    U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate
    to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant
    Challenges Remain (05-JUN-06, GAO-06-519).

    The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S.
    preparedness for such an event. The National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. detection and
    warning efforts and partners with federal and state agencies in
    the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to reduce
    tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated $17.24 million in
    supplemental funding to enhance these efforts. This report (1)
    identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard
    and the extent to which potential impacts have been assessed, (2)
    discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami
    warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential
    impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses
    NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami
    programs.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-519
        ACCNO:   A55105
      TITLE:     U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners
    Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but
    Significant Challenges Remain
         DATE:   06/05/2006
      SUBJECT:   Disaster planning
    	     Emergency management
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Intergovernmental relations
    	     Tsunamis
    	     Warning systems
    	     Weather forecasting
    	     Risk assessment
    	     Alaska
    	     California
    	     Hawaii
    	     Indian Ocean Tsunami
    	     National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
    	     Program

    	     Oregon
    	     Puerto Rico
    	     TsunamiReady Program
    	     Virgin Islands
    	     Washington

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    GAO-06-519

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Report to Congressional Committees

    GAO

                              and Senator Dianne Feinstein

    June 2006

    U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS

      Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential
                       Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain

    GAO-06-519

    U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS

    Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce
    Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain

      What GAO Found

    NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska, California,
    Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
    Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami hazard. The east
    and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While high-hazard areas
    have been identified, limited information exists on the likely impacts of
    a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack inundation maps showing
    the potential extent of tsunami flooding in communities, and others have
    maps that may be unreliable. State assessments of likely tsunami impacts
    on people and infrastructure have been limited, in part, due to a lack of
    tsunami loss estimation software, as exists for floods and other hazards.
    Although federal warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and
    issue warnings, false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their
    effectiveness. Some state and local emergency managers have raised
    concerns about false alarms-the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not
    followed by destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores-potentially causing
    citizens to ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the
    Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede
    timely warnings to communities. For example, signal coverage for these two
    systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and
    failure to properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed
    or not transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false
    alarms but, according to agency officials, lacking the states' permission
    elsewhere, has only conducted "live" end-to-end testing of the warning
    systems in Alaska to identify problems.

    The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami
    impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education,
    and infrastructure protection, but the level of implementation varies
    considerably by location. Most of the states and some communities GAO
    visited have basic mitigation plans identifying tsunami hazards. While all
    of these locations have multiple warning mechanisms in place, disruptions
    to key infrastructure such as telephone lines may hamper timely warnings.
    Furthermore, key educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps
    and developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In
    addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure from
    tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions. Emergency
    managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need to focus on
    more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding limitations.
    Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA's preparedness program,
    according to NOAA officials, because they perceive the threat of a tsunami
    to be low. The nationwide expansion of NOAA's tsunami-related activities
    and NTHMP is under way; however, the future direction of these efforts is
    uncertain because they lack long-range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to
    identify longrange goals, establish risk-based priorities, and define
    performance measures to assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are
    achieving the desired results.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

    Letter

                                                                                1
         Results in Brief                                                       5
         Background                                                             9
         The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and
         Caribbean Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been
         Comprehensively Assessed                                              14
         Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but
         Warning Systems Have Limitations                                      24
         State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under
         Way, although Implementation Varies Considerably among
         Locations                                                             29
         Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities
         Is Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning           39
         Conclusions                                                           44
         Recommendations for Executive Action                                  45
         Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                    45

      Figures

    Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis 10
    Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods 12

        Page i GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow 13 Figure 4: Pacific Ocean
    Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii 16 Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone
    17 Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone 18 Figure 7: The Puerto Rico
    Trench Subduction Zone 19 Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission
    for EAS and NOAA

    Weather Radio 27 Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs 32 Figure 10:
    TsunamiReady Sign for Communities 38

                                     Abbreviations

    DART           Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
    EAS            Emergency Alert System
    FEMA           Federal Emergency Management Agency

    HAZUS-MH Hazards U.S.-Multi-Hazard NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration NTHMP National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program NWS
    National Weather Service USGS U.S. Geological Survey

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

          Washington, DC 20548

    A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an underwater
    earthquake.1 A tsunami wave may be very small in the deep ocean, but as it
    approaches land can increase to tens of feet in height and reach shore as
    a fast-moving wall of turbulent water. Tsunamis pose an inundation threat
    to low-lying coastal communities from multiple destructive waves that can
    penetrate far inland. Tsunamis are categorized as either distant or local.
    Distant tsunamis travel long distances from their triggering events to
    strike the coast hours later, allowing time to warn and evacuate
    threatened communities. Local tsunamis strike the coast minutes after
    their nearshore triggering event, allowing little time for warning and
    evacuation. However, the frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United
    States has been low, compared with other natural hazards, such as
    hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods.

    The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) manages federal
    tsunami detection and warning efforts. NOAA's National Weather Service
    (NWS) operates two tsunami warning centers whose staff monitor seismic
    data and, based on the location and magnitude of earthquakes, issue
    warnings when tsunamis are likely. The warning centers transmit a tsunami
    warning message to NWS forecast offices and state emergency management
    centers, among others.2 NWS forecast offices transmit the warning over
    NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NOAA Weather Radio) and the Emergency
    Alert System. NOAA Weather Radio is a nationwide network of radio stations
    broadcasting continuous weather information, including warnings, watches,
    forecasts and other hazard information, 24 hours a day directly from NWS
    weather forecast offices. The Federal Communication Commission's Emergency
    Alert System, designed to provide the President a means to communicate
    with the American people in the event of an emergency, can decode and
    retransmit NOAA Weather Radio warning messages over radio and television
    broadcast and cable systems.

    Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in efforts
    to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis through education, hazard
    assessment, mitigation planning, and other activities. For example, NOAA

    1

    Landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes may also generate a
    tsunami.

    2

    NWS is the official U.S. source of warnings for life-threatening weather
    conditions, as well as tsunamis. NWS operates 122 weather forecast offices
    nationwide, providing weather, water and climate forecasts and warnings
    for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas to
    protect life and property and enhance the national economy.

        Page 2 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    operates a tsunami preparedness recognition program known as TsunamiReady
    that encourages communities to educate citizens on tsunami hazards,
    develop tsunami hazard plans, and establish local warning systems, among
    other things. In addition, NOAA provides leadership and funding for the
    National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP). This program,
    initiated in 1996, has been a partnership between NOAA; the U.S.
    Geological Survey (USGS); the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
    and five states-Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington-to
    assess tsunami hazards, improve and coordinate tsunami warning systems,
    and develop state and local hazard mitigation programs.3 For example,
    under the NTHMP, NOAA provides funding and technical support to help the
    states produce inundation maps showing the extent to which coastal areas
    may be flooded by a tsunami. Communities use these maps to help identify
    people and property at-risk and to develop strategies for mitigating the
    hazard. Furthermore, the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster
    Mitigation Act of 2000, requires all states and localities to develop
    FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plans to qualify for certain disaster
    relief funding.4 These plans provide a framework for states and
    communities to assess their vulnerability to all hazards and, if a
    significant tsunami threat exists, develop approaches to reduce tsunami
    impacts on people and infrastructure within their jurisdictions.

    In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental
    funds for NOAA to expand and improve its tsunami detection capabilities,
    enhance warning center operations and facilities, produce tsunami
    inundation forecast models, and expand the TsunamiReady program
    participation nationwide.5 In fiscal year 2006, $9.82 million in
    appropriations were designated for tsunami-related activities, and NOAA
    requested $21.66 million for fiscal year 2007.6 NOAA is initially spending
    these funds primarily on enhancing its tsunami detection capabilities, for

    3

    As of March 2006, NOAA was expanding the NTHMP into a nationwide program
    open to participation by 28 coastal states and territories.

    4

    42 U.S.C. S: 5165.

    5

    After a tsunami-generating event, inundation forecast models combine
    actual wave data with precomputed flooding scenarios to predict the size
    of the wave and the extent of potential flooding for specific locations.

    6

    The $9.82 million designated for tsunami-related activities in fiscal year
    2006 includes over $2.5 million for specific activities, such as $500,000
    for warning sirens for the state of Washington.

    example, by expanding its network of Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting
    of Tsunamis (DART) detection stations in the Pacific Ocean to 39 stations
    covering the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean Sea.

    To address questions regarding the status of national tsunami
    preparedness, this report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the
    greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential tsunami impacts
    on people and infrastructure have been assessed; (2) discusses the
    effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system; (3)
    describes ongoing local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the
    potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities; and (4) assesses
    NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.

    In conducting our work, we visited the states participating in the
    NTHMP-Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington-as well as Puerto
    Rico and Florida. We met with federal, state, and local officials,
    reviewed documentation related to tsunami hazard assessment, warning and
    mitigation efforts, and analyzed plans for current and future tsunami
    preparedness activities. To identify the U.S. coastal areas facing the
    greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which their vulnerability to
    tsunami impacts has been assessed, we reviewed historic and seismic data
    and analysis from NOAA and other federal and state sources. For the states
    facing the greatest tsunami hazards, we determined the extent to which
    tsunami inundation maps identifying the potential vulnerability of people
    and infrastructure have been prepared, and reviewed each state's
    FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plan to determine how and to what
    extent tsunami impacts have been assessed.

    To discuss the effectiveness of the current federal tsunami warning
    system, we visited both of NOAA's tsunami warning centers and met with
    officials to discuss how they conduct their detection and warning
    responsibilities and how they measure their effectiveness. In addition, we
    visited selected NOAA warning forecast offices, met with officials to
    determine how tsunami warnings are disseminated and tracked, and met with
    state emergency managers to determine how they receive warnings and to
    obtain their views regarding the effectiveness of the warnings. We also
    reviewed reports prepared by NOAA and by state emergency managers that
    evaluated the effectiveness of warnings issued by NOAA on June 14, 2005,
    due to a potentially tsunami-generating earthquake off the Northern
    California coastline.

    To describe local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the
    potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, we initially met
    with state emergency managers and reviewed state mitigation documents.
    Because comprehensive statewide data on local mitigation activities does
    not exist, we next visited selected at-risk communities recommended by
    state emergency managers. The communities we visited are Seward and
    Kodiak, Alaska; San Mateo County and Crescent City, California; Hilo and
    Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; Mayaguez and Rincon,
    Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, Washington. We discussed
    tsunami preparedness efforts with the community emergency managers, such
    as planning, warning, education and outreach, infrastructure protection,
    and the TsunamiReady program and obtained documentation of their efforts
    and activities in these areas. We also met with NOAA officials involved
    with the TsunamiReady program and reviewed program documentation.

    To assess NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami
    programs, we met with NOAA officials and reviewed plans for NOAA's ongoing
    tsunami activities, as well as schedules for the completion of NOAA's
    Tsunami Program expansion. We also met with National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program participants, including NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and state
    representatives and reviewed program documentation to determine how NOAA
    is planning for the future management and direction of its tsunami
    activities.

    We conducted our work between April 2005 and March 2006 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    The coastal areas of the five states bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S.

      Results in Brief

    territories in the Caribbean face the greatest tsunami hazard, but
    reliable and comprehensive assessments of the potential impacts on people
    and infrastructure have not been completed for many of these areas.
    According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant and
    local tsunamis are Hawaii and the west coast states of California, Oregon,
    and Washington, whereas Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
    are threatened primarily by local tsunamis. Historically, the east coast
    and the Gulf coast tsunami hazards are relatively low. Because inundation
    maps are the foundation for evaluating potential tsunami impacts on
    communities, map production has been a high priority for NOAA and the
    threatened states. However, progress on this front has been slow-for
    example, Alaska has inundation maps for only 5 of 60 at-risk
    communities-primarily because accurate maps are complex and costly

    Page 5 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    for states to produce. To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and
    localities also need to assess the potential impacts of a tsunami on
    people and infrastructure. While FEMA has standardized computer software
    for comprehensively estimating the likely human, structural, and economic
    damages from natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes,
    no such tool exists for tsunamis. For this and other reasons, California
    and Alaska have not specifically assessed potential tsunami losses, while
    the other at-risk areas have produced limited tsunami damage assessments.
    Consequently, emergency managers in the at-risk states and U.S.
    territories do not have comprehensive information on how many and what
    types of structures would be exposed and damaged, how many people could be
    injured or killed, or the extent of potential short and long-term economic
    impacts of a tsunami. We are recommending that NOAA work with FEMA and
    USGS to create standardized tsunami loss estimation software.

    Although NWS's warning centers can quickly detect potential tsunamis and
    issue warnings, the effectiveness of these warnings is hampered by false
    alarms and limitations in the federal systems that transmit warnings to
    the local level. NWS's warning centers have rapidly analyzed seismic data
    to detect potential tsunamis, and if the location and magnitude of an
    earthquake indicated that a tsunami was likely, the centers generally
    issued a warning within 5 to 10 minutes for local tsunamis. However, some
    state and local emergency management officials have raised concerns about
    false alarms, because the warnings proved to be unnecessary-no damaging
    waves actually reached U.S. shores following the 16 warnings issued since
    1982-or were overly broad and included communities that were not
    imminently threatened. Such warnings can cause unnecessary and costly
    evacuations and, experts warn, may cause people to ignore future warnings.
    NWS has begun addressing false alarm concerns, for example, by expanding
    the network of DART stations that help warning centers confirm whether a
    tsunami has been generated, but it has not set specific performance
    targets for reducing the number, scope, and duration of false alarms. We
    are recommending that NOAA take specific steps, such as reexamining its
    rules for when a warning will be issued and to which areas, to reduce
    false alarms. Furthermore, although NWS warning centers effectively
    transmit tsunami warnings to NWS forecast offices, these offices do not
    always send timely warnings to affected local areas because the two
    primary federal warning alert systems-the Emergency Alert System and NOAA
    Weather Radio-have significant limitations. For example, signal coverage
    for these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal
    areas. This shortcoming was highlighted in June 2005, when an actual
    tsunami warning for the west coast was issued but

    Page 6 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    signal problems prevented the warning from reaching portions of the coasts
    of Washington and Oregon. Also, to properly activate these warning
    systems, NWS forecast office staff must enter a tsunami-specific code into
    a computer. During the June 2005 event, failure to do so in a timely
    manner or at all resulted in warnings being delayed or not transmitted to
    some locations. NOAA has only conducted end-to-end tests of the tsunami
    warning system using actual "live" warning codes, rather than test codes,
    in Alaska to identify problems before actual events occur. In commenting
    on a draft of this report, NOAA said that it conducts such end-to-end
    testing where allowed and uses test codes in other states. We are
    recommending that NOAA continue to work with the states to conduct
    end-to-end testing that ensures the system will function as intended
    during an emergency.

    The at-risk communities we visited have taken actions to mitigate tsunami
    impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education,
    and infrastructure protection; however, the level of implementation among
    these locations varies considerably. Each of the six states we visited
    have FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans that identify tsunami
    hazards; and most have taken the additional step of identifying actions to
    mitigate those hazards, such as relocating critical facilities out of
    inundation zones. However, only 4 of the 12 communities we visited have
    developed FEMA-approved plans that include tsunami mitigation projects.
    Further, while all of the states and communities we visited have developed
    some mechanisms for warning people about a tsunami threat, communications
    problems may hamper some communities' ability to receive and disseminate
    warnings in a timely manner. For example, during the west coast tsunami
    warning in June 2005, many 911 dispatch centers and telephone lines were
    overloaded, in some cases, preventing local emergency managers from
    quickly disseminating the warning to other local officials and preventing
    telephone-based warning systems from reaching residents. Moreover, while
    state and local officials recognize the need to educate the public, key
    efforts identified by tsunami preparedness experts-such as distributing
    evacuation maps and developing school curricula-have not been consistently
    implemented across the states and communities we visited. For example,
    only two of the six at-risk states we visited have developed and
    implemented tsunami preparedness curricula in schools. In addition, few
    states and localities have implemented long-term mitigation efforts such
    as land-use restrictions and building design codes to prevent loss of life
    and reduce economic damage. Overall, state and local emergency managers
    attributed the variability in tsunami preparedness efforts to a variety of
    factors, including their focus on other higher priority natural hazards
    and a lack of

    Page 7 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    funding. Furthermore, only a few communities in coastal areas have chosen
    to participate in NOAA's voluntary TsunamiReady program, which is designed
    to help them take the initial steps in tsunami mitigation. NOAA officials
    believe that TsunamiReady participation is limited because of community
    perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high cost versus
    benefit. We are recommending that NOAA evaluate the TsunamiReady program
    to determine how to increase participation by high-risk communities.

    Efforts are under way to significantly expand federal tsunami detection
    and related activities as well as the NTHMP; however, the future direction
    of these efforts is uncertain because NOAA has not established long-range
    strategic plans to guide them. Strategic plans are important because they
    help agencies set specific program goals and objectives, define
    performance measures for assessing program effectiveness, ensure
    coordination of existing activities and establish risk-based priorities.
    Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, NOAA's various
    tsunamirelated activities, such as warning center operations, the
    TsunamiReady program, and tsunami-related research, were not managed as a
    formal, integrated program. NOAA combined the activities in 2005 into a
    single program and is currently strengthening and expanding certain
    elements of the program. However, NOAA has not yet adopted a
    comprehensive, riskbased strategic plan to guide its expanded tsunami
    program into the future. NOAA officials told us they expect to finalize
    such a plan during 2006. In addition, the plan that NOAA is using to guide
    the NTHMP activities has not been updated since 1996, and the program's
    performance has not been formally assessed since 2001. As a result, some
    issues raised in the 2001 assessment, such as lack of performance
    measures, remain concerns of state NTHMP members today. Representatives of
    the five original high-hazard NTHMP states are also concerned that the
    program's funding decisions and strategic direction may become less
    risk-based as states that face relatively low hazards join the program.
    Without an updated, risk-based strategic plan for the expanded NTHMP, NOAA
    will have difficulty ensuring that the most threatened states get the
    resources they need to continue and complete key mitigation activities. We
    are recommending that NOAA evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked
    well and what high-priority activities remain to be completed and develop
    comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and
    NTHMP.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce
    representing NOAA agreed with all of our recommendations and indicated
    that steps will be taken to implement them. The Department of Homeland

    Page 8 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

                                       Background

    Security representing FEMA concurred with our recommendation that NOAA
    should work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized tsunami loss
    estimation software. However the department noted that FEMA does not have
    the resources to pursue such a request; and therefore, any request of
    assistance on this issue from NOAA would have to address these resource
    constraints. The Department of the Interior did not comment on our
    recommendations. The comments from the Departments of Commerce, Homeland
    Security, and the Interior appear in appendixes I, II and III.

    Tsunamis are typically generated by underwater earthquakes-landslides,
    volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are other known, but less common,
    tsunami sources. Tsunami generating earthquakes usually occur in
    subduction zones, such as those found in the Pacific Ocean off the U.S.
    western and Alaskan coasts, as well as in the Caribbean. Marked by deep
    trenches in the seafloor, subduction zones are formed where one of the
    earth's outer shell of tectonic plates plunges underneath another.7
    Usually the plates are gradually moving past each other, but friction may
    temporarily lock them together, causing stress to build up between the
    plates. Sometimes the stress is relieved suddenly in the form of a large
    earthquake. As shown in figure 1, the bottom plate dives farther down,
    snapping the top plate violently upward, disturbing the overlying
    seawater. The size of the resulting tsunami depends on a complex set of
    factors, including the size of the earthquake, its depth below the ocean
    floor, the depth of the water, the type and amount of seafloor movement
    and the energy released.

    7

    Tectonic plates are the large plates of rock that compose the earth's
    outermost layer and move in relation to each other as they ride atop the
    hot, mobile material below them.

    Page 9 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

                Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis

    Source: NOAA.

    Once generated, some tsunami waves move quickly inland while other waves
    head toward the open ocean, often at speeds up to 600 miles per hour.
    Therefore, a tsunami generated by an earthquake off the coast of Alaska
    would be a local tsunami for that state's coastal areas, and could strike
    within minutes of the event, while the same event is considered a distant
    tsunami for the coast of Washington state, which would not likely be hit
    until 3 or more hours later.

    While tsunamis can be a high impact natural hazard, the frequency of
    damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, compared with other
    natural hazards. According to NOAA's records, the last tsunami

    Page 10 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    causing significant impacts was at Skagway, Alaska, in November 1994,
    where the landslide and associated tsunami caused one death and $25
    million in damages. According to FEMA, flooding, severe storms, and
    hurricanes are the most common and costly causes of disaster declarations
    in the United States; at least 10 such events since 1989 have each
    required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion dollars. Although
    damaging tsunamis are relatively rare, the devastation caused by the
    Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrates the need for assessing the threat, and
    for monitoring and preparing for an event in at-risk areas, particularly
    low-lying, seismically active coastal areas.

    The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, is
    responsible for warning Alaska, the west coast and east coast states, and
    states along the Gulf of Mexico, while the Richard H. Hagemeyer, Pacific
    Tsunami Warning Center in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, is responsible for warning
    Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea.8 These
    warning centers use two types of data for determining when to issue a
    tsunami warning. First, they receive and analyze earthquake data from
    seismic networks operated by NOAA, USGS, the states, and universities to
    determine whether to issue a warning.9 If the seismic data indicate that a
    local tsunami may be generated, the responsible warning center issues a
    warning based on the earthquake data alone. Second, the warning centers
    analyze sea-level data to determine whether a tsunami has actually been
    generated, and if not, cancel the warning. The centers receive sea-level
    data through a network of DART stations and sea-level gauges, as shown in
    figure 2. DART stations consist of a seafloor bottom-pressure recording
    system that is capable of detecting tsunamis smaller than 1 inch and is
    connected to a surface buoy that transmits the data by satellite to NOAA.
    Scientists at the warning centers incorporate the data from the DART
    stations into tsunami forecast models to estimate the size of the expected
    waves and the potential impact on coastal areas. The tsunami warning
    centers have used forecast models they developed, as well as models

    8

    The warning center in Alaska is also responsible for providing warnings to
    Canada, and the warning center in Hawaii is responsible for warning 27
    countries in the Pacific. In addition, each warning center provides
    operational backup for the other center.

    9

    In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $8.1 million in supplemental funds
    for USGS to, among other things, begin expanding the Global Seismographic
    Network.

    Page 11 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    developed by NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, which produce
    expected tsunami inundations at nine high-risk locations.10

    Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods

    Source: NOAA. Source: NOAA. DART station Tide gauge

    A network of federal, state, and local government agencies are responsible
    for ensuring that a tsunami warning reaches the public. Figure 3 provides
    an overview of the key components of this process. The federal tsunami
    warning centers send a warning to NWS forecast offices and state emergency
    management centers by multiple means, such as FEMA's National Warning
    System, a dedicated telephone hotline, and NWS's satellite-based National
    Weather Wire Service.11 The forecast offices, in turn, transmit the
    warning over NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert System (EAS).
    State emergency managers receive tsunami warnings from NWS and then warn
    counties and local communities using multiple methods, including a
    dedicated telephone network for state and local emergency management
    officials. Finally, county and local officials are

    10

    The nine completed tsunami forecast models are for Kodiak, AK; Crescent
    City, CA; Hilo, HI; Newport, OR; Seaside, OR; San Francisco, CA; Willapa
    Bay, WA; Neah Bay, WA; and Port Angeles, WA.

    11

    The National Weather Wire Service transmits text-based weather forecasts
    and warnings to an array of subscribers, including the media.

    Page 12 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    responsible for warning the public and issuing evacuation orders, using a
    variety of methods including bullhorns, sirens, and telephone systems.

                       Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow

    Source: GAO analysis.

    Federal, state, and local government agencies also conduct hazard
    mitigation activities to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. At the
    federal level, NWS operates the TsunamiReady community recognition
    program. Initiated in 2000, TsunamiReady is modeled after NWS's StormReady
    program for hurricanes and tornados. NWS meteorologists in regional
    forecast offices are responsible for reviewing applications from coastal
    communities and ensuring that they meet program requirements in
    conjunction with state emergency management officials. NOAA also provides
    a chairperson and funding for the NTHMP. From 1998 through 2001, NOAA
    provided $2.3 million annually for the NTHMP, increasing to $4.3 million
    annually in 2002 through 2005, and returning to $2.3 million in

    Page 13 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

      The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean
      Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively Assessed

    2006. Initially, the five participating states each received less than
    $100,000 annually from the NTHMP, but in recent years they have each
    received approximately $275,000 annually to directly supplement their
    individual mitigation efforts, while NOAA and the other federal partners
    used the remaining funds to support their own activities under the
    program. NOAA estimates that since the program's inception the states have
    matched the NTHMP funding by a ratio of six state in-kind or dollar
    contributions for every program dollar.

    Tsunamis pose the greatest hazard to the coastal areas of the five states
    bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S. territories in the Caribbean, but for
    many of these areas reliable, comprehensive assessments of potential
    tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have not been completed. Some
    high-hazard coastal areas do not have tsunami inundation maps- the
    foundation for evaluating potential tsunami impacts on communities-
    showing the extent to which a tsunami would penetrate inland and flood
    communities, while others have maps that may not be reliable. Progress in
    developing these maps has been slow, primarily because accurate maps are
    complex and costly for states to produce. Furthermore, states and
    communities do not have comprehensive information on the potential human,
    structural, and economic impacts of a tsunami. While FEMA has standardized
    computer software for estimating losses resulting from natural disasters
    such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, no such tool exists for
    assessing tsunamis.

    The Coastal Areas of the Pacific United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
    Virgin Islands Face the Greatest Tsunami Hazards

    According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant and
    local tsunami hazards are Hawaii and the west coast states of California,
    Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska and the Caribbean Islands of Puerto
    Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened primarily by local
    tsunamis, as shown in table 1. The hazard levels are primarily based on
    tsunami source, height, and frequency information since 1900-the most
    reliable and accurate information available-from NOAA's National
    Geophysical Data Center tsunami database.

    Source: NOAA.

    According to NOAA, Hawaii is a high-hazard area for distant and local
    tsunamis. Hawaii has experienced many destructive tsunamis because of its
    location in the Pacific Ocean, as shown in figure 4, where about 80
    percent of all recorded tsunamis have occurred. More than one-half of all
    tsunamis recorded in the Hawaiian Islands were generated in the distant
    Aleutian regions of the northern and northwestern Pacific Ocean, and about
    one-fourth were generated along the western coast of South America.
    Hawaii's local tsunami threat stems from earthquake and volcanic activity,
    which cause underwater landslides off the coast. Hawaii suffered its
    greatest tsunami death and destruction in 1946, when an earthquake in the
    Aleutian Islands generated a tsunami that reportedly killed 159 people.
    Hilo, Hawaii suffered the greatest loss-96 deaths and the destruction of
    its waterfront area. Since 1946, an additional five tsunamis-four distant
    and one local-have caused a reported 63 deaths and widespread destruction.

    Figure 4: Pacific Ocean Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii

    Sources: USGS and MapArt.

    NOAA considers the west coast a high-hazard area for distant tsunamis and
    medium-hazard area for local tsunamis. Like Hawaii, the west coast
    historically has suffered the most destruction from tsunamis generated by
    Pacific earthquakes in the distant South America and Aleutian regions. In
    California, two tsunamis have caused significant damage. The 1960 Chilean
    earthquake caused estimated tsunami damages of over $1 million, and the
    tsunami generated by the 1964 Alaskan event killed 12 in Northern

    Page 16 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    California and caused an estimated $15 million in destruction, including
    damages inside San Francisco Bay. Oregon and Washington both have
    sustained damages in coastal areas from distant tsunamis over the years.
    Although distant tsunamis historically have been most common, a local
    tsunami generated by the 750 mile long Cascadia subduction zone, lying
    just 50 to 100 miles off the coasts of Washington, Oregon, and Northern
    California, is considered a major threat. (See fig. 5.) Geologic and other
    records from a Cascadia earthquake in 1700 suggest that the fault could
    generate a tsunami wave of up to 30 feet that would likely reach the
    Oregon coast in 15 to 30 minutes, raising concerns of a catastrophic
    future event.

                         Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone

    Sources: USGS and MapArt.

    Alaska is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis, but a low-hazard area for
    distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami threat to Alaska is
    caused by seismic activity in the Aleutian subduction zone where the
    Pacific and North-American tectonic plates collide, as shown in figure 6.
    Tsunamis generated by earthquake induced landslides occurring inside bays
    have been responsible for most death and damage in Alaska. The 1964
    Alaskan earthquake triggered several tsunamis that in some cases struck
    land within 2 minutes of being generated. The tsunamis caused 106 deaths
    in Alaska and caused significant damage in the towns of Kodiak, Seward,
    Whittier, and Valdez. Only once has a distant tsunami caused damage in
    Alaska; the 1960 Chilean earthquake caused relatively minor tsunami
    impacts on Alaskan harbors.

                         Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone

    Sources: USGS and MapArt.

    The Caribbean area, including the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the

    U.S. Virgin Islands, is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis but a
    lowhazard area for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami
    threat posed to the islands comes primarily from the potential for

    Page 18 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    earthquakes and underwater landslides in the Puerto Rico Trench subduction
    zone that lies to the north of both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
    Islands, as shown in figure 7. Puerto Rico's most devastating event of the
    last century occurred in 1918, when an earthquake off the northwest coast
    generated a tsunami of more than 15 feet, causing an estimated 140 deaths
    and about $4 million in property damages. In the town of Aguadilla, nearly
    300 homes were destroyed. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, an 1867 earthquake
    in the Anegada Trench sent destructive waves into the harbor of Charlotte
    Amelie on the island of Saint Thomas, destroying boats, the wharf, and the
    waterfront.

                    Figure 7: The Puerto Rico Trench Subduction Zone

    Sources: USGS and MapArt.

    According to NOAA, the Atlantic and Gulf state coasts are relatively
    lowhazard areas for distant or local tsunamis, with few reliable reports
    of tsunami waves of any size ever reaching either coast. This is a

    Page 19 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    Potential Tsunami Impacts on People and Infrastructure Have Not Been
    Comprehensively or Reliably Assessed

    consequence of the low level of tsunami generating seismic activity
    nearby-the nearest subduction zones are in the Caribbean. Historically,
    none of the tsunamis generated in the Atlantic Ocean region has
    significantly affected the east coast of the United States. For example,
    the 1929 Grand Banks earthquake-induced landslide caused a tsunami which
    killed 29 in Newfoundland but only resulted in a wave height of 1 foot on
    the U.S. coast, and a distant tsunami generated by a massive earthquake
    near Lisbon, Portugal in 1755 had no observed impact on the U.S. coast.
    The potential distant threat from the collapse of a volcanic island off
    the coast of Africa is the subject of scientific debate, and the potential
    for a local tsunami-generating collapse of the continental shelf off of
    the east coast is being investigated but is unconfirmed. Regarding the
    Gulf coast, an earthquake in the Caribbean is considered the most likely
    source of a tsunami; however, scientists believe that Florida and Cuba
    protect the Gulf from Caribbean tsunamis and that the Gulf is unlikely to
    propagate a large, destructive tsunami wave.

    Because inundation maps are the foundation for evaluating the potential
    impacts of tsunami events, producing such maps has been a high priority
    since 1996 for NOAA and the five states participating in the NTHMP. To
    optimize time and resources, the NTHMP partners agreed that (1) the states
    would identify the high-priority communities to be mapped; (2) NOAA,
    state, and university tsunami modeling scientists would use models to
    produce inundation information for high-priority areas identified by the
    states; and (3) state and local officials would produce and publish
    official inundation maps. NOAA's Center for Tsunami Inundation Mapping
    Efforts at its Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory assists the
    modelers and the states in their efforts.

    Although the NTHMP planned to complete mapping for all at-risk U.S.
    coastal communities by 1999, progress has been slowed, primarily because
    more accurate-but also more complex and costly-mapping techniques have
    been adopted by the states. Initially, the NTHMP planned to use relatively
    simple modeling technology because this approach would require fewer
    resources than the more advanced technique, known as twodimensional
    modeling, which requires detailed seafloor and coastal terrain data to
    accurately model wave action and impact. Upon comparison of these two
    technologies, the NTHMP decided in December 1996 to use twodimensional
    modeling techniques for all mapping. While the NTHMP members recognized
    that adopting two-dimensional modeling would reduce the pace of modeling
    and mapping, they agreed that the decision would result in products of
    improved detail, quality, and reliability.

    Page 20 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    Consequently, in the five states participating in the NTHMP, some coastal
    areas currently do not have two-dimensional tsunami inundation maps, while
    other coastal areas have inundation maps that predate current modeling
    standards and therefore may not be reliable.12 Specifically:

         o Alaska has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 5 communities,
           while 60 additional communities are prioritized, but have yet to be
           mapped;
         o California has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 11 coastal
           counties, excluding some areas such as harbors, while maps are being
           produced for the remaining 4 counties;
         o Hawaii has 66 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current
           modeling standards; because the existing maps may underestimate
           inundation areas, the state initiated a two-dimensional mapping
           program in 2005 that has produced one map;
         o Oregon has 52 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current
           modeling standards; since 1996 the state has produced two-dimensional
           maps for 9 communities, and 17 additional communities are prioritized
           but have not yet been mapped; and
         o Washington has two-dimensional maps for its southern coast as well as
           many northern areas, while eight additional maps have been prioritized
           but remain incomplete for certain coastal bay and Puget Sound
           communities.

    To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need to
    assess potential impacts on people and infrastructure. According to FEMA
    risk assessment guidance, after mapping how and where hazards will impact
    an area, planners should determine what elements of the population,
    infrastructure, and economy will be impacted by the hazards and estimate
    the potential losses that could occur. According to FEMA, estimating
    losses is essential for decision making at all levels of government,
    including providing a basis for developing mitigation plans

    Separate from the NTHMP, Puerto Rico has produced two-dimensional tsunami
    inundation maps for its entire coastline, and the U.S. Virgin Islands has
    produced maps for St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas that roughly
    estimate tsunami inundation based on the wave that struck the islands in
    1867.

    Page 21 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    and policies, emergency preparedness, and response and recovery planning.

    Each of the five Pacific region states, as well as Puerto Rico and the
    U.S. Virgin Islands, have identified tsunamis as a hazard in their
    FEMAapproved, all-hazard mitigation plans.13 To obtain FEMA approval,
    states are required to describe and estimate losses-based on their own and
    local jurisdiction assessments-for state-owned or -operated buildings,
    infrastructure, and critical facilities in areas subject to hazards.
    According to FEMA, the agency deliberately took the approach of not being
    highly prescriptive regarding the development of the plans-focusing its
    requirements more on what should be done rather than how it should be
    done-in recognition of the inherent differences among states in terms of
    size, resources, capabilities, and vulnerability. For example, states are
    highly encouraged, but not required, to consider impacts on vulnerable
    populations, in particular elderly, disabled, and low-income persons, and
    to analyze the potential economic and human impact that each hazard would
    have statewide. FEMA also encourages the use of several tools in preparing
    damage assessments, such as HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S.-Multi-Hazard), which is
    standardized computer software for comprehensively estimating the likely
    human, structural, and economic damages from earthquakes, floods, and
    hurricane winds. However, HAZUS-MH does not include a tsunami loss
    estimation module; and according to FEMA, there is no similarly reliable
    tool for estimating tsunami losses.

    The National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on
    tsunami risk reduction specifically called for FEMA, NOAA, and USGS to
    take responsibility for developing a coordinated risk-assessment tool-
    e.g., HAZUS-for effective use in tsunami risk assessments.14 The National
    Institute of Building Sciences-which produced the existing HAZUS-MH
    software for other hazards in partnership with FEMA-has estimated that
    developing tsunami loss estimation methods and software would take about 3
    years, at a cost of up to $10 million. A standardized tsunami loss
    estimation tool would not only help the existing five NTHMP-member states
    conduct risk assessments, but it would also be useful to any additional
    states joining the NTHMP as it expands into a national program;

    In addition, the Atlantic coast states of Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
    New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maine, and North Carolina have also identified
    tsunamis as a hazard.

    14"Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for Action."
    National Science and Technology Council, December 2005.

    Page 22 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    and it could also help the NTHMP and NOAA prioritize tsunami activities to
    focus on the areas most vulnerable to tsunami losses.

    Because of the lack of tsunami inundation maps, the variability in
    approaches that was allowed in the all-hazard plans, and the lack of a
    standardized tsunami loss estimation tool, some at-risk states have not
    specifically assessed potential tsunami impacts, while other at-risk
    states or territories have produced assessments that do not provide
    complete loss information for all areas. Consequently, emergency managers
    in the at-risk states and territories do not have comprehensive
    information on how many and what types of structures would be exposed and
    damaged, how many people would likely be injured or killed, or the extent
    of likely short- and long-term economic impacts in the event of a
    tsunami.15 For example:

         o Alaska has not assessed tsunami impacts because the state lacks
           detailed inundation information for many at-risk coastal communities;
         o California assessed impacts from its high-risk earthquake hazard where
           tsunamis are identified as a subhazard, but the state has not
           specifically assessed tsunami impacts; and
         o Hawaii assessed tsunami impacts on the state's critical infrastructure
           and estimated the average annualized property loss; but the state did
           not estimate injuries, deaths or the overall economic impacts due to
           tsunamis.

    According to NOAA officials, risk assessments for coastal areas requires
    the careful analysis of information such as tsunami frequency,
    site-specific tsunami inundation levels, and population density; but they
    acknowledge that such information is not available for many at-risk areas.
    Nevertheless, in March 2006, NOAA developed a preliminary estimate of the
    tsunami risk to people on beaches in various areas, including the Pacific
    region, Florida's east coast, and the Caribbean region. Based on
    historical tsunami frequency information from the 1700's to the present,
    and estimates of current daily beach attendance, NOAA's analysis suggests
    that while large tsunamis occur more often in the Pacific region, over a
    100-year time frame, the potential loss of life in the Caribbean and
    Florida regions could be greater due to higher beach attendance in these
    warm water locations.

    15The seven Atlantic coast states that identified tsunamis as a hazard did
    not assess tsunami impacts either because they concluded that the tsunami
    risk was low or because they lacked adequate information on the hazard to
    permit assessment of tsunami impacts.

    Page 23 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

      Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning Systems
      Have Limitations

    NWS's two tsunami warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and
    issue warnings, but the effectiveness of these warnings has been hampered
    by frequent false alarms and limitations in the federal systems that
    transmit warnings to the local level. Experts warn that false alarms may
    generate unnecessary and costly evacuations and cause people to ignore
    future warnings. NWS is working to reduce the number and duration of false
    alarms, but it has not established any specific performance targets for
    reducing them. Furthermore, although the warning centers quickly transmit
    tsunami warnings to NWS forecast offices, the forecast offices do not
    always send timely warnings to affected local areas because the two
    primary federal warning systems-the Emergency Alert System and NOAA
    Weather Radio-have significant limitations.

    NWS Quickly Detects Potential Tsunamis and Issues Warnings, but False
    Alarms Are a Concern

    NWS's tsunami warning centers' goal is to issue "timely, accurate,
    reliable, and effective" warnings to protect coastal populations from
    tsunamis. Based on warning center data, the centers issued timely warning
    bulletins, generally within 5 to 10 minutes for local events.16 The
    tsunami warning centers have consistently reduced their average annual
    time to issue bulletins-from 11 minutes in 1996 to 6.4 minutes in 2005 for
    the center in Alaska, and from 16 minutes in 1996 to 4.5 minutes in 2005
    for the center in Hawaii. According to tsunami warning center officials,
    more and better quality seismic data, as well as improved analysis
    techniques and computer equipment over the last decade, have enabled
    faster bulletin issuance.

    While the warning centers are able to detect potential tsunamis and issue
    timely warnings, some state and local officials have raised concerns about
    their accuracy and reliability due to false alarms. No destructive tsunami
    has reached U.S. shores following any of the 16 warnings-primarily for
    local tsunamis-issued to states by the warning centers since 1982.
    According to warning center officials, their responsibility to provide
    timely warnings requires them to broadcast warnings based on limited,
    preliminary earthquake information before any resulting tsunami wave is
    actually observed. However, according to emergency response experts, such
    false alarms can generate costly, potentially dangerous evacuations

    16

    Warning bulletins include "tsunami warnings" to inform areas where a
    tsunami is likely, "tsunami watches" that alert areas outside of a warned
    area, and "tsunami information bulletins" that inform areas that an
    earthquake has occurred but a tsunami is unlikely.

    Page 24 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    and may cause people to ignore critical warnings in the future. For
    example, according to the state of Hawaii's most recent estimate, an
    evacuation from a tsunami false alarm in 1996 would have cost the state
    $58.2 million in economic losses, or-adjusted for inflation-about $71
    million in 2006 dollars.

    According to some state and local emergency management officials, a false
    alarm occurred in June 2005, when they received a tsunami warning from NWS
    that they felt was too broad. On June 14, 2005, the warning center in
    Alaska detected a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 90 miles off the Northern
    California coast. The center quickly issued a warning for all coastal
    areas that were within two hours of the tsunami's forecasted travel time,
    including areas from the northern tip of Canada's Vancouver Island to the
    California-Mexico border. Knowing that it would take hours for the tsunami
    to reach his community, a Southern California emergency management
    official who received the warning sought to confirm the tsunami's
    existence by contacting his Northern California counterparts closer to the
    source. He learned that a destructive tsunami had not been generated and
    determined that his community should not evacuate. According to this
    official, because his area was not imminently threatened by a tsunami, it
    should not have been included in the initial warning. As a result of the
    feedback received after the June 14, 2005 event, the warning center in
    Alaska has changed its warning protocols so that it will issue a tsunami
    warning for only about half of the area that received a warning during the
    June event, if a similar situation should occur in the future.

    Seismologists outside of NOAA have suggested that the tsunami warning
    centers could reduce the duration-and perhaps the number-of false alarms
    by relying more on seismic analyses that assess the type and direction of
    an earthquake. For example, according to some state and USGS
    seismologists, the June 14, 2005, earthquake's horizontal motion should
    have indicated that the generation of a tsunami was highly unlikely,
    enabling the warning center to cancel the warning within minutes, rather
    than over an hour later. However, a NWS review of the event noted that
    horizontal-motion earthquakes can trigger submarine landslides that can in
    turn produce tsunamis, so the warning center should not cancel a warning
    solely based on seismic analysis. According to warning center officials,
    they receive feedback from outside seismologists regarding warning
    procedures through organizations such as the NTHMP. However, some outside
    seismologists are concerned that warning center seismologists are
    reluctant to seek feedback or adopt new analytical procedures for issuing
    and canceling warnings.

    Limitations in Federal Emergency Warning Systems Impede Rapid and
    Comprehensive Tsunami Warning Transmission

    NOAA expects that false alarms will be reduced with the expansion of the
    sea-level data network and through an upgrade of its forecasting tools.
    DART stations help reduce false alarms for distant tsunamis because the
    stations detect slight changes in deep-ocean waves far from shore that
    help forecast how these waves will grow as they approach the coast. In
    addition to expanding the DART network, NOAA is upgrading the models that
    use DART data to forecast tsunami flooding and is also expanding and
    upgrading its network of sea-level gauges that the warning centers use to
    confirm or cancel tsunami warnings. The tide gauge expansion plan calls
    for deploying a total of 16 new gauges and upgrading 33 gauges by November
    2006.

    NOAA acknowledges the importance of reducing tsunami false alarms but has
    not yet established performance goals or related metrics for identifying
    progress toward this goal, such as tracking the number and duration of
    warnings to areas that do not experience destructive tsunamis. According
    to NWS officials, they are currently evaluating outcome goals and
    performance measures for warnings and other tsunami-related activities and
    expect to finalize these goals and measures in 2006.

    Technical gaps and procedural limitations have impeded federal emergency
    warning systems from broadcasting rapid and comprehensive tsunami warnings
    to affected local areas. For example, technical gaps such as weak signals
    and transmitter failures have prevented comprehensive warning transmission
    over the EAS and NOAA Weather Radio. Broadcasting tsunami warnings over
    EAS and NOAA Weather Radio requires NOAA-owned transmitters to relay a
    signal from the NWS forecast offices to the broadcast stations and NOAA
    Weather Radio, as shown in figure 8.

      Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission for EAS and NOAA Weather Radio

    Source: GAO analysis and Art Explosion.

    According to NOAA officials, NOAA transmitters provide signal coverage for
    97 percent of the nation's population; however, some coastal locations
    including portions of Hawaii receive such weak signals that NOAA Weather
    Radio is unlikely to function. Transmitter failure has also prevented
    warnings from being sent over EAS and NOAA Weather Radio. For example, on
    June 14, 2005, some coastal communities in Washington and Oregon did not
    receive the warning over EAS or NOAA Weather Radio because transmitters
    failed to send a signal. A September 2005 test of the federal tsunami
    warning systems in California, Oregon, and Washington found improvements
    in problematic transmission areas identified during the June event but
    uncovered new signal transmission issues in other areas. NWS is adding new
    transmitters to improve signal coverage and refurbishing old transmitters
    to improve their reliability.

    In addition, procedural limitations such as the NWS forecast offices'
    inconsistent activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio can impede rapid and
    comprehensive transmission of tsunami warnings. On June 14, 2005,

    Page 27 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    the forecast offices responded to the tsunami warning in a variety of
    ways, some of which caused delays or nontransmission of EAS or NOAA
    Weather Radio warnings to affected local areas. For example, staff in some
    NWS forecast offices did not enter a tsunami-specific warning code into a
    computer, resulting in EAS and NOAA Weather Radio not activating rapidly,
    if at all. According to a subsequent NWS assessment of the event, guidance
    to forecast office staff on tsunami warning procedures was inadequate.
    Since the June 2005 event, coastal NWS forecast offices in Washington,
    Oregon, and California have received guidance that, for example, lists EAS
    activation as the proper first step when a tsunami warning is received.

    Although the warning centers conduct monthly tests of their communication
    systems to ensure that NWS forecast offices and state emergency management
    centers receive the warnings, NWS does not routinely conduct periodic
    end-to-end tests of the tsunami warning system using the actual "live"
    computer codes rather than test codes. Such an end-to-end test would check
    the systems and procedures used to transmit an actual tsunami warning from
    the tsunami warning center to the public and identify technical gaps and
    procedural shortcomings. NWS conducted the first such end-to-end test of
    the tsunami warning system in Alaska, including activation of EAS and NOAA
    Weather Radio in March 2005. The test uncovered breakdowns in EAS warning
    transmission at television and radio stations whose EAS systems were not
    set up to use the tsunami warning code. NWS is working with emergency
    managers and broadcasters in Alaska to take corrective actions and retest
    the system. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that
    while it supports broadening end-to-end testing in at-risk states it can
    conduct end-to end testing using "live" warning codes for the EAS system
    only in those states that permit it to do so. In other states, end-to-end
    testing is conducted by using test codes for the EAS system. NOAA said it
    will continue to encourage state participation in the end-to-end testing
    of the tsunami warning system.

      State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way, although
      Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations

    The 12 coastal communities in the six at-risk states and territories that
    we visited are taking actions to mitigate tsunami impacts through
    planning, warning system improvements, public education, and some
    infrastructure protection efforts, although the level of implementation
    varies considerably among locations.17 While state and local tsunami
    mitigation plans and warning systems have largely been developed,
    limitations exist that have raised concerns about their effectiveness. In
    addition, key public education efforts have not been consistently
    implemented in all coastal communities we visited, and only a few
    communities have taken steps to protect critical infrastructure from
    potential tsunami damage. Overall, tsunami mitigation efforts have been
    mixed due to a number of challenges, including competing priorities,
    funding constraints, and lack of authority to implement legislative or
    policy changes. Finally, while 7 of the 12 communities we visited
    participate in NOAA's TsunamiReady preparedness program, nationwide few
    coastal communities have chosen to participate in the program.

    State and Local Tsunami Mitigation Plans and Warning Systems Have Been
    Largely Developed, but Concerns Exist about Warning System Effectiveness

    According to FEMA guidance, the purpose of mitigation planning is to
    identify natural hazards, consider actions and activities to reduce
    potential losses from those hazards, and coordinate the implementation of
    a hazard mitigation plan. All six of the states and territories we visited
    have developed FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans, a requirement
    to qualify for certain disaster-related grant funds under the Stafford
    Act, as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.18 These plans
    identify tsunami hazards and describe in general terms the vulnerability
    of people and property to tsunami threats. Most of the state level plans
    we reviewed take the additional step of identifying specific actions to
    mitigate the risks identified, such as relocating critical facilities out
    of tsunami inundation zones. While only 4 of the 12 communities we visited
    have FEMAapproved plans, each of the four has identified projects to
    mitigate tsunami hazards. State and local emergency managers whom we spoke

    17

    The six at-risk states and territories are Alaska, California, Hawaii,
    Oregon, Puerto Rico, and Washington. The 12 communities are Seward and
    Kodiak, Alaska; Crescent City and San Mateo County, California; Hilo and
    Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; Mayaguez and Rincon,
    Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, Washington.

    18

    According to FEMA, the states used FEMA Pre-disaster Mitigation Program
    grant funds to develop their all-hazard mitigation plans. In addition,
    FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has funded tsunami mitigation
    projects in Alaska and Puerto Rico.

    with cited resource and time constraints as significant barriers to
    improving mitigation planning.

    All of the states and communities we visited have developed warning
    systems, but they have various limitations that may impact their
    effectiveness. State and local tsunami warning systems help ensure that
    all at-risk residents and tourists are warned about a potential tsunami in
    a timely manner. Most of the coastal communities we visited employ some
    technologically sophisticated methods to warn residents. For example, 8 of
    the 12 communities we visited had at least one tsunami warning siren and
    three alerted residents by an automated telephone system. However, local
    emergency managers told us that inadequate warning siren coverage was a
    significant issue in many locations, such as Ocean Shores, Washington, and
    on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula. In addition, many of the warning methods used
    by communities-such as sirens and internet-based messaging systems-are
    dependent on telephone lines and other infrastructure that would likely be
    disrupted by a strong earthquake. During the June 2005 tsunami warning on
    the west coast, officials in several communities noted that telephone
    lines were overloaded by a surge of incoming 911 calls from concerned
    residents, in some cases, preventing emergency managers from contacting
    other local officials and preventing telephone-based warning systems from
    reaching all residents. Some emergency managers expressed concern that
    they do not have adequate backup systems to receive and disseminate
    warning messages if telephone lines fail. Finally, three of the
    communities we visited rely on warning methods such as verbal
    notifications by bullhorns or radio broadcasts.

    State and local emergency managers are aware of the limitations of
    existing tsunami warning systems and are involved in a number of projects
    to address them. For example, some of the communities we visited have
    attempted to obtain additional sirens and replace unreliable ones to
    provide better coverage to residents. For Crescent City, California, and
    Gold Beach, Oregon, county officials obtained a number of used civil
    defense sirens for a nominal cost but reported that installation and
    maintenance costs pose additional challenges. Washington state has
    provided seven at-risk communities with advanced All Hazard Alert
    Broadcasting sirens, but their high cost-approximately $50,000, twice as
    much as a new, conventional siren-may be prohibitive for other
    communities.19 In addition, communities have taken actions to ensure more
    effective communications between emergency management officials and first
    responders. For example, some have purchased satellite phones and digital
    communications systems that are not vulnerable to earthquake damages or
    interoperable radios that ensure that first responders can talk to each
    other if telephone lines are disrupted. In coastal areas with high
    population and building densities-where roads, bridges, and other
    horizontal evacuation methods are limited or where warning time is
    short-vertical evacuation to the upper floors of buildings that are
    capable of withstanding the initial earthquake and subsequent tsunami can
    be an

    20

    alternative or supplement to horizontal evacuation.

    Most of the states and communities we visited have made efforts to test
    their evacuation plans and warning systems, but few comprehensive drills
    have been conducted. Recent events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
    have illustrated that robust training and testing are important to
    identify problems in advance of an actual event.21 However, only Seaside,
    Oregon, has conducted comprehensive tsunami exercises involving multiple
    agencies and full public participation. Five of the communities we visited
    have conducted exercises involving multiple agencies in mock tsunami
    scenarios to discuss plans and procedures involved in responding to a real
    event. While these efforts are useful, their limited scope may not
    adequately identify all of the issues that would emerge in an actual
    event. For example, in an actual emergency, traffic control and public
    evacuations may take substantially longer than estimated. Local officials
    told us that more comprehensive drills would be beneficial, but they have
    limited funding and staff to plan and conduct them and getting community
    involvement is very difficult due to the disruption to the local economy.

    19

    The All Hazard Alert Broadcasting Radio is an outdoor system that provides
    both tone and voice alert and notification to residents/visitors by
    federal, state, and local emergency authorities; an intense blue light is
    also activated at each location to further indicate the area is in a
    hazardous situation.

    20

    FEMA and NOAA, with a grant from the NTHMP and the National Earthquake
    Hazards Reduction Program, are currently developing guidance for
    constructing vertical evacuation shelters.

    21

    See GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David Walker on GAO's
    Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2006).

    Tsunami Education and Outreach Efforts Have Not Been Consistently
    Implemented

    Education and outreach efforts are important because plans and warning
    systems may do little to save lives if the public does not know what to do
    when it receives a warning. Two such efforts, distributing evacuation maps
    and posting tsunami evacuation signs, raise awareness of tsunami threats
    and educate the public on appropriate escape routes. Ten of the 12
    communities we visited have either received evacuation maps from the state
    or developed their own maps identifying appropriate evacuation routes.
    However, only five of the communities reported distributing evacuation
    maps to all residents, either by mailing them to all registered utility
    customers, publishing them in the local telephone book, or in one case
    distributing them door-to-door.22 A few communities have taken other
    actions to reach the public such as posting evacuation maps in police
    stations and on grocery store reader boards. Several communities have made
    efforts to reach tourists by providing evacuation maps at areas they
    frequent, such as the local visitor's center and distributing tsunami
