
between officials and responders at the local, state, and federal levels.
As a result, it was difficult for officials to gain situational awareness.
Even when local officials were able to conduct damage assessments, the
lack of communications assets caused delays in the transmitting of the
results of the assessments. Communications problems, like damage
assessment problems, have been long-standing problems that were also
highlighted following Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
The military, other agencies, and public companies all have extensive
communications assets and capabilities, but the Department of Homeland
Security16 has responsibility for coordinating the communications portion
of disaster response operations under the NRP. However, neither the NRP,
the Department of Homeland Security, nor DOD fully identified the
extensive military communication capabilities that could be leveraged as
part of a proactive federal response to a catastrophe. In addition, DOD's
emergency response plan, Functional Plan 2501, addressed internal military
communications requirements, but it did not address the communication
requirements of communities affected by a catastrophic natural disaster.
It also did not address coordination with civilian responders. Typically,
military equipment cannot communicate with civilian police, fire, and
emergency medical systems unless it is augmented with specialized
equipment. While the military and civilian agencies deployed mobile
communication vans that were able to connect different communications
systems that are normally incompatible, the placement of these vans was
not coordinated and some areas had multiple systems while other areas had
no systems at all. Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and
the Department of Homeland Security and DOD waited for requests for
assistance rather than deploying a proactive response, some of the
military's available communication assets were never requested or
deployed.
In addition to the coordination challenges, communications challenges
arose within the military response. Some deployed National Guard assets
were underutilized because the states that sent the assets placed
restrictions on their use. The equipment was sent solely to support the
Department of Homeland Security/Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection/ National Communications System.
Page 25 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
The Military Encountered Problems Integrating Its Response
sending states' units and thus was unavailable for priority use. As a
result, a number of mobile communications vans were collocated at a single
site while other areas remained without communications. In addition, some
National Guard responders were short of equipment. For example, one
National Guard unit deployed to the area of operations with only 5 percent
of its communications personnel and 50 percent of its communication
equipment. As a result of these problems, military forces lacked good
communication between headquarters units and troops on the ground. While
subordinate military commanders are trained to complete their missions
even when they do not have communications with their headquarters, this
lack of communication made it difficult for senior military leaders to
determine which missions had been completed, which were still ongoing, and
what new missions may have surfaced.
The integration of the military response to Hurricane Katrina was affected
by inadequate planning and by a key mobilization statute that limited
DOD's reserve component members from being involuntarily ordered to active
duty for disaster response. The military did not adequately plan for the
integration of large numbers of deployed troops from different commands
during disaster response operations. For example, a Louisiana plan to
integrate military responders from outside the state called for the
reception of not more than 300 troops per day. However, in the days
following Hurricane Katrina, more than 20,000 National Guard members from
other states arrived in Louisiana to join the response effort, and on one
single day-September 5, 2005-more than 8,500 National Guard members from
other states arrived in Louisiana to join the Katrina response effort.
One critical issue that needs to be resolved in any large, integrated
operation is the decision concerning command and control of the forces.
This issue had not been resolved prior to Hurricane Katrina and was a
subject of discussion during the critical first days after Katrina made
landfall. Ultimately, the military took a pragmatic approach to deconflict
the operation with separate active-duty and National Guard chains of
command. The federal forces-the active component and mobilized Reserve
volunteers-were under the command and control of Northern Command's Joint
Task Force-Katrina, while the National Guard forces, including those from
other states, were under the command and control of the governors in
Mississippi and Louisiana. While response operations were coordinated
across the several chains of command, they were not integrated, which led
to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort. For example, many
responding military units from outside the states were assigned missions
within established geographic boundaries, but the
Page 26 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Louisiana and Mississippi National Guard units had functional missions
that cut across these geographic boundaries. Furthermore, in New Orleans,
the geographic boundaries were not the same as the city district
boundaries. This made coordination with local responders more difficult.
Despite the lack of prior planning to address integration issues, many
efforts were made to integrate the response. For example, active military
representatives were assigned to state emergency operations centers and
the commander of the active forces traveled daily throughout the affected
region coordinating and collaborating with National Guard, and federal,
state, and local civilian officials.
Because the military had not specifically planned nor decided which parts
of the military response would be handled by the National Guard and which
parts would be handled by the active component and mobilized reservists,
many of the force flow decisions and integration efforts were ad hoc in
the midst of the crisis. Because military plans and exercises had not
provided a means for integrating the response, no one had the total
picture of the forces on the ground, the forces that were on the way, the
missions for which forces had been allocated, and the missions that still
needed to be done. For example, National Guard commanders in Mississippi
and Louisiana were not prepared to receive the division headquarter
elements that were sent from Indiana and Kansas to command the
out-of-state National Guard forces that were arriving in the two states
from around the country.
