Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs Consistent Policies	 
and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon	 
Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats (28-APR-06,	 
GAO-06-592).							 
                                                                 
The possibility that an adversary may use chemical or biological 
weapons against U.S. forces makes it important for a weapon	 
system to be able to survive such attacks. In the National	 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress mandated
that the Department of Defense submit a plan to address weapon	 
system chemical and biological survivability by February 28,	 
2005. This plan was to include developing a centralized database 
with information about the effects of chemical and biological	 
agents on materials used in weapon systems. DOD did not submit	 
its plan as mandated. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to
which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological	 
survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD's	 
internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that  
includes chemical and biological survivability research and test 
data for weapon system design and development.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-592 					        
    ACCNO:   A52800						        
  TITLE:     Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs Consistent    
Policies and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of	 
Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats		 
     DATE:   04/28/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Biological research				 
	     Biological warfare 				 
	     Chemical research					 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Databases						 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Weapons research and development			 
	     Weapons systems					 

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GAO-06-592

     

     * Report to Congressional Committees
          * April 2006
     * chemical and biological defense
          * DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the
            Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological
            Threats
     * Contents
          * Results in Brief
          * Background
          * DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon
            System Chemical and Biological Survivability
               * DOD and Service Policies Do Not Establish a Clear Process
                 for Considering and Testing Weapon System Chemical and
                 Biological Survivability
               * Program Offices Did Not Consistently Document Chemical and
                 Biological Survivability Decisions
               * DOD Lacks Effective Survivability Oversight
          * Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability
            Information in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown
          * Conclusions
          * Recommendations for Executive Action
          * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Scope and Methodology
     * Sampled Weapon System Programs Either Conducted or Considered Some
       Level of Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing
          * Program Offices' Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing
            Varied for Reviewed Weapon Systems
          * Variety of Factors Affected Testing Decisions
     * Comments from the Department of Defense
     * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2006

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the
Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats

Contents

Figures

April 28, 2006Letter

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that an adversary may use
chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to respond to our
superior conventional warfare capabilities and potentially gain an
advantage on the battlefield. This increases the importance of considering
a weapon system's ability to survive chemical and biological attacks as
part of its design and development. DOD's investment of billions of
dollars in modern weapon systems makes it critical that equipment can
continue to operate after a battlefield is contaminated and can be reused
after undergoing decontamination procedures.

DOD and service policies consider chemical and biological survivability to
be the capability of a system and its crew to withstand a chemically or
biologically contaminated environment without losing the ability to
accomplish the assigned mission. This capability includes a weapon
system's ability to withstand chemical or biological decontamination, a
process that may itself be caustic, corrosive, or otherwise harmful to the
system. Throughout this report, we will refer to this issue as weapon
system chemical and biological survivability.

This report updates aspects of our prior work and is intended to help
facilitate DOD's efforts to address chemical and biological survivability
in its weapon system acquisition process. Both GAO's and DOD's Inspectors
General have previously reported on problems regarding this aspect of
weapon system acquisition. For example, in 2003 we reported that DOD had
not developed a systematic approach for ensuring that the services
appropriately incorporate chemical and biological survivability into
weapon system design and testing.1 In the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2005,2 Congress mandated that DOD submit a plan for
addressing such survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to
include development of a centralized database containing comprehensive
information about the effects of chemical and biological agents and
contaminants on the materials used in weapon systems. In addition, the
Senate Armed Services Committee directed that we evaluate DOD's plan and
report our findings to Congress within 180 days of the plan's submission.
As of April 3, 2006, DOD has not submitted the mandated plan. On August 2,
2005, DOD provided Congress with an interim report in partial response to
the congressional mandate. The interim report indicated that DOD may not
fully address the mandate until the end of fiscal year 2007. In
anticipation of receiving DOD's plan and to provide a foundation for our
review you asked us to examine DOD's existing policies and processes for
considering chemical and biological survivability of weapon systems, and
to assess the status of DOD's efforts to create a centralized chemical and
biological effects database. Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the
extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological
survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD's internal
controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical
and biological survivability research and test data for weapon system
design and development.

