Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition	 
Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges (06-APR-06,	 
GAO-06-610T).							 
                                                                 
The current generation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has	 
been in development for defense applications since the 1980's. As
of February 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) had more than  
3,000 unmanned aircraft, about 2,000 of which are supporting	 
ongoing operations in Iraq. DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
validates the importance of unmanned systems and establishes	 
plans to significantly expand investment in unmanned systems and 
their use in military operations over the next several years. The
Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to	 
determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS	 
programs. This testimony addresses GAO's prior work and 	 
preliminary observations on (1) the operational successes and	 
challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in combat	 
operations, and the extent to which DOD has taken steps to	 
address challenges; (2) DOD's progress in establishing a	 
strategic plan and oversight framework to guide joint and	 
service-specific UAS development efforts and related investment  
decisions; and (3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and Predator
programs' business cases and acquisition strategies and the	 
lessons learned that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat 
Air Systems program.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-610T					        
    ACCNO:   A50977						        
  TITLE:     Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and	      
Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges	 
     DATE:   04/06/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Interoperability					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Unmanned aerial vehicles				 
	     Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle		 
	     Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 
	     Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 
	     Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 		 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 

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GAO-06-610T

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

GAO

  Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
                       Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST Thursday, April 6, 2006

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational
                                   Challenges

Statement of Sharon Pickup Director, Defenses Capabilities and Management

Michael J. Sullivan Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

  GAO-06-610T

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational
Challenges

  What GAO Found

DOD has experienced a high level of mission successes with UAS, but
continues to face challenges in fully maximizing the use of these assets.
In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used UAS for
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike missions
in support of joint and service-specific operations. As the numbers of UAS
operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft grows, DOD continues to
face operational challenges related to interoperability, availability of
communications bandwidth, and airspace integration. While DOD and the
services have taken some positive initial steps to address these
challenges, such as issuing guidance and developing initiatives to improve
interoperability, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of
these efforts cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully
implemented.

While DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for
acquiring UAS, it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS
development and investment decisions. Since GAO last reported, DOD
established new oversight bodies and updated its UAS Roadmap, but it is
too early to tell how the new entities will interrelate and whether they
will be able to influence service plans. Also, the updated roadmap
identifies broad goals, desired capabilities, and service acquisition
plans, but lacks critical elements, such as a clear link among goals,
capabilities, and plans, opportunities for joint endeavors, and funding
priorities and needs. Until DOD develops a strategic plan, it will not be
well positioned to validate requirements, evaluate and integrate services
plans, and establish program and funding priorities, nor will Congress
have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. Such a
plan would also help DOD anticipate and minimize the types of challenges
that are being experienced today.

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development
programs have shared many of the same problems as other major weapon
systems that begin an acquisition program too early, with many
uncertainties about requirements, funding, and immature technology,
design, and production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar
outcomes- changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery,
performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future
acquisition programs can learn from past efforts to craft better and less
risky acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include preparing
a comprehensive business case, adopting a knowledge-based and incremental
acquisition strategy, and sustaining disciplined leadership and direction.
Frequent changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology
demonstration program and recent budget actions raise some questions about
the Department's priorities and future directions for UAS. Concerns have
also been raised about possible duplication of systems as the services
look to expand individual fleets. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to
coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs are encouraging and could be
a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and
interoperability.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).1 As you know, the current
generation of UAS has been under development for defense applications
since the 1980s and is providing combat forces with intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities that are helping to
transform today's military operations. We appeared before you last year to
discuss the performance of UAS in current operations, and DOD's progress
in improving strategic and acquisition planning. At the time, we testified
on our preliminary observations that while unmanned aircraft operations
had achieved significant mission successes, emerging operational
challenges could affect DOD's ability to maximize the use of UAS to
enhance operations and effectively promote force transformation.2 We also
emphasized the need for DOD to develop a strategic plan to guide UAS
development and highlighted lessons learned from our prior UAS development
and acquisition reviews that could be instructive for the development and
fielding of UAS. Since last year's testimony, we issued two reports on
these matters and made several recommendations intended to improve DOD's
management and acquisition of UAS.3

Since last year, we have seen an increasingly high level of UAS use in
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, DOD has issued an
updated UAS roadmap and recently released its Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) report, both of which indicate the department is planning to
increase its inventory of unmanned aircraft and associated funding
requests significantly over the next several years. At the same time, we
understand that DOD has initiated several studies to determine
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, including
those for UAS, which could affect future investment decisions. We

1

Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as "unmanned aerial
vehicles." "Unmanned aircraft" is consistent with the Federal Aviation
Administration's classification and emphasizes other components of the
system, such as payload, ground stations, and communications equipment.

2

GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-395T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
9, 2005).

3

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD
Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky
Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).

Page 1 GAO-06-610T

understand Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to
determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS programs. We
are also aware that DOD has made some changes in its plans for key future
UAS acquisitions.