A key mobilization statute17 also affected the integration of the military
response. Title 10 of the United States Code currently limits a unit or
member of a reserve component from being involuntarily ordered to federal
active duty for disaster response. While this restriction applies to both
National Guard and Reserve forces, National Guard forces were mobilized
under both state active duty and Title 32 for Hurricane Katrina. No
similar provisions exist to specifically mobilize Reserve forces for
disaster response, although it is conceivable that if the President
declares a national emergency, reserve component forces could become
available for involuntary activation. As a result, all the Reservists who
responded to Hurricane Katrina were volunteers, and Reservists constituted
a relatively small portion of the response when compared to the National
Guard and active component portions of the response.
10 U.S.C. S:12304.
Search and Rescue Plans and Efforts Were Not Coordinated
If the military continues to rely on Reserve volunteers it will have
difficulty fully executing DOD's 2005 civil support strategy that calls
for a focused reliance on both the National Guard and the Reserves. 18 The
strategy notes that the National Guard is particularly well suited for
civil support missions because it is routinely exercised with local law
enforcement and first responders, experienced in supporting neighboring
communities in times of crisis, and accessible in state active duty and
Title 32 status. However, the strategy also emphasizes the use of the
Reserves for domestic missions. The strategy specifically states that "the
nation needs to focus particular attention on better using the
competencies of National Guard and Reserve" organizations, and notes that
Reserve forces currently provide many key capabilities. The process of
lining up volunteers can be time-consuming and is more appropriate for
mobilizing individuals than it is for mobilizing entire units or
capabilities that may be needed during a catastrophe.
In 1993, after Hurricane Andrew, the military was facing a drawdown in
force size and increasing mission requirements, and we issued two reports
related to disaster assistance that addressed the Title 10 limitation. One
of the reports19 said that, to improve DOD's response to catastrophic
events, the Congress may want to consider amending Title 10 of the United
States Code to allow reserve component units to be involuntarily activated
to provide disaster assistance. Such a change would have provided DOD with
more flexibility in the use of its total force. However, the limitation
has remained in place. While the mobilization restriction did not limit
the military's ability to respond to Hurricane Katrina, it could limit
DOD's ability to respond to future catastrophes if large portions of the
active-duty and National Guard forces are unavailable due to other mission
requirements.
were rescued after Katrina through the
efforts of military, civil government, and private rescuers, the lack of
clarity in search and rescue plans led to operations that, according to
aviation officials, were not as efficient as they could have been. The NRP
18
Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June
2005.
19
GAO/NSIAD-93-180 noted that the legislative intent of the Title 10
limitation was to prevent Reserve personnel from being activated
frequently, which could cause problems with their employers, but noted
that we would expect Reserve units would be activated for disaster
assistance only when there is a catastrophe. We further stated that any
changes to the call-up authority may need to consider limitations on the
number of units/personnel that can be activated as well as the period of
activation.
addressed only part of the search and rescue mission, and the National
Search and Rescue Plan had not been updated to reflect the NRP. Under the
United States National Search and Rescue Plan, which was issued in 1999,
the Coast Guard ordinarily has responsibility for providing or arranging
maritime search and rescue services, and the Air Force ordinarily has
responsibility for providing or arranging nonmaritime search and rescue
services in the continental United States. The plan also calls on DOD to
support civil search and rescue efforts when the efforts do not interfere
with DOD's primary military duties, and it states that DOD and Coast Guard
commands should provide their facilities for civil search and rescue to
the fullest extent practicable. While the NRP acknowledges the existence
of the National Search and Rescue Plan, the NRP does not specifically
address how the Coast Guard and the Air Force organizational
responsibilities in the National Search and Rescue Plan coincide with the
NRP's urban search and rescue annex. That annex lays out organizational
responsibilities for search and rescue during a disaster, but it focuses
on ground rescues. While the NRP includes DOD and the Coast Guard among
the many supporting agencies, it lists the Department of Homeland
Security's Emergency Preparedness and Response and FEMA as the primary and
coordinating agencies for urban search and rescue.
As a result of the lack of clear search and rescue guidance, the aviation
portion of military search and rescue operations was not fully integrated
with the helicopter search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and
other rescuers. At least two different locations were assigning search and
rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans and
no one had the total picture of the missions that had been resourced and
the missions that still needed to be performed. In accordance with the
National Search and Rescue Plan, the Air Force established a Joint Search
and Rescue Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, to manage Hurricane
Katrina search and rescue missions; however, this center was not set up
until September 4, 2005, 6 days after Katrina's landfall. Furthermore, the
center did not have radar coverage over New Orleans. After Katrina made
landfall, search and rescue helicopters operating in the New Orleans area
were receiving their tasks from either the Coast Guard, which was based at
Belle Chase, Louisiana, or from a task force led by the Louisiana National
Guard, which was operating at the Superdome. According to Louisiana
National Guard officials, they worked with the Coast Guard to deconflict
the aviation operations, but the search and rescue efforts that were being
directed from the two sites were not integrated. For example, some
military aircraft received their direction from the task for at the
Superdome, while others received their direction from the Coast Guard or
the Joint Task Force that was in command of the
Page 29 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
DOD Assumed an Unanticipated Logistics Role
active troops on the ground. Neither the Coast Guard nor the Louisiana
National Guard had visibility of all the aircraft operating over the city
of New Orleans in the initial days after Katrina made landfall. According
to military officials, better integration of search and rescue efforts
could reduce duplications of effort for search and rescue aircraft.
