Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices
and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts (29-MAR-06,
GAO-06-557T).
The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system
dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems
worldwide to terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an
increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony,
which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on
passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1)
the security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail
transit operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance
security; (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) funding of rail transit
security and use of risk management in funding decisions; and (3)
the steps DHS and DOT have taken to improve coordination on rail
transit security matters. As part of its 2005 report, GAO
contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger rail
operators in seven European and Asian countries.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-557T
ACCNO: A50417
TITLE: Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security
Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts
DATE: 03/29/2006
SUBJECT: Comparative analysis
Counterterrorism
Emergency preparedness
Homeland security
Inspection
Interagency relations
Mass transit
Passengers
Rail security
Railroad industry
Railroad safety
Risk assessment
Terrorism
Transportation security
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-557T
* Background
* U.S. and Foreign Rail Transit Operators Have Taken Similar A
* U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Prac
* Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used
* DHS and DOT Help Fund Security Efforts, and Some Funding Dec
* DHS and DOT Help Fund Rail Transit Security Efforts
* Using Risk Management Approach Can Help Direct Federal Funds
* Coordination between Federal Agencies Has Faced Challenges a
* DHS and DOT Have Worked to Improve Coordination on Transit S
* Coordination between Federal Agencies Will Continue to Be Im
* Concluding Observations
* Contact Information
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
Testimony before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST
Wednesday, March 29, 2006
PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY
Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security
Efforts
Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAO-06-557T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on rail
transit security. The London rail bombings that took place in July
2005-resulting in over 50 fatalities and more than 700 injuries-made clear
that even when a variety of security precautions are in place, rail
transit systems that move high volumes of passengers each day remain
vulnerable to terrorist attack. While securing the U.S. rail transit
system is a daunting task-a shared responsibility requiring coordinated
action on the part of federal, state, and local governments and the
private sector-it is important nonetheless to take the necessary steps to
identify and mitigate risks to rail transit systems.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders involved
in securing these systems can lead to communication challenges,
duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. Key
federal stakeholders with critical roles to play within the rail sector
include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is
responsible for transportation security overall, and the Office of Grants
and Training,1 which provides grant funds to rail operators and conducts
risk assessments for passenger rail agencies, both within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS); and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), both within the Department of
Transportation (DOT). One of the critical challenges facing these federal
agencies, and the rail system operators they oversee or support, is
finding ways to protect rail systems from potential terrorist attacks
without compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail transit.
At the federal level, another significant challenge to securing rail
systems involves the allocation of resources. Rail transit systems
represent one of many modes of transportation-along with aviation,
maritime, and others-competing for limited federal security resources.
Within the rail transit sector itself, there is competition for resources,
as federal, state, and local agencies and rail operators seek to identify
and invest in appropriate security measures to safeguard these systems
while also investing in other capital and operational improvements.
Moreover, given competing priorities and limited homeland security
resources, difficult policy decisions have to be made by Congress and the
executive branch to prioritize security efforts and direct resources to
the areas of greatest risk within the rail transit system, among all
transportation modes, and across other nationally critical sectors.
1DHS's Office of Grants and Training was formerly called the Office of
Domestic Preparedness.
To help federal decision makers determine how to best allocate limited
resources, we have advocated, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has recommended, and the
subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
requires, that a risk management approach be employed to guide security
decision making.2 A risk management approach entails a continuous process
of managing risks through a series of actions, including setting strategic
goals and objectives, assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating
alternative security measures, selecting which measures to undertake, and
implementing and monitoring those measures. In July 2005, in announcing
his proposal for the reorganization of DHS, the Secretary of Homeland
Security declared that as a core principle of the reorganization, the
department must base its work on priorities driven by risk.
My testimony will cover three areas: (1) the security practices that
domestic and selected foreign rail transit operators have implemented to
mitigate risks and enhance security, and any differences in these
practices; (2) DHS's and DOT's funding of rail transit security and use of
risk management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have
taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. My
comments today are based on our body of work on passenger rail security
issues, including our September 2005 report to the Chairman of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Railroads, Senators
Snowe and Boxer, and Representative Castle.3 For this report, we contacted
32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger rail operators in seven
European and Asian countries. These domestic and foreign rail agencies and
the areas they serve are listed in appendix I. All of the reports on which
this statement is based were prepared in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
2Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. For more information on risk
management, see GAO, Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed
to Optimize Resources, GAO-05-357T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005);
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001); and Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target
Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 1998).
3GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
9, 2005); GAO, Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and
Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-04-598T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2004); GAO, Transportation Security: Federal
Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2003); and GAO, Mass Transit: Federal Actions Could Help
Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 13, 2002).
