U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
Significant Challenges (03-MAY-06, GAO-06-535).
Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments
toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy
activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to
counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy
actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual
understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine (1) what
public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the
Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach
to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain
to be addressed.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-535
ACCNO: A53080
TITLE: U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage
Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
Significant Challenges
DATE: 05/03/2006
SUBJECT: Communication
Cultural exchange programs
Foreign policies
International relations
National policies
Periodicals
Program evaluation
Public diplomacy
Public relations
Strategic planning
Muslim countries
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GAO-06-535
* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of
State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
* May 2006
* U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
* State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts
* Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs
* Definition of the Muslim World
* State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the
Muslim World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same
* Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim
Populations
* Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived
* Shared Values Initiative
* Hi Magazine and Web Site
* Partnerships for Learning
* Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard
Programs and Tools
* Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State's Policy
Advocacy and News Management Operations
* Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate
Guidance, but Improvements Are Planned
* Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy
* Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or
Theme
* Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined
* Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail
* Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited
* Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking
* Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance
* Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements
Still Lacking
* Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts
in the Muslim World
* Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
* State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security
Concerns
* Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour
Length, Time, and Language Capability
* Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public
Diplomacy Efforts
* Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World
* Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World
* State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human
Capital Challenges
* State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best
Practices
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim Populations
* Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions and Selected
Programs
* Positions
* Programs
* Bureau of International Information Programs
* Bureau of Public Affairs Programs
* Other Programs
* Private Sector Best Practices
* Business for Diplomatic Action
* Defense Science Board
* Comments from the State Department
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State,
Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives
May 2006
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges
Contents
Tables
Figures
May 3, 2006Letter
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf Chairman Subcommittee on Science, the
Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, foreign public opinion polls
conducted by the State Department (State) and firms such as Zogby
International have shown that negative attitudes toward the United States
have generally grown worse in many countries around the world. One
particular concern has been a marked worsening of such negative attitudes
in the Muslim world1-an audience of key strategic interest in the United
States' war on terrorism.2 State's public diplomacy programs and
activities are designed to counter such negative sentiments through
ongoing attempts to communicate with elites and mass audiences overseas.
These efforts include crisis management and daily news operations designed
to explain U.S. foreign policy positions and actions; strategic
information programs designed to more broadly engage, inform, and
influence target audiences; and long-term activities, such as exchanges,
to promote relationship building and mutual understanding.3
As a follow-up to our April 2005 public diplomacy report,4 we reviewed
State's current public diplomacy initiatives designed to reach out to
countries with significant Muslim populations and determined how such
initiatives are being implemented at the post level. Specifically, we
examined: (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has
directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic
approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what program challenges
remain to be addressed.
To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed State officials from the
Under Secretary's office, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Public
Affairs, and the Bureau of Resource Management. We also interviewed
officials in State's Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central
Asian Affairs,5 African Affairs, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs. We
collected and analyzed data on the allocation of public diplomacy staff
and selected program costs by regional bureau. We also convened a
roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts in Washington, D.C., who were
identified by various U.S. government officials and others as
knowledgeable of U.S. efforts to engage Muslim audiences, to discuss key
program challenges, obstacles, and potential solutions.
We conducted fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt to review the
implementation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in countries of particular
strategic interest to the United States. In each country, we met with a
broad cross section of U.S. embassy officials, British Council and embassy
staff, and local focus groups to discuss public perceptions of the United
States, program implementation efforts, effectiveness measurement efforts,
and program challenges. Additionally, we conducted phone interviews with
State Public Affairs officers in Indonesia and Turkey to supplement the
information we collected at the three posts we visited. The combined
population of these countries is approximately 680 million, or 45 percent
of the total population of the 58 countries and territories in the Muslim
world.
The focus of our review was public diplomacy activities designed to
communicate information about the United States to target audiences
overseas. Thus, we did not review State-led reform initiatives, such as
the Middle East Partnership Initiative.6 Aside from State, we examined
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts to tell
America's assistance story and Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to
support State's public diplomacy activities. In addition, we collected
funding and program information on U.S. international broadcasting but did
not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the Alhurra
satellite television network-the Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG)
two primary initiatives aimed at Arab audiences. GAO is reviewing these
broadcast initiatives separately.
We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with
significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major
initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data from fiscal years
2004 and 2006, regional bureau budgets for overseas operations increased
by 21 percent in total, with the largest percentage going to the South
Asia (39 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (28 percent), and Near East
(25 percent) regions, each of which includes countries with large Muslim
populations. Over the past 3 years, however, the number of authorized
overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at
all. As part of the Secretary of State's newly announced transformational
diplomacy initiative, the department intends to reposition some staff to
better align available resources with its strategic priorities, including
initial plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe
and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to
the Muslim world. Since 2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy
activities focused on the Muslim world-Shared Values, a media campaign;
Hi, a youth-oriented magazine; and Partnerships for Learning, a group of
exchange programs geared to younger audiences. While these particular
initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended, posts continue to
pursue a range of standard public diplomacy programs and tools available
to embassies around the world. In addition, while Partnerships for
Learning no longer provides a focal point for State's exchange efforts in
the Muslim world, several exchange programs continue to target younger,
marginalized sectors of society in the Muslim world. The new Under
Secretary has introduced several new public diplomacy initiatives to help
officers at all posts better advocate U.S. policy and respond to breaking
news, while many other initiatives are still in their early stages of
development.
Our fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally
lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private
sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better
communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core
messages, segmented target audiences, detailed strategies and tactics,
in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and a
communication plan that brings it all together. These findings were
reinforced by a worldwide review of mission performance plans conducted by
State in 2005, which also concluded that a large number of posts lacked at
least some of these key strategic elements. State recently established a
strategic framework outlining priority goals for public diplomacy, such as
marginalizing extremists, and related tactics that include education and
empowerment; however, the department has not issued guidance on how these
strategies and tactics should be implemented. Such guidance is a critical
first step to developing detailed communication plans in the field.
U.S. embassies face multiple challenges in implementing their public
diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public
outreach and concerns related to staff numbers, time, and language
capabilities. These challenges are particularly acute in countries with
significant Muslim populations; for example, the threat level for
terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in the
Muslim world, and 15 of State's 20 so-called unaccompanied posts are
located in countries in the Muslim world. Security and budgetary concerns
have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities and curtail
certain public outreach efforts, sending foreign publics the unintended
message that the United States is unapproachable. Efforts to compensate
for this loss in public presence include the use of small-scale external
facilities staffed with local employees, expanded embassy speaker
programs, and traveling teams of embassy employees engaging in outreach
efforts. Meanwhile, public diplomacy efforts at post are hindered by a
shortage of officers, and these officers face an increasing administrative
burden. Tours of duty for diplomats at posts in the Muslim world are
shorter than elsewhere, which can limit the effectiveness of public
diplomacy efforts in these posts. Furthermore, State's data show that as
many as 30 percent of public diplomacy positions in countries with
significant Muslim populations are filled by officers with insufficient
language skills. As a result, public diplomacy officers in the Muslim
world spend less time communicating with local audiences than the position
requires. While State has begun to address many of these challenges, it is
too early to determine the effectiveness of such efforts. Further,
opportunities to share best practices across posts on how to overcome some
of these challenges remain underutilized.
To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy
outreach efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop written
guidance detailing how the department intends to implement the Under
Secretary's priority goals and tactics as they apply to the Muslim world.
We recommend the development of a sample country-level communication plan
to accompany this document as a guide for posts to use and adapt to their
environment. Finally, we recommend that the Secretary develop a systematic
mechanism for sharing best practices data to address long-standing program
challenges, which have been particularly acute in the Muslim world. In
commenting on a draft of this report, State concurred with our findings
and recommendations. We have reprinted State's comments in appendix V. We
also incorporated technical comments from State where appropriate.
Background
The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to understand,
inform, engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of global
audiences in ways that support the United States' strategic interests.
U.S. public diplomacy efforts are implemented by several entities,
including State, DOD, USAID, and BBG, and function under the broad
guidance of the White House and the National Security Council.7 Funding is
concentrated in State and BBG, which together received approximately $1.2
billion for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2005. USAID and DOD have
relatively small public diplomacy budgets.
State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts
State's public diplomacy operations are guided by the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of
Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and
Public Affairs. The department's regional and functional bureaus also
contain public diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant assistant
secretary.8 The Under Secretary has direct authority over the three public
diplomacy bureaus but does not have line authority over public diplomacy
operations in other regional or functional bureaus.9 In overseas missions,
Foreign Service public diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs,
Cultural Affairs, Information, Information Resources, and Regional English
Language officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and
report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.
Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs
In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to pubic diplomacy and
public affairs. According to the department's performance plan, its
investment in public diplomacy and public affairs continues to increase,
particularly for efforts targeting audiences in the Middle East. Exchange
programs received the majority of fiscal year 2005 funding, $356 million,
which was a 12.4 percent increase over fiscal year 2004. These programs
include international visitors, citizen exchanges, the Fulbright academic
exchange program, and English-language teaching. State's information
programs received roughly $68 million in fiscal year 2005 to fund programs
such as the U.S. speakers program, mission Web sites, and American
Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United
States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees. The
remaining public diplomacy funds go to State's regional bureaus to pay for
the salaries of locally engaged staff overseas, among other purposes.
Appendix III provides a summary of selected programs managed by each
bureau along with a description of staff positions.