Another factor that affected the military response was the large and
unanticipated logistics role it was asked to assume when FEMA became
overwhelmed. Under the NRP, FEMA is responsible for coordinating logistics
during disaster response efforts but during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA
quickly became overwhelmed. Supplies that had been positioned prior to
Katrina's landfall were quickly exhausted. As a result, FEMA placed orders
for more than 9 million meals-ready-to-eat and then, 4 days after
landfall, asked DOD to assume a significant portion of its logistics
responsibilities. Specifically, FEMA gave DOD responsibility for
procurement, transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel,
and medical supplies and it authorized DOD to spend up to $1 billion to
accomplish this mission. According to DOD officials, all of the 9 million
meals that FEMA had ordered were shipped to the region by September 4,
2005. However, because FEMA lacked the capability to maintain
visibility-from order through final delivery-of the supplies and
commodities it had ordered, DOD had difficulty gaining visibility over the
supplies and commodities when it assumed FEMA's logistics
responsibilities. As a result of its lack of visibility over the meals
that were in transit, DOD had to airlift 1.7 million meals to Mississippi
to respond to a request from the Adjutant General of Mississippi, who was
concerned that food supplies were nearly exhausted.
We recently issued a report that examined how the food provided by foreign
nations was managed,20 and we have additional work planned to look at the
entire logistics process to best determine how the federal government can
provide support in the future.
20
GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures are Needed
to Ensure Accountability for International Assistance, GAO-06-460
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
Page 30 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
DOD Has Begun Taking Actions to Address Catastrophic Disaster Response
Problems, Some of Which are Complex and Long-standing
DOD is aware of disaster response problems described in this report and is
beginning to take actions to address the lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. The department has
been conducting its own lessons-learned reviews and is also examining the
lessons and recommendations in reports from a White House review panel,
congressional oversight committees, and other sources. As a result, DOD is
taking some actions to address catastrophic disaster response problems.
While it is too early to fully evaluate the effectiveness of these ongoing
and planned actions, many appear to hold promise for improving future
responses. However, the issues identified during the aftermath of Katrina
are often complex, cross agency boundaries, and are, in some cases,
long-standing. Substantial improvement to the military's disaster and
catastrophe response will require sustained attention from management at
the highest levels of DOD and from key officials across the government.
Military Lessons Learned Are Emerging
DOD has collected lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina from a
variety of sources. Within the department, DOD has a formal set of
procedures to identify, capture, and share information collected as a
result of operations in order to enhance performance in future operations.
Even in the midst of the Hurricane Katrina response operation, officials
from various military organizations were collecting information on lessons
learned and this continued well after most operations had ceased. For
example, communications issues that had surfaced were studied by both
active and National Guard commands that had responded to Hurricane
Katrina. DOD also formed a task force to study the response and is
compiling and analyzing various military and other lesson learned reports
to help design an improved response to future natural catastrophic events.
In addition, the DOD Inspector General's Office and the service audit
agencies are reviewing aspects of the Hurricane Katrina response.
Other organizations have also been gathering lessons learned. According to
DOD officials, they have reviewed White House and congressional reports
identifying lessons to be applied or challenges to be addressed in future
response operations. While the assessments were different, many common
themes emerged and are similar to the issues we describe in this report.
For example, a February 2006 White House report21 also recognized
21
The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned, February 23, 2006.
Page 31 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
DOD Is Taking Initial Steps to Improve Future Military Response to Catastrophes
the significant role that the military plays in catastrophes, and it even
recommended that DOD work with the Department of Homeland Security to
identify those extraordinary circumstances when it is appropriate for DOD
to temporarily lead the federal response. That report also noted the lack
of a unified command structure for active and National Guard forces and
suggested that DOD work on ensuring integration of those forces in future
responses. It further recommended that DOD seek ways to leverage Reserve
members' civilian skills in disaster relief efforts. In addition, an over
500-page congressional report22 found numerous issues with the Katrina
response, including the lack of integration of National Guard and
active-duty forces, which hampered the military response.
To address the challenges highlighted in these lessons learned reports,
DOD is currently planning numerous actions to improve its ability to
respond to a catastrophic event. For example, DOD officials stated that
the department is currently updating its emergency response plan and
intends to use a contingency plan rather than a less detailed functional
plan to guide its military support to civil authority missions.