In summary:
o Domestic and foreign rail transit operators we contacted have
taken similar actions to help secure their systems, such as
implementing customer awareness programs, upgrading security
technology, and tightening access controls. Also, both domestic
and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide
security-related activities and funding. However, we also observed
rail security practices in foreign countries that were not in use
domestically at the time of our review. For example, some foreign
rail operators use covert testing to help keep employees alert to
security threats or randomly screen passengers. In addition,
centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as
chemical sensors, and best practices are maintained in some
foreign countries. While introducing any of these security
practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal,
fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless
warrant further examination. In our September 2005 report on
passenger rail security, we recommended, among other things, that
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with DOT and
the passenger rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk
management context, of implementing certain rail security
practices used in foreign countries, including covert testing and
random screening, an information clearinghouse for security
technologies and best practices, and practices that integrate
security into infrastructure design.4 DHS and DOT generally agreed
with the report's recommendations.
o Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments,
and DHS has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the
allocation of transit security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and
Training is the primary source of security funding for passenger
rail systems. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, the
Office of Grants and Training provided over $320 million in grants
to rail transit agencies through the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) and the Transit Security Grant Programs. The
Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making
authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger
rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk
assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. Using
assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is
especially critical given the competition for resources within the
rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the
other modes of transportation. Moreover, as the 2005 London rail
bombings dramatically illustrated, even when a variety of security
precautions are put in place, passenger rail systems remain
vulnerable and attractive targets given their open designs and the
high volumes of passengers they transport each day. Thus, it is
important that limited resources are targeted to security
activities that have the greatest impact on reducing overall risk.
DOT's FTA also helps fund rail transit security efforts through
the financial assistance it provides to transit agencies. In
addition, FTA requires that a certain percentage of federal funds
be devoted to security activities. Specifically, transit agencies
are required to spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula
funds on security improvements.5
o To improve coordination on transportation security matters,
including rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) in September 2004. The MOU defines broad
areas of responsibility for each department. The two departments
also signed a transit security annex to the MOU in September 2005
that delineates the specific security-related roles,
responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit issues.
We believe these actions are positive steps forward in addressing
the coordination problems we have previously identified. For
instance, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security directives to
domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system
in Madrid. However, federal and rail industry officials raised
questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with
these directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with
TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated.
Effective coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be
important as both departments move forward with existing programs
and new security initiatives. For example, to avoid duplication
and confusion, it will be important that TSA coordinate the
oversight activities of its rail inspectors with those of the
state auditors from FTA's State Safety Oversight program and FRA's
rail safety inspectors.
4GAO-05-851.
5FTA's urbanized area formula grant program provides federal funds to
urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for
transit capital investments, operating expenses, and
transportation-related planning.
Background
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22
states use some form of rail transit-that is, heavy, commuter, and light
rail. Heavy rail systems-subway systems like New York City's transit
system and Washington, D.C.'s Metro-typically operate on fixed rail lines
within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of
traffic. Commuter rail systems generally operate on railroad tracks and
provide regional service (e.g., between a central city and adjacent
suburbs)-and are traditionally associated with older industrial cities,
such as Boston, New York, and Chicago. Light rail systems are typically
characterized by lightweight passenger rail cars that operate on track
that is not separated from vehicular traffic for much of the way. Figure 1
identifies the geographic location of rail transit systems within the
United States.
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Rail Transit Systems
According to rail transit officials and experts, certain characteristics
of rail transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist
attacks and therefore difficult to secure. By design, rail transit systems
are open (i.e., have multiple access points, hubs serving multiple
carriers, and, in some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large
numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation
system is housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points.
The openness of rail transit systems can leave them vulnerable because
operator personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or
leaves the systems. Other characteristics of some rail transit
systems-high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and
location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)-also
make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for
mass casualties and economic damage and disruption. Moreover, some of
these same characteristics make rail transit systems difficult to secure.
For example, the numbers of riders that pass through a subway
system-especially during peak hours-may make the sustained use of some
security measures, such as metal detectors, difficult because their use
could result in long lines that could disrupt scheduled service. In
addition, multiple access points along extended routes could make the cost
of securing each location prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic
effects of security enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a
difficult challenge.
Securing the nation's rail transit systems is a shared responsibility
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and the passengers who ride these rail
systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of federal government
agencies in securing the nation's transportation systems, including rail
transit, have continued to evolve. Before September 11, DOT-namely,
FTA-was the primary federal entity involved in rail transit security
matters. In response to the attacks of September 11, Congress passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA within
DOT and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security in all
modes of transportation.6 The act also gave TSA regulatory authority for
security over all transportation modes. ATSA does not specify TSA's roles
and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation
modes at the level of detail it does for aviation security. Instead, the
act broadly identifies TSA as responsible for ensuring the security of all
modes of transportation. With the passage of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, TSA was transferred, along with over 20 other agencies, to DHS.7
While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all
transportation modes, FTA conducts nonregulatory safety and security
activities, including safety- and security-related training, research,
technical assistance, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA
promotes safety and security through its grant-making authority.
6Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
7Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
U.S. and Foreign Rail Transit Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure
Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May
Exist
U.S. rail transit operators have taken numerous actions to secure their
rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the
United States and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions
included both improvements to system operations and capital enhancements
to system facilities, such as track, buildings, and train cars. All of the
U.S. rail transit operators we contacted have implemented some security
measures-such as customer awareness programs and more, and more visible,
security personnel-that were generally consistent with those we observed
in Europe and Asia. We also identified three rail security
practices-covert testing, random screening of passengers and their
baggage, and maintaining a centralized clearinghouse on rail security
technologies-used in foreign countries but not, at the time or our review,
domestically.8
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices
Both U.S. and foreign rail transit operators we contacted have implemented
similar improvements to enhance the security of their systems. To guide
security actions and spending, domestic and foreign operators-even the
privatized foreign systems-consider risk assessments, budget constraints,
and other factors. For example, one foreign rail operator with a daily
ridership of 2.3 million passengers used a risk management methodology to
assess risks, threats, and vulnerabilities to rail in order to guide
security spending. According to the operator, the methodology employs a
"risk informed" approach to support management's business decision process
regarding security. A summary of domestic and foreign security practices
follows.