USAID, DOD, and BBG also support the U.S. government's communication
efforts in the field. USAID reports that it has established an overseas
network of more than one hundred Development Outreach and Communications
officers, who work with Public Affairs officers to promote America's
assistance story. DOD has also become involved in public diplomacy and is
developing a strategy for "military support for public diplomacy" to
identify ways it can effectively support State's operations. For example,
DOD Military Information Support Teams have been dispatched to selected
posts, at the request of the Ambassador, to assist with outreach efforts.
Finally, U.S. international broadcasting, led by the BBG, is a major
contributor to the United States' efforts to communicate directly with
foreign audiences. Between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, the BBG expects to
spend nearly $240 million on its Middle East Broadcasting Network, which
includes Alhurra satellite television network and the Arabic-language
Radio Sawa.
Definition of the Muslim World
According to State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the
Muslim world is composed of 58 countries and territories with significant
Muslim populations, many of which are members of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference. These countries have a combined population of more
than 1.5 billion and are located in Africa, Asia, and Europe (see app.
II). Figure 1 shows their locations.
Figure 1: Map of the Muslim World
State's public diplomacy investment in these 58 countries and territories
has increased in recent years. According to department data, State
provided funds for 179 speakers to travel to these countries in fiscal
year 2005, up from 157 in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, the department
funded nearly 5,800 exchange participants from these countries in fiscal
year 2005, up from about 5,100 in fiscal year 2004. The department spent
nearly $115 million on exchange and information programs in these
countries in fiscal year 2005.
State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim World,
but Programs Generally Remain the Same
State devotes significant public diplomacy program and staffing resources
to regions with large Muslim populations. Beginning in 2002, State
introduced three key initiatives focused on reaching younger and broader
Muslim audiences to supplement the standard exchange and information
programs used by most embassies; these initiatives have been largely
terminated or suspended. Nevertheless, posts in the Muslim world continue
to generally employ the same exchange, cultural, and information programs
used throughout the world.10 In fiscal year 2006, the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs introduced several new initiatives
designed to help officers in the field improve their advocacy of U.S.
foreign policy and enhance their ability to quickly respond to breaking
news stories, while other initiatives, some of which are specific to
Muslim audiences, are still in development.
Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim Populations
In our 2003 report on public diplomacy, we reported that the department
had increased its overall spending on public diplomacy since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, with the largest relative increases going to
regions with large Muslim populations. Specifically, we noted that while
State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs received the largest
overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest
percentage increases in such resources occurred in regions with
significant Muslim populations. As table 1 shows, this pattern has
continued over the past 3 years, with total spending on overseas public
diplomacy increasing 21 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2006. The
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs continues to receive the largest
overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, with the largest
percentage increases in resources going to regions with countries with
large Muslim populations including South Asia (39 percent), East Asia and
Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25 percent).
Table 1 provides data on public diplomacy funding and staffing for each of
State's regional bureaus. The table also shows the number of countries
with significant Muslim populations in each region, according to State's
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, along with the population of
these countries.
Table 1: Overseas Public Diplomacy Resources by Regional Bureau, Fiscal
Years 2004 and 2006
Dollars in
millions
Countries with
significant Muslim
populations
Regional 2004 2006 Percentage Number of Total
bureau (actual) increase countries (58 population
(estimated) total)
(millions)
Africa
Funding $59 $70 19% 24 432
Authorized 90 91 1
officers
East Asia
and Pacific
Funding 78 100 28 3 266
Authorized 89 89 0
officers
Europe and
Eurasia
Funding 198 229 16 9 141
Authorized 192 192 0
officers
Near East
Funding 69 86 25 18 341
Authorized 66 68 3
officers
South Asiaa
Funding 41 57 39 4 337
Authorized 38 39 3
officers
Western
Hemisphere
Funding 74 87 18 0 NA
Authorized 103 103 0
officers
Source: State Department.
Notes: Funding data include American salaries for overseas staff including
regional bureau employees and employees from the Bureau for International
Information Programs and the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs.
Data do not include salary costs of locally engaged staff.
Funding data include exchange programs, regional bureau program funds, and
program budgets managed by Information Resource officers and Regional
English Language officers.
Authorized officer positions cover overseas staff including regional
bureau employees, Information Resource officers, and Regional English
Language officers.
aData current as of January 2006.
In our 2003 report, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas
had significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring in
State's Near East (27 percent increase) and South Asia (15 percent
increase) bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have
stayed largely the same over the past 3 years with increases of 3 percent
or less. In January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to reposition
officers as part of her transformational diplomacy initiative. State
officials said that the department will initially reposition approximately
75 Foreign Service officers this year from posts in Europe and Washington,
D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world.
According to these officials, over one-third of the positions that will be
relocated are public diplomacy positions.
Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived
State has developed three programs specifically designed to reach Muslim
audiences: the Shared Values media campaign, the Arabic-language Hi
magazine, and the youth-oriented Partnerships for Learning exchange
strategy. These initiatives have been largely suspended or terminated, but
State continues to focus many of its exchange programs on younger
audiences.
Shared Values Initiative
In 2002, State launched the Shared Values Initiative to highlight the
common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans, demonstrate
that America is not at war with Islam, and stimulate dialogue between the
United States and the Muslim world. The initiative, which cost about $15
million, centered on a paid television campaign, which was developed by a
private sector advertising firm and attempted to illustrate the daily
lives of Muslim Americans. This multimedia campaign also included a
booklet on Muslim life in America, speaker tours, an interactive Web site
to promote dialogue between Muslims in the United States and abroad, and
other information programs. The initial phase of the Shared Values
Initiative was aired in six languages in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Kuwait, as well as on pan-Arab media. State estimates that 288 million
people were exposed to these messages, but television stations in several
countries, including Egypt and Lebanon, refused to air the programs for
political and other reasons.
In 2003, the report by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab
and Muslim World, commonly referred to as the Djerejian report, credited
the campaign for having a solid research basis but criticized it for
taking far longer to develop than similar private sector advertising
campaigns.11 The report also noted that some embassies were reluctant to
promote the ads. A department analysis of foreign reaction to the Shared
Values Initiative concluded that media outlets in many countries found the
campaign to be propaganda and unlikely to succeed as long as U.S. foreign
policy remained unchanged. While some posts continue to host events on
Muslim life in America, the Shared Values Initiative's centerpiece
television campaign aired only for the holy month of Ramadan in the winter
of 2002-03 and was subsequently discontinued. Additionally, the
interactive Web site, "Open Dialogue," is no longer in operation.
Hi Magazine and Web Site
Following the demise of the Shared Values Initiative, State launched the
Arabic-language Hi magazine in July 2003 with an annual budget of $4.5
million. Designed to highlight American culture, values, and lifestyles,
Hi was directed at Arab youth in the Middle East and North Africa and was
expected to influence Arab youth to have a more positive perception of the
United States. Hi was produced by a private sector magazine firm, and
State estimated its circulation to be about 50,000 in the Arab world. One
official in Egypt, however, said that of the 2,500 copies the embassy
distributed monthly to newsstands in Cairo, often as many as 2,000 copies
were returned unsold (see fig. 2). State officials in Washington noted
that, as a matter of practice, these copies were subsequently
redistributed to public institutions in Egypt, such as schools and
libraries. According to embassy officials, they were unable to sell many
copies of Hi because it was so new and relatively expensive. In December
2005, State suspended publication of Hi magazine pending the results of an
internal evaluation, which was prompted by concerns over the magazine's
cost, reach, and impact, according to State officials. State expects this
evaluation to be completed by May 2006. According to one official, an
initial assessment of
the magazine found that most readers access Hi via its Web sites, which
remain in operation.12
Figure 2: Unsold Copies of Hi Magazine Returned to the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo, October 2005
Partnerships for Learning
In 2002, State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs developed an
exchange initiative specifically for youth from Muslim communities called
Partnerships for Learning, which provided an organizing theme to help
guide the department's exchange investments. Designed to reach a "younger,
broader, deeper" audience in the Muslim world, one senior State official
called Partnerships for Learning, "the heart of our extensive engagement
with the Arab and Muslim world." According to a senior State official, the
Partnerships for Learning program was terminated as an organizing theme in
late 2005 with the appointment of the latest Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Nevertheless, department officials said that
its exchange programs will continue to focus on younger audiences. These
officials stated that the department is exploring other program models to
engage the greatest number of undergraduate students while increasing cost
effectiveness. Similarly, State told us that the Partnerships for Learning
concept continues to infuse almost all of its citizen exchange programs.
Between 2002 and 2005, the department estimates that nearly $150 million
was spent on exchanges supporting the Partnerships for Learning theme.
This figure includes new programs developed to implement this theme and
funds spent on existing exchange programs that targeted a younger, more
diverse, and less elite audience in the Muslim world. The two major new
programs developed by the department were the Youth Exchange and Study
(YES) program and the Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Studies
(PLUS) program.13 Between 2003 and 2005, the YES program provided
scholarships to more than 600 high school students from the Muslim world
to study in the United States. Similarly, since 2004 the PLUS program has
brought more than 170 students from the Middle East, North Africa, and
South Asia to the United States for 2 years of academic study at an
American college or university. The YES and PLUS programs, with a combined
budget of $25 million, remain active in fiscal year 2006. The department
has not yet conducted a formal evaluation of the YES and PLUS programs.14
Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard Programs and
Tools
Officials at the three posts we visited-Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt-said
that they use a broad range of programs available to them, similar to the
mix of programs used throughout the world, including information,
exchange, and cultural programs. Table 2 provides a breakdown of selected
activities at each post. In addition to these programs, these officials
said that they spend a significant amount of time on news and crisis
management, such as responding to media inquiries and coordinating media
events. In Pakistan, for example, we observed the acting public affairs
officer coordinate media events related to the Secretary of State's visit
and arrange interviews for the Ambassador regarding U.S. relief efforts in
the wake of the October 2005 South Asian earthquake.
