Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to	 
Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in	 
the United States (28-MAR-06, GAO-06-558T).			 
                                                                 
GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat	 
nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. 
Together with the March 2005 report on the Department of Energy's
Megaports Initiative, these reports represent GAO's analysis of  
the U.S. effort to deploy radiation detection equipment 	 
worldwide. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made 
and challenges faced by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense 
(DOD), and State in providing radiation detection equipment to	 
foreign countries and (2) the Department of Homeland Security's  
(DHS) efforts to install radiation detection equipment at U.S.	 
ports of entry and challenges it faces. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-558T					        
    ACCNO:   A50158						        
  TITLE:     Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S.      
Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other	 
Countries and in the United States				 
     DATE:   03/28/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Border security					 
	     Cargo security					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Dirty bombs					 
	     Equipment management				 
	     Hazardous substances				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Radiation monitoring				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Strategic planning 				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-558T

     

     * Summary
     * Background
     * U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Oth
     * DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equip
     * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST

Tuesday, March 28, 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in
Other Countries and in the United States

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-06-558T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. government
programs to combat nuclear smuggling through the deployment of radiation
detection equipment at border crossings and other ports of entry both in
foreign countries and in the United States.1 According to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 662
confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological
materials worldwide. Twenty-one of these cases involved material that
could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, and over 400 involved materials
that could be used to produce a device that uses conventional explosives
with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Especially in the
aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened
concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear material or a nuclear
weapon into the United States. This could happen in several ways: nuclear
materials could be hidden in a car, train, or ship; sent through the mail;
carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an
unprotected border. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the
consequences could be devastating to our national and economic interests.

In response to these threats, four U.S. agencies, the Departments of
Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State (State), and Homeland Security (DHS),
implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and in
the United States. Regarding U.S. efforts in other countries, the first
major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during the 1990s
concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in
countries of the former Soviet Union. One of the main U.S. programs
providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments is DOE's
Second Line of Defense program, which began installing equipment at key
sites in Russia in 1998. In 2003, DOE began a second program, the
Megaports Initiative, to combat nuclear smuggling at major foreign
seaports.2 In addition to DOE's efforts, two DOD programs have provided
radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, and radiation detection
training to 8 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Similarly, three State programs have provided radiation detection
equipment and training to 31 countries since fiscal year 1994.

1See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying
Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain,
GAO-06-389 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006) and Combating Nuclear
Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge
U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries,
GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006).

Regarding efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in the United States, DHS is
responsible for providing radiation detection capabilities at U.S. ports
of entry. Until April 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
managed this program. However, on April 15, 2005, the President directed
the establishment, within DHS, of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO), whose duties include acquiring and supporting the deployment of
radiation detection equipment.3 CBP continues its traditional screening
function at ports of entry to prevent illegal immigration and interdict
contraband, including the operation of radiation detection equipment. DHS
is deploying portal monitors in five phases: international mail and
express courier facilities; northern border crossings; major seaports;
southwestern border crossings; and all other categories, including
international airports and remaining border crossings, seaports, and rail
crossings. Generally, CBP prioritized these categories according to their
perceived vulnerability to the threat of nuclear smuggling (rather than
through a formal risk assessment).

My testimony summarizes the findings of our two reports being released
today on U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically, I will
discuss (1) the progress made by the various federal agencies tasked with
installing radiation detection equipment at ports of entry in foreign
countries and the challenges these agencies face and (2) DHS's efforts to
install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and
challenges DHS faces in completing its program.

2In addition to the two reports being released today, in March 2005 we
reported on DOE's Megaports Initiative. For additional information, see
GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). Through the end of
fiscal year 2005, DOE had spent about $101 million to complete
installations at four ports in Greece, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and the
Bahamas. DOE anticipates completing an additional port in Spain in April
2006. DOE has signed agreements to begin work at ports in seven other
countries (China, Honduras, Israel, Oman, the Philippines, Thailand, and
the United Arab Emirates).

3See National Security Presidential Directive No. 43/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive No. 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection (Apr. 15, 2005).

