    Nuclear Power: Plants Have Upgraded Security, but the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission Needs to Improve Its Process for Revising
    the Design Basis Threat (04-APR-06, GAO-06-555T).

    The nation's commercial nuclear power plants are potential
    targets for terrorists seeking to cause the release of
    radioactive material. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an
    independent agency headed by five commissioners, regulates and
    oversees security at the plants. In April 2003, in response to
    the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC revised the
    design basis threat (DBT), which describes the threat that plants
    must be prepared to defend against in terms of the number of
    attackers and their training, weapons, and tactics. NRC also
    restructured its program for testing security at the plants
    through force-on-force inspections (mock terrorist attacks). This
    testimony addresses the following: (1) the process NRC used to
    develop the April 2003 DBT for nuclear power plants, (2) the
    actions nuclear power plants have taken to enhance security in
    response to the revised DBT, and (3) NRC's efforts to strengthen
    the conduct of its force-on-force inspections. This testimony is
    based on GAO's report on security at nuclear power plants, issued
    on March 14, 2006 (GAO-06-388).
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-555T
        ACCNO:   A50717
      TITLE:     Nuclear Power: Plants Have Upgraded Security, but the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission Needs to Improve Its Process for
    Revising the Design Basis Threat
         DATE:   04/04/2006
      SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Homeland security
    	     Independent regulatory commissions
    	     Inspection
    	     Nuclear facility security
    	     Nuclear powerplant safety
    	     Nuclear powerplants
    	     Security threats
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism

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    GAO-06-555T

         * Summary
         * Background
         * NRC's Process for Revising the DBT Was Generally Logical and
              * NRC's Process for Revising Its DBT Was Generally Logical and
              * Changes to the Threat Assessment Staff's Initial Recommendat
         * Nuclear Power Plants Made Substantial Changes to Their Secur
         * NRC Has Significantly Improved the Force-on-Force Inspection
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
         * GAO's Mission
         * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
              * Order by Mail or Phone
         * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * Congressional Relations
         * Public Affairs

    Testimony

    Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
    International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

    Tuesday, April 4, 2006

    NUCLEAR POWER

    Plants Have Upgraded Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Needs
    to Improve Its Process for Revising the Design Basis Threat

    Statement of Jim Wells, Director Natural Resources and Environment

    GAO-06-555T

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

    I am pleased to be here today to discuss our recent work on security of
    the nation's 103 operating commercial nuclear power plants, located at 65
    sites in 31 states. My testimony today is based on our report being
    released today, entitled Nuclear Power Plants: Efforts Made to Upgrade
    Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat
    Process Should Be Improved ( GAO-06-388 ).1

    As you know, nuclear power plants were among the targets considered in the
    original plan for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Furthermore,
    according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which regulates and
    oversees the safe operation and security of nuclear power plants, there
    continues to be a general credible threat of a terrorist attack on the
    nation's commercial nuclear power plants, in particular by al Qaeda and
    like-minded Islamic terrorist groups. Such an attack could cause a release
    of radioactive material and endanger public health and safety through
    exposure to an elevated level of radiation.

    To defend against a potential terrorist attack, NRC issues and enforces
    security-related regulations and orders, and nuclear power plant licensees
    implement security measures to meet NRC requirements. In particular, NRC
    formulates a design basis threat (DBT)-the threat that plants must defend
    against-and tests plants' ability to defend against the DBT. The DBT
    characterizes the elements of a potential attack, including the number of
    attackers, their training, and the weapons and tactics they are capable of
    employing. NRC periodically reviews the potential terrorist threat to
    determine whether to make changes to the DBT. Most recently, NRC revised
    the DBT in April 2003 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
    After revising the DBT, NRC required nuclear power plant sites to submit
    new security plans by April 29, 2004, for its review and approval and to
    implement the security described in their new plans by October 29, 2004.
    In November 2004, NRC began using its force-on-force inspection program to
    test sites' ability to defend against the revised DBT. This program
    employs mock terrorist attacks as the principal means to test the sites'
    security.

    1We also prepared a classified version of our report, which includes
    additional details about the DBT and security at nuclear power plants that
    NRC does not release to the public. For more information on NRC's
    oversight of security at nuclear power plants, see GAO, Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at
    Nuclear Power Plants, GAO-04-1064T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2004); and
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear
    Power Plants Needs to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-752 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
    4, 2003).

