    U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
    Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
    Significant Challenges (03-MAY-06, GAO-06-535).

    Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments
    toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy
    activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to
    counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy
    actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual
    understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine (1) what
    public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the
    Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach
    to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain
    to be addressed.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-535
        ACCNO:   A53080
      TITLE:     U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage
    Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
    Significant Challenges
         DATE:   05/03/2006
      SUBJECT:   Communication
    	     Cultural exchange programs
    	     Foreign policies
    	     International relations
    	     National policies
    	     Periodicals
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Public diplomacy
    	     Public relations
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Muslim countries

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    GAO-06-535

         * Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of
           State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on
           Appropriations, House of Representatives
              * May 2006
         * U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
              * State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
                Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
                   * State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts
                   * Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs
                   * Definition of the Muslim World
              * State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the
                Muslim World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same
                   * Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim
                     Populations
                   * Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived
                        * Shared Values Initiative
                        * Hi Magazine and Web Site
                        * Partnerships for Learning
                   * Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard
                     Programs and Tools
                   * Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State's Policy
                     Advocacy and News Management Operations
              * Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate
                Guidance, but Improvements Are Planned
                   * Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy
                        * Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or
                          Theme
                        * Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined
                        * Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail
                        * Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited
                        * Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking
                        * Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance
                   * Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements
                     Still Lacking
              * Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts
                in the Muslim World
                   * Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
                        * State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security
                          Concerns
                   * Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour
                     Length, Time, and Language Capability
                        * Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public
                          Diplomacy Efforts
                        * Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World
                        * Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World
                        * State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human
                          Capital Challenges
                   * State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best
                     Practices
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendations for Executive Action
              * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
         * Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim Populations
         * Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions and Selected
           Programs
              * Positions
              * Programs
                   * Bureau of International Information Programs
                   * Bureau of Public Affairs Programs
                   * Other Programs
         * Private Sector Best Practices
              * Business for Diplomatic Action
              * Defense Science Board
         * Comments from the State Department
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State,
    Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations,
    House of Representatives

    May 2006

    U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

    State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
    Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    May 3, 2006Letter

    The Honorable Frank R. Wolf Chairman Subcommittee on Science, the
    Departments of State,     Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies
    Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, foreign public opinion polls
    conducted by the State Department (State) and firms such as Zogby
    International have shown that negative attitudes toward the United States
    have generally grown worse in many countries around the world. One
    particular concern has been a marked worsening of such negative attitudes
    in the Muslim world1-an audience of key strategic interest in the United
    States' war on terrorism.2 State's public diplomacy programs and
    activities are designed to counter such negative sentiments through
    ongoing attempts to communicate with elites and mass audiences overseas.
    These efforts include crisis management and daily news operations designed
    to explain U.S. foreign policy positions and actions; strategic
    information programs designed to more broadly engage, inform, and
    influence target audiences; and long-term activities, such as exchanges,
    to promote relationship building and mutual understanding.3

    As a follow-up to our April 2005 public diplomacy report,4 we reviewed
    State's current public diplomacy initiatives designed to reach out to
    countries with significant Muslim populations and determined how such
    initiatives are being implemented at the post level. Specifically, we
    examined: (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has
    directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic
    approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what program challenges
    remain to be addressed.

    To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed State officials from the
    Under Secretary's office, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
    the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Public
    Affairs, and the Bureau of Resource Management. We also interviewed
    officials in State's Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central
    Asian Affairs,5 African Affairs, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs. We
    collected and analyzed data on the allocation of public diplomacy staff
    and selected program costs by regional bureau. We also convened a
    roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts in Washington, D.C., who were
    identified by various U.S. government officials and others as
    knowledgeable of U.S. efforts to engage Muslim audiences, to discuss key
    program challenges, obstacles, and potential solutions.

    We conducted fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt to review the
    implementation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in countries of particular
    strategic interest to the United States. In each country, we met with a
    broad cross section of U.S. embassy officials, British Council and embassy
    staff, and local focus groups to discuss public perceptions of the United
    States, program implementation efforts, effectiveness measurement efforts,
    and program challenges. Additionally, we conducted phone interviews with
    State Public Affairs officers in Indonesia and Turkey to supplement the
    information we collected at the three posts we visited. The combined
    population of these countries is approximately 680 million, or 45 percent
    of the total population of the 58 countries and territories in the Muslim
    world.

    The focus of our review was public diplomacy activities designed to
    communicate information about the United States to target audiences
    overseas. Thus, we did not review State-led reform initiatives, such as
    the Middle East Partnership Initiative.6 Aside from State, we examined
    U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts to tell
    America's assistance story and Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to
    support State's public diplomacy activities. In addition, we collected
    funding and program information on U.S. international broadcasting but did
    not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the Alhurra
    satellite television network-the Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG)
    two primary initiatives aimed at Arab audiences. GAO is reviewing these
    broadcast initiatives separately.

    We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with
    significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major
    initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data from fiscal years
    2004 and 2006, regional bureau budgets for overseas operations increased
    by 21 percent in total, with the largest percentage going to the South
    Asia (39 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (28 percent), and Near East
    (25 percent) regions, each of which includes countries with large Muslim
    populations. Over the past 3 years, however, the number of authorized
    overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at
    all. As part of the Secretary of State's newly announced transformational
    diplomacy initiative, the department intends to reposition some staff to
    better align available resources with its strategic priorities, including
    initial plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe
    and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to
    the Muslim world. Since 2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy
    activities focused on the Muslim world-Shared Values, a media campaign;
    Hi, a youth-oriented magazine; and Partnerships for Learning, a group of
    exchange programs geared to younger audiences. While these particular
    initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended, posts continue to
    pursue a range of standard public diplomacy programs and tools available
    to embassies around the world. In addition, while Partnerships for
    Learning no longer provides a focal point for State's exchange efforts in
    the Muslim world, several exchange programs continue to target younger,
    marginalized sectors of society in the Muslim world. The new Under
    Secretary has introduced several new public diplomacy initiatives to help
    officers at all posts better advocate U.S. policy and respond to breaking
    news, while many other initiatives are still in their early stages of
    development.

    Our fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally
    lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private
    sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better
    communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core
    messages, segmented target audiences, detailed strategies and tactics,
    in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and a
    communication plan that brings it all together. These findings were
    reinforced by a worldwide review of mission performance plans conducted by
    State in 2005, which also concluded that a large number of posts lacked at
    least some of these key strategic elements. State recently established a
    strategic framework outlining priority goals for public diplomacy, such as
    marginalizing extremists, and related tactics that include education and
    empowerment; however, the department has not issued guidance on how these
    strategies and tactics should be implemented. Such guidance is a critical
    first step to developing detailed communication plans in the field.

    U.S. embassies face multiple challenges in implementing their public
    diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public
    outreach and concerns related to staff numbers, time, and language
    capabilities. These challenges are particularly acute in countries with
    significant Muslim populations; for example, the threat level for
    terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in the
    Muslim world, and 15 of State's 20 so-called unaccompanied posts are
    located in countries in the Muslim world. Security and budgetary concerns
    have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities and curtail
    certain public outreach efforts, sending foreign publics the unintended
    message that the United States is unapproachable. Efforts to compensate
    for this loss in public presence include the use of small-scale external
    facilities staffed with local employees, expanded embassy speaker
    programs, and traveling teams of embassy employees engaging in outreach
    efforts. Meanwhile, public diplomacy efforts at post are hindered by a
    shortage of officers, and these officers face an increasing administrative
    burden. Tours of duty for diplomats at posts in the Muslim world are
    shorter than elsewhere, which can limit the effectiveness of public
    diplomacy efforts in these posts. Furthermore, State's data show that as
    many as 30 percent of public diplomacy positions in countries with
    significant Muslim populations are filled by officers with insufficient
    language skills. As a result, public diplomacy officers in the Muslim
    world spend less time communicating with local audiences than the position
    requires. While State has begun to address many of these challenges, it is
    too early to determine the effectiveness of such efforts. Further,
    opportunities to share best practices across posts on how to overcome some
    of these challenges remain underutilized.

    To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy
    outreach efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop written
    guidance detailing how the department intends to implement the Under
    Secretary's priority goals and tactics as they apply to the Muslim world.
    We recommend the development of a sample country-level communication plan
    to accompany this document as a guide for posts to use and adapt to their
    environment. Finally, we recommend that the Secretary develop a systematic
    mechanism for sharing best practices data to address long-standing program
    challenges, which have been particularly acute in the Muslim world. In
    commenting on a draft of this report, State concurred with our findings
    and recommendations. We have reprinted State's comments in appendix V. We
    also incorporated technical comments from State where appropriate.

    Background

    The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to understand,
    inform, engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of global
    audiences in ways that support the United States' strategic interests.
    U.S. public diplomacy efforts are implemented by several entities,
    including State, DOD, USAID, and BBG, and function under the broad
    guidance of the White House and the National Security Council.7 Funding is
    concentrated in State and BBG, which together received approximately $1.2
    billion for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2005. USAID and DOD have
    relatively small public diplomacy budgets.

    State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts

    State's public diplomacy operations are guided by the Under Secretary for
    Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of
    Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and
    Public Affairs. The department's regional and functional bureaus also
    contain public diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant assistant
    secretary.8 The Under Secretary has direct authority over the three public
    diplomacy bureaus but does not have line authority over public diplomacy
    operations in other regional or functional bureaus.9 In overseas missions,
    Foreign Service public diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs,
    Cultural Affairs, Information, Information Resources, and Regional English
    Language officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and
    report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.

    Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs

    In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to pubic diplomacy and
    public affairs. According to the department's performance plan, its
    investment in public diplomacy and public affairs continues to increase,
    particularly for efforts targeting audiences in the Middle East. Exchange
    programs received the majority of fiscal year 2005 funding, $356 million,
    which was a 12.4 percent increase over fiscal year 2004. These programs
    include international visitors, citizen exchanges, the Fulbright academic
    exchange program, and English-language teaching. State's information
    programs received roughly $68 million in fiscal year 2005 to fund programs
    such as the U.S. speakers program, mission Web sites, and American
    Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United
    States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees. The
    remaining public diplomacy funds go to State's regional bureaus to pay for
    the salaries of locally engaged staff overseas, among other purposes.
    Appendix III provides a summary of selected programs managed by each
    bureau along with a description of staff positions.