Today, you asked us to discuss the results of our previous reports and our
preliminary observations on the ongoing work we are conducting for this
Subcommittee on the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into combat
operations. Specifically, we will highlight (1) operational successes and
challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in combat operations, and
the extent to which DOD has taken steps to address these challenges; (2)
DOD's progress in establishing a strategic plan and oversight framework to
guide joint and service-specific UAS development efforts and related
investment decisions; and (3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and
Predator programs' business cases and acquisition strategies and the
lessons learned that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
Systems (J-UCAS) program. We will be continuing our work on the
integration of UAS in combat operations and plan to issue a report to you
based on this work later this year.

To address our first two objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed
documentation from the UAS Planning Task Force within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
each of the military services; U.S. Joint Forces Command; the Joint Staff;

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and other organizations. We also observed
Predator training and support to ongoing operations, and updated our
previously issued reports on UAS strategic planning and operational
challenges. Additionally, we discussed operational challenges with CENTCOM
officials and UAS operators who recently returned or are currently
supporting operations in Iraq to better understand the use of UAS in
ongoing operations. To address our third objective, we interviewed
officials and obtained data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Air Force Headquarters; Navy
Headquarters; Air Combat Command; Air Force Materiel Command's
Aeronautical Systems Center; and prime contractors. We reviewed
acquisition strategies, plans, and outcomes for the three largest UAS
acquisition programs, the Global Hawk, Predator, and J-UCAS. We compared
plans to DOD's acquisition policy preferences and best practices to
identify lessons learned for improving future programs.

We conducted our ongoing work from August 2005 to April 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 2 GAO-06-610T

Warfighting commanders are experiencing a high level of mission success

with UAS in ongoing operations but, as we observed last year, they
continue to face operational challenges in fully maximizing the use of
these assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used
UAS with great success for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
offensive strike missions in support of joint and service-specific
operations. For example, commanders continue to rely on the Air Force
Predator and Army Shadow UAS to help identify improvised explosive devices
and locate the enemy forces who planted them, allowing for the detonation
of the devices and the capture of the enemy forces. Notwithstanding these
successes, interoperability remains a challenge as we previously reported,
and integrating UAS into combat operations is becoming more complicated.
For example, some UAS components cannot easily exchange and transmit data
with ground forces because they were not designed to interoperable
standards. Further, the availability of communications bandwidth4 is
constrained, limiting the number of UAS and other systems that can be
operated simultaneously, and the amount of data that can be transmitted
from the UAS. In the absence of standards requiring sensor payloads to be
reprogrammable from one band to another, UAS were designed and built
without this flexibility. In our December 2005 report, we recommended that
DOD take steps to develop or adjust standards to address these
interoperability and bandwidth challenges.5 Additionally, our preliminary
work indicates that airspace integration is a growing challenge as demand
for UAS remains high and the number of assets operating in the same
airspace as manned aircraft steadily grows. Among other things, unmanned
aircraft are deployed and controlled at different levels of command, and
have generally been rapidly fielded without the benefit of a commonly
accepted concept of operations. As the number and usage of UAS increases,
effective airspace integration will be crucial to avoid duplicative
deployments of UAS and safety mishaps. While DOD has taken some positive
steps to address these challenges and our prior recommendations, such as
issuing guidance and developing initiatives to improve interoperability,
progress to date has been limited and the effectiveness of these steps
cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented.

4

Bandwidth refers to the available frequencies to support the flight of
UAS, to transmit the output of onboard sensors, and to interface with air
traffic control centers.

5

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).

Page 3 GAO-06-610T

While DOD continues to request funds for UAS and the services continue to
plan, develop, and field UAS systems, it still lacks a robust oversight
framework and strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment
decisions. Since we last testified, DOD established additional oversight
bodies - a Joint Center of Excellence and Joint Material Review Board - to
supplement the efforts of its already existing UAS Planning Task force and
to facilitate planning and coordination for the acquisition and use of
UAS. While these actions appear to be steps in the right direction, it is
too early to determine how these entities will interrelate with one
another, what impact they will have on addressing the challenges we have
identified, and whether they will be able to influence service UAS
investment decisions or deployment. While DOD has updated its UAS Roadmap,
it is still not a viable strategic plan because it lacks key planning
elements. For example, while it describes broad goals, desired
capabilities for UAS, and service-specific acquisition plans, it does not
provide clear linkages nor does it address the relationship among service
plans, opportunities for joint endeavors, investment priorities and
related funding needs. As we have previously reported, without a strategic
plan and effective oversight framework for using UAS, DOD has little
assurance that it will have a basis for validating requirements,
integrating service efforts, and establishing program and funding
priorities. Furthermore, Congress may not have all the information it
needs to evaluate DOD's UAS funding requests. Such a plan would help DOD
assure that service plans for developing UAS anticipate and potentially
minimize the types of challenges that are emerging today, particularly in
the areas of interoperability, bandwidth, and airspace integration.

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development
programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems
that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about
requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and
production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes-
changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance
shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition
programs can learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky
acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include (1) establishing
a comprehensive business case that matches customer requirements with
available resources to include proven technologies, sufficient time, and
realistic funding; (2) implementing an incremental, knowledge-based
acquisition strategy that separates technology development from product
development and minimizes concurrency between testing and production; and
(3) maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction. Frequent
changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) technology

Page 4 GAO-06-610T

                                   Background

demonstration program and recent budget actions raise some questions about
the department's priorities and future directions for UAS. Garnering the
benefits from improved coordination among the military services'
individual programs and maintaining an emphasis on joint development and
employment strategy seem to be at some risk. Concerns have also been
raised about possible duplication of systems as the services look to
expand individual fleets. The ongoing Army and Air Force effort to
coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs is encouraging and could be a
model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and
interoperability.