    The DBT does not represent the maximum size and capability of a terrorist
    attack that is possible but, rather, NRC's assessment of the threat that
    the nuclear power plants must at all times be prepared to defend against
    "to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety." Furthermore,
    NRC regulations do not require nuclear power plants to protect against
    attacks by an "enemy of the United States," whether a foreign government
    or other person.2 NRC originally included this provision in its
    regulations in 1967 (prior to issuing the first DBT for nuclear power
    plants). According to NRC officials, the provision was intended to address
    the possibility that Cuba might launch an attack on a nuclear power plant
    in Florida. In revising the DBT in April 2003, NRC did not use this
    provision to exempt plants from defending against terrorist groups such as
    al Qaeda but, rather, stated that a private security force (such as at a
    nuclear power plant) cannot reasonably be expected to defend against all
    threats-for example, airborne attacks. Importantly, NRC works with other
    federal agencies to coordinate an integrated response to a terrorist
    threat or attack on a nuclear power plant.

    Our March 2006 report examined (1) the process NRC used to develop the
    April 2003 DBT for nuclear power plants, (2) the actions nuclear power
    plants have taken to enhance security in response to the revised DBT, and
    (3) NRC's efforts to strengthen the conduct of its force-on-force
    inspections. For the report, we reviewed documents detailing the process
    NRC used to revise the DBT and interviewed the NRC commissioners and
    staff. We also visited four nuclear power plant sites (one in each of the
    four NRC regions) to observe the security enhancements that sites made to
    address the revised DBT, and we reviewed a sample of NRC's baseline and
    force-on-force inspection reports. GAO staff with security expertise
    accompanied us on our visits in order to assist in our review of the
    sites' security strategies. Finally, we observed a total of three
    force-on-force inspections at two other sites. We performed our work from
    November 2004 through January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    20 C.F.R. S: 50.13.

                                        Summary

    NRC revised the DBT for nuclear power plants using a process that was
    generally logical and well-defined. Specifically, trained threat
    assessment staff made recommendations for changes based on an analysis of
    demonstrated terrorist capabilities. To enhance the predictability and
    consistency of its assessments and its recommendations to the NRC
    commissioners for changes to the DBT, the NRC threat assessment staff
    developed and used a comprehensive screening tool to analyze intelligence
    information and to evaluate particular terrorist capabilities, or
    "adversary characteristics," for inclusion in the DBT. The resulting DBT
    requires plants to defend against a larger terrorist threat, including a
    larger number of attackers, a refined and expanded list of weapons, and an
    increase in the maximum size of a vehicle bomb. The revised DBT generally,
    but not always, corresponded to the original recommendations of the threat
    assessment staff. For example, the maximum number of attackers in the
    revised DBT is based, in part, on the staff's analysis of the size of
    terrorist cells worldwide. However, for other important elements of the
    DBT, such as the weapons that attackers could use against a plant, the
    final version of the revised DBT does not correspond to the staff's
    original recommendations. We identified the following two principal
    reasons for these differences:

               o  First, the threat assessment staff made changes to its initial
               recommendations after obtaining feedback from stakeholders,
               including the nuclear industry, on a draft of the DBT. A number of
               the changes reflected industry objections to the draft. For
               example, following meetings with industry, the staff decided not
               to recommend including certain weapons in the list of adversary
               characteristics that nuclear power plants should be prepared to
               defend against. In its comments, the industry had pressed for NRC
               to remove such adversary characteristics from the draft DBT. The
               industry considered them to be prohibitively expensive to defend
               against or to be representative of an enemy of the United States,
               which is the responsibility of the government, rather than the
               industry, to defend against. NRC officials told us the changes
               resulted from further analysis of the intelligence data and the
               reasonableness of required defensive measures rather than the
               industry objections. Nevertheless, in our view, this situation
               created the appearance that changes were made based on what
               industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against,
               rather than an assessment of the terrorist threat.
               o  Second, in deciding on the revised DBT, the commissioners
               largely supported the staff's recommendations but also made some
               significant changes. These changes reflected their policy
               judgments on what is reasonable for a private security force to
               defend against. However, the commissioners did not identify
               explicit criteria for what is and what is not reasonable for a
               private security force to defend against, such as the cost of
               defending against particular adversary characteristics. For
               example, the commissioners decided against including two weapons
               that the threat assessment staff had concluded could plausibly be
               used against a U.S. nuclear power plant. Furthermore, instead of
               providing a reason for its decision to remove these weapons, the
               commission's voting record showed that individual commissioners
               used differing criteria and emphasized different factors, such as
               cost or practicality of defensive measures. We believe the absence
               of reviewable criteria reduced the transparency of the
               decision-making process. The absence of criteria also potentially
               reduced the rigor of the decision-making process.