Recognizing the urgency of preparing for catastrophic events, the
department hopes to complete many of its initial steps by June 1, 2006,
the start of the next hurricane season. Since details about many of the
department's actions were still emerging as we completed our review we
were unable to fully assess the effectiveness of DOD's actions. However,
many actions appear to offer promise for improving future responses.
Several additional examples of DOD's planned efforts follow.
o To improve situational awareness and assist in damage assessment after
a catastrophe, DOD is working on a plan to coordinate and synchronize
surveillance and reconnaissance requests and assets.
o To improve integration of responders, DOD is planning several steps,
including (1) expanding its training programs to accommodate planners
from other agencies and (2) conducting new homeland defense and civil
support exercises.
o To improve coordination between National Guard and active forces, and,
specifically, avoid duplication of effort by military forces during an
22
A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, U.S.
House of Representatives, February 15, 2006.
Page 32 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Complex and Longstanding Issues Will Require Sustained Management Attention
to Resolve
incident, NGB officials will work with the states to build a database of
current and planned state-to-state agreements for sharing National
Guard forces.
DOD also has an organizational realignment underway that military
officials believe should improve the response to future disasters and
catastrophes. This realignment gives a single Army organization, the Fifth
United States Army, responsibility for domestic disaster response. When
Katrina made landfall in August 2005, disaster responsibilities within the
Army were split between two organizations.23 Under the change, the Fifth
Army becomes a subordinate (U.S. Army, North) to the Northern Command and
will focus on homeland defense and disaster response. According to
military officials, Army, North, is establishing two command posts that
will be capable of deploying within 18 hours as joint task forces for
catastrophes anywhere in the United States. The command posts will be
available when Army, North, reaches its full operating capability in
October, 2006. Furthermore, to improve interagency coordination, specially
trained defense coordinating elements are being established and co-located
within each of FEMA's 10 regional offices. Army, North, also has a number
of training and planning efforts underway to improve its support to civil
authorities.
While DOD's efforts to address the Katrina lessons learned appear to be
steps in the right direction, some of the issues DOD is facing are complex
and long-standing and cut across agency boundaries. As a result,
substantial improvement will occur only if the actions receive sustained
management attention at the highest levels, both within DOD and within the
other responsible agencies. Many of the problems encountered during the
Katrina response were also reported after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. For
example, in a 1993 report,24 we found that the practice of assigning
responsibility for conducting damage assessments to state and local
officials under the Federal Response Plan25 was not suitable for
23
The First United States Army had responsibility for responding to
hurricanes and other disasters in Minnesota and states east of the
Mississippi River, including Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. The Fifth
United States Army had responsibility for responding to hurricanes and
other disasters in the remaining states, including Louisiana and Texas.
Both commands had mobilization and training responsibilities as well.
24
GAO/NSIAD-93-180.
25
The Federal Response Plan was issued in 1992 and was replaced by the
National Response Plan in 2004.
Conclusions
catastrophic situations and it contributed to the lack of timely damage
assessments during Hurricane Andrew. Our report also found supply
distribution delays caused by a lack of visibility over FEMA-ordered
supplies, and found confusion over the command and control relationships,
which had not been fully resolved prior to Andrew's landfall. Due to the
complexity and long-standing nature of these problems, DOD's planned and
ongoing actions must receive sustained top-management attention in order
to effect needed improvements in the military's ability to support civil
authorities.
Part of DOD's challenge in moving forward is the complexity of the
problems, especially given the uncertainty of potential events and the
sheer number of organizations at all levels of government that are
involved. Coordinating improvements across the various parts of the
military, alone, will be a challenge. The National Guard and active-duty
forces have complicated chains-of-command, especially in peacetime when
the National Guard typically serves the state governors. Other issues
require close coordination with state and local governments. For example,
conducting damage assessments, a critical early step in developing an
appropriate response to an event, can involve many different agencies at
all levels of government. Damage assessments are normally to be conducted
by local or state officials during a disaster. However, local and state
officials who are overwhelmed in a catastrophe are unlikely to be able to
conduct timely and comprehensive damage assessments. Paradoxically,
without timely, comprehensive damage assessments federal responders may
not realize the extent to which local and state official are overwhelmed.
While the issues are complex, they are also urgent, and experience has
illustrated that the military has critical and substantial capabilities
that are needed in the wake of catastrophic events.
