Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has
Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and
Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain
(04-APR-06, GAO-06-597T).
It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and
baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses
on the progress TSA is making in strengthening aspects of
aviation security and the challenges that remain. Particularly,
this testimony highlights (1) progress TSA has made, and
challenges it faces, in managing a federalized security
workforce--including federal security directors (FSD) and
transportation security officers (TSO)--with operational
responsibility for ensuring security of passengers and their
baggage; and (2) actions TSA has taken, and the challenges it
faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of other
airport security activities.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-597T
ACCNO: A50737
TITLE: Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and
Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain
DATE: 04/04/2006
SUBJECT: Airport personnel
Airport security
Aviation security
Baggage screening
Cargo security
Employee training
Labor force
Passenger screening
Performance measures
Personnel management
Staff utilization
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-597T
* TSA Operational Responsibilities for Passenger and Checked B
* TSA Regulatory Responsibilities for Air Cargo and Airport Se
* TSA Has Taken Action to Support FSDs, but Additional Clarifi
* TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but
* TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training, but Faces Challenges in D
* TSA Has Implemented Various Approaches to Measuring the Perf
* Additional Action Needed to Strengthen TSA Inspections and O
* Further Steps May Be Needed to Strengthen TSA Oversight of C
* Order by Mail or Phone
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency
Organization, Committee on Government Reform,House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
April 4, 2006
AVIATION SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a
Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but
Challenges Remain
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues
GAO-06-597T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the management and deployment of federal employees charged with securing
U.S. commercial airports. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, securing
the nation's aviation system-and ensuring that a federal workforce was in
place to carry out a wide range of aviation security
responsibilities-became a key goal of the administration and the Congress.
Among the actions taken to address this need, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, which established the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), charged the agency with,
among other things, overseeing security operations at the nation's more
than 400 commercial airports.1 In TSA, the federal workforce comprises,
among others, federal security directors (FSDs)-the ranking authority
responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at airports;
transportation security officers (TSO), formerly known as screeners; and
inspectors responsible for ensuring that air carriers, airport employees
and airport vendors comply with established security requirements.
My testimony today addresses two separate areas related to the management
and oversight of the federal airport security workforce: (1) the progress
TSA has made, and the challenges it faces, in managing a federalized
security workforce with operational responsibility for ensuring security
of passengers and their baggage, and (2) the actions TSA has taken, and
the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of
other airport security activities.
My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the
security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our ongoing work on
TSA's staffing standards for TSOs. We did our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains a
list of related GAO products issued since September 11, 2001.
1ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation
(DOT) with responsibility for securing all modes of transportation,
including aviation. Pub. L. No. 107-71, S: 101, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). The
Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on November 25, 2002,
transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Pub. L. No. 107-296, S: 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178.
Summary
While TSA has made progress in managing the federalized aviation security
workforce, including its FSDs and TSOs, TSA continues to face challenges
in several key areas, including clarifying FSD roles and responsibilities,
and managing the deployment and training of its TSO workforce. TSA has
made changes to better support and empower the FSD position, including
granting greater authority and flexibility to FSDs in carrying out their
responsibilities. For example, in carrying out their responsibilities in
overseeing security at the nation's airports, FSDs have formed
partnerships with key stakeholders and participated in communication and
coordination efforts to address a range of issues, including airport
security, operations, and coordination. However, while TSA has developed
guidance that describes the many roles and responsibilities of FSDs, we
recently reported that TSA's primary document outlining FSDs' authority
was outdated and lacked clarity regarding FSD authority during security
incidents relative to other airport stakeholders with whom FSDs must
coordinate closely on aviation security matters. For example, we found
instances where confusion or conflicting opinions developed over whether
the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during particular
security incidents. Regarding its TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned
actions to strengthen the management of the TSO workforce, which must be
deployed in sufficient numbers and trained and certified in the latest
screening procedures and technology to accomplish its security mission.
Acknowledging imbalances in the screener workforce, TSA developed
standards for determining TSO staffing for all airports at which federal
screening is required and developed a Screening Allocation Model (SAM) to
determine airport staffing levels. In determining staffing allocations,
the SAM takes into account not only flight and passenger data, but also
data unique to each airport-including flight schedules, passenger and
baggage distribution curves, and TSA passenger and baggage screening
configurations. However, FSDs we interviewed had preliminary concerns
about the assumptions in the model, noting, among other things, that it
has been a challenge to attract, hire, and retain a part-time TSO
workforce at the 20 percent level indicated in the model. In addition to
having an adequate number of screeners, effective screening involves
screeners properly trained to do their job. TSA has taken numerous steps
to expand training beyond the basic training requirement to include
self-guided courses on its Online Learning Center; a recurrent training
requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a quarter; and training on
threat information, explosives detection, and new screening approaches.
However, insufficient TSO staffing and a lack of high-speed
Internet/intranet connectivity create impediments to the TSO workforce
taking full advantage of training opportunities. With respect to
evaluating TSOs, TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the
performance of the various components of the passenger and checked baggage
screening systems-people, processes and technology. Specifically, TSA has
implemented and strengthened efforts to collect performance data by
performing covert (undercover, unannounced) tests, using the Threat Image
Projection (TIP) system2 at passenger screening checkpoints, and
implementing a congressionally mandated annual TSO recertification
program. Despite these efforts, TSA covert testing has identified that
weaknesses existed in the ability of TSOs to detect threat objects on
passengers, in their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage.
TSA has taken steps to strengthen the federal workforce responsible for
other key areas of aviation security, including domestic air cargo and
airport perimeters and access controls, but it faces additional challenges
in each of these areas related to performance measurement and regulatory
oversight. We reported in October 2005, for example, that TSA had
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections. We
noted, however, that TSA had not developed performance measures to
determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers-carriers
that consolidate air cargo from multiple shippers and deliver it to air
carriers to be transported-are complying with air cargo security
requirements, and had not analyzed the results of inspections to
systematically target future inspections on those entities that pose a
higher security risk to the domestic air cargo system. Without these
performance measures and systematic analyses, TSA will be limited in its
ability to effectively target its workforce for future inspections and
fulfill its oversight responsibilities for this important area of aviation
security. In June 2005, TSA officials informed us that in the future they
intend to compile information on the number of instances in which specific
air cargo security requirements are inspected, and are taking steps to
enhance TSA's ability to conduct compliance inspections of indirect air
carriers, by, among other things, using undercover testing to identify air
cargo security weaknesses. We also found that TSA has made efforts to
incorporate risk-based decision making into securing air cargo, but has
not conducted assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets
(cargo facilities and aircraft)-two crucial elements of a risk-based
management approach without which TSA may not be able to appropriately
focus its resources on the most critical security needs. Moreover, to
better allocate resources for air cargo security, TSA established a
requirement for random inspection of air cargo to address threats to the
nation's aviation transportation system-a reflection of the agency's
position that inspecting 100 percent of air cargo was not technologically
feasible and would be potentially disruptive to the flow of air commerce.
In the area of airport perimeter and access control security, we reported
in June 2004 that while background checks were not required for all
airport workers, TSA requires most airport workers who perform duties in
secured and sterile areas3 to undergo a fingerprint-based criminal history
records check. TSA further requires airport operators to compare
applicants' names against TSA's aviation security watch lists. Once
workers undergo this review, they are granted access to airport areas in
which they perform duties. In addition, ATSA mandated that TSA require
airport operators and air carriers to develop security awareness training
programs for airport workers such as ground crews and gate, ticket, and
curbside agents of air carriers. According to TSA, training requirements
for these airport workers had not been established because additional
training would result in increased costs for airport operators. In the
area of security-related training, TSA did not require airport vendors
with direct access to the airfield and aircraft to develop security
programs, which would include security measures for vendor employees and
property, as required by ATSA. In July 2004, in response to our
recommendations, TSA made several improvements in these areas, through the
issuance of a series of security directives, including requiring enhanced
background checks and improved access controls for airport employees who
work in restricted airport areas.