Table 2: Selected Public Diplomacy Activities at Posts in Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Egypt, Fiscal Year 2005
Nigeria Pakistan Egypt
American Corners
Number-opened 10 0 0
Number-planned 2 5 2
Number of speakers 5 18 7
Number of exchange participants 143 215 359
Local language magazine Magama Khabr-o-Nazar Hi
Sources: GAO and State Department.
Academic and professional exchanges were an important public diplomacy
tool at each post we visited. In fiscal year 2005, State obligated more
than $12 million for such exchanges in these countries. All of the posts
we visited had an active Fulbright exchange program, managed by the
embassy in Nigeria and by binational commissions in Pakistan and Egypt. In
Nigeria, the embassy has participated in the Partnerships for Learning-YES
program since 2003 and has sent about 35 Nigerian high school students and
their teachers to study in Iowa through this program. According to the
Public Affairs officer in Nigeria, the embassy has shifted resources to
assure that 50 percent of exchange participants are Muslim, reflecting
their overall proportion of Nigeria's population. Additionally, the Public
Affairs officer in Islamabad is working to develop a database of Pakistani
exchange alumni to enable the embassy to maintain better contact with this
audience.
Posts have also made use of information programs such as speakers,
magazines, information resource centers, and, to a limited extent,
American Corners. Data from State's Bureau of International Information
Programs show that the bureau funded 5 speakers in Nigeria, 18 in
Pakistan, and 7 in Egypt in fiscal year 2005. These speakers discussed
topics such as the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Muslim life and
religious tolerance in America, and U.S. foreign policy. In addition,
these posts take advantage of "target of opportunity" speakers-American
experts who already happen to be in the region. Each post we visited also
distributes a U.S.-funded magazine in local languages, such as the Hausa
Magama in Nigeria and the Urdu Khabr-o-Nazar in Pakistan. Further, these
posts operate small reference libraries within the embassy compound, known
as Information Resource Centers. According to officials in Egypt, the
embassy's resource center receives more than 1,000 visitors per month, on
average, while security concerns in Pakistan have limited the numbers of
visitors to its center. Additionally, the embassy in Nigeria has
established 10 American Corners, with plans to open more in the near
future. While there are no American Corners in Egypt or Pakistan, embassy
officials in those countries told us they are currently seeking local
partners to host such a facility.
Finally, other agencies have played a limited role in supporting the
mission's overall public diplomacy efforts in the countries we visited.
USAID has hired Development Outreach and Communication officers in Nigeria
and Egypt and was in the process of hiring an officer in Pakistan in
October 2005. DOD has sent two Military Information Support Teams to
Nigeria to help publicize the department's humanitarian assistance
programs in the country. In addition, U.S. broadcasting reaches audiences
in Nigeria and Pakistan through Voice of America's (VOA) Hausa, English,
and Urdu services, and the Arabic Radio Sawa and Alhurra satellite
television network reach some audiences in Egypt. Finally, in November
2005, VOA announced the launch of a new half-hour television program in
Urdu to be broadcast on GEO-TV, a commercial station in Pakistan.
Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State's Policy Advocacy and News
Management Operations
During the past 6 months, State has launched a number of initiatives
designed to broadly improve its ability to explain U.S. foreign policy
decisions and respond to breaking news both within and outside the Muslim
world. These initiatives, created in Washington, D.C., impact field
operations to the extent that Ambassadors and other spokespersons at posts
will be better positioned to advocate U.S. foreign policy decisions and
actions and effectively react to developing news stories. These
initiatives include the following:
o A Rapid Response Unit established in the Bureau of Public Affairs to
produce a daily report on stories driving news around the world and give
the U.S. position on those issues. This report is distributed to U.S.
cabinet and subcabinet officials, Ambassadors, public affairs officers,
regional combatant commands, and others.
o "Echo Chamber" messages to provide U.S. Ambassadors and others with
clear guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on major
news stories and policy issues. These policy-level statements are posted
to State's internal Web site and can be broadly accessed by post staff
around the world. These statements are also made available to VOA's policy
office for use in crafting editorials reflecting the views of the U.S.
government.
o Establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, a key media
market, this summer. The hub, which will operate out of commercial office
space to facilitate public access, will be staffed with two to three
spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional media
outlets, with a focus on television given its broad reach, to advocate
U.S. policies. According to State officials, a regional center is needed
since embassy public affairs staff focus on bilateral issues and no one in
the department is specifically responsible for transregional media
operations.
In addition to these initiatives, several other efforts are under way.
These efforts include empowering the American Muslim community to speak
out for the United States,15 creating an Office of Public/Private
Partnerships to stimulate private sector involvement, and developing
enhanced technology to expand the use of new communication venues in order
to better reach target audiences.
Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance,
but Improvements Are Planned
Our review of mission performance plans for the countries we visited found
that they lacked key strategic planning elements recognized by GAO and the
private sector as vital to effectively communicating with target
audiences. Among the missing elements are core messages and themes, target
audience segmentation and analysis, details on program strategies and
tactics, in-depth research and evaluation to inform strategic
communication decisions, and a fully developed communication plan to tie
everything together.16 In 2005, State established a strategic framework
for U.S. public diplomacy efforts; however, these early efforts lack
guidance from Washington to the field on strategies and tactics. In
addition, posts are not required to develop in-depth analysis to better
inform and support their program decisions or country-specific
communication plans to help inform and guide their implementation efforts.
Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy
GAO and other groups, including the Defense Science Board,17 have
suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to public diplomacy by
modeling and adapting private sector communication practices to suit its
purposes (see app. IV). Key best practices identified in GAO's September
2003 report are shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy
Based on our review of mission performance plans18 and on fieldwork in
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, we found that posts' public diplomacy
programming generally lacked these important elements of strategic
communications planning. In particular, posts lacked a clear theme or
message and specific target audiences were generally not identified. Posts
also failed to develop detailed strategies and tactics to direct available
public diplomacy programs and tools toward clear, measurable objectives in
the most efficient manner possible. Further, research and evaluation
efforts to inform all facets of strategic communications are limited by
the relatively small budget in Washington, D.C., allocated to such efforts
and a general lack of expertise in the field with regard to commissioning
and conducting such studies. Finally, posts lack detailed, country-level
communication plans to tie everything together. These findings are
reinforced by a worldwide review of fiscal year 2007 mission performance
plans conducted by State's Bureau of Resource Management in 2005. In
particular, State determined that post efforts were generally not directed
at specific target audiences, lacked specific and reasonable communication
objectives and strategies, and often failed to provide outcome and impact
measures of program success.
Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or Theme
Private sector communication best practices suggest the need for a core
message or theme, which can be developed on a worldwide, regional, or
country-by-country basis, and should be consistently applied to and woven
through all program activities and events. The posts we visited did not
have a core message or theme to direct their communication efforts. We
found that post efforts focused on general program goals established in
Washington, D.C., which are found in the mission performance plans. For
public diplomacy, these goals are promoting mutual understanding,
advancing American values, and influencing international public opinion.
According to State officials, these goals can be interpreted in many
different ways and have limited practical utility for developing a
targeted communication strategy. As one senior embassy official in Nigeria
noted, these goals are "amorphous" in nature and "hard to quantify" in
practice. Specifically, posts noted the following communication goals in
their fiscal year 2006 mission performance plans:
o Nigeria-Influencing International Public Opinion: Nigeria's fiscal year
2006 mission performance plan simply states that the post intends to move
the opinions of Northern Nigerians to mirror those of the rest of the
Nigerian population, which is largely supportive of U.S. values and
principles.19
o Pakistan-Promoting Mutual Understanding: Pakistan's mission performance
plan states that the post will seek to enhance the image of the United
States in Pakistan and increase the depth of understanding among
Pakistanis of how American society, culture, and values shape the
objectives behind and reasons for U.S. policies towards Pakistan.
o Egypt-Advancing American Values: Egypt's mission performance plan notes
that the post will use information activities, exchanges, and local
information programming to bolster awareness among Egyptians of values
shared with Americans and increase Egyptian public understanding of
American society.
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan told us that, while specific
messages have been developed at post, there are in fact too many competing
messages (such as the United States is a great place to live, the United
States is a great place to visit, American cultural diversity and
democracy are good things), and the post needed to do a better job of
defining and clarifying its message. A senior embassy official in Nigeria
echoed this point by stating that his post needed a core message that
could be coordinated across State, USAID, DOD, and other supporting
agencies.
Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined
Private sector best practices suggest that analyzing target markets in
depth and segmenting these markets are critical to developing effective
information campaigns. The posts we visited generally had not used these
practices to help refine and focus their communication efforts. In its
worldwide review, State's Resource Management Bureau found that some posts
had done a poor job of answering the basic question of whether to direct
their communication efforts at a mass audience or opinion leaders. The
reviewers concluded that posts should focus on opinion leaders in the 130
less developed countries with poor communications infrastructure (many
countries with significant Muslim populations fall in this group), while
posts in roughly 40 other countries with adequate communications
infrastructures should focus on reaching the general public. As a first
step, the reviewers recommended that posts in the former group undertake
an inventory of opinion leaders they wished to influence. This "key
influencers analysis" could be segmented into various groups such as
youth; women; opinion and editorial writers; professors; and ethnic,
religious, and business leaders, who could serve as message multipliers.
In 2004, Washington sought to supplement mission performance planning
activities by asking posts worldwide to prepare an analysis of key
influencers. According to senior officials in Washington, D.C., only about
one-half of posts worldwide ever submitted the requested analysis. Among
the posts we visited, only Nigeria was able to produce a copy of an
influence analysis, which we found to be rudimentary in nature and not
fully responsive to the guidance provided by Washington, D.C.
The posts we visited generally neither focused on important subcategories
such as urban versus rural, men versus women, and religious versus
nonreligious, nor did they segment based on the level or intensity of
opposition (ranging from "soft" to "hard") toward the United States.
However, posts have attempted to reach a "younger, broader, and deeper"
audience20 through exchange programs such as YES, which targets high
school students. Also, some efforts are under way to target exchange
program alumni,21 locals who have studied in or visited the United States,
and expatriates living in the United States who could serve as goodwill
ambassadors for the United States.
In contrast to post practices, we noted that the British Council,22 which
maintains a presence in all three countries we visited, relies on a four
tier audience system, which is used worldwide to target their outreach
efforts.23 Also, the Defense Science Board has reported that target
audiences in the Muslim world can be divided into five categories, ranging
from hard opposition to hard support. Their report notes that identifying
audiences that are "winnable" in terms of increased public support is
critical to successful strategic communication and requires borrowing from
campaign and private sector methodologies and conducting political-style
attitudinal research and identifying the highest priority support groups
that can most likely be influenced.
Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail
The private sector uses sophisticated strategies to integrate complex
communication efforts involving multiple players. Our review of mission
performance plans revealed that only limited attention had been given to
developing detailed public diplomacy strategies and tactics to guide their
implementation of an array of public diplomacy programs and tools. While
such strategies can include message amplification tactics or the use of
third-party spokespersons to increase the credibility of delivered
messages,24 the mission performance plans we reviewed were noteworthy for
their brevity and lack of detail on such strategies. For example, the
Nigerian post's goal paper on public diplomacy and public affairs runs
just over two pages. These two pages serve as the road map for
implementing the post's public diplomacy efforts, which involve several
agencies, assorted programs and projects, and substantial program funds.
The plan devotes one sentence to describe its strategy to achieve its
performance goal and three sentences to describe the tactics that will be
used to implement the strategy.
On occasion, the strategies and tactics outlined in mission performance
plans were or will be supplemented by additional planning efforts. In
Pakistan, we noted that the Public Affairs officer had drafted a summary
level plan to guide the efforts of the public affairs section. In Egypt,
the Public Affairs officer told us that the Chief of Mission has directed
his section to develop an "Islamic strategy" for Egypt to include details
on working with religious leaders, integrating English language teaching
efforts, working with local universities, and so on.
In its review, State's Resource Management Bureau also found that posts
had generally not developed meaningful strategies and tactics that would
lead to quantifiable results. The reviewers suggested that posts adopt a
more rigorous and measurable outreach strategy focused on opinion leaders
in countries where a mass audience cannot easily be reached. As defined
earlier, the first step entails identifying the opinion leaders the post
would like to influence. Second, posts should identify a "critical mass"
of opinion leaders who must be reached and influenced in order to have a
significant impact on the target audience. Third, posts should develop
programs and initiatives designed to reach these specific individuals,
with the goal of persuading and motivating opinion leaders to spread the
message. The reviewers suggested that exchange programs could be
reinforced with targeted strategic information programs. Public Affairs
officers were briefed on these findings in 2005, and mission performance
plan guidance has been updated to incorporate most of these recommended
elements.
Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited
Private sector best practices highlight the value of a research driven
approach to designing, implementing, evaluating, and fine-tuning strategic
communications efforts. Given the relatively small budgets devoted to
research and evaluation efforts, posts had access to a limited amount of
information to help guide their strategic communication activities.25
Valuable research can include such topics as: (1) audience attitudes and
beliefs; (2) root causes driving negative sentiments and beliefs; (3)
country-specific social, economic, political, and military environments;
(4) local media and communication options; and (5) diagnosis of deeper
performance issues and possible program fixes.
Because the posts we visited did not have the budgets or required
expertise to conduct this type of research or program evaluation on their
own, they relied on the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and evaluation
staff in Washington, D.C., to conduct such studies for them. However, only
a limited range of research and evaluation data is available to posts.
Most of this data is not tailored to a specific country and it was unclear
whether available research and evaluation results are incorporated in post
planning and evaluation activities. Available research and evaluations
products include the following:
o Broad public opinion polling data: Conducted by State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, these polls document that local populations, to
a significant degree, hold negative views toward the United States. Such
polls serve a valuable role in identifying the depth of the public
perception problem but are of limited utility in diagnosing the source of
the problem or the specific impact that U.S. public diplomacy efforts have
had on alleviating such negative perceptions.
o Root cause polling data: In particular, State's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research released an opinion analysis in March 2003 based on a series
of surveys examining the root causes of anti-American sentiments in 10
Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Significantly,
the 2003 analysis notes that "the belief that the U.S. is hostile toward
Muslim countries was the single largest component of anti-American
sentiments in all 10 countries, outweighing even the publics' view of how
the United States treats their own country." This type of insight can
provide the basis for identifying and developing a core message or
theme-one of the key private sector best practices discussed earlier. Our
roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts noted that this view is
grounded in Muslim concerns over U.S. foreign policies and actions in the
Muslim world. All of our panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the
major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations
and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted
upon by government officials. According to our panelists, these core
issues include the Arab/Israeli conflict, the war in Iraq, U.S. support
for antidemocratic regimes in the region, perceptions of U.S. imperialism,
and U.S. support for globalization, which is viewed as hurting Muslims.
o Program evaluations: While State has traditionally focused its
evaluation activities on exchanges, the department has established an
evaluation schedule that includes ongoing assessments of key public
diplomacy programs and initiatives, including the English ACCESS
Microscholarship program, Hi magazine, American Corners, and a contract
with the Performance Institute to examine State's performance measurement
framework for public diplomacy. Planned evaluations include media training
and outreach and the U.S. speakers programs. These evaluations are
conducted by staff in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the
Bureau of International Information Programs, and the Office of Policy,
Planning, and Resources in the Under Secretary's office.
Additionally, other forms of research are not being fully utilized. In
particular, the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a series of public
diplomacy planning papers in 2005 for six countries of strategic national
interest to the United States (China, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Nigeria,
and Venezuela). These papers included detailed country profiles and issue
analyses, recommended public diplomacy strategies for each country, and
served as the focus of two conferences that sought to promote dialogue
among academic and agency experts regarding how to improve and refine U.S.
public diplomacy efforts in each country. However, we found that State
officials in both Egypt and Nigeria were not familiar with this exercise
or the papers produced for their host countries.
Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking
Private sector best practices suggest that a detailed, country-specific
communication plan serves to pull together the complex data and analysis
required for a feasible plan of action that can be monitored and improved
as needed based on performance feedback. However, none of the posts we
visited had such a detailed communication plan. Prior to 1999, when public
diplomacy efforts were managed by the former U.S. Information Agency
(USIA), detailed communication plans were developed on a
country-by-country basis. These plans included details on core messages
and themes, target audiences, and research on key opinion leaders,
audience attitudes, and the local media environment. With the integration
of the USIA into State in 1999, these country plans were eliminated,
leaving the mission performance plans as the focal point for such
information. As suggested by several post officials, the country plans
prepared by USIA were superior to the mission performance planning process
since they focused on public diplomacy (a program driven function that is
distinct from the policy focus predominant in other department operations)
and provided a detailed road map to guide program implementation efforts.
In marked contrast to State, we noted that USAID's new Development
Outreach and Communications officers are developing country-level
communication plans. These plans are based on guidance prepared by public
affairs staff in Washington, D.C., pertaining to roles and
responsibilities, coordination requirements, communication tips and
techniques, and the development of a long-term communication strategy.
This guidance notes that "having a thoughtful communication strategy that
is understood by the key leadership of the Mission is integral to
communicating most effectively." The guidance suggests that a good
communication strategy should adequately describe the Mission's public
relations goals, should be linked to a specific time frame and resource
request, and should identify the Mission's communication strengths and
weaknesses, key themes and messages, priority audiences, and the best
means to reach them. Most importantly, the messages must be repeated over
and over again to ensure that they are heard.
Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance
In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.
public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) support
the President's Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope; (2) isolate
and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding regarding shared
values and common interests between Americans and peoples of different
countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under Secretary noted she intends to
achieve these goals using five tactics-engagement, exchanges, education,
empowerment, and evaluation-and by using various public diplomacy programs
and other means. This framework represents a noteworthy start; however,
the department has not yet developed written guidance that provides
details on how the Under Secretary's new strategic framework should be
implemented in the field.