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used signs and
announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they observed
suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 domestic rail
operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer awareness program
or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign rail operators we
visited also attempt to enhance customer awareness. For example, 11 of the
13 operators we interviewed had implemented a customer awareness program.
Similar to programs of U.S. operators, these programs used signs,
announcements, and brochures to inform passengers and employees about the
need to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activities.
8At the time we completed our work in June 2005, these three practices
were not utilized. However, as discussed later in this testimony, some
rail operators began using random screening in the aftermath of the July
bomb attacks on the London subway system and others may have begun
utilizing this or other security practices since our report.
More, and more visible security personnel: Of the 32 U.S. rail operators
we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security personnel they
used since September 11, to provide security throughout their system or
had taken steps to increase the visibility of their security personnel.
For example, several U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke with had
instituted policies such as requiring their security staff to wear
brightly colored vests and patrol trains or stations more frequently, so
they are more visible to customers and potential terrorists or criminals.
These policies make it easier for customers to contact security personnel
in the event of an emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or
person. At foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased
the number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent
years because of the perceived increase in the risk of a terrorist attack.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. rail transit operators we
contacted, 21 had begun to use canine units, which include both dogs and
human handlers, to patrol their facilities or trains or had increased
their use of such teams. In foreign countries we visited, rail transit
operators' use of canine units varied. In some Asian countries, dogs were
not culturally accepted by the public and thus were not used for rail
security purposes. Most European rail transit operators used canine units
for explosives detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we
interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,
either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many cases,
this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and persons
and to respond to events once they occur. For example, the London
Underground and the British Transport Police developed the "HOT" method
for Underground employees to identify suspicious items in the rail system.
In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages or items
that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the environment.
If items meet all of these criteria, employees are to notify station
managers, who are to call in the authorities and potentially shut down the
station or take other action. According to London Underground officials,
the HOT method has significantly reduced the number of system disruptions
caused when a suspicious item was identified. Several rail transit
operators in the United States and abroad have trained their employees in
the HOT method. It is important to note that such training is not designed
to prevent acts of terrorism like the July 2005 London attacks, in which
suicide bombers killed themselves rather than leaving bombs behind.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and foreign rail
operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious behavior as a
means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. rail transit operators we
contacted were using some form of behavioral screening. For example, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which operates Boston's
T system, has adopted a behavioral screening system to identify passengers
exhibiting suspicious behavior. The Massachusetts State Police train all
MBTA personnel to be on the lookout for behavior that may indicate someone
has criminal intent, and to approach and search such persons and their
baggage when appropriate. Abroad, we found that 4 of the 13 operators we
interviewed had implemented forms of behavioral screening similar to
MBTA's system. All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we contacted
have ruled out an airport-style screening system for daily use in heavy
traffic. According to the operators, such a system, in which each
passenger and the passenger's baggage are screened by a magnetometer or
X-ray machine, raised concerns about cost, staffing, and customer
convenience, among other factors.
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had embarked on
programs designed to upgrade their existing security technology. For
example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had implemented a form
of closed-circuit television (CCTV) to monitor their stations, yards, or
trains. While these cameras cannot be monitored closely at all times,
because of the large number of staff the operators said would be required,
many rail operators told us the cameras act as a deterrent, assist
security personnel in determining how to respond to incidents that have
already occurred, and can be monitored if an operator has received
information that an incident may occur at a certain time or place in a
system. One rail operator, New Jersey Transit, had installed "smart"
cameras, which were programmed to alert security personnel when suspicious
activity occurred, such as if a passenger left a bag in a certain location
or a boat docked under a bridge. According to the New Jersey Transit
officials, this technology was relatively inexpensive and not difficult to
implement. Several other operators said they were interested in exploring
this technology. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited
had CCTV systems in place. As in the United States, foreign rail operators
use these cameras primarily to deter crime and to respond to incidents
after they occur, because they do not have enough staff to monitor all the
cameras continuously.
Most rail operators we spoke with had not installed equipment for
detecting chemical or biological agents because of the costs involved, but
a few operators had this equipment or were exploring its purchase. For
example, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), in
Washington, D.C., has installed these sensors in some of its stations,
thanks to a program jointly sponsored by DOT and the Department of Energy
that provided this equipment to WMATA because of the high perceived
likelihood of an attack in Washington, D.C. Also, at the time of our
review, at least three other domestic rail operators we spoke with were
exploring the possibility of partnering with federal agencies to install
such equipment in their facilities on an experimental basis. Also, as in
the United States, a few foreign operators had implemented chemical or
biological detection devices at rail stations, but their use was not
widespread. Two of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed had implemented
these sensors, and both were doing so on an experimental basis. In
addition, police officers from the British Transport Police-responsible
for policing the rail system in the United Kingdom-were equipped with
pagers to detect chemical, biological, or radiological elements in the
air, allowing them to respond quickly in case of a terrorist attack using
one of these methods. The British Transit Police also have three vehicles
carrying devices to determine if unattended baggage contains explosives.
These vehicles patrol the system 24 hours per day.
