Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported
Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected
Locations (28-MAR-06, GAO-06-545R).
This report responds to a Congressional request that we
investigate potential security weaknesses related to the
installation of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of
entry. We focused our efforts on testing whether the radiation
portal monitors installed at the U.S. ports of entry would detect
radioactive material transported in vehicles attempting to enter
the United States. We also agreed to provide our observations
regarding the procedures that Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors followed when
the radiation portal monitors detected such material. We have
reported on the security of our nation's northern border in terms
of detection of illegal transport of radioactive material into
the United States in our previous work.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-545R
ACCNO: A50198
TITLE: Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported
Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected
Locations
DATE: 03/28/2006
SUBJECT: Border security
Counterterrorism
Dirty bombs
Forgery
Hazardous substances
Homeland security
Inspection
Radiation monitoring
Terrorism
Radiation detection
Counterfeiting
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April 10, 2006
ERRATA
Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive
Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations (GAO 06-545R,
March 28, 2006).
GAO reposted the Web version of this report on April 10, 2006, to reflect
changes in the text on pages 2 and 8. The original version of the report,
posted on March 28, implied that officials from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology selected the amount of radioactive sources we
used in our border testing. The reposted version clarifies that GAO
determined the amount of radioactive sources used in the tests after
consulting with an outside expert.
Gregory D. Kutz
Managing Director
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations
March 28, 2006
The Honorable Norm Coleman
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Subject: Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported
Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations
This report responds to your request that we investigate potential
security weaknesses related to the installation of radiation detection
equipment at U.S. ports of entry. Based on discussions with your staff, we
focused our efforts on testing whether the radiation portal monitors
installed at the U.S. ports of entry would detect radioactive material
transported in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. We also
agreed to provide our observations regarding the procedures that
Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
inspectors followed when the radiation portal monitors detected such
material.
We have reported on the security of our nation's northern border in terms
of detection of illegal transport of radioactive material into the United
States in our previous work.
Scope and Methodology
We selected two land ports of entry that had radiation portal monitors
installed: one at the U.S.-Canadian border and one at the U.S.-Mexican
border. Radiation portal monitors are large pieces of stationary equipment
that CBP uses as part of its overall strategy to thwart radiological
terrorism by detecting the presence of radioactive materials by screening
people, vehicles, and cargo as they pass through ports of entry. In order
to safely plan and execute our undercover operation, several of our
investigators attended training at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Our investigators received
training on the safe handling, storage, and transport of radioactive
materials.
When considering the type of radioactive sources to use in our undercover
operation, we decided to use one of the most common radioisotopes used in
industry for its strong radioactivity. After consulting with an outside
expert, we used an amount of radioactive sources that we determined was
sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb.1
As part of our investigation, we purchased a small quantity of the
radioactive sources from a commercial source by posing as an employee of a
fictitious company. This was to demonstrate that anyone can purchase small
quantities of radioactive sources for stockpiling because suppliers are
not required to exercise any due diligence in determining whether the
buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources and suppliers are
not required to ask the buyer to produce a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) document when making purchases in small quantities. We then deployed
two teams of investigators to the field to make simultaneous border
crossings at the northern and southern borders in an attempt to transport
radioactive sources into the United States.
While making our simultaneous crossings, we focused our investigation on
whether the radiation portal monitors would detect the radioactive sources
we carried and whether CBP inspectors exercised due diligence to determine
the authenticity of paperwork presented by individuals attempting to
transport radioactive sources across our borders. Although we offer
observations on the procedures that CBP inspectors followed for our two
border crossings, we did not evaluate the adequacy of the design or
effectiveness of those procedures. Our investigation also tested whether
an NRC document could be counterfeited using data easily accessible and
available to the public. We conducted our investigation from July 2005
through December 2005 in accordance with quality standards for
investigations as set forth by the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Summary of Investigation
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small
amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and
transport the material from a
commercial source over the telephone. One of our investigators, posing as
an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated
that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to
calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not
challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether buyers
have legitimate uses for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers
required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases
in small quantities.