Clearly, Hurricane Katrina was one of the most devastating natural
disasters in our nation's history, and because of its size and strength,
it will have long-standing effects for years to come. By their nature,
major catastrophic events involve extraordinary levels of casualties,
damage, or disruption that will likely immediately overwhelm state and
local responders-circumstances that make sound planning for catastrophic
events all the more crucial. Prior disasters and the actual experience of
Hurricane Katrina show that the military is likely to contribute
substantial support to state and local authorities. More detailed planning
would improve officials' understanding of the support the military could
be expected to provide following a catastrophic incident, including the
types of capabilities that might be provided, the actions that might be
taken
Recommendations for Executive Action
proactively and in response to specific requests, and the integrating of
the National Guard and active-duty response. Further, while the limited
participation of Reserve members after Katrina did not affect response
efforts, under current law, DOD's ability to respond to future
catastrophes may be limited if it cannot involuntarily mobilize reserve
component members-particularly if large portions of the active and
National Guard forces are unavailable due to other mission requirements.
The devastation of Katrina and the issues it revealed serve as a warning
that actions are needed to clearly identify the military capabilities that
will be required from the National Guard, Reserve, and active forces as
part of a proactive federal response following a catastrophic natural
disaster. Without urgent and detailed attention to improve planning, the
military and federal government risk being unprepared for the next
catastrophe.
We recommend that DOD take the following four actions:
First, given the expected heavy reliance on the military during
catastrophes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with proposed revisions
to the NRP that will fully address the proactive functions the military
will be expected to perform during a catastrophic incident, for inclusion
in the next NRP update.
Second, in view of the fast approaching 2006 hurricane season and other
natural and man-made threats that could result in a catastrophe at any
instant, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish milestones
and expedite the development of detailed plans and exercises to fully
account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is
likely to provide to civil authorities in response to the full range of
domestic disasters, including catastrophes. The plans and exercises should
specifically address the
o use of reconnaissance capabilities to assess damage,
o use of communications capabilities to facilitate support to civil
authorities,
o integration of active component and National Guard and Reserve forces,
o use of search and rescue capabilities and the military's role in
search and rescue, and
o role the military might be expected to play in logistics.
Page 35 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Third, since National Guard troops can join response efforts as part of
the federal response or as part of the state response under mutual
assistance agreements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to work with the state governors
and adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of the types of
capabilities the National Guard will likely provide in response to
domestic natural disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance
agreements along with the associated units that could provide these
capabilities. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make this information
available to the Northern Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other
organizations with federal military support to civil authority planning
responsibilities.
Finally, based on the above action by the National Guard Bureau to
identify the National Guard units that are likely to respond to domestic
disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements, we also
recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish milestones and identify
the types of scalable federal military capabilities and the units that
could provide those capabilities in response to the full range of domestic
disasters and catastrophes covered by DOD's defense support to civil
authorities plans.
In a 1993 report26 we suggested that the Congress may want to consider
removing the statutory restriction on DOD's authority to involuntarily
activate Reserve units for catastrophic disaster relief. In view of the
significant military downsizing that has occurred since we first raised
this matter and the need to actively engage the total force in order to
meet missions at home and abroad, we continue to believe that the Congress
should consider lifting or modifying the mobilization restriction-10
U.S.C. S:12304 (c)(1)-that limits reserve component participation in
catastrophic natural disasters.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated the report was
thorough and made a significant contribution to DOD's plans to improve and
Our Evaluation the department's support to civil authorities during
domestic disaster
incidents. In addition to partially concurring with our recommendations,
DOD's made several comments about the report that fell into two broad
26
GAO/RCED-93-186.
categories, DOD's role during domestic disaster response and its
pre-Katrina planning and exercise schedule.
First, DOD believed the report called for a greater DOD role during
domestic disaster response but noted that it must strike a balance between
its warfighting role overseas and the need to support civil authorities at
home. While DOD said it would continue to work as part of a unified
interagency effort, it said that the goal is to enhance the domestic
disaster response capacities of other agencies. Until that goal is
achieved, DOD will be prepared to respond even more rapidly with more
resources to another catastrophe in the United States. We recognize the
need to balance DOD's overseas warfighting mission and its domestic
response missions. In the report, we note DOD's role is primarily that of
a supporting agency under the NRP, and that the nature of the military
response will vary depending on the nature of the emergency. However,
given the military's capabilities, its response and level of support to
civil authorities is likely to be more significant during large disasters
and catastrophes.
Second, DOD said that the title of the report is misleading because it
does not recognize DOD's extensive planning and exercise schedule prior to
August 29, 2005, such as specific preparations in response to six 2005
hurricanes. We added additional information about these efforts. However,
we continue to believe that the title accurately reflects the report's
findings and recommendations. As stated in the report, DOD had
periodically held modest military support to civil authorities exercises
but the exercises used underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in
preparing for a catastrophe. We also note that DOD's comments acknowledge
the need to improve its plans and exercises. In fact, DOD's comments
acknowledged the need to conduct at least one fully integrated major
exercise with the Department of Homeland Security each year rather than
the separate exercises that have been conducted in the past.
