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-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-634	

TITLE:     NASA'S JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE: Knowledge-Based Acquisition 
Approach Key to Addressing Program Challenges

DATE:   07/14/2006 
				                                                                         
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GAO-06-634

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * JWST's Revised Strategy Does Not Fully Incorporate a Knowled
          * Immature Technologies, Design Challenges, and Testing Restri
          * Containing Further Cost Growth and Schedule Slippage
          * Knowledge-Based Approach Key to Overcoming Challenges
          * Risks Not Fully Addressed by Recently Revised Acquisition St
          * Knowledge-Based Approach Would Allow the JWST Program to Bet
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * GAO Contact
     * Staff Acknowledgments
     * NASA Reports
     * Space Reports
     * Best Practices Reports
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

July 2006

NASA'S JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE

Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Key to Addressing Program Challenges

James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space
Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb
Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope
James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space
Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb
Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope
James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space
Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb
Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope
James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space
Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb
Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope James Webb Space Telescope

GAO-06-634

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2
Background 3
JWST's Revised Strategy Does Not Fully Incorporate a Knowledge-Based
Approach That Could Reduce Risks and Better Inform Decision Making 6
Conclusions 18
Recommendations for Executive Action 18
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22
Appendix II Technology Readiness Levels 23
Appendix III Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration 25
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27
Related GAO Products 28

Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual Drawing of NASA's JWST 4
Figure 2: Comparison of NASA's Life Cycle with a Knowledge-Based
Acquisition Life Cycle 11
Figure 3: Technology Maturity Levels for Product Development 13

Abbreviations

CSA Canadian Space Agency ESA European Space Agency JWST James Webb Space
Telescope KP1 Knowledge point 1 NAR Non-advocate Review NASA National
Aeronautics and Space Administration PDR Preliminary Design Review TRL
Technology Readiness Levels

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 14, 2006

Congressional Committees

As the expected follow-on to the tremendously successful Hubble Space
Telescope, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is being designed to explore the early
universe and allow scientists to shed light on the origins and nature of
the universe by allowing them to look deeper into space-and thus farther
back in time-than ever before. Recently, however, NASA acknowledged that
the program1 has experienced cost growth exceeding $1 billion-which
increased its life-cycle cost estimate from $3.5 billion to $4.5
billion-and its schedule has slipped nearly 2 years. The agency
restructured the program and is now anticipating a launch no sooner than
June 2013.

Because of the restructuring and past cost and schedule problems, we
reviewed the program to determine the extent to which the JWST program's
acquisition strategy follows NASA acquisition policy and Government
Accountability Office (GAO) best practices for ensuring that adequate
product knowledge is used to make informed investments. We conducted our
work under the Comptroller General's authority and are addressing this
report to you because of your committee's or subcommittee's interest in
NASA activities.

To assess the extent to which the JWST acquisition strategy follows NASA
policy and GAO best practices for ensuring readiness to proceed into
implementation, we reviewed NASA policy guidance and compared it with the
JWST program's acquisition strategy. We also benchmarked the JWST
acquisition strategy to best practices. We interviewed NASA and contractor
officials to clarify our understanding of the program's management
approach and technology development plan. We analyzed cost and schedule
information and discussed the impact of the investment in the JWST on
other NASA programs with NASA officials. We attended two design reviews,
including one at the prime contractor's facility. We performed our review
from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

1The JWST is a one-project program, according to a NASA official. The
terms "program" and "project" are used interchangeably throughout this
report.

                                Results in Brief

Although the JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to
conform to NASA's acquisition policies, the program still faces
considerable challenges because it has not fully implemented a
knowledge-based approach. Our past work on the best practices of product
developers in government and industry has found that using a
knowledge-based approach is often a key factor in program success. We
recently made recommendations that NASA take steps to ensure that projects
follow a knowledge-based approach for product development.2 NASA concurred
and revised its acquisition policy. When we initiated our work and before
the JWST program's recently revised acquisition strategy, program
officials intended to have NASA commit to the program and start
implementation with immature technologies, according to best practices,
and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these
shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition
strategy to conform to NASA policy. However, the current strategy still
does not fully incorporate a knowledge-based approach that ensures that
resources match requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before
program start, which is the end of the formulation phase and the beginning
of the implementation phase. If program officials follow the current plan,
the maturity of key technologies may not be adequately tested prior to
program start. For example, a test to demonstrate critical performance
parameters is scheduled to occur after the program start decision and some
planned test items may not provide the validity needed to adequately
verify technology maturity. In addition, it appears the program will not
have sufficient funding resources to ensure the program's success.
According to a review conducted by NASA's Independent Program Assessment
Office, the program's contingency funding is too low and phased in too
late in the program to support the planned launch date and provide the
necessary resources to address as yet unforeseen problems. In light of the
fiscally constrained environment the federal government and NASA will face
in the years ahead, adopting a knowledge-based approach will not only
increase the JWST program's chances for success but also lay the
foundation for comparison between competing programs. As more programs,
such as the JWST, move into implementation, using a knowledge-based
approach will allow NASA to assess these development efforts in a
consistent format to confirm the continued viability of the investment.

2GAO, NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could
Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2005).

To increase the JWST program's chances of successful product development
and to better inform NASA's decision-making process, we are recommending
that the NASA Administrator (1) direct the JWST program to apply a
knowledge-based acquisition approach, including incremental markers, to
ensure that adequate knowledge is attained at key decision points and to
hold the program accountable and (2) instruct the JWST program to continue
to adhere to NASA acquisition policy and base the program's go/no-go
decision not only on adherence to that policy, but also on demonstrating
that it is meeting incremental knowledge markers and that adequate funds
are available to execute the program.

