U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate
to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant
Challenges Remain (05-JUN-06, GAO-06-519).
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S.
preparedness for such an event. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. detection and
warning efforts and partners with federal and state agencies in
the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to reduce
tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated $17.24 million in
supplemental funding to enhance these efforts. This report (1)
identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard
and the extent to which potential impacts have been assessed, (2)
discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami
warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential
impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses
NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami
programs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-519
ACCNO: A55105
TITLE: U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners
Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but
Significant Challenges Remain
DATE: 06/05/2006
SUBJECT: Disaster planning
Emergency management
Emergency preparedness
Intergovernmental relations
Tsunamis
Warning systems
Weather forecasting
Risk assessment
Alaska
California
Hawaii
Indian Ocean Tsunami
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program
Oregon
Puerto Rico
TsunamiReady Program
Virgin Islands
Washington
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GAO-06-519
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
GAO
and Senator Dianne Feinstein
June 2006
U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS
Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential
Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain
GAO-06-519
U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS
Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce
Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain
What GAO Found
NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami hazard. The east
and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While high-hazard areas
have been identified, limited information exists on the likely impacts of
a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack inundation maps showing
the potential extent of tsunami flooding in communities, and others have
maps that may be unreliable. State assessments of likely tsunami impacts
on people and infrastructure have been limited, in part, due to a lack of
tsunami loss estimation software, as exists for floods and other hazards.
Although federal warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and
issue warnings, false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their
effectiveness. Some state and local emergency managers have raised
concerns about false alarms-the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not
followed by destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores-potentially causing
citizens to ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the
Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede
timely warnings to communities. For example, signal coverage for these two
systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and
failure to properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed
or not transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false
alarms but, according to agency officials, lacking the states' permission
elsewhere, has only conducted "live" end-to-end testing of the warning
systems in Alaska to identify problems.
The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami
impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education,
and infrastructure protection, but the level of implementation varies
considerably by location. Most of the states and some communities GAO
visited have basic mitigation plans identifying tsunami hazards. While all
of these locations have multiple warning mechanisms in place, disruptions
to key infrastructure such as telephone lines may hamper timely warnings.
Furthermore, key educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps
and developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In
addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure from
tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions. Emergency
managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need to focus on
more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding limitations.
Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA's preparedness program,
according to NOAA officials, because they perceive the threat of a tsunami
to be low. The nationwide expansion of NOAA's tsunami-related activities
and NTHMP is under way; however, the future direction of these efforts is
uncertain because they lack long-range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to
identify longrange goals, establish risk-based priorities, and define
performance measures to assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are
achieving the desired results.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
1
Results in Brief 5
Background 9
The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and
Caribbean Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been
Comprehensively Assessed 14
Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but
Warning Systems Have Limitations 24
State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under
Way, although Implementation Varies Considerably among
Locations 29
Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities
Is Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning 39
Conclusions 44
Recommendations for Executive Action 45
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45
Figures
Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis 10
Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods 12
Page i GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow 13 Figure 4: Pacific Ocean
Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii 16 Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone
17 Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone 18 Figure 7: The Puerto Rico
Trench Subduction Zone 19 Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission
for EAS and NOAA
Weather Radio 27 Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs 32 Figure 10:
TsunamiReady Sign for Communities 38
Abbreviations
DART Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
EAS Emergency Alert System
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
HAZUS-MH Hazards U.S.-Multi-Hazard NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration NTHMP National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program NWS
National Weather Service USGS U.S. Geological Survey
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
Washington, DC 20548
A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an underwater
earthquake.1 A tsunami wave may be very small in the deep ocean, but as it
approaches land can increase to tens of feet in height and reach shore as
a fast-moving wall of turbulent water. Tsunamis pose an inundation threat
to low-lying coastal communities from multiple destructive waves that can
penetrate far inland. Tsunamis are categorized as either distant or local.
Distant tsunamis travel long distances from their triggering events to
strike the coast hours later, allowing time to warn and evacuate
threatened communities. Local tsunamis strike the coast minutes after
their nearshore triggering event, allowing little time for warning and
evacuation. However, the frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United
States has been low, compared with other natural hazards, such as
hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) manages federal
tsunami detection and warning efforts. NOAA's National Weather Service
(NWS) operates two tsunami warning centers whose staff monitor seismic
data and, based on the location and magnitude of earthquakes, issue
warnings when tsunamis are likely. The warning centers transmit a tsunami
warning message to NWS forecast offices and state emergency management
centers, among others.2 NWS forecast offices transmit the warning over
NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NOAA Weather Radio) and the Emergency
Alert System. NOAA Weather Radio is a nationwide network of radio stations
broadcasting continuous weather information, including warnings, watches,
forecasts and other hazard information, 24 hours a day directly from NWS
weather forecast offices. The Federal Communication Commission's Emergency
Alert System, designed to provide the President a means to communicate
with the American people in the event of an emergency, can decode and
retransmit NOAA Weather Radio warning messages over radio and television
broadcast and cable systems.
Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in efforts
to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis through education, hazard
assessment, mitigation planning, and other activities. For example, NOAA
1
Landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes may also generate a
tsunami.
2
NWS is the official U.S. source of warnings for life-threatening weather
conditions, as well as tsunamis. NWS operates 122 weather forecast offices
nationwide, providing weather, water and climate forecasts and warnings
for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas to
protect life and property and enhance the national economy.
Page 2 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
operates a tsunami preparedness recognition program known as TsunamiReady
that encourages communities to educate citizens on tsunami hazards,
develop tsunami hazard plans, and establish local warning systems, among
other things. In addition, NOAA provides leadership and funding for the
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP). This program,
initiated in 1996, has been a partnership between NOAA; the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS); the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
and five states-Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington-to
assess tsunami hazards, improve and coordinate tsunami warning systems,
and develop state and local hazard mitigation programs.3 For example,
under the NTHMP, NOAA provides funding and technical support to help the
states produce inundation maps showing the extent to which coastal areas
may be flooded by a tsunami. Communities use these maps to help identify
people and property at-risk and to develop strategies for mitigating the
hazard. Furthermore, the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000, requires all states and localities to develop
FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plans to qualify for certain disaster
relief funding.4 These plans provide a framework for states and
communities to assess their vulnerability to all hazards and, if a
significant tsunami threat exists, develop approaches to reduce tsunami
impacts on people and infrastructure within their jurisdictions.
In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental
funds for NOAA to expand and improve its tsunami detection capabilities,
enhance warning center operations and facilities, produce tsunami
inundation forecast models, and expand the TsunamiReady program
participation nationwide.5 In fiscal year 2006, $9.82 million in
appropriations were designated for tsunami-related activities, and NOAA
requested $21.66 million for fiscal year 2007.6 NOAA is initially spending
these funds primarily on enhancing its tsunami detection capabilities, for
3
As of March 2006, NOAA was expanding the NTHMP into a nationwide program
open to participation by 28 coastal states and territories.
4
42 U.S.C. S: 5165.
5
After a tsunami-generating event, inundation forecast models combine
actual wave data with precomputed flooding scenarios to predict the size
of the wave and the extent of potential flooding for specific locations.
6
The $9.82 million designated for tsunami-related activities in fiscal year
2006 includes over $2.5 million for specific activities, such as $500,000
for warning sirens for the state of Washington.
example, by expanding its network of Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting
of Tsunamis (DART) detection stations in the Pacific Ocean to 39 stations
covering the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean Sea.
To address questions regarding the status of national tsunami
preparedness, this report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the
greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential tsunami impacts
on people and infrastructure have been assessed; (2) discusses the
effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system; (3)
describes ongoing local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the
potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities; and (4) assesses
NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.
In conducting our work, we visited the states participating in the
NTHMP-Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington-as well as Puerto
Rico and Florida. We met with federal, state, and local officials,
reviewed documentation related to tsunami hazard assessment, warning and
mitigation efforts, and analyzed plans for current and future tsunami
preparedness activities. To identify the U.S. coastal areas facing the
greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which their vulnerability to
tsunami impacts has been assessed, we reviewed historic and seismic data
and analysis from NOAA and other federal and state sources. For the states
facing the greatest tsunami hazards, we determined the extent to which
tsunami inundation maps identifying the potential vulnerability of people
and infrastructure have been prepared, and reviewed each state's
FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plan to determine how and to what
extent tsunami impacts have been assessed.
To discuss the effectiveness of the current federal tsunami warning
system, we visited both of NOAA's tsunami warning centers and met with
officials to discuss how they conduct their detection and warning
responsibilities and how they measure their effectiveness. In addition, we
visited selected NOAA warning forecast offices, met with officials to
determine how tsunami warnings are disseminated and tracked, and met with
state emergency managers to determine how they receive warnings and to
obtain their views regarding the effectiveness of the warnings. We also
reviewed reports prepared by NOAA and by state emergency managers that
evaluated the effectiveness of warnings issued by NOAA on June 14, 2005,
due to a potentially tsunami-generating earthquake off the Northern
California coastline.
To describe local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the
potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, we initially met
with state emergency managers and reviewed state mitigation documents.
Because comprehensive statewide data on local mitigation activities does
not exist, we next visited selected at-risk communities recommended by
state emergency managers. The communities we visited are Seward and
Kodiak, Alaska; San Mateo County and Crescent City, California; Hilo and
Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; Mayaguez and Rincon,
Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, Washington. We discussed
tsunami preparedness efforts with the community emergency managers, such
as planning, warning, education and outreach, infrastructure protection,
and the TsunamiReady program and obtained documentation of their efforts
and activities in these areas. We also met with NOAA officials involved
with the TsunamiReady program and reviewed program documentation.
To assess NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami
programs, we met with NOAA officials and reviewed plans for NOAA's ongoing
tsunami activities, as well as schedules for the completion of NOAA's
Tsunami Program expansion. We also met with National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program participants, including NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and state
representatives and reviewed program documentation to determine how NOAA
is planning for the future management and direction of its tsunami
activities.