Access control: Tightening access procedures at key facilities or
rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to enhance
security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger rail
operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized access
at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32 U.S.
operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities and
stations. This often involved installing a system requiring employees to
swipe an access card to gain access to control rooms, repair facilities,
and other key locations. All 13 foreign operators had implemented some
system to control access to their critical facilities or rights-of-way.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security, rail
transit operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now
beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of new and
existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of the
32 domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 had removed their conventional
trash bins entirely, or replaced them with transparent or bomb-resistant
trash bins, as TSA directed in May 2004. Foreign rail operators had taken
steps to remove traditional trash bins from their systems. Of the 13
operators we visited, 8 had either removed their trash bins entirely or
replaced them with blast-resistant cans or transparent receptacles.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security
into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we
visited, 11 have attempted to design new facilities with security in mind
and have attempted to retrofit older facilities to incorporate
security-related modifications. For example, one foreign operator we
visited is retrofitting its train cars with windows that passengers can
open in the event of a chemical attack. In addition, the London
Underground, one of the oldest rail systems in the world, incorporates
security into the design of all its new stations as well as of
modifications to existing stations. We observed several security features
in the design of Underground stations, such as the use of vending machines
that have no holes that someone could use to hide a bomb, and sloped tops
to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top of the machine.
In addition, stations are designed to provide staff with clear lines of
sight to all areas of the station, such as underneath benches or ticket
machines, and station designers try to eliminate or restrict access to any
recessed areas where a bomb could be hidden.
In the United States, several rail transit operators said they were taking
security into account when designing new facilities or remodeling older
ones. Twenty-two of 32 rail operators we interviewed told us that they
were incorporating security into the design of new or existing rail
infrastructure. For example, New York City Transit and Port Authority
Trans-Hudson (PATH) officials told us they are incorporating security into
the design of its new stations, including the redesigned Fulton Street
station and the World Trade Center Hub that were damaged or destroyed
during the September 11 attacks. In addition, in June 2005, FTA issued
guidelines for use by the transit industry encouraging the incorporation
of particular security features into the design of transit infrastructure.
These guidelines include, for example, increasing visibility for onboard
staff, reducing the areas where someone could hide an explosive device on
a transit vehicle, and enhancing emergency exits in transit stations.
Figure 2 illustrates several security measures that we observed in rail
transit stations both in the United States and abroad. It should be noted
that this figure represents an amalgam of stations we visited, not any
particular station.
Figure 2: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Rail Transit
Environment
Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the United
States
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems
are similar to those U.S. rail transit operators are implementing, we
encountered three practices in other countries that were not currently in
use among the domestic rail transit operators we contacted as of June
2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. These practices are
discussed below.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited use covert
testing to keep employees alert about their security responsibilities.
Covert testing involves security staff staging unannounced events to test
the response of railroad staff to incidents such as suspicious packages or
alarms. In one European system, security staff place suspicious items
throughout their system to see how long it takes operating staff to
respond to the items. Similarly, one Asian rail operator's security staff
break security seals on fire extinguishers and open alarmed emergency
doors randomly to see how long it takes staff to respond. Officials of
these operators stated that these tests are carried out daily and are
beneficial because the staff know they could be tested at any moment and
are therefore more likely to be vigilant about security.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 conducts
some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage. In the
systems where this practice is used, security personnel can approach
passengers either in stations or on the trains and ask them to submit
their persons or their baggage to a search. Passengers declining to
cooperate must leave the system. For example, in Singapore, rail agency
officials rotate the stations where they conduct random searches so that
the searches are carried out at a different station each day. Before the
July 2005 London bombings, no rail transit operators in the United States
were randomly screening passengers or baggage every day. However, during
the Democratic National Convention in 2004, MBTA began randomly screening
every 11th passenger at certain stations and times of the day, asking the
passenger to provide his or her bags to be screened. Those who refused
were not allowed to ride the system. MBTA officials recognized that it is
impossible to implement such a system comprehensively throughout the rail
network without major staffing increases, and that even doing random
screening regularly would be a drain on resources. However, officials
stated that such a system is workable during special events and times of
heightened security but would have to be designed very carefully to ensure
that passengers' civil liberties were not violated. After the July 2005
London bombings, four rail transit operators-PATH, New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, New Jersey Transit, and Utah Transit Authority
in Salt Lake City-implemented limited forms of random baggage screening in
their system.
National government maintains clearinghouse on technologies and best
practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we
visited, their national governments have centralized the process for
performing research and developing passenger rail security technologies
and maintaining a clearinghouse on these technologies and security best
practices. According to these officials, this practice allows rail
operators to have one central source for information on the merits of a
particular passenger rail security technology, such as chemical sensors,
CCTVs, and intrusion detection devices. No federal agency has compiled or
disseminated best practices to rail operators to aid in this process. Some
U.S. rail operators we interviewed expressed interest in there being a
more active centralized federal research and development authority in the
United States to evaluate and certify passenger rail security technologies
and make that information available to rail operators. We have also
previously reported that stakeholders have stated that the federal
government should play a greater role in testing transportation security
technology and making this information available to industry
stakeholders.9 Currently, many operators said they informally ask other
rail operators about their experiences with a certain technology, perform
their own research via the Internet or trade publications, or perform
their own testing. TSA and DOT agree that making the results of research
testing available to industry stakeholders could be a valuable use of
federal resources because it would reduce the need for multiple rail
operators to perform the same research and development efforts, but they
have not taken steps to implement this practice.10
Implementing these three practices-covert testing, random screening, and a
government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices-in
the United States could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural
challenges because of the differences between the United States and these
foreign nations. For instance, many foreign nations have dealt with
terrorist attacks on their public transportation systems for decades,
compared with the United States, where rail transportation has not been
specifically targeted during terrorist attacks. According to foreign rail
operators, these experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of
certain security practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public
may view as a violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage
the use of public transportation. The impact of security measures on
passengers is an important consideration for domestic rail transit
operators, since most passengers could choose another means of
transportation, such as a personal automobile. As such, security measures
that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause
inconvenience could push people away from transit and into their cars. In
contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian countries we visited are
more dependent on public transportation than most U.S. residents and
therefore, according to the rail operators we spoke with, may be more
willing to accept more intrusive security measures, simply because they
have no other choice for getting from place to place. Nevertheless, in
order to identify innovative security measures that could help further
mitigate terrorism-related risk to rail assets it is important to at least
consider assessing the feasibility and costs and benefits of implementing
in the United States the three rail security practices we identified in
foreign countries. Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail industry
associations, and rail systems we interviewed told us that operators would
benefit from such an evaluation. Furthermore, the passenger rail
association officials told us that such an evaluation should include
practices used by foreign rail operators that integrate security into
infrastructure design.
