Hurricane Katrina: Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure
Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance (06-APR-06, GAO-06-600T).
In response to Hurricane Katrina, countries and organizations
donated to the United States government cash and in-kind
donations, including foreign military assistance. The National
Response Plan establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is
the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for accepting the
assistance and coordinating its distribution. GAO's testimony
covers (1) the amount and use of internationally donated cash and
(2) the extent to which federal agencies with responsibilities
for international in-kind assistance offered to the United States
had policies and procedures to ensure the appropriate
accountability for the acceptance and distribution of that
assistance.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-600T
ACCNO: A50978
TITLE: Hurricane Katrina: Policies and Procedures Are Needed to
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance
DATE: 04/06/2006
SUBJECT: Accountability
Cash management
Disaster recovery
Disaster relief aid
Foreign financial assistance
Foreign military assistance
Funds management
Gifts or gratuities
Hurricane Katrina
Internal controls
International relations
National response plan
Policies and procedures
Transparency
National Response Plan
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GAO-06-600T
Testimony
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Thursday, April 6, 2006
HURRICANE KATRINA
Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and
Accountability for International Assistance
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
and
McCoy Williams, Director
Financial Management and Assurance
GAO-06-600T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the results of GAO's work
concerning the accountability for international assistance for Hurricane
Katrina, which is based on the report that we issued today.1 Hurricane
Katrina brought death, devastation, and destruction to the Gulf Coast
states causing billions of dollars in damage and dislocating thousands of
residents. In response to the disaster, many foreign countries and
organizations offered cash and in-kind assistance, including foreign
military donations, to the United States.2
In addition to relevant statutes, Executive Orders, and directives, the
National Response Plan (NRP) is the framework for managing domestic
events. According to the NRP, the Department of State (DOS) is the
coordinator for all offers of international assistance.3 For Hurricane
Katrina, DOS established a task force to coordinate the offers of foreign
assistance and to provide the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
information regarding the offers.4 FEMA used the Stafford Act5 to accept
some of the assistance, and after acceptance, it was then responsible for
coordinating the distribution of the assistance and ensuring it was
distributed as intended. To accomplish these tasks, FEMA requested support
from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an organization
within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), to manage
all logistics/operations support to coordinate the international in-kind
assistance for FEMA. DOD was involved in the receipt of disaster relief
donations from foreign militaries. In addition to the agencies mentioned
above, the National Security Council (NSC) also had a role to play in the
federal response to the hurricane. The NRP section on principal
organizational elements states that issues that require policy
adjudication or that fall outside the Secretary of Homeland Security's
areas of authority are elevated for resolution through the Homeland
Security Council6 and the National Security Council system.
1GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed
to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
2 In-kind donations are noncash items such as food, clothing, blankets,
and tents that were donated by foreign countries to the U.S. government.
Foreign military donations came directly from foreign militaries to the
United States and included such items as the use of amphibious ships,
divers, and pumps.
3 Also, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for
domestic incident management, and the Secretary of State is charged with
the responsibility to coordinate international activities related to the
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a domestic incident
within the United States.
4 The U.S. government did not accept all offers of assistance. For
example, the United States did not accept one offer of cash from a country
due to ongoing U.S. sanctions against the country.
5 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act, 42 U.S.C. S: 5201
(b).
The NRP also includes financial management guidance that states that
federal agencies are to use proper federal financial principles, policies,
regulations, and management controls to ensure proper accountability of
funds. To safeguard assets, agencies can use the Comptroller General's
Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government.7 These
standards provide federal agencies with the framework necessary to
establish internal controls and thus safeguard and monitor assets and
inventory to prevent waste, loss, or unauthorized use.
Our testimony today is focused on (1) the amount of cash that foreign
countries donated, and the extent to which cash had been used to assist in
the relief efforts; and (2) the extent to which those federal agencies
with responsibilities regarding the international assistance had policies
and procedures in place to ensure the appropriate accountability for the
acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign
military donations.
Summary
Given that the U.S. government had never before received such substantial
amounts of international disaster assistance, ad hoc procedures were
developed to manage the acceptance and distribution of the cash and
in-kind assistance. It is understandable that not all procedures would be
in place at the outset to guide the acceptance and distribution of the
assistance and provide a higher level of accountability.