To examine the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and
biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed DOD,
joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and obtained
documentation and interviewed officials throughout DOD and at program
offices from a non probability sample of nine major weapon systems based
on several factors including (1) high dollar value (2) whether the system
is a joint program, and (3) risk of exposure to chemical and biological
weapons.3 To evaluate the adequacy of DOD's internal controls for
maintaining a comprehensive database that facilitates the inclusion of
chemical and biological survivability in weapon system design and
development, we reviewed DOD and service policies, guidance, and
procedures and conducted interviews with database officials, officials at
the weapon system program offices we visited, and members of the chemical
and biological testing community. We compared these policies, guidance,
and procedures to the objectives and fundamental concepts of internal
controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.4 We conducted our review from February 2005 through January
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
More detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.

Results in Brief

DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies
inconsistently address and do not establish a clear process for
considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability.5 
Although DOD strategic guidance and policy have for the last decade
repeatedly emphasized the growing threat of an adversary's use of chemical
and biological weapons, DOD and joint acquisition policies currently do
not require that survivability be specifically addressed, and the military
services have developed their own varying and unique policies. In the
absence of consistent policies from DOD and the services, the nine weapon
system program offices we reviewed made inconsistent decisions in their
consideration and testing of weapon system survivability, even for similar
systems. For example, the program offices for the three land systems we
reviewed each conducted very different tests, even though all three
systems are intended for the same operating environment. Similarly, the
program offices for the nine weapon systems we reviewed did not
consistently document their chemical and biological survivability
decisions because of the absence of a DOD or joint requirement for them to
do so. Although the program offices could provide documentation regarding
what chemical and biological survivability testing was conducted, they did
not have a consistent method to track what was considered or not included.
Furthermore, DOD is unable to exercise oversight of program office
decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological survivability
because DOD and service policies have not established a clear oversight
process for monitoring these decisions. According to DOD officials,
chemical and biological survivability is not usually a key performance

parameter,6 so the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)7 does not provide
oversight, and there is no specific chemical and biological survivability
Functional Capabilities Board to review program office survivability
decisions.

DOD, through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC),8 maintains a
centralized database that could facilitate program offices' consideration
of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the extent to
which this database is comprehensive is unknown. Although DOD policy
requires DTIC to maintain a comprehensive database of scientific and
technical information, it is unlikely that this database contains all
DOD-related data about the effects of chemical and biological agents and
decontaminants on weapon systems for three reasons. First, it is unclear
whether chemical and biological survivability information is covered by
the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information
be submitted to DTIC. Some DOD officials we interviewed also told us there
is disagreement about whether this policy applies to chemical and
biological information. Second, there is no established process for
submitting scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result,
information is submitted through the ad hoc actions of individual
personnel and organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern that
not all the information is being submitted. Third, no office or
organization in DOD has been designated as having oversight responsibility
to ensure that information is submitted to DTIC. The lack of a database
with comprehensive information about weapon system chemical and biological
survivability could result in unnecessary expenditures on duplicative
testing. For example, if research or testing is performed regarding an
aspect of survivability, but its results not entered in the DTIC database,
a program office interested in the same research might fail to recognize
it had already been performed and cause the same work to be redone.

We are making recommendations for DOD to modify its policy to better
ensure that weapon system chemical and biological survivability is
consistently addressed in the acquisition process and that DTIC's
centralized database contains comprehensive chemical and biological
survivability information. In commenting on our draft, DOD agreed with all
our recommendations and stated it expects to (1) issue a department
Chemical Biological Contamination Policy by May 2006, (2) subsequently
draft a DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Survivability, and (3) develop a chemical and biological material
effects database by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.

Background

In the post-Cold War era, the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapon technologies in developing countries presents DOD with a national
security challenge. The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews
as well as other DOD publications have emphasized the need to address the
increasing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review specifically states that DOD's vision is to
organize, train, equip, and resource the future force to deal with all
aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. It notes that
DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since
2001, and is increasing funding for its Chemical Biological Defense
Program across the Future Years Defense Program by $2.1 billion
(approximately 20 percent). However, experiences during the Persian Gulf
War and the preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed weaknesses in
the preparedness of U.S. forces to defend against a chemical or biological
attack. In addition, we and DOD's Inspector General have published reports
addressing continued problems in aspects of DOD's chemical and biological
defense preparedness. Finally, at present there remain disagreements
within DOD regarding the nature and extent of the chemical and biological
threat and the degree to which major weapon systems should be survivable
against such threats and capable of operating in a contaminated
environment (see app. II). This lack of agreement could adversely affect
DOD's ability to develop and carry out a coherent plan to defend against
chemical and biological threats.