Our past reports have detailed the difficulties the White House and the
department have encountered in developing any type of written
communication strategy. In our 2003 report and again in our 2005 report,
we noted several attempts by State and the National Security Council to
develop a communication strategy for the interagency community. In 2004,
the National Security Council and the department created the Muslim World
Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to develop an interagency strategy
to marginalize extremists. The committee collected information from
embassies around the world to help develop a draft outreach strategy, but
it was ultimately not released to posts pending further guidance from the
new Under Secretary. On April 8, 2006, the President established a new
Policy Coordinating Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication. This committee, to be led by the Under Secretary, is
intended to coordinate interagency activities. According to department
officials, one of the committee's tasks will be to issue a formal
interagency public diplomacy strategy. It is not clear how long this
effort will take or when a strategy will be developed.
Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements Still Lacking
While the department has not yet issued guidance on how to implement the
strategic framework established by the Under Secretary, officials in
Washington acknowledged the need to improve message delivery at the post
level and have begun to implement a more rigorous approach to program
planning and evaluation. Based on prior reports by GAO and others, the
department has begun to institute a "culture of measurement," which should
significantly impact the rigor and sophistication of its strategic
planning and evaluation efforts. Beginning 2 years ago, the department
sought to establish this culture through a variety of means, including the
creation of an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources within the office
of the Under Secretary; the creation of a Public Diplomacy Evaluation
Council to share best practices; the creation of a unified office of
program evaluations; and the development of an expanded evaluation
schedule, which places a new emphasis on assessing the department's
strategic information programs.
The department also plans to institutionalize the use of the "logic model"
approach endorsed by GAO and others, which could have a significant impact
on the department's program design, implementation, and evaluation
efforts.26 The logic model calls for program managers to define their key
inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact. The head of the Public
Diplomacy Evaluation Council has briefed field staff on the logic model
using the illustration in figure 4.
Figure 4: Logic Model for State Public Diplomacy Programs
The logic model will be implemented via a performance measurement
framework contract led by the Performance Institute. Implementation
details, guidance, training, and so on will be developed by the
Performance Institute in coordination with key State stakeholders. Major
elements of the model should be in place by September 2006, with full
implementation expected by the 2009 mission performance plan cycle.
In January 2006, the department issued guidance on preparing mission
performance plans that embodies its desire to increase the rigor and
sophistication of post strategic planning and evaluation efforts. Issued
for the fiscal year 2008 planning cycle, this guidance calls for more
strategic thinking and planning than was required in the past, noting that
"there are increased expectations for measurement and specificity in
planning for public diplomacy and this leads to requests for more
sophisticated information from the field." The guidance calls for
identification of specific target audiences, key themes and messages,
detailed strategies and tactics, and performance outcomes that can be
measured with a reasonable degree of precision and clearly demonstrate the
ultimate impact of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. If fully implemented,
this guidance should begin to address the shortcomings we found in mission
performance plans in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. However, such guidance
will not be implemented for another 2 years, raising significant concerns
about what the department intends to do now to address strategic planning
shortfalls.
While Washington's guidance is designed to significantly improve the
strategic decisions summarized in mission performance plans, it does not
require that missions prepare in-depth analyses to better inform and
support their strategic program decisions. Such analyses include
country-situation papers, in-depth audience research, media analyses to
understand how people receive information and who the key media providers
are, and details on how related agency programs and planning efforts
should be integrated to achieve common communication objectives. Finally,
this guidance does not require that missions develop a separate
communication plan to incorporate Washington and post-conducted analyses
and planned strategies and tactics. The lack of a country-level
communication plan increases the risk that planning will remain largely
conceptual and fall short in terms of effectiveness at the tactical level.
Also, country-level communication plans could be prepared and updated as
needed, apart from the mission performance planning cycle, particularly as
the new guidance for mission performance plans will not take effect until
fiscal year 2008.
Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in the
Muslim World
Public diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public access
and outreach to local populations. The public diplomacy corps in the field
faces several human capital challenges, such as the lack of a sufficient
number of officers, lack of staff time, shortened tours of duty, and
limited language proficiency. While State has taken steps to address these
challenges, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of some of these
efforts, and officers at the three posts we visited told us that many of
these issues remain unresolved. In addition, State lacks an effective
means to share embassy best practices that could help address some of
these challenges.
Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access,
forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between safety and
mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one of our top
priorities... but it can't be at the expense of the mission." While posts
around the world have faced increased threats, security concerns are
particularly acute at many posts in countries with significant Muslim
populations. As figure 5 illustrates, the threat level for terrorism is
rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in the Muslim world,
compared with 34 percent of posts elsewhere.
Figure 5: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and Non-Muslim
Worlds, October 2005
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly
accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and
Libraries. According to one State official, in 1990 the majority of posts
had such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do. In
Pakistan, for example, all of the American Centers have closed for
security reasons, with the last such facility, in Islamabad, closed in
February 2005. These same concerns have prevented the establishment of a
U.S. presence elsewhere. Officials in Nigeria said they would like to open
a facility in the north of the country to serve the region's 70 million
predominantly Muslim inhabitants, but security and budgetary concerns
prevent them from doing so-one senior embassy official in Nigeria said
that nothing they can do from the capital, Abuja, would be as effective as
having a permanent presence in the north. As a result, embassies have had
to find other venues for public diplomacy programs, and some activities
have been moved onto embassy compounds.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to
reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report
concluded that "security concerns often require a `low profile' approach
during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times,
would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United
States."27 This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the
embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange programs. For
example, an official in Peshawar, Pakistan, said that consulate staff
handpicked students for a 9/11 Commission Report reading group because the
consulate could not widely publicize the program. While several officials
in Pakistan described the reading group as a success, its reach was
limited due to security concerns.
Furthermore, precautions designed to improve the security of American
facilities have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that the
United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State
officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this
perception, as do requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones
and pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan,
visitors to the embassy's Information Resource Center have fallen to as
few as one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy's
rigorous security procedures. In Egypt, one of the ambassador's priorities
is remodeling the embassy in order to make it more inviting to visitors.
State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security Concerns
State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly
accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American
Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United
States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees.
According to State data, there are currently approximately 300 American
Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in the Muslim world,
with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will be in the Muslim
world). Several recent studies on public diplomacy have recommended the
expansion of the American Corners program, but its effectiveness has not
been evaluated.28 While one State official told us that American Corners
are the best solution given the current security environment, others have
described them as public diplomacy "on the cheap." The American Corner we
visited in Nigeria was confined to a single small room housing a limited
reference library and a small selection of donated books (see fig. 6); at
a meeting with a focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated in
U.S. sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the American
Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding hosts for
American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.
Figure 6: Photographs of American Corner, Abuja, Nigeria
Information Resource Centers, small reference libraries for limited
audiences created to replace some of the functions of American Centers'
open libraries, most of which have closed, are another attempt to balance
security and access. State's Bureau of International Information Programs
operates more than 170 such centers worldwide. Because they are located
within the embassy compound, however, public access to these facilities is
often limited. For example, in Abuja, the center is open only to students
and other specific demographic groups, and access is granted by
appointment only; officials in Islamabad reported similar restrictions.
The head of the center in Abuja said that accessibility was one of his
primary challenges.
State has also made departmentwide efforts to expand public outreach
beyond external facilities, and individual posts are devising creative
solutions to this challenge. In Nigeria, several embassy staff, including
the Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a permanent
American presence; according to embassy officials, these "embassy on the
road" tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve dozens of
individuals. Additionally, in Pakistan we observed an embassy-funded
American Discovery Center, a small kiosk providing information on America,
placed in a local school. There are over 180 such kiosks in schools across
Pakistan, although one embassy official remarked that as many as half of
these schools have restricted access to the kiosk for a variety of
reasons.
Addressing concerns over the United States' decreased outreach
capabilities, Secretary Rice recently announced plans to deploy more
diplomats in areas with a limited U.S. presence by increasing the number
of American Presence Posts. There are currently 8 such posts,29 which are
staffed by one Foreign Service officer and are intended to extend the U.S.
diplomatic presence beyond foreign capitals and reach out to "emerging
communities of change." We visited one such post in Alexandria, Egypt,
which contained a publicly accessible reading room, offered free computer
access, and hosted frequent cultural events. One advantage of the American
Presence Posts over American Corners, according to the principal officer
in Alexandria, was that the post was able to maintain control over the
facility.
Another means of reaching large audiences in high-threat posts while
minimizing security concerns is through international broadcasting.30
However, in a 2003 survey conducted by GAO, almost 30 percent of public
diplomacy officers in the field said that transmission strength was
ineffective in helping to achieve public diplomacy goals in their country.
Officials we spoke with in Pakistan and Egypt said this challenge still
exists, suggesting that poor signal strength for U.S. broadcasts in their
host countries limits the impact of broadcasting. The administration's
fiscal year 2007 budget request includes a request to increase U.S.
broadcasting to countries in the Muslim world while reducing broadcasts
elsewhere, particularly in Europe and Eurasia.
Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour Length, Time, and
Language Capability
Insufficient numbers of public diplomacy staff and staff time hinder
outreach efforts at posts in the Muslim world. Additionally, tours of duty
tend to be shorter in the Muslim world than elsewhere, which negatively
impacts continuity at a post, as well as the ability to cultivate personal
relationships. Further, we found that public diplomacy officers at many
posts cannot communicate effectively with local populations in local
languages, hampering overall U.S. public diplomacy efforts. To address
these challenges, State has taken several steps, both at the department
and post level, highlighted by the Secretary's transformational diplomacy
initiative, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this
initiative.
Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Efforts
While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an
increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy
officials told us that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the
capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State data,
the department had established 834 public diplomacy positions overseas in
2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant. Compounding this
challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to temporary duty in
Iraq, which, according to one State official, has drawn down field
officers even further. Staffing shortages may also limit the amount of
training public diplomacy officers receive. According to the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Public Diplomacy, "the need to fill a post quickly often
prevents public diplomacy officers from receiving their full training."31
In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with
administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy
outreach activities than previously. One senior State official said that
administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal reporting,
compete with officers' public diplomacy responsibilities. Another official
in Egypt told us that there was rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or
evaluate her programs. In addition, State officials in Washington
acknowledged that additional requirements for posts to improve strategic
planning and evaluation of their public diplomacy programs would need to
be accompanied by additional staff with relevant expertise.
Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World
Staffing challenges in public affairs sections at posts in the Muslim
world are exacerbated by shorter tours of duty and fewer officers bidding
on public diplomacy positions than in the non-Muslim world. According to
data provided by State, the average tour length at posts in the Muslim
world is 2.1 years, compared with 2.7 years in the non-Muslim world.
Figure 7 shows the average tour length by region. Furthermore, as a result
of the security concerns mentioned above, tours at many posts in the
Muslim world are for only 1 year, without family members. Of State's 20
so-called unaccompanied posts, 15 are in the Muslim world.
Figure 7: Average Tour of Duty Length by Region (as of December 2005)
Shorter tours contribute to insufficient language skills and limit
officers' ability to cultivate personal relationships, which, according to
a senior public diplomacy officer, are vital to understanding Arabs and
Muslims. Another senior State official, noting the prevalence of one-year
tours in the Muslim world, told us that Public Affairs officers who have
shorter tours tend to produce less effective work than officers with
longer tours. In Pakistan, we were told that the Public Affairs officer
views himself as a "management consultant," in part because of his short
tour in Islamabad. Furthermore, the department's Inspector General
observed that the rapid turnover of American officers in Pakistan was a
major constraint to public diplomacy activities in the country.32
In addition, public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world have received
fewer bids than public diplomacy positions elsewhere. An analysis of data
from State's summer 2005 posting cycle shows that public diplomacy
positions in the Muslim world received fewer than half the average number
of bids of non-Muslim posts-averaging 3.7 bids per position at posts in
the Muslim world, compared with 8.9 bids per position elsewhere. As a
result of the lower number of bids for public diplomacy positions in the
Muslim world, it has been harder to fill these positions.
Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World
Many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world do not meet the
language requirements established for their positions by State.33
According to data provided by State, in countries with significant Muslim
populations, 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions
are filled by officers without the requisite proficiency in those
languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In Arabic language posts,
about 36 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions are
filled by staff unable to speak Arabic at the designated level. In
addition, State officials told us that there are even fewer officers who
are willing or able to speak on television or engage in public debate in
Arabic. The Information Officer in Cairo stated that his office does not
have enough Arabic speakers to engage the Egyptian media effectively.
Figure 8 shows the percentage of public diplomacy positions in the Muslim
world staffed by officers meeting language requirements.
Figure 8: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language
Requirements (as of August 2005)
As a result, many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot
communicate as well with local audiences as their position requires.
According to the Djerejian report, "The ability to speak, write, and read
a foreign language is one of the recognized prerequisites of effective
communications. Foreign Service officers who are fluent in Arabic
immediately convey a sense of respect for and interest in the people to
whom they speak, and fluency prevents the distortion of translation."
State's Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs has said
that communicating in other languages is a public diplomacy challenge and
that encouraging Americans to speak foreign languages is a priority for
public diplomacy.
State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human Capital Challenges
State has recently made several efforts to address its human capital
challenges; in particular, following the Secretary of State's comment that
public diplomacy is the job of the entire embassy, officials in Washington
have encouraged posts to expand their embassy employee speaker programs.
By increasing the number of American officers speaking to foreign
audiences, posts have attempted to compensate for the loss of public
diplomacy staff and the diminished amount of time public diplomacy
officers have available for outreach. We observed these efforts in Abuja,
Islamabad, and Peshawar, where the embassies have developed mission
speaker bureaus, which are lists of embassy staff willing to speak to
local audiences on a variety of topics related to America. In Egypt,
however, the department's Inspector General noted that non-public
diplomacy officers rarely engage in public outreach, missing a valuable
opportunity to further increase understanding of U.S. policies, culture,
and values.
The Secretary of State also recently proposed changes in staff incentives
as part of her call for transformational diplomacy. New requirements for
career advancement would include service in at least one hardship post,
fluency in two or more languages, and expertise in two or more regions. In
addition, the Secretary has announced plans to reposition staff in all
career tracks, starting in summer 2006, from posts in Europe and
Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the
Muslim world. It is too early to evaluate the impact of these efforts.
Recognizing a persistent national foreign language deficit, in January
2006 President Bush announced plans for a National Security Language
Initiative to further strengthen national security by developing foreign
language skills.34 The President's original request for this initiative
was $114 million in fiscal year 2007, split between State, DOD, the
Department of Education, and the Director of National Intelligence-State's
share of this funding is about $27 million, according to department
officials. State's efforts will focus on critical languages spoken in the
Muslim world, such as Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, and Urdu, among others.
Under this initiative, State will provide opportunities for U.S. high
school students, undergraduates, and graduate students to study these and
other languages abroad and will strengthen foreign language teaching in
the United States through exchanges and professional development. State
has also established a facility in Tunis for advanced Arabic language
instruction, including courses to train staff to appear on Arabic-language
television and radio.
State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best Practices
While individual posts have devised innovative approaches to overcome the
challenges their public diplomacy programs face, State generally lacks a
systematic, comprehensive means of communicating these practices and
transferring knowledge and experience across posts. For example, in
Nigeria, we noted the embassy practice of taking a team, headed by the
Ambassador, on coordinated outreach efforts to key cities in the country
where the United States currently lacks a diplomatic presence. The Deputy
Chief of Mission noted frustration with the post's inability to share this
and other practices with posts that might benefit from lessons learned in
Nigeria.
Existing means of sharing best practices among public diplomacy officers
tend to be regional in scope, ad hoc in nature, or underutilized in
practice. These mechanisms include annual Public Affairs officer
conferences in each region, anecdotal submissions in State's RESULTS
database, and weekly newsletters issued by regional public diplomacy
offices. While some officers stated that the regional Public Affairs
officer conferences were helpful for sharing these practices, one official
noted that no formal reports were generated at these conferences and that
there has only been one global conference. The department maintains a
database of public diplomacy program results, which is based on anecdotes
submitted by officers in the field following speaker, exchange, or other
public diplomacy programs. While it is a potential tool for retaining
institutional memory at State, some State officials said that anecdotes
were not systematically entered into the database. Others suggested that
this database be modified to enable officers to flag best practices to
make them easier to locate in the future. In March 2006, State officials
told us that the Under Secretary's office was working on a Web-based
system for officers in the field and in Washington, D.C., to share ideas
and expected this system to be operational within the next month.
A strengthened, institutionalized system for sharing best practices could
improve the retention of institutional memory at State. However, given the
constraints on public diplomacy officers' time, any means of sharing best
practices should not create an additional reporting burden on officers in
the field. Furthermore, whichever method State chooses to communicate best
practices, it should ensure that the practices are not self-submitted but
rather reviewed by a third party for appropriateness.
Conclusions
In recent years, State has shifted public diplomacy resources to the
Muslim world, but three of its new initiatives specifically designed to
reach Muslim audiences have been short-lived. Lacking specifically
targeted programs, posts in Muslim-majority countries continue to use the
same information and exchange programs available to posts throughout the
world. GAO and others have suggested the adoption of private sector best
practices as a means to improve the department's communication efforts in
Washington and at the post level. These practices call for the use of
central messages or themes, target audience segmentation and analysis,
in-depth audience research and evaluation, and the preparation of detailed
communication plans to pull these various elements together. Communication
efforts at the posts we visited generally lacked these strategic elements.
State has taken several steps to address this problem, including the
development of a strategic framework with goals and tactics, the creation
of a transformational diplomacy initiative to implement some of these best
practices, and the issuance of updated guidance to improve fiscal year
2008 mission performance plans. These are all positive steps. However,
Washington still lacks written guidance to implement the strategic
framework developed by the current Under Secretary. In addition, posts
have not prepared in-depth analyses or detailed communication plans to
support their strategic communication decisions. Compounding this lack of
strategic planning and evaluation are challenges related to staffing and
security at posts in the Muslim world. State currently lacks a systematic
mechanism for sharing best practices, which could help address some of
these challenges.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the delivery of public diplomacy messages to Muslim audiences
around the world, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to take
the following two actions:
o To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. outreach
efforts, develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to
implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world and
incorporates the strategic communication best practices discussed in this
report. This guidance should be developed in consultation with the White
House, affected government agencies, and outside experts who have a
practical knowledge of what is needed to translate private sector best
practices into practical steps which can be taken in the field. To
accompany this guidance, we recommend that State develop a sample
country-level communication plan that posts can tailor to local
conditions.
o To meet the challenges facing public diplomacy officers in the field,
including the need to balance security with outreach and short tours of
duty at certain posts, strengthen existing systems of sharing best
practices in order to more systematically transfer knowledge among
embassies around the world.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The State Department provided written comments on a draft of this report
(see app. V). State concurred with the report's findings and conclusions.