In the absence of guidance for international cash donations for a domestic
disaster, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage cash donations from 36
countries that totaled $126 million. DOS recorded the funds in a
designated account at the U.S. Treasury, and we were able to account for
the deposits and disbursements of the cash. As cash donations arrived, an
NSC-led interagency working group was established to make policy decisions
about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told us that they had
identified an account that could be credited with interest to receive the
international cash donations and presented to the working group a number
of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency
working group determined that the use of the donated funds, if accepted
under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than if the funds were held
until accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October
2005, FEMA accepted $66 million of donated funds under the Stafford Act
and spent the funds on a case management grant to provide case workers to
assist 100,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina. As of March 16,
2006, $60 million had not been distributed and remained in an account at
Treasury that did not pay interest.8 Treasury may pay interest on funds
accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. Since Treasury did not have the
authority to pay interest on the funds in the DOS account, the purchasing
power of those funds held in the DOS account have decreased due to
inflation. Further since an additional $400 million or more in potential
donations could materialize, it is important that cash management policies
and plans be implemented to address the forthcoming funds to maintain the
purchasing power of the donated funds.
6 The Homeland Security Council ensures the coordination of all homeland
security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and
promotes the effective development and implementation of all homeland
security policies.
7 GAO, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD
00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
At the time of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD
lacked sufficient policies and procedures to adequately ensure appropriate
accountability for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind
donations-including foreign military donations. Lacking this guidance,
these agencies established ad hoc policies and procedures to account for
the acceptance and distribution of assistance; however, the ad hoc
policies and procedures did not include internal controls for the
appropriate federal agencies to maintain adequate oversight of the
assistance that would assure the assistance was received at designated
distribution points. For example, FEMA and USAID/OFDA were unable to
provide us evidence that they had determined or confirmed that
international in-kind assistance arrived at FEMA distribution points.
Also, the lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the
nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and
insufficient advance coordination before agreeing to receive items,
resulted in food and medical items, such as Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and
medical supplies that arrived and did not meet USDA or FDA standards and
thus could not be distributed in the United States. This resulted in
storage costs of about $80,000. For receiving foreign military donations
for disaster relief, DOS established a process to coordinate with FEMA and
DOD, but the procedures allowed for confusion about which agency was to
accept these items. FEMA and DOD each assumed the other agency had
accepted these donations under their respective gift authorities, but it
is not clear either agency did so. As a result, even for the foreign
military donations that were vetted through the DOS process, it is unclear
whether any agency properly accepted or maintained oversight of these
donations and knew how they were eventually used. In addition, DOD's lack
of internal guidance regarding the DOS task force coordinating process
resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS,
FEMA, or DOD knowledge or oversight.
8 On March 16, 2006, DOS and the Department of Education (ED) signed a
Memorandum of Agreement that states that $60 million will be transferred
to ED for use in school reconstruction projects and other projects in the
Hurricane Katrina-affected areas. We did not review the details of this
agreement.
Officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD acknowledged the need for delineated
policies and procedures to manage international assistance in the event
that the United States receives international assistance in the future. As
called for by The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,9
officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD told us that by June 1, 2006, they will
provide policies and procedures for managing international assistance to
the Homeland Security Council. We made six recommendations that focus on
specific areas for agencies with a role in international assistance to
develop in the National Response Plan or other appropriate plan. Our
recommendations complement the administration's recommendations, but are
more specific in some areas, such as the management of cash donations. For
example, we recommended that alternative cash management options be
considered, including the placement of cash donations in an account that
would pay interest while decisions are made regarding the use of the
donations. We also recommended that oversight of in-kind donations be
maintained by tracking the donations from the time of receipt to
disbursement, to provide reasonable assurance that assistance is delivered
as intended. In addition, we recommended that plans be established for the
acceptance of donated items that include coordination with regulatory
agencies, such as USDA and FDA, in advance to prevent items that cannot be
distributed from coming into the United States. We also recommended that
DOD develop and issue internal guidance to commanders to ensure that all
foreign military donations for disaster relief are coordinated through DOS
to ensure appropriate acceptance, coordination, and oversight of the
donations. In commenting on our draft report, DOD and DHS generally agreed
with our recommendations.