We conducted our work between April 2005 and March 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
The coastal areas of the five states bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S.
Results in Brief
territories in the Caribbean face the greatest tsunami hazard, but
reliable and comprehensive assessments of the potential impacts on people
and infrastructure have not been completed for many of these areas.
According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant and
local tsunamis are Hawaii and the west coast states of California, Oregon,
and Washington, whereas Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
are threatened primarily by local tsunamis. Historically, the east coast
and the Gulf coast tsunami hazards are relatively low. Because inundation
maps are the foundation for evaluating potential tsunami impacts on
communities, map production has been a high priority for NOAA and the
threatened states. However, progress on this front has been slow-for
example, Alaska has inundation maps for only 5 of 60 at-risk
communities-primarily because accurate maps are complex and costly
Page 5 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
for states to produce. To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and
localities also need to assess the potential impacts of a tsunami on
people and infrastructure. While FEMA has standardized computer software
for comprehensively estimating the likely human, structural, and economic
damages from natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes,
no such tool exists for tsunamis. For this and other reasons, California
and Alaska have not specifically assessed potential tsunami losses, while
the other at-risk areas have produced limited tsunami damage assessments.
Consequently, emergency managers in the at-risk states and U.S.
territories do not have comprehensive information on how many and what
types of structures would be exposed and damaged, how many people could be
injured or killed, or the extent of potential short and long-term economic
impacts of a tsunami. We are recommending that NOAA work with FEMA and
USGS to create standardized tsunami loss estimation software.
Although NWS's warning centers can quickly detect potential tsunamis and
issue warnings, the effectiveness of these warnings is hampered by false
alarms and limitations in the federal systems that transmit warnings to
the local level. NWS's warning centers have rapidly analyzed seismic data
to detect potential tsunamis, and if the location and magnitude of an
earthquake indicated that a tsunami was likely, the centers generally
issued a warning within 5 to 10 minutes for local tsunamis. However, some
state and local emergency management officials have raised concerns about
false alarms, because the warnings proved to be unnecessary-no damaging
waves actually reached U.S. shores following the 16 warnings issued since
1982-or were overly broad and included communities that were not
imminently threatened. Such warnings can cause unnecessary and costly
evacuations and, experts warn, may cause people to ignore future warnings.
NWS has begun addressing false alarm concerns, for example, by expanding
the network of DART stations that help warning centers confirm whether a
tsunami has been generated, but it has not set specific performance
targets for reducing the number, scope, and duration of false alarms. We
are recommending that NOAA take specific steps, such as reexamining its
rules for when a warning will be issued and to which areas, to reduce
false alarms. Furthermore, although NWS warning centers effectively
transmit tsunami warnings to NWS forecast offices, these offices do not
always send timely warnings to affected local areas because the two
primary federal warning alert systems-the Emergency Alert System and NOAA
Weather Radio-have significant limitations. For example, signal coverage
for these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal
areas. This shortcoming was highlighted in June 2005, when an actual
tsunami warning for the west coast was issued but
Page 6 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
signal problems prevented the warning from reaching portions of the coasts
of Washington and Oregon. Also, to properly activate these warning
systems, NWS forecast office staff must enter a tsunami-specific code into
a computer. During the June 2005 event, failure to do so in a timely
manner or at all resulted in warnings being delayed or not transmitted to
some locations. NOAA has only conducted end-to-end tests of the tsunami
warning system using actual "live" warning codes, rather than test codes,
in Alaska to identify problems before actual events occur. In commenting
on a draft of this report, NOAA said that it conducts such end-to-end
testing where allowed and uses test codes in other states. We are
recommending that NOAA continue to work with the states to conduct
end-to-end testing that ensures the system will function as intended
during an emergency.
The at-risk communities we visited have taken actions to mitigate tsunami
impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education,
and infrastructure protection; however, the level of implementation among
these locations varies considerably. Each of the six states we visited
have FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans that identify tsunami
hazards; and most have taken the additional step of identifying actions to
mitigate those hazards, such as relocating critical facilities out of
inundation zones. However, only 4 of the 12 communities we visited have
developed FEMA-approved plans that include tsunami mitigation projects.
Further, while all of the states and communities we visited have developed
some mechanisms for warning people about a tsunami threat, communications
problems may hamper some communities' ability to receive and disseminate
warnings in a timely manner. For example, during the west coast tsunami
warning in June 2005, many 911 dispatch centers and telephone lines were
overloaded, in some cases, preventing local emergency managers from
quickly disseminating the warning to other local officials and preventing
telephone-based warning systems from reaching residents. Moreover, while
state and local officials recognize the need to educate the public, key
efforts identified by tsunami preparedness experts-such as distributing
evacuation maps and developing school curricula-have not been consistently
implemented across the states and communities we visited. For example,
only two of the six at-risk states we visited have developed and
implemented tsunami preparedness curricula in schools. In addition, few
states and localities have implemented long-term mitigation efforts such
as land-use restrictions and building design codes to prevent loss of life
and reduce economic damage. Overall, state and local emergency managers
attributed the variability in tsunami preparedness efforts to a variety of
factors, including their focus on other higher priority natural hazards
and a lack of
Page 7 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
funding. Furthermore, only a few communities in coastal areas have chosen
to participate in NOAA's voluntary TsunamiReady program, which is designed
to help them take the initial steps in tsunami mitigation. NOAA officials
believe that TsunamiReady participation is limited because of community
perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high cost versus
benefit. We are recommending that NOAA evaluate the TsunamiReady program
to determine how to increase participation by high-risk communities.
Efforts are under way to significantly expand federal tsunami detection
and related activities as well as the NTHMP; however, the future direction
of these efforts is uncertain because NOAA has not established long-range
strategic plans to guide them. Strategic plans are important because they
help agencies set specific program goals and objectives, define
performance measures for assessing program effectiveness, ensure
coordination of existing activities and establish risk-based priorities.
Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, NOAA's various
tsunamirelated activities, such as warning center operations, the
TsunamiReady program, and tsunami-related research, were not managed as a
formal, integrated program. NOAA combined the activities in 2005 into a
single program and is currently strengthening and expanding certain
elements of the program. However, NOAA has not yet adopted a
comprehensive, riskbased strategic plan to guide its expanded tsunami
program into the future. NOAA officials told us they expect to finalize
such a plan during 2006. In addition, the plan that NOAA is using to guide
the NTHMP activities has not been updated since 1996, and the program's
performance has not been formally assessed since 2001. As a result, some
issues raised in the 2001 assessment, such as lack of performance
measures, remain concerns of state NTHMP members today. Representatives of
the five original high-hazard NTHMP states are also concerned that the
program's funding decisions and strategic direction may become less
risk-based as states that face relatively low hazards join the program.
Without an updated, risk-based strategic plan for the expanded NTHMP, NOAA
will have difficulty ensuring that the most threatened states get the
resources they need to continue and complete key mitigation activities. We
are recommending that NOAA evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked
well and what high-priority activities remain to be completed and develop
comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and
NTHMP.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce
representing NOAA agreed with all of our recommendations and indicated
that steps will be taken to implement them. The Department of Homeland
Page 8 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Background
Security representing FEMA concurred with our recommendation that NOAA
should work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized tsunami loss
estimation software. However the department noted that FEMA does not have
the resources to pursue such a request; and therefore, any request of
assistance on this issue from NOAA would have to address these resource
constraints. The Department of the Interior did not comment on our
recommendations. The comments from the Departments of Commerce, Homeland
Security, and the Interior appear in appendixes I, II and III.
Tsunamis are typically generated by underwater earthquakes-landslides,
volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are other known, but less common,
tsunami sources. Tsunami generating earthquakes usually occur in
subduction zones, such as those found in the Pacific Ocean off the U.S.
western and Alaskan coasts, as well as in the Caribbean. Marked by deep
trenches in the seafloor, subduction zones are formed where one of the
earth's outer shell of tectonic plates plunges underneath another.7
Usually the plates are gradually moving past each other, but friction may
temporarily lock them together, causing stress to build up between the
plates. Sometimes the stress is relieved suddenly in the form of a large
earthquake. As shown in figure 1, the bottom plate dives farther down,
snapping the top plate violently upward, disturbing the overlying
seawater. The size of the resulting tsunami depends on a complex set of
factors, including the size of the earthquake, its depth below the ocean
floor, the depth of the water, the type and amount of seafloor movement
and the energy released.
7
Tectonic plates are the large plates of rock that compose the earth's
outermost layer and move in relation to each other as they ride atop the
hot, mobile material below them.
Page 9 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis
Source: NOAA.
Once generated, some tsunami waves move quickly inland while other waves
head toward the open ocean, often at speeds up to 600 miles per hour.
Therefore, a tsunami generated by an earthquake off the coast of Alaska
would be a local tsunami for that state's coastal areas, and could strike
within minutes of the event, while the same event is considered a distant
tsunami for the coast of Washington state, which would not likely be hit
until 3 or more hours later.
While tsunamis can be a high impact natural hazard, the frequency of
damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, compared with other
natural hazards. According to NOAA's records, the last tsunami
Page 10 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
causing significant impacts was at Skagway, Alaska, in November 1994,
where the landslide and associated tsunami caused one death and $25
million in damages. According to FEMA, flooding, severe storms, and
hurricanes are the most common and costly causes of disaster declarations
in the United States; at least 10 such events since 1989 have each
required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion dollars. Although
damaging tsunamis are relatively rare, the devastation caused by the
Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrates the need for assessing the threat, and
for monitoring and preparing for an event in at-risk areas, particularly
low-lying, seismically active coastal areas.