9GAO-03-843.
10 GAO-03-843 .
Differences in the business models and financial status of some foreign
rail operators could also affect the feasibility of adopting certain
security practices in the United States. Several foreign countries we
visited have privatized their passenger rail operations. Although most of
the foreign rail operators we visited-even the privatized systems-rely on
their governments for some type of financial assistance, two foreign rail
operators generated significant revenue and profits in other business
endeavors, which they said allowed them to invest heavily in security
measures for their rail systems.
Another important difference between domestic and foreign rail operators
is the structure of their police forces. In particular, England, France,
Belgium, and Spain all have national police forces patrolling rail systems
in these countries. The use of a national police force is a reflection
that these foreign countries often have one nationalized rail system,
rather than over 30 rail transit systems owned and operated by numerous
state and local governments, as is the case in the United States. For
example, in France, the French National Railway operates all intercity
passenger rail services in the country, and the French Railway police
provide security. According to foreign rail operators, the use of one
national rail police force allows for consistent policing and security
measures throughout the country. In the United States, by contrast, some
transit agencies maintain individual polices forces, while others rely on
their city or county police forces for security.
DHS and DOT Help Fund Security Efforts, and Some Funding Decisions Are
Risk-Based
Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has
promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit
security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training administers the UASI
and Transit Security grant programs. These programs have provided over
$320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for certain security
activities since fiscal year 2003. The Office of Grants and Training has
leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding
decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators
complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant.
FTA also helps fund rail transit security efforts through the financial
assistance it provides to transit agencies, with the stipulation that a
certain percentage of federal funds be used for security activities.
DHS and DOT Help Fund Rail Transit Security Efforts
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, the Office of
Grants and Training, became the primary federal source for security
funding for passenger rail systems. The Office of Grants and Training is
the principal component of DHS responsible for preparing the United States
for acts of terrorism and has primary responsibility within the executive
branch for assisting and supporting DHS, in coordination with other
directorates and entities outside the department, in conducting risk
analysis and risk management activities for state and local governments.
In carrying out its mission, the Office of Grants and Training provides
training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning
and execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other support to
assist states, local jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. Through the UASI grant
program, the Office of Grants and Training has provided grants to urban
areas to help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to
prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. In 2003 and 2004,
$65 million and $50 million, respectively, were allocated to rail transit
agencies through the UASI program. In addition, the DHS Appropriations Act
of 2005 appropriated $150 million for rail transit, intercity passenger
rail, freight rail, and transit agency security grants.11 This funding has
allowed the Office of Grants and Training to build upon the work under way
through the UASI program and create and administer new programs focused
specifically on transportation security, including the Transit Security
Grant Program. This program provides financial assistance to address
security preparedness and enhancements for transit (to include commuter,
heavy, and light rail systems; intracity buses, and ferries). Table 1
summarizes the funding provided to rail transit providers through the UASI
and Transit Security Grant Program from 2003 through 2006.
Table 1: Security Grants Provided by the Office of Grants and Training to
Rail Transit Providers, 2003 through 2006
Fiscal year Funding levels
2003 $65,000,000
2004 $50,000,000
2005 $108,000,000
2006 $110,000,000
Total $323,000,000
Source: DHS Office of Grants and Training.
Although FTA now plays a supporting role in rail transit security matters
since the creation of TSA, it remains an important partner in funding
security efforts. FTA provides financial assistance to rail transit
agencies to plan and develop new systems and operate, maintain, and
improve existing systems. Rail transit agencies can use some of this
funding for security activities, although the agencies have to balance
investments in security against other competing priorities. In addition,
FTA promotes safety and security through its grant-making authority. FTA
stipulates conditions of grants, such as certain safety and security
statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for
noncompliance with the conditions of a grant. For example, transit
agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds-which
is FTA's largest grant program-on security improvements.12
11Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (2004).
Using Risk Management Approach Can Help Direct Federal Funds to Highest Rail
Transit Security Priorities
In recent years, we, along with Congress, the executive branch, and the
9/11 Commission have required or advocated that federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities use a risk management approach to help
ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets or
activities considered to have the highest security priority. A risk
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through
a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives,
performing risk assessments, evaluating alternative actions to reduce
identified risks by preventing or mitigating their impact, selecting
actions to undertake by management, and implementing and monitoring those
actions. We have concluded that without a risk management approach, there
is limited assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are
properly prioritized and focused. Targeting resources to the highest
priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within
the rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other
modes of transportation. Moreover, as the 2005 London rail bombings
dramatically illustrated, even when a variety of security precautions are
put in place, passenger rail systems remain vulnerable and attractive
targets given their open designs and the high volumes of passengers they
transport each day. Thus, it is important that limited resources are
targeted to security activities that have the greatest impact on reducing
overall risk.