9The White House, The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
Cash Donation Management Policies, Procedures, and Plans Were Not in Place
In the absence of international cash donation management policies,
procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage the cash
donations flowing to the U.S. government from other countries for
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. By September 21, about $115 million had
been received and as of December 31, 2005, DOS reported that $126 million
had been donated by 36 countries. Our review noted that DOS's ad hoc
procedures did ensure the proper recording of international cash donations
and we were able to reconcile the funds received with those held in the
designated DOS account at Treasury. Also, an NSC-led interagency working
group was established to determine uses for the international cash
donations for domestic disaster relief. In October 2005, $66 million of
the $126 million donated had been accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act
and used for a Hurricane Katrina relief grant. As of March 16, 2006, the
other $60 million from international donations remained undistributed.
Once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, funds would be limited to
use on activities in furtherance of the act. We were told that the NSC-led
interagency working group did not transfer the funds to FEMA because it
wanted to retain the flexibility to spend the donated funds on a wider
range of assistance than is permitted under the Stafford Act. During this
period and while deliberations were ongoing, the funds were kept in an
account that did not pay interest, thereby diminishing the purchasing
power of the donated funds and losing an opportunity to maximize the
resources available for relief. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA could have
held the funds in an account that can pay interest, but Treasury lacks the
statutory authority to credit DOS-held funds with interest. A number of
options could be considered to address this situation if there are dual
goals of flexibility and maintaining purchasing power.
Key Events Involving the Use of International Cash Donations
Table 1 below shows the dates of key events in the receipt and
distribution of the international cash donations according to
documentation received and interviews with DOS and FEMA officials.
Table 1: International Cash Donations Received and Used--Key Dates
Date Event
August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina hit Gulf Coast region
September 2, 2005 DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force established
September 3, 2005 DOS provided deposit instructions to diplomatic and
consular posts for foreign cash donations
September 6, 2005 FEMA identified account that can earn interest
September 21, 2005 About $115 million in foreign donations received
September 23, 2005 FEMA presented items the funds could be spent on
October 20, 2005 DOS transferred $66 million to FEMA
October 28, 2005 FEMA awarded case management services grant to United
Methodist Committee on Relief
February 28, 2006 $60 million in remaining donations undistributed
March 16, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement signed between DOS and
Department of Education to spend remaining $60 million
Source: GAO analysis.
In early September 2005, FEMA officials identified an account at the U.S.
Treasury for recording international cash donations and a number of
potential uses for the donations that would help meet relief needs of the
disaster. By September 21, 2005, about $115 million in foreign cash
donations had been received. In a paper submitted to the NSC-led
interagency working group, dated September 22, 2005, DOS recognized that
every effort should be made to disburse the funds to provide swift and
meaningful relief to Hurricane Katrina victims without compromising needed
internal controls to ensure proper management and effective use of the
cash donations and transparency. FEMA officials told us that on September
23, 2005, they had identified and proposed to the NSC-led interagency
working group that the international cash donations could be spent on the
following items for individuals and families affected by Hurricane
Katrina: social services assistance, medical transportation, adapting
homes for medical and handicap needs, job training and education, living
expenses, building materials, furniture, and transportation. At NSC's
request, on October 7, 2005 FEMA presented more detailed proposals for
using the foreign donations. On October 20, 2005, with the NSC-led
interagency working group consensus, DOS transferred to FEMA $66 million
of the international donations to finance case management services to help
up to 100,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina define what their
needs are and to obtain available assistance.
As of February 2006, the remaining $60 million had not been released,
pending the NSC-led interagency working group determination about the
acceptance and use of the remaining funds. DOS and FEMA officials told us
that for the remaining $60 million in donated funds, the NSC-led
interagency working group had considered a series of proposals received
from a number of both public and private entities. At the time of our
review, we were told that the NSC-led interagency working group decided
that the vital needs of schools in the Gulf Coast area would be an
appropriate place to apply the donations, and that they were working with
the Department of Education to finalize arrangements to provide funding to
meet those needs. FEMA officials told us that under the Stafford Act, they
could use donated funds for projects such as rebuilding schools, but
projects for new schools buildings are not consistent with Stafford Act
purposes unless replacing a damaged one. Also, according to DHS officials,
the Act would have required that receiving entities match FEMA funds for
these purposes. However, because of the devastation, the entities would
have difficulty matching FEMA funds, which in essence limited FEMA from
doing these types of projects. According to DHS, FEMA considered whether
it would be useful for donated funds to contribute to the non-federal
share for applicants having trouble meeting the non-federal share, but
would need legislative authority to use it to match federal funds. We
contacted NSC to further discuss these matters; however NSC did not
respond to our requests for a meeting. On March 16, 2006, DOS and the
Department of Education signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the use
of $60 million of the international cash donations.