    USAID, DOD, and BBG also support the U.S. government's communication
    efforts in the field. USAID reports that it has established an overseas
    network of more than one hundred Development Outreach and Communications
    officers, who work with Public Affairs officers to promote America's
    assistance story. DOD has also become involved in public diplomacy and is
    developing a strategy for "military support for public diplomacy" to
    identify ways it can effectively support State's operations. For example,
    DOD Military Information Support Teams have been dispatched to selected
    posts, at the request of the Ambassador, to assist with outreach efforts.
    Finally, U.S. international broadcasting, led by the BBG, is a major
    contributor to the United States' efforts to communicate directly with
    foreign audiences. Between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, the BBG expects to
    spend nearly $240 million on its Middle East Broadcasting Network, which
    includes Alhurra satellite television network and the Arabic-language
    Radio Sawa.

    Definition of the Muslim World

    According to State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the
    Muslim world is composed of 58 countries and territories with significant
    Muslim populations, many of which are members of the Organization of the
    Islamic Conference. These countries have a combined population of more
    than 1.5 billion and are located in Africa, Asia, and Europe (see app.
    II). Figure 1 shows their locations.

    Figure 1: Map of the Muslim World

    State's public diplomacy investment in these 58 countries and territories
    has increased in recent years. According to department data, State
    provided funds for 179 speakers to travel to these countries in fiscal
    year 2005, up from 157 in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, the department
    funded nearly 5,800 exchange participants from these countries in fiscal
    year 2005, up from about 5,100 in fiscal year 2004. The department spent
    nearly $115 million on exchange and information programs in these
    countries in fiscal year 2005.

    State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim World,
    but Programs Generally Remain the Same

    State devotes significant public diplomacy program and staffing resources
    to regions with large Muslim populations. Beginning in 2002, State
    introduced three key initiatives focused on reaching younger and broader
    Muslim audiences to supplement the standard exchange and information
    programs used by most embassies; these initiatives have been largely
    terminated or suspended. Nevertheless, posts in the Muslim world continue
    to generally employ the same exchange, cultural, and information programs
    used throughout the world.10 In fiscal year 2006, the Under Secretary for
    Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs introduced several new initiatives
    designed to help officers in the field improve their advocacy of U.S.
    foreign policy and enhance their ability to quickly respond to breaking
    news stories, while other initiatives, some of which are specific to
    Muslim audiences, are still in development.

    Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim Populations

    In our 2003 report on public diplomacy, we reported that the department
    had increased its overall spending on public diplomacy since the terrorist
    attacks of September 11, with the largest relative increases going to
    regions with large Muslim populations. Specifically, we noted that while
    State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs received the largest
    overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest
    percentage increases in such resources occurred in regions with
    significant Muslim populations. As table 1 shows, this pattern has
    continued over the past 3 years, with total spending on overseas public
    diplomacy increasing 21 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2006. The
    Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs continues to receive the largest
    overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, with the largest
    percentage increases in resources going to regions with countries with
    large Muslim populations including South Asia (39 percent), East Asia and
    Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25 percent).

    Table 1 provides data on public diplomacy funding and staffing for each of
    State's regional bureaus. The table also shows the number of countries
    with significant Muslim populations in each region, according to State's
    Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, along with the population of
    these countries.

    Table 1: Overseas Public Diplomacy Resources by Regional Bureau, Fiscal
    Years 2004 and 2006

    Dollars in
        millions
                                                      Countries with
                                                    significant Muslim
                                                       populations
    Regional        2004        2006 Percentage           Number of      Total
    bureau      (actual)               increase       countries (58 population
                            (estimated)                         total)
                                                                       (millions)
    Africa
    Funding          $59         $70        19%                  24        432
    Authorized        90          91          1
    officers
    East Asia
    and Pacific
    Funding           78         100         28                   3        266
    Authorized        89          89          0
    officers
    Europe and
    Eurasia
    Funding          198         229         16                   9        141
    Authorized       192         192          0
    officers
    Near East
    Funding           69          86         25                  18        341
    Authorized        66          68          3
    officers
    South Asiaa
    Funding           41          57         39                   4        337
    Authorized        38          39          3
    officers
    Western
    Hemisphere
    Funding           74          87         18                   0         NA
    Authorized       103         103          0
    officers

    Source: State Department.

    Notes: Funding data include American salaries for overseas staff including
    regional bureau employees and employees from the Bureau for International
    Information Programs and the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs.
    Data do not include salary costs of locally engaged staff.

    Funding data include exchange programs, regional bureau program funds, and
    program budgets managed by Information Resource officers and Regional
    English Language officers.

    Authorized officer positions cover overseas staff including regional
    bureau employees, Information Resource officers, and Regional English
    Language officers.

    aData current as of January 2006.

    In our 2003 report, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas
    had significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring in
    State's Near East (27 percent increase) and South Asia (15 percent
    increase) bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have
    stayed largely the same over the past 3 years with increases of 3 percent
    or less. In January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to reposition
    officers as part of her transformational diplomacy initiative. State
    officials said that the department will initially reposition approximately
    75 Foreign Service officers this year from posts in Europe and Washington,
    D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world.
    According to these officials, over one-third of the positions that will be
    relocated are public diplomacy positions.

    Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived

    State has developed three programs specifically designed to reach Muslim
    audiences: the Shared Values media campaign, the Arabic-language Hi
    magazine, and the youth-oriented Partnerships for Learning exchange
    strategy. These initiatives have been largely suspended or terminated, but
    State continues to focus many of its exchange programs on younger
    audiences.

    Shared Values Initiative

    In 2002, State launched the Shared Values Initiative to highlight the
    common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans, demonstrate
    that America is not at war with Islam, and stimulate dialogue between the
    United States and the Muslim world. The initiative, which cost about $15
    million, centered on a paid television campaign, which was developed by a
    private sector advertising firm and attempted to illustrate the daily
    lives of Muslim Americans. This multimedia campaign also included a
    booklet on Muslim life in America, speaker tours, an interactive Web site
    to promote dialogue between Muslims in the United States and abroad, and
    other information programs. The initial phase of the Shared Values
    Initiative was aired in six languages in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia,
    and Kuwait, as well as on pan-Arab media. State estimates that 288 million
    people were exposed to these messages, but television stations in several
    countries, including Egypt and Lebanon, refused to air the programs for
    political and other reasons.

    In 2003, the report by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab
    and Muslim World, commonly referred to as the Djerejian report, credited
    the campaign for having a solid research basis but criticized it for
    taking far longer to develop than similar private sector advertising
    campaigns.11 The report also noted that some embassies were reluctant to
    promote the ads. A department analysis of foreign reaction to the Shared
    Values Initiative concluded that media outlets in many countries found the
    campaign to be propaganda and unlikely to succeed as long as U.S. foreign
    policy remained unchanged. While some posts continue to host events on
    Muslim life in America, the Shared Values Initiative's centerpiece
    television campaign aired only for the holy month of Ramadan in the winter
    of 2002-03 and was subsequently discontinued. Additionally, the
    interactive Web site, "Open Dialogue," is no longer in operation.

    Hi Magazine and Web Site

    Following the demise of the Shared Values Initiative, State launched the
    Arabic-language Hi magazine in July 2003 with an annual budget of $4.5
    million. Designed to highlight American culture, values, and lifestyles,
    Hi was directed at Arab youth in the Middle East and North Africa and was
    expected to influence Arab youth to have a more positive perception of the
    United States. Hi was produced by a private sector magazine firm, and
    State estimated its circulation to be about 50,000 in the Arab world. One
    official in Egypt, however, said that of the 2,500 copies the embassy
    distributed monthly to newsstands in Cairo, often as many as 2,000 copies
    were returned unsold (see fig. 2). State officials in Washington noted
    that, as a matter of practice, these copies were subsequently
    redistributed to public institutions in Egypt, such as schools and
    libraries. According to embassy officials, they were unable to sell many
    copies of Hi because it was so new and relatively expensive. In December
    2005, State suspended publication of Hi magazine pending the results of an
    internal evaluation, which was prompted by concerns over the magazine's
    cost, reach, and impact, according to State officials. State expects this
    evaluation to be completed by May 2006. According to one official, an
    initial assessment of

    the magazine found that most readers access Hi via its Web sites, which
    remain in operation.12

    Figure 2: Unsold Copies of Hi Magazine Returned to the U.S. Embassy in
    Cairo, October 2005

    Partnerships for Learning

    In 2002, State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs developed an
    exchange initiative specifically for youth from Muslim communities called
    Partnerships for Learning, which provided an organizing theme to help
    guide the department's exchange investments. Designed to reach a "younger,
    broader, deeper" audience in the Muslim world, one senior State official
    called Partnerships for Learning, "the heart of our extensive engagement
    with the Arab and Muslim world." According to a senior State official, the
    Partnerships for Learning program was terminated as an organizing theme in
    late 2005 with the appointment of the latest Under Secretary for Public
    Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Nevertheless, department officials said that
    its exchange programs will continue to focus on younger audiences. These
    officials stated that the department is exploring other program models to
    engage the greatest number of undergraduate students while increasing cost
    effectiveness. Similarly, State told us that the Partnerships for Learning
    concept continues to infuse almost all of its citizen exchange programs.