DOD defines an unmanned aircraft as a powered aerial vehicle that does not
carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift,
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally,
unmanned aircraft systems consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control
station; information and retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes,
wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. According
to DOD, many elements are needed for the use of UAS, including a systems
architecture that allows data to be moved, adequate spectrum and bandwidth
for communication, airspace management and deconfliction, common data
standards and formats to allow sharing and data fusion, common operating
systems, and system interoperability. Potential missions considered
appropriate for unmanned aircraft systems have expanded from the original
focus on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission areas
to the area of limited tactical strike capabilities, with projected plans
for persistent ground attack, electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy
air defenses.

As shown in table 1, DOD had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft as of
February 2006, compared to fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in 2000.6 As of
January 2006, more than 2000 of these aircraft were supporting ongoing
operations in Iraq. Over 88 percent of the unmanned aircraft currently in
inventory are small UAS, those launched by hand or by bungee. As a point
of comparison, no small unmanned aircraft were in inventory in 2000.

6

The total number represents the number of unmanned aircraft, rather than
unmanned aircraft systems, and includes test and training assets.

Page 5 GAO-06-610T

Table 1: Number and Type of Unmanned Aircraft in DOD's Inventory, as of
February 2006

Total aircraft Type System Service/Command inventory

Small UAS Pointer Air Force/Special 126 (weight less than Operations
Command 10 lbs./airspeed Raven Army/Air Force/ 1776

less than 100 kts.) Special Operations Command

Dragon Eye Marine Corps/

Special Operations Command

Force Protection Air Force Airborne Surveillance System

Swift Special Operations Command

BATCAM Air Force

Tactical UAS Pioneer Navy and Marine Corps 34 (weight less than Shadow 200
Army 140

500 lbs./airspeed less than 120 Neptune Special Operations 15 kts.)
Command

Tern Special Operations Command

Mako Special Operations Command

Tigershark Special Operations Command

Theater-level Predator A Air Force 70 UAS

I-Gnat Army 4

Hunter Army

Fire Scout Navy/Army

Predator B Air Force

Global Hawk Air Force/Navy

                                   Total 3048

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.

Similarly, UAS flight hours have also increased. For example, as shown in
figure 1 below, flight hours have increased from about 5,000 hours in 1996
to 109,000 hours in 2005.

Page 6 GAO-06-610T

              Figure 1: Unmanned Aircraft Flight Hours, 1996-2005

Note: Numbers do not reflect small unmanned aircraft.

As the numbers of unmanned aircraft and flight hours have increased, so
has UAS funding. Total UAS funding shows an increase from about $363
million in fiscal year 2001 to about $2.06 billion in fiscal year 2006. In
addition, the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget projects funding will
grow to about $3.02 billion in fiscal year 2011. These figures do not
include supplemental funding. DOD has requested approximately $208 million
for UAS in its fiscal year 2006 supplemental request.

In December 2002, DOD created the 2002-2027 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Roadmap, which was designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAS
development and describe current programs, identify potential missions for
UAS, and provide guidance on developing emerging technologies. In August
2005, DOD issued an updated version of the roadmap covering the period
2005-2030. Like its predecessor, the 2005 roadmap contains broad goals for
unmanned systems that support the department's larger goals of fielding
transformational capabilities, establishing joint standards, and
controlling costs.

Furthermore, DOD's 2006 QDR published in February 2006 validates the
importance of unmanned systems. Overall, the QDR provides direction for

Page 7 GAO-06-610T

accelerating the department's transformation to focus more on combatant
commanders' needs and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities. In
particular, the QDR report highlighted the department's plans to expand
investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations. For
example, it states DOD's intent to nearly double unmanned aircraft
coverage by accelerating the acquisition of the Predator and Global Hawk
systems. It also plans to restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
Systems program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based
aircraft to increase naval reach and persistence. Further, the QDR plans
to develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability by
2018 and sets a goal that about 45 percent of the future long-range strike
force be unmanned. Lastly, the 2006 QDR directs the Air Force to establish
an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron under the U.S. Special Operations
Command.

DOD has experienced a high level of mission success using UAS in combat
operations, but faces some operational challenges that could hamper joint
operations. We previously identified interoperability and limited
bandwidth as challenges and, according to our preliminary work, as the
number of unmanned systems increases, airspace integration is becoming a
growing challenge. While DOD has taken initial steps to address these
challenges, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these
actions cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented.

  Combat Successes Realized, but Challenges Remain

Recent UAS Successes in Combat Operations

DOD has achieved significant operational successes in combat operations
from its use of a variety of unmanned aircraft and their sensor,
communications, and armaments payloads, thereby increasing the demand for
and use of UAS. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have
used a variety of UAS, such as the Predator, Raven, and Shadow, in
integral roles on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
offensive strike joint or service-specific missions. For example, a
Predator UAS provided video to a U.S. military element which provided
situational awareness that contributed to the success of a mission that
resulted in the capture of an al Qaida operational commander. Similarly,
the Army used its Shadow UAS to identify an improvised explosive device
and guide U.S. forces to the location of the enemy forces, enabling the
capture of the enemy forces and safe detonation of the improvised
explosive device.