The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, is
responsible for warning Alaska, the west coast and east coast states, and
states along the Gulf of Mexico, while the Richard H. Hagemeyer, Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, is responsible for warning
Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea.8 These
warning centers use two types of data for determining when to issue a
tsunami warning. First, they receive and analyze earthquake data from
seismic networks operated by NOAA, USGS, the states, and universities to
determine whether to issue a warning.9 If the seismic data indicate that a
local tsunami may be generated, the responsible warning center issues a
warning based on the earthquake data alone. Second, the warning centers
analyze sea-level data to determine whether a tsunami has actually been
generated, and if not, cancel the warning. The centers receive sea-level
data through a network of DART stations and sea-level gauges, as shown in
figure 2. DART stations consist of a seafloor bottom-pressure recording
system that is capable of detecting tsunamis smaller than 1 inch and is
connected to a surface buoy that transmits the data by satellite to NOAA.
Scientists at the warning centers incorporate the data from the DART
stations into tsunami forecast models to estimate the size of the expected
waves and the potential impact on coastal areas. The tsunami warning
centers have used forecast models they developed, as well as models
8
The warning center in Alaska is also responsible for providing warnings to
Canada, and the warning center in Hawaii is responsible for warning 27
countries in the Pacific. In addition, each warning center provides
operational backup for the other center.
9
In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $8.1 million in supplemental funds
for USGS to, among other things, begin expanding the Global Seismographic
Network.
Page 11 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
developed by NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, which produce
expected tsunami inundations at nine high-risk locations.10
Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods
Source: NOAA. Source: NOAA. DART station Tide gauge
A network of federal, state, and local government agencies are responsible
for ensuring that a tsunami warning reaches the public. Figure 3 provides
an overview of the key components of this process. The federal tsunami
warning centers send a warning to NWS forecast offices and state emergency
management centers by multiple means, such as FEMA's National Warning
System, a dedicated telephone hotline, and NWS's satellite-based National
Weather Wire Service.11 The forecast offices, in turn, transmit the
warning over NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert System (EAS).
State emergency managers receive tsunami warnings from NWS and then warn
counties and local communities using multiple methods, including a
dedicated telephone network for state and local emergency management
officials. Finally, county and local officials are
10
The nine completed tsunami forecast models are for Kodiak, AK; Crescent
City, CA; Hilo, HI; Newport, OR; Seaside, OR; San Francisco, CA; Willapa
Bay, WA; Neah Bay, WA; and Port Angeles, WA.
11
The National Weather Wire Service transmits text-based weather forecasts
and warnings to an array of subscribers, including the media.
Page 12 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
responsible for warning the public and issuing evacuation orders, using a
variety of methods including bullhorns, sirens, and telephone systems.
Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow
Source: GAO analysis.
Federal, state, and local government agencies also conduct hazard
mitigation activities to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. At the
federal level, NWS operates the TsunamiReady community recognition
program. Initiated in 2000, TsunamiReady is modeled after NWS's StormReady
program for hurricanes and tornados. NWS meteorologists in regional
forecast offices are responsible for reviewing applications from coastal
communities and ensuring that they meet program requirements in
conjunction with state emergency management officials. NOAA also provides
a chairperson and funding for the NTHMP. From 1998 through 2001, NOAA
provided $2.3 million annually for the NTHMP, increasing to $4.3 million
annually in 2002 through 2005, and returning to $2.3 million in
Page 13 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean
Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively Assessed
2006. Initially, the five participating states each received less than
$100,000 annually from the NTHMP, but in recent years they have each
received approximately $275,000 annually to directly supplement their
individual mitigation efforts, while NOAA and the other federal partners
used the remaining funds to support their own activities under the
program. NOAA estimates that since the program's inception the states have
matched the NTHMP funding by a ratio of six state in-kind or dollar
contributions for every program dollar.
Tsunamis pose the greatest hazard to the coastal areas of the five states
bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S. territories in the Caribbean, but for
many of these areas reliable, comprehensive assessments of potential
tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have not been completed. Some
high-hazard coastal areas do not have tsunami inundation maps- the
foundation for evaluating potential tsunami impacts on communities-
showing the extent to which a tsunami would penetrate inland and flood
communities, while others have maps that may not be reliable. Progress in
developing these maps has been slow, primarily because accurate maps are
complex and costly for states to produce. Furthermore, states and
communities do not have comprehensive information on the potential human,
structural, and economic impacts of a tsunami. While FEMA has standardized
computer software for estimating losses resulting from natural disasters
such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, no such tool exists for
assessing tsunamis.
The Coastal Areas of the Pacific United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands Face the Greatest Tsunami Hazards
According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant and
local tsunami hazards are Hawaii and the west coast states of California,
Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska and the Caribbean Islands of Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened primarily by local
tsunamis, as shown in table 1. The hazard levels are primarily based on
tsunami source, height, and frequency information since 1900-the most
reliable and accurate information available-from NOAA's National
Geophysical Data Center tsunami database.
Source: NOAA.
According to NOAA, Hawaii is a high-hazard area for distant and local
tsunamis. Hawaii has experienced many destructive tsunamis because of its
location in the Pacific Ocean, as shown in figure 4, where about 80
percent of all recorded tsunamis have occurred. More than one-half of all
tsunamis recorded in the Hawaiian Islands were generated in the distant
Aleutian regions of the northern and northwestern Pacific Ocean, and about
one-fourth were generated along the western coast of South America.
Hawaii's local tsunami threat stems from earthquake and volcanic activity,
which cause underwater landslides off the coast. Hawaii suffered its
greatest tsunami death and destruction in 1946, when an earthquake in the
Aleutian Islands generated a tsunami that reportedly killed 159 people.
Hilo, Hawaii suffered the greatest loss-96 deaths and the destruction of
its waterfront area. Since 1946, an additional five tsunamis-four distant
and one local-have caused a reported 63 deaths and widespread destruction.
Figure 4: Pacific Ocean Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii
Sources: USGS and MapArt.
NOAA considers the west coast a high-hazard area for distant tsunamis and
medium-hazard area for local tsunamis. Like Hawaii, the west coast
historically has suffered the most destruction from tsunamis generated by
Pacific earthquakes in the distant South America and Aleutian regions. In
California, two tsunamis have caused significant damage. The 1960 Chilean
earthquake caused estimated tsunami damages of over $1 million, and the
tsunami generated by the 1964 Alaskan event killed 12 in Northern
Page 16 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
California and caused an estimated $15 million in destruction, including
damages inside San Francisco Bay. Oregon and Washington both have
sustained damages in coastal areas from distant tsunamis over the years.
Although distant tsunamis historically have been most common, a local
tsunami generated by the 750 mile long Cascadia subduction zone, lying
just 50 to 100 miles off the coasts of Washington, Oregon, and Northern
California, is considered a major threat. (See fig. 5.) Geologic and other
records from a Cascadia earthquake in 1700 suggest that the fault could
generate a tsunami wave of up to 30 feet that would likely reach the
Oregon coast in 15 to 30 minutes, raising concerns of a catastrophic
future event.
Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone
Sources: USGS and MapArt.
Alaska is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis, but a low-hazard area for
distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami threat to Alaska is
caused by seismic activity in the Aleutian subduction zone where the
Pacific and North-American tectonic plates collide, as shown in figure 6.
Tsunamis generated by earthquake induced landslides occurring inside bays
have been responsible for most death and damage in Alaska. The 1964
Alaskan earthquake triggered several tsunamis that in some cases struck
land within 2 minutes of being generated. The tsunamis caused 106 deaths
in Alaska and caused significant damage in the towns of Kodiak, Seward,
Whittier, and Valdez. Only once has a distant tsunami caused damage in
Alaska; the 1960 Chilean earthquake caused relatively minor tsunami
impacts on Alaskan harbors.
Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone
Sources: USGS and MapArt.
The Caribbean area, including the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands, is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis but a
lowhazard area for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami
threat posed to the islands comes primarily from the potential for
Page 18 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
earthquakes and underwater landslides in the Puerto Rico Trench subduction
zone that lies to the north of both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, as shown in figure 7. Puerto Rico's most devastating event of the
last century occurred in 1918, when an earthquake off the northwest coast
generated a tsunami of more than 15 feet, causing an estimated 140 deaths
and about $4 million in property damages. In the town of Aguadilla, nearly
300 homes were destroyed. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, an 1867 earthquake
in the Anegada Trench sent destructive waves into the harbor of Charlotte
Amelie on the island of Saint Thomas, destroying boats, the wharf, and the
waterfront.
Figure 7: The Puerto Rico Trench Subduction Zone
Sources: USGS and MapArt.
According to NOAA, the Atlantic and Gulf state coasts are relatively
lowhazard areas for distant or local tsunamis, with few reliable reports
of tsunami waves of any size ever reaching either coast. This is a
Page 19 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Potential Tsunami Impacts on People and Infrastructure Have Not Been
Comprehensively or Reliably Assessed
consequence of the low level of tsunami generating seismic activity
nearby-the nearest subduction zones are in the Caribbean. Historically,
none of the tsunamis generated in the Atlantic Ocean region has
significantly affected the east coast of the United States. For example,
the 1929 Grand Banks earthquake-induced landslide caused a tsunami which
killed 29 in Newfoundland but only resulted in a wave height of 1 foot on
the U.S. coast, and a distant tsunami generated by a massive earthquake
near Lisbon, Portugal in 1755 had no observed impact on the U.S. coast.
The potential distant threat from the collapse of a volcanic island off
the coast of Africa is the subject of scientific debate, and the potential
for a local tsunami-generating collapse of the continental shelf off of
the east coast is being investigated but is unconfirmed. Regarding the
Gulf coast, an earthquake in the Caribbean is considered the most likely
source of a tsunami; however, scientists believe that Florida and Cuba
protect the Gulf from Caribbean tsunamis and that the Gulf is unlikely to
propagate a large, destructive tsunami wave.
Because inundation maps are the foundation for evaluating the potential
impacts of tsunami events, producing such maps has been a high priority
since 1996 for NOAA and the five states participating in the NTHMP. To
optimize time and resources, the NTHMP partners agreed that (1) the states
would identify the high-priority communities to be mapped; (2) NOAA,
state, and university tsunami modeling scientists would use models to
produce inundation information for high-priority areas identified by the
states; and (3) state and local officials would produce and publish
official inundation maps. NOAA's Center for Tsunami Inundation Mapping
Efforts at its Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory assists the
modelers and the states in their efforts.