DHS' Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making
authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail. For
example, passenger rail operators must have completed a risk assessment to
be eligible for financial assistance through the fiscal year 2005 Transit
Security Grant program administered by the Office of Grants and Training.
To receive these funds, rail transit operators are also required to have a
security and emergency preparedness plan that identifies how the operator
intends to respond to security gaps identified by risk assessments. This
plan, along with a regional transit security strategy prepared by regional
transit stakeholders, will serve as the basis for determining how the
grant funds are to be allocated.
12FTA is to verify that agencies comply with the requirement to spend 1
percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security improvements and
may withhold funding from agencies that it finds are not in compliance.
Agencies are not required to comply with this spending rule if a valid
justification can be documented, such as state and local funds for
security are inadequate or security trend data do not warrant security
spending.
Coordination between Federal Agencies Has Faced Challenges and Will Continue to
Be Important
Prior to the creation of DHS, DOT modal agencies, such as FTA and FRA,
were the primary federal agencies involved in rail transit security
matters. Since Congress passed ATSA in 2001, creating TSA and giving it
regulatory authority over the security of all modes of transportation,
federal agencies have had some difficulty coordinating their activities
and communicating to industry stakeholders about their role and
responsibilities. In response to a GAO recommendation, DOT and DHS entered
into an MOU to better coordinate their activities and have embarked on a
number of initiatives to improve their coordination with each other and
with industry stakeholders. Coordination between DHS and DOT will continue
to be important as both departments move forward with existing programs
and new security initiatives, such as TSA's deployment of its rail
inspectors.
DHS and DOT Have Worked to Improve Coordination on Transit Security Matters
Although DOT modal administrations have played supporting roles in
transportation security matters since the creation of TSA, they remain
important partners in the federal government's efforts to improve rail
security, given DOT's role in funding and overseeing the safety of rail
transit systems. For example, as previously mentioned, FTA provides
financial assistance to rail transit agencies, and some of this funding
can, and in some cases must, be used for security activities. In addition,
FTA has regulatory authority for state safety oversight of rail
fixed-guideway systems and for a drug and alcohol program, and FRA has
regulatory authority for rail safety over commuter rail operators. As we
have previously reported, it could be difficult to distinguish DOT's role
in maintaining and improving transportation safety from DHS's role in
securing the transportation system because security is often intertwined
with safety.13 Moreover, FTA and FRA are continuing their rail transit
security efforts as TSA moves ahead with its rail transit security
initiatives.14
13GAO-03-843.
14For information about TSA's, FTA's, and FRA's rail transit security
initiatives, see GAO-05-851.
We have previously reported that coordination between DHS and DOT, as well
as between DHS and rail transit stakeholders, could be improved. For
example, in our September 2005 report on rail security, we noted that TSA
provided limited opportunities for other federal agencies and the rail
industry to collaborate in the development of its passenger rail security
directives, which were issued in May 2004 to provide a consistent baseline
standard of protective measures for all passenger rail operators.15
Federal and rail industry officials have raised questions about the
feasibility of implementing and complying with the directives, noting,
among other things, that the directives do not reflect a complete
understanding of the rail transit environment or necessarily incorporate
industry best practices. In addition, in 2003, we noted that
representatives from several associations told us that they have received
conflicting messages from the federal agencies involved in transportation
security, including rail transit.16 We further noted that representatives
from several associations also stated that their members were unclear
about which agency to contact for their various security concerns and
which agency has oversight for certain issues. We concluded that a lack of
clearly defined roles and responsibilities can lead to problems such as
duplication and conflicting efforts, gaps in preparedness, and confusion.
Moreover, a lack of coordination can strain intergovernmental
relationships, drain resources, and raise the potential for problems in
responding to terrorism. Therefore, we recommended that DHS and DOT use a
mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clearly delineate their
roles and responsibilities. At a minimum, we recommended that this
mechanism establish the responsibilities of each entity in setting,
administering, and implementing security standards and regulations;
determining funding priorities; and interfacing with the transportation
industry, as well as define each entity's role in the inevitable overlap
of some safety and security activities.
In response to our 2003 recommendation, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) in September 2004 to develop procedures through which
the two departments could improve their cooperation and coordination in
promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods
throughout the transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of
responsibility for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in
consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify,
prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. The
MOU between DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for cooperation
that is to be supplemented by additional signed agreements, or annexes,
between the departments. These annexes are to delineate the specific
security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for
mass transit, rail, research and development, and other matters. The annex
for mass transit security was signed in September 2005.17 According to DHS
and DOT officials, this annex is intended to ensure that the programs and
protocols for incorporating stakeholder feedback and making enhancements
to security measures are coordinated. For example, the annex requires that
DHS and DOT consult on such matters as regulations and directives that
affect security. The annex also identifies points of contact for
coordinating this consultation.
15GAO-05-851.
16GAO-03-843.
In addition to their work on the MOU and related annexes, DHS and TSA have
taken other steps to improve collaboration with DOT and industry
stakeholders. In April 2005, DHS officials stated that better
collaboration with DOT and industry stakeholders was needed to develop
strategic security plans associated with various homeland security
presidential directives and statutory mandates, such as the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which required DHS to develop
a national strategy for transportation security in conjunction with DOT.