Additionally, small UAS such as the Raven have been instrumental in
enabling troops to find, locate, and destroy numerous targets. For
example, a Raven was used to identify a suspicious vehicle in the

Page 8 GAO-06-610T

DOD Faces Operational Challenges in Integrating UAS into Combat Operations

courtyard of a residence, which facilitated the discovery of a large
weapons and ammunition cache when soldiers conducting the ground combat
operations confirmed the vehicle contained explosives. As a result of
successes such as these, the demand for and use of UAS are continuing to
grow.

Notwithstanding these operational successes, DOD continues to face
challenges in effectively integrating unmanned systems into joint combat
operations, and progress in addressing these challenges has been limited.
Key challenges identified in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
relate to interoperability,7 the availability of communications bandwidth,
and managing UAS and manned systems in the same airspace.

First, while numerous UAS are being called on to conduct important
missions in recent operations, interoperability remains a challenge. For
example, as we reported in December 2005, some unmanned aircraft sensor
and communications payloads and ground stations cannot easily exchange
data because they were not designed to interoperable communications
standards, even within a single service in certain circumstances. When
communication systems are incompatible, operating forces may be required
to operate their own UAS to accomplish a mission, rather than using UAS
that are already operating in the same area, thus increasing the numbers
of systems being operated. To permit the sharing of tactical intelligence
obtained by unmanned aircraft sensors, the services or combatant commands
have developed certain technical patches that permit compatibility but
slow data transmission. DOD guidance requires interoperability and DOD's
2005 roadmap identifies it as a key goal. In the absence of specific
standards, the services have tended to initiate separate development
programs, specifically tailored to service specific requirements.
Officials from U.S. Central Command have also emphasized the need for
improved interoperability and standards. For example, the commander of
U.S. Central Command recently testified that while UAS have transformed
the battlespace and demand for their capabilities is significant, there is
a need to develop an integrated architecture of many sensors to support
operational units. He further stated that experiences to date highlight
the importance of an established

7

Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, and forces to provide
and receive data and information from other systems, units, and forces.

Page 9 GAO-06-610T

interoperability standard for all intelligence systems that can function
in a joint and combined environment.

Second, communications bandwidth continues to represent a major challenge
for UAS. Unmanned aircraft and their sensor, armaments, and communications
payloads depend on reliable access to communications bandwidth. Bandwidth
is needed to support systems that control the flight of certain unmanned
aircraft, to transmit data collected by payload sensors, and to interface
with air traffic control centers. Because UAS and other weapons or
communications systems, including manned aircraft, often operate on the
same frequency, certain frequencies can become congested and interference
can occur. Such capacity constraints may limit the number of UAS and other
systems that can be effectively operated simultaneously and the amount of
available data that can be transmitted. Despite having the capability to
operate multiple UAS simultaneously, DOD's roadmap states that the limited
number of frequencies available often restricts the number of unmanned
aircraft airborne at any point in time to one. As we reported in December
2005, the problem with constrained bandwidth cannot be easily overcome
without potentially costly modifications to existing systems because DOD
has not established standards requiring unmanned aircraft or sensor
payloads to be reprogrammable from one band to another.

To address these challenges, we recommended that DOD develop standards,
including overall UAS interoperability standards and standards that will
allow for future UAS to be reprogrammable to different frequencies. We are
also aware that, in the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization
Act, Congress required that the Secretary of Defense take such steps to
ensure that all8 service tactical unmanned aerial vehicles are equipped
and configured so that the data link used is the Tactical Common Data Link
and those vehicles use data formats consistent with the architectural
standard for tactical UAS.9 We understand that some of the military
services have provided a report to Congress to identify which systems are
currently in compliance with the Tactical Data Link requirement. According
to DOD, use of this link is

8

The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
may waive the applicability of these requirements to any tactical UAS if
the Undersecretary determines and certifies to the congressional defense
committees that it would be technologically infeasible or uneconomically
acceptable to integrate a tactical data link.

9

Pub. L. No. 109-163 S: 141 (2006).

Page 10 GAO-06-610T

expected to reduce the amount of bandwidth used and allow the UAS to
utilize a broader band of frequencies; however, it will not totally
alleviate the problem because it is too heavy to use on small UAS and may
result in shifting the frequency congestion to other bands.