2The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs' detection
capabilities by projecting threat images, including images of guns and
explosives, into bags as they are screened. TSOs are responsible for
positively identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be
searched.
Background
TSA Operational Responsibilities for Passenger and Checked Baggage Security
Prior to the passage of ATSA, the screening of passengers and checked
baggage had been performed by private screening companies under contract
to the airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible
for ensuring compliance with screening regulations. With the passage of
ATSA and the transfer of aviation security responsibilities to TSA,
including passenger and checked baggage screening at airports, TSA
assigned FSDs-the top-ranking TSA authorities responsible for security at
the nation's airports-to one or more commercial airports to oversee
security activities. TSA has approximately 157 FSD positions at commercial
airports nationwide to lead and coordinate TSA security activities.
Although an FSD is responsible for security at each commercial airport,
not every airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that airport. Most
category X airports4 have an FSD responsible for that airport alone, while
at other airports the FSD located at a hub airport has responsibility over
one or more spoke airports of the same or smaller size.
3Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers wait after
screening to board departing aircraft. Access to these areas is generally
controlled by TSA screeners at checkpoints where they conduct physical
screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage for weapons and
explosives.
In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for passenger
and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA also set forth specific
enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement, with deadlines
for completing many of them. These requirements include
o assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations
at more than 400 commercial airports by November 19, 2002;
o establishing a basic screener training program composed of a
minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of
on-the-job training;
o conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners;
o conducting operational testing of screeners;5
o requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an
operational test; and
o screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives
detection systems by December 31, 2002.6
As mandated by ATSA, TSA hired and deployed a TSO workforce to
assume operational responsibility for conducting passenger and
checked baggage screening. Passenger screening is a process by
which authorized TSA personnel inspect individuals and property to
deter and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive,
incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item onboard an aircraft or
into a sterile area. TSOs must inspect individuals for prohibited
items at designated screening locations.7 The four passenger
screening functions are (1) X-ray screening of property, (2)
walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, (3)
hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and (4) physical
search of property and trace detection for explosives. Checked
baggage screening is a process by which authorized TSOs inspect
checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon onboard an aircraft.
Checked baggage screening is accomplished through the use of
explosive detection systems8 (EDS) or explosive trace detection
(ETD) systems,9 and through the use of other means, such as manual
searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag match,10 when
EDS and ETD systems are unavailable.
In addition to establishing requirements for passenger and checked
baggage screening, ATSA charged TSA with the responsibility for
ensuring the security of air cargo, including, among other things,
establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic and
foreign passenger carriers that transport cargo, domestic and
foreign all-cargo carriers, and domestic indirect air
carriers-carriers that consolidate air cargo from multiple
shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported; and
overseeing implementation of air cargo security requirements by
air carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance
inspections. In general, TSA inspections are designed to ensure
air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, while
air carrier inspections focus on ensuring that cargo does not
contain weapons, explosives, or stowaways.11 TSA is responsible
for inspecting 285 passenger and all-cargo air carriers with about
2,800 cargo facilities nationwide, as well as 3,800 indirect air
carriers with about 10,000 domestic locations. In conducting
inspections, TSA inspectors review documentation, interview
carrier personnel, directly observe air cargo operations, or
conduct tests to determine whether air carriers and indirect air
carriers are in compliance with air cargo security requirements.
In 2004, an estimated 23 billion pounds of air cargo was
transported within the United States, with about a quarter of this
amount transported on passenger aircraft. Recently, DHS reported
that most cargo on passenger aircraft is not physically inspected.
ATSA also granted TSA the responsibility for overseeing U.S.
airport operators' efforts to maintain and improve the security of
commercial airport perimeters, access controls, and airport
workers. While airport operators, not TSA, retain direct
day-to-day operational responsibilities for these areas of
security, ATSA directs TSA to improve the security of airport
perimeters and the access controls leading to secured airport
areas, as well as take measures to reduce the security risks posed
by airport workers. Each airport's security program, which must be
approved by TSA, outlines the security policies, procedures, and
systems the airport intends to use in order to comply with TSA
security requirements. FSDs oversee the implementation of the
security requirements at airports.
Of TSA's 950 aviation security inspectors located at airports
throughout the United States, 750 are considered generalists who
conduct a variety of aviation security inspections, and 200 are
dedicated to conducting air cargo inspections. The FSD at each
airport is responsible for determining the scope and emphasis of
the inspections, as well as discretion for how to assign local
inspection staff. TSA provides local airport FSDs and inspectors
with goals for the number of inspections to be conducted per
quarter.
In recent years, TSA has taken numerous actions related to the
deployment, training, and performance of their aviation security
workforce. TSA has, for example, taken action to support the
authority of FSDs at airports, though additional clarification of
their roles is needed. TSA also has improved the management and
deployment of its TSO workforce with the use of a formal staffing
model, though hiring and deployment challenges remain. TSA has
also strengthened TSO training, and implemented various approaches
to measuring TSO performance related to passenger and baggage
screening activities.
In recent years, TSA has taken steps to ensure that FSDs, as the
ranking TSA authorities at airports, coordinated their security
actions with various airport stakeholders, and had sufficient
authority to carry out their responsibilities. In September 2005,
we reported on the roles and responsibilities of FSDs and other
issues related to the position, including the extent to which they
formed and facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders.12
At that time, we reported that the FSDs and most stakeholders at
the seven airports we visited had developed partnerships that were
generally working well. TSA recognized that building and
maintaining partnerships with airport stakeholders was essential
to FSDs' success in addressing security as well as maintaining an
appropriate level of customer service. To that end, TSA
established general guidance for FSDs to follow in building
stakeholder partnerships, but left it to the FSDs to determine how
best to achieve effective partnerships at their respective
airports. As a part of their security responsibilities, FSDs must
coordinate closely with airport stakeholders-airport and air
carrier officials, local law enforcement, and emergency response
officials-to ensure that airports are adequately protected and
prepared in the event of a terrorist attack. FSDs' success in
sustaining and ensuring the effectiveness of aviation security
efforts is dependent on their ability to develop and maintain
effective partnerships with these stakeholders. FSDs need to
partner with law enforcement stakeholders, for example, because
they do not have a law enforcement body of their own to respond to
security incidents. Partnerships can be of mutual benefit to FSDs
and airport stakeholders and can enhance customer service. For
example, FSDs rely on air carrier data on the number of passengers
transiting through checkpoints to appropriately schedule
screeners, and air carriers rely on the FSD to provide an
efficient screening process to minimize wait times for passengers.
At the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders cited several
ways FSDs maintained partnerships, including being accessible to
their stakeholders to help resolve problems and meeting with
stakeholders to discuss how to implement new security policies. In
addition, a variety of communication and coordination efforts were
in place at the airports we visited, and many of these efforts
existed before TSA assigned FSDs to airports. Formal mechanisms
included security and general airport operations meetings,
incident debriefings, and training exercises to help ensure a
coordinated response in the event of a security incident.
We also found that in response to concerns over FSD authority in
responding to airport-specific security needs, in 2004, TSA made a
number of changes to better support and empower the FSD. These
changes included
o establishing a local hiring initiative that vested more hiring
authority with the FSDs to address airport staffing needs,
o providing flexibility to offer training locally to screeners,
o increasing authority to address performance and conduct
problems,
o relocating five area director positions from the headquarters
to the field in conjunction with establishing a report group to
provide operational support and a communication link with
headquarters, and
o establishing a mentoring program for newly appointed FSDs or
their deputies.
Most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes
favorably. For example, most were satisfied with TSA's new local
hiring process that provided more options for FSDs to be involved
with hiring screeners, and most said that the new process was
better than the more centralized hiring process it replaced. TSA
officials concluded, among other things, that TSO candidates
selected at airports where the FSD and staff were conducting the
hiring process were more selective in accepting offers-leading to
lower attrition-because they had more knowledge of what the job
would entail than contractors did when they handled the hiring
process. In addition, most of the FSDs we interviewed also saw
value in the headquarters group TSA established to provide
operational support to the field and a communication link among
headquarters, field-based area directors, and FSDs.