Responding to the need for better collaboration, DHS established a
senior-level steering committee in conjunction with DOT to coordinate the
development of this national strategy. In addition, senior DHS and TSA
officials stated that industry groups would also be involved in developing
the national strategy for transportation security and other strategic
plans. Moreover, according to TSA's assistant administrator for intermodal
programs, TSA intends to work with APTA and other industry stakeholders in
developing security standards for the rail transit industry.18
17Congress required that an annex to the MOU be signed that would, among
other things, define and clarify the respective transit security roles and
responsibilities of each department. Pub. L. 109-59, S: 3028 (2005).
18APTA is a standards development organization recognized by DOT that has
set standards for commuter rail, mass transit, and bus safety and
operations.
Coordination between Federal Agencies Will Continue to Be Important
DOT's and DHS's efforts to enhance coordination between their agencies and
with industry stakeholders on security matters are welcome. Effective
coordination between the two departments will continue to be important as
both move forward in implementing existing programs as well as new
security initiatives. For example, FTA administers the State Safety
Oversight program, which mandates that state-designated agencies oversee
the safety of rail transit agencies. Although ATSA gave TSA final
regulatory authority over all modes of transportation, including rail
transit, in the program, FTA sets out minimum requirements the state
oversight agencies must ensure that transit agencies meet. FTA's mandated
minimum requirements include security components, one of which directs
rail transit agencies to maintain a system security plan that includes
controls to address employee and passenger security and a process for
conducting internal security reviews. Several rail transit operators told
us that they were confused by having to answer to both FTA and TSA for
transportation security matters. We have ongoing work for the full
Committee examining the State Safety Oversight program-and, as part of
this review, we will be exploring the extent to which FTA and TSA work
together in implementing this program. We expect to issue our report later
this summer.
Another area that will require continued coordination is DHS's and DOT's
security and safety oversight efforts. TSA has hired rail inspectors to,
among other things, monitor and enforce compliance with its May 2004
passenger rail security directives. As of March 2006, TSA had filled 99 of
up to 100 inspector positions authorized by Congress.19 However, TSA has
not yet established processes or criteria for determining and enforcing
compliance. TSA has also not determined how its rail inspectors will be
used to enforce the directives or how they will coordinate with existing
FRA safety inspectors or state oversight auditors involved in the State
Safety Oversight Program. The Director of TSA's Surface Transportation
Inspection Program, which oversees the rail inspectors, and a local rail
inspector program supervisor told us that they looked forward to
coordinating with FTA on the State Safety Oversight program and would be
open to a formalized role in the program, but had not held any discussions
with FTA about what that role would be. In fact, both the Director and the
local supervisor admitted that they were not familiar with the program's
requirements. In addition, the transit security annex to the MOU between
DHS and DOT does not explicitly mention the State Safety Oversight program
as a program for which the two agencies will collaborate, and officials
from several state oversight agencies said they were unsure what their
role would be in overseeing security once the TSA rail inspectors began
their duties. Also, FRA and TSA officials told us that the details of how
TSA rail inspectors will coordinate with the approximately 400 existing
FRA safety inspectors and 160 state employees enforcing FRA passenger rail
rules and regulations remain to be determined. Both FRA and TSA stated
that they were committed to avoiding duplication of effort and would work
to communicate their respective roles and responsibilities to transit
agency officials.
19These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of 2005
and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with $12
million in funding for rail security activities.
Another area requiring continued coordination is the funding of rail
transit security activities. Specifically, the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU)20 included a provision mandating that DOT and DHS collaborate
on a joint rulemaking for the Transit Security Grant Program. The joint
rulemaking is to establish the characteristics of and requirements for
transit security grants, including funding priorities, eligible
activities, methods for awarding grants, and limitations on administrative
expenses. The rule is currently being drafted, and officials from DHS'
Office of Grants and Training told us they expected it to be finalized in
summer 2006.
Concluding Observations
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the 2005 London rail bombings made clear that
even when a variety of security precautions are put in place, rail transit
systems that move high volumes of passengers daily remain vulnerable to
attack. Security cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, it is important that
we take steps to identify and mitigate risks to passenger rail systems.
While domestic rail agencies have implemented a number of security
practices that are generally consistent with those of foreign rail
operators, they have not adopted some practices used in other countries,
including covert testing, random screening, and information clearinghouses
for new security technologies and best practices. Despite the potential
political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges that implementing these
additional practices in the United States could pose, we continue to
believe that the practices may warrant further examination, and we stand
by our September 2005 recommendations that DHS, in collaboration with DOT
and the passenger rail industry, evaluate the feasibility of implementing
them.
20P.L. 109-59.
As we move forward with efforts to enhance rail transit security, it is
important that we do not examine rail transit security actions and funding
in isolation. Rail transit systems represent one of many modes of
transportation competing for limited federal security resources. Given
competing priorities and finite resources, difficult policy decisions will
have to be made by Congress and the executive branch to prioritize
security efforts and direct resources to the areas of greatest risk within
the passenger rail system, across all transportation modes, and across
other sectors of the economy. As we have previously noted in past reports,
adopting a risk management approach can help guide and inform these
difficult decisions-and help ensure that finite national resources are
dedicated to assets or activities considered to have the highest security
priority. DHS has taken steps to adopt a risk management approach.