Until 2003, DOD's acquisition procedures9 (unless waived) required that
weapon systems survivability be addressed in accordance with assessed
threat levels, including chemical and biological, anticipated in the
weapon system's projected operating environment. These procedures defined
survivability as the capability of a weapon system and crew to avoid or
withstand a man-made hostile environment without suffering an abortive
impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. The Army,
Navy, and Air Force issued supplemental acquisition policies that
established service-specific procedures to address the chemical and
biological contamination survivability of their weapon systems. In 2003,
DOD replaced its acquisition procedures with a Defense Acquisition
Guidebook, which, together with the controlling DOD directive and
instruction,10 no longer specifically requires that weapon system
survivability against chemical and biological threats be addressed during
the system design and development phase. According to a DOD official, this
action was part of a DOD effort to simplify its weapon system acquisition
process. The only current DOD acquisition requirement specifically related
to chemical and biological threats is that weapon system program offices
address protection for crew members (as opposed to the weapon system
itself) against the effects of a chemical or biological threat.11

As part of weapon system design and development efforts, DOD uses
scientific and technical information from research and testing activities
to better understand various chemical and biological agents and their
impact on military operations, including the survivability of weapon
systems. DTIC maintains a centralized database containing a broad range of
scientific and technical information intended to maximize the return on
investment in research, evaluation, and studies.12 In addition to its
centralized database, DTIC uses the Chemical and Biological Information
Analysis Center (CBIAC), a contractor-operated information analysis
center, to maintain additional databases and provide information specific
to chemical and biological issues.13 DOD indicated in its August 2005
interim report that it intends to build on the existing databases
maintained by CBIAC and to develop a centralized database by the end of
fiscal year 2007 that contains comprehensive information on the effects of
chemical and biological agents and decontaminants on weapon systems.

In executing its role as a coordinating point for DOD scientific and
technical information databases and systems, DTIC makes information
available throughout DOD. Figure 1 illustrates the intended flow of
information among testing facilities, program offices, and DTIC.

Figure 1: Intended Flow of Documents Containing Technical Data Related to
Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability

DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon System
Chemical and Biological Survivability

DOD and the military services do not consistently address weapon system
chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process. In
the absence of clear DOD guidance and effective controls, responsibility
for decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological
survivability has devolved largely to the individual military services and
weapon system program offices. The program offices we visited do not
consistently document their chemical and biological survivability
decisions, nor is there an established, clear, and effective DOD-level
process for the oversight of these decisions.

DOD and Service Policies Do Not Establish a Clear Process for Considering
and Testing Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability

Although emphasis is placed on chemical and biological threats in DOD's
strategic guidance, DOD and military service policies do not establish a
clear process for considering and testing weapon system chemical and
biological survivability. While DOD acquisition policies require that
survivability of personnel after exposure to chemical and biological
agents be addressed by all weapon system programs, they do not
specifically require the consideration of weapon system survivability.14
There also are no DOD policies regarding the quantity and type of weapon
system survivability testing that should be conducted. In addition, joint
staff policies do not address or provide specific instruction as to how
chemical and biological survivability should be considered during the
acquisition process, or how this consideration should be monitored,
reviewed, and documented.15

Each of the existing service acquisition policies is therefore unique and
differs in the extent and amount of detail it requires for considering
weapon system chemical and biological survivability. DOD acquisition
officials told us that each weapon system service sponsor has the ability
to decide whether and to what extent to incorporate survivability testing.
Of the military services, the Army has the most detailed policy for
addressing this. However, while emphasizing the need to monitor and review
chemical and biological survivability issues in general, Army policies
allow service sponsors and program offices to individually decide how and
to what extent to consider weapon system survivability during the
acquisition process. The Air Force and Navy have less detailed policies
and also leave decision making to the weapon system sponsor and program
office. Navy officials told us that, in their opinion, having less rigid
requirements was advantageous because it reduces system development time
and costs.