One area where we noted room for improvement at the FSD level was
in how the FSD's authority has been defined. In September 2005, we
reported that TSA had developed guidance that describes the many
roles and responsibilities of FSDs, most of which is associated
with securing commercial airports from terrorist threats.13
However, while the guidance clearly defined FSD roles and
responsibilities, TSA's primary document outlining FSDs' authority
was outdated and lacked clarity regarding FSD authority relative
to that of other airport stakeholders with whom FSDs must
coordinate closely to help ensure the effectiveness of aviation
security efforts. The absence of a clear understanding of the
authority of the position had reportedly resulted in confusion
during past security incidents and had raised concerns among some
stakeholders at both the national and airport levels about
possible ambiguity regarding FSDs' authority during incidents.
Accordingly, we recommended that steps be taken to update TSA's
Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect the authority
of FSDs relative to that of airport stakeholders during security
incidents and communicate the authority of the position, as
warranted, to the FSDs and all airport stakeholders. Such action
would benefit FSDs by further enabling them to communicate and
share consistent information about their authority with their
staff and airport stakeholders, including law enforcement
agencies. In commenting on our recommendation, DHS stated that a
new restatement of the Delegation Order had been drafted by a
working group composed of FSDs from the FSD Advisory Council and
relevant stakeholders and is being internally coordinated for
comment and clearance.
To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number
of passenger and checked baggage TSOs trained and certified in the
latest screening procedures and technology. We reported in
February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had
hindered the ability of some FSDs to provide sufficient resources
to staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at
their checkpoints without using additional measures such as
overtime.14 TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts
created imbalances in the screener workforce and has since been
taking steps to address these imbalances over the past 2 years,
by, among other things, meeting a congressional requirement to
develop a staffing model for TSOs. Specifically, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required TSA to
develop and submit to Congress standards for determining the
aviation security staffing for all airports at which screening is
required.15 The act also directed GAO to review these standards,
which we are doing. These staffing standards are to provide for
necessary levels of airport security, while also ensuring that
security-related delays experienced by airline passengers are
minimized. In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation
security staffing standards to Congress. Known as the Screening
Allocation Model (SAM), these standards are intended to provide an
objective measure for determining TSO airport staffing levels,
while staying within the congressionally mandated limit of 45,000
FTE screeners.
Whereas TSA's prior staffing model was demand-driven based on
flight and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand
data but also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through
the airport and the availability of the workforce. In determining
the appropriate TSO staffing levels, the SAM first considers the
workload demands unique to each individual airport-including
flight schedules, load factors and connecting flights, and number
of passenger bags. These demand inputs are then processed against
certain assumptions about the processing of passengers and
baggage-including expected passenger and baggage processing rates,
required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment, and
equipment alarm rates. Using these and various other data, the SAM
determines the daily workforce requirements and calculates a work
schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a recommended
mix of full-time and part-time staff and a total number of TSO
full-time equivalents (FTE) needed to staff the airport,16
consistent with a goal of 10 minutes maximum wait time for
processing passengers and baggage.
For fiscal year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of
42,170 TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay
within a 43,000 TSO FTE budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006, TSA
officials reduced the number of FTEs allocated to airports to
42,056, a level that allowed it to fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the
National Screener Force-a force composed of TSOs who provide
screening support to all airports------and to maintain a
contingency of 329 TSO FTEs in reserve to meet unanticipated
demands, such as a new air carrier coming on line at an airport.17
As of January 2006, there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and 5,782
part-time TSOs on board nationwide, representing an annualized
rate of 41,085 TSO FTEs. According to TSA headquarters officials,
the SAM can be adjusted to account for the uniqueness of
particular airport security checkpoints and airline traffic
patterns. Further, it is up to the FSDs to ensure that all of the
data elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports, and
to bring to TSA's attention any factors that should be reviewed to
determine if changes to the SAM are appropriate. The President's
fiscal year 2007 budget requests a total of 45,121 FTEs under the
Passenger and Baggage TSO personnel compensation and benefits
categories.
As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified
several preliminary concerns about TSA's efforts to address its
staffing imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport
passenger and checked baggage screening checkpoints. At the five
airports we visited, FSD staff raised concerns about the SAM
assumptions as they related to their particular airports.18 Among
other things, they noted that the recommendation for 20 percent
part-time TSO workforce-measured in terms of FTEs-often could not
be reached, the expected processing rates for passenger and
baggage screening were not being realized, non-passenger screening
at large airports was higher than assumed, and the number of TSO
FTEs needed per checkpoint lane and per baggage screening machine
was not sufficient for peak periods. Regarding the SAM assumption
of a 20 percent part-time TSO FTE level across all airports, FSD
staff we visited stated that the 20 percent goal has been
difficult to achieve because of, among other things, economic
conditions leading to competition for part-time workers, remote
airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit, TSO base
pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and part-time
workers' desire to convert to full-time status. According to TSA
headquarters officials, while the nationwide annual TSO attrition
rate is about 23 percent (compared to a rate of 14 percent
reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent for part-time
TSOs. TSA has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs since it began
actively recruiting them in the summer of 2003. In February 2004,
we reported that FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated
that they experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time
TSOs, which they believed to be due to many of the same factors,
such as low pay and benefits, undesirable hours, the location of
their airport, the lack of accessible and affordable parking or
public transportation, and the high cost of living in the areas
surrounding some airports.19 These FSDs stated that very few
full-time TSOs were interested in converting to part-time status-a
condition that still exists-and TSA officials stated that
attrition rates for part-time TSOs were considerably higher than
those for full-time TSOs.
At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing
review of the SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been
able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels. In February
2004, we reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed
concern that TSA's hiring process was not responsive to their
needs and hindered their ability to reach their authorized
staffing levels and adequately staff screening checkpoints.
Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with the lack of a continuous
hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and
their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis.
We reported that TSA was taking steps to make the hiring process
more responsive to FSDs' needs. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs
with more input into the hiring process in an effort to streamline
the process and enable FSDs to more quickly meet their staffing
needs.
During our five airport visits, some FSD staff we interviewed also
cited another limitation of the SAM-specifically, that the model
does not account for screeners who are performing administrative
or other duties. The officials also noted that, because they are
not authorized to hire a sufficient number of mission support
staff, TSOs are being routinely used-in some cases full time-to
carry out non-screening and administrative duties, including
supporting payroll, scheduling, uniform supplies, legal support,
logistics, and operations center activities. At the five airports
we visited in January and February 2006, out of a total of 2,572
TSO full time equivalents (FTE) on-board at those airports,
roughly 136 FTEs (just over five percent) were being used for
administrative duties. FSD staff stated that some of these TSOs
are being used on a part-time basis, while others are used on a
full-time basis. The use of TSOs in these support functions could
adversely affect the ability of FSDs to adequately staff their
screening checkpoints.
To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational
flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October
2003, TSA established a National Screening Force (formerly known
as the Mobile Screening Force established in November 2002) to
provide screening support to all airports in times of emergency,
seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that
require a greater number of screeners than regularly available to
FSDs. In February 2004, we reported that the National Screening
Force consisted of over 700 full-time passenger and baggage TSOs.
TSA officials stated that while these screeners have a home
airport to which they are assigned, they travel to airports in
need of screening staff approximately 70 percent of the year.