                                    Summary

Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign
countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent a total of about $178 million
since fiscal year 1994 to provide assistance to 36 countries. For example,
DOE's Second Line of Defense program has installed equipment at 83 sites,
mostly in Russia, at a cost of about $130 million. However, DOE, DOD, and
State face challenges that could compromise their programs' effectiveness,
including (1) corruption of foreign border security officials, (2)
technical limitations of some equipment at foreign sites, (3) problems
with maintenance of some handheld equipment, and (4) the lack of
infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites.

           o  According to officials from several countries we visited,
           corruption is a pervasive problem within border security
           organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are
           concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could
           compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection
           equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To
           mitigate this threat, DOE and DOD plan to deploy communications
           links between individual border sites and national command centers
           so that alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by multiple
           officials.

           o  Some portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies
           previously installed at foreign border sites have technical
           limitations and can only detect gamma radiation, which makes them
           less effective at detecting weapons-usable nuclear material than
           equipment with both gamma and neutron radiation detection
           capabilities. Since 2002, DOE has maintained this equipment but
           has only upgraded equipment at one site. Until the remaining sites
           receive equipment with both gamma and neutron detection
           capabilities, they will be vulnerable to certain forms of nuclear
           smuggling.

           o  DOE has not systematically maintained handheld radiation
           detection equipment provided by State and other agencies. As a
           result, many pieces of handheld equipment, which are vital for
           border officials to conduct secondary inspections, may not
           function properly.

           o  Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that
           often do not have access to infrastructure essential to operate
           radiation detection equipment and associated communication
           systems. Additionally, environmental conditions at some sites,
           such as extreme heat, can affect equipment performance. To
           mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and State have provided
           generators and other equipment at remote border sites to ensure
           stable electricity supplies and, when appropriate, heat shields or
           other protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation
           detection equipment.

           In addition, State is the lead interagency coordinator charged
           with limiting overlap and duplication of effort among U.S.
           programs, but its ability to carry out this role has been limited
           by deficiencies in its strategic plan for interagency coordination
           and its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation
           detection equipment provided to other countries.

           Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S.
           ports of entry, through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670
           portal monitors- about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans
           to deploy-at U.S. border crossings, seaports, and international
           mail and express courier facilities at a cost of about $286
           million. DHS plans to deploy a total of 3,034 portal monitors by
           2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and
           deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in
           releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in
           negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type
           and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy.
           Specifically:

           o  DHS's cumbersome review process for providing requested
           information to the Congress has resulted in funds being
           unavailable until later in the fiscal year. This review process
           involves multiple approvals within DHS and the Office of
           Management and Budget and has held up the release of program
           funds, which has delayed the deployment of radiation detection
           equipment at U.S. ports of entry.

           o  Difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement
           of portal monitors and screening of railcars have delayed
           deployments at U.S. seaports. Many seaport operators are concerned
           that radiation detection equipment may inhibit the flow of
           commerce through their ports. In addition, seaports are much
           larger than land border crossings, consist of multiple terminals,
           and may have multiple exits, which may require a greater number of
           portal monitors.

           o  DHS's $1.3 billion cost estimate for completing its domestic
           radiation detection program is uncertain, in part, because DHS
           would like to deploy advanced technology portal monitors that will
           likely cost significantly more than current models. However, tests
           have shown that these new advanced technology portal monitors are
           not demonstrably more effective than current models in their core
           function of identifying the presence of radiation. Consequently,
           it is not clear that the benefits of the new portal monitors would
           be worth the increased cost.

           In addition, CBP officers have made progress in using radiation
           detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection
           guidelines, but we identified ways to improve CBP's secondary
           inspection procedures. For example, when detection equipment
           alarms to indicate the presence of radioactivity, CBP officers are
           not expressly required to open containers and inspect their
           interiors, even though, under some circumstances, doing so can
           increase the chances that the source of radioactivity will be
           correctly located and identified. Furthermore, although
           radiological materials shipped into the United States are
           generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
           license, importers are not required to present these licenses at
           U.S. ports of entry, and CBP inspectors are not required to verify
           the authenticity of these licenses and do not have a system to do
           so. My GAO colleague, Mr. Greg Kutz, will be testifying on a GAO
           operation that was conducted to test CBP's inspection procedures
           and certain NRC licensing procedures.