The extent to which services consider weapon system survivability during
the acquisition process is further influenced by differences in how each
service perceives the chemical and biological threat and plans to conduct
operations in a contaminated environment. The Army focuses on tactical and
theater chemical and biological threats against exposed ground combat
personnel and equipment. In comparison, the Air Force concept of
operations in a contaminated environment is mainly a strategy of avoidance
and protection, while the Navy view is that a chemical or biological
attack on surface ships is a less likely threat.

In the absence of DOD-wide policies and processes, DOD officials stated
that the responsibility for determining the extent of chemical and
biological survivability consideration or testing has fallen largely on
the individual weapon system program offices, in consultation with each
service sponsor. However, program offices also lack specific guidance and
a clear process governing the extent to which chemical and biological
survivability should be considered or tested. In our review of nine weapon
system programs, we found that the program offices exercised broad
discretion over whether or to what extent to evaluate the need for and
benefit of conducting chemical and biological survivability testing.
Although all nine of these program offices had conducted or were
considering some kind of testing, we found that the extent and nature of
this testing varied widely, even for similar types of systems. For
example, the two sea-based weapon system program offices we reviewed
considered chemical and biological testing differently, even though both
systems are intended for similar operating environments. The program
offices for the three land systems we reviewed also conducted very
different tests from one another, although these systems also are intended
for the same operating environment.

Many factors affected the program offices' determination about the extent
to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability, including
the type of system (air, land, or sea), required system capabilities,
system concept of operation, perceived chemical and biological threat, and
other factors relating to the status of system cost, schedule, and
performance. A more detailed discussion of the testing conducted for the
nine weapon system programs we reviewed can be found in appendix II.

Program Offices Did Not Consistently Document Chemical and Biological
Survivability Decisions

The nine weapon system program offices we reviewed did not consistently
document their decisions regarding how they considered or tested chemical
and biological survivability. Although they could provide documentation
regarding what survivability testing was conducted, they did not have a
consistent method to track what was considered or was not included,
because there is no DOD, joint, or service requirement for program offices
to document these decisions. DOD officials stated that there is currently
no DOD-level process for documenting how weapon system program offices
determined whether to consider or test chemical and biological
survivability.

DOD Lacks Effective Survivability Oversight

There is no effective DOD-level oversight of how chemical and biological
survivability is considered by weapon system program offices. In 1993,
Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to designate an office as the
single DOD focal point for chemical and biological defense matters.16 DOD
subsequently identified the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the single DOD
focal point for chemical and biological defense matters.17 However, the
military services and various offices within DOD never adopted a
consistent method for incorporating chemical and biological survivability
and related testing into major weapon system development acquisition,
including oversight responsibilities. Between 1994 and 2004, GAO and DOD
Inspector General reports identified multiple management and oversight
process problems regarding the incorporation of chemical and biological
survivability into weapon system development. Various military service
acquisition offices and DOD agencies, such as the U.S. Army Nuclear
Chemical Agency, and the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense, held differing
views as to where this responsibility resided and how chemical and
biological survivability should be incorporated into weapon system
development. These differing views have hindered the development of an
oversight process and prevented effective monitoring of weapon system
program office decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability.
Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs directed the development and
issuance of DOD's August 2005 interim report, DOD continues to lack a
clear and effective department-level process for overseeing the inclusion
of chemical and biological survivability in weapon system development.

In addition, according to DOD officials, no single joint organization,
such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council18 or the Joint
Requirements Office,19 specifically monitors or tracks whether weapon
system chemical and biological survivability is considered in the weapon
system acquisition process. There also is no specific chemical and
biological survivability Functional Capabilities Board20 to review program
office survivability decisions. DOD officials stated that these joint
oversight organizations do not have a role in overseeing weapon system
chemical and biological survivability and that consideration of
survivability requirements during the acquisition process is therefore
service-specific. Furthermore, because chemical and biological
survivability is not usually a key performance parameter21 for a weapon
system, it is often traded off to satisfy other pressing requirements
dealing with the weapon system cost, schedule, or performance. DOD
officials we spoke with acknowledged that program cost and schedule
concerns could reduce the amount of chemical and biological weapon system
survivability testing conducted. While the Milestone Decision Authority
focuses on requirements associated with key performance parameters, none
of the nine weapon systems we reviewed included chemical and biological
survivability as a key performance factor. Only specific chemical and
biological equipment-such as detection, protection, and decontamination
equipment-have identified chemical and biological survivability as a key
performance parameter.

Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability Information in
DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown

DOD, through DTIC, maintains a centralized database for science and
technology information that could facilitate program offices'
consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but
the comprehensiveness of the survivability information in this database is
unknown. We found it unlikely that this database is comprehensive for
three reasons: (1) DOD policy is unclear as to whether chemical and
biological information is covered by the policy, (2) no process has been
established governing how information should be submitted to DTIC, and (3)
no office or organization is responsible for overseeing that information
is submitted to DTIC.

It is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information is
covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical
information be submitted to DTIC. This policy requires that DTIC be
provided with copies of DOD-sponsored scientific and technical
information, but does not specifically address whether chemical and
biological survivability information is included. Some DOD officials
involved in chemical and biological survivability research and/or testing
told us that they believed they were not required to submit the results of
their work to DTIC. Further, there is no established process for
submitting chemical and biological information to DTIC.22 As a result,
individual personnel and organizations submit information to DTIC through
ad hoc actions, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all
information is submitted to DTIC as required.

Finally, no office or organization in DOD has been clearly designated as
responsible for exercising oversight to ensure that chemical and
biological research and testing results are submitted to DTIC. The DOD
instruction addressing management of the collection of scientific and
technical information assigns responsibility for submitting research and
testing results to the DOD activities involved,23 but this instruction
does not specifically indicate whether the activity sponsoring or
approving the work or, alternatively, the organization performing it is
responsible for its submission to DTIC. Officials at the DOD research and
testing facilities we visited told us they routinely submitted the results
of their work to DTIC, and we observed that DTIC and CBIAC were storing
large amounts of this information. The two major DOD chemical and
biological research and testing facilities we visited had an oversight
process in place for ensuring that all research and testing projects
submitted the required information to DTIC. However, responsibility for
submitting this information was either left to individual research or
testing staff, or was presumed to have been submitted to DTIC by the
program offices requesting the work. DTIC officials stated that DTIC was
not responsible for ensuring that DOD research and testing facilities
submitted all research and testing results, and that DTIC had neither the
authority nor the desire to do this. We could not identify any military
service or program office level oversight for ensuring that research and
testing results were submitted to DTIC, and some of the program offices we
visited said the submission of research and test results to DTIC was not
their responsibility. The absence of an internal control for ensuring that
research and test results are submitted to DTIC and entered in DTIC's
database could result in unnecessary expenditures on duplicative work. For
example, if research or testing is performed regarding an aspect of
survivability, but its results not entered in the DTIC database, officials
in another program office interested in the same research or testing might
fail to recognize it had already been performed and cause this work to be
done again.

Conclusions

The issues identified in previous DODIG and GAO reports regarding weapon
system incorporation of chemical and biological survivability during the
system acquisition process remain largely unresolved. Without DOD
establishing consistent policy requiring that chemical and biological
survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition and
establishing a clear process for doing so, the incorporation of chemical
and biological survivability into major weapons system acquisition is
likely to remain varied and inconsistent. Consequently, military planners
and commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance,
availability, and interoperability issues. This, in turn, could complicate
the planning and execution of operations and increase the risk of mission
failure, because systems that are not chemically or biologically
survivable but become exposed to chemical or biological agents may not be
available to a combatant commander for reuse in critical missions, such as
deploying or supplying troops. Furthermore, without consistent
documentation of program offices' rationales for trade-off decisions in
their consideration of weapon system chemical and biological
survivability, DOD's ability to identify and analyze associated risks
could be hindered. Finally, the absence of a clearly defined DOD-level
process for overseeing military service and program office actions limits
DOD's ability to ensure that appropriate weapon system survivability
decisions are being made.