TSA budgeted from appropriations received in fiscal year 2006 for
615 FTEs for the National Screening Force. The President's fiscal
year 2007 budget request includes $35 million for operational
expenses of the National Screening Force (not including salaries
and benefits of force members). According to the budget request,
in fiscal year 2007, the National Screening Force will generally
be deployed only to those airports experiencing significant
staffing shortfalls associated with increased seasonal traffic or
when a special event, such as a Super Bowl or a large national
conference, occurs requiring an immediate influx of additional TSO
support. At one category X airport we recently visited, the FSD
stated that because of challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for
this airport, he has had to rely on 59 members of the National
Screening Force deployed to his airport, and had been relying on
this force since 2004. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget
request states that TSA will continue to review methods for
reducing costs associated with this force, including ensuring that
each airport has a sufficient staffing program in place to address
short-term needs.
In the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request, TSA identified
several additional initiatives under way to address the management
of the TSO workforce. These efforts include attempts to reduce
attrition by creating a performance-based pay system, and
establishing retention incentives to include performance bonuses,
retention allowances, college credit reimbursement and flexible
staffing. TSA also reported efforts to enhance opportunities for
career advancement within the TSO job category, reducing
on-the-job injuries by reengineering baggage screening areas, and
deploying a national nurse care management program at 21 airports
to assist TSOs in returning to work in a shorter period of time.
Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003, TSA has taken
a number of actions designed to strengthen training available to
the TSO workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the
performance of TSOs.20 In September 2003, we reported that TSA had
not fully developed or deployed a recurrent training program for
passenger TSOs. At that time, little training was available to
TSOs once they completed their basic TSO training. Since then, TSA
has expanded training available to the TSO workforce, such as
introducing an Online Learning Center that makes self-guided
courses available over TSA's intranet and the Internet and
expanding training available to supervisory TSOs. TSA also
established a recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week,
averaged over a quarter, and provided FSDs with additional tools
to facilitate and enhance TSO training, including at least one
modular bomb set kit-containing components of an improvised
explosive device (IED)-and at least one weapons training kit. TSA
has also instituted a program called Threat in the Spotlight that,
based on intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners with the
latest in threat information regarding terrorist attempts to get
threat objects past screening checkpoints. Additionally, in
December 2005, TSA reported completing enhanced explosives
detection training for over 18,000 TSOs. This training included
both classroom and hands-on experiences, and focused particularly
on identifying X-ray images of IED component parts, not just a
completely assembled bomb. TSA plans for the remaining TSO
workforce to receive this training by June 2006 through the Online
Learning Center or other delivery methods. TSA also has developed
new training curriculums to support new screening approaches. For
example, TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in
behavior observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify
passengers exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or
deception.
However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and
a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the
Online Learning Center have made it difficult for all TSOs
screeners at many airports to receive required training and has
limited TSO access to TSA training tools.21 As previously
discussed, TSA is taking steps to address the TSO staffing
challenges. However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA's
efforts will address TSA's ability to provide required training
while maintaining adequate coverage for screening operations. In
terms of access to the Online Learning Center, TSA plans to
complete the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet
connectivity to airports during fiscal year 2007. TSA established
its Online Learning Center to provide passenger and baggage
screeners with online, high-speed access to training courses.
However, effective use of the Online Learning Center requires
high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA has not been able
to provide to all airports. In May 2005, we reported that as of
October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have
high speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center.
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request reports that
approximately 220 of the more than 400 airport and field locations
have full information technology infrastructure installation, to
include high-speed network connectivity, while the rest of the
airports operate with dial-up access to TSA systems. According to
the budget request, TSA will use $120 million in fiscal year 2006
to deploy high-speed connectivity to all category X and I airports
and preliminary high-speed connectivity to all category II, III,
and IV airports. The budget request includes a request for a total
of $90 million to support this effort in fiscal year 2007, of
which $54 million is needed to complete the deployment of
high-speed connectivity at category II, III, and IV airports.22
TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the
various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems-people, processes, and technology-but results of covert
testing identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to
exist. In November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to
strengthen its efforts to measure the performance of its screening
functions.23 At that time, TSA had collected limited data on the
effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives, to include
screening functions. Specifically, limited covert (undercover,
unannounced) testing had been performed, the TIP system used to
aid TSOs in identifying threat objects within baggage was not
fully operational at passenger screening checkpoints and was not
available for checked baggage screening systems, and TSA had not
fully implemented a congressionally mandated annual TSO
proficiency review. Since then, TSA has implemented and
strengthened efforts to collect performance data in each of these
areas.
In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the
amount of passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it
performs and recently changed its approach to covert testing to
focus its resources on catastrophic threats-threats that can take
down an airplane or blow up an airplane. TSA's Office of
Inspections (OI) (formerly the Office of Internal Affairs and
Program Review, or OIAPR) conducts unannounced covert tests of
TSOs to assess their ability to detect threat objects and to
adhere to TSA-approved procedures. These tests, in which
undercover OI inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through
passenger screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are
designed to measure vulnerabilities in passenger and checked
baggage screening systems and to identify systematic problems
affecting performance of TSOs in the areas of training,
procedures, and technology. OI, which began covert testing in
September 2002, conducted 836 tests in fiscal year 2003 and 2,369
tests in fiscal year 2004 using its staff of 183
full-time-equivalents.24 In reporting its covert testing results,
OI makes recommendations to TSA leadership that address
deficiencies identified during testing and are intended to improve
screening effectiveness. As of December 2005, OI had issued 29
reports to management on the results of its checkpoint and checked
baggage covert testing. In total, the reports include 19 distinct
recommendations related to passenger and checked baggage
screening.25 Of these 19 recommendations, 11 relate to screener
training. In September 2005, OI began implementing a revamped
testing process that included a more risk-based approach and
focused its resources on catastrophic threats. OI officials stated
that they will continue testing. However, TSA leadership is
reviewing the results of the revised testing, and final decisions
regarding the structure, content, and frequency of future tests
have not yet been made.
Our analysis of TSA's covert testing results for tests conducted
between September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall,
weaknesses existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat
objects on passengers, in their carry-on bags, and in checked
baggage. Covert testing results in this analysis cannot be
generalized either to the airports where the tests were conducted
or to airports nationwide.26
In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct
their own covert testing of local airport passenger screening
activities-a practice that TSA had previously prohibited.27
Between May 2004 and April 2005, FSDs conducted a total of 17,954
local covert tests at 350 airports; as of February 2006, TSA
reported that FSDs had conducted a total of 48,826 local covert
tests. In February 2005, TSA released a general procedures
document for local covert testing at checked baggage screening
locations. Between March 2005 and September 2005, 1,370 local
tests of EDS screening were conducted at 71 airports. TSA
headquarters officials stated that a key challenge FSDs face in
conducting local testing is the lack of available federal staff to
conduct the testing, particularly at smaller airports. In May
2005, we reported that TSA officials stated that they had not yet
begun to use data from local covert testing to identify training
and performance needs because of difficulties in ensuring that
local covert testing is implemented consistently nationwide.28 TSA
officials stated in March 2006, that the data are available for
FSDs to use to identify training needs and levels of TSO
performance.
Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security
effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening
procedures and technologies in the operating environment in
addition to other TSA measures that assess the performance of
passenger and checked baggage TSOs. One other source of
information on TSO performance in detecting threat objects is the
results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test passenger
screeners' detection capabilities by projecting threat images,
including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as
they are screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible
for identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be
searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether
the threat is real and then records the TSO's performance in a
database that could be analyzed for performance trends.29 TIP
threat detection results in conjunction with OI covert test
results and local testing are intended to assist TSA in
identifying specific training and performance improvement efforts.
In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP
as planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but one
of the more than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide.30 In December
2005, TSA reported that it has further expanded the image library
to include additional images of IEDs and IED components as part of
its effort to improve TSOs' detection of explosives. Additionally,
the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA
plans to maximize the training benefits of the TIP system by
tailoring TIP sessions to address individual TSO weaknesses
revealed in user performance data. For example, if a TSO has
particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the TIP would trigger the
projection of a higher proportion of simulated IEDs while that TSO
was operating the machine under standard circumstances.