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our
recommendations. NASA's comments are included in their entirety in
appendix III.

                                   Background

The JWST-identified by the National Research Council as the top priority
new initiative for astronomy and physics for the current decade-is a large
deployable space-based observatory being developed to study and answer
fundamental questions ranging from the formation and structure of the
universe to the origin of planetary systems and the origins of life. Often
referred to as the replacement to Hubble, the JWST is more of a next
generation telescope-one that scientists believe will be capable of seeing
back to the origins of the universe (Big Bang). The JWST will have a
large, segmented primary mirror-6.5 meters (about 21 feet) in
diameter-which is a leap ahead in technology over the last generation of
mirrors. The observatory requires a sunshield approximately the size of a
tennis court to allow it to cool to the extremely cold temperature (around
40 degrees Kelvin, or minus 388 degrees Fahrenheit) necessary for the
telescope and science instruments to work. The mirror and the
sunshield-both critical components-must fold up to fit inside the launch
vehicle and open to their operational configuration once the JWST is in
orbit. In addition, the observatory will house science instruments-such as
a near-infrared3 camera, a near-infrared spectrograph,4 a mid-infrared
instrument, and a fine guidance sensor-to enable scientists to conduct
various research activities.

Figure 1: Conceptual Drawing of NASA's JWST

The JWST is an international collaboration among the United States, the
European Space Agency (ESA), and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA). ESA will
provide the near-infrared spectrograph science instrument, the optical
bench assembly of the mid-infrared instrument, and the launch of the JWST
by means of an Ariane 5 expendable launch vehicle. CSA's contribution will
be the fine guidance sensor to enable stable pointing.

3Infrared radiation is one of the many types of "light" that comprise the
electromagnetic spectrum. Infrared light is situated outside of the
visible spectrum and has wavelengths longer than visible light.
Astronomers generally divide the infrared portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum into three regions: near infrared, mid infrared, and far
infrared. The JWST will be sensitive to near-infrared and mid-infrared
radiation.

4A spectrograph is an instrument for dispersing radiation (as
electromagnetic radiation or sound waves) into a spectrum and
photographing or mapping the spectrum.

Recently, the JWST program recognized significant cost growth and schedule
slippage. In March 2005, NASA identified about $1 billion cost growth,
which increased the JWST's life-cycle cost estimate from $3.5 billion to
$4.5 billion. In addition, the program's schedule slipped nearly 2 years.
As a result, the program began a series of re-baselining efforts to revise
its acquisition strategy. In summer 2005, NASA Headquarters chartered two
independent review teams-an Independent Review Team from NASA's
Independent Program Assessment Office and a Science Assessment Team-to
evaluate the program. The Independent Review Team was charged with
examining the program's new cost/schedule/ technical baseline and reported
in mid-April 2006 that (1) the JWST's scientific performance met the
expectations of the science community, (2) the technical content was
complete and sound, and (3) the Goddard Space Flight Center and contractor
teams were effective. However, the team was concerned about the program's
early year funding constraints.

The Science Assessment Team, an international team of outside experts, was
established to evaluate scientific capabilities of the JWST in the 2015
time frame in light of other astronomical facilities that would be
available. The team concluded that the financial savings gained from the
reduction in the size of the primary mirror area would not be worth the
resultant loss of scientific capabilities. The team recommended relaxing
some science requirements and simplifying other aspects of the mission,
such as integration and testing, to reduce the program's cost risk. For
example, the team recommended relaxing the contamination requirements,
allowing the project to test the mirrors using an innovative approach that
will reduce costs. The team also recommended that the JWST de-emphasize
the shorter wavelengths, since other astronomical facilities would be
available to cover that range.

 JWST's Revised Strategy Does Not Fully Incorporate a Knowledge-Based Approach
           That Could Reduce Risks and Better Inform Decision Making

The JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to conform to
NASA's acquisition policies; however, the program still faces considerable
challenges. GAO best practices work has found that using a knowledge-based
approach is a key factor in program success. When we initiated our work
and before the program's recently revised acquisition strategy, program
officials intended to have NASA commit to the program and start
implementation with immature technologies, according to best practices,
and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these
shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition
strategy to align their decision milestones in accordance with NASA
acquisition policy. While this is a good step, the current strategy does
not fully incorporate a knowledge-based approach that could reduce the
program's risks by ensuring that resources match requirements at program
start. By closely following a knowledge-based approach, the JWST program
will increase its chances for success and better inform NASA's decision
making.

Immature Technologies, Design Challenges, and Testing Restrictions Still Pose
Risks

The JWST contains several innovations, including lightweight optics, a
deployable sunshield, and a folding segmented mirror. Although the program
began risk reduction activities early to develop and mature some
technologies, such as the lightweight segmented folding mirror, the
program is challenged with maturing some of its other critical
technologies. For example, the sunshield, which consists of five layers of
membranes, must be folded for launch but then unfurled to its operational
configuration-with enough tension to prevent wrinkle patterns that could
interfere with the telescope's mirrors, but not so much tension to cause
tears in the fabric. The sunshield must also be aligned with the rest of
the observatory so that only the top layer of the sunshield is visible to
the primary mirror and a correct angle between the observatory and the sun
and other heat-radiating bodies is maintained to enable the telescope and
science instruments to preserve the very cold temperature-about 40 degrees
Kelvin-critical for achieving the JWST's mission. In addition, using
passive cooling devices, such as heat switches, to allow specific areas of
the telescope to cool down, represent additional challenges since these
items will be used in new configurations. NASA also recently substituted
the cryo-cooler used for the mid-infrared instrument for a lower
technology component to save mass. According to JWST officials, the
program recently awarded the development contract for the cryo-cooler. In
addition, the micro shutter array, which will allow the JWST to program
specific patterns of the electromagnetic spectrum for viewing, is a new
technology being developed by the Goddard Space Flight Center and is still
at a relatively low level of maturity. JWST officials acknowledge that
they are concerned about maturing the cryo-cooler and the micro shutter
array.