1 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty
bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive powder or
pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, the blast
carries radioactive material into the surrounding area.
The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of
radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted
simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected
in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and
southern borders. However, our investigators were able to enter the United
States with enough radioactive sources to make two dirty bombs using
counterfeit documents. Specifically, they were able to successfully
represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company and present a
counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the
secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never
questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of
lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive,
acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
Background
A dirty bomb, or a radiological dispersal device, combines a conventional
explosive with radioactive material. In most cases, the conventional
explosive would have more immediate lethality than the radioactive
material. A dirty bomb would most likely result in small radiation
exposures and would typically not contain enough radiation to kill people
or cause severe illnesses. However, by scattering the radioactive
material, the dirty bomb has the effect of contaminating an area. The
extent of local contamination depends on several factors, including the
size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used,
and weather conditions. While there could be an increase in the cancer
risk among those exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb, the more
significant effect of a dirty bomb could be the closing of contaminated
areas. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and
business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are
generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons
of mass destruction.
Many radioactive materials are used in a variety of industrial,
scientific, and medical applications. For instance, radioactive materials
are used in smoke detectors and for cancer treatments. However, few of the
materials are considered suitable for use in a dirty bomb. A Department of
Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Interagency Working Group
identified radioactive materials of highest concern based on the potential
dose impacts of the materials and the availability of such materials in
sufficient quantities.2
To address the threat of dirty bombs and other nuclear material, the
federal government has programs in place that regulate the transportation
of radioactive material and to prevent illegal transport of radioactive
material across our nation's borders. CBP uses radiation detection
equipment at ports of entry to prevent the illicit transport of
radioactive material into the United States. The goal of CBP's inspection
program is to "...thwart the operations of terrorist organizations by
detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border travel of
terrorists, terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including Weapons
of Mass Destruction and their precursors." Deploying radiation detection
equipment is part of CBP's strategy for thwarting radiological terrorism
and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal of screening
all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the United States.
2 Department of Energy/Nuclear Regulatory Commission Interagency Working
Group on Radiological Dispersion Devices. Radiological Dispersal Devices:
An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and
Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition, Report to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy (May 2003).
Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land
border ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible
for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility
into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry
of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction.
Radiation Detection Devices
To help detect the presence of radiation and identify the type of
radiation present, CBP generally relies on three types of radiation
detection devices - radiation portal monitors, Personal Radiation
Detectors (PRDs), and Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs).
Radiation portal monitors have the ability to detect the presence of gamma
radiation, which is emitted by all radioactive materials of greatest
concern,3 and neutrons, which are emitted by only a limited number of
materials, including plutonium. CBP uses PRDs that detect the presence of
gamma radiation but not neutrons. CBP requires its inspectors to wear PRDs
while on duty and ensure that the PRDs are activated. PRDs alert
inspectors to the presence of harmful levels of radiation when they are
conducting cargo and vehicle searches. PRDs can detect radioactive
materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device, also
known as a dirty bomb. Another type of radiation detection equipment that
CBP uses are RIIDs, which are handheld devices designed to determine the
identity of the radioactive material, whether it is a radiological source
used in medicine or industry, a naturally occurring source of radiation,
or weapons-usable nuclear material.
Radiation Detection Alerts
For the purposes of this report, we focused only on the procedures for
gamma radiation, the type of radiation used in our tests. To identify the
type of radiation present, inspectors use a handheld RIID. If the
radiation portal monitor and the RIID do not detect the presence of
neutrons, inspectors follow gamma radiation procedures, which require that
they first use their PRDs to determine the safe distance at which to
conduct an inspection.
If, after reviewing documentation or obtaining advice from Laboratories
and Scientific Services personnel, the CBP inspectors are satisfied that
the radioactive source is properly documented or is consistent with
innocent radiation sources, the vehicle and passengers can be released. If
CBP inspectors are not satisfied that the source is documented or
innocent, they must obtain guidance from the Laboratory and Scientific
Services.