    Between 2002 and 2005, the department estimates that nearly $150 million
    was spent on exchanges supporting the Partnerships for Learning theme.
    This figure includes new programs developed to implement this theme and
    funds spent on existing exchange programs that targeted a younger, more
    diverse, and less elite audience in the Muslim world. The two major new
    programs developed by the department were the Youth Exchange and Study
    (YES) program and the Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Studies
    (PLUS) program.13 Between 2003 and 2005, the YES program provided
    scholarships to more than 600 high school students from the Muslim world
    to study in the United States. Similarly, since 2004 the PLUS program has
    brought more than 170 students from the Middle East, North Africa, and
    South Asia to the United States for 2 years of academic study at an
    American college or university. The YES and PLUS programs, with a combined
    budget of $25 million, remain active in fiscal year 2006. The department
    has not yet conducted a formal evaluation of the YES and PLUS programs.14

    Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard Programs and
    Tools

    Officials at the three posts we visited-Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt-said
    that they use a broad range of programs available to them, similar to the
    mix of programs used throughout the world, including information,
    exchange, and cultural programs. Table 2 provides a breakdown of selected
    activities at each post. In addition to these programs, these officials
    said that they spend a significant amount of time on news and crisis
    management, such as responding to media inquiries and coordinating media
    events. In Pakistan, for example, we observed the acting public affairs
    officer coordinate media events related to the Secretary of State's visit
    and arrange interviews for the Ambassador regarding U.S. relief efforts in
    the wake of the October 2005 South Asian earthquake.

    Table 2: Selected Public Diplomacy Activities at Posts in Nigeria,
    Pakistan, and Egypt, Fiscal Year 2005

                                               Nigeria          Pakistan    Egypt
    American Corners
    Number-opened                                10                 0        0
    Number-planned                                2                 5        2
    Number of speakers                            5                18        7
    Number of exchange participants             143               215      359
    Local language magazine                  Magama     Khabr-o-Nazar       Hi

    Sources: GAO and State Department.

    Academic and professional exchanges were an important public diplomacy
    tool at each post we visited. In fiscal year 2005, State obligated more
    than $12 million for such exchanges in these countries. All of the posts
    we visited had an active Fulbright exchange program, managed by the
    embassy in Nigeria and by binational commissions in Pakistan and Egypt. In
    Nigeria, the embassy has participated in the Partnerships for Learning-YES
    program since 2003 and has sent about 35 Nigerian high school students and
    their teachers to study in Iowa through this program. According to the
    Public Affairs officer in Nigeria, the embassy has shifted resources to
    assure that 50 percent of exchange participants are Muslim, reflecting
    their overall proportion of Nigeria's population. Additionally, the Public
    Affairs officer in Islamabad is working to develop a database of Pakistani
    exchange alumni to enable the embassy to maintain better contact with this
    audience.

    Posts have also made use of information programs such as speakers,
    magazines, information resource centers, and, to a limited extent,
    American Corners. Data from State's Bureau of International Information
    Programs show that the bureau funded 5 speakers in Nigeria, 18 in
    Pakistan, and 7 in Egypt in fiscal year 2005. These speakers discussed
    topics such as the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Muslim life and
    religious tolerance in America, and U.S. foreign policy. In addition,
    these posts take advantage of "target of opportunity" speakers-American
    experts who already happen to be in the region. Each post we visited also
    distributes a U.S.-funded magazine in local languages, such as the Hausa
    Magama in Nigeria and the Urdu Khabr-o-Nazar in Pakistan. Further, these
    posts operate small reference libraries within the embassy compound, known
    as Information Resource Centers. According to officials in Egypt, the
    embassy's resource center receives more than 1,000 visitors per month, on
    average, while security concerns in Pakistan have limited the numbers of
    visitors to its center. Additionally, the embassy in Nigeria has
    established 10 American Corners, with plans to open more in the near
    future. While there are no American Corners in Egypt or Pakistan, embassy
    officials in those countries told us they are currently seeking local
    partners to host such a facility.

    Finally, other agencies have played a limited role in supporting the
    mission's overall public diplomacy efforts in the countries we visited.
    USAID has hired Development Outreach and Communication officers in Nigeria
    and Egypt and was in the process of hiring an officer in Pakistan in
    October 2005. DOD has sent two Military Information Support Teams to
    Nigeria to help publicize the department's humanitarian assistance
    programs in the country. In addition, U.S. broadcasting reaches audiences
    in Nigeria and Pakistan through Voice of America's (VOA) Hausa, English,
    and Urdu services, and the Arabic Radio Sawa and Alhurra satellite
    television network reach some audiences in Egypt. Finally, in November
    2005, VOA announced the launch of a new half-hour television program in
    Urdu to be broadcast on GEO-TV, a commercial station in Pakistan.

    Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State's Policy Advocacy and News
    Management Operations

    During the past 6 months, State has launched a number of initiatives
    designed to broadly improve its ability to explain U.S. foreign policy
    decisions and respond to breaking news both within and outside the Muslim
    world. These initiatives, created in Washington, D.C., impact field
    operations to the extent that Ambassadors and other spokespersons at posts
    will be better positioned to advocate U.S. foreign policy decisions and
    actions and effectively react to developing news stories. These
    initiatives include the following:

    o A Rapid Response Unit established in the Bureau of Public Affairs to
    produce a daily report on stories driving news around the world and give
    the U.S. position on those issues. This report is distributed to U.S.
    cabinet and subcabinet officials, Ambassadors, public affairs officers,
    regional combatant commands, and others.

    o "Echo Chamber" messages to provide U.S. Ambassadors and others with
    clear guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on major
    news stories and policy issues. These policy-level statements are posted
    to State's internal Web site and can be broadly accessed by post staff
    around the world. These statements are also made available to VOA's policy
    office for use in crafting editorials reflecting the views of the U.S.
    government.

    o Establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, a key media
    market, this summer. The hub, which will operate out of commercial office
    space to facilitate public access, will be staffed with two to three
    spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional media
    outlets, with a focus on television given its broad reach, to advocate
    U.S. policies. According to State officials, a regional center is needed
    since embassy public affairs staff focus on bilateral issues and no one in
    the department is specifically responsible for transregional media
    operations.

    In addition to these initiatives, several other efforts are under way.
    These efforts include empowering the American Muslim community to speak
    out for the United States,15 creating an Office of Public/Private
    Partnerships to stimulate private sector involvement, and developing
    enhanced technology to expand the use of new communication venues in order
    to better reach target audiences.

    Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance,
    but Improvements Are Planned

    Our review of mission performance plans for the countries we visited found
    that they lacked key strategic planning elements recognized by GAO and the
    private sector as vital to effectively communicating with target
    audiences. Among the missing elements are core messages and themes, target
    audience segmentation and analysis, details on program strategies and
    tactics, in-depth research and evaluation to inform strategic
    communication decisions, and a fully developed communication plan to tie
    everything together.16 In 2005, State established a strategic framework
    for U.S. public diplomacy efforts; however, these early efforts lack
    guidance from Washington to the field on strategies and tactics. In
    addition, posts are not required to develop in-depth analysis to better
    inform and support their program decisions or country-specific
    communication plans to help inform and guide their implementation efforts.

    Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy

    GAO and other groups, including the Defense Science Board,17 have
    suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to public diplomacy by
    modeling and adapting private sector communication practices to suit its
    purposes (see app. IV). Key best practices identified in GAO's September
    2003 report are shown in figure 3.

    Figure 3: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy

    Based on our review of mission performance plans18 and on fieldwork in
    Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, we found that posts' public diplomacy
    programming generally lacked these important elements of strategic
    communications planning. In particular, posts lacked a clear theme or
    message and specific target audiences were generally not identified. Posts
    also failed to develop detailed strategies and tactics to direct available
    public diplomacy programs and tools toward clear, measurable objectives in
    the most efficient manner possible. Further, research and evaluation
    efforts to inform all facets of strategic communications are limited by
    the relatively small budget in Washington, D.C., allocated to such efforts
    and a general lack of expertise in the field with regard to commissioning
    and conducting such studies. Finally, posts lack detailed, country-level
    communication plans to tie everything together. These findings are
    reinforced by a worldwide review of fiscal year 2007 mission performance
    plans conducted by State's Bureau of Resource Management in 2005. In
    particular, State determined that post efforts were generally not directed
    at specific target audiences, lacked specific and reasonable communication
    objectives and strategies, and often failed to provide outcome and impact
    measures of program success.

    Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or Theme

    Private sector communication best practices suggest the need for a core
    message or theme, which can be developed on a worldwide, regional, or
    country-by-country basis, and should be consistently applied to and woven
    through all program activities and events. The posts we visited did not
    have a core message or theme to direct their communication efforts. We
    found that post efforts focused on general program goals established in
    Washington, D.C., which are found in the mission performance plans. For
    public diplomacy, these goals are promoting mutual understanding,
    advancing American values, and influencing international public opinion.
    According to State officials, these goals can be interpreted in many
    different ways and have limited practical utility for developing a
    targeted communication strategy. As one senior embassy official in Nigeria
    noted, these goals are "amorphous" in nature and "hard to quantify" in
    practice. Specifically, posts noted the following communication goals in
    their fiscal year 2006 mission performance plans:

    o Nigeria-Influencing International Public Opinion: Nigeria's fiscal year
    2006 mission performance plan simply states that the post intends to move
    the opinions of Northern Nigerians to mirror those of the rest of the
    Nigerian population, which is largely supportive of U.S. values and
    principles.19

    o Pakistan-Promoting Mutual Understanding:  Pakistan's mission performance
    plan states that the post will seek to enhance the image of the United
    States in Pakistan and increase the depth of understanding among
    Pakistanis of how American society, culture, and values shape the
    objectives behind and reasons for U.S. policies towards Pakistan.

    o Egypt-Advancing American Values:  Egypt's mission performance plan notes
    that the post will use information activities, exchanges, and local
    information programming to bolster awareness among Egyptians of values
    shared with Americans and increase Egyptian public understanding of
    American society.

    The Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan told us that, while specific
    messages have been developed at post, there are in fact too many competing
    messages (such as the United States is a great place to live, the United
    States is a great place to visit, American cultural diversity and
    democracy are good things), and the post needed to do a better job of
    defining and clarifying its message. A senior embassy official in Nigeria
    echoed this point by stating that his post needed a core message that
    could be coordinated across State, USAID, DOD, and other supporting
    agencies.

    Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined

    Private sector best practices suggest that analyzing target markets in
    depth and segmenting these markets are critical to developing effective
    information campaigns. The posts we visited generally had not used these
    practices to help refine and focus their communication efforts. In its
    worldwide review, State's Resource Management Bureau found that some posts
    had done a poor job of answering the basic question of whether to direct
    their communication efforts at a mass audience or opinion leaders. The
    reviewers concluded that posts should focus on opinion leaders in the 130
    less developed countries with poor communications infrastructure (many
    countries with significant Muslim populations fall in this group), while
    posts in roughly 40 other countries with adequate communications
    infrastructures should focus on reaching the general public. As a first
    step, the reviewers recommended that posts in the former group undertake
    an inventory of opinion leaders they wished to influence. This "key
    influencers analysis" could be segmented into various groups such as
    youth; women; opinion and editorial writers; professors; and ethnic,
    religious, and business leaders, who could serve as message multipliers.
    In 2004, Washington sought to supplement mission performance planning
    activities by asking posts worldwide to prepare an analysis of key
    influencers. According to senior officials in Washington, D.C., only about
    one-half of posts worldwide ever submitted the requested analysis. Among
    the posts we visited, only Nigeria was able to produce a copy of an
    influence analysis, which we found to be rudimentary in nature and not
    fully responsive to the guidance provided by Washington, D.C.

    The posts we visited generally neither focused on important subcategories
    such as urban versus rural, men versus women, and religious versus
    nonreligious, nor did they segment based on the level or intensity of
    opposition (ranging from "soft" to "hard") toward the United States.
    However, posts have attempted to reach a "younger, broader, and deeper"
    audience20 through exchange programs such as YES, which targets high
    school students. Also, some efforts are under way to target exchange
    program alumni,21 locals who have studied in or visited the United States,
    and expatriates living in the United States who could serve as goodwill
    ambassadors for the United States.

    In contrast to post practices, we noted that the British Council,22 which
    maintains a presence in all three countries we visited, relies on a four
    tier audience system, which is used worldwide to target their outreach
    efforts.23 Also, the Defense Science Board has reported that target
    audiences in the Muslim world can be divided into five categories, ranging
    from hard opposition to hard support. Their report notes that identifying
    audiences that are "winnable" in terms of increased public support is
    critical to successful strategic communication and requires borrowing from
    campaign and private sector methodologies and conducting political-style
    attitudinal research and identifying the highest priority support groups
    that can most likely be influenced.

    Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail

    The private sector uses sophisticated strategies to integrate complex
    communication efforts involving multiple players. Our review of mission
    performance plans revealed that only limited attention had been given to
    developing detailed public diplomacy strategies and tactics to guide their
    implementation of an array of public diplomacy programs and tools. While
    such strategies can include message amplification tactics or the use of
    third-party spokespersons to increase the credibility of delivered
    messages,24 the mission performance plans we reviewed were noteworthy for
    their brevity and lack of detail on such strategies. For example, the
    Nigerian post's goal paper on public diplomacy and public affairs runs
    just over two pages. These two pages serve as the road map for
    implementing the post's public diplomacy efforts, which involve several
    agencies, assorted programs and projects, and substantial program funds.
    The plan devotes one sentence to describe its strategy to achieve its
    performance goal and three sentences to describe the tactics that will be
    used to implement the strategy.

    On occasion, the strategies and tactics outlined in mission performance
    plans were or will be supplemented by additional planning efforts. In
    Pakistan, we noted that the Public Affairs officer had drafted a summary
    level plan to guide the efforts of the public affairs section. In Egypt,
    the Public Affairs officer told us that the Chief of Mission has directed
    his section to develop an "Islamic strategy" for Egypt to include details
    on working with religious leaders, integrating English language teaching
    efforts, working with local universities, and so on.

    In its review, State's Resource Management Bureau also found that posts
    had generally not developed meaningful strategies and tactics that would
    lead to quantifiable results. The reviewers suggested that posts adopt a
    more rigorous and measurable outreach strategy focused on opinion leaders
    in countries where a mass audience cannot easily be reached. As defined
    earlier, the first step entails identifying the opinion leaders the post
    would like to influence. Second, posts should identify a "critical mass"
    of opinion leaders who must be reached and influenced in order to have a
    significant impact on the target audience. Third, posts should develop
    programs and initiatives designed to reach these specific individuals,
    with the goal of persuading and motivating opinion leaders to spread the
    message. The reviewers suggested that exchange programs could be
    reinforced with targeted strategic information programs. Public Affairs
    officers were briefed on these findings in 2005, and mission performance
    plan guidance has been updated to incorporate most of these recommended
    elements.

    Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited

    Private sector best practices highlight the value of a research driven
    approach to designing, implementing, evaluating, and fine-tuning strategic
    communications efforts. Given the relatively small budgets devoted to
    research and evaluation efforts, posts had access to a limited amount of
    information to help guide their strategic communication activities.25
    Valuable research can include such topics as: (1) audience attitudes and
    beliefs; (2) root causes driving negative sentiments and beliefs; (3)
    country-specific social, economic, political, and military environments;
    (4) local media and communication options; and (5) diagnosis of deeper
    performance issues and possible program fixes.

    Because the posts we visited did not have the budgets or required
    expertise to conduct this type of research or program evaluation on their
    own, they relied on the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and evaluation
    staff in Washington, D.C., to conduct such studies for them. However, only
    a limited range of research and evaluation data is available to posts.
    Most of this data is not tailored to a specific country and it was unclear
    whether available research and evaluation results are incorporated in post
    planning and evaluation activities. Available research and evaluations
    products include the following:

    o Broad public opinion polling data: Conducted by State's Bureau of
    Intelligence and Research, these polls document that local populations, to
    a significant degree, hold negative views toward the United States. Such
    polls serve a valuable role in identifying the depth of the public
    perception problem but are of limited utility in diagnosing the source of
    the problem or the specific impact that U.S. public diplomacy efforts have
    had on alleviating such negative perceptions.

    o Root cause polling data: In particular, State's Bureau of Intelligence
    and Research released an opinion analysis in March 2003 based on a series
    of surveys examining the root causes of anti-American sentiments in 10
    Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria,
    Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Significantly,
    the 2003 analysis notes that "the belief that the U.S. is hostile toward
    Muslim countries was the single largest component of anti-American
    sentiments in all 10 countries, outweighing even the publics' view of how
    the United States treats their own country." This type of insight can
    provide the basis for identifying and developing a core message or
    theme-one of the key private sector best practices discussed earlier. Our
    roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts noted that this view is
    grounded in Muslim concerns over U.S. foreign policies and actions in the
    Muslim world. All of our panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the
    major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations
    and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted
    upon by government officials. According to our panelists, these core
    issues include the Arab/Israeli conflict, the war in Iraq, U.S. support
    for antidemocratic regimes in the region, perceptions of U.S. imperialism,
    and U.S. support for globalization, which is viewed as hurting Muslims.

    o Program evaluations: While State has traditionally focused its
    evaluation activities on exchanges, the department has established an
    evaluation schedule that includes ongoing assessments of key public
    diplomacy programs and initiatives, including the English ACCESS
    Microscholarship program, Hi magazine, American Corners, and a contract
    with the Performance Institute to examine State's performance measurement
    framework for public diplomacy. Planned evaluations include media training
    and outreach and the U.S. speakers programs. These evaluations are
    conducted by staff in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the
    Bureau of International Information Programs, and the Office of Policy,
    Planning, and Resources in the Under Secretary's office.

    Additionally, other forms of research are not being fully utilized. In
    particular, the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a series of public
    diplomacy planning papers in 2005 for six countries of strategic national
    interest to the United States (China, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Nigeria,
    and Venezuela). These papers included detailed country profiles and issue
    analyses, recommended public diplomacy strategies for each country, and
    served as the focus of two conferences that sought to promote dialogue
    among academic and agency experts regarding how to improve and refine U.S.
    public diplomacy efforts in each country. However, we found that State
    officials in both Egypt and Nigeria were not familiar with this exercise
    or the papers produced for their host countries.

    Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking

    Private sector best practices suggest that a detailed, country-specific
    communication plan serves to pull together the complex data and analysis
    required for a feasible plan of action that can be monitored and improved
    as needed based on performance feedback. However, none of the posts we
    visited had such a detailed communication plan. Prior to 1999, when public
    diplomacy efforts were managed by the former U.S. Information Agency
    (USIA), detailed communication plans were developed on a
    country-by-country basis. These plans included details on core messages
    and themes, target audiences, and research on key opinion leaders,
    audience attitudes, and the local media environment. With the integration
    of the USIA into State in 1999, these country plans were eliminated,
    leaving the mission performance plans as the focal point for such
    information. As suggested by several post officials, the country plans
    prepared by USIA were superior to the mission performance planning process
    since they focused on public diplomacy (a program driven function that is
    distinct from the policy focus predominant in other department operations)
    and provided a detailed road map to guide program implementation efforts.

    In marked contrast to State, we noted that USAID's new Development
    Outreach and Communications officers are developing country-level
    communication plans. These plans are based on guidance prepared by public
    affairs staff in Washington, D.C., pertaining to roles and
    responsibilities, coordination requirements, communication tips and
    techniques, and the development of a long-term communication strategy.
    This guidance notes that "having a thoughtful communication strategy that
    is understood by the key leadership of the Mission is integral to
    communicating most effectively." The guidance suggests that a good
    communication strategy should adequately describe the Mission's public
    relations goals, should be linked to a specific time frame and resource
    request, and should identify the Mission's communication strengths and
    weaknesses, key themes and messages, priority audiences, and the best
    means to reach them. Most importantly, the messages must be repeated over
    and over again to ensure that they are heard.

    Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance

    In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.
    public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) support
    the President's Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope; (2) isolate
    and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding regarding shared
    values and common interests between Americans and peoples of different
    countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under Secretary noted she intends to
    achieve these goals using five tactics-engagement, exchanges, education,
    empowerment, and evaluation-and by using various public diplomacy programs
    and other means. This framework represents a noteworthy start; however,
    the department has not yet developed written guidance that provides
    details on how the Under Secretary's new strategic framework should be
    implemented in the field.