In addition, the program also faces design challenges related to the
launch vehicle and the observatory's stability. For example, program
officials told us that they may need to request a waiver because the
telescope will not fit within the criteria limits of the launch vehicle's
envelop without making design modifications. Furthermore, due to the late
selection of the launch vehicle, the project office and prime contractor
are just beginning to discuss interfaces, transportation at the launch
site, and the additional space issue with Ariane 5 officials. Also, the
project faces the unresolved problem of finding the best way to keep the
observatory stable. The large sunshield, observatory attitude changes, and
other effects conspire to produce unbalanced torques, which can make the
observatory unstable. The project continues to look at ways to resolve
this problem, including thrusters to rebalance the observatory, but
project officials say this will continue to be a challenge.

Another overriding concern is NASA's inability to test the entire
observatory in its operational environment, since there is no test
facility in the United States large enough to perform this test. The plan
is to incrementally test components and subsystems on the ground in
laboratories simulating the observatory's operational environment and to
make extensive use of modeling and simulation. According to the memorandum
summarizing the January 2006 System Definition Review, a key concern is
that the JWST is pushing the limits of ground test facilities and cannot
be tested at the observatory level; therefore, requiring complicated
integration and testing with a series of subsystem tests and analyses. In
its April 2006 assessment of the JWST program, the Independent Review Team
reported that there are several exceptions to the "test as you fly"5
guideline and that mitigation strategies need to be developed before the
end of the preliminary design phase.

Containing Further Cost Growth and Schedule Slippage

In March 2005, the JWST program recognized that its cost had grown by
about $1 billion, increasing the JWST's life-cycle cost estimate from $3.5
billion to $4.5 billion. About half of the cost growth was due to schedule
slippage-a 1-year schedule slip because of a delay in the decision to use
an ESA-supplied Ariane 5 launch vehicle and an additional 10-month slip
caused by budget profile limitations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. More
than a third of the cost increase was caused by requirements and other
changes. An increase in the program's contingency funding accounted for
the remainder-about 12 percent-of the growth.

5"Test as you fly" means performing the final performance and
environmental test with the spacecraft fully integrated in the same
configuration that it will be in when it launches, according an agency
official.

Despite an increase in the program's contingency funding, the Independent
Review Team found that the contingency funding is still inadequate. In its
April 2006 assessment of the JWST program's re-baselining, the Independent
Review Team expressed concern over the program's contingency funding,
stating that it is too low and phased in too late. According to the team,
the program's contingency from 2006 through 2010 of only $29 million, or
about 1.5 percent,6 after "liens" and "threats"7 is inadequate.8 The team
also stated that a 25 percent to 30 percent total contingency is
appropriate for a program of this complexity. The program's total
contingency is only about 19 percent. The team warned that because of the
inadequate contingency, the program's ability to resolve issues, address
program risk areas, and accommodate unknown problems is very limited.
Therefore, the team concluded that from a budget perspective, the
re-baselined program is not viable for a 2013 launch. The team recommended
that before the Non-Advocate Review (NAR)9 leading to program start, steps
should be taken by the Science Mission Directorate to assure that the JWST
program contains an adequate time-phased funding contingency to secure a
stable launch date.

6Some budget cuts were restored after the Independent Review Team's
assessment, increasing this amount to about 3 percent.

7A "lien" is a potential cost to a project, direct or indirect, which may
or may not come to fruition, for which a portion of funding reserves is
set aside. According to a JWST project official, "threats" are things that
concern a project or engineer, which may or may not come true, but which
bear watching to see if they have validity; however, they do not require
the same rigor as "liens."

8According to a member of the Independent Review Team, "threats" were
included in the analysis because after examining the project office's
"threat" list, the team concluded that the "threats" had a high
probability of occurring and were therefore more like "liens."

9The NAR-a program/project milestone review prescribed by NASA Procedural
Requirements 7120.5C-is intended to provide NASA management with an
independent assessment of a program's readiness to move into
implementation and the final design phase.

The JWST program remains at risk of incurring additional cost growth and
schedule slippage because of the technical challenges that must be
resolved-immature technologies, design challenges, and testing
restrictions. Our best practices work indicates that immature technology
increases the risk of cost increases and schedule slips. Unresolved
technology challenges can cascade through a product development cycle
often resulting in an unstable design that will require more testing and
thus more time and money to fix the problems. Subsequently, it will be
difficult to prepare a reliable cost estimate until these challenges are
resolved.

Knowledge-Based Approach Key to Overcoming Challenges

Our past work on the best practices of product developers in government
and industry has found that the use of a knowledge-based approach is a key
factor in successfully addressing challenges such as those faced by the
JWST program. Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of
work on how leading developers in industry and government use a
knowledge-based approach to deliver high quality products on time and
within budget.10 A knowledge-based approach to product development efforts
enables developers to be reasonably certain that, at critical junctures or
"knowledge points" in the acquisition life cycle, their products are more
likely to meet established cost, schedule, and performance baselines and
therefore provides them with information needed to make sound investment
decisions. The marker for the first juncture-knowledge point 1
(KP1)-occurs just prior to program start. At KP1, the customer's
requirements match the product developer's resources in terms of
knowledge, time, and money. At KP 2, the product design is stable, and
production processes are mature at KP 3. Product development efforts that
have not followed a knowledge-based approach can frequently be
characterized by poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes.