Third, our preliminary work indicates that effectively integrating UAS
into the airspace is becoming a growing challenge in ongoing operations.
With the growing numbers and increasing use of UAS of various types and
sizes to support combat missions, particularly in Iraq, coordination,
integration, and deconfliction of airspace among UAS and manned systems
are becoming more complex. In addition to limitations on communications
interoperability, UAS are deployed and controlled at different levels of
command. Furthermore, UAS have generally been rapidly fielded without the
benefit of a commonly accepted concept of operations for the different
types of UAS, including tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment
and use of assets. According to U.S. Central Command officials, because
there are numerous UAS in theater now, many with multirole capabilities
and disparate command and control, the potential exists for deployment of
multiple UAS capabilities to support the same operation. Moreover, UAS are
not currently equipped with the capability to sense and avoid other
unmanned or manned aircraft but instead rely on procedural control methods
for deconfliction. While aware of only a few mishaps, many of the
officials we spoke with are concerned about problems in the future as the
numbers of UAS steadily increase. For example, according to a U.S. Central
Command official, there have been some collisions between small UAS and
helicopters. Army officials stated that they were aware of one collision
between a Raven UAS and a helicopter. The cause of the collision was
attributed to the helicopter pilot being outside of his designated flight
area. With the number of UAS in support of ongoing operations increasing,
effective airspace integration is critical to maximize service
capabilities, avoid duplicative deployments, and minimize safety mishaps.

DOD is taking some initial steps to address interoperability, bandwidth,
and airspace integration challenges, but progress has been limited. For
example, to promote interoperability and address bandwidth issues, in
December 2005 DOD issued guidance reminding the services that common data
link10 remains the DOD standard for all intelligence, surveillance, and

The common data link is a family of full-duplex, jam-resistant,
point-to-point microwave communication links developed by the U.S.
government and used in imagery and signals intelligence collections
systems.

Page 11 GAO-06-610T

  Progress Made but Additional Elements Needed to Establish a UAS Strategic Plan
  and Effective Oversight

reconnaissance links. Further, DOD continues to refine its guidance for
improved interoperability and supportability of information technology and
national security systems, which include UAS. In March 2006, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction addressing
certification and validation of DOD information technology and national
security systems acquisition programs to meet emerging key
interoperability performance parameters, such as information exchange.11
Additionally, DOD's 2005 roadmap contains an appendix which outlines
interoperability standards. However, DOD officials acknowledge that the
UAS roadmap and the parameters included in the March guidance are evolving
and neither provides an inclusive list of all standards required to
achieve interoperability. The services are also initiating efforts to
improve interoperability. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are
moving to a "one system" ground control station to allow multiple UAS
platforms to be operated by a single ground control station. In addition,
the Air Force has demonstrated a multiaircraft control ground control
station that would control up to four Predator air vehicles at any one
time. Furthermore, an initiative originally started by the Air Force-as
the Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver System-has been embraced by
each of the services to enable ground forces to receive information
directly from certain airborne unmanned aircraft. Also, the Army has begun
to integrate Blue Force Tracker12 into some of its UAS to improve
situational awareness. All of these efforts are in preliminary stages and,
while these steps are positive, their effectiveness cannot be adequately
assessed until they are fully implemented.

While DOD has made some progress, it still lacks a robust oversight
framework and strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment
decisions. DOD's progress includes an update to its roadmap and the
establishment of new oversight bodies to facilitate planning and
coordination regarding the development, procurement, and use of UAS.
Despite our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD's updated roadmap
still lacks key planning elements such as a clear link between goals,
capabilities, plans, funding priorities, and needs. Therefore, it is not
yet a viable strategic plan for guiding UAS development and investment.

11

CJCSI 6212.01D (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006).

12

Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and communications system
that enables users to monitor the location of other Blue Force
Tracker-equipped aircraft and vehicles.

Page 12 GAO-06-610T

Additional UAS Oversight Bodies Established

As you may recall, in October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the Joint Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Planning Task Force (now known as the UAS Planning Task Force) to
provide oversight for the department's UAS programs and to provide
guidance, as necessary, to promote interoperability and commonality. To
communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAS systems, the Task
Force published its first UAS roadmap in 2002 and an updated version in
2005. The roadmap describes current programs, identifies potential
missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. According to DOD
officials, the Task Force is currently focused on coordinating with the
services as they procure and field greater numbers of UAS in an effort to
ensure the military services avoid duplication of systems, while
developing integrated systems that can work together in joint combat
operations.

To supplement the efforts of its UAS Planning Task Force, DOD has
established two additional UAS oversight bodies since we last testified.
For example, in July 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council13
established a new Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence to
focus on UAS operational issues and the Joint UAS Material Review Board14
to address joint UAS material issues and prioritize solutions. The Center
of Excellence-assisted by an advisory council composed of representatives
from each of the combatant commands, the services, and the Joint UAS
Material Review Board-is responsible for facilitating the development and
integration of UAS common operating standards, capabilities, concepts,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training. The Center of
Excellence has been charged with developing a joint concept of operations
for unmanned aircraft systems. According to center officials, the concept
of operations will likely address issues such as interoperability and
airspace integration.

13

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization made up
of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four-star officer
designated from each of the services that bases recommendations to the
Chairman on interaction with combatant commanders and the Joint Staff
Director-led Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams that perform
detailed assessments of programmatic alternatives, tradeoffs, risks,
bill-payers, and effectiveness. CJCSI 3180.01 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 31,
2002).

14

This group was formerly known as the Joint UAV Overarching Integrated
Process Team and was rechartered to form the Joint Material Review Board
and tasked with addressing UAS material issues.