    Our past reports have detailed the difficulties the White House and the
    department have encountered in developing any type of written
    communication strategy. In our 2003 report and again in our 2005 report,
    we noted several attempts by State and the National Security Council to
    develop a communication strategy for the interagency community. In 2004,
    the National Security Council and the department created the Muslim World
    Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to develop an interagency strategy
    to marginalize extremists. The committee collected information from
    embassies around the world to help develop a draft outreach strategy, but
    it was ultimately not released to posts pending further guidance from the
    new Under Secretary. On April 8, 2006, the President established a new
    Policy Coordinating Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic
    Communication. This committee, to be led by the Under Secretary, is
    intended to coordinate interagency activities. According to department
    officials, one of the committee's tasks will be to issue a formal
    interagency public diplomacy strategy. It is not clear how long this
    effort will take or when a strategy will be developed.

    Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements Still Lacking

    While the department has not yet issued guidance on how to implement the
    strategic framework established by the Under Secretary, officials in
    Washington acknowledged the need to improve message delivery at the post
    level and have begun to implement a more rigorous approach to program
    planning and evaluation. Based on prior reports by GAO and others, the
    department has begun to institute a "culture of measurement," which should
    significantly impact the rigor and sophistication of its strategic
    planning and evaluation efforts. Beginning 2 years ago, the department
    sought to establish this culture through a variety of means, including the
    creation of an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources within the office
    of the Under Secretary; the creation of a Public Diplomacy Evaluation
    Council to share best practices; the creation of a unified office of
    program evaluations; and the development of an expanded evaluation
    schedule, which places a new emphasis on assessing the department's
    strategic information programs.

    The department also plans to institutionalize the use of the "logic model"
    approach endorsed by GAO and others, which could have a significant impact
    on the department's program design, implementation, and evaluation
    efforts.26 The logic model calls for program managers to define their key
    inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact. The head of the Public
    Diplomacy Evaluation Council has briefed field staff on the logic model
    using the illustration in figure 4.

    Figure 4: Logic Model for State Public Diplomacy Programs

    The logic model will be implemented via a performance measurement
    framework contract led by the Performance Institute. Implementation
    details, guidance, training, and so on will be developed by the
    Performance Institute in coordination with key State stakeholders. Major
    elements of the model should be in place by September 2006, with full
    implementation expected by the 2009 mission performance plan cycle.

    In January 2006, the department issued guidance on preparing mission
    performance plans that embodies its desire to increase the rigor and
    sophistication of post strategic planning and evaluation efforts. Issued
    for the fiscal year 2008 planning cycle, this guidance calls for more
    strategic thinking and planning than was required in the past, noting that
    "there are increased expectations for measurement and specificity in
    planning for public diplomacy and this leads to requests for more
    sophisticated information from the field." The guidance calls for
    identification of specific target audiences, key themes and messages,
    detailed strategies and tactics, and performance outcomes that can be
    measured with a reasonable degree of precision and clearly demonstrate the
    ultimate impact of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. If fully implemented,
    this guidance should begin to address the shortcomings we found in mission
    performance plans in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. However, such guidance
    will not be implemented for another 2 years, raising significant concerns
    about what the department intends to do now to address strategic planning
    shortfalls.

    While Washington's guidance is designed to significantly improve the
    strategic decisions summarized in mission performance plans, it does not
    require that missions prepare in-depth analyses to better inform and
    support their strategic program decisions. Such analyses include
    country-situation papers, in-depth audience research, media analyses to
    understand how people receive information and who the key media providers
    are, and details on how related agency programs and planning efforts
    should be integrated to achieve common communication objectives. Finally,
    this guidance does not require that missions develop a separate
    communication plan to incorporate Washington and post-conducted analyses
    and planned strategies and tactics. The lack of a country-level
    communication plan increases the risk that planning will remain largely
    conceptual and fall short in terms of effectiveness at the tactical level.
    Also, country-level communication plans could be prepared and updated as
    needed, apart from the mission performance planning cycle, particularly as
    the new guidance for mission performance plans will not take effect until
    fiscal year 2008.

    Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in the
    Muslim World

    Public diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public access
    and outreach to local populations. The public diplomacy corps in the field
    faces several human capital challenges, such as the lack of a sufficient
    number of officers, lack of staff time, shortened tours of duty, and
    limited language proficiency. While State has taken steps to address these
    challenges, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of some of these
    efforts, and officers at the three posts we visited told us that many of
    these issues remain unresolved. In addition, State lacks an effective
    means to share embassy best practices that could help address some of
    these challenges.

    Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach

    Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access,
    forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between safety and
    mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
    then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one of our top
    priorities... but it can't be at the expense of the mission." While posts
    around the world have faced increased threats, security concerns are
    particularly acute at many posts in countries with significant Muslim
    populations. As figure 5 illustrates, the threat level for terrorism is
    rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in the Muslim world,
    compared with 34 percent of posts elsewhere.

    Figure 5: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and Non-Muslim
    Worlds, October 2005

    Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly
    accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and
    Libraries. According to one State official, in 1990 the majority of posts
    had such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do. In
    Pakistan, for example, all of the American Centers have closed for
    security reasons, with the last such facility, in Islamabad, closed in
    February 2005. These same concerns have prevented the establishment of a
    U.S. presence elsewhere. Officials in Nigeria said they would like to open
    a facility in the north of the country to serve the region's 70 million
    predominantly Muslim inhabitants, but security and budgetary concerns
    prevent them from doing so-one senior embassy official in Nigeria said
    that nothing they can do from the capital, Abuja, would be as effective as
    having a permanent presence in the north. As a result, embassies have had
    to find other venues for public diplomacy programs, and some activities
    have been moved onto embassy compounds.

    Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to
    reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report
    concluded that "security concerns often require a `low profile' approach
    during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times,
    would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United
    States."27 This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the
    embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange programs. For
    example, an official in Peshawar, Pakistan, said that consulate staff
    handpicked students for a 9/11 Commission Report reading group because the
    consulate could not widely publicize the program. While several officials
    in Pakistan described the reading group as a success, its reach was
    limited due to security concerns.

    Furthermore, precautions designed to improve the security of American
    facilities have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that the
    United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State
    officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this
    perception, as do requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones
    and pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan,
    visitors to the embassy's Information Resource Center have fallen to as
    few as one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy's
    rigorous security procedures. In Egypt, one of the ambassador's priorities
    is remodeling the embassy in order to make it more inviting to visitors.

    State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security Concerns

    State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly
    accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American
    Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United
    States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees.
    According to State data, there are currently approximately 300 American
    Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in the Muslim world,
    with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will be in the Muslim
    world). Several recent studies on public diplomacy have recommended the
    expansion of the American Corners program, but its effectiveness has not
    been evaluated.28 While one State official told us that American Corners
    are the best solution given the current security environment, others have
    described them as public diplomacy "on the cheap." The American Corner we
    visited in Nigeria was confined to a single small room housing a limited
    reference library and a small selection of donated books (see fig. 6); at
    a meeting with a focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated in
    U.S. sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the American
    Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding hosts for
    American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.

    Figure 6: Photographs of American Corner, Abuja, Nigeria

    Information Resource Centers, small reference libraries for limited
    audiences created to replace some of the functions of American Centers'
    open libraries, most of which have closed, are another attempt to balance
    security and access. State's Bureau of International Information Programs
    operates more than 170 such centers worldwide. Because they are located
    within the embassy compound, however, public access to these facilities is
    often limited. For example, in Abuja, the center is open only to students
    and other specific demographic groups, and access is granted by
    appointment only; officials in Islamabad reported similar restrictions.
    The head of the center in Abuja said that accessibility was one of his
    primary challenges.

    State has also made departmentwide efforts to expand public outreach
    beyond external facilities, and individual posts are devising creative
    solutions to this challenge. In Nigeria, several embassy staff, including
    the Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a permanent
    American presence; according to embassy officials, these "embassy on the
    road" tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve dozens of
    individuals. Additionally, in Pakistan we observed an embassy-funded
    American Discovery Center, a small kiosk providing information on America,
    placed in a local school. There are over 180 such kiosks in schools across
    Pakistan, although one embassy official remarked that as many as half of
    these schools have restricted access to the kiosk for a variety of
    reasons.

    Addressing concerns over the United States' decreased outreach
    capabilities, Secretary Rice recently announced plans to deploy more
    diplomats in areas with a limited U.S. presence by increasing the number
    of American Presence Posts. There are currently 8 such posts,29 which are
    staffed by one Foreign Service officer and are intended to extend the U.S.
    diplomatic presence beyond foreign capitals and reach out to "emerging
    communities of change." We visited one such post in Alexandria, Egypt,
    which contained a publicly accessible reading room, offered free computer
    access, and hosted frequent cultural events. One advantage of the American
    Presence Posts over American Corners, according to the principal officer
    in Alexandria, was that the post was able to maintain control over the
    facility.

    Another means of reaching large audiences in high-threat posts while
    minimizing security concerns is through international broadcasting.30
    However, in a 2003 survey conducted by GAO, almost 30 percent of public
    diplomacy officers in the field said that transmission strength was
    ineffective in helping to achieve public diplomacy goals in their country.
    Officials we spoke with in Pakistan and Egypt said this challenge still
    exists, suggesting that poor signal strength for U.S. broadcasts in their
    host countries limits the impact of broadcasting. The administration's
    fiscal year 2007 budget request includes a request to increase U.S.
    broadcasting to countries in the Muslim world while reducing broadcasts
    elsewhere, particularly in Europe and Eurasia.

    Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour Length, Time, and
    Language Capability

    Insufficient numbers of public diplomacy staff and staff time hinder
    outreach efforts at posts in the Muslim world. Additionally, tours of duty
    tend to be shorter in the Muslim world than elsewhere, which negatively
    impacts continuity at a post, as well as the ability to cultivate personal
    relationships. Further, we found that public diplomacy officers at many
    posts cannot communicate effectively with local populations in local
    languages, hampering overall U.S. public diplomacy efforts. To address
    these challenges, State has taken several steps, both at the department
    and post level, highlighted by the Secretary's transformational diplomacy
    initiative, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this
    initiative.

    Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Efforts

    While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an
    increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy
    officials told us that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the
    capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State data,
    the department had established 834 public diplomacy positions overseas in
    2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant. Compounding this
    challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to temporary duty in
    Iraq, which, according to one State official, has drawn down field
    officers even further. Staffing shortages may also limit the amount of
    training public diplomacy officers receive. According to the U.S. Advisory
    Commission on Public Diplomacy, "the need to fill a post quickly often
    prevents public diplomacy officers from receiving their full training."31

    In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with
    administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy
    outreach activities than previously. One senior State official said that
    administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal reporting,
    compete with officers' public diplomacy responsibilities. Another official
    in Egypt told us that there was rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or
    evaluate her programs. In addition, State officials in Washington
    acknowledged that additional requirements for posts to improve strategic
    planning and evaluation of their public diplomacy programs would need to
    be accompanied by additional staff with relevant expertise.

    Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World

    Staffing challenges in public affairs sections at posts in the Muslim
    world are exacerbated by shorter tours of duty and fewer officers bidding
    on public diplomacy positions than in the non-Muslim world. According to
    data provided by State, the average tour length at posts in the Muslim
    world is 2.1 years, compared with 2.7 years in the non-Muslim world.
    Figure 7 shows the average tour length by region. Furthermore, as a result
    of the security concerns mentioned above, tours at many posts in the
    Muslim world are for only 1 year, without family members. Of State's 20
    so-called unaccompanied posts, 15 are in the Muslim world.

    Figure 7: Average Tour of Duty Length by Region (as of December 2005)

    Shorter tours contribute to insufficient language skills and limit
    officers' ability to cultivate personal relationships, which, according to
    a senior public diplomacy officer, are vital to understanding Arabs and
    Muslims. Another senior State official, noting the prevalence of one-year
    tours in the Muslim world, told us that Public Affairs officers who have
    shorter tours tend to produce less effective work than officers with
    longer tours. In Pakistan, we were told that the Public Affairs officer
    views himself as a "management consultant," in part because of his short
    tour in Islamabad. Furthermore, the department's Inspector General
    observed that the rapid turnover of American officers in Pakistan was a
    major constraint to public diplomacy activities in the country.32

    In addition, public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world have received
    fewer bids than public diplomacy positions elsewhere. An analysis of data
    from State's summer 2005 posting cycle shows that public diplomacy
    positions in the Muslim world received fewer than half the average number
    of bids of non-Muslim posts-averaging 3.7 bids per position at posts in
    the Muslim world, compared with 8.9 bids per position elsewhere. As a
    result of the lower number of bids for public diplomacy positions in the
    Muslim world, it has been harder to fill these positions.

    Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World

    Many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world do not meet the
    language requirements established for their positions by State.33
    According to data provided by State, in countries with significant Muslim
    populations, 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions
    are filled by officers without the requisite proficiency in those
    languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In Arabic language posts,
    about 36 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions are
    filled by staff unable to speak Arabic at the designated level. In
    addition, State officials told us that there are even fewer officers who
    are willing or able to speak on television or engage in public debate in
    Arabic. The Information Officer in Cairo stated that his office does not
    have enough Arabic speakers to engage the Egyptian media effectively.
    Figure 8 shows the percentage of public diplomacy positions in the Muslim
    world staffed by officers meeting language requirements.

    Figure 8: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy
    Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language
    Requirements (as of August 2005)

    As a result, many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot
    communicate as well with local audiences as their position requires.
    According to the Djerejian report, "The ability to speak, write, and read
    a foreign language is one of the recognized prerequisites of effective
    communications. Foreign Service officers who are fluent in Arabic
    immediately convey a sense of respect for and interest in the people to
    whom they speak, and fluency prevents the distortion of translation."
    State's Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs has said
    that communicating in other languages is a public diplomacy challenge and
    that encouraging Americans to speak foreign languages is a priority for
    public diplomacy.

    State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human Capital Challenges

    State has recently made several efforts to address its human capital
    challenges; in particular, following the Secretary of State's comment that
    public diplomacy is the job of the entire embassy, officials in Washington
    have encouraged posts to expand their embassy employee speaker programs.
    By increasing the number of American officers speaking to foreign
    audiences, posts have attempted to compensate for the loss of public
    diplomacy staff and the diminished amount of time public diplomacy
    officers have available for outreach. We observed these efforts in Abuja,
    Islamabad, and Peshawar, where the embassies have developed mission
    speaker bureaus, which are lists of embassy staff willing to speak to
    local audiences on a variety of topics related to America. In Egypt,
    however, the department's Inspector General noted that non-public
    diplomacy officers rarely engage in public outreach, missing a valuable
    opportunity to further increase understanding of U.S. policies, culture,
    and values.

    The Secretary of State also recently proposed changes in staff incentives
    as part of her call for transformational diplomacy. New requirements for
    career advancement would include service in at least one hardship post,
    fluency in two or more languages, and expertise in two or more regions. In
    addition, the Secretary has announced plans to reposition staff in all
    career tracks, starting in summer 2006, from posts in Europe and
    Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the
    Muslim world. It is too early to evaluate the impact of these efforts.

    Recognizing a persistent national foreign language deficit, in January
    2006 President Bush announced plans for a National Security Language
    Initiative to further strengthen national security by developing foreign
    language skills.34 The President's original request for this initiative
    was $114 million in fiscal year 2007, split between State, DOD, the
    Department of Education, and the Director of National Intelligence-State's
    share of this funding is about $27 million, according to department
    officials. State's efforts will focus on critical languages spoken in the
    Muslim world, such as Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, and Urdu, among others.
    Under this initiative, State will provide opportunities for U.S. high
    school students, undergraduates, and graduate students to study these and
    other languages abroad and will strengthen foreign language teaching in
    the United States through exchanges and professional development. State
    has also established a facility in Tunis for advanced Arabic language
    instruction, including courses to train staff to appear on Arabic-language
    television and radio.

    State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best Practices

    While individual posts have devised innovative approaches to overcome the
    challenges their public diplomacy programs face, State generally lacks a
    systematic, comprehensive means of communicating these practices and
    transferring knowledge and experience across posts. For example, in
    Nigeria, we noted the embassy practice of taking a team, headed by the
    Ambassador, on coordinated outreach efforts to key cities in the country
    where the United States currently lacks a diplomatic presence. The Deputy
    Chief of Mission noted frustration with the post's inability to share this
    and other practices with posts that might benefit from lessons learned in
    Nigeria.

    Existing means of sharing best practices among public diplomacy officers
    tend to be regional in scope, ad hoc in nature, or underutilized in
    practice. These mechanisms include annual Public Affairs officer
    conferences in each region, anecdotal submissions in State's RESULTS
    database, and weekly newsletters issued by regional public diplomacy
    offices. While some officers stated that the regional Public Affairs
    officer conferences were helpful for sharing these practices, one official
    noted that no formal reports were generated at these conferences and that
    there has only been one global conference. The department maintains a
    database of public diplomacy program results, which is based on anecdotes
    submitted by officers in the field following speaker, exchange, or other
    public diplomacy programs. While it is a potential tool for retaining
    institutional memory at State, some State officials said that anecdotes
    were not systematically entered into the database. Others suggested that
    this database be modified to enable officers to flag best practices to
    make them easier to locate in the future. In March 2006, State officials
    told us that the Under Secretary's office was working on a Web-based
    system for officers in the field and in Washington, D.C., to share ideas
    and expected this system to be operational within the next month.

    A strengthened, institutionalized system for sharing best practices could
    improve the retention of institutional memory at State. However, given the
    constraints on public diplomacy officers' time, any means of sharing best
    practices should not create an additional reporting burden on officers in
    the field. Furthermore, whichever method State chooses to communicate best
    practices, it should ensure that the practices are not self-submitted but
    rather reviewed by a third party for appropriateness.

    Conclusions

    In recent years, State has shifted public diplomacy resources to the
    Muslim world, but three of its new initiatives specifically designed to
    reach Muslim audiences have been short-lived. Lacking specifically
    targeted programs, posts in Muslim-majority countries continue to use the
    same information and exchange programs available to posts throughout the
    world. GAO and others have suggested the adoption of private sector best
    practices as a means to improve the department's communication efforts in
    Washington and at the post level. These practices call for the use of
    central messages or themes, target audience segmentation and analysis,
    in-depth audience research and evaluation, and the preparation of detailed
    communication plans to pull these various elements together. Communication
    efforts at the posts we visited generally lacked these strategic elements.
    State has taken several steps to address this problem, including the
    development of a strategic framework with goals and tactics, the creation
    of a transformational diplomacy initiative to implement some of these best
    practices, and the issuance of updated guidance to improve fiscal year
    2008 mission performance plans. These are all positive steps. However,
    Washington still lacks written guidance to implement the strategic
    framework developed by the current Under Secretary. In addition, posts
    have not prepared in-depth analyses or detailed communication plans to
    support their strategic communication decisions. Compounding this lack of
    strategic planning and evaluation are challenges related to staffing and
    security at posts in the Muslim world. State currently lacks a systematic
    mechanism for sharing best practices, which could help address some of
    these challenges.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To improve the delivery of public diplomacy messages to Muslim audiences
    around the world, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the
    Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to take
    the following two actions:

    o To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. outreach
    efforts, develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to
    implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world and
    incorporates the strategic communication best practices discussed in this
    report. This guidance should be developed in consultation with the White
    House, affected government agencies, and outside experts who have a
    practical knowledge of what is needed to translate private sector best
    practices into practical steps which can be taken in the field. To
    accompany this guidance, we recommend that State develop a sample
    country-level communication plan that posts can tailor to local
    conditions.

    o To meet the challenges facing public diplomacy officers in the field,
    including the need to balance security with outreach and short tours of
    duty at certain posts, strengthen existing systems of sharing best
    practices in order to more systematically transfer knowledge among
    embassies around the world.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    The State Department provided written comments on a draft of this report
    (see app. V). State concurred with the report's findings and conclusions.
    State also indicated that it has begun to address the recommendations
    contained in this report. State said it is developing an integrated
    strategic plan that includes elements of private sector best practices.
    State also said it is developing a sample country-level communication plan
    and constructing a Web-based system for conveying best practices. State
    did not indicate when the strategic plan or sample country-level
    communication plans will be completed. We modified our findings regarding
    State's exchange programs, noting their continued focus on younger
    audiences. In addition, State provided technical comments, which have been
    incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
    Congress and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to
    others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov . If you or your staff
    have any

    questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or
    fordj@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations
    and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
    contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

    Sincerely yours,

    Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade

    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix I

    To determine what public diplomacy resources and programs the State
    Department (State) has directed to the Muslim world, we reviewed State
    budget requests, annual performance and accountability reports, and other
    documents. We also interviewed officials from State's Office of the Under
    Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Office of Policy,
    Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
    International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; the Bureau of
    Resource Management; and regional bureaus. We also observed training
    classes for new public diplomacy officers at State's Foreign Service
    Institute. We obtained and analyzed documents on public diplomacy budgets
    and program descriptions from these offices and bureaus. To assess the
    reliability of State's data, we reviewed documentation related to the data
    sources and discussed the data with knowledgeable State officials. We
    determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
    report. We also compared data on the populations of countries in the
    Muslim world from the United Nations, World Bank, and CIA World Factbook,
    and found them sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    We based our definition of the Muslim world on State's Bureau of
    Educational and Cultural Affairs' list of 58 countries and territories
    with significant Muslim populations. These countries are spread across the
    Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and have a combined population of
    more than 1.5 billion people. Appendix II lists these countries.