We recently reported that NASA's revised acquisition policy for developing
flight systems and ground support projects incorporates some aspects of
the best practices used by successful developers.11 For example, NASA
policy requires projects to conduct a major decision review-NAR-before
moving from formulation to implementation. Further, before moving from
formulation to implementation, projects must validate requirements and
develop realistic cost and schedule estimates, human capital plans, a
preliminary design, and a technology plan-all key elements for matching
needs to resources before commitment to a major investment is made at
project start. Figure 2 compares NASA's life cycle with a knowledge-based
acquisition life cycle.

10Our best practice reviews are identified in the "Related GAO Products"
section at the end of this report.

11 GAO-06-218 .

Figure 2: Comparison of NASA's Life Cycle with a Knowledge-Based
Acquisition Life Cycle

While the policy incorporates elements of a knowledge-based approach, we
also reported that NASA's acquisition policies lack the necessary
requirements to ensure that programs proceed and are funded only after an
adequate level of knowledge at key junctures. For example, NASA policy
does not require that programs demonstrate technologies at high levels of
maturity at program start. Further, although NASA policy does require
project managers to establish a continuum of technical and management
reviews, the policy does not specify what these reviews should be nor does
it require major decision reviews at other key points in a product's
development. These best practices could be used to further reduce program
risks.

In order to close the gaps between NASA's current acquisition environment
and best practices on knowledge-based acquisition, we recommended that
NASA take steps to ensure that NASA projects follow a knowledge-based
approach for product development. Specifically, we recommended that NASA
(1) in drafting its systems engineering policy, incorporate requirements
for flight systems and ground support projects to capture specific product
knowledge by key junctures in project development and use demonstration of
this knowledge as exit criteria for decision making at key milestones and
(2) revise NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5C to institute additional
major decision reviews following the NAR for flight systems and ground
support projects, which result in recommendations to the appropriate
decision authority at key milestones. NASA concurred with our
recommendations and agreed to revise its policies.

One of the resources needed at program start is mature technology. Our
best practices work has shown that technology readiness levels (TRL)12- a
concept developed by NASA-can be used to gauge the maturity of individual
technologies. Specifically, TRL 6-demonstrating a technology as a fully
integrated prototype in a realistic environment-is the level of maturity
needed to minimize risks for space systems entering product development.
To achieve TRL 6, technology maturity must be demonstrated in a relevant
environment using a prototype or model. (See app. II for a detailed
description and definition of TRLs and test environments.)

12TRLs characterize the readiness of technologies for hand-off to project
implementers. Nine levels are defined representing concepts from
fundamental research level through technologies fully qualified and
demonstrated in flight.

Figure 3: Technology Maturity Levels for Product Development

A knowledge-based approach also involves the use of incremental markers to
ensure that the required knowledge has been attained at each critical
juncture. For example, exit criteria at KP1 should include demonstrated
maturity of critical technologies, completed trade-offs and finalized
requirements, and initial cost and schedule estimates using results from
the preliminary design review. The approach ensures that managers will (1)
conduct activities to capture relevant product development knowledge, (2)
provide evidence that knowledge was captured, and (3) hold decision
reviews to determine that appropriate knowledge was captured to allow a
move to the next phase. If the knowledge attained at each juncture does
not justify the initial investment, the project should not go forward and
additional resources should not be committed.

Risks Not Fully Addressed by Recently Revised Acquisition Strategy

Prior to the program's recent acquisition strategy revision, program
officials were not following NASA acquisition policy13 and were set to
commit to the program and start implementation with immature technologies,
according to best practices, and without a preliminary design. For
instance, the schedule called for convening the NAR before the end of
preliminary design. NASA policy indicates that the NAR and Preliminary
Design Review (PDR) should be aligned. Even at the pre-NAR14 in July 2003,
the plan had been to have the NAR before the PDR,15 although the two
reviews were closer together than the more recent plan.

13NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5C, which states that its requirements
are applicable to all programs and projects currently in formulation as of
the effective date of March 22, 2005.

During our review, we discussed these shortfalls with NASA officials. To
their credit, they revised their acquisition strategy to conform to NASA
policy. Currently, the mission NAR-upon which the program start decision
will be based-will be aligned with the mission PDR (scheduled for March
2008). We believe this is a positive step, since it will ensure that a
preliminary design-a key element for matching needs to resources-is
established before program start. The revised strategy also splits the NAR
into two parts-a technical NAR and a mission NAR. The purpose of the
technical NAR (scheduled for January 2007) will be to determine whether
the project has successfully retired its invention risk, i.e., critical
technologies have achieved TRL 6, according to a NASA official. Technology
issues will not be revisited after the technical NAR unless problems
arise. However, it is unclear if the critical technologies will be
demonstrated to a level of fidelity required by best practices at the
technical NAR. Furthermore, the strategy does not fully incorporate a
knowledge-based approach that could address the program's risks by
ensuring-through the use of exit criteria-that resources match
requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before program start.
For example:

           o  Under a knowledge-based approach, adequate testing is required
           to demonstrate that key technologies are mature-at TRL 6-prior to
           program start. This is particularly important for the JWST, given
           the program's challenges with testing restrictions and the fact
           that the observatory cannot be serviced in space. In some cases,
           such as the sunshield, backup technologies do not exist, thus
           increasing the importance of adequately maturing and testing
           critical technologies. If key components-like the sunshield-fail,
           then the entire observatory will be lost. This requires greater
           fidelity in the testing, even as early as demonstrating the
           maturity of key technologies prior to program start.