Finally, the sheer number of stakeholders involved in securing rail
transit systems can lead to communication challenges, duplication of
effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. With the execution
of the MOU and transit security annex, DHS and DOT have taken important
steps forward in improving coordination among the federal entities
involved in rail transit security matters. These new agreements will be
tested as both departments proceed with new security initiatives and
existing programs, such as FTA's State Safety Oversight program. We stand
ready to assist the Committee and Subcommittee in monitoring these
developments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information
For further information on this testimony, please contact JayEtta Z.
Hecker at (202) 512-2834 or Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512- 3404.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Nikki
Clowers, Colin Fallon, Kirk Kiester, and Ray Sendejas.
Appendix I-Domestic and Foreign Rail Agencies GAO Contacted for GAO-05-851
Table 1: Domestic Passenger Rail Agencies We Visited or Interviewed
Passenger rail agency Urban area served
Altamont Commuter Express (ACE) Stockton and San Jose,
California
Alaska Railroad Corporation Anchorage and Fairbanks, Alaska
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) San Francisco - Oakland,
California
CALTRAIN San Francisco and San Jose,
California
San Diego Transit Corp. (Coaster) San Diego, California
Dallas Area Rapid Transit / Trinity Dallas, Texas
Railway Express (DART)
Greater Cleveland Regional Transportation Cleveland, Ohio
Authority (GCRTA)
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Los Angeles, California
Transportation Authority (LACMTA)
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Atlanta, Georgia
Authority (MARTA)
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) Greater Washington, DC, and
Maryland
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Boston, Massachusetts
Authority (MBTA)
METRA Commuter Rail Chicago, Illinois
Southern California Regional Rail Greater Los Angeles, California
Authority (Metrolink)
Long Island Railroad (LIRR) New York, New York
Metro North Railroad (MNR) New York, New York
New York City Transit (NYCT) New York, New York
Staten Island Railway (SIR) New York, New York
San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) San Francisco, California
Northern Indiana Commuter District Chicago, Illinois -- Northern
Indiana
Delaware River Port Authority (PATCO) New Jersey and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH) New York, New York -- New Jersey
San Diego Trolley San Diego, California
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Authority (SEPTA)
South Florida Regional Transportation Miami, Florida
Authority (SFRTA)
Connecticut Department of Transportation New Haven, Connecticut
(Shore Line East)
Sound Transit (Sounder) Seattle, Washington
TRIMET Portland, Oregon
Virginia Railway Express (VRE) Northern Virginia, Greater
Washington, D.C.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Washington, D.C.
Authority (WMATA)
New Jersey Transit (NJT) Newark, New Jersey -- New York,
New York
Miami Dade Transit Miami, Florida
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Chicago, Illinois
Source: National Transit Database
Table 2: Foreign Passenger Agencies We Contacted
Passenger rail agency Area served
Paris Metro Paris, France
French National Railway France
London Underground London, United Kingdom
Network Rail United Kingdom
Channel Tunnel Rail Link United Kingdom/France
Belgian National Railway Belgium
Madrid Metro Madrid, Spain
RENFE (Spanish National Railway) Spain
JR Central Japan
Tokyo Metro Tokyo, Japan
SBS Transit Corporation Singapore
Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Singapore
Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway Hong Kong
Source: GAO
(544121)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: [email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
D.C. 20548
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-557T.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at (202) 512-2834 or
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404.
Highlights of GAO-06-557T, a testimony before the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and
Pipelines, House of Representatives
March 29, 2006
PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY
Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security
Efforts
The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically
revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to
terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an increased focus on
security for these systems.
This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on
passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1) the
security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail transit
operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security; (2) the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) funding of rail transit security and use of risk
management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have taken
to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. As part of its
2005 report, GAO contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger
rail operators in seven European and Asian countries.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security recommended, among
other things, that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration
with DOT, determine the feasibility of implementing certain rail security
practices used in foreign countries. DHS and DOT generally agreed with the
report's recommendations.
Domestic and foreign rail transit operators GAO contacted have taken
similar actions to help secure their systems, including implementing
customer awareness programs, increasing the number and visibility of their
security personnel, and upgrading security technology. Also, both domestic
and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide security-related
activities and spending. However, GAO also observed security practices
that were used by certain foreign passenger rail operators, but were not
employed in the United States at the time of GAO's review. For example,
some foreign rail operators use covert testing to help keep employees
alert to security threats or randomly screen passengers. Centralized
clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as chemical sensors,
and best practices are also maintained in some foreign countries. While
introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may
pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may
nevertheless warrant further examination.
Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has
promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit
security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training is the primary source
of security funding for passenger rail systems, providing over $320
million in grants to rail transit agencies for fiscal years 2003 to 2006.
The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making authority
to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring,
for example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for
a transit security grant. As we have noted in previous reports, using
assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is
especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail
transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes of
transportation. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also helps fund
rail transit security efforts by providing financial assistance to transit
agencies and requiring that they spend 1 percent of their urbanized area
formula funds on security improvements.
To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including rail
transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
in September 2004. DHS and DOT also signed a transit security annex to the
MOU in September 2005 that delineates specific security-related roles,
responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit issues. In GAO's
view, these actions are positive steps forward in addressing the
coordination problems GAO previously identified. For instance, federal and
rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of
implementing and complying with TSA's May 2004 security directives, citing
limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best
practices were incorporated. Effective coordination between DHS and DOT
will continue to be important as both departments move forward with
existing programs and new security initiatives.
*** End of document. ***