Page 13 GAO-06-610T

The Material Review Board is chartered to provide a forum to identify or
resolve requirements and corresponding material issues regarding
interoperability and commonality, prioritize potential solutions, assess
the focus of current and future programs, and seek strategies common to
all services. The Material Review Board is composed of members from each
of the services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
Joint Forces Command. Due to the broad nature of UAS, at various times
other stakeholders, such as the combatant commanders, also attend board
meetings. Additionally, the board is not a standing body with full-time
members, but rather an organization that meets periodically.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council also tasked both the Center of
Excellence and the Material Review Board with submitting recommendations
to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and with
coordinating service-sponsored UAS submissions.15 DOD officials state that
having the center and board serve in this coordination role will allow
them to leverage service developmental efforts, capabilities, and
requirements to enable joint interoperability, and reduce duplication of
effort. As of March 2006, the center and board were in the process of
organizing, establishing guidance and procedures, conducting initial
meetings, and identifying initial efforts.

In addition to the UAS Joint Planning Task Force, DOD views the new
oversight bodies as means to more effectively manage service UAS programs.
While these changes appear to be steps in the right direction, it is
unknown whether they will provide an effective oversight framework. It is
too early to tell how these entities will interrelate or what impact they
will have in addressing interoperability issues and the other challenges
we have identified. While DOD intends for these entities to play a role in
guiding service UAS acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution
of unmanned air systems, it is also unclear to what extent they will be
able to influence the services because none of the entities are chartered
with the authority to direct the military services to adopt any of their
suggestions. Rather, they act in an advisory capacity and make
recommendations to the services and Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process. It is a
collaborative system that DOD uses to identify capability gaps and
integrated solutions to resolve these gaps.

Page 14 GAO-06-610T

Updated UAS Roadmap Better Identifies Challenges but Still Lacks Key
Strategic Plan Elements

Notwithstanding our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD's updated
UAS roadmap lacks key planning elements and is not a strategic plan that
can guide UAS development and investment decisions. As we have previously
testified and reported, a strategic plan and effective oversight can be
helpful in guiding efforts to develop and field UAS and to address the
types of challenges that are emerging with integrating UAS into the force
structure. Specifically, we emphasized that while DOD's 2002 roadmap
contained some elements of a strategic plan-in that it identified
approaches to attaining long-term goals and assessed in part, annual
performance goals and performance indictors that identified progress
towards these goals-it only minimally addressed other elements, such as
the interrelationship between service-specific efforts, opportunities for
joint endeavors, or funding issues.16 We reported that although the joint
UAS Planning Task Force had taken a positive step by developing the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, a key planning document,
neither it nor other DOD guidance documents represented a comprehensive
strategic plan to guide the development and fielding of UAS. We further
reported that without a strategic framework and an oversight body with
sufficient program directive authority to implement planning, DOD had
little assurance its investment would result in UAS programs being
effectively integrated into the force structure. Consequently, we found
that DOD risked increased costs, future interoperability problems, and
duplication among the military services. We recommended that DOD establish
a strategic plan and designate the Task Force or another body to oversee
implementation of the plan.

Since that time, DOD has established the previously discussed entities and
the UAS Planning Task Force published an updated roadmap-the Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030. Similar to its predecessor, the 2005
roadmap contains some elements of a strategic plan such as broad long-term
goals and priorities, but lacks other crucial elements of a strategic
plan, such as milestones and performance measures for achieving these
goals and priorities. While it also describes desired capabilities for
UAS, operational issues or challenges based on ongoing operations, and
service-specific acquisition plans, it does not provide a clear link among
the goals, desired capabilities, and plans, nor does it sufficiently
address the interrelationship among service plans to each other and how
they promote joint operations, opportunities for joint

16

GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17,
2004).

Page 15 GAO-06-610T

  Unmanned Aircraft Programs Provide Lessons Learned for Future Systems to Craft
  Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies

endeavors, and investment priorities and related funding needs. We believe
the roadmap does not provide specific guidance on UAS development or
related force structure integration. In fact, the roadmap clearly states
that it neither authorizes specific UAS nor prioritizes the requirements,
as this is the responsibility of the services and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council. DOD officials acknowledged to us that the updated
roadmap is not a strategic plan and does not contain details about force
structure, resources, and other capability implementation issues, but
rather emphasizes technology. U.S. Central Command officials have cited
the need for an integrated roadmap for UAS to ensure interoperability is
achieved and that new UAS systems neither interfere with nor limit mission
performance. We continue to believe that a strategic plan is needed to
better position DOD to validate requirements, evaluate services plans,
integrate service efforts, and establish program and funding priorities.
Without a strategic plan, Congress may not have all the information it
needs to evaluate DOD's UAS funding requests. Furthermore, a strategic
plan and oversight framework would help DOD assure that service plans for
developing UAS anticipate and potentially minimize the types of challenges
that are emerging today, particularly in the areas of interoperability,
bandwidth, and airspace integration.

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development
programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems
that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about
requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and
production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes-
changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance
shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition
programs can learn from past efforts to limit risks and improve outcomes
by establishing comprehensive business cases to match customer
requirements and available resources and by adopting disciplined
knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategies consistent with DOD
acquisition policy preferences and best practices. Recent management
decisions and budget actions raise some questions about the department's
priorities, future direction for UAS, and possible duplication of systems.
Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate acquisitions, logistics,
and employment of two similar systems are encouraging.