           To achieve TRL 6 (the maturity level required by best practices
           for program start), technology maturity must be demonstrated as a
           representative model or prototype-which is very close to the
           actual system in form, fit, and function-in a relevant
           environment. However, there is risk that the current JWST
           technology development plan will not result in the appropriate
           demonstration of technology maturity. For example, the half-scale
           thermal vacuum test of the entire observatory16 at Johnson Space
           Center is currently planned for September 2008, and so the
           knowledge gained regarding the maturity of the sunshield's thermal
           and dynamic performance17 is pushed out 6 months beyond the
           PDR/NAR/program start date of March 2008. When JWST program
           officials briefed us in August 2005, the TRL levels for thermal
           and dynamic performance of the sunshield were both assessed to be
           at TRL 4, and the plan to get to TRL 6 was to test these
           subsystems during this half-scale thermal vacuum test. However, in
           fall 2005 program officials reviewed the technology development
           plan and concluded that only the materials for the sunshield's
           membrane are technology development items, while other items
           affecting the configuration and deployment of the sunshield-such
           as thermal and dynamic performance-are considered engineering
           challenges. JWST officials stated that earlier testing of sample
           materials demonstrated the sunshield's thermal performance and a
           demonstration using a 1/10th scale model demonstrated dynamic
           performance18 and satisfied TRL 6 requirements. However, we have
           found in our best practices work that demonstrating a technology
           to a TRL 6 typically involves demonstrating that a prototype-close
           to the form, fit, and functionality intended for the product-has
           been demonstrated in an environment that closely represents the
           anticipated operational environment. In our past review of
           development programs, we have found that if this level of maturity
           is not demonstrated before a product development effort is
           launched, a program increases the likelihood of cost growth and
           schedule delays as it tries to close the knowledge gap between the
           technologies' maturity level and the product's design
           requirements.

           o  The JWST program's inadequate contingency runs contrary to
           another premise of a knowledge-based approach-having sufficient
           resources in terms of funding available to ensure a program's
           success. As discussed in an earlier section, the Independent
           Review Team stated that the program's contingency from 2006
           through 2010 of only about 1.5 percent after "liens" and "threats"
           is inadequate. The team warned that, because of the inadequate
           contingency, the program's ability to resolve issues, address
           program risk areas, and accommodate unknown problems is very
           limited. The team concluded that, from a budget perspective, the
           re-baselined program is not viable for a 2013 launch.

14The pre-NAR is an independent review of programs/projects conducted at
the end of the concept development phase to assess readiness to proceed
into the preliminary design phase.

15The PDR is the project milestone review which establishes the basis for
proceeding with a detailed design. The purpose of the PDR is to
demonstrate that the preliminary design meets all system requirements with
an acceptable level of risk within the planned cost and schedule.

16According to the mission systems engineer, the half-scale thermal vacuum
test will be done using a half-scale model of the entire observatory.
Deployments, including the sunshield, will be tested, and the sunshield
membrane will be vibrated during the test.

17The purpose of dynamic testing is to determine how the sunshield behaves
structurally when shaken at different frequencies in order to predict the
influence of disturbances on the pointing control of the JWST's optics.

18The main components of the 1/10th scale model test article were a
central mounting block, four support tubes, and four Kapton film layers.
Therefore, the 1/10th scale model was not a scale version of the current
JWST sunshield, which consists of five layers of Kapton membranes with
special coatings, booms, hinges, deployment motors, edge cables, stowed
boom restraints, stowed membrane containment structure, and other
mechanisms.

Knowledge-Based Approach Would Allow the JWST Program to Better Inform NASA's
Decision-Making Process

A good basis for making informed investment decisions is essential in the
fiscally constrained environment that now exists across the federal
government. Our nation faces large, growing, and structural long-term
fiscal imbalances. Given the severity of those fiscal challenges and the
wide range of federal programs, hard choices need to be considered across
the government, and NASA is no exception. NASA must compete with other
departments and agencies for part of a constricted discretionary spending
budget.

In the near future, NASA will need to determine the resources necessary to
develop the systems and supporting technologies to achieve the President's
Vision for Space Exploration-while simultaneously financing its other
priority programs-and structure its investment strategy accordingly.
Initial implementation of the Vision as explained in NASA's Exploration
Systems Architecture Study calls for completing the International Space
Station, developing a new crew exploration vehicle, and returning to the
moon no later than 2020. NASA estimates that it will cost approximately
$104 billion over the next 13 years to accomplish these initial goals.
These priorities, along with NASA's other missions, will be competing
within NASA for funding. It will likely be difficult for decision makers
to agree on which projects to invest in and which projects, if any, to
terminate. The NASA Administrator has acknowledged that NASA faces
difficult choices about its missions in the future-for example, between
human space flight, science, and aeronautics missions.

In the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for NASA, the JWST has
the largest budget allocation of all programs in the Science Mission
Directorate's Astrophysics Division for the 5-year budget horizon from
fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011-nearly $2 billion of the
division's $6.9 billion total budget, or about 29 percent. An inadequately
informed decision to commit to the estimated $4.5 billion total funding
for the JWST would significantly impact NASA's science portfolio, since
funding given to the JWST will not available for other programs. Early in
the planning for how to handle the JWST program's cost growth, NASA
officials recognized the impact that the JWST's cost growth could have on
other programs. In a July 2005 briefing to the Agency Program Management
Council19 soon after the cost growth was identified, NASA officials stated
that "something must give if JWST stays in the portfolio." The choices
discussed were (1) relaxing requirements or (2) adding budget and
schedule, which would mean that other missions would be deferred or
deleted from the portfolio.