Despite these improvements, TIP is not yet available for checked
baggage screening. In April 2004, we reported that TSA officials
stated that they were working to resolve technical challenges
associated with using TIP for checked baggage screening on
explosives detection system (EDS) machines and have started EDS
TIP image development.31 However, in December 2004, TSA officials
stated that because of severe budget reductions, TSA will be
unable to begin implementing a TIP program for checked baggage in
fiscal year 2005. Officials did not specify when such a program
might begin.
Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual
recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an
annual proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet
all qualifications and standards required to perform the screening
function. To meet this requirement, TSA established a
recertification program. The first recertification program-which
was conducted during the period October 2003 through March
2004-was composed of two assessment components, one of TSOs'
performance and the other of TSOs' knowledge and skills. During
the performance assessment component of the recertification
program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and individual
goals, such as maintaining the nation's air security, vigilantly
carrying out duties with utmost attention to tasks that will
prevent security threats, and demonstrating the highest levels of
courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of satisfaction
with screening services. The knowledge and skills assessment
component consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard
operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical
demonstration of skills.
Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification
testing for the first 2 years the program was in place, with about
1 percent of TSOs subject to recertification failing to complete
this requirement. In both years, TSOs faced the greatest
difficulty on their first attempt to pass the practical
demonstration of skills module-a hands-on simulated work sample
used to evaluate a screener's knowledge, skill, and ability when
performing specific screener tasks along with the ability to
provide customer service.32 According to TSA officials, at the
completion of recertification at an airport, TSA management has
access to reports at both the individual TSO and airport level,
which identify the specific areas that were missed during testing.
National level reports are also available that isolate areas that
need improvement and can be targeted in basic and recurrent
training. In fiscal year 2004, TSA established a performance
measure for the recertification program.33
During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function
TSOs who were actively working as both passenger and checked
baggage TSOs were required to take only the recertification test
for passenger TSOs. They were therefore not required to take the
recertification testing modules required for checked baggage, even
though they worked in that capacity.34 TSA's second annual
recertification testing, which began in October 2004, included
components for dual-function TSOs, but did not include an image
recognition module for checked baggage TSOs-which would include
dual-function screeners performing checked baggage screening. TSA
officials stated that a decision was made to not include an image
recognition module for checked baggage TSOs during this cycle
because not all checked baggage TSOs would have completed training
on the onscreen resolution protocol by the time recertification
testing was conducted at their airports.35 In October 2005, TSA
released guidance for screener recertification that included an
image recognition module for checked baggage and dual-function
screeners trained in the onscreen alarm resolution protocol.
In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of
TSOs, TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure
the effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems. These indexes measure overall performance through a
composite of indicators and are derived by combining specific
performance measures relating to passenger and checked baggage
screening, respectively. Such measures can be useful in
identifying shortfalls that might be addressed by initiatives to
enhance the workforce, such as providing special training.
Specifically, these indexes measure the effectiveness of the
screening systems through machine probability of detection and
covert testing results;36 efficiency through a calculation of
dollars spent per passenger or bag screened; and customer
satisfaction through a national poll, customer surveys, and
customer complaints at both airports and TSA's national call
center. We reported in May 2005 that the screening performance
indexes developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but
without targets for each component of the index, TSA will have
difficulty performing meaningful analyses of the parts that make
up the index. For example, without performance targets for covert
testing, TSA will not have identified a desired level of
performance related to screener detection of threat objects.
Performance targets for covert testing would enable TSA to focus
its improvement efforts on areas determined to be most critical,
as 100 percent detection capability may not be attainable.37 In
January 2005, TSA officials stated that the agency planned to
track the performance of individual index components and establish
performance targets against which to measure these components.
Since then, TSA has finalized targets for the indexes, including
targets for passenger and checked baggage covert testing.
TSA has taken steps to strengthen oversight for key areas of
aviation security, including domestic air cargo security
operations conducted by air carriers, and airport perimeter
security operations and access controls carried out by airport
operators. For air cargo, TSA has increased the number of
inspectors used to assess air carrier and indirect air carrier
compliance with security requirements, and has incorporated
elements of risk-based decision making to guide air cargo security
needs. As of October 2005, however, TSA had not developed
performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers and
indirect air carriers are complying with air cargo security
requirements, limiting TSA's ability to effectively target its
workforce for future inspections and fulfill its oversight
responsibilities. On airport premises, TSA had, at the time of our
2004 review, begun evaluating the security of airport perimeters
and the controls that limit access into secured airport areas, but
had not completed actions to ensure that all airport workers
employed in these areas were vetted prior to hiring and then
trained.
We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased
the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air
carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with security
requirements. 38 We noted, however, that TSA had not developed
performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers and
indirect air carriers were complying with security requirements,
and had not analyzed the results of inspections to systematically
target future inspections on those entities that pose a higher
security risk to the domestic air cargo system. Without these
performance measures and systematic analyses, TSA will be limited
in its ability to effectively target its workforce for future
inspections and fulfill its oversight responsibilities for this
essential area of aviation security. We also reported on other
actions that TSA had taken to focus limited resources on the most
critical security needs.
Our analysis of TSA's inspection records39 showed that between
January 1, 2003, and January 31, 2005, TSA conducted 36,635 cargo
inspections of air carriers and indirect air carriers and found
4,343 violations.40 Although TSA had compiled this information,
the agency had not determined what constitutes an acceptable level
of performance or compared air carriers' and indirect air
carriers' performance against this standard. Without measures to
determine an acceptable level of compliance with air cargo
security requirements, TSA cannot assess the performance of
individual air carriers or indirect air carriers against national
performance averages or goals that would allow TSA to target
inspections and other actions on those that fall below acceptable
levels of compliance. According to TSA officials, the agency was
working on developing short-term and long-term outcome measures
for air cargo security, but they did not provide a timetable for
when this effort would be completed.
In addition, TSA had taken initial steps to compile information on
the results of its compliance inspections of air carriers and
indirect air carriers and identify the most frequent types of
violations found. For example, from January 1, 2003, to January
31, 2005, TSA identified violations committed by air carriers and
indirect air carriers involving noncompliance with air cargo
security requirements in several areas-such as cargo acceptance
procedures, access control to cargo facilities, and physical cargo
inspections-that TSA had determined to be high-risk because they
would pose the greatest risk to the safety and security of air
cargo operations. TSA identified indirect air carriers' failure to
comply with their own security programs as the area with the most
violations, which according to TSA officials is due, in part, to
indirect air carriers' unfamiliarity with air cargo security
requirements. While TSA had identified frequently occurring
violations, it had not yet determined the specific area of
violation for a large number of inspections. In addition, TSA
could not identify how many of its 36,635 inspections covered each
air cargo security requirement. As a result, TSA could not
determine the compliance rate for each specific area inspected.
Without complete information on the specific air cargo security
requirements that air carriers and indirect air carriers violated,
as well as the number of times each topic area was inspected, TSA
was limited in its ability to determine the compliance rates for
specific air cargo security requirements and effectively target
future inspections for air cargo security requirements that were
most frequently violated and the air carriers and indirect air
carriers that violate them. In June 2005, TSA officials informed
us that in the future they intended to compile information on the
number of instances in which specific air cargo security
requirements were inspected.
In addition, while TSA compiled information on the results of its
compliance inspections, the agency had not yet systematically
analyzed these results to target future inspections on security
requirements and entities that pose a higher risk. Analyzing
inspection results would be consistent with our internal control
standards calling for comparisons of data to identify
relationships that could form the basis for corrective actions, if
necessary.41 TSA officials and the agency's fiscal year 2005
annual domestic inspection and assessment plan identified the need
for such analyses. According to TSA officials, the agency had
recently hired one staff person to begin analyzing inspection
data. In June 2005, TSA officials also stated that the agency was
working to revise its Performance and Results Information System
database to allow for more accurate recording of inspection
violations. However, the agency had not systematically analyzed
the results of its inspections to target future inspections of
those entities that pose an increased security risk. Without an
analysis of the results of its inspections, TSA had a limited
basis to determine how best to allocate its inspection resources.