           In our report on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other
           countries, we made five recommendations. Specifically, we
           recommended that DOE take steps to upgrade U.S.-funded portal
           monitors in foreign countries that do not have both gamma and
           neutron detection capabilities and improve program cost estimates
           for anticorruption measures. Additionally, we recommended that
           State, working with DOE and DOD, ensure maintenance is provided
           for all handheld radiation detection equipment supplied by U.S.
           programs; strengthen its interagency coordination plan by
           including specific performance measures, overall cost estimates,
           and projected time frames for completion of U.S. efforts; and
           compile, maintain, and share a master list of all U.S. radiation
           detection assistance. Both DOE and State agreed with our
           recommendations. In our report on DHS's efforts to deploy
           radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry, we made nine
           recommendations, including a series of actions designed to help
           DHS speed up the pace of portal monitor deployments, better
           account for schedule delays and cost uncertainties, make the most
           efficient use of program resources, and improve its ability to
           interdict illicit nuclear materials. DHS agreed with our
           recommendations and is taking steps to implement them.

           Detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear material is complicated
           because one of the materials of greatest concern-highly enriched
           uranium-has a relatively low level of radioactivity and is,
           therefore, among the most difficult to detect. In contrast,
           medical and industrial radioactive sources, which could be used to
           construct a dirty bomb, are highly radioactive and, therefore,
           easier to detect. Although their levels of radioactivity differ,
           uranium and radioactive sources are similar in that they generally
           emit only gamma radiation, which is relatively easily shielded
           when encased in high-density material, such as lead. For example,
           we reported in March 2005 that a cargo container containing a
           radioactive source passed through radiation detection equipment
           DOE had installed at a foreign seaport without being detected
           because the source was surrounded by large amounts of scrap metal
           in the container.

           Plutonium, another nuclear material of great concern, emits both
           gamma and neutron radiation. Although most currently fielded
           radiation detection equipment has the capability to detect both
           gamma and neutron radiation, shielding neutron radiation can be
           more difficult than shielding gamma radiation. Consequently,
           plutonium can usually be detected by a neutron detector regardless
           of the amount of shielding from high-density material. According
           to DOE officials, neutron radiation alarms are caused only by
           man-made materials, such as plutonium, while gamma radiation
           alarms are caused by a variety of naturally occurring sources,
           including commercial goods such as bananas, ceramic tiles, and
           fertilizer, as well as by dangerous nuclear materials, such as
           uranium and plutonium.

           Because of the complexities of detecting and identifying nuclear
           material, customs officers and border guards who are responsible
           for operating detection equipment must be trained in using
           handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm,
           identify false alarms, and properly respond to cases of nuclear
           smuggling. The manner in which radiation detection equipment is
           deployed, operated, and maintained can also limit its
           effectiveness. Given the difficulties in detecting certain nuclear
           materials and the inherent limitations of currently deployed
           radiation detection equipment, it is important that the equipment
           be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes
           authorities' ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials.

           Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the
           installation of radiation detection equipment are important, the
           United States should not and does not rely upon radiation
           detection equipment at U.S. or foreign borders as its sole means
           for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear warhead from
           reaching the United States. Recognizing the need for a broad
           approach to the problem, the U.S. government has multiple
           initiatives that are designed to complement each other that
           provide a layered defense against nuclear terrorism. For example,
           DOE works to secure nuclear material and warheads at their sources
           through programs that improve the physical security at nuclear
           facilities in the former Soviet Union and in other countries. In
           addition, DHS has other initiatives to identify containers at
           foreign seaports that are considered high risk for containing
           smuggled goods, such as nuclear and other dangerous materials.
           Supporting all of these programs is intelligence information that
           can give advanced notice of nuclear material smuggling and is a
           critical component to prevent dangerous materials from entering
           the United States.