Without clarifying existing policies regarding which research and testing
information should be submitted, the process to be used for submitting it,
and which DOD offices or organizations are responsible for overseeing its
submission, DTIC will likely be unable to ensure the maintenance of a
centralized database containing comprehensive chemical and biological
research and testing information. This could limit DOD's ability to
efficiently and economically assess the effects of chemical and biological
agent contamination on weapon system components and materials, and could
result in duplicative research and testing, thus causing unnecessary
design and development costs.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To better ensure the incorporation of chemical and biological
survivability into weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics to take the following six actions:

o Either modify current DOD policy or develop guidance to ensure that
chemical and biological survivability is consistently addressed in the
weapon system acquisition process. This policy or guidance should

o establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the
extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should be
considered and tested;

o require consistent, DOD-wide documentation of decisions regarding how
weapon system chemical and biological survivability is considered and
tested; and

o establish an oversight process within DOD and the services for
monitoring weapon system program office decisions;

o modify current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical and
biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive. This
modified policy should

o state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs in
the body of scientific and technical information that is required to be
submitted to DTIC;

o clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the
submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical information
to DTIC; and

o designate which DOD office or organization is responsible for exercising
oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to DTIC.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all
recommendations. Regarding our recommendations for either modifying
current DOD policy or developing guidance to ensure that chemical and
biological survivability is consistently addressed in the weapon system
acquisition process, DOD plans to issue a Chemical Biological
Contamination Survivability Policy by May 2006 and subsequently draft a
DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Survivability. With regard to our recommendations for modifying current
DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical and biological
scientific and technical information is comprehensive, DOD initiated the
development of a chemical and biological material effects database by
forming and hosting an executive steering committee that met for the first
time in March 2006. DOD plans to establish and institute this database at
the Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center
(CBIAC) managed by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). The
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs is overseeing the development of this
database, which DOD expects to be ready by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected] . Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.

Davi M. D'Agostino Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
Appropriations House of Representatives

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and
biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed DOD,
joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and
interviewed officials throughout DOD. We also conducted a non probability
sample of nine major weapon systems.1 We selected programs for this non
probability sample based on several factors, including (1) high dollar
value,2 (2) whether the weapon system was a joint program, and (3) risk of
exposure to chemical and biological weapons. The methodology used to
select our sample helped achieve a sample of weapon systems that was both
diverse and relevant to chemical and biological survivability. For
example, the sample includes weapon systems from all military services and
all types of systems-land, sea, and air. The sample also includes both
legacy systems and those currently in development. To understand how DOD's
acquisition, testing, and data submission and storage policies affect
weapon systems program offices' practices, we spoke with officials and
examined documentation from the nine weapon system program offices we
reviewed. The list of selected weapons systems is provided below:

o C-17 Globemaster

o DD(X) Destroyer

o Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

o F/A-22 Raptor

o Future Combat Systems

o Joint Strike Fighter

o Littoral Combat Ship

o Stryker Infantry Carrier

o V-22 Osprey Vertical Lift Aircraft

To determine the extent to which DOD maintains a comprehensive database
for facilitating the inclusion of chemical and biological survivability in
weapons system design and development, we reviewed DOD and service
policies, guidance, and procedures. We compared these policies, guidance,
and procedures to the objectives and fundamental concepts of internal
controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government. We also conducted interviews with database officials and
members of the chemical and biological testing community and reviewed
documents at the following locations in consultation with DOD officials
and identified as crucial to this subject area in previous GAO reports:

o Air Force Research Laboratory, Dayton, Ohio

o Army Research Laboratory, Survivability and Lethality Analysis
Directorate, Aberdeen, Maryland

o Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center, Edgewood, Maryland

o Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

o West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

o Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Alexandria, Virginia

We conducted our review from February 2005 through January 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II

Sampled Weapon System Programs Either Conducted or Considered Some Level
of Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing 

We conducted a non probability sample of nine weapon system programs and
found that all conducted or were considering some kind of system
survivability testing. The survivability of the weapon system programs we
reviewed was tested by an array of testing procedures and a variety of
simulated and live chemical and biological agents and decontamination
solutions. Seven conducted either coupon1 testing of materials or
component testing. In a few cases, chemical and biological survivability
testing was only conducted at the weapons system level and not at the
coupon or component level. All of the weapon system program offices we
interviewed conducted literature searches, discussions with subject matter
experts, and consulted with testing facilities and organizations (such as
the West Desert Test Center) to develop their chemical and biological
survivability testing strategy. Figure 2 shows the different types of
testing related to chemical and biological survivability that had been
performed on the selected weapon systems at the time of our review. This
figure does not reflect either planned or unplanned survivability testing
that might be performed with regard to these systems in the future.