Although the NTHMP planned to complete mapping for all at-risk U.S.
coastal communities by 1999, progress has been slowed, primarily because
more accurate-but also more complex and costly-mapping techniques have
been adopted by the states. Initially, the NTHMP planned to use relatively
simple modeling technology because this approach would require fewer
resources than the more advanced technique, known as twodimensional
modeling, which requires detailed seafloor and coastal terrain data to
accurately model wave action and impact. Upon comparison of these two
technologies, the NTHMP decided in December 1996 to use twodimensional
modeling techniques for all mapping. While the NTHMP members recognized
that adopting two-dimensional modeling would reduce the pace of modeling
and mapping, they agreed that the decision would result in products of
improved detail, quality, and reliability.
Page 20 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Consequently, in the five states participating in the NTHMP, some coastal
areas currently do not have two-dimensional tsunami inundation maps, while
other coastal areas have inundation maps that predate current modeling
standards and therefore may not be reliable.12 Specifically:
o Alaska has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 5 communities,
while 60 additional communities are prioritized, but have yet to be
mapped;
o California has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 11 coastal
counties, excluding some areas such as harbors, while maps are being
produced for the remaining 4 counties;
o Hawaii has 66 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current
modeling standards; because the existing maps may underestimate
inundation areas, the state initiated a two-dimensional mapping
program in 2005 that has produced one map;
o Oregon has 52 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current
modeling standards; since 1996 the state has produced two-dimensional
maps for 9 communities, and 17 additional communities are prioritized
but have not yet been mapped; and
o Washington has two-dimensional maps for its southern coast as well as
many northern areas, while eight additional maps have been prioritized
but remain incomplete for certain coastal bay and Puget Sound
communities.
To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need to
assess potential impacts on people and infrastructure. According to FEMA
risk assessment guidance, after mapping how and where hazards will impact
an area, planners should determine what elements of the population,
infrastructure, and economy will be impacted by the hazards and estimate
the potential losses that could occur. According to FEMA, estimating
losses is essential for decision making at all levels of government,
including providing a basis for developing mitigation plans
Separate from the NTHMP, Puerto Rico has produced two-dimensional tsunami
inundation maps for its entire coastline, and the U.S. Virgin Islands has
produced maps for St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas that roughly
estimate tsunami inundation based on the wave that struck the islands in
1867.
Page 21 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
and policies, emergency preparedness, and response and recovery planning.
Each of the five Pacific region states, as well as Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands, have identified tsunamis as a hazard in their
FEMAapproved, all-hazard mitigation plans.13 To obtain FEMA approval,
states are required to describe and estimate losses-based on their own and
local jurisdiction assessments-for state-owned or -operated buildings,
infrastructure, and critical facilities in areas subject to hazards.
According to FEMA, the agency deliberately took the approach of not being
highly prescriptive regarding the development of the plans-focusing its
requirements more on what should be done rather than how it should be
done-in recognition of the inherent differences among states in terms of
size, resources, capabilities, and vulnerability. For example, states are
highly encouraged, but not required, to consider impacts on vulnerable
populations, in particular elderly, disabled, and low-income persons, and
to analyze the potential economic and human impact that each hazard would
have statewide. FEMA also encourages the use of several tools in preparing
damage assessments, such as HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S.-Multi-Hazard), which is
standardized computer software for comprehensively estimating the likely
human, structural, and economic damages from earthquakes, floods, and
hurricane winds. However, HAZUS-MH does not include a tsunami loss
estimation module; and according to FEMA, there is no similarly reliable
tool for estimating tsunami losses.
The National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on
tsunami risk reduction specifically called for FEMA, NOAA, and USGS to
take responsibility for developing a coordinated risk-assessment tool-
e.g., HAZUS-for effective use in tsunami risk assessments.14 The National
Institute of Building Sciences-which produced the existing HAZUS-MH
software for other hazards in partnership with FEMA-has estimated that
developing tsunami loss estimation methods and software would take about 3
years, at a cost of up to $10 million. A standardized tsunami loss
estimation tool would not only help the existing five NTHMP-member states
conduct risk assessments, but it would also be useful to any additional
states joining the NTHMP as it expands into a national program;
In addition, the Atlantic coast states of Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maine, and North Carolina have also identified
tsunamis as a hazard.
14"Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for Action."
National Science and Technology Council, December 2005.
Page 22 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
and it could also help the NTHMP and NOAA prioritize tsunami activities to
focus on the areas most vulnerable to tsunami losses.
Because of the lack of tsunami inundation maps, the variability in
approaches that was allowed in the all-hazard plans, and the lack of a
standardized tsunami loss estimation tool, some at-risk states have not
specifically assessed potential tsunami impacts, while other at-risk
states or territories have produced assessments that do not provide
complete loss information for all areas. Consequently, emergency managers
in the at-risk states and territories do not have comprehensive
information on how many and what types of structures would be exposed and
damaged, how many people would likely be injured or killed, or the extent
of likely short- and long-term economic impacts in the event of a
tsunami.15 For example:
o Alaska has not assessed tsunami impacts because the state lacks
detailed inundation information for many at-risk coastal communities;
o California assessed impacts from its high-risk earthquake hazard where
tsunamis are identified as a subhazard, but the state has not
specifically assessed tsunami impacts; and
o Hawaii assessed tsunami impacts on the state's critical infrastructure
and estimated the average annualized property loss; but the state did
not estimate injuries, deaths or the overall economic impacts due to
tsunamis.
According to NOAA officials, risk assessments for coastal areas requires
the careful analysis of information such as tsunami frequency,
site-specific tsunami inundation levels, and population density; but they
acknowledge that such information is not available for many at-risk areas.
Nevertheless, in March 2006, NOAA developed a preliminary estimate of the
tsunami risk to people on beaches in various areas, including the Pacific
region, Florida's east coast, and the Caribbean region. Based on
historical tsunami frequency information from the 1700's to the present,
and estimates of current daily beach attendance, NOAA's analysis suggests
that while large tsunamis occur more often in the Pacific region, over a
100-year time frame, the potential loss of life in the Caribbean and
Florida regions could be greater due to higher beach attendance in these
warm water locations.
15The seven Atlantic coast states that identified tsunamis as a hazard did
not assess tsunami impacts either because they concluded that the tsunami
risk was low or because they lacked adequate information on the hazard to
permit assessment of tsunami impacts.
Page 23 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning Systems
Have Limitations
NWS's two tsunami warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and
issue warnings, but the effectiveness of these warnings has been hampered
by frequent false alarms and limitations in the federal systems that
transmit warnings to the local level. Experts warn that false alarms may
generate unnecessary and costly evacuations and cause people to ignore
future warnings. NWS is working to reduce the number and duration of false
alarms, but it has not established any specific performance targets for
reducing them. Furthermore, although the warning centers quickly transmit
tsunami warnings to NWS forecast offices, the forecast offices do not
always send timely warnings to affected local areas because the two
primary federal warning systems-the Emergency Alert System and NOAA
Weather Radio-have significant limitations.
NWS Quickly Detects Potential Tsunamis and Issues Warnings, but False
Alarms Are a Concern
NWS's tsunami warning centers' goal is to issue "timely, accurate,
reliable, and effective" warnings to protect coastal populations from
tsunamis. Based on warning center data, the centers issued timely warning
bulletins, generally within 5 to 10 minutes for local events.16 The
tsunami warning centers have consistently reduced their average annual
time to issue bulletins-from 11 minutes in 1996 to 6.4 minutes in 2005 for
the center in Alaska, and from 16 minutes in 1996 to 4.5 minutes in 2005
for the center in Hawaii. According to tsunami warning center officials,
more and better quality seismic data, as well as improved analysis
techniques and computer equipment over the last decade, have enabled
faster bulletin issuance.
While the warning centers are able to detect potential tsunamis and issue
timely warnings, some state and local officials have raised concerns about
their accuracy and reliability due to false alarms. No destructive tsunami
has reached U.S. shores following any of the 16 warnings-primarily for
local tsunamis-issued to states by the warning centers since 1982.
According to warning center officials, their responsibility to provide
timely warnings requires them to broadcast warnings based on limited,
preliminary earthquake information before any resulting tsunami wave is
actually observed. However, according to emergency response experts, such
false alarms can generate costly, potentially dangerous evacuations
16
Warning bulletins include "tsunami warnings" to inform areas where a
tsunami is likely, "tsunami watches" that alert areas outside of a warned
area, and "tsunami information bulletins" that inform areas that an
earthquake has occurred but a tsunami is unlikely.
Page 24 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
and may cause people to ignore critical warnings in the future. For
example, according to the state of Hawaii's most recent estimate, an
evacuation from a tsunami false alarm in 1996 would have cost the state
$58.2 million in economic losses, or-adjusted for inflation-about $71
million in 2006 dollars.
According to some state and local emergency management officials, a false
alarm occurred in June 2005, when they received a tsunami warning from NWS
that they felt was too broad. On June 14, 2005, the warning center in
Alaska detected a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 90 miles off the Northern
California coast. The center quickly issued a warning for all coastal
areas that were within two hours of the tsunami's forecasted travel time,
including areas from the northern tip of Canada's Vancouver Island to the
California-Mexico border. Knowing that it would take hours for the tsunami
to reach his community, a Southern California emergency management
official who received the warning sought to confirm the tsunami's
existence by contacting his Northern California counterparts closer to the
source. He learned that a destructive tsunami had not been generated and
determined that his community should not evacuate. According to this
official, because his area was not imminently threatened by a tsunami, it
should not have been included in the initial warning. As a result of the
feedback received after the June 14, 2005 event, the warning center in
Alaska has changed its warning protocols so that it will issue a tsunami
warning for only about half of the area that received a warning during the
June event, if a similar situation should occur in the future.