                              Page 16 GAO-06-610T

Acquisition Strategies and Outcomes Experienced by Current Programs Can Be
Used to Improve Future Systems

We recently reported on DOD's three largest UAS programs.17 We analyzed
and contrasted the acquisition strategies and outcomes of the Air Force's
Global Hawk and Predator programs. We identified lessons learned that
could benefit the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology
demonstration and other future systems.

The Global Hawk and Predator programs had similar beginnings, but followed
different acquisition strategies that resulted in different outcomes.
While both programs began with top leadership support and accomplished
successful, focused demonstration efforts, Global Hawk switched to a
high-risk acquisition strategy by accelerating development and production.
With the substantial overlap in development, test, and production, the
program experienced significant gaps in knowledge about technology,
design, and manufacturing capabilities while requiring sizable funding. As
a result, serious cost and schedule problems have ensued, some required
capabilities have been deferred or dropped, operational tests have
identified performance problems, and the Global Hawk program is being
restructured for the fourth time. In contrast, the Predator program has
pursued an acquisition strategy that is more consistent with DOD's revised
acquisition guidance and commercial best practices for a more structured
and evolutionary acquisition approach. While the Predator program has some
overlap in development and production and has experienced some problems,
the program's cost growth and schedule delays have been relatively minor,
and testing of prototypes in operational environments has already begun.

There are trends that run consistently through the Global Hawk and
Predator programs, similar to trends in other major defense acquisition
programs that we have reviewed. That is, when DOD provides strong
leadership at an appropriate organizational level, it enables innovative,
evolutionary, and disciplined processes to work. Once leadership is
removed or diminished, programs have tended to lose control of
requirements and add technical and funding risks. We have also found that
after successful demonstrations to quickly field systems with existing
technologies, problems were encountered after the programs transitioned
into the system development phase of the acquisition process. The services
pushed programs into production without maturing processes

17

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past
Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).

Page 17 GAO-06-610T

and also began to add new requirements that stretched beyond technology
and design resources. Inadequate technology, design, and production
knowledge increased risk and led to cost, schedule, and performance
problems.

The J-UCAS technology demonstration program and its offspring could
benefit from the lessons learned in the Global Hawk and Predator programs.
Since its inception, the J-UCAS program has been in flux. Program
leadership, funding, and priorities have changed several times. The recent
Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another restructuring into a Navy
program to demonstrate a carrier-based unmanned combat air system. The Air
Force plans to consider J-UCAS technologies and accomplishments in its
efforts to develop a new long-range strike capability. Before DOD commits
to major acquisition development programs for the Navy and Air Force, it
has the opportunity and time to develop the knowledge needed to prepare
solid and feasible business cases and to adopt disciplined, evolutionary
strategies consistent with DOD acquisition policy preferences and best
practices to support advanced unmanned systems acquisitions. Refining
requirements based on proven technologies and a feasible design based on
systems engineering are best accomplished in the concept and technology
development phase that precedes the start of a system acquisition program.
During this early phase, the environment is conducive to changes in
requirements that can be accomplished more cost-effectively than after
systems integration begins and large organizations of engineers,
suppliers, and manufacturers are formed to prepare for the start of system
production.

Key lessons that can be applied to J-UCAS and other future systems include

     o maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to
       that experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of
       Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the
       Predator's Task Force Arnold (a senior group of Air Force leaders that
       helped the program maintain a tight focus on program requirements and
       direction);
     o establishing a clear business case that justifies initial investments
       and constrains individual program requirements to match available
       resources based on proven technologies, engineering knowledge, and

Page 18 GAO-06-610T

Future Direction of DOD's UAS Acquisitions

time available before committing to system development and

demonstration;

     o implementing an incremental acquisition strategy preferred by defense
       policy and best practices that separates technology development from
       product development and minimizes concurrency between testing and
       production;
     o establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and
       demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and
       used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward and
       investing more money; and
     o managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully
       resource product development and production based on a cost estimate
       that has been informed by proven technologies and a preliminary
       design.

Additionally, lessons learned from the transition of the Global Hawk and
Predator systems from technology demonstrations into system production and
operation are important. The advanced concept technology demonstration can
be a valuable tool to prove concepts and military utility before
committing time and funds to a major system acquisition. Designing in
product reliability and producibility, and making informed trade-offs
among alternative support approaches are key aspects of development and
can save substantial money in operating and maintaining systems during
their lifetimes. However, if these operational aspects of system
development are not addressed early before production, they can have major
negative impacts on life-cycle costs. The original Predator demonstration
effort did not emphasize design and development tasks that make a system
more reliable and supportable. This made the transition from demonstration
to acquisition more difficult and the Air Force had to organize a team to
respond and resolve reliability and supportability issues.

Frequent changes to J-UCAS and recent budget actions raise some questions
about the department's priorities and future direction for unmanned
aircraft systems, which a strategic plan would help address. Garnering the
benefits from improved coordination among the military services'
individual programs and maintaining an emphasis on joint development and
fielding strategy seem to be at some risk.