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Testing Performed on Sampled Weapon
Systems

Program Offices' Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing Varied for
Reviewed Weapon Systems

We found that the extent and nature of chemical and biological
survivability testing varied widely in all nine weapon systems we
reviewed, even for similar types of systems. Both sea-based weapon systems
we reviewed exhibited varying consideration of chemical and biological
testing. For example, the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office
considered chemical and biological survivability testing low-risk due to
the perceived operating environment and concept of operations for this
weapon system. Officials stated that the key survivability approach will
be to reduce susceptibility to contamination through detection and
avoidance. In contrast, the Navy's next generation destroyer DD(X) was
designed with a higher chemical and biological system protection level,
and consequently the program office conducted limited coupon testing of
specific materials found in the ship's superstructure.2 In its technical
comments on this report, DOD stated that this occurred because the DD(X)
concept of operations does not preclude exposure to chemical and
biological attacks, while the LCS concept of operations does preclude
exposure to chemical and biological agents. These systems thus utilized
different concepts of operations although both are intended to operate in
a littoral environment.

DOD and program officials stated that land systems would be those most
likely to include chemical and biological survivability testing because of
the increased likelihood of encountering contamination on the modern
battlefield. However, these programs also conducted tests very different
from each other although they are intended for the same operating
environment. The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program
office conducted four chemical and biological materials tests that looked
at the effects of decontaminants on a variety of materials and included
extensive tests using Chemical Agent Resistant Coating on the exterior and
interior of the vehicle. In comparison, program officials from the Army's
new wheeled personnel carrier, Stryker, used a different approach,
focusing on applying a chemical agent simulant to a complete Stryker
vehicle and then conducting decontamination procedures. However, in this
case a different testing approach for a similar system may have been
appropriate because the Stryker is not constructed with new materials and
all existing materials used in constructing the Stryker meet military
specification requirements for chemical and biological survivability. The
Army's Future Combat System is currently reassessing chemical and
biological survivability in its design and development. This program is
still in development and has not reached the point where definitive
decisions on chemical and biological survivability are applicable. The
Army sponsor and the program office have been coordinating with the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, and
the Army Training and Doctrine Command in creating chemical and biological
survivability requirements.

Of the four aircraft weapon system programs we sampled, three conducted
similar levels of chemical and biological testing. Of the three current
systems, the Air Force's F/A-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter program
offices conducted testing as extensive as that conducted by the Navy for
the V-22 Osprey, although these two systems were assessed as much less
likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination as the V-22
Osprey. The V-22 Osprey program office performed vulnerability
assessments, survivability assessments, and some material coupon tests.
Both the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-22 Raptor program offices
conducted complementary material and component contamination and
decontamination compatibility tests. To identify material survivability
issues, the F/A-22 Raptor program office contracted with a defense
contractor to perform a literature search in advance of any testing. The
Joint Strike Fighter program office effectively employed the results of
this F/A-22 Raptor testing performed by using the survivability manual
developed for the F/A-22 Raptor rather than developing its own. This
manual was effectively used as a reference to meet both program's chemical
and biological survivability and decontamination thresholds following
exposure to chemical and biological weapons and decontamination
procedures. The legacy aircraft system we reviewed, the C-17, conducted
little chemical and biological testing because much of its testing and
development occurred during a different threat environment. Program
officials stated that decontamination procedures for the C-17 were
developed in the 1980s and that the chemical and biological survivability
requirements were drastically scaled down after the end of the Cold War.

Variety of Factors Affected Testing Decisions

Many factors affected the program office's determination about the extent
to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability. These
factors included the type of system (i.e., air, land, or sea), required
system capabilities, system concept of operation, the perceived chemical
and biological threat, and other factors related to the status of system
cost, schedule, and performance. Senior DOD officials stated that each
service sponsor has the ability to choose whether to accept the risks
related to cost and schedule to incorporate testing of chemical and
biological survivability.