Seismologists outside of NOAA have suggested that the tsunami warning
centers could reduce the duration-and perhaps the number-of false alarms
by relying more on seismic analyses that assess the type and direction of
an earthquake. For example, according to some state and USGS
seismologists, the June 14, 2005, earthquake's horizontal motion should
have indicated that the generation of a tsunami was highly unlikely,
enabling the warning center to cancel the warning within minutes, rather
than over an hour later. However, a NWS review of the event noted that
horizontal-motion earthquakes can trigger submarine landslides that can in
turn produce tsunamis, so the warning center should not cancel a warning
solely based on seismic analysis. According to warning center officials,
they receive feedback from outside seismologists regarding warning
procedures through organizations such as the NTHMP. However, some outside
seismologists are concerned that warning center seismologists are
reluctant to seek feedback or adopt new analytical procedures for issuing
and canceling warnings.
Limitations in Federal Emergency Warning Systems Impede Rapid and
Comprehensive Tsunami Warning Transmission
NOAA expects that false alarms will be reduced with the expansion of the
sea-level data network and through an upgrade of its forecasting tools.
DART stations help reduce false alarms for distant tsunamis because the
stations detect slight changes in deep-ocean waves far from shore that
help forecast how these waves will grow as they approach the coast. In
addition to expanding the DART network, NOAA is upgrading the models that
use DART data to forecast tsunami flooding and is also expanding and
upgrading its network of sea-level gauges that the warning centers use to
confirm or cancel tsunami warnings. The tide gauge expansion plan calls
for deploying a total of 16 new gauges and upgrading 33 gauges by November
2006.
NOAA acknowledges the importance of reducing tsunami false alarms but has
not yet established performance goals or related metrics for identifying
progress toward this goal, such as tracking the number and duration of
warnings to areas that do not experience destructive tsunamis. According
to NWS officials, they are currently evaluating outcome goals and
performance measures for warnings and other tsunami-related activities and
expect to finalize these goals and measures in 2006.
Technical gaps and procedural limitations have impeded federal emergency
warning systems from broadcasting rapid and comprehensive tsunami warnings
to affected local areas. For example, technical gaps such as weak signals
and transmitter failures have prevented comprehensive warning transmission
over the EAS and NOAA Weather Radio. Broadcasting tsunami warnings over
EAS and NOAA Weather Radio requires NOAA-owned transmitters to relay a
signal from the NWS forecast offices to the broadcast stations and NOAA
Weather Radio, as shown in figure 8.
Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission for EAS and NOAA Weather Radio
Source: GAO analysis and Art Explosion.
According to NOAA officials, NOAA transmitters provide signal coverage for
97 percent of the nation's population; however, some coastal locations
including portions of Hawaii receive such weak signals that NOAA Weather
Radio is unlikely to function. Transmitter failure has also prevented
warnings from being sent over EAS and NOAA Weather Radio. For example, on
June 14, 2005, some coastal communities in Washington and Oregon did not
receive the warning over EAS or NOAA Weather Radio because transmitters
failed to send a signal. A September 2005 test of the federal tsunami
warning systems in California, Oregon, and Washington found improvements
in problematic transmission areas identified during the June event but
uncovered new signal transmission issues in other areas. NWS is adding new
transmitters to improve signal coverage and refurbishing old transmitters
to improve their reliability.
In addition, procedural limitations such as the NWS forecast offices'
inconsistent activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio can impede rapid and
comprehensive transmission of tsunami warnings. On June 14, 2005,
Page 27 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
the forecast offices responded to the tsunami warning in a variety of
ways, some of which caused delays or nontransmission of EAS or NOAA
Weather Radio warnings to affected local areas. For example, staff in some
NWS forecast offices did not enter a tsunami-specific warning code into a
computer, resulting in EAS and NOAA Weather Radio not activating rapidly,
if at all. According to a subsequent NWS assessment of the event, guidance
to forecast office staff on tsunami warning procedures was inadequate.
Since the June 2005 event, coastal NWS forecast offices in Washington,
Oregon, and California have received guidance that, for example, lists EAS
activation as the proper first step when a tsunami warning is received.
Although the warning centers conduct monthly tests of their communication
systems to ensure that NWS forecast offices and state emergency management
centers receive the warnings, NWS does not routinely conduct periodic
end-to-end tests of the tsunami warning system using the actual "live"
computer codes rather than test codes. Such an end-to-end test would check
the systems and procedures used to transmit an actual tsunami warning from
the tsunami warning center to the public and identify technical gaps and
procedural shortcomings. NWS conducted the first such end-to-end test of
the tsunami warning system in Alaska, including activation of EAS and NOAA
Weather Radio in March 2005. The test uncovered breakdowns in EAS warning
transmission at television and radio stations whose EAS systems were not
set up to use the tsunami warning code. NWS is working with emergency
managers and broadcasters in Alaska to take corrective actions and retest
the system. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that
while it supports broadening end-to-end testing in at-risk states it can
conduct end-to end testing using "live" warning codes for the EAS system
only in those states that permit it to do so. In other states, end-to-end
testing is conducted by using test codes for the EAS system. NOAA said it
will continue to encourage state participation in the end-to-end testing
of the tsunami warning system.
State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way, although
Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations
The 12 coastal communities in the six at-risk states and territories that
we visited are taking actions to mitigate tsunami impacts through
planning, warning system improvements, public education, and some
infrastructure protection efforts, although the level of implementation
varies considerably among locations.17 While state and local tsunami
mitigation plans and warning systems have largely been developed,
limitations exist that have raised concerns about their effectiveness. In
addition, key public education efforts have not been consistently
implemented in all coastal communities we visited, and only a few
communities have taken steps to protect critical infrastructure from
potential tsunami damage. Overall, tsunami mitigation efforts have been
mixed due to a number of challenges, including competing priorities,
funding constraints, and lack of authority to implement legislative or
policy changes. Finally, while 7 of the 12 communities we visited
participate in NOAA's TsunamiReady preparedness program, nationwide few
coastal communities have chosen to participate in the program.
State and Local Tsunami Mitigation Plans and Warning Systems Have Been
Largely Developed, but Concerns Exist about Warning System Effectiveness
According to FEMA guidance, the purpose of mitigation planning is to
identify natural hazards, consider actions and activities to reduce
potential losses from those hazards, and coordinate the implementation of
a hazard mitigation plan. All six of the states and territories we visited
have developed FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans, a requirement
to qualify for certain disaster-related grant funds under the Stafford
Act, as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.18 These plans
identify tsunami hazards and describe in general terms the vulnerability
of people and property to tsunami threats. Most of the state level plans
we reviewed take the additional step of identifying specific actions to
mitigate the risks identified, such as relocating critical facilities out
of tsunami inundation zones. While only 4 of the 12 communities we visited
have FEMAapproved plans, each of the four has identified projects to
mitigate tsunami hazards. State and local emergency managers whom we spoke
17
The six at-risk states and territories are Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, and Washington. The 12 communities are Seward and
Kodiak, Alaska; Crescent City and San Mateo County, California; Hilo and
Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; Mayaguez and Rincon,
Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, Washington.
18
According to FEMA, the states used FEMA Pre-disaster Mitigation Program
grant funds to develop their all-hazard mitigation plans. In addition,
FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has funded tsunami mitigation
projects in Alaska and Puerto Rico.
with cited resource and time constraints as significant barriers to
improving mitigation planning.
All of the states and communities we visited have developed warning
systems, but they have various limitations that may impact their
effectiveness. State and local tsunami warning systems help ensure that
all at-risk residents and tourists are warned about a potential tsunami in
a timely manner. Most of the coastal communities we visited employ some
technologically sophisticated methods to warn residents. For example, 8 of
the 12 communities we visited had at least one tsunami warning siren and
three alerted residents by an automated telephone system. However, local
emergency managers told us that inadequate warning siren coverage was a
significant issue in many locations, such as Ocean Shores, Washington, and
on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula. In addition, many of the warning methods used
by communities-such as sirens and internet-based messaging systems-are
dependent on telephone lines and other infrastructure that would likely be
disrupted by a strong earthquake. During the June 2005 tsunami warning on
the west coast, officials in several communities noted that telephone
lines were overloaded by a surge of incoming 911 calls from concerned
residents, in some cases, preventing emergency managers from contacting
other local officials and preventing telephone-based warning systems from
reaching all residents. Some emergency managers expressed concern that
they do not have adequate backup systems to receive and disseminate
warning messages if telephone lines fail. Finally, three of the
communities we visited rely on warning methods such as verbal
notifications by bullhorns or radio broadcasts.
State and local emergency managers are aware of the limitations of
existing tsunami warning systems and are involved in a number of projects
to address them. For example, some of the communities we visited have
attempted to obtain additional sirens and replace unreliable ones to
provide better coverage to residents. For Crescent City, California, and
Gold Beach, Oregon, county officials obtained a number of used civil
defense sirens for a nominal cost but reported that installation and
maintenance costs pose additional challenges. Washington state has
provided seven at-risk communities with advanced All Hazard Alert
Broadcasting sirens, but their high cost-approximately $50,000, twice as
much as a new, conventional siren-may be prohibitive for other
communities.19 In addition, communities have taken actions to ensure more
effective communications between emergency management officials and first
responders. For example, some have purchased satellite phones and digital
communications systems that are not vulnerable to earthquake damages or
interoperable radios that ensure that first responders can talk to each
other if telephone lines are disrupted. In coastal areas with high
population and building densities-where roads, bridges, and other
horizontal evacuation methods are limited or where warning time is
short-vertical evacuation to the upper floors of buildings that are
capable of withstanding the initial earthquake and subsequent tsunami can
be an
20
alternative or supplement to horizontal evacuation.
Most of the states and communities we visited have made efforts to test
their evacuation plans and warning systems, but few comprehensive drills
have been conducted. Recent events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
have illustrated that robust training and testing are important to
identify problems in advance of an actual event.21 However, only Seaside,
Oregon, has conducted comprehensive tsunami exercises involving multiple
agencies and full public participation. Five of the communities we visited
have conducted exercises involving multiple agencies in mock tsunami
scenarios to discuss plans and procedures involved in responding to a real
event. While these efforts are useful, their limited scope may not
adequately identify all of the issues that would emerge in an actual
event. For example, in an actual emergency, traffic control and public
evacuations may take substantially longer than estimated. Local officials
told us that more comprehensive drills would be beneficial, but they have
limited funding and staff to plan and conduct them and getting community
involvement is very difficult due to the disruption to the local economy.