DOD also commented on our four recommendations, partially concurring with
each of them. With respect to our first recommendation-to revise the NRP
to fully address the proactive functions that the military will be
expected to perform during a catastrophic incident-DOD said that proactive
military functions can be identified in all 15 major disaster scenarios
and said it is working with the Department of Homeland Security to revise
the NRP. While DOD stated that the long-term focus of the U.S. government
should be to develop more robust domestic disaster capabilities within the
Department of Homeland Security, it acknowledged that DOD will need to
assume a more robust response role in the interim
Page 37 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
period, and when other responders lack the resources and expertise to
handle a particular disaster.
With respect to our second recommendation that concerned the development
of detailed plans and exercises, DOD listed a number of steps it is taking
to improve its disaster response planning and exercises and said that
consistent with its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support the
active component should complement, but not duplicate, the National
Guard's likely role as an early responder. The DOD comments also said that
planning and exercises should include local, state, and federal
representatives and should stress the responders with the highest degree
of realism possible-to the breaking point if possible. However, the
comments said that logistics planning and execution is the clear
responsibility of FEMA and individual states, and DOD would remain ready
in a supporting role. We agree with DOD that effective disaster plans and
exercises require stressing scenarios with the active participation of
representatives from all levels of government. We also agree that FEMA and
states have logistics responsibilities. However, we continue to believe
that DOD should plan and prepare to assume additional emergency support
function responsibilities during catastrophes when other responders may be
overwhelmed.
DOD also partially concurred with our third recommendation-that the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau work with the state governors and adjutants
general to develop and maintain a list of the types of capabilities the
National Guard will likely provide in response to domestic natural
disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements, along with
the associated units that will provide these capabilities. DOD said that
it was not feasible to identify the specific units that would provide
these capabilities and requested that we modify our recommendation to say
units that "could" provide these capabilities rather than units that
"will" provide those capabilities. We agree and have adjusted our
recommendation. In addition, DOD listed steps the U.S. Northern Command is
taking to better understand the capabilities of National Guard units and
it stated that the National Guard is creating a database to facilitate
planning its employment in support of the homeland. As part of the
database implementation, the National Guard Bureau has identified a need
to place a contractor in each of its Joint Force Headquarters-State
locations.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that it identify
the types of scaleable federal military capabilities and units that will
provide those capabilities in response to the full range of domestic
Page 38 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina
disasters and catastrophes covered by DOD's defense support to civil
authorities plans. DOD noted that it has developed scalable capability
packages in conjunction with pre-scripted requests for assistance and
Northern Command's Contingency Plan 2501, which is scheduled to be signed
in the spring of 2006. However, because DOD's forces can be used to meet
many different types of missions, DOD requested that we modify our
recommendation to say identify the types of scaleable federal military
capabilities and units that "could" (rather than "will") provide those
capabilities. We agree and have adjusted our recommendation.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate. DOD's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Northern Command; the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau; the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency;
the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sharon L. Pickup Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Susan M. Collins Chairman The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Office of The Secretary Of Defense
To address our objectives, we interviewed officials from DOD, the National
Guard, the military services, and defense agencies that participated in
the response to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, we reviewed military time
lines, after-action reports, lessons learned studies, briefings,
congressional testimonies, and other documents. During our review, we met
with and obtained information from officials in the following
organizations.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, Arlington, Va.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Arlington, Va. Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, Arlington, Va.
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy,
Arlington, Va. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics & Material Readiness, Arlington, Va. Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Arlington, Va. McHale-Mauldin
Hurricane Katrina Task Force, Arlington, Va. Joint Staff Director of
Military Support, National Military Command Center, Arlington, Va.
Defense Logistics Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
Office of the Inspector General, Logistics Management Division, Arlington,
Va. Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
Commands
U.S.
Strategic Command, Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Bolling Air Force
Base, Washington, D.C.
U.S.
Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colo.
U.S.
Joint Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet Compound, Norfolk, Va.
U.S.
Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
Military Services
U.S. Army
U.S.
Army Forces Command, Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Ga. First U.S.
Army, Fort Gillem, Ga. Fifth U.S. Army/ Army North, Fort Sam
Houston, San Antonio, Tex.
U.S.
Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. Surface Distribution and
Deployment Command, Alexandria, Va. 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st
Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Tex. 13th Corps Support Command Fort
Hood, Tex. 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.
U.S. Navy
Fleet Forces Command, Naval Station Norfolk , Norfolk, Va. Joint Force
Maritime Component Command, Naval Station Norfolk, Norfolk, Va. 2nd Fleet,
Naval Station Norfolk, Norfolk, Va. USS Iwo Jima USS Truman USS Bataan
Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C. First Naval Construction
Division, Little Creek Amphibious Base, Norfolk, Va. Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Norfolk, Va.
U.S.
Marine Corps Headquarters Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and
Operations Department, Arlington, Va. Marine Corps Forces Command,
Naval Station Norfolk, Norfolk, Va. 2nd Marine Expeditionary
Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp
Lejeune, N.C.