           One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection
           equipment to foreign governments is DOE's Second Line of Defense
           program, which began installing equipment at key sites in Russia
           in 1998. According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2005,
           the program had spent about $130 million to complete installations
           at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. Ultimately, DOE plans to install
           radiation detection equipment at a total of about 350 sites in 31
           countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570 million. In
           addition to DOE's efforts, other U.S. agencies also have programs
           that provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign
           governments. Two programs at DOD-the International
           Counterproliferation Program and Weapons of Mass Destruction
           Proliferation Prevention Initiative-have provided equipment and
           related training to eight countries in the former Soviet Union and
           Eastern Europe at a cost of about $22 million. Similarly, three
           programs at State-the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund,
           Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program, and Export
           Control and Related Border Security program-have spent about $25
           million to provide radiation detection equipment and training to
           31 countries.

           However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could
           compromise their programs' effectiveness, including (1) corruption
           of foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of
           equipment at some foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of
           handheld equipment, and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh
           environmental conditions at some border sites. First, according to
           officials from several recipient countries we visited, corruption
           is a pervasive problem within the ranks of border security
           organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are
           concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could
           compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection
           equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To
           mitigate this threat, DOE and DOD plan to deploy communications
           links between individual border sites and national command centers
           so that alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by multiple
           officials, thus establishing redundant layers of accountability
           for alarm response. In addition, DOD plans to implement a program
           in Uzbekistan to combat some of the underlying issues that can
           lead to corruption through periodic screening of border security
           personnel.

           Second, some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S.
           agencies previously installed have technical limitations: they can
           detect only gamma radiation, making them less effective at
           detecting some nuclear material than equipment with both gamma and
           neutron radiation detection capabilities. Through an interagency
           agreement, DOE assumed responsibility for ensuring the long-term
           sustainability and continued operation of radiation portal
           monitors and X-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors that
           State and other U.S. agencies provided to 23 countries. Through
           this agreement, DOE provides spare parts, preventative
           maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through regularly
           scheduled maintenance visits. Since 2002, DOE has maintained this
           equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the exception of at
           one site in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new
           implementing agreements with the appropriate ministries or
           agencies within the governments of each of the countries where the
           old equipment is located are needed before DOE can install more
           sophisticated equipment.

           Third, since 2002, DOE has been responsible for maintaining
           certain radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State
           and other agencies in 23 countries. However, DOE is not
           responsible for maintaining handheld radiation detection equipment
           provided by these agencies. As a result, many pieces of handheld
           equipment, which are vital for border officials to conduct
           secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians, may not function
           properly. For example, in Georgia, we observed border guards
           performing secondary inspections with a handheld radiation
           detector that had not been calibrated (adjusted to conform with
           measurement standards) since 1997. According to the detector's
           manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that the
           detector functions properly.

           Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often
           do not have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber
           optic lines, and other infrastructure essential to operate
           radiation detection equipment and associated communication
           systems. Additionally, environmental conditions at some sites,
           such as extreme heat, can affect the performance of equipment. To
           mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and State have provided
           generators and other equipment at remote border sites to ensure
           stable supplies of electricity and, when appropriate, heat shields
           or other protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation
           detection equipment.

           We also reported that State's ability to carry out its role as
           lead interagency coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment
           assistance has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan
           for interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive
           list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance. In
           response to a recommendation we made in 2002, State led the
           development of a governmentwide plan to coordinate U.S. radiation
           detection equipment assistance overseas. This plan broadly defines
           a set of interagency goals and outlines the roles and
           responsibilities of participating agencies. However, the plan
           lacks key components, including overall program cost estimates,
           projected time frames for program completion, and specific
           performance measures. Without these elements in the plan, State
           will be limited in its ability to effectively measure U.S.
           programs' progress toward achieving the interagency goals.