    To assess whether posts adopted a strategic approach to implementing
    public diplomacy, we reviewed Washington-produced mission performance
    planning guidance prepared by the Office of Policy, Planning, and
    Resources (located within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public
    Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the results of a fiscal year 2005 review of
    mission performance plans conducted by the Bureau of Resource Management,
    public opinion polling results prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and
    Research, and related strategic planning and evaluation documents prepared
    by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of
    International Information Programs. In Egypt, Nigeria, and Pakistan, we
    reviewed fiscal year 2005 mission performance plans and related strategic
    planning and evaluation documentation, and, to discuss the scope and
    adequacy of each post's strategic planning and evaluation efforts, also
    met with a wide range of embassy officials including the Ambassador or
    Deputy Chief of Mission, public affairs section staff, political and
    economic officers, regional affairs officers, and U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DOD)
    officials. To discuss a range of strategic planning, research, and
    evaluation issues in Washington, we met with representatives from the
    Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources; the Bureau of Resource
    Management; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Bureau of
    Educational and Cultural Affairs; and the Bureau of International
    Information Programs. We also discussed private sector communication best
    practices with a representative from Business for Diplomatic Action.

    To identify the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the
    Muslim world and what State has done to address these challenges, we
    reviewed recent studies and reports on public diplomacy. In addition:

    o We met with officials from State's Office of the Under Secretary for
    Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the Office of Policy, Planning,
    and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
    International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; and regional
    bureaus in Washington, D.C.

    o We met with U.S. embassy officers and foreign government, academic, and
    nongovernmental organization representatives in Nigeria, Pakistan, and
    Egypt to learn about and observe challenges facing public diplomacy
    efforts at posts abroad. We also spoke with U.S. embassy officials in
    Indonesia and Turkey by telephone. We selected these countries based on
    their strategic importance to the United States, their proportion of the
    total population of the Muslim world, their geographic distribution, and
    their mix of public diplomacy programs.

    o We analyzed State data on staffing, language requirements, bids for
    public diplomacy positions, and threat ratings from 2005. To assess the
    reliability of these data, we surveyed agency officials responsible for
    collecting and analyzing these data. We determined the data to be
    sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    o In September 2005, we convened a roundtable of Muslim experts in
    Washington, D.C., to discuss program challenges and potential solutions.
    Participants included experts in public opinion and public affairs,
    foreign journalists, and representatives from think tanks and academia.

    We did not review covert strategic communications efforts managed by DOD
    or the intelligence community. We limited our review of USAID to the
    agency's efforts to communicate its assistance efforts and did not review
    the assistance efforts themselves. We limited our review of DOD to its
    support of State's public diplomacy activities. We did not review
    State-led reform initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership
    Initiative but focused instead on public diplomacy activities designed to
    communicate information about the United States to target overseas
    audiences. For the BBG, we collected funding and program information but
    did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the Alhurra
    satellite network-the BBG's two primary initiatives aimed at Arab
    audiences. We are reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.

    We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim Populations Appendix II

               Region               Country        Populationa  Percentage Muslim
    Africa                 Benin                        7.5                20%
                              Burkina Faso                13.9                 50
                              Cameroon                    16.4                 20
                              Chad                         9.8                 51
                              Comoros                      0.7                 98
                              Cote d'Ivoire               17.3              35-40
                              Djibouti                     0.5                 94
                              Eritrea                      4.6                >50
                              Ethiopia                    73.1              45-50
                              Gabon                        1.4                 <1
                              Gambia                       1.6                 90
                              Guinea                       9.5                 85
                              Guinea-Bissau                1.4                 45
                              Mali                        12.3                 90
                              Mauritania                   3.1                100
                              Mozambique                  19.4                 18
                              Niger                       11.7                 80
                              Nigeria                    128.8                 50
                              Senegal                     11.1                 94
                              Sierra Leone                 6.0                 60
                              Somalia                      8.6                >50
                              Sudan                       40.2                 70
                              Togo                         5.7                 20
                              Uganda                      27.3                 16
    East Asia and Pacific  Brunei                       0.4                 67
                              Indonesia                  242.0                 88
                              Malaysia                    24.0                 60
    Europe and Eurasia     Albania                      3.6                 70
                              Azerbaijan                   7.9                 93
                              Kazakhstan                  15.2                 47
                              Kosovo
                              Kyrgyzstan                   5.1                 75
                              Tajikistan                   7.2                 90
                              Turkey                      69.7                100
                              Turkmenistan                 5.0                 89
                              Uzbekistan                  26.9                 88
    Near East              Algeria                     32.5                 99
                              Bahrain                      0.7                100
                              Egypt                       77.5                 94
                              Iran                        68.0                 98
                              Iraq                        26.1                 97
                              Jordan                       5.8                 92
                              Kuwait                       2.3                 85
                              Lebanon                      3.8                 60
                              Libya                        5.8                 97
                              Morocco                     32.7                 99
                              Oman                         3.0                >75
                              Qatar                        0.9                 95
                              Saudi Arabia                26.4                100
                              Syria                       18.4                 74
                              Tunisia                     10.1                 98
                              UAE                          2.6                 96
                              West Bank and Gaza           3.8                 75
                              Yemen                       20.7                 90
    South Asia             Afghanistan                 29.9                 99
                              Bangladesh                 144.3                 83
                              Maldives                     0.3                >50
                              Pakistan                   162.4                 97

    Sources: State Department and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.

    Note: As defined by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and
    Cultural Affairs.

    aIn millions.

    Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions and Selected
    Programs Appendix III

    Positions

    Public Affairs Officer (PAO): The PAO is the senior public diplomacy
    adviser in the embassy. He/she coordinates all aspects of mission public
    affairs ensuring that public diplomacy resources are deployed in support
    of mission goals. The PAO also supervises the public affairs section
    including the work of the information/press section and the cultural
    section.

    Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO): The CAO manages the embassy's educational
    and professional exchange programs, including the Fulbright program.
    He/she also carries out cultural programs that highlight American society
    and achievements and administers the speaker program that brings U.S.
    experts to address targeted audiences in the host country.

    Information Officer (IO): The IO is the embassy spokesperson and primary
    point of contact for information about the United States and mission
    affairs. The IO advises senior management on media relations and public
    affairs strategies and manages the distribution of information to members
    of the target audience.

    Information Resource Officer (IRO): Generally librarians by training, IROs
    are responsible for embassies' Information Resource Centers (IRC) and
    American Corners. They are also responsible for supporting IRC programs
    and training local IRC staff. There are approximately 20 IROs at missions
    around the world.

    Regional English Language Officer (RELO): Worldwide, State has 17
    experienced TEFL/TESL professionals, known as RELOs. RELOs help embassies
    design strategies to support English teaching and work with various
    partners to organize in teacher training seminars and workshops and offer
    general guidance.

    Programs

    Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs

    o Fulbright Program: Flagship U.S. government exchange program for
    graduate students, professors, researchers, professionals, and secondary
    level teachers to teach, study, and conduct research. Americans are hosted
    by schools or universities around the world, and foreign participants by
    U.S. secondary schools, colleges, or universities.

    o International Visitors (IV): 3-week visits to the United States by
    rising leaders in diverse fields. IVs travel in groups or as individuals
    and experience American cultural life and society along with professional
    interchange with U.S. counterparts.

    o Voluntary Visitors (VV): Programs for foreign nationals already
    traveling to the United States, including professional appointments and
    domestic travel support. VVs can partly be funded by an embassy.

    o Office of Citizen Exchanges professional and institutional exchange
    programs: Exchanges designed to link private sector American expertise and
    resources with priority institutions to engage youth influencers and
    promote civil society, democracy, youth leadership, and volunteerism,
    among other topics.

    o Humphrey Program: Midlevel professionals from developing countries come
    to the United States for a year of academic study and professional
    experience.

    o English Language Teaching: Targeted English language programs in
    specific regions and countries of the world, coordinated with the embassy.
    Programs include the English ACCESS Microscholarship program, English
    Language Fellow program, English Language Specialist program, and
    E-Teacher program.

    o Rhythm Road: Professional jazz and urban music groups who tour countries
    with limited exposure to American culture, playing concerts and talking
    about their music and American society.

    o Feature Film Service: Films provided to posts by the Motion Picture
    Association of America and other organizations for festivals, screenings
    by Ambassadors, and other programmatic usage by post public affairs
    sections.

    o Cultural Ambassadors: Utilizes world-renowned American cultural figures
    to reach out to young people around the globe.

    o Cultural Envoys and Cultural Visitors: Cultural Envoys aims to utilize
    the talents of average Americans to engage with young people abroad.
    Cultural Visitors is designed to bring young "idea" leaders in the arts
    and humanities to the United States for internships.