Further, analyzing key program performance data and using the
results of this analysis to effectively allocate resources are
consistent with elements of a risk management approach.
Specifically, analyzing the results of compliance inspection data
could help focus limited inspection resources on those entities
posing a higher security risk. Such targeting is important because
TSA may not have adequate resources to inspect all air carriers
and indirect air carriers on a regular basis. For example, as we
reported in October 2005, according to TSA inspection data for the
period from January 1, 2003, to January 31, 2005, compliance
inspections identified a greater incidence of violations by
indirect air carriers than by air carriers. In addition, the
percentage of inspections of air carriers that did not identify a
violation of air cargo security requirements was significantly
higher than that for indirect air carriers. According to TSA
officials, the agency was taking steps to enhance its ability to
conduct compliance inspections of indirect air carriers.42
To further target its inspections, TSA was conducting special
emphasis assessments, which include testing to identify air cargo
security weaknesses.43 On the basis of its review of compliance
inspection results for the period of January 2003 to January 2005,
TSA identified 25 indirect air carriers and 11 air carriers with a
history of violations related to air cargo security requirements.
TSA officials stated that the agency began conducting tests on
these air carriers and indirect air carriers in April 2005.44 TSA
officials stated that the agency planned to conduct additional
tests. However, TSA officials stated that the agency had not yet
determined how it will use the results of its testing program to
help interpret the results from its other compliance inspection
efforts. TSA had also not analyzed inspection results to identify
additional targets for future testing. Such analysis could include
focusing compliance testing efforts on air carriers and indirect
air carriers with a history of air cargo security violations
related to high-risk areas.
TSA has made efforts to incorporate risk-based decision making
into securing air cargo, but has not conducted assessments of air
cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo facilities and
aircraft)-two crucial elements of a risk-based management approach
without which TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its
resources on the most critical security needs. TSA also completed
an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a
threat-based risk management approach and identified strategic
objectives and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security.
Then, in November 2004, TSA issued a proposed air cargo security
rule to enhance and improve the security of air cargo
transportation.45 When finalized, TSA intends for this rule to
implement most of the objectives set forth in the strategic plan.
TSA had also not completed a methodology for assessing the
vulnerability and criticality of air cargo assets, or established
a schedule for conducting such assessments because of competing
agency efforts to address other areas of aviation security.
TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to
streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and
businesses) are made known to carriers with whom they conduct
business. However, the information on the universe of shippers was
incomplete because shipper participation was not mandatory and the
data had not been thoroughly reviewed. TSA estimated that the
database represented less than a third of the total population of
known shippers. Further, TSA had not taken steps to identify
shippers who may pose a security threat, in part because TSA had
incomplete information on known shippers. TSA was attempting to
address this limitation by its November 2004 proposed air cargo
security rule which would make the Known Shipper database
mandatory. This would require air carriers and indirect air
carriers to submit information on their known shippers to TSA's
Known Shipper database. Finally, TSA plans to take further steps
to identify those shippers who may pose a security risk.
In addition, TSA established a requirement for random inspection
of air cargo to address threats to the nation's aviation
transportation system and to reflect the agency's position that
inspecting 100 percent of air cargo was not technologically
feasible and would be potentially disruptive to the flow of air
commerce. However, this requirement, which was revised in 2005 to
increase the percentage of inspections required, contained
exemptions based on the nature and size of cargo that may leave
the air cargo system vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA's plans
for enhancing air cargo security included implementing a system
for targeting elevated risk cargo for inspection.46 Although the
agency acknowledged that the successful development of this system
was contingent upon having complete, accurate, and current
targeting information, the agency had not yet completed efforts to
ensure information that will be used by the system is reliable.
Further, through its proposed air cargo security rule, TSA planned
to require air carriers and indirect air carriers to secure air
cargo facilities, screen all individual persons boarding all-cargo
aircraft, and conduct security checks on air cargo workers. In
commenting on the proposed air cargo security rule, industry
stakeholders representing air carriers, indirect air carriers and
airport authorities stated that several of the proposals,
including those mentioned above, may be costly and difficult to
implement, and that TSA may have underestimated the costs
associated with implementing these proposed measures. Our analysis
of TSA's estimate also suggested that it may have been an
underestimate. TSA stated that it plans to reassess its cost
estimates before issuing its final air cargo security rule.
In October 2005, we made several recommendations to assist TSA in
strengthening the security of the domestic air cargo
transportation system.47 These recommendations included (1)
developing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments
of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets; (2) reexamining
the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions; (3)
developing measures to gauge air carrier and indirect air carrier
compliance with air cargo security requirements; (4) developing a
plan for systematically analyzing and using the results of air
cargo compliance inspections to target future inspections and
identify system wide corrective actions; (5) assessing the
effectiveness of enforcement actions in ensuring air carrier and
indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security
requirements; (6) and ensuring that the data to be used in the
Freight Assessment System are complete, accurate, and current. DHS
agreed with our recommendations. We currently have an ongoing
review assessing the security of air cargo entering the United
States from foreign countries.
As discussed previously, domestic commercial airport authorities
have primary responsibility for securing airport perimeters and
restricted areas, whereas TSA conducts regulatory inspections to
help ensure that airport authorities are complying with TSA
security requirements. We reported in June 2004 on TSA's efforts
to strengthen the security of airport perimeters (such as airfield
fencing and access gates), the adequacy of controls restricting
unauthorized access to secured areas (such as building entry ways
leading to aircraft), and security measures pertaining to
individuals who work at airports.48 At the time of our review, we
found TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport security but
needed a better approach for assessing results. In addition, TSA
required criminal history records checks and security awareness
training for most, but not all, the airport workers called for in
ATSA. Further, TSA did not require airport vendors with direct
access to the airfield and aircraft to develop security programs,
which would include security measures for vendor employees and
property, as required by ATSA.
TSA is responsible for, and, at the time of our 2004 review, had
begun evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the
controls that limit access into secured airport areas, but had not
yet determined how the results of these evaluations could be used
to make improvements to the nation's airport system as a whole.
Specifically, we found that TSA had begun conducting regulatory
compliance inspections, covert testing of selected security
procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected airports.
These evaluations-though not yet completed at the time of our
report-identified perimeter and access control security concerns.
For example, TSA identified instances where airport operators
failed to comply with existing security requirements, including
requirements related to access control.49 In addition, TSA
identified threats to perimeter and access control security at
each of the airports where vulnerability assessments were
conducted in 2003. TSA had plans to begin conducting joint
vulnerability assessments with the FBI but had not yet determined
how it would allocate existing resources between its own
independent airport assessments and the new joint assessments, or
developed a schedule for conducting future vulnerability
assessments. In addition, TSA had not yet determined how to use
the results of its inspections in conjunction with its efforts to
conduct covert testing and vulnerability assessments to enhance
the overall security of the nation's commercial airport system.
In June 2004, we also reported that background checks were not
required for all airport workers. TSA requires most airport
workers who perform duties in secured and sterile areas to undergo
a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. TSA further
requires airport operators to compare applicants' names against
TSA's aviation security watch lists.50 Once workers undergo this
review, they are granted access to airport areas in which they
perform duties. For example, those workers who have been granted
unescorted access to secured areas are authorized access to these
areas without undergoing physical screening for prohibited items
(which passengers undergo prior to boarding a flight). To meet TSA
requirements, airport operators transmit applicants' fingerprints
to a TSA contractor, who in turn forwards the fingerprints to TSA,
who submits them to the FBI to be checked for criminal histories
that could disqualify an applicant for airport employment. In
March 2006, that TSA contractor reported that its background
clearinghouse system had processed over 2 million criminal history
record checks of airport and airline employees. TSA also requires
that airport operators verify that applicants' names do not appear
on TSA's "no fly" and "selectee" watch lists to determine whether
applicants are eligible for employment.51
According to TSA, by December 6, 2002, all airport workers who had
unescorted access to secured airport areas-approximately 900,000
individuals nationwide-had undergone a fingerprint-based criminal
history records check and verification that they did not appear on
TSA's watch lists, as required by regulation. In late 2002, TSA
required airport operators to conduct fingerprint-based checks and
watch list verifications for an additional approximately 100,000
airport workers who perform duties in sterile areas. As of April
2004, TSA said that airport operators had completed all of these
checks.