In addition, committing to the JWST program obligates the government
contractually, since it allows the prime contractor to begin
implementation tasks on the very long prime contract extending from
October 2002 through launch-currently planned for June 2013-plus one year.
The contract states that until the project achieves the implementation
milestone, contract spending is limited to formulation activities, except
for long-lead items and other activities approved in writing. After the
implementation milestone is achieved at program start, the contracting
officer will notify the contractor by letter to proceed to implementation.
According to the contracting officer, the assumption is that this is the
go-ahead for the whole program.

To make well-informed decisions, NASA needs the knowledge to assess the
value of its programs-like the JWST program-in relationship to each other.
In May 2004, we reported that, of 27 NASA programs we examined, 17 had
cost increases averaging about 31percent.20 One of the programs in our
sample was another infrared telescope program-the Spitzer Space
Telescope-and it was plagued by schedule slippages caused by delays in the
delivery of components, flight software, the mission operation system, and
launch delays, all contributing to a 29.3 percent increase in program
costs. In general, we found the programs in the sample lacked sufficient
knowledge needed to make informed acquisition decisions. Insufficient
knowledge to make informed investment decisions can further complicate the
already-difficult choices that NASA faces. Conversely, sufficient
knowledge at key junctures can facilitate well-informed investment
decisions and protect the government from incurring contractual
liabilities before it is appropriate. A knowledge-based approach ensures
that comprehensive and comparable programmatic data are obtained.

19The Agency Program Management Council is one of a system of Governing
Program Management Councils responsible for assessing program and project
formulation and implementation as well as providing oversight and
direction.

20GAO, NASA: Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes Hinders
Effective Program Management, GAO-04-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

                                  Conclusions

Within the JWST program, NASA officials have accomplished a great deal,
such as the development of the large, segmented mirror that is a leap
ahead in technology. Moreover, the program has support from the larger
scientific community. To enhance the program's chances for success,
program officials have chosen a path forward which follows NASA's policies
for ensuring readiness to proceed into implementation/product development.
However, the JWST program's revised strategy does not fully address the
risks associated with the many challenges that the program still
faces-including maturing technology, mitigating testing restrictions, and
ensuring that adequate funding is available for contingencies. This puts
the program at risk of further cost growth and schedule slippage. The
program needs to have sufficient knowledge at key junctures to
successfully address its challenges and use incremental markers to make
certain that resources in terms of knowledge, time, workforce, and money
match the requirements. Given the severity of the fiscal challenges our
nation faces and the wide range of competing federal programs, hard
choices need to be considered across the government, and NASA is no
exception. Using a knowledge-based approach for NASA's new development
programs such as the JWST could help the agency make the difficult choices
about how to allocate its limited budget resources among competing
priorities by utilizing common and consistent criteria in program
evaluations.

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

To increase the JWST program's chances of successful product development,
we recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following actions:

           o  Direct the JWST program to fully apply a knowledge-based
           acquisition approach-to include incremental markers-that will not
           only ensure that adequate knowledge is attained at key decision
           points, but also hold the program accountable. These markers
           should include, but not be limited to

                        o  schedules that demonstrate the maturity of all
                        critical technologies prior to program start;
                        o  criteria to ensure the validity of test articles;
                        o  criteria to demonstrate that mature component
                        designs being used in new configurations meet form,
                        fit, and function standards; and
                        o  criteria to ensure that sufficient contingency
                        funding can be provided and phased appropriately.

           o  Instruct the JWST program to continue to adhere to NASA
           acquisition policy and base the program's go/no-go review (NAR)
           decision not only on adherence to that policy, but also on (1) the
           program's ability to demonstrate whether it is meeting the
           knowledge markers outlined earlier and (2) whether adequate funds
           are available to execute the program.

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our two
recommendations and outlined actions that the agency plans to take to
implement such recommendations. NASA said that it endorses the
knowledge-based approach recommended and that it believes the current JWST
program plan is consistent with that approach. NASA's recognition of the
value of obtaining knowledge prior to moving to subsequent acquisition
phases and acknowledgment that it plans to use exit criteria as knowledge
markers for other JWST mission-level reviews are welcome steps toward
establishing an agency-wide risk reduction culture. Now, it will be
critical for NASA decision makers to enforce adherence to the discipline
of the knowledge-based approach and ensure that critical product knowledge
is indeed demonstrated before allowing the JWST program to proceed. In the
years ahead, NASA decision makers will likely face pressures to grant
waivers for going forward with immature technologies, allow programs to be
restructured, and thus marginalize accountability. For a program such as
the JWST, whose investment is already substantial and successful outcome
eagerly anticipated by the science community, adherence to such
knowledge-based principles will need to be strictly enforced. As
identified in this report, NASA would be well served by applying its own
technology readiness standards (reprinted in appendix II) as part of its
exit criteria, and demonstrating that critical technologies are at the TRL
6 level prior to program start using a representative model or
prototype-which is very close to the actual system in form, fit, and
function-in a relevant environment. Emphasis by decision makers on the
application of "form, fit, and function standards" and "validity of test
articles" as exit criteria for the JWST program start and entry into Phase
C will help address our concern that the current JWST technology
development plan may not result in the appropriate demonstration of
technology maturity prior to program start. NASA's comments are reprinted
in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and to the NASA Administrator. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged
in appendix IV.