State also indicated that it has begun to address the recommendations
contained in this report. State said it is developing an integrated
strategic plan that includes elements of private sector best practices.
State also said it is developing a sample country-level communication plan
and constructing a Web-based system for conveying best practices. State
did not indicate when the strategic plan or sample country-level
communication plans will be completed. We modified our findings regarding
State's exchange programs, noting their continued focus on younger
audiences. In addition, State provided technical comments, which have been
incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov . If you or your staff
have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix I
To determine what public diplomacy resources and programs the State
Department (State) has directed to the Muslim world, we reviewed State
budget requests, annual performance and accountability reports, and other
documents. We also interviewed officials from State's Office of the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Office of Policy,
Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; the Bureau of
Resource Management; and regional bureaus. We also observed training
classes for new public diplomacy officers at State's Foreign Service
Institute. We obtained and analyzed documents on public diplomacy budgets
and program descriptions from these offices and bureaus. To assess the
reliability of State's data, we reviewed documentation related to the data
sources and discussed the data with knowledgeable State officials. We
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We also compared data on the populations of countries in the
Muslim world from the United Nations, World Bank, and CIA World Factbook,
and found them sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We based our definition of the Muslim world on State's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs' list of 58 countries and territories
with significant Muslim populations. These countries are spread across the
Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and have a combined population of
more than 1.5 billion people. Appendix II lists these countries.
To assess whether posts adopted a strategic approach to implementing
public diplomacy, we reviewed Washington-produced mission performance
planning guidance prepared by the Office of Policy, Planning, and
Resources (located within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the results of a fiscal year 2005 review of
mission performance plans conducted by the Bureau of Resource Management,
public opinion polling results prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, and related strategic planning and evaluation documents prepared
by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of
International Information Programs. In Egypt, Nigeria, and Pakistan, we
reviewed fiscal year 2005 mission performance plans and related strategic
planning and evaluation documentation, and, to discuss the scope and
adequacy of each post's strategic planning and evaluation efforts, also
met with a wide range of embassy officials including the Ambassador or
Deputy Chief of Mission, public affairs section staff, political and
economic officers, regional affairs officers, and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DOD)
officials. To discuss a range of strategic planning, research, and
evaluation issues in Washington, we met with representatives from the
Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources; the Bureau of Resource
Management; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs; and the Bureau of International
Information Programs. We also discussed private sector communication best
practices with a representative from Business for Diplomatic Action.
To identify the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the
Muslim world and what State has done to address these challenges, we
reviewed recent studies and reports on public diplomacy. In addition:
o We met with officials from State's Office of the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the Office of Policy, Planning,
and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; and regional
bureaus in Washington, D.C.
o We met with U.S. embassy officers and foreign government, academic, and
nongovernmental organization representatives in Nigeria, Pakistan, and
Egypt to learn about and observe challenges facing public diplomacy
efforts at posts abroad. We also spoke with U.S. embassy officials in
Indonesia and Turkey by telephone. We selected these countries based on
their strategic importance to the United States, their proportion of the
total population of the Muslim world, their geographic distribution, and
their mix of public diplomacy programs.
o We analyzed State data on staffing, language requirements, bids for
public diplomacy positions, and threat ratings from 2005. To assess the
reliability of these data, we surveyed agency officials responsible for
collecting and analyzing these data. We determined the data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
o In September 2005, we convened a roundtable of Muslim experts in
Washington, D.C., to discuss program challenges and potential solutions.
Participants included experts in public opinion and public affairs,
foreign journalists, and representatives from think tanks and academia.
We did not review covert strategic communications efforts managed by DOD
or the intelligence community. We limited our review of USAID to the
agency's efforts to communicate its assistance efforts and did not review
the assistance efforts themselves. We limited our review of DOD to its
support of State's public diplomacy activities. We did not review
State-led reform initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership
Initiative but focused instead on public diplomacy activities designed to
communicate information about the United States to target overseas
audiences. For the BBG, we collected funding and program information but
did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the Alhurra
satellite network-the BBG's two primary initiatives aimed at Arab
audiences. We are reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.
We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim Populations Appendix II
Region Country Populationa Percentage Muslim
Africa Benin 7.5 20%
Burkina Faso 13.9 50
Cameroon 16.4 20
Chad 9.8 51
Comoros 0.7 98
Cote d'Ivoire 17.3 35-40
Djibouti 0.5 94
Eritrea 4.6 >50
Ethiopia 73.1 45-50
Gabon 1.4 <1
Gambia 1.6 90
Guinea 9.5 85
Guinea-Bissau 1.4 45
Mali 12.3 90
Mauritania 3.1 100
Mozambique 19.4 18
Niger 11.7 80
Nigeria 128.8 50
Senegal 11.1 94
Sierra Leone 6.0 60
Somalia 8.6 >50
Sudan 40.2 70
Togo 5.7 20
Uganda 27.3 16
East Asia and Pacific Brunei 0.4 67
Indonesia 242.0 88
Malaysia 24.0 60
Europe and Eurasia Albania 3.6 70
Azerbaijan 7.9 93
Kazakhstan 15.2 47
Kosovo
Kyrgyzstan 5.1 75
Tajikistan 7.2 90
Turkey 69.7 100
Turkmenistan 5.0 89
Uzbekistan 26.9 88
Near East Algeria 32.5 99
Bahrain 0.7 100
Egypt 77.5 94
Iran 68.0 98
Iraq 26.1 97
Jordan 5.8 92
Kuwait 2.3 85
Lebanon 3.8 60
Libya 5.8 97
Morocco 32.7 99
Oman 3.0 >75
Qatar 0.9 95
Saudi Arabia 26.4 100
Syria 18.4 74
Tunisia 10.1 98
UAE 2.6 96
West Bank and Gaza 3.8 75
Yemen 20.7 90
South Asia Afghanistan 29.9 99
Bangladesh 144.3 83
Maldives 0.3 >50
Pakistan 162.4 97
Sources: State Department and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.
Note: As defined by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs.
aIn millions.
Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions and Selected
Programs Appendix III
Positions
Public Affairs Officer (PAO): The PAO is the senior public diplomacy
adviser in the embassy. He/she coordinates all aspects of mission public
affairs ensuring that public diplomacy resources are deployed in support
of mission goals. The PAO also supervises the public affairs section
including the work of the information/press section and the cultural
section.
Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO): The CAO manages the embassy's educational
and professional exchange programs, including the Fulbright program.
He/she also carries out cultural programs that highlight American society
and achievements and administers the speaker program that brings U.S.
experts to address targeted audiences in the host country.
Information Officer (IO): The IO is the embassy spokesperson and primary
point of contact for information about the United States and mission
affairs. The IO advises senior management on media relations and public
affairs strategies and manages the distribution of information to members
of the target audience.
Information Resource Officer (IRO): Generally librarians by training, IROs
are responsible for embassies' Information Resource Centers (IRC) and
American Corners. They are also responsible for supporting IRC programs
and training local IRC staff. There are approximately 20 IROs at missions
around the world.
Regional English Language Officer (RELO): Worldwide, State has 17
experienced TEFL/TESL professionals, known as RELOs. RELOs help embassies
design strategies to support English teaching and work with various
partners to organize in teacher training seminars and workshops and offer
general guidance.
Programs
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs
o Fulbright Program: Flagship U.S. government exchange program for
graduate students, professors, researchers, professionals, and secondary
level teachers to teach, study, and conduct research. Americans are hosted
by schools or universities around the world, and foreign participants by
U.S. secondary schools, colleges, or universities.
o International Visitors (IV): 3-week visits to the United States by
rising leaders in diverse fields. IVs travel in groups or as individuals
and experience American cultural life and society along with professional
interchange with U.S. counterparts.
o Voluntary Visitors (VV): Programs for foreign nationals already
traveling to the United States, including professional appointments and
domestic travel support. VVs can partly be funded by an embassy.
o Office of Citizen Exchanges professional and institutional exchange
programs: Exchanges designed to link private sector American expertise and
resources with priority institutions to engage youth influencers and
promote civil society, democracy, youth leadership, and volunteerism,
among other topics.
o Humphrey Program: Midlevel professionals from developing countries come
to the United States for a year of academic study and professional
experience.
o English Language Teaching: Targeted English language programs in
specific regions and countries of the world, coordinated with the embassy.
Programs include the English ACCESS Microscholarship program, English
Language Fellow program, English Language Specialist program, and
E-Teacher program.
o Rhythm Road: Professional jazz and urban music groups who tour countries
with limited exposure to American culture, playing concerts and talking
about their music and American society.
o Feature Film Service: Films provided to posts by the Motion Picture
Association of America and other organizations for festivals, screenings
by Ambassadors, and other programmatic usage by post public affairs
sections.
o Cultural Ambassadors: Utilizes world-renowned American cultural figures
to reach out to young people around the globe.
o Cultural Envoys and Cultural Visitors: Cultural Envoys aims to utilize
the talents of average Americans to engage with young people abroad.