ATSA also mandates that TSA require airport operators and air
carriers to develop security awareness training programs for
airport workers such as ground crews, and gate, ticket, and
curbside agents of air carriers. 52 However, while TSA requires
such training for these airport workers if they have unescorted
access to secured areas, the agency did not require training for
airport workers who perform duties in sterile airport areas.53
According to TSA, training requirements for these airport workers
have not been established because additional training would result
in increased costs for airport operators.
Further, TSA had not addressed the act's provision that calls for
the agency to require that airport vendors with direct access to
the airfield and aircraft develop security programs to address
security measures specific to vendor employees (companies doing
business in or with the airport).54 TSA said that expanding
requirements for background checks and security awareness training
for additional workers and establishing requirements for vendor
security programs would be costly to implement and would require
time-consuming rule-making efforts to assess potential impacts and
obtain and incorporate public comment on any proposed regulations.
In June 2004, we recommended, and DHS generally agreed, that TSA
better justify future decisions on how best to proceed with
security evaluations and implement additional measures to reduce
the potential security risks posed by airport workers. In July
2004, in response to our recommendations, TSA made several
improvements in these areas, through the issuance of a series of
security directives, including requiring enhanced background
checks and improved access controls for airport employees who work
in restricted airport areas.55
Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant progress in
deploying its federal aviation security workforce to meet
congressional mandates related to establishing passenger and
checked baggage screening operations. With the initial
congressional mandates now largely met, TSA has turned its
attention to more systematically deploying its TSO workforce and
assessing and enhancing its effectiveness in screening passengers
and checked baggage. TSA has developed a staffing model intended
to identify the necessary levels of TSOs to support airport
screening operations. However, given the challenges TSA faces in
determining appropriate staffing levels at airports, it is
critical that TSA carefully consider how it strategically hires,
deploys and manages its TSO workforce to help strengthen its
passenger and checked baggage screening programs. In addition, as
threats and technology evolve, it is vital that TSA continue to
enhance training for the TSO workforce. Over the past several
years, TSA has strengthened its TSO training program in an effort
to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge and skills needed to
successfully perform their screening functions. However, without
addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing training,
including installing high-speed connectivity at airport training
facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening
workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at
a desired level.
The importance of the nation's air cargo security system and the
limited resources available to protect it underscore the need for
a risk management approach to prioritize security efforts so that
a proper balance between costs and security can be achieved. TSA
has taken important steps in establishing such a risk management
approach, but more work remains to be done to fully address the
risks posed to air cargo security, including assessments of
systemwide vulnerabilities and critical assets. Without such
assessments, TSA is limited in its ability to focus its resources
on those air cargo vulnerabilities that represent the most
critical security needs. In addition, without performance measures
to gauge air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air
cargo security requirements and analyzing the results of its
compliance inspections, TSA cannot effectively focus its
inspection resources on those entities posing the greatest risk.
In addition, TSA's goal of developing a system to target elevated
risk cargo for inspection without impeding the flow of air
commerce will be difficult to achieve without ensuring that the
information used to target such cargo is complete, accurate, and
current. By addressing these areas, TSA would build a better basis
for strengthening air cargo security as it moves forward in
implementing risk-based security initiatives.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee
may have at this time.
For further information on this testimony, please contact at
Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or [email protected] . Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, John Barkhamer, Amy
Bernstein, Kristy Brown, Philip Caramia, Kevin Copping, Glenn
Davis, Christine Fossett, Thomas Lombardi, Laina Poon, and Maria
Strudwick made key contributions to this testimony.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T . Washington,
D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203 . Washington, D.C.:
November 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic
Air Cargo Security. GAO-06-76 . Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the
Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935 .
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.
GAO-05-781 . Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight
Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken
Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R . Washington,
D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T . Washington,
D.C.: July 13, 2005
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457 . Washington,
D.C.: May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under
Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.
GAO-05-356 . Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365 .
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using
Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324 .
Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T . Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to
Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening
Services. GAO-05-126 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to
Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144 . Washington, D.C.: November 10,
2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728 .
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention
Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544 .
Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
GAO-04-785T . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519
. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T .
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T .
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R . Washington, D.C.: March 5,
2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385 .
Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T .
Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a
Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development
Program. GAO-04-341R . Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T . Washington, D.C.: November 20,
2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing
Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional
Actions Needed. GAO-04-242 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T . Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173 . Washington, D.C.:
September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T . Washington, D.C.: September 9,
2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T . Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges. GAO-03-843 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides
Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T .
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and
Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T . Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to
Cover Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T .
Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190 . Washington, D.C.: January
17, 2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
DOT's Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22 . Washington, D.C.: January
10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344 . Washington, D.C.: December 20,
2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253 . Washington, D.C.: November 22,
2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects
Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington,
D.C.: October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses
Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T . Washington, D.C.: October 2,
2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T . Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for,
Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T . Washington,
D.C.: September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T . Washington,
D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's
Efforts. GAO-01-1158T . Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to
Improve Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T .
Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T . Washington, D.C.: September 20,
2001.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
the performance and accountability of the federal government for
the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday,
GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on
its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted
products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe
to Updates."
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
(202) 512-6061
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
[email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
(202) 512-7470
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, D.C. 20548
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548
4TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into one of
five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, IV, and V) based on various
factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, and
other special security considerations. In general, category X airports
have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports
have the smallest.
5TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a TSO
conducted by TSA, on any screening function, to assess the screener's
threat item detection ability or adherence to TSA-approved procedures.
6Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for screening all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems was, in effect, extended
until December 31, 2003.
TSA Regulatory Responsibilities for Air Cargo and Airport Security
7TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual or
property that has not been screened or inspected in accordance with
passenger screening standard operating procedures. If an individual
refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must not be allowed
into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft.
8Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine objects
inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat
explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode.
9Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials.
10Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening
checked baggage that requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft
as the checked baggage.
11Domestic passenger air carriers have 11 separate areas of cargo security
that are subject to inspection, while indirect air carriers have 12 areas
that are subject to inspection. All-cargo carriers that have implemented
the voluntary all-cargo security program have 24 areas that are subject to
inspection. These areas of inspection include access to cargo, cargo
acceptance, including cargo from known shippers, and security training and
testing.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of an
Aviation Security Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges
TSA Has Taken Action to Support FSDs, but Additional Clarification of Roles Is
Needed to Support Stakeholder Coordination
12GAO, Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the
Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed, GAO-05-935 (Washington
D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005).
TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but Continues to Face
Deployment Challenges
13 GAO-05-935 .
14GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 12, 2004).
15Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, S: 4023, 118 Stat 3638, 3723-24.
16One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime
hours.
17This budgetary FTE limit is not to be confused with the 45,000 FTE
screener cap imposed by Congress in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act that
limits the total number of FTE screeners available to TSA.
18We interviewed FSD staff at 3 category X airports, 1 category I
airports, and 1 category III airport.
19 GAO-04-440T.
TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training, but Faces Challenges in Delivering the
Training
20GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,
2003).
21GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
2005).
TSA Has Implemented Various Approaches to Measuring the Performance of TSOs
Conducting Passenger and Baggage Security Screening Activities
22According to the budget request, the remaining $36 million is needed to
support operations and maintenance costs, including recurring costs for
routers, switches, circuits, cabinets, racks, and network monitoring.
23GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).
24Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time assignment for
the majority of OI staff. According to OI, 14 full-time-equivalent
positions in headquarters are dedicated fully to the covert testing
program, which includes covert testing of all modes of transportation, not
just airports. These 14 full-time-equivalents are in OI's Special
Operations group and form the core of team leaders for the covert testing
trips.
25Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports issued by
OIAPR.
26Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were not
identified using the principles of probability sampling. In a probability
sample to assess screener detection of threat objects, each screening of a
passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of being selected. A
well-designed probability sample would enable failure rates to be
generalized to all airports. However, for cost and operational reasons,
probability sampling may not be feasible for passenger and checked baggage
screening because it would require a very large sample size and an
exhaustive examination of each sampled passenger or baggage to determine
if there was a threat object to detect.
27The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004 and August
2004 to provide information on alternative testing methods.
28GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington D.C.: May 2,
2005).
29The TIP database records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false alarm rate.
These two results are used to determine the probability of detection and
probability of false alarms, which determine overall TIP performance. The
TIP performance measure is classified as sensitive security information.
30 GAO-05-457 .
31GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-505T (Washington,
D.C.: April 22, 2004).
32We cannot report on the specific results of the recertification testing
because they are sensitive security information.
33Information related to the measures is sensitive security information.
34As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce included
approximately 25,947 dual-trained screeners who were certified to serve as
passenger or baggage screeners.
35TSA's onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS machine
alarm goes off, indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA TSOs, by
reviewing computer-generated images of the inside of the bag, attempt to
determine whether or not a suspect item or items are in fact explosive
materials. If the TSO is unable to make this determination, the bag is
diverted from the main conveyor belt into an area where it receives a
secondary screening by a TSO with an ETD machine.
36According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are established
by the certification standards for each particular model of machines, and
machines are not deployed unless they have met those standards.
TSA Has Made Progress in Providing Regulatory Oversight of Airport and Air
Carrier Security Activities, but it Could Better Target Workforce
Resources
37TSA's measures for covert testing are passenger screener covert test
results (percentage of TSOs correctly identifying and resolving threat
images) and baggage screener covert test results (percentage of TSOs
correctly identifying and resolving threat images). The targets for these
measures are classified.
Additional Action Needed to Strengthen TSA Inspections and Oversight of Domestic
Air Cargo Security
38GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005).
39TSA established an automated Performance and Results Information System
(PARIS) to compile the results of cargo inspections and the actions taken
when violations are identified. The PARIS database, established in July
2003, provides TSA a Web-based method for entering, storing, and
retrieving performance activities and information on TSA-regulated
entities, including air carriers and indirect air carriers. PARIS includes
profiles for each entity, inspections conducted by TSA, incidents that
occur throughout the nation, such as instances of bomb threats, and
investigations that are prompted by incidents or inspection findings.
40We requested all of TSA's compliance inspection data, starting in
November 2001. According to TSA, agency efforts to conduct air cargo
compliance inspections during calendar years 2001 and 2002 were minimal.
Moreover, documentation of inspection results for that period was
problematic in part because of the way the Federal Aviation Administration
reported compliance inspection data, which made it difficult to migrate
the Federal Aviation Administration's data into TSA's PARIS system.
41GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G
(Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
42Factors accounting for the limited number of TSA compliance inspections
of indirect air carrier facilities are sensitive security information and
discussed in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-446SU .
43According to TSA, special emphasis assessments are distinct from agency
efforts to conduct covert testing by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and
Program Review. Covert testing is typically done by undercover TSA agents
and includes testing the security procedures at passenger check points and
airport access controls.
44Results of TSA's tests are considered sensitive security information and
described in the sensitive security version of this report GAO-05-446SU .
45Air Cargo Security Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg. 65,258 (proposed Nov. 10,
2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R pts. 1540-48).
46This system, referred to as Freight Assessment, would target elevated
risk cargo for inspection to minimize the agency's reliance on random
inspections. This system is supposed to compare information on individual
cargo shipments and shippers, among other things, against targeting
criteria to assign a risk level to cargo. This would subject elevated risk
cargo to additional inspection through physical searches or non intrusive
technology.
Further Steps May Be Needed to Strengthen TSA Oversight of Commercial Airport
Perimeters and Access Controls
47 GAO-06-76 .
48GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-728
(Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004).
49Our evaluation of TSA's covert testing of airport access controls was
classified and was discussed in a separate classified report.
5049 U.S.C. S: 44936 requires airports and air carriers to conduct
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks for all workers seeking
unescorted access to the Security Identification Display Area.
Specifically, no individual may be given unescorted access authority if he
or she has been convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of
any of 28 disqualifying offenses during the 10 years before the date of
the individual's application for unescorted access authority, or while the
individual has unescorted access authority.
51TSA's no-fly list contains the names of individuals that pose, or are
suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation or national security.
Individuals on this list will not be permitted to board an aircraft. There
is also a selectee process by which individuals who meet certain criteria
are set aside for additional screening.
52Pub. L. No. 107-71, S: 106(e), 115 Stat. at 610.
53TSA regulations governing security training are virtually the same as
those required previously under the regulations as administered by FAA.
Concluding Observations
54See 49 U.S.C. S: 44903(h)(4)(d).
55TSA has taken other actions that are considered sensitive security
information.
Contact Information
Appendix I: Related GAO Products
(440503)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
Order by Mail or Phone
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Congressional Relations
Public Affairs
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-597T .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-597T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal
Workforce and Agency Organization, Committee on Government Reform, House
of Representatives
April 4, 2006
AVIATION SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a
Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but
Challenges Remain
It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at
commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making
in strengthening aspects of aviation security and the challenges that
remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights (1) progress TSA has made,
and challenges it faces, in managing a federalized security
workforce-including federal security directors (FSD) and transportation
security officers (TSO)-with operational responsibility for ensuring
security of passengers and their baggage; and (2) actions TSA has taken,
and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of
other airport security activities.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen aviation security with respect to aviation workforce planning,
deployment, and oversight. TSA generally agreed with our recommendations
and is taking actions to implement them. GAO also has ongoing reviews
related to TSA staffing models and other aviation security issues, and may
make additional recommendations as appropriate.
TSA has made progress in managing, deploying, and training a federalized
aviation security workforce, including FSDs (the lead authority at U.S.
airports) and TSOs (formerly known as screeners). FSDs have, for example,
formed partnerships with key federal and private-sector stakeholders at
airports engaged in security and operations. We reported, however, that
the guidance on FSD authority is outdated and lacks clarity, particularly
regarding security incidents when FSDs must coordinate with other
stakeholders. Regarding TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned actions to
strengthen the management and deployment of the TSO workforce. TSA has,
for instance, developed a screening allocation model to determine TSO
staffing levels at airports. However, FSDs have reported concerns that
despite such a model, attracting, hiring, and retaining an adequate
part-time TSO workforce remains a challenge. We have reported that, while
TSA has expanded training opportunities for TSOs, insufficient TSO
staffing and other problems hinder the ability of TSOs to take training.
To evaluate TSO performance, TSA has collected performance data by
conducting covert (undercover, unannounced) tests at passenger screening
checkpoints.
TSA has taken steps to strengthen key areas of aviation security for which
it has regulatory and oversight responsibility, including domestic air
cargo security, but faces challenges related to oversight and performance
measurement. We reported in October 2005, for example, that while TSA had
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections
conducted, performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers
and others are complying with air cargo security requirements had not been
developed. Without such performance measures, and a systematic analysis of
these results of air cargo security inspections, TSA's ability to target
its workforce for future inspections, and fulfill oversight
responsibilities, will be limited. Further, while TSA has incorporated
elements of risk-based decision making into securing air cargo, its
efforts are not yet complete. To address these and other issues, TSA
officials stated that they plan to compile additional information on air
cargo inspections to enhance their ability to conduct compliance
inspections of air carriers using covert testing, and to require random
inspection of air cargo.
Screening Passengers and Cargo Are Aviation Security Concerns
*** End of document. ***