Allen Li Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison

Chairman

The Honorable Bill Nelson

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United State Senate

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Chairman

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert

Chairman

The Honorable Bart Gordon

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ken Calvert

Chairman

The Honorable Mark Udall

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Chairman

The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce,
and, Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the JWST acquisition strategy follows NASA
policy and GAO best practices for ensuring readiness to proceed into
implementation, we reviewed NASA policy on program management and compared
the JWST project office's management approach to NASA policy.
Additionally, we analyzed the JWST acquisition strategy and benchmarked it
to best practices. We interviewed NASA and contractor officials to clarify
our understanding of the JWST management approach and technology
development plan in relation to NASA policy and guidelines and best
practices. To deepen our understanding of JWST technical issues, we
attended the 3-day Sunshield Subsystem Concept Design Review as well as
the 4-day JWST System Definition Review.

To evaluate the impact of the JWST acquisition strategy on NASA's ability
to assess the program and make informed investment decisions in the
context of its other priorities, we analyzed available JWST cost and
schedule data and conducted interviews with program officials to clarify
our understanding of the information. Furthermore, we requested and
reviewed documentary support breaking out the components of the cost
increases and schedule slippage. We also interviewed program officials to
clarify our understanding of the potential impact that investment in the
JWST will have on other NASA programs. In addition, we reviewed statements
of the NASA Administrator, budget documents, GAO's High-Risk Series, and
GAO's 21st Century Challenges to better evaluate the JWST's significance
in the larger NASA and federal government context.

To accomplish our work, we visited NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; Marshall Space Flight
Center, Huntsville, Alabama; Northrop Grumman Space Technology, Redondo
Beach, California; and Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation,
Boulder, Colorado.

We performed our review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels Appendix II: Technology Readiness
Levels

Technology                                              Demonstration      
Readiness Level   Description      Hardware Software    Environment        
TRL 1: Basic      Lowest level of  None. (Paper studies None               
principles        technology       and analysis.)       
observed and      readiness.                            
reported.         Scientific                            
                     research begins                       
                     to be translated                      
                     into applied                          
                     research and                          
                     development.                          
                     Examples might                        
                     include paper                         
                     studies of a                          
                     technology's                          
                     basic                                 
                     properties.                           
TRL 2: Technology Invention        None. (Paper studies None               
concept and/or    begins. Once     and analysis.)       
application       basic principles                      
formulated.       are observed,                         
                     practical                             
                     applications can                      
                     be invented. The                      
                     application is                        
                     speculative and                       
                     there is no                           
                     proof or                              
                     detailed                              
                     analysis to                           
                     support the                           
                     assumption.                           
                     Examples are                          
                     still limited to                      
                     paper studies.                        
TRL 3: Analytical Active research  Analytical studies   Lab                
and experimental  and development  and demonstration of 
critical function is initiated.    nonscale individual  
and/or            This includes    components (pieces   
characteristic    analytical       of subsystem).       
proof of concept. studies and                           
                     laboratory                            
                     studies to                            
                     physically                            
                     validate                              
                     analytical                            
                     predictions of                        
                     separate                              
                     elements of the                       
                     technology.                           
                     Examples include                      
                     components that                       
                     are not yet                           
                     integrated or                         
                     representative.                       
TRL 4: Component  Basic            Low fidelity         Lab                
and/or            technological    breadboard.          
breadboard.       components are   Integration of       
Validation in     integrated to    nonscale components  
laboratory        establish that   to show pieces will  
environment.      the pieces will  work together. Not   
                     work together.   fully functional or  
                     This is          form or fit but      
                     relatively "low  representative of    
                     fidelity"        technically feasible 
                     compared to the  approach suitable    
                     eventual system. for flight articles. 
                     Examples include                      
                     integration of                        
                     "ad hoc"                              
                     hardware in a                         
                     laboratory.                           
TRL 5: Component  Fidelity of      High fidelity        Lab demonstrating  
and/or breadboard breadboard       breadboard.          functionality but  
validation in     technology       Functionally         not form and fit.  
relevant          increases        equivalent but not   May include flight 
environment.      significantly.   necessarily form     demonstrating      
                     The basic        and/or fit (size     breadboard in      
                     technological    weight, materials,   surrogate          
                     components are   etc.). Should be     aircraft.          
                     integrated with  approaching          Technology ready   
                     reasonably       appropriate scale.   for detailed       
                     realistic        May include          design studies.    
                     supporting       integration of       
                     elements so that several components   
                     the technology   with reasonably      
                     can be tested in realistic support    
                     a simulated      elements/subsystems  
                     environment.     to demonstrate       
                     Examples include functionality.       
                     "high fidelity"                       
                     laboratory                            
                     Integration of                        
                     components.                           
TRL 6:            Representative   Prototype-Should be  High-fidelity lab  
System/subsystem  model or         very close to form,  demonstration or   
model or          prototype        fit and function.    limited/restricted 
prototype         system, which is Probably includes    flight             
demonstration in  well beyond the  the integration of   demonstration for  
a relevant        breadboard       many new components  a relevant         
environment.      tested for TRL   and realistic        environment.       
                     5, is tested in  supporting           Integration of     
                     a relevant       elements/subsystems  technology is well 
                     environment.     if needed to         defined.           
                     Represents a     demonstrate full     
                     major step up in functionality of the 
                     a technology's   subsystem.           
                     demonstrated                          
                     readiness.                            
                     Examples include                      
                     testing a                             
                     prototype in a                        
                     high fidelity                         
                     laboratory                            
                     environment or                        
                     in simulated                          
                     operational                           
                     environment.                          
TRL 7: System     Prototype near   Prototype. Should be Flight             
prototype         or at planned    form, fit and        demonstration in   
demonstration in  operational      function integrated  representative     
an operational    system.          with other key       operational        
environment.      Represents a     supporting           environment such   
                     major step up    elements/subsystems  as flying test bed 
                     from TRL 6,      to demonstrate full  or demonstrator    
                     requiring the    functionality of     aircraft.          
                     demonstration of subsystem.           Technology is well 
                     an actual system                      substantiated with 
                     prototype in an                       test data.         
                     operational                           
                     environment,                          
                     such as in an                         
                     aircraft,                             
                     vehicle or                            
                     space. Examples                       
                     include testing                       
                     the prototype in                      
                     a test bed                            
                     aircraft.                             
TRL 8: Actual     Technology has   Flight qualified     Developmental test 
system completed  been proven to   hardware             and evaluation in  
and "flight       work in its                           the actual system  
qualified"        final form and                        application.       
through test and  under expected                        
demonstration.    conditions. In                        
                     almost all                            
                     cases, this TRL                       
                     represents the                        
                     end of true                           
                     system                                
                     development.                          
                     Examples include                      
                     developmental                         
                     test and                              
                     evaluation of                         
                     the system in                         
                     its intended                          
                     weapon system to                      
                     determine if it                       
                     meets design                          
                     specifications.                       
TRL 9: Actual     Actual           Actual system in     Operational test   
system "flight    application of   final form           and evaluation in  
proven" through   the technology                        operational        
successful        in its final                          mission            
mission           form and under                        conditions.        
operations.       mission                               
                     conditions, such                      
                     as those                              
                     encountered in                        
                     operational test                      
                     and evaluation.                       
                     In almost all                         
                     cases, this is                        
                     the end of the                        
                     last "bug                             
                     fixing" aspects                       
                     of true system                        
                     development.                          
                     Examples include                      
                     using the system                      
                     under                                 
                     operational                           
                     mission                               
                     conditions.                           