19
The All Hazard Alert Broadcasting Radio is an outdoor system that provides
both tone and voice alert and notification to residents/visitors by
federal, state, and local emergency authorities; an intense blue light is
also activated at each location to further indicate the area is in a
hazardous situation.
20
FEMA and NOAA, with a grant from the NTHMP and the National Earthquake
Hazards Reduction Program, are currently developing guidance for
constructing vertical evacuation shelters.
21
See GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2006).
Tsunami Education and Outreach Efforts Have Not Been Consistently
Implemented
Education and outreach efforts are important because plans and warning
systems may do little to save lives if the public does not know what to do
when it receives a warning. Two such efforts, distributing evacuation maps
and posting tsunami evacuation signs, raise awareness of tsunami threats
and educate the public on appropriate escape routes. Ten of the 12
communities we visited have either received evacuation maps from the state
or developed their own maps identifying appropriate evacuation routes.
However, only five of the communities reported distributing evacuation
maps to all residents, either by mailing them to all registered utility
customers, publishing them in the local telephone book, or in one case
distributing them door-to-door.22 A few communities have taken other
actions to reach the public such as posting evacuation maps in police
stations and on grocery store reader boards. Several communities have made
efforts to reach tourists by providing evacuation maps at areas they
frequent, such as the local visitor's center and distributing tsunami
hazard information and evacuation maps to hotels. Regarding tsunami signs,
9 of the 12 communities reported posting tsunami hazard or evacuation
route signs in their communities, such as those shown in figure 9,
although in a few locations, local emergency managers reported that the
signs are frequently stolen.
Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs
Source: Oregon Emergency Management.
According to emergency management officials and other emergency
preparedness experts, focusing on educating youth-the adults of
tomorrow-has considerable promise for increasing tsunami
22
In Hawaii, evacuation maps are printed in each county's telephone book.
preparedness. Specifically, two key efforts-developing and implementing
school curricula and conducting tsunami evacuation drills in schools- may
help improve tsunami preparedness now and in the future. Of the six
at-risk states and territories we visited, only two-Oregon and
Washington-have developed tsunami specific curricula and are teaching them
in schools, according to state emergency managers.23 The Washington state
curriculum is targeted at two age groups-grades K through 6 and grades 7
through 12-and provides various lessons to help students plan ahead for a
tsunami and protect themselves and their families when a tsunami occurs.
In addition, Hawaii has developed a tsunami specific curriculum that will
be tailored to each of its counties. Oregon and Hawaii also require
schools in tsunami inundation areas to conduct tsunami drills at least
once a year, often in conjunction with Tsunami Awareness month activities.
For example, in Hilo, Hawaii, an elementary school located in a known
tsunami inundation area conducts an annual evacuation drill in which
students practice responding to a tsunami warning by walking from the
school to a safe location. Three of the communities we visited in
Washington, Puerto Rico, and Alaska also reported conducting tsunami
evacuation drills in schools at least once a year, even though the states
do not require them.
All six of the at-risk states and territories we visited have conducted a
variety of education and outreach activities to distribute tsunami hazard
information to communities. For example, the states we visited have
developed a variety of print materials, produced videos, made tsunami
information available on the Internet, and conducted forums and other
workshops to educate citizens on tsunami risks and preparedness. At the
community level, 11 of the 12 emergency managers we visited stated that
forums and workshops have been conducted to educate residents and tourists
about tsunami hazards.24 However, only two local emergency managers
reported meeting with special needs populations, such as
23
In 1995, the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 378, requiring that at
least 30 minutes of earthquake, tsunami, and other disaster-related
education be taught in schools each month, among other things. Or. Rev.
Stat. S: 336.071 (2003).
24
One comprehensive education effort was funded by the NTHMP. In September
2004, the city of Seaside, Oregon, launched a 9-month Tsunami Awareness
Program to determine the feasibility of educating the public on tsunami
hazards and preparedness practices. The community implemented five
outreach strategies to reach target audiences, including a neighborhood
educator project, business workshop, school outreach program, public
workshop, and a tsunami evacuation drill that included Seaside residents,
businesses, and visitors.
States and Localities Have Undertaken Few Efforts to Protect
Infrastructure from Potential Tsunami Damage
community hospitals and senior centers, to distribute tsunami hazard
information and encourage them to develop tsunami evacuation plans.
All of the at-risk states and territories acknowledged the need for
additional education and outreach but cited two primary challenges to
increasing and sustaining such efforts. First, many of the state emergency
managers whom we spoke with noted that they are responsible for other,
higher priority hazards-such as floods and wildland fires-that occur more
frequently than tsunamis. Second, the states have limited funding
dedicated to tsunami preparedness activities. Of the approximately
$275,000 in NTHMP funds provided annually to each state, the states have
chosen to use most of it to develop or upgrade existing tsunami inundation
maps rather than for education or outreach efforts. Local emergency
managers echoed these challenges. Moreover, in many areas that depend on
tourism, local emergency managers said that businesses are reluctant to
post tsunami hazard information because it may scare tourists and
negatively impact the economy. Many noted, however, that since the
December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the subsequent June 2005 tsunami
warning on the west coast, community interest in workshops and forums has
increased. Local businesses-in particular hotels and motels- have become
increasingly interested in receiving tsunami hazard information to
distribute to patrons.
According to tsunami experts, land-use planning and zoning strategies- for
example, designating tsunami hazard areas for open-space uses, such as
parks, and locating new infrastructure and critical facilities (i.e.,
police stations, hospitals, and potable water systems) out of tsunami
hazard areas-can mitigate loss of life and property from a devastating
tsunami.25 However, many of the at-risk states we visited have not adopted
any landuse planning strategies to address the tsunami threat. Oregon is
the only at-risk state we visited that has passed a land-use statute
placing limits on the construction of certain high occupancy structures
within tsunami inundation areas.26 Alaska also places restrictions on
development in certain designated "natural hazard" areas, including
coastal areas potentially affected by tsunamis.27 One at-risk community
also has been
25
Designing for Tsunamis: Seven Principles for Planning and Designing for
Tsunami Hazards. NTHMP, March 2001.
26
Or. Rev. Stat. S:S: 455.446-447 (2003).
27
Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, S: 112.210 (2006).
Page 34 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
successful in implementing a land-use strategy to mitigate future tsunami
losses. The city of Hilo, Hawaii, developed an Urban Renewal Plan-based on
the devastation from the 1960 tsunami-that set aside certain "open areas"
for limited use in order to minimize the danger of loss of life or damage
to property in areas potentially subject to inundation from tsunamis.28
Tsunami experts believe that constructing new buildings in a tsunami
inundation area to better withstand tsunami forces can reduce loss of life
and property damage in cases where land-use planning and zoning are not
feasible. Building design and construction in the United States is
governed at the local level by building codes that establish minimum
acceptable requirements for preserving public safety. Although the Uniform
Building Code contains design requirements and standards for fire, wind,
floods, and earthquakes, it does not include requirements for
tsunami-resilient design.29 Nonetheless, two communities we visited, Hilo
and Honolulu, Hawaii, have developed guidelines for constructing
tsunami-resilient structures. For example, a 2000 Honolulu building
ordinance requires, among other things, that the inhabitable space in
buildings at-risk from tsunamis must be elevated above the regulatory
flood elevation through the use of posts, piles, piers or shear walls
parallel to the expected flow of a tsunami wave.30 None of the at-risk
states we visited have developed guidelines for constructing
tsunami-resilient structures although legislation establishing tax
incentives for such construction is pending in Washington.31 Hawaii's
state legislature is currently considering a bill to develop a state
building code based on the International Building Code, which, according
to state emergency management officials, would strengthen buildings
against tsunamis and other hazards.32 In commenting on a draft of this
report, FEMA noted that, the International Building Code, which has
replaced the Uniform Building Code as the national model code, also does
not contain specific requirements addressing the tsunami
28
Urban Renewal Plan for the Kaiko'o Project, Hawaii Redevelopment Agency,
County of Hawaii, Hilo, Hawaii, June 1965.
29
Most local building codes in the Pacific states are based on the Uniform
Building Code prepared by the International Conference of Building
Officials.
30
Revised ordinances of Honolulu, Ch. 16-11, available at
http://www.co.honolulu.hi.us/refs/roh/16a11.htm.
31
H.B.
1022, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2006).
H.B.
3230, 23rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Hi. 2005).
32
hazard. However, structures built in conformance with the International
Building Code are likely to perform better during a tsunami because of
other code provisions, particularly seismic requirements.
Several states, including California and Oregon, have adopted laws and
ordinances for retrofitting existing buildings to reduce losses from
future earthquakes.33 For existing infrastructure, earthquake retrofits
may improve tsunami resistance, or help minimize floating debris that can
damage nearby buildings.34 Earthquake retrofits could be particularly
important in the case of a locally generated tsunami off the west coast of
the United States, where a magnitude 9.0 or greater earthquake is likely
to precede a tsunami. FEMA has developed guidance for rehabilitating
buildings to resist earthquake forces.35
Most of the states and coastal communities we visited have not attempted
to mitigate tsunami risk through land-use planning and infrastructure
requirements for several reasons. First, state and local emergency
managers said that although they recognize the need for additional
infrastructure protections, such decisions typically reside with a
community's city council or other governing body. Second, many coastal
communities rely on coastal-dependent development such as ports and
harbors that, by their nature, must be situated on the coast; and in other
cases, communities have already built to capacity in tsunami hazard areas,
and relocation is not a practical or cost-effective option. Finally, few
states or coastal communities have adopted tsunami building codes because
model codes generally have not included requirements for designing
tsunami-resilient structures and few have implemented retrofitting
projects because of their high costs.
33
See e.g., Cal. Gov. Code S: 8875 (2006); S.B. 2-5, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2005).