U.S.
Air Force Operations Group, Arlington, Va. National Security
Emergency Preparedness, Arlington, Va. Joint Force Air Component
Command, 1st Air Force, Tyndall Air Force Base, Panama City, Fla.
Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. Air Combat
Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
Joint Task Force Katrina, New Orleans, La.
Task Forces
Task Forces Pelican and Eagle, Louisiana National Guard, Camp Beauregard,
La.
National Guard
National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Va. Louisiana National Guard, Baton
Rouge, La. Louisiana National Guard, Carville, La. Assistant Adjutant
General, Mississippi Army National Guard, Gulfport, Miss. 186th Air
Refueling Wing, Mississippi Air National Guard, Meridian, Miss. 172nd
Airlift Wing, Mississippi Air National Guard, Jackson, Miss. Joint Forces
Headquarters, Indiana National Guard, Indianapolis, In. 38th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Indianapolis, In. Joint Forces Headquarters, Kansas
National Guard, Topeka, Ks. 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Ft.
Leavenworth, Ks. Joint Force Headquarters, Jackson, Ms.
To assess the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises
reflected the military assistance that might be required during a
catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, we analyzed planning and
directive documents related to military support to civil authority, such
as the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and the Military
Support27 and Assistance28 to Civil Authorities directives, and state
plans. In analyzing these documents and others, we determined the extent
to which they addressed a mechanism for the integration of forces and
established a process to identify and communicate the military
capabilities available to civil authorities or those that could be sent by
DOD following a disaster or catastrophic event. We also reviewed
after-action reports from training exercises to determine whether
assumptions for the exercises were realistic in light of recent
catastrophic disasters, to establish the level of military involvement in
recent disaster planning exercises, and to determine whether the training
scenarios exercised available military capabilities. We discussed our
analysis with officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau,
and others to determine the extent to which the directives, plans, and
lessons from
27
DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authority.
28
DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authority.
exercises adequately supported the military's response to civil authority
after Hurricane Katrina.
To examine the support that the military provided in responding to Katrina
and factors that affected that response, we obtained briefings and reports
describing the military's response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and
Mississippi. We compared and contrasted data collected and resolved
discrepancies through interviews with officials from DOD, state National
Guard forces, Joint Task Force Katrina, and service, and state officials.
We specifically examined the time line of the military's response, the
size and nature of the forces that responded, and the challenges faced in
supporting civil authorities. To compare this response to prior military
responses, accounting for differences in storms, we analyzed testimony and
reports about the military's response to other natural disasters.29 We
analyzed relevant documents and lessons learned reports from the military
to specifically examine the damage assessment, logistics, communication,
search and rescue, and security/law enforcement response to determine if
previously identified concerns had been addressed prior to Hurricane
Katrina.
Additionally, to determine what actions, if any, the military is taking to
address lessons learned from Katrina, we collected and analyzed briefings
and lessons learned reports from organizations participating in the
response. We discussed recommended actions from lessons learned reports
and how the military plans to improve its response to future disasters
with officials from DOD and the National Guard Bureau.
GAO, Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki
and Typhoon Omar, GAO/NSIAD-93-180 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 1993),
Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic
Disaster, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993), and Disaster
Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation's
Response Strategy, GAO/RCED-93-46 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 1993).
We conducted our work from September 2005 through April 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: NRP Emergency Support Function Responsibilities
Supporting
agencies or
Emergency support Primary agencies or organizationsa
function organizations
#1- Transportation Department of Transportation DOD and 10 others
#2- Communications DHS/Information Analysis and DOD and 7 others
Infrastructure
Protection/National
Communications System
#3- Public works and DOD/U.S. Army Corps of DOD and 16 others
engineering Engineers
DHS/Emergency Preparedness and
Response/FEMA
#4- Firefighting Department of DOD and 5 others
Agriculture/Forest Service
#5- Emergency management DHS/Emergency Preparedness and DOD and 25 others
Response/FEMA
#6- Mass care, housing, DHS/Emergency Preparedness and DOD and 15 others
and human Response/FEMA
services American Red Cross
#7- Resource support General Services DOD and 9 others
Administration
#8- Public health and Department of Health and Human DOD and 15 others
medical services Services
#9- Urban search and DHS/Emergency Preparedness and DOD and 10 others
rescue Response/FEMA
#10- Oil and hazardous Environmental Protection DOD and 14 others
materials Agency
response
#11- Agriculture and Department of Agriculture DOD and 12 others
natural resources
Department of the Interior
#12- Energy Department of Energy DOD and 11 others
#13- Public safety and DHS DOD and 12 others
security
Department of Justice
#14- Long-term community Department of Agriculture DOD and 10 others
recovery and
mitigation Department of Commerce
DHS/Emergency Preparedness and
Response/FEMA
Department of Housing and
Urban Development
Department of the Treasury
Small Business Administration
#15- External affairs DHS/Emergency Preparedness and DOD and 25 others
Response/FEMA
Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Plan. DHS = Department of
Homeland Security. FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency.
a
The Army Corps of Engineers was included with DOD and not counted as a
separate agency.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 1.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 1. See comment 2.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 5.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 6.