           Additionally, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, State
           has not maintained accurate information on the operational status
           and location of all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S.
           programs. While DOE, DOD, and State each maintain lists of
           radiation detection equipment provided by their programs, they do
           not regularly share such information, and no comprehensive list of
           all equipment provided by U.S. programs exists. For example,
           according to information we received from program managers at DOE,
           DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld radiation
           detection equipment had been provided to 36 foreign countries
           through the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of this
           equipment was provided to the same countries by multiple agencies
           and programs, it is difficult to determine the degree to which
           duplication of effort has occurred. Without a coordinated master
           list of all U.S.-funded equipment, program managers at DOE, DOD,
           and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and
           being used as intended, determine the equipment needs of countries
           where they plan to provide assistance, or detect whether an agency
           has unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.

           Through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 radiation
           portal monitors nationwide- about 22 percent of the portal
           monitors DHS plans to deploy-at international mail and express
           courier facilities, land border crossings, and seaports in the
           United States. DHS has completed portal monitor deployments at
           international mail and express courier facilities and the first
           phase of northern border sites-57 and 217 portal monitors,
           respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS had deployed 143
           of 495 portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at southern
           border sites.4 As of February 2006, CBP estimated that, with these
           deployments, it has the ability to screen about 62 percent of all
           containerized shipments entering the United States (but only 32
           percent of all containerized seaborne shipments) and roughly 77
           percent of all private vehicles. DHS plans to deploy 3,034 portal
           monitors by September 2009 at a cost of $1.3 billion. However, the
           final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because
           of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors,
           difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and
           uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection
           equipment DHS plans to deploy. Further, to meet this goal, DHS
           would have to deploy about 52 portal monitors a month for the next
           4 years-a rate that far exceeds the 2005 rate of about 22 per
           month.

           In particular, several factors have contributed to the delay in
           the deployment schedule. First, DHS provides the Congress with
           information on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before
           releasing any funds. However, DHS's cumbersome review process has
           consistently caused delays in providing such information to the
           Congress. For example, according to the House Appropriations
           Committee report on DHS's fiscal year 2005 budget, CBP should
           provide the Congress with an acquisition and deployment plan for
           the portal monitor program prior to funding its contractors. This
           plan took many months to finalize, mostly because it required
           multiple approvals within DHS and the Office of Management and
           Budget prior to being submitted to the Congress. The lengthy
           review process delayed the release of funds and, in some cases,
           disrupted and delayed deployment.

           Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about
           placement of portal monitors and screening of railcars have
           delayed deployments at U.S. seaports. Many seaport operators are
           concerned that radiation detection equipment may inhibit the flow
           of commerce through their ports. In addition, seaports are much
           larger than land border crossings, consist of multiple terminals,
           and may have multiple exits, which may require a greater number of
           portal monitors. Further, devising an effective way to conduct
           secondary inspections of rail traffic as it departs seaports
           without disrupting commerce has delayed deployments. This problem
           may worsen because the Department of Transportation has forecast
           that the use of rail transit out of seaports will probably
           increase in the near future.

           Finally, DHS's $1.3 billion estimate for the project is highly
           uncertain, in part, because of uncertainties in the type and cost
           of radiation detection equipment that DHS plans to deploy. The
           estimate is based on DHS's plans for widespread deployment of
           advanced technology portal monitors, which are currently being
           developed. However, the prototypes of this equipment have not yet
           been shown to be more effective than the portal monitors now in
           use, and DHS officials say they will not purchase the advanced
           portal monitors unless they are proven to be clearly superior.
           Moreover, when advanced technology portal monitors become
           commercially available, experts estimate that they will cost
           between about $330,000 and $460,000 each, far more than the
           currently used portal monitors whose costs range from about
           $49,000 to $60,000. Even if future test results indicate better
           detection capabilities, without a detailed comparison of the two
           technologies' capabilities it would not be clear that the
           dramatically higher cost for this new equipment would be worth the
           investment.