Source: GAO and its analysis of NASA data.

Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

A Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Allen Li (202) 512-4841

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant
Director; Greg Campbell; Keith Rhodes; Sylvia Schatz; Erin Schoening; Hai
Tran; and Ruthie Williamson made key contributions to this report.

Related GA Related GAO Products

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Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar Effort Needs Additional Knowledge
before Starting Development. GAO-04-759 . Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD's New Space Systems Acquisition
Policy. GAO-04-379R . Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2004.

Space Acquisitions: Committing Prematurely to the Transformational
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Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisition
Management Policy. GAO-03-1073 . Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.

Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite
and Related Acquisitions. GAO-03-825R . Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003.

Military Space Operations: Planning, Funding, and Acquisition Challenges
Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control. GAO-02-738 . Washington, D.C.:
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Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-Low at Risk of Missing
Initial Deployment Date. GAO-01-6 . Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2001.

Best Practices Reports

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-05-301 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to Improve
DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393 . Washington,
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Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-04-248 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, but
More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53 . Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2003.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-03-476 . Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
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Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices.
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Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better
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Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon
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Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
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Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Program
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Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116 . Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.

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GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123 . Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56 . Washington, D.C.: February
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Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD's Earned Value
Management Process. GAO/NSIAD-97-108 . Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1997.

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer Improvements
for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162 . Washington, D.C.: August 26, 1996.

(120480)

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Highlights of GAO-06-634 , a report to congressional committees

July 2006

NASA'S JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE

Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Key to Addressing Program Challenges

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb
Space Telescope (JWST) is being designed to explore the origins and nature
of the universe. It should allow scientists to look deeper into space-and
thus farther back in time-than ever before. The program, however, has
experienced cost growth of more than $1 billion and its schedule has
slipped nearly 2 years. NASA recently restructured the program and now
anticipates a launch no sooner than June 2013. Because of the cost and
schedule problems, under the Comptroller General's authority, we reviewed
the JWST program to determine the extent to which this procurement follows
NASA acquisition policy and GAO best practices for ensuring that adequate
product knowledge is used to make informed investment decisions

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the NASA administrator: (1) direct the JWST program to
fully apply a knowledge-based acquisition approach to ensure that adequate
knowledge is attained at key decision points and also to hold the program
accountable and (2) instruct the JWST program to continue to adhere to
NASA acquisition policy and go forward only after demonstrating that it is
meeting incremental knowledge markers and has sufficient funds to execute
the program. NASA concurred with GAO's recommendations.

Although the JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to
conform to NASA's acquisition policies, the program still faces
considerable challenges because it has not fully implemented a
knowledge-based approach, which our past work has shown is often a key
factor in program success. In a recent report, we made recommendations
that NASA take steps to ensure that projects follow a knowledge-based
approach for product development. NASA concurred and revised its
acquisition policy. When we initiated our work and before the JWST
program's recently revised acquisition strategy, program officials
intended to have NASA commit to program start, which is the end of the
formulation phase and the beginning of the implementation phase, with
immature technologies, according to best practices, and without a
preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these shortfalls with
NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition strategy to conform to
NASA policy. However, the current strategy still does not fully
incorporate a knowledge-based approach which ensures that resources match
requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before program start.
If program officials follow the current plan, the maturity of key
technologies may not be adequately tested prior to program start. In
addition, it appears the program will not have sufficient funding
resources to ensure the program's success. In light of the fiscally
constrained environment the federal government and NASA will face in the
years ahead, adopting a knowledge-based approach will not only increase
the JWST program's chances for success but also lay the foundation for
comparison between competing programs.

Conceptual Drawing of NASA's JWST
*** End of document. ***