3 Radioactive materials of greatest concern are those materials that could
be used in a nuclear weapon such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Documentation Was Produced to Support Undercover Investigation
As part of our undercover investigation, we produced counterfeit documents
before sending our two teams of investigators out to the field. We found
two NRC documents and a few examples of the documents by searching the
Internet.4 We subsequently used commercial, off-the-shelf computer
software to produce two counterfeit NRC documents authorizing the
individual to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
To support our investigators' purported reason for having radioactive
sources in their possession when making their simultaneous border
crossings, a GAO graphic artist designed a logo for our fictitious company
and produced a bill of lading using computer software.
With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported Radioactive
Sources across Both Borders
Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of radioactive
sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making their recent,
simultaneous border crossings. In our earlier work, we had purchased
radioactive sources, two containers to store and transport the material,
and we had obtained a genuine NRC document.
For the purposes of our current undercover investigation, we purchased a
small amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and
transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One
of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company,
stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources
to calibrate personal radiation detectors. According to the NRC, suppliers
are not required to determine whether the buyer has a legitimate use for
the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to
produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. The
amount of radioactive sources our investigator sought to purchase did not
require an NRC document. The company mailed the radioactive sources to an
address in Washington, D.C. We could have purchased all of the radioactive
sources used in our two undercover border crossings by making multiple
purchases from different suppliers, using similarly convincing cover
stories, using false identities, and had all of the radioactive sources
conveniently shipped to our nation's capital.
4 None of these documents were available on NRC's Web site.
We have pointed out the weaknesses in federal and state controls over the
security5 of sealed sources in our prior work,6 noting that it is possible
that these materials can be obtained for malicious intent. Sealed
radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel
or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. We
recommended in August 2003 that NRC modify its process of issuing specific
licenses to ensure that sealed sources cannot be purchased before NRC's
verification - through inspection or other means - that the materials will
be used as intended. NRC has not implemented our licensing recommendation
to date, more than 2 years later. However, NRC has recently established an
interagency task force to evaluate the licensing, use, and security of
radioactive materials. Further delays in implementing our licensing
recommendation, given today's security environment, continues to leave
NRC's licensing process vulnerable to compromise and inadequate in terms
of precluding the smuggling of radioactive material across our nation's
borders.
Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the
U.S.-Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border
Northern Border Crossing
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of
radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our
investigators - acting in an undercover capacity -- drove to an official
port of entry between Canada and the United States. They also had in their
possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious
company and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive
through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at the
booth for their primary inspection. As our investigators drove past the
radiation portal monitors and approached the primary checkpoint booth,
they observed the CBP inspector look down and reach to his right side of
his booth. Our investigators assumed that the radiation portal monitors
had activated and signaled the presence of radioactive sources. The CBP
inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked them where
they lived. One of our investigators on the two-man undercover team handed
the CBP inspector both of their passports and told him that he lived in
Maryland while the second investigator told the CBP inspector that he
lived in Virginia.
The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they were
transporting in their vehicle. One of our investigators told the CBP
inspector that they were transporting specialized equipment back to the
United States. A second CBP inspector, who had come over to assist the
first inspector, asked what else our investigators were transporting. One
of our investigators told the CBP inspectors that they were transporting
radioactive sources for the specialized equipment. The CBP inspector in
the primary checkpoint booth appeared to be writing down the information.
Our investigators were then directed to park in a secondary inspection
zone, while the CBP inspector conducted further inspections of the
vehicle.
5 As used in this report, "security" refers to measures to prevent
unauthorized access to, loss, and/or theft of sealed sources, or
radioactive materials used for medical and industrial purposes. See GAO,
Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of
Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-804 (Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2003).
6 GAO-03-804.
During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP inspector
that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the radioactive
sources. The CBP inspector asked if he could make copies of our
investigators' counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery as well
as their counterfeit NRC document. Although the CBP inspector took the
documents to the copier, our investigators did not observe him retrieving
any copies from the copier.