Page 19 GAO-06-610T

In terms of overall investment, while development and procurement funding
have significantly increased since the terror attacks in September 2001,
annual funding requested in fiscal year 2007 for unmanned aircraft systems
is $1.7 billion, while DOD's funding for tactical aviation programs in
2007 is $25.1 billion. The total funding programmed in the fiscal year
2006 defense budget request was $15.4 billion and $153.9 billion,
respectively. The near-term investment plans laid out in the fiscal year
2007 budget request are smaller than the amounts projected over the same
period in the fiscal year 2005 budget.

The termination of the J-UCAS as a joint technology demonstration program
and uncertain, evolving future plans for its offspring also seem somewhat
at odds with official plans for jointness. The J-UCAS was one of the top
priorities in DOD's roadmap published in August 2005 and was cited as
leading the way to the next generation of unmanned aircraft- extending
missions beyond the original focus on intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities to persistent, survivable, and advanced combat
capabilities with increased levels of autonomy. A weaponized, stealthy
unmanned aircraft was also selected as the most effective solution to
close capability gaps identified in the joint strike enabler initial
capabilities document published in December 2004. The system envisioned
was to provide a penetrating and persistent strike aircraft against
high-threat enemy air defenses and other high-value ground targets. Before
JUCAS became a joint program in October 2003, the Air Force had planned to
accelerate its own unmanned combat air system with initial deliveries in
fiscal year 2007. It appears to us that Air Force support for such a
system waned when it became a joint program on a less aggressive fielding
schedule.

Also uncertain is how many crossover benefits can be mutually provided by
separate Navy and Air Force efforts as restructured. The Navy is starting
up its own program in fiscal year 2007 with about $1.8 billion in funds
cut from the J-UCAS program. Some of the remaining J-UCAS programmed
funding was redirected to the Air Force's long-range strike program and
other efforts. Requirements are somewhat divergent. The Navy appears to be
most interested in fielding a relatively small aircraft of moderate
endurance that may operate solo from aircraft carriers to provide
surveillance for the battle group. The Air Force's future striker will
likely be a larger land-based platform able to operate in groups, with a
longer range requiring aerial refueling and employing a large
weapons-carrying capacity. The Air Force is expected to use J-UCAS
experience in conducting an analysis of alternatives during 2006 of the
future striker, which may be manned, unmanned, or some combination. Air
Force plans

Page 20 GAO-06-610T

are still evolving at this time and it is unclear how much of the previous
investment in J-UCAS technology and continuing Navy efforts will benefit
the Air Force program.

As the J-UCAS evolves one more time-and efforts return to the individual
services-some key challenges will exist to maintain the advantages that
were offered by a joint effort. The services need to be aware of those
advantages and not arbitrarily reject them for parochial reasons. For
example, exploiting past plans for common operating systems, components,
and payloads could offer cost savings in acquisition and life-cycle
support as well as improved interoperability. In particular, the common
operating system could be a cutting edge tool to integrate and provide for
interoperability of air vehicles, allowing groups of unmanned aircraft to
fly in a coordinated manner and function autonomously (without human
input). A top priority when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
led J-UCAS, the common operating system is now likely to be terminated,
according to a program official.

Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of DOD unmanned
aircraft systems as the services look to expand individual fleets. The
joint decision of the Air Force and Army to develop a memorandum of
understanding on the Predator and Warrior programs is encouraging and
could be a model for inhibiting duplication and fostering synergy of
efforts. These two systems are similar in mission and design and are
manufactured by the same contractor. The services agreed to a
collaborative solution in terms of acquisition, logistics, and employment
and to optimize funding and leverage current and future systems to rapidly
field identified capabilities. A more detailed memorandum of understanding
is expected soon to articulate the path forward for each of the services
in respect to developing complementary capabilities. One possible outcome
could be a decision to acquire one system to meet the needs of both
services. We note, however, that the Air Force recently substantially
increased its planned investments in Predator A to buy much greater
quantities; this year's funding estimates through 2011 are 165 percent
more than was estimated for the same period last year. It would seem more
prudent to do the analysis and reach the collaborative decisions with the
Army before committing to increased investments.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may have.

Page 21 GAO-06-610T

  Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup at
(202) 512-9619 or Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915. Other individuals
making key contributions to this statement include Patricia Lentini,
Michael Hazard, Susan Tindall, Bruce Fairbairn, Shvetal Khanna, Rae Ann
Sapp, Charlie Shivers III, Brian Simpson, Renee Brown, Katherine Lenane,
and Charles Perdue.

  Related GAO Products

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to
Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. GAO-06-447.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can
Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2005.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. Washington, D.C.: November
5, 2004.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development
and Fielding Efforts. GAO-04-530T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise
Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.: March
9, 2004.

                              Page 22 GAO-06-610T

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology Exports
for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. Washington,
D.C.: January 23, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200
Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude Endurance
Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.: December 15,
1998.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to
Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.: September
23, 1997. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts.
GAO/T-NSIAD-97- 138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy Fleet
Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short-Range System Still in
Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
Short-Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 1992.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.

Page 23 GAO-06-610T

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
Short-Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
1990.

Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.

Page 24 GAO-06-610T

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