    o Arts Exchanges in International Issues: An annual grants competition
    designed to identify American partner organizations to conduct exchange
    programs in priority countries, utilizing cultural and artistic media and
    programs to address priority U.S. foreign policy goals.

    o Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation: Assists less developed
    countries in preserving their cultural heritage and demonstrates U.S.
    respect for other cultures.

    o International Partnership Among Museums: An institutional linkage
    program carried out with the American Association of Museums, selecting
    American museums to partner with a museum abroad to develop a
    collaborative program built around a theme.

    o International Cultural Property Protection: Carries out the Convention
    on Cultural Property Implementation Act, which protects cultural patrimony
    of signatory nations.

    o National Security Language Initiative: Program activity will include
    in-country language training for U.S. Fulbright students in Arabic,
    Turkish, and Indic languages; summer intensive language programs abroad
    for undergraduate beginning students and intermediate/advanced training
    for undergraduate and graduate students; expansion of the Fulbright
    Foreign Language Teaching Assistant Program to bring 300 native speakers
    of critical languages to teach in U.S. universities and schools; and a new
    component to the teacher exchange program to assist U.S. teachers of
    critical need languages to study abroad.

    o Study of the U.S.: Promotes better understanding of the United States
    through Summer Institutes for foreign university faculty, reference
    collections, and the Currents in American Scholarship series.

    o EducationUSA: Promotes higher education abroad by supporting overseas
    advising centers and collaborating with U.S. educational organizations to
    strengthen international exchange.

    Bureau of International Information Programs

    o U.S. Speakers: American subject-matter experts travel to a host country
    to address selected audiences on a range of policy issues and various
    aspects of American society.

    o American Corners: Public diplomacy outposts in host-country
    organizations, such as libraries and universities, that provide access to
    information about the United States through book collections, the
    Internet, and local programming to the general public.

    o Information Resource Centers: Computer-based knowledge platforms at
    embassies and consulates that provide information about U.S. policies and
    American society to targeted sectors of the host-country population.

    o Digital video conferences: Two-way video/phone dialogues between U.S.
    subject-matter experts and their counterparts in a host country.

    o USINFO: Authoritative, up-to-date Web site providing information on U.S.
    policy and American issues directed at foreign readers. Available in
    English and six world languages.

    o Washington File: Daily compilations of news articles and official texts
    intended for foreign audiences. Available on the USINFO Web site.

    o Electronic Journals: Web-based monthly publications focused on themes
    supporting mission performance plan goals. Available in several languages,
    Electronic Journals can be downloaded and printed for local distribution.

    o Infocentral: On-line resource for U.S. government spokespersons and
    embassy officers who need information on policy issues, access to press
    clips, and cleared guidance.

    o Mission Web sites: Each embassy maintains its own Web site with links to
    the State Department and other sources of information about the United
    States and U.S. policy.

    o Issue Briefs: Background information on policy topics, available at the
    Infocentral Web site, intended for use only by U.S. officials who need to
    articulate and explain policy positions.

    o Paper Shows: Exhibitions of 35-40 panels featuring photographic and
    documentary images and text on significant American personalities, issues,
    and events. Paper shows are produced in several languages and displayed in
    museums, libraries, theaters, and other public places worldwide.

    Bureau of Public Affairs Programs

    o Foreign Press Centers: Support centers for foreign journalists in
    Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles providing facilitative
    assistance, interviews with U.S. officials, and information resources.

    o Office of Broadcast Services: Provides television and radio to overseas
    posts, runs American Embassy Television Network, and assists foreign TV
    crews making film documentaries in the United States on subjects of
    interest to the U.S. government.

    Other Programs

    o Media reaction: Summary compilations of foreign editorial and op-ed
    reactions to issues of interest to the United States, available daily on
    the Web.

    Private Sector Best Practices Appendix IV

    GAO and other groups have called for a transformation in how U.S. public
    diplomacy efforts are conducted. One key element of this proposed
    transformation is the perceived need to adopt and adapt strategic
    communication best practices from the private sector.

    GAO suggested in its September 2003 report on State public diplomacy
    efforts that the department examine private sector public relations
    efforts and political campaigns' use of sophisticated strategies to
    integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players. GAO's
    roundtable with public relations firms from the private sector revealed
    that the key strategic components of such efforts include establishing the
    scope and nature of the problem, identifying the target audience,
    determining the core message, and defining both success and failure. The
    panel emphasized the importance of synchronizing these activities in a
    systematic way, so that communication efforts are mutually reinforcing in
    advancing the campaign's overall objectives. They noted that without a
    carefully integrated plan, the various elements are at risk of canceling
    each other out and possibly damaging the overall campaign. Figure 9
    illustrates the steps in the process.

    Figure 9: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy

    Business for Diplomatic Action

    Testimony by the President of Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA)1
    provides a suggested strategic road map for the government to follow,
    building on private sector best practices.2 BDA suggests that U.S. public
    diplomacy efforts be redesigned following a five step plan: (1) listen,
    ask questions, and analyze; (2) participate in foundation building process
    for a comprehensive communication strategy; (3) introduce a "positioning
    concept" for the United States in a post-9/11 world; (4) develop a
    comprehensive communication plan; and (5) put someone in charge. Under
    step one, BDA notes that "there are knowledge gaps with regard to issues
    of anti-American sentiment and public diplomacy programming." Under step
    two, BDA suggests that a task force of public and private sector parties
    explore the significance and implications of the research data collected
    under step one. Under step three, a "positioning concept" for the United
    States would be developed, capturing a point of view, a promise, and a
    personality. Step four requires the development of a comprehensive
    communication plan which can take the form of a multiaudience grid listing
    existing attitudes, desired attitudes, barriers standing between existing
    and desired attitudes, and the best means to address and remove these
    barriers. BDA notes that answers to these questions will vary by target
    audience (e.g., Muslim parents, Muslim youth, Chinese business leaders,
    etc.), but all must be translations of the "positioning concept" agreed to
    in step three. Finally, someone must be in put in charge to ensure that
    all activities, behaviors, and messages are aligned to the new positioning
    concept.

    Defense Science Board

    In its September 2004 report on strategic communications, the Defense
    Science Board makes a case that borrowing and adapting private sector
    communication practices is a critical step toward revitalizing U.S. public
    diplomacy efforts.3 The report notes that the United States approaches
    modern warfare with cutting-edge strategies, tactics, and weapons,
    designed to be effective against modern foes, and constantly updated. By
    contrast, the report argues, U.S. current strategic communication planning
    and execution is mired in diplomatic and marketing tactics of yesteryear.
    The United States has no clearly defined strategic framework, themes, or
    messages. The report goes on to note that building an effective strategic
    communication culture that borrows the most effective private sector
    marketing and political campaign techniques will be at the core of
    rebuilding and reinventing the way the United States listens, engages, and
    communicates with the world.

    The report notes that achieving this goal will involve the following three
    key steps:

    o As in a successful political campaign, the United States must clearly
    define what success means in terms of its benefits for all target
    audiences. All constituents must understand what success means for them in
    personal terms. A carefully defined set of themes and messages must
    reinforce targeted audiences' perceived and personal benefits.

    o The United States must communicate what its vision for the future
    promises on individual terms, not national or pan-national religious
    terms. The United States should personalize the benefits of its defined
    future, for example, personal control, choice and change, personal
    mobility, meritocracy, and individual rights (in particular, women's
    rights).

    o As with most effective private sector and political marketing campaigns,
    the United States must understand what target populations must be reached
    and influenced to achieve success. And the United States must understand
    what it takes to move them. More importantly, it must target audiences
    that can be moved-pragmatically and strategically picking its target
    audiences.

    Comments from the State Department Appendix V

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix VI

    Jess Ford (202) 512-4128

    In addition to the individual named above, Diana Glod, Assistant Director;
    Michael ten Kate; Robert Ball; Mehrunisa Qayyum; Richard Bakewell; and Joe
    Carney made significant contributions to this report. Martin de Alteriis,
    Elaine Vaurio, and Ernie Jackson provided technical assistance.

    (320339)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-535 .

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
    fordj@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-535 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
    Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related
    Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

    May 2006

    U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

    State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
    Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges

    Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the
    United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities-led by the
    State Department (State)-are designed to counter such sentiments by
    explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and
    advancing mutual understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine
    (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the
    Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach to
    implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain to be
    addressed.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of State develop (1) implementing
    guidance for its public diplomacy strategy modeled on private sector best
    practices, (2) a sample country-level communication plan that could be
    adapted for local use by posts, and (3) a systematic mechanism for sharing
    best practices data to address long-standing program challenges. State
    agreed with the report's recommendations.

    State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with
    significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major
    initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data for fiscal years
    2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with the
    largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with significant
    Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized overseas positions
    in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at all. As part of the
    Secretary of State's newly announced transformational diplomacy
    initiative, the department intends to reposition staff to better align
    with policy priorities. Since 2002, State has initiated three public
    diplomacy activities focused on the Muslim world-a media campaign, a
    youth-oriented magazine, and a group of youth-focused exchange
    programs-but these initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended.
    However, several exchange programs continue to target youth in the Muslim
    world. In addition, posts in the Muslim world use a range of standard
    programs and tools which the Under Secretary plans to supplement with
    several new initiatives.

    GAO's fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally
    lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private
    sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better
    communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core
    messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to
    monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan that
    brings all these elements together. These findings were reinforced by
    State's own post-level review. State established a new strategic framework
    for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2006, calling for, among other things,
    marginalizing extremists and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures.
    However, posts have not been given written guidance on how to implement
    this strategy. Such guidance is a critical first step to developing
    in-depth communication plans in the field.

    Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their
    public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with
    public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language
    capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language designated
    public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled by officers
    without the requisite language skills. State has begun to address many of
    these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of
    many of these efforts. Further, State lacks a systematic, comprehensive
    means of sharing best practices in public diplomacy, which could help
    transfer knowledge and experience across posts.
    *** End of document. ***