           We also identified potential issues with the procedures CBP
           inspectors use to perform secondary inspections that, if
           addressed, could strengthen the nation's defenses against nuclear
           smuggling. For example, CBP's procedures require only that
           officers locate, isolate, and identify radiological material.
           Typically, officers perform an external examination by scanning
           the sides of cargo containers with handheld radiation detection
           equipment during secondary inspections. CBP's guidance does not
           specifically require officers to open containers and inspect their
           interiors, even when their external examination cannot
           unambiguously resolve the alarm. However, under some
           circumstances, opening containers can improve security by
           increasing the chances that the source of radioactivity that
           originally set off the alarm will be correctly located and
           identified. The second potential issue with CBP's procedures
           involves NRC documentation. Individuals and organizations shipping
           radiological materials to the United States must generally acquire
           a NRC license, but according to NRC officials, the license does
           not have to accompany the shipment. Although inspectors examine
           such licenses when these shipments arrive at U.S. ports of entry,
           CBP officers are not required to verify that shippers of
           radiological material actually obtained required licenses and to
           authenticate licenses that accompany shipments. We found that CBP
           inspectors lack access to NRC license data that could be used to
           authenticate a license at the border.

           This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond
           to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
           have.

           For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
           (202) 512-3841 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our
           Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
           on the last page of this statement. R. Stockton Butler, Nancy
           Crothers, Jim Shafer, and Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions
           to this statement.

           Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying
           Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns
           Remain. GAO-06-389 . Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.

           Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and
           Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
           Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311 . Washington,
           D.C.: March 14, 2006.

           Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
           Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T
           . Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

           Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
           Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority
           Foreign Seaports. GAO-05-375 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

           Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials,
           New Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T . Washington, D.C.:
           November 18, 2002.

           Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
           Equipment. GAO-03-235T . Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.

           Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear
           Smuggling. GAO-02-989T Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.

           Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
           Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
           Planning. GAO-02-426 . Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

           The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
           investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
           meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
           the performance and accountability of the federal government for
           the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
           evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
           recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
           informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
           commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
           accountability, integrity, and reliability.

           The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
           no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday,
           GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on
           its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted
           products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe
           to Updates."

           The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
           are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
           Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
           Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
           discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

           U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
           (202) 512-6061

           Contact:

           Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
           [email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
           (202) 512-7470

           Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400
           U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
           512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
           Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

                                   Background

 U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries Face
              Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Challenges

 DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports
                         of Entry, but Concerns Remain

4In addition, three portal monitors had been installed at the Nevada Test
Site to analyze their detection capabilities, and four had been
retrofitted at express mail facilities.

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products

(360687)

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Congressional Relations

Public Affairs

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-558T .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-558T , a testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate

March 28, 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in
Other Countries and in the United States

GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. Together with the
March 2005 report on the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative,
these reports represent GAO's analysis of the U.S. effort to deploy
radiation detection equipment worldwide.

In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made and challenges faced
by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State in providing
radiation detection equipment to foreign countries and (2) the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to install radiation detection
equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges it faces.

What GAO Recommends

In the report on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other
countries, GAO made five recommendations to improve, among other things,
equipment maintenance, coordination among U.S. programs, and
accountability of equipment. Both DOE and State agreed with GAO's
recommendations. In the report on radiation detection at U.S. ports of
entry, GAO made nine recommendations designed to help DHS speed up the
pace of portal monitor deployments, better account for schedule delays and
cost uncertainties, and improve its ability to interdict illicit nuclear
materials. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations.

Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign
countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since fiscal
year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36 countries. For
example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's Second Line of Defense
program had completed installation of equipment at 83 sites, mostly in
Russia. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could
compromise their efforts, including corruption of foreign border security
officials, technical limitations and inadequate maintenance of some
equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites.
To address these challenges, U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps,
including combating corruption by installing multitiered communications
systems that establish redundant layers of accountability for alarm
response. State coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication
of effort. However, State's ability to carry out this role has been
limited by deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of
a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to
other countries.

Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors
through December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation
detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286
million. DHS plans to install a total of 3,034 radiation portal monitors
by the end of fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However,
the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of
delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in
negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and cost
of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found
that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers have made progress
in using radiation detection equipment correctly and adhering to
inspection guidelines, but CBP's secondary inspection procedures could be
improved. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require its officers to
open containers and inspect them for nuclear and radioactive materials
when they cannot make a determination from an external inspection and that
DHS work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute
procedures by which inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports of
entry.

U.S.-Funded Equipment in Uzbekistan and at a Northern U.S. Port of Entry
*** End of document. ***