Inadequate Cash Management Policies and Planning Reduced Purchasing Power of
Some International Cash Donations for Disaster Relief
Advance planning is very important given the outstanding pledges of $400
million or more that DOS officials indicated may still be received. While
acknowledging that the U.S. government has never previously had occasion
to accept such large amounts of international donations for disaster
relief, going forward, advance planning is a useful tool to identify
potential programs and projects prior to the occurrence of an event of
such magnitude. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, while the NSC-led
interagency working group reviewed various proposals on the use of the
remaining $60 million, DOS held the funds in an account at the U.S.
Treasury that did not earn interest. Treasury lacks the statutory
authority to credit those DOS-held funds with interest. For the time the
funds were not used, their purchasing power diminished due to inflation.
If these funds had been placed in an account that could have been credited
with interest to offset the erosion of purchasing power, the amount of
funds available for relief and recovery efforts would have increased while
decision makers determined how to use them. The U.S. government would be
responsible for paying the interest if these funds were held in an account
at the Treasury that can pay interest. Although the Stafford Act does not
apply to the donated funds maintained in the DOS account at Treasury, the
Stafford Act does provide that excess funds accepted under the Act may be
placed in Treasury securities, and the related interest paid on such
investments would be credited to the account. Had the foreign monetary
donations been placed in Treasury securities, we estimate that by February
23, 2006, the remaining funds for relief efforts would have increased by
nearly $1 million.10
The Administration's report, The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned, released on February 23, 2006, recognized that there was
no pre-established plan for handling international donations and that
implementation of the procedures developed was a slow and often
frustrating process. The report includes recommendations that DOS should
establish before June 1, 2006, an interagency process to determine
appropriate uses of international cash donations, and ensure timely use of
these funds in a transparent and accountable manner, among others. DOS
officials recognized that the ad hoc process needed to be formalized and
planned to develop such procedures by June 1, 2006. When developing
policies and procedures, it is important that consideration also be given
to strategies that can help maintain the purchasing power of the
international donations. If the goal is to maintain both purchasing power
and flexibility, then among the options to consider are seeking statutory
authority for DOS to record funds in a Treasury account that can pay
interest similar to donations accepted under the Stafford Act pending
decisions on how the funds would be used, or to allow DOS to deposit the
funds in an existing Treasury account of another agency that can pay
interest pending decisions on how the funds would be used.
10Interest was computed based on an estimated average annual yield of 5
percent for Treasury Government Account Series from October 21, 2005, to
February 23, 2006.
Lack of Guidance Regarding the Accountability for International In-Kind
Assistance
In the absence of guidance, we found a lack of accountability in the
management of the in-kind assistance. Specifically, FEMA did not have a
process in place that confirmed that the in-kind assistance sent to
distribution sites was received. The lack of guidance, inadequate
information about the nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind
assistance, and insufficient advance coordination also resulted in the
arrival of food and medical assistance that could not be used in the
United States. Also, the ad hoc procedures created to manage foreign
military donations allowed for confusion about which agency-FEMA or
DOD-should accept and be responsible for oversight of such donations.
Lack of Policies and Procedures to Confirm Receipt of Goods at Distribution
Points
Because of the lack of guidance to track assistance, USAID/OFDA created a
database to track the assistance as it arrived. We found that USAID/OFDA
reasonably accounted for the assistance given the lack of information on
the manifests and the amount of assistance that was arriving within a
short time. However, on September 14, 2005, FEMA did request USAID/OFDA to
track the assistance from receipt to final disposition. However, the
system USAID/OFDA created did not include confirming that the assistance
was received at the FEMA distribution sites. In part, USAID/OFDA did not
set up these procedures on its own in this situation, because its mission
is to deliver assistance in foreign countries and it had never distributed
assistance within the United States. FEMA officials told us that they
assumed USAID/OFDA had these controls in place. FEMA and USAID/OFDA
officials could not provide us with evidence that confirmed that the
assistance sent to distribution sites was received. Without these controls
in place to ensure accountability for the assistance, FEMA does not know
if all or part of these donations were received at FEMA distribution
sites. Internal controls, such as a system to track that shipments are
received at intended destinations, provides an agency with oversight, and
for FEMA in this case, they help ensure that international donations are
received at FEMA destination sites.