DOD officials stated that in general land systems are perceived as the
most likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination and that
the perceived threat for sea and air systems has traditionally been
considered lower than the perceived threat for land systems. This
perception was based on old Cold War concepts and has since changed. DOD
officials told us that asymmetric threats are a greater concern today and
that system developers must weigh the threat context as they are
developing systems and deciding what types of survivability to test based
on perceived risk.

Program offices we visited stated that the high financial cost of both
live and simulated chemical and biological agent testing was a factor that
influences decisions about testing weapon system chemical and biological
survivability. For example, officials at the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle program office estimated that coupon testing with live agents
could cost approximately $30,000 to $50,000, and full system, live agent
field testing of equipment at a facility such as the West Desert Test
Center at Dugway Proving Grounds would cost approximately $1 million. In
addition, the C-17 program office stated that live agent testing cost
approximately $1 million. Interviews with various DOD research facilities
where testing is conducted supported these amounts. F/A-22 program
officials also stated that although they conducted coupon and component
tests, they would not encourage a full system chemical and biological
survivability test because such a test would be too expensive and would
destroy the aircraft being tested.

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood, Assistant
Director; Renee S. Brown, Jane Ervin, Catherine Humphries, David Mayfield,
Renee McElveen, Anupama Patil, Matthew Sakrekoff, Rebecca Shea, and Cheryl
Weissman also made key contributions to this report.

(350641)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-592 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Davi D' Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-592 , a report to congressional committees

April 2006

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the
Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats

The possibility that an adversary may use chemical or biological weapons
against U.S. forces makes it important for a weapon system to be able to
survive such attacks. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense submit a plan
to address weapon system chemical and biological survivability by February
28, 2005. This plan was to include developing a centralized database with
information about the effects of chemical and biological agents on
materials used in weapon systems. DOD did not submit its plan as mandated.
GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which DOD addresses weapon
system chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition
process, and (2) DOD's internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive
database that includes chemical and biological survivability research and
test data for weapon system design and development.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending modifications to DOD's current weapon system
acquisition policy to ensure that (1) weapon system chemical and
biological survivability is consistently addressed and (2) that DOD's
chemical and biological scientific and technical information database is
comprehensive. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and currently has
actions underway for their implementation.

The extent to which chemical and biological survivability is considered in
the weapon system acquisition process is mixed and varied. Although DOD
strategic guidance and policy has emphasized the growing threat of an
adversary's use of chemical and biological weapons for over a decade, DOD,
joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies are
inconsistent and do not establish a clear process for considering and
testing system chemical and biological survivability. To assess the extent
DOD addresses chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition
process, GAO conducted a non probability sample of nine major weapon
systems based on high dollar value, whether the system was a joint
program, and risk of exposure to chemical and biological weapons. Because
DOD and joint acquisition policies do not require that survivability be
specifically addressed, the military services have developed their own
varying and unique policies. Thus, for the nine weapon systems GAO
reviewed, the program offices involved made individual survivability
decisions, resulting in inconsistent survivability consideration and
testing. In the absence of DOD requirements, program offices also
inconsistently document their decisions regarding how they consider and
test chemical and biological survivability. Furthermore, DOD policies do
not establish a clear process for responsibility, authority, and oversight
for monitoring program office decisions regarding chemical and biological
survivability. Without establishing consistent policies requiring that
chemical and biological survivability be considered during weapon system
acquisition, and a clear process for doing so, military planners and
commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance,
availability, and interoperability issues. These could negatively affect
system availability in a contaminated environment and limit DOD's ability
to identify risk and ensure that appropriate decisions are made.

DOD, through its Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), maintains a
centralized database for science and technology information that could
facilitate program offices' consideration of weapon system chemical and
biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of this database is
unknown due to inadequate internal controls. It is unlikely that the DTIC
database contains fully comprehensive information about this for three
reasons. First, it is unclear whether this information is covered by the
broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information be
submitted to DTIC. Second, there is no established process for submitting
scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result, it is submitted
to DTIC through the ad hoc actions of individual personnel and
organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all
information is being submitted to DTIC. Third, no office or organization
in DOD has been given clear oversight responsibility to ensure that
information is submitted to DTIC. The lack of a database with
comprehensive information about weapon system chemical and biological
survivability creates the risk of unnecessary expenditures on duplicative
testing.
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