34
Retrofitting is making changes to an existing building to protect it from
flooding, or other hazards such as high winds and earthquakes.
35
FEMA-172, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, Handbook of
Techniques for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings.
Page 36 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Community Participation in NOAA's TsunamiReady Hazard Preparedness Program
Is Limited
Of the approximately 500 coastal communities at-risk from a tsunami in
five Pacific states and Puerto Rico, only 25 communities-including 7 of
the 12 we visited-have been recognized by NWS as TsunamiReady, the primary
federal effort to encourage communities to prepare for tsunami hazards.36
According to NWS, the program was developed to provide minimum standard
guidelines for communities to follow and to enhance tsunami readiness by
increasing public awareness and understanding of the tsunami hazard, among
other things.37 Communities that meet program standards are provided signs
such as those shown in figure 10.
36
In January 2006, FEMA developed a proposal that encourages communities to
map and manage tsunami hazards by providing credits in the Community
Rating System that reduce their flood insurance rates. The Community
Rating System, part of the National Flood Insurance Program, is a
voluntary incentive program that recognizes and encourages community
floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum program
requirements. Communities that participate in the National Flood Insurance
Program receive federally subsidized flood insurance.
37
As of March 2006, there were a total of 27 TsunamiReady recognized
communities in the United States, including 2 on the East Coast - Indian
Harbour Beach, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia. All counties in the state
of Hawaii are also recognized as TsunamiReady.
Source: NWS.
While the majority of at-risk coastal communities have not joined the
TsunamiReady program, we found that four of the five at-risk communities
we visited that are not yet recognized as TsunamiReady do plan to pursue
recognition in the future. Two of the four communities are currently
taking steps to meet program requirements by installing additional warning
infrastructure, such as NOAA Weather Radios. Emergency management
officials generally agreed that the TsunamiReady program is a good first
step toward helping communities mitigate the potential impact of a
tsunami. Specifically, in the TsunamiReady communities we visited, most
officials stated that they sought recognition to increase community
tsunami awareness, and officials noted that the TsunamiReady signs had
helped them move toward that goal. One emergency manager whom we spoke
with stated that the TsunamiReady recognition had "opened doors" to
conduct outreach with hotels and that hotel managers had begun seeking
tsunami hazard information. However, some of the state emergency managers
with whom we spoke expressed three concerns about the TsunamiReady
program: (1) it is too limited in scope-for
Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is Occurring
in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning
example, emphasizing warning infrastructure but not requiring tsunami
specific evacuation and mitigation plans; (2) it should be more focused on
education, particularly regarding the local tsunami threat; and (3) the
name "TsunamiReady" promotes a false perception of readiness, since
preparedness is a continuous process.
NOAA officials believe that the lack of program participation may be due
to community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high cost
versus benefit, but the agency has not formally assessed the program to
identify barriers to participation or potential program modifications to
encourage participation. The agency's 2005 Report to Congress on the
Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation Plan, identifies achieving
tsunami preparedness recognition for at-risk communities in the United
States as a vital part of its tsunami activities.38 To that end, according
to the report, the agency has committed to work with each atrisk coastal
community across the nation to ensure that community and emergency
management officials fully understand the tsunami hazard and take action
to prepare.
A significant expansion of federal tsunami detection, warning, and related
activities, as well as the NTHMP, is under way; however, the future
direction of these efforts is unclear because NOAA has not developed
long-range strategic plans to guide them. In 2005, NOAA combined its
various tsunami-related activities into a single program and is currently
strengthening and expanding certain elements of the program. However, NOAA
has not yet adopted a comprehensive strategic plan that sets specific
program goals and objectives, defines performance measures, ensures
coordination of existing activities, and establishes risk-based priorities
to guide the expansion of the warning program into the future.
Furthermore, with the likely expansion of the NTHMP from 5 state
participants to potentially 28 state and territorial participants in 2006,
it will be difficult for NOAA to ensure that the most threatened states
receive the resources they need to continue and to complete key mitigation
activities without an updated, risk-based strategic plan.
38
NOAA, FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-13),
Report to Congress on NOAA's Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation
Plan.
Page 39 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
NOAA Is Expanding Elements of Its Tsunami Program, but the Program Lacks a
Long-Range Strategic Plan
Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami, NOAA's various tsunami-related
activities, such as warning center operations, the TsunamiReady program,
and tsunami-related research were not managed as a formal, integrated
program within the agency. The administration's initiative to expand
NOAA's tsunami activities-and the receipt of supplemental funding from the
Congress for that purpose-led NOAA in April 2005, to establish an
integrated national Tsunami Program. NOAA is strengthening the Tsunami
Program by (1) expanding the Pacific warning center and National Data Buoy
Center facilities by the end of 2005;39 (2) expanding tsunami warning
center operating hours to 24 hours, 7 days a week in April 2006; (3)
upgrading and expanding water level observation capabilities by November
2006; (4) expanding and upgrading the earthquake detection network by the
end of 2006; (5) establishing a long-term tsunami data archive by late
2007; (6) increasing DART tsunami detection stations in the Pacific,
Atlantic, and Caribbean by early 2008; (7) expanding TsunamiReady
participation nationwide through 2012; and (8) developing a tsunami
forecast system, including 75 inundation forecast models by 2013.
While NOAA has developed a schedule for strengthening elements of the
Tsunami Program, it has not developed a long-range strategic plan that
includes specific detection, warning and mitigation outcome goals, and
performance measures to evaluate progress in achieving them. For example,
NOAA does not have program outcome goals and performance measures for
reducing false alarms or other critical tsunami-related activities such as
mapping, modeling, research, education, and outreach. Although strategic
planning is required for the major functions and operations of agencies by
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, it is not specifically
required for individual programs within agencies. However, our work
related to the act and the experience of leading organizations have shown
the importance of identifying long-term goals and establishing performance
measures to guide program operations and help policy makers determine if
program activities are achieving the desired results. In addition, the
Department of Commerce's Inspector General has identified improving
strategic planning as a top priority and
39
The National Data Buoy Center, under the NWS, designs, develops, operates,
and maintains a network of data collecting buoys and coastal stations.
Page 40 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
reported on the need for NOAA's programs to improve how they report and
measure performance toward achieving specific outcomes.40
In this context, a strategic plan would provide NOAA a framework for
ensuring that its tsunami-related activities are planned and implemented
in a risk-based manner. Our recent reports have emphasized the importance
of federal agencies using risk-based planning. For example, in a June 2005
testimony on the Department of Homeland Security's resource allocation, we
reported that the department must carefully weigh the benefit of
activities and allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risks is
worth the additional cost.41 Any actions taken by NOAA absent risk-based
analysis have the potential to divert funds away from locations, such as
the Pacific and Caribbean regions, where the tsunami hazard-particularly
from local tsunamis-is well documented. Some of NOAA's activities designed
to strengthen the tsunami program are scheduled in a manner that raises
questions about the extent to which they are risk-based. For example,
there is little historical evidence of tsunamis on the Atlantic coast or
Gulf coast, yet expansion activities already implemented or scheduled in
2006 include the placement of DART stations in the Atlantic Ocean, tsunami
forecast modeling of an east coast community, and recognition of new
TsunamiReady communities on the east coast. In addition, NOAA's initial
strengthening efforts emphasize detection and warning for distant
tsunamis, while the greater risk to most locations in the United
States-according to NOAA data as well as the National Science and
Technology Council's December 2005 report on tsunami risk reduction-are
likely to be posed by local tsunamis. For example, the deployment of DART
stations and warning center enhancements will not reduce the local tsunami
risk as directly as other strategies such as educating vulnerable
populations to immediately head for high ground when the earth shakes near
the coast. According to NWS officials, they are
40
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements Needed in
the Reporting for NOAA GOALS-Build Sustainable Fisheries, Recover
Protected Species, and Predict and Assess Decadel to Centennial Climate
Change, Final Audit Report No. FSD-15989-4-0001, September 2004; National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements Needed in the
Reporting of Performance Measures Related to Promoting Safe Navigation and
Sustaining Healthy Coasts, Audit Report No. FSD-14998-3-0001, February
2003; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements
Needed in the Reporting of Performance Measures Related to Goals for
Advancing Shortterm Warnings and Implementing Seasonal to Interannual
Climate Forecasts, Audit Report No. FSD-15643-3-0001, September 2003.
41
GAO, Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate
Resources to Highest Priorities, GAO-05-824T (Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2005).
Concerns Exist about the Management and Direction of the Expanded National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
in the process of evaluating outcome goals and performance measures for
the Tsunami Program, and expect to finalize a strategic plan in 2006. In
commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that it will work with
its partners to begin a risk assessment following the completion of a
tsunami hazard assessment in November 2006, which will improve its future
ability to allocate funds in a manner consistent with established risk
management practices.
Since its inception in 1996, NOAA has used the Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Implementation Plan to guide NTMHP activities. The plan has four specific
goals: (1) raise awareness of affected populations, (2) supply tsunami
inundation and evacuation maps, (3) improve tsunami warning systems, and
(4) incorporate tsunami planning into state and federal all-hazards
mitigation programs. In August 2001, an expert panel reviewed the NTHMP's
progress and performance under the plan and provided a number of
suggestions for improving the program. While the thenchairman of the NTHMP
drafted some goals based on the suggestions, NOAA did not update or revise
the plan to incorporate the experts' suggestions or the proposed goals
because, according to the subsequent chairman, the plan's four original
goals had not yet been achieved.
Five years later, two key issues raised by the expert panel review remain
concerns of the state NTHMP participants. First, the positive impacts of
the program were being largely assumed and not effectively measured. State
members of the NTHMP still believe that more needs to be done to measure
the effectiveness of tsunami mitigation activities-such as surveys to
measure the effectiveness of public education programs. Second, the NTHMP
was "seriously out of balance," in terms of focusing on detection and risk
assessment at the expense of working with communities to educate and
modify behaviors in ways that could save lives. State members of the NTHMP
remain concerned about the focus on detection and warning systems
improvements, which are perceived as "federal solutions," rather than
state and local educational and behavioral activities, such as conducting
tsunami preparedness drills, which they see as key to community
preparedness, particularly for local tsunamis.
The NTHMP had planned to conduct another program review and develop an
updated implementation plan in 2006. These plans have been placed on hold,
according to the chairman of the NTHMP, because the decision to make the
NTHMP a nationwide program-likely including representatives of the 23
states on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts as well as the two
commonwealths and three U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and
Page 42 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Caribbean Sea-raised significant issues that needed to be settled before
any revisions to the program's goals and objectives could be considered.42
However, failing to conduct a program review now means that the program
will not have vital information regarding (1) what has worked or not
worked in implementing the program since 2001 and (2) what tsunami
mitigation activities remain incomplete in the five original Pacific area
states with high tsunami hazards. A program review could contribute to the
development of a risk-based strategic plan that ensures that the
activities that remain uncompleted in areas with the greatest threat get
the highest priority for funding.
According to NOAA officials, the agency expects to implement the nine
recommended actions for the NTHMP and the Tsunami Program contained in the
National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on tsunami
risk reduction. The report, developed by NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and other
federal agencies, recommends actions such as developing standardized and
coordinated tsunami hazard and risk assessments for all U.S. coastal
areas, improving tsunami detection and warning data and infrastructure,
enhancing tsunami forecast and warning capabilities, promoting the
development of model mitigation measures, and increasing outreach to
communities. However, because the report and recommendations were
developed without the participation of the NTHMP members, they question
whether the recommendations and priorities represent the best strategic
direction for the NTHMP. All of the state NTHMP members agree that full
participation in program decision making by individuals with state and
local level knowledge of tsunami mitigation activities is key to the
efficiency and success of the NTHMP.
In addition, state NTHMP members are particularly concerned that the
program's funding decisions and strategic direction may become less
riskbased with the inclusion of numerous eastern and southern coastal
states with lower known tsunami hazards. These members want to ensure that
communities facing the greatest threat obtain the greatest benefits from
the program, particularly since many tsunami preparedness activities
remain incomplete and unfunded in the original five at-risk states. For
example, in 2005, the Director of the California Governor's Office of
Emergency Services estimated that in California alone over the next five
years about $19.5 million was needed for state preparedness activities and
The commonwealths are Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, and
the territories are American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Page 43 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Conclusions
about $7.5 million for local government activities. As such, state NTHMP
members were surprised to learn that some eastern states have already
submitted proposals for NTHMP funding.
In the hazardous Pacific region, NOAA and its federal and state partners
are working to help prepare communities for tsunamis. However, much is
left to be done to improve tsunami hazard assessment, detection, warning,
and mitigation for these areas and other at-risk areas of the United
States. It is particularly important that when at-risk states complete
their inundation mapping, they then conduct comprehensive assessments of
the expected damage from a tsunami. Without this basic information,
emergency managers will not be able to effectively formulate plans to
mitigate potential tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure. In
addition, improved technical capabilities to detect tsunamis will be of
limited value if the warning systems and processes that NOAA depends on to
disseminate this information cannot reliably ensure that all threatened
individuals and communities will receive an accurate and timely warning.
Because tsunamis are an infrequent hazard that may be overlooked due to
higher priority reoccurring natural hazards such as hurricanes and
flooding, NOAA and its federal and state partners face a significant
challenge ensuring that communities are sufficiently engaged in
preparedness activities. The Indian Ocean tsunami, however, has created a
window of opportunity by spotlighting the devastation and destruction that
can result from a lack of planning, preparedness, and education for such
an event-no matter how rare. We believe that federal and state partners
can take advantage of this current sense of urgency and develop a
strategic approach that will ensure that the significantly increased
resources that have been made available to expand U.S. tsunami detection
and preparedness programs are being effectively targeted. As part of this
effort, all federal tsunami-related activities, including the TsunamiReady
program and the NTHMP, should be reassessed to determine how to increase
their effectiveness. Moreover, NOAA needs to address the lack of
long-range, risk-based strategic planning for these activities. Without
strategic planning and performance measures to guide these efforts, the
Congress and the public will lack important information about the extent
to which resources are being directed to activities that are of the
greatest benefit to the most vulnerable communities and to what extent
measurable progress is being made toward the desired results. We believe
U.S. tsunami programs guided by long-term strategic plans with
demonstrable achievements will be better able to sustain their efforts for
vulnerable coastal communities into the future.
To help improve national tsunami preparedness, we are recommending
Recommendations for
that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take
theExecutive Action following six actions:
o work with the FEMA Director and the USGS Director to create
standardized tsunami loss estimation software to help communities
determine the potential impact of tsunamis and identify appropriate
mitigation actions;
o reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms by (1) completing
the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, (2) reexamining
NWS's rules dictating when a warning will be issued and to which
areas, (3) establishing a routine process for other federal and state
experts to formally review and comment on the centers' use of seismic
data, and (4) setting performance goals to guide improvements;
o work with the states to conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the
tsunami warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency
Alert System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a
tsunami emergency;
o evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any,
exist to participation and what modifications are needed to encourage
more high-risk communities to participate;
o evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well in the past and
what high priority activities remain to be completed and to help
inform strategic planning efforts, and;
o develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami
Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program that consider
input from states and federal partners and include metrics for
measuring progress toward achieving program goals.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Departments of
Commerce, Homeland Security and the Interior for their review and comment.
Commerce, representing NOAA, concurred with all six recommendations and
generally agreed with our findings, although it provided technical and
factual clarifications, which we have incorporated into the report as
appropriate. However, in its comments, NOAA suggested a revision to one of
the recommendations with which we disagree. In response to our
recommendation that NOAA evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine
what barriers, if any, exist to participation and what
Page 45 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
modifications are needed to encourage more high-risk communities to
participate, NOAA suggested changing the recommendation's focus from
"high-risk" to "at-risk" communities. According to NOAA all U.S. coastal
communities should be prepared for a tsunami no matter how rare. While we
agree that preparing all U.S. coastal communities for a tsunami may be a
laudable long-term goal, given the agency's limited resources, it may be
an unrealistic goal in the short-term. Therefore, we believe that NOAA
should use a risk-based approach and target initial participation in the
TsunamiReady program to those communities that face the greatest risk.
Commerce's specific comments and our detailed responses are presented in
appendix I.
Homeland Security, representing FEMA, commented on one of the six
recommendations and indicated that while it concurred with the
recommendation that NOAA work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized
tsunami loss estimation software, it was concerned that FEMA did not have
the funding or the staff resources to pursue such a request and that such
a request from NOAA would have to address these resource needs. Homeland
Security also noted that the report did not mention other programs such as
FEMA's Pre-disaster Mitigation Program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program, which can be used by states and communities to fund tsunami
mitigation projects. We revised the report to mention that these programs
have funded tsunami mitigation projects. Finally, Homeland Security stated
that the report's description of the TsunamiReady program as it relates to
response, preparedness, and mitigation activities is unclear. We believe
that we have clearly characterized the program as providing minimum
guidelines that communities can use to enhance tsunami readiness and
therefore have not revised the report in response to this comment.
Homeland Security's specific comments and our detailed responses are
presented in appendix
II.
The Department of the Interior commented that the report was a thorough
well-researched examination of the nation's tsunami warning system and
that it correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the
federal, state, and local levels to have an effective tsunami warning
system. Interior also said that it supports the need for a risk-based
approach to prioritizing federal investments in this system and is
actively collaborating with NOAA to provide the hazard assessments
necessary for such an approach. In addition, Interior said that one area
it felt was inadequately addressed in the report was the importance of a
long-term federal role in research to improve tsunami warnings and
mitigate tsunami risks and noted that none of our recommendations involved
improving or expanding
Page 46 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
research. While we agree that tsunami-related research is an important
issue, it was not included in the scope of our review, and consequently,
this report does not cover issues related to tsunami research or offer any
recommendations in this area. Interior's specific comments and our
detailed responses are presented in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce,
Homeland Security, and the Interior; appropriate congressional committees;
and other interested Members of Congress. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Anu K. Mittal
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Commerce's letter
dated May 8, 2006.
1. Having all coastal communities be prepared for a tsunami may be a
GAO Comment
worthwhile long-term goal; however, given limited resources, in the
short-term we believe that it is important to prioritize the efforts of
the TsunamiReady program to encourage higher-risk communities to
participate.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland Security's
letter dated May 12, 2006.
1. We revised the text to show the correct title for the FEMA Director.
1. We describe FEMA's Community Rating System in a report footnote. For
this reason, we did not revise the report.
2. We revised the report to indicate that FEMA's Pre-disaster Mitigation
Program and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program have funded tsunami
mitigation activities.
3. We believe that the report clearly describes the TsunamiReady program
as providing minimum guidelines for communities to use to enhance
tsunami preparedness, not as a program that requires all of the
activities that could be taken to maximize community protection. For
this reason, we did not revise the report.
4. We believe that the report adequately describes the NTHMP's federal
and state partnership as well as the roles of emergency management
organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, not only for
warning systems, but also for planning, education and outreach, and
infrastructure protection mitigation activities. For this reason, we
did not revise the report.
5. We revised the report to clarify that vertical evacuation should only
occur in buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial
earthquake and subsequent tsunami.
6. We revised the report to clarify the extent to which building codes
address the tsunami hazard.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of the Interior's letter
dated May 4, 2006.
1. The analysis of the federal role in research on tsunami warnings and
GAO Comment
mitigation was not included in the scope of this report. Consequently, we
did not examine issues related to tsunami research or offer any
recommendations.
Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841
In addition to those named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant Director;
Staff
Brad C. Dobbins; Joel A. Green; Ryan S. Lambert; and Susan M.
Acknowledgments Zimmerman made key contributions to this report. Also
contributing to the report were Claudia K. Becker; John W. Delicath;
Gregory A. Marchand; John G. Smale, Jr.; Anne O. Stevens; and Randall B.
Williamson.
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