Inadequate Guidance, Information, and Coordination Resulted in the Arrival of
Food and Medical Items That Could Not Be Used
We noted that the guidance the agencies created did not include policies
and procedures to help ensure that food and medical supplies that the U.S.
government agreed to receive and came into the United States met U.S.
standards. The lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the
nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and
insufficient advance coordination with regulatory agencies before agreeing
to receive them, resulted in food and medical items, such as MREs and
medical supplies, that came into the United States even though they did
not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the
United States. We noted that FEMA's list of items that could be used for
disaster relief that was provided to DOS was very general and did not
provide any exceptions, for example, about contents of MREs. DHS commented
on our report that FEMA repeatedly requested from DOS additional
information about the foreign items being offered and DOS did not respond.
Both instances represent lost opportunities to have prevented the arrival
of items that could not be distributed in the United States. The food
items included MREs from five countries. Because of the magnitude of the
disaster, some normal operating procedures governing the import of goods
were waived. According to USDA and FDA officials, under normal procedures,
entry documents containing specific information, which are filed with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, are transmitted to USDA and FDA for those
agencies' use in determining if the commodities are appropriately
admissible into the United States. Without consultation or prior
notification to USDA or FDA, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection authorized suspension of some normal operating procedures for
the import of regulated items like food and medical supplies.
Consequently, USDA and FDA had no involvement in the decision making or
process of agreeing to receive regulated product donations, including MREs
and medical supplies, and no opportunity to ensure that they would all be
acceptable for distribution before the donated goods arrived. Both USDA
and FDA, based on regulations intended to protect public health, prevented
distribution of some international donations, which resulted in the
assistance being stored at a cost of about $80,000.
Policies and Procedures Were Lacking in the Oversight of Foreign Military
Donations
In the absence of policies and procedures, DOS, FEMA, and DOD created ad
hoc policies and procedures to manage the receipt and distribution of
foreign military goods and services. However, this guidance left open
which agency-FEMA or DOD-was to formally accept the foreign military
assistance and therefore each agency apparently assumed the other had done
so under their respective gift authorities. As a result, it is unclear
whether FEMA or DOD accepted or maintained oversight of the foreign
military donations that were vetted through the DOS Task Force. The offers
of foreign military assistance included, for example, the use of
amphibious ships and diver salvage teams. FEMA did not maintain oversight
of the foreign military donations that it accepted through the DOS task
force. A FEMA official told us that they were unable to tell us how the
foreign military donations were used because FEMA could not match the use
of the donations with mission assignments it gave Northern Command.
Moreover, FEMA and Northern Command officials told us of instances in
which foreign military donations arrived in the United States that were
not vetted through the DOS task force. For example, we were told of
military MREs that were shipped to a military base and distributed
directly to hurricane victims. For the shipments that were not vetted
through the Task Force, DOS, FEMA, and DOD officials could not provide us
information on the type, amount, or use of the items. As a result, the
agencies cannot determine if these items of assistance were safeguarded
and used as intended.
In closing, since the U.S. government had never before received such
substantial amounts of international disaster assistance, we recognize
that DOS, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD created ad hoc procedures to manage
the receipt, acceptance, and distribution of the assistance as best they
could. Going forward, it will be important to have in place clear
policies, procedures, and plans on managing and using both cash and
in-kind donations in a manner that provides accountability and
transparency. If properly implemented, the six recommendations included in
our report issued today will help to ensure that the cognizant agencies
fulfill their responsibilities to effectively manage and maintain
appropriate and adequate internal control over foreign donations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes GAO's prepared statement. We would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For further information on this testimony, please contact either Davi M.
D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected] or McCoy Williams at
(202) 512-9095 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Kay Daly, Lorelei St. James, Jay Spaan, Pamela Valentine, and
Leonard Zapata.
(350767)
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