Cultural Visitors is designed to bring young "idea" leaders in the arts
and humanities to the United States for internships.
o Arts Exchanges in International Issues: An annual grants competition
designed to identify American partner organizations to conduct exchange
programs in priority countries, utilizing cultural and artistic media and
programs to address priority U.S. foreign policy goals.
o Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation: Assists less developed
countries in preserving their cultural heritage and demonstrates U.S.
respect for other cultures.
o International Partnership Among Museums: An institutional linkage
program carried out with the American Association of Museums, selecting
American museums to partner with a museum abroad to develop a
collaborative program built around a theme.
o International Cultural Property Protection: Carries out the Convention
on Cultural Property Implementation Act, which protects cultural patrimony
of signatory nations.
o National Security Language Initiative: Program activity will include
in-country language training for U.S. Fulbright students in Arabic,
Turkish, and Indic languages; summer intensive language programs abroad
for undergraduate beginning students and intermediate/advanced training
for undergraduate and graduate students; expansion of the Fulbright
Foreign Language Teaching Assistant Program to bring 300 native speakers
of critical languages to teach in U.S. universities and schools; and a new
component to the teacher exchange program to assist U.S. teachers of
critical need languages to study abroad.
o Study of the U.S.: Promotes better understanding of the United States
through Summer Institutes for foreign university faculty, reference
collections, and the Currents in American Scholarship series.
o EducationUSA: Promotes higher education abroad by supporting overseas
advising centers and collaborating with U.S. educational organizations to
strengthen international exchange.
Bureau of International Information Programs
o U.S. Speakers: American subject-matter experts travel to a host country
to address selected audiences on a range of policy issues and various
aspects of American society.
o American Corners: Public diplomacy outposts in host-country
organizations, such as libraries and universities, that provide access to
information about the United States through book collections, the
Internet, and local programming to the general public.
o Information Resource Centers: Computer-based knowledge platforms at
embassies and consulates that provide information about U.S. policies and
American society to targeted sectors of the host-country population.
o Digital video conferences: Two-way video/phone dialogues between U.S.
subject-matter experts and their counterparts in a host country.
o USINFO: Authoritative, up-to-date Web site providing information on U.S.
policy and American issues directed at foreign readers. Available in
English and six world languages.
o Washington File: Daily compilations of news articles and official texts
intended for foreign audiences. Available on the USINFO Web site.
o Electronic Journals: Web-based monthly publications focused on themes
supporting mission performance plan goals. Available in several languages,
Electronic Journals can be downloaded and printed for local distribution.
o Infocentral: On-line resource for U.S. government spokespersons and
embassy officers who need information on policy issues, access to press
clips, and cleared guidance.
o Mission Web sites: Each embassy maintains its own Web site with links to
the State Department and other sources of information about the United
States and U.S. policy.
o Issue Briefs: Background information on policy topics, available at the
Infocentral Web site, intended for use only by U.S. officials who need to
articulate and explain policy positions.
o Paper Shows: Exhibitions of 35-40 panels featuring photographic and
documentary images and text on significant American personalities, issues,
and events. Paper shows are produced in several languages and displayed in
museums, libraries, theaters, and other public places worldwide.
Bureau of Public Affairs Programs
o Foreign Press Centers: Support centers for foreign journalists in
Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles providing facilitative
assistance, interviews with U.S. officials, and information resources.
o Office of Broadcast Services: Provides television and radio to overseas
posts, runs American Embassy Television Network, and assists foreign TV
crews making film documentaries in the United States on subjects of
interest to the U.S. government.
Other Programs
o Media reaction: Summary compilations of foreign editorial and op-ed
reactions to issues of interest to the United States, available daily on
the Web.
Private Sector Best Practices Appendix IV
GAO and other groups have called for a transformation in how U.S. public
diplomacy efforts are conducted. One key element of this proposed
transformation is the perceived need to adopt and adapt strategic
communication best practices from the private sector.
GAO suggested in its September 2003 report on State public diplomacy
efforts that the department examine private sector public relations
efforts and political campaigns' use of sophisticated strategies to
integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players. GAO's
roundtable with public relations firms from the private sector revealed
that the key strategic components of such efforts include establishing the
scope and nature of the problem, identifying the target audience,
determining the core message, and defining both success and failure. The
panel emphasized the importance of synchronizing these activities in a
systematic way, so that communication efforts are mutually reinforcing in
advancing the campaign's overall objectives. They noted that without a
carefully integrated plan, the various elements are at risk of canceling
each other out and possibly damaging the overall campaign. Figure 9
illustrates the steps in the process.
Figure 9: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy
Business for Diplomatic Action
Testimony by the President of Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA)1
provides a suggested strategic road map for the government to follow,
building on private sector best practices.2 BDA suggests that U.S. public
diplomacy efforts be redesigned following a five step plan: (1) listen,
ask questions, and analyze; (2) participate in foundation building process
for a comprehensive communication strategy; (3) introduce a "positioning
concept" for the United States in a post-9/11 world; (4) develop a
comprehensive communication plan; and (5) put someone in charge. Under
step one, BDA notes that "there are knowledge gaps with regard to issues
of anti-American sentiment and public diplomacy programming." Under step
two, BDA suggests that a task force of public and private sector parties
explore the significance and implications of the research data collected
under step one. Under step three, a "positioning concept" for the United
States would be developed, capturing a point of view, a promise, and a
personality. Step four requires the development of a comprehensive
communication plan which can take the form of a multiaudience grid listing
existing attitudes, desired attitudes, barriers standing between existing
and desired attitudes, and the best means to address and remove these
barriers. BDA notes that answers to these questions will vary by target
audience (e.g., Muslim parents, Muslim youth, Chinese business leaders,
etc.), but all must be translations of the "positioning concept" agreed to
in step three. Finally, someone must be in put in charge to ensure that
all activities, behaviors, and messages are aligned to the new positioning
concept.
Defense Science Board
In its September 2004 report on strategic communications, the Defense
Science Board makes a case that borrowing and adapting private sector
communication practices is a critical step toward revitalizing U.S. public
diplomacy efforts.3 The report notes that the United States approaches
modern warfare with cutting-edge strategies, tactics, and weapons,
designed to be effective against modern foes, and constantly updated. By
contrast, the report argues, U.S. current strategic communication planning
and execution is mired in diplomatic and marketing tactics of yesteryear.
The United States has no clearly defined strategic framework, themes, or
messages. The report goes on to note that building an effective strategic
communication culture that borrows the most effective private sector
marketing and political campaign techniques will be at the core of
rebuilding and reinventing the way the United States listens, engages, and
communicates with the world.
The report notes that achieving this goal will involve the following three
key steps:
o As in a successful political campaign, the United States must clearly
define what success means in terms of its benefits for all target
audiences. All constituents must understand what success means for them in
personal terms. A carefully defined set of themes and messages must
reinforce targeted audiences' perceived and personal benefits.
o The United States must communicate what its vision for the future
promises on individual terms, not national or pan-national religious
terms. The United States should personalize the benefits of its defined
future, for example, personal control, choice and change, personal
mobility, meritocracy, and individual rights (in particular, women's
rights).
o As with most effective private sector and political marketing campaigns,
the United States must understand what target populations must be reached
and influenced to achieve success. And the United States must understand
what it takes to move them. More importantly, it must target audiences
that can be moved-pragmatically and strategically picking its target
audiences.
Comments from the State Department Appendix V
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix VI
Jess Ford (202) 512-4128
In addition to the individual named above, Diana Glod, Assistant Director;
Michael ten Kate; Robert Ball; Mehrunisa Qayyum; Richard Bakewell; and Joe
Carney made significant contributions to this report. Martin de Alteriis,
Elaine Vaurio, and Ernie Jackson provided technical assistance.
(320339)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-535 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-535 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
May 2006
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges
Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the
United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities-led by the
State Department (State)-are designed to counter such sentiments by
explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and
advancing mutual understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine
(1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the
Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach to
implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain to be
addressed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State develop (1) implementing
guidance for its public diplomacy strategy modeled on private sector best
practices, (2) a sample country-level communication plan that could be
adapted for local use by posts, and (3) a systematic mechanism for sharing
best practices data to address long-standing program challenges. State
agreed with the report's recommendations.
State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with
significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major
initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data for fiscal years
2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with the
largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with significant
Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized overseas positions
in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at all. As part of the
Secretary of State's newly announced transformational diplomacy
initiative, the department intends to reposition staff to better align
with policy priorities. Since 2002, State has initiated three public
diplomacy activities focused on the Muslim world-a media campaign, a
youth-oriented magazine, and a group of youth-focused exchange
programs-but these initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended.
However, several exchange programs continue to target youth in the Muslim
world. In addition, posts in the Muslim world use a range of standard
programs and tools which the Under Secretary plans to supplement with
several new initiatives.
GAO's fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally
lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private
sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better
communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core
messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to
monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan that
brings all these elements together. These findings were reinforced by
State's own post-level review. State established a new strategic framework
for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2006, calling for, among other things,
marginalizing extremists and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures.
However, posts have not been given written guidance on how to implement
this strategy. Such guidance is a critical first step to developing
in-depth communication plans in the field.
Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their
public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with
public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language
capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language designated
public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled by officers
without the requisite language skills. State has begun to address many of
these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of
many of these efforts. Further, State lacks a systematic, comprehensive
means of sharing best practices in public diplomacy, which could help
transfer knowledge and experience across posts.
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