Our investigators watched the CBP inspector use a RIID, which he said is
used to identify the source of radioactive material, to examine the
investigators' vehicle. He used the RIID to identify the source of
radiation emanating from the investigators' vehicle. He told our
investigators that he had to perform additional inspections. After
determining that the investigators were not transporting additional
sources of radiation, the CBP inspector made copies of our investigators'
drivers' licenses, returned their drivers' licenses to them, and our
investigators were then allowed to enter the United States. At no time did
the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading
or the counterfeit NRC document.
Southern Border Crossing
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of
radioactive sources into the trunk of their vehicle. Our investigators
drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also had
in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our two-person undercover team was signaled to
drive through the radiation portal monitors through the use of a traffic
light signal and stopped at the primary checkpoint for their primary
inspection. As our investigators drove past the portal monitors and
approached the primary checkpoint, they observed that the CBP inspector
remained in the primary checkpoint for several moments prior to
approaching our investigators' vehicle. Our investigators assumed that the
radiation portal monitors had activated and signaled the presence of
radioactive sources.
The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked
them if they were American citizens. Our investigators told the CBP
inspector that they were both American citizens and handed him their state
issued driver's licenses. The CBP inspector also asked our investigators
about the purpose of their trip to Mexico and asked whether they were
bringing anything into the United States from Mexico. Our investigators
told the CBP inspector that they were returning from a business trip in
Mexico and were not bringing anything into the United States from Mexico.
While our investigators remained inside their vehicle, the CBP inspector
used what appeared to be a RIID to scan the outside of the vehicle. One of
our investigators told him that they were transporting specialized
equipment. The CBP inspector asked one of our investigators to open the
trunk of the rental vehicle and to show him the specialized equipment. Our
investigator told the CBP inspector that they were transporting
radioactive sources in addition to the specialized equipment. The primary
CBP inspector then directed our investigators to park in a secondary
inspection zone for further inspection.
During the secondary inspection, the CBP inspector said he needed to
verify the type of material our investigators were transporting, and
another CBP inspector approached with what appeared to be a RIID to scan
the cardboard boxes where the radioactive sources was placed. The
instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources.
When asked again about the purpose of their visit to Mexico, one of our
investigators told the CBP inspector that they had used the radioactive
sources in a demonstration designed to secure additional business for
their company. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them to
transport the equipment to Mexico. One of our investigators provided the
counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery, as well as their
counterfeit NRC document. The CBP inspector took the paperwork provided by
our investigators and walked into the CBP station. He returned several
minutes later and returned the paperwork. At no time did the CBP inspector
question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit
NRC document.
Corrective Action Briefings
We conducted corrective action briefings with CBP officials and NRC
officials shortly after completing our undercover operations. On December
21, 2005, we briefed CBP officials about the results of our border
crossing tests. CBP officials agreed to work with the NRC and CBP's
Laboratories and Scientific Services to come up with a way to verify the
authenticity of NRC materials documents.
We conducted two corrective action briefings with NRC officials on January
12 and January 24, 2006, about the results of our border crossing tests.
NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive material we
determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that NRC's "concern
threshold" is significantly higher. We continue to believe that our
purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to counterfeit an NRC
document are matters that NRC should address. Further, we believe that the
amount of radioactive sources that we were able to transport into the
United States during our operation would be sufficient to produce two
dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons of mass disruption. Finally,
NRC officials told us that they are aware of the potential problems of
counterfeiting documents and that they are working to resolve these
issues.
As agreed with your office, unless you announce the contents of this
report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days after its issuance
date. At that time, we will send it to the appropriate congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to the Department of Homeland
Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If you or your staff have
any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7455 (
[email protected] ). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff
who made major contributions to this report are listed in enclosure I.
Sincerely yours,
Gregory D. Kutz
Managing Director
Forensic Audits
and Special Investigations
Keith A. Rhodes
Chief Technologist
Center for Technology
and Engineering
Gene Aloise
Director
Natural Resources
And Environment
Enclosure -- 1
Enclosure I
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-7455
Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Andrew
O'Connell, Richard Egan, John Cooney, Paul Desaulniers, Christine
Hodakievic, George Ogilvie, Rich Hung, Jim Shafer, Stockton Butler, Kord
Basnight, and Renee McElveen made key contributions to this report.
(192203)
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