               Licensees of nuclear power plants have made substantial changes to
               their security in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks and
               the 2003 revisions to the DBT. At the sites we visited, these
               actions included, for example, adding security barriers and
               detection equipment, implementing new protective strategies,
               enhancing access control, and hiring additional security officers.
               In some cases, the sites went beyond what NRC required. For
               example, one site added electronic intrusion detection equipment
               to its outer perimeter, which was not required. According to NRC,
               other sites implemented security enhancements similar to what we
               saw at the sites we visited. Despite these considerable efforts,
               it is too early to conclude that all sites are capable of
               defending against the DBT because, as of March 30, 2006, NRC had
               conducted force-on-force inspections at 27, or less than half, of
               the 65 sites. According to NRC, sites have generally performed
               well during force-on-force inspections, and the results of
               baseline inspections show that sites have generally complied with
               their security plans. However, a number of sites have experienced
               problems and have not always met security requirements. Most
               notably, we observed a force-on-force inspection at a site in
               which the licensee's performance at the time was at best
               questionable in its ability to defend against the DBT.

               NRC has made a number of improvements to its force-on-force
               inspection program. For example, NRC is implementing a schedule to
               conduct the inspections more frequently at each site-every 3 years
               rather than every 8 years-and has instituted measures to make the
               inspections more realistic, such as using laser equipment to
               better simulate the weapons that attackers and security officers
               would likely employ during an actual attack on a nuclear power
               plant. These improvements are important because, as we noted from
               our observation of three force-on-force inspections and our review
               of NRC reports on others, the inspections have the ability to
               detect weaknesses in sites' protective strategies, which can then
               be corrected. Nevertheless, in observing three inspections and
               discussing the program with NRC officials, we noted issues in the
               force-on-force program that warrant continued NRC attention. For
               example, the level of security expertise and training among
               controllers, who observe exercise participants to ensure the
               safety and effectiveness of the exercises, was inconsistent.

               Our report included two recommendations to address the
               shortcomings in the process NRC used to revise the DBT. First, we
               recommended that NRC assign responsibility for obtaining feedback
               from the nuclear industry and other stakeholders on proposed
               changes to the DBT to an office within NRC other than the threat
               assessment section, thereby insulating the staff and mitigating
               the appearance of undue industry influence on the threat
               assessment itself. Second, we recommended that NRC develop
               explicit criteria to guide the commissioners in their
               deliberations to approve changes to the DBT. These criteria should
               include setting out the specific factors and how they will be
               weighed in deciding what is reasonable for a private guard force
               to defend against. In addition, we recommended that NRC continue
               to evaluate and implement measures to further strengthen the
               force-on-force inspection program. In commenting on a draft of our
               report, NRC commended our efforts to ensure that the report was
               accurate and constructive. NRC also provided additional clarifying
               comments pertaining to the process it used to revise the DBT for
               nuclear power plants. For example, NRC requested that we revise
               the report to explain that it made a deliberate decision to
               develop the revised DBT while simultaneously seeking input from
               stakeholders in order to expedite its response to the September
               11, 2001 terrorist attacks. We revised the report accordingly.

               NRC is an independent agency established by the Energy
               Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate the civilian use of nuclear
               materials. It is headed by a five-member commission, with one
               commission member designated by the President to serve as chairman
               and official spokesperson. The commission as a whole formulates
               policies and regulations governing nuclear reactor and materials
               safety and security, issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates
               legal matters brought before it. Security for commercial nuclear
               power plants is addressed by NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and
               Incident Response. This office develops policy on security at
               nuclear facilities and is the agency's security interface with the
               Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the intelligence and law
               enforcement communities, the Department of Energy (DOE), and other
               agencies. Within this office, the Threat Assessment Section
               assesses security threats involving NRC-licensed activities and
               develops recommendations regarding the DBT for the commission's
               consideration.

               The DBT for radiological sabotage applied to nuclear power plants
               identifies the terrorist capabilities (or "adversary
               characteristics") that sites are required to defend against. The
               adversary characteristics generally describe the components of a
               ground assault and include the number of attackers; the size of a
               vehicle bomb; and the weapons, equipment, and tactics that could
               be used in an attack. Other threats in the DBT include a
               waterborne assault and the threat of an insider. The DBT does not
               include the threat of an airborne attack.

               Force-on-force inspections are NRC's performance-based means for
               testing the effectiveness of nuclear power plant security
               programs. These inspections are intended to demonstrate how well a
               nuclear power plant might defend against a real-life threat. In a
               force-on-force inspection, a professional team of adversaries
               attempts to reach specific "target sets" within a nuclear power
               plant that would allow them to commit radiological sabotage. These
               target sets represent the minimum pieces of equipment or
               infrastructure an attacker would need to destroy or disable in
               order to commit radiological sabotage that results in an elevated
               release of radioactive material to the environment. NRC also
               conducts baseline inspections at nuclear power plants. During
               these inspections, security inspectors examine areas such as
               officer training, fitness for duty, positioning and operational
               readiness of multiple physical and technical security components,
               and the controls the licensee has in place to ensure that
               unauthorized personnel do not gain access to the protected area.
               NRC's policy is to conduct a baseline inspection at each site
               every year, with the complete range of baseline inspection
               activities conducted over a 3-year cycle. For both force-on-force
               and baseline inspections, licensees are responsible for
               immediately correcting or compensating for any deficiency in which
               NRC concludes that security is not in accordance with the approved
               security plans or other security orders.

               The process by which NRC revised the DBT for nuclear power plants
               was generally logical and well defined in that trained threat
               assessment staff made recommendations for changes based on an
               analysis of demonstrated terrorist capabilities. The NRC
               commissioners evaluated the recommendations and considered whether
               the proposed changes constituted characteristics representative of
               an enemy of the United States, or were otherwise not reasonable
               for a private security force to defend against. However, while the
               final version of the revised DBT generally corresponded to the
               original recommendations of the threat assessment staff, some
               elements did not, which raised questions about the extent to which
               the revised DBT represents the terrorist threat.

               NRC made its 2003 revisions to the DBT for nuclear power plants
               using a process that the agency has had in place since issuing the
               first DBT in the late 1970s. In this process, NRC staff trained in
               threat assessment use reports and secure databases provided by the
               intelligence community to monitor information on terrorist
               activities worldwide. (NRC does not directly gather intelligence
               information but rather receives intelligence from other agencies
               that it uses to formulate the DBT for nuclear power plants.) The
               staff analyze this information both to identify specific
               references to nuclear power plants and to determine what
               capabilities terrorists have acquired and how they might use those
               capabilities to attack nuclear power plants in the United States.
               The staff normally summarize applicable intelligence information
               and any recommendations for changes to the DBT in semiannual
               reports to the NRC commissioners on the threat environment.

               In 1999, the NRC staff began developing a set of criteria-the
               adversary characteristics screening process-to decide whether to
               recommend particular adversary characteristics for inclusion in
               the DBT and to enhance the predictability and consistency of their
               recommendations. The staff use initial screening criteria to
               exclude from further consideration certain adversary
               characteristics, such as those that would more likely be used by a
               foreign military than by a terrorist group. For adversary
               characteristics that pass the initial round of screening, the
               threat assessment staff apply additional screening factors, such
               as the type of terrorist group that demonstrated the
               characteristic. For example, the staff consider whether an
               adversary characteristic has been demonstrated by transnational or
               terrorist groups operating in the United States, or by terrorist
               groups that operate only in foreign countries. Finally, on the
               basis of their analysis and interaction with intelligence and
               other agencies, the staff decide whether to recommend that the
               commission include the adversary characteristics in the DBT for
               nuclear power plants. NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and
               Incident Response, which includes the Threat Assessment Section,
               reviews and endorses the threat assessment staff's analysis and
               recommendations.

               Terrorist attacks have generally occurred outside the United
               States, and intelligence information specific to nuclear power
               plants is very limited. As a result, one of the NRC threat
               assessment staff's major challenges has been to decide how to
               apply this limited information to nuclear power plants in the
               United States. For example, one of the key elements in the revised
               DBT, the number of attackers, is based on NRC's analysis of the
               group size of previous terrorist attacks worldwide. According to
               NRC threat assessment staff, the number of attackers in the
               revised DBT falls within the range of most known terrorist cells
               worldwide.3 NRC staff recommendations regarding other adversary
               characteristics also reflected the staff's interpretation of
               intelligence information. For example, the staff considered a
               range of sizes for increasing the vehicle bomb in the revised DBT
               and ultimately recommended a size that was based on an analysis of
               previous terrorist attacks using vehicle bombs. Intelligence and
               law enforcement officials we spoke with did not have information
               contradicting NRC's interpretation regarding the number of
               attackers or other parts of the NRC DBT but did point to the
               uncertainty regarding the size of potential attacks and the
               relative lack of intelligence on the terrorist threat to nuclear
               power plants.

               In addition to analyzing intelligence information, NRC monitored
               and exchanged information with DOE, which also has a DBT for
               comparable facilities that process or store radiological materials
               and are, therefore, potential targets for radiological sabotage.4
               However, while certain aspects of the two agencies' DBTs for
               radiological sabotage are similar, NRC generally established less
               rigorous requirements than DOE- for example, with regard to the
               types of equipment that could be used in an attack. The DOE DBT
               includes a number of weapons not included in the NRC DBT.
               Inclusion of such weapons in the NRC DBT for nuclear power plants
               would have required plants to take substantial additional security
               measures. Furthermore, DOE included other capabilities in its DBT
               that are not included in the NRC DBT. Despite these differences,
               both agencies used similar intelligence information to derive key
               aspects of their DBTs. For example, both DOE and NRC based the
               number of attackers on intelligence on the size of terrorist
               cells, and DOE officials told us they used intelligence similar to
               NRC's to derive the number of attackers. Likewise, DOE and NRC
               officials provided us with similar analyses of intelligence
               information on previous terrorist attacks using vehicle bombs. DOE
               and NRC officials also told us that most vehicle bombs used in
               terrorist attacks are smaller than the size of the vehicle bomb in
               NRC's revised DBT.

               While NRC followed a generally logical and well-defined process to
               revise the DBT for nuclear power plants, two aspects of the
               process raised a fundamental question-the extent to which the DBT
               represents the terrorist threat as indicated by intelligence data
               compared with the extent to which it represents the threat that
               NRC considers reasonable for the plants to defend against. These
               two aspects were (1) the process NRC used to obtain stakeholder
               feedback on a draft of the DBT and (2) changes made by the
               commissioners to the NRC staff's recommended DBT.

               With regard to the first aspect, the process NRC used to obtain
               feedback from stakeholders, including the nuclear industry,
               created the appearance of industry influence on the threat
               assessment regarding the characteristics of an attack. NRC staff
               sent a draft DBT to stakeholders in January 2003, held a series of
               meetings with them to obtain their comments, and received written
               comments. NRC specifically sought and received feedback from the
               nuclear industry on what is reasonable for a private security
               force to defend against and the cost of and time frame for
               implementing security measures to defend against specific
               adversary characteristics. During this same period, the threat
               assessment staff continued to analyze intelligence information and
               modify the draft DBT.

               In its written comments on the January 2003 draft DBT, the Nuclear
               Energy Institute (NEI), which represents the nuclear power
               industry, objected to a number of the adversary characteristics
               the NRC staff had included. Subsequently, the NRC staff made
               changes to the draft DBT, which they then submitted to the NRC
               commissioners.5 The changes made by the NRC staff-in particular,
               the size of the vehicle bomb and list of weapons that could be
               used in an attack-reflected some (but not all) of NEI's
               objections. For example, NEI wrote that some sites would not be
               able to protect against the size of the vehicle bomb proposed by
               NRC because of insufficient land for installation of vehicle
               barrier systems at a necessary distance. Instead, NEI agreed that
               it would be reasonable to protect against a smaller vehicle bomb.
               Similarly, NEI argued against the inclusion of certain weapons
               because of the cost of protecting against the weapons. NEI wrote
               that such weapons (as well as the vehicle bomb size initially
               proposed by the NRC staff) would be indicative of an enemy of the
               United States, which sites are not required to protect against
               under NRC regulations. In its final recommendations to the
               commissioners, the NRC staff reduced the size of the vehicle bomb
               to the amount NEI had proposed and removed a number of weapons NEI
               had objected to. On the other hand, NRC did not make changes that
               reflected all of the industry's objections. For example, NRC staff
               did not remove one particular weapon NEI had objected to, which,
               according to NRC's analysis, has been a staple in the terrorist
               arsenal since the 1970s and has been used extensively worldwide.

               With regard to the commissioners' review and approval of the NRC
               staff's recommendations, the commissioners largely supported the
               staff's recommendations but also made some significant changes
               that reflected policy judgments. Specifically, the commissioners
               considered whether any of the recommended changes to the DBT
               constituted characteristics representative of an enemy of the
               United States, which sites are not required to protect against
               under NRC regulations. In approving the revised DBT, the
               commission stated that nuclear power plants' civilian security
               forces cannot reasonably be expected to defend against all
               threats, and that defense against certain threats (such as an
               airborne attack) is the primary responsibility of the federal
               government, in coordination with state and local law enforcement
               officials. Based on such considerations, the commission voted to
               remove two weapons the NRC staff had recommended for inclusion in
               the revised DBT based on its threat assessment. However, the
               document summarizing the commission's decision to approve the
               revised DBT did not provide a reason for excluding these weapons.
               For example, the commission did not indicate whether its decision
               was based on criteria, such as the cost for nuclear power plants
               to defend against an adversary characteristic or the efforts of
               local, state, and federal agencies to address particular threats.
               In our view, the lack of such criteria reduced the transparency of
               the commission's decisions to make changes to the threat
               assessment staff's recommendations.

               The four nuclear power plant sites we visited made substantial
               changes in response to the revised DBT, including measures to
               detect, delay, and respond to the increased number of attackers
               and to address the increased vehicle bomb size. These security
               enhancements were in addition to other measures licensees
               implemented-such as stricter requirements for obtaining physical
               access to nuclear power plants-in response to a series of security
               orders NRC issued after September 11, 2001. According to NEI, as
               of June 2004, the cost of security enhancements made since
               September 11, 2001, for all sites amounts to over $1.2 billion.

               To enhance their detection capabilities, the four sites we visited
               installed additional cameras throughout different areas of the
               sites and instituted random patrols in the owner-controlled
               areas.6 Furthermore, the sites we visited installed a variety of
               devices designed to delay attackers and allow security officers
               more time to respond to their posts and fire upon attackers. The
               sites generally installed these delay devices throughout the
               protected areas as well as inside the reactor and other buildings.
               Sites also enhanced their ability to respond to an attack by
               constructing bullet-resistant structures at various locations in
               the protected area or within buildings, increasing the minimum
               number of security officers defending the sites at all times, and
               expanding the amount of training provided to them. (See fig. 1 for
               an example of a bullet-resistant structure.) According to NRC,
               other sites took comparable actions to defend against the revised
               DBT.

               Figure 1: Example of a Bullet-Resistant Structure

               In addition to adding measures designed to detect, delay, and
               respond to an attack, the licensees at the four sites we visited
               installed new vehicle barrier systems to defend against the larger
               vehicle bomb in the revised DBT. In particular, the licensees
               designed comprehensive systems that included sturdy barriers to
               (1) prevent a potential vehicle bomb from approaching the sites
               and (2) channel vehicles to entrances where security officers
               could search them for explosives and other prohibited items. The
               vehicle barrier systems either completely encircled the plants
               (except for entrances manned by armed security officers) or formed
               a continuous barrier in combination with natural or manmade
               terrain features, such as bodies of water or trenches, that would
               prevent a vehicle from approaching the sites.

               In general, the four sites we visited all implemented a
               "defense-in-depth" strategy, with multiple layers of security
               systems that attackers would have to defeat before reaching vital
               areas or equipment and destroying or disabling systems sufficient
               to cause an elevated release of radiation off site. The sites
               varied in how they implemented these measures, primarily depending
               on site-specific characteristics such as topography and on the
               degree to which they planned to interdict attackers within the
               owner-controlled area and far from the sites' vital area, as
               opposed to inside the protected area but before they could reach
               the vital equipment. For example, one site with a predominantly
               external strategy installed an intrusion detection system in the
               owner-controlled area so that security officers would be able to
               identify intruders as early as possible. The site was able to
               install such a system because of the large amount of open,
               unobstructed space in the owner-controlled area. In contrast,
               security managers at another site we visited described a
               protective strategy that combined elements of an external strategy
               and an internal strategy. For example, the site identified "choke
               points"-locations attackers would need to pass before reaching
               their targets-inside the protected area and installed
               bullet-resistant structures at the choke points where officers
               would be waiting to interdict the attackers. NRC officials told us
               that licensees have the freedom to design their protective
               strategies to accommodate site-specific conditions, so long as the
               strategies satisfy NRC requirements and prove successful in a
               force-on-force inspection.

               In addition to the security enhancements we observed, security
               managers at each site described ways in which they had exceeded
               NRC requirements and changes they plan to make as they continue to
               improve their protective strategies. For example, security
               managers at three of the sites we visited told us the number of
               security officers on duty at any one shift exceeded the minimum
               number of security officers that NRC requires be dedicated to
               responding to attacks. Similarly, in at least some areas of the
               sites, the new vehicle barrier systems were farther from the
               reactors and other vital equipment than necessary to protect the
               sites against the size of vehicle bomb in the revised DBT.

               Despite the substantial security improvements we observed at the
               four sites we visited, it is too early to conclude, either from
               NRC's force-on-force or baseline inspections, that all nuclear
               power plant sites are capable of defending against the revised DBT
               for the following two reasons:

               o  First, as of March 30, 2006, NRC had completed force-on-force
               inspections at 27 of the 65 sites, and it is not planning to
               complete force-on-force inspections at all sites until 2007, in
               accordance with its 3-year schedule. NRC officials told us that
               plants have generally performed well during force-on-force
               inspections. However, we observed a force-on-force inspection at
               one site in which the site's ability to defend against the DBT was
               at best questionable. The site's security measures appeared
               impressive and were similar to those we observed at other sites.
               Nevertheless, some or all of the attackers were able to enter the
               protected area in each of the three exercise scenarios.
               Furthermore, attackers made it to the targets in two of the
               scenarios, although the outcomes of the two scenarios were called
               into question by uncertainties regarding whether the attackers had
               actually been neutralized before reaching the targets. As a
               result, NRC decided to conduct another force-on-force inspection
               at the site, which we also observed. The site made substantial
               additional security improvements-at a cost of $37 million,
               according to the licensee-and NRC concluded after the second
               force-on-force inspection that the site had adequately defended
               against a DBT-style attack.
               o  Second, we noted from our review of 18 baseline inspection
               reports and 9 force-on-force inspection reports that sites have
               encountered a range of problems in meeting NRC's security
               requirements. NRC officials told us that all sites have
               implemented all of the security measures described in their new
               plans submitted in response to the revised DBT. However, 12 of the
               18 baseline inspection reports and 4 of the 9 force-on-force
               inspection reports we reviewed identified problems or items
               needing correction. For example, during two different baseline
               inspections, NRC found (1) an intrusion detection system in which
               multiple alarms were not functioning properly, making the entire
               intrusion detection system inoperable, according to the site, and
               (2) three examples of failure to properly search personnel
               entering the protected area, which NRC concluded could reduce the
               overall effectiveness of the protective strategy by allowing the
               uncontrolled introduction of weapons or explosives into the
               protected area. According to NRC, the licensees at these two
               sites, as well as at the other sites where NRC inspection reports
               noted other problems, took immediate corrective actions.

               NRC has made a number of improvements to the force-on-force
               inspection program, several of which address recommendations we
               made in our September 2003 report on NRC's oversight of security
               at commercial nuclear power plants. We had made our
               recommendations when NRC was restructuring the force-on-force
               program to provide a more rigorous test of security at the sites
               in accordance with the DBT, which was also under revision. For
               example, we recommended that NRC conduct the inspections more
               frequently at each site, use laser equipment to better simulate
               attackers' and security officers' weapons, and require the
               inspections to make use of the full terrorist capabilities stated
               in the DBT. Actions NRC has taken that satisfy these
               recommendations include conducting the exercises more frequently
               at each site (every 3 years rather than every 8 years), and NRC so
               far is on track to complete the first round of force-on-force
               inspections on schedule, by 2007. Furthermore, NRC is using laser
               equipment to simulate weapons, and the attackers in the
               force-on-force exercise inspections that we observed used key
               adversary characteristics of the revised DBT, including the number
               of attackers, a vehicle bomb, a passive insider, and explosives.

               Nevertheless, we identified issues in the force-on-force
               inspection program that could affect the quality of the
               inspections and that continue to warrant NRC's attention. For
               example, the level of security expertise and training among
               controllers-individuals provided by the licensee who observe each
               security officer and attacker to ensure the safety and
               effectiveness of the exercise-varied in the force-on-force
               inspections we observed. One site used personnel with security
               backgrounds while another site used plant employees who did not
               have security-related backgrounds but who volunteered to help. In
               its force-on-force inspection report for this latter site, NRC
               concluded that the level of controller training contributed to the
               uncertain outcome of the force-on-force exercises, which resulted
               in NRC's conducting a second force-on-force inspection at the
               site.

               Furthermore, we noted that the force-on-force exercises end when a
               site's security force successfully stops an attack. Consequently,
               at sites that successfully defeat the mock adversary force early
               in the exercise scenario, NRC does not have an opportunity to
               observe the performance of sites' internal security-that is, the
               strategies sites would use to defeat attackers inside the vital
               area. When we raised this issue, NRC officials appeared to
               recognize the benefit of designing the force-on-force inspections
               to test sites' internal security strategies but said that doing so
               would require further consideration of how to implement changes to
               the force-on-force inspections. Based on our observations of three
               force-on-force inspections, other areas where NRC may be able to
               make further improvements included the following:

               o  ensuring the proper use of laser equipment;
               o  varying the timing of inspection activities, such as the
               starting times of the mock attacks, in order to minimize the
               artificiality of the inspections;
               o  ensuring the protection of information about the planned
               scenarios for the mock attacks so that security officers do not
               obtain knowledge that would allow them to perform better than they
               otherwise would; and
               o  providing complete feedback to licensees on NRC inspectors'
               observations on the results of the force-on-force exercises.

               Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
               happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the
               Subcommittee may have at this time.

               For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
               (202) 512-3841 (or at wellsj@gao.gov). Raymond H. Smith, Jr.
               (Assistant Director), Joseph H. Cook, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman,
               and Michelle K. Treistman made key contributions to this
               testimony.

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                                       Background

     NRC's Process for Revising the DBT Was Generally Logical and Well Defined, but
      Some Changes Were Not Clearly Linked to an Analysis of the Terrorist Threat

    NRC's Process for Revising Its DBT Was Generally Logical and Well Defined

    3In this report, "terrorist cell" refers only to terrorists who
    participate in an attack, not those who support but do not participate in
    an attack.

    4For further information on the DOE DBT, see GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's
    Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to
    Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat,
    GAO-05-611 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005); and Nuclear Security: DOE
    Needs to Resolve Significant Issues before It Fully Meets the New Design
    Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004).

    Changes to the Threat Assessment Staff's Initial Recommendations Were Not
    Clearly Linked to an Analysis of the Terrorist Threat

    5The NRC staff submitted their final draft DBT to the commissioners for
    their review and approval in April 2003, together with a summary of
    stakeholder comments.

     Nuclear Power Plants Made Substantial Changes to Their Security to Address the
                Revised DBT, but NRC Inspections Have Uncovered Problems

    6The owner-controlled area refers to the land and buildings within the
    site boundary that the owner can limit or allow access to for any reason.
    The protected area is within the owner-controlled area and requires a
    higher level of access control. The vital area contains the sites' vital
    equipment, the destruction of which could directly or indirectly endanger
    public health and safety through exposure to radiation.

    NRC Has Significantly Improved the Force-on-Force Inspection Program, but
                                   Challenges Remain

                         GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    (360681)

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    Highlights of GAO-06-555T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
    National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
    Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

    April 4, 2006

    NUCLEAR POWER

    Plants Have Upgraded Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Needs
    to Improve Its Process for Revising the Design Basis Threat

    The nation's commercial nuclear power plants are potential targets for
    terrorists seeking to cause the release of radioactive material. The
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency headed by five
    commissioners, regulates and oversees security at the plants. In April
    2003, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC
    revised the design basis threat (DBT), which describes the threat that
    plants must be prepared to defend against in terms of the number of
    attackers and their training, weapons, and tactics. NRC also restructured
    its program for testing security at the plants through force-on-force
    inspections (mock terrorist attacks). This testimony addresses the
    following: (1) the process NRC used to develop the April 2003 DBT for
    nuclear power plants, (2) the actions nuclear power plants have taken to
    enhance security in response to the revised DBT, and (3) NRC's efforts to
    strengthen the conduct of its force-on-force inspections. This testimony
    is based on GAO's report on security at nuclear power plants, issued on
    March 14, 2006 (GAO-06-388).

    What GAO Recommends

    In its March 2006 report, GAO recommended that NRC improve its process for
    making changes to the DBT and evaluate and implement measures to further
    strengthen its force-on-force inspection program.

    NRC revised the DBT for nuclear power plants using a process that was
    generally logical and well-defined. Specifically, trained threat
    assessment staff made recommendations for changes based on an analysis of
    demonstrated terrorist capabilities. The resulting DBT requires plants to
    defend against a larger terrorist threat, including a larger number of
    attackers, a refined and expanded list of weapons, and an increase in the
    maximum size of a vehicle bomb. Key elements of the revised DBT, such as
    the number of attackers, generally correspond to the NRC threat assessment
    staff's original recommendations, but other important elements do not. For
    example, the NRC staff made changes to some recommendations after
    obtaining feedback from stakeholders, including the nuclear industry,
    which objected to certain proposed changes, such as the inclusion of
    certain weapons. NRC officials said the changes resulted from further
    analysis of intelligence information. Nevertheless, GAO found that the
    process used to obtain stakeholder feedback created the appearance that
    changes were made based on what the industry considered reasonable and
    feasible to defend against rather than on what an assessment of the
    terrorist threat called for.

    Nuclear power plants made substantial security improvements in response to
    the September 11, 2001, attacks and the revised DBT, including security
    barriers and detection equipment, new protective strategies, and
    additional security officers. It is too early, however, to conclude that
    all sites are capable of defending against the DBT because, as of March
    30, 2006, NRC had conducted force-on-force inspections at 27, or less than
    half, of the 65 nuclear power plant sites.

    NRC has improved its force-on-force inspections-for example, by conducting
    inspections more frequently at each site. Nevertheless, in observing three
    inspections and discussing the program with NRC, GAO noted potential
    issues in the inspections that warrant NRC's continued attention. For
    example, a lapse in the protection of information about the planned
    scenario for a mock attack GAO observed may have given the plant's
    security officers knowledge that allowed them to perform better than they
    otherwise would have. A classified version of GAO's report provides
    additional details about the DBT and security at nuclear power plants.
    *** End of document. ***