See comment 7.
See comment 8.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment. 1.
See comment 9.
See comment 10.
See comment 11.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 12.
See comment 13.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 1.
See comment 14.
See comment 9.
See comment 15.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 14.
See comment 12.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 16.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 17.
See comment 9.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 18.
See comment 12.
See comment 19.
See comment 20.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 20.
See comment 9.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense letter dated
May 5, 2006, and its attachments.
1. See the "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation" section, which begins
GAO Comments
on page 36.
1. Many of the actions DOD cites were not completed when we ended our
review, and several are still not completed, so we cannot evaluate
their effectiveness. We continue to believe that "DOD is beginning to
take action" is accurate.
2. Our report distinguishes between disasters and catastrophes and
emphasizes the need to plan for extensive use of DOD capabilities
during catastrophes, when other responders are overwhelmed. Our report
does not call for expanded use of DOD capabilities during disasters.
3. See the comments on our first recommendation in the "Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation" section.
4. See the comments on our second recommendation in the "Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation" section.
5. See the comments on our third recommendation in the "Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation" section.
6. USTRANSCOM is one of the agencies that would be included in our
recommendation that the National Guard Bureau make the information
available to "other organizations with federal military support to
civil agency planning responsibilities."
7. See the comments on our fourth recommendation in the "Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation" section.
8. We have addressed this comment in the report.
9. Our report makes reference to DOD's use of reconnaissance assets
during Hurricane Rita.
10. While we have added additional information about DOD's integration
efforts, these additional efforts do not diminish our finding that
integration problems led to inefficiencies and duplication of effort.
Page 64 GAO-06-643 Hurricane Katrina Appendix III: Comments From the
Department of Defense
1. Although aviation officials expressed safety concerns to us, we agree
that the fact that military search and rescue efforts were conducted
under extreme conditions without any aviation accidents constitutes a
considerable accomplishment, so we have revised our search and rescue
section.
2. We evaluated these technical comments and incorporated them as
appropriate.
3. Our report recognizes that the military forces, which responded to
Hurricane Katrina, were operating within existing regulatory and
policy guidelines, such as the NRP, DOD's Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support, and the current mobilization authorities,
and the report recommends adjustments to some of these guidelines.
4. The focus of this report was the preparation for and response to
Hurricane Katrina, not Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. However, where
appropriate, we have incorporated information about lessons learned
from Katrina, such as the use of reconnaissance assets to assess
damage from Hurricane Rita.
5. We modified the report to show that commands had issued planning and
warning orders prior to Katrina's landfall. However, our report
emphasizes the need for deliberative, advanced planning in addition to
crisis action planning.
6. We continue to believe that the solution to long-standing damage
assessment problems requires military involvement.
7. The First Army comments provide additional information about the
aviation picture over New Orleans, but as stated in the report, search
and rescue tasks were being assigned from two sites that were not
integrated. This led to some duplication of effort.
8. Military officials told us that many of their troops worked directly
with local officials and performed whatever tasks were most needed.
They said that many of these tasks were not captured in official
statistics or mission assignments.
9. We agree that some operational overlap was inevitable, but limitations
in planning led to inefficiencies and some duplication of effort.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also
made contributions to this report: John Pendleton, Assistant Director;
Krislin Bolling; Ann Borseth; Alissa Czyz; Amy Dingler; Michael Ferren;
Richard Geiger; Kenya Jones; Tina Kirschbaum; Patricia Lentini; Brian
Mateja; Thomas Mills; Elizabeth Morris; Robert Poetta; Gina Saylor;
Natalie Schneider; Frank Smith; Leo Sullivan; and Steve Woods.
Related GAO Products
Preparedness
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington D.C.:
November 10, 2004.
Reserve forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and
Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington D.C.:
April 29, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for
Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Federal Response
Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown
but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington D.C.:
January 26, 2001.
Military Operations: DOD's Disaster Relief Assistance in Response to
Hurricane Mitch. GAO/NSIAD-99-122R. Washington D.C.: March 29, 1999.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington D.C.: March 8, 2006.
Command and Control
Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic
Disasters. GAO/RCED-93-186. Washington D.C.: July 23, 1993.
Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the
Nation's Response Strategy. GAO/T-RCED-93-46. Washington D.C.: January 27,
1993.
Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricane Andrew and Iniki and
Typhoon Omar. GAO/NSIAD-93-180. Washington D.C.: January 18, 1993.
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to
Support Military Operations. GAO/T-RCED-93-46. Washington D.C.: January
27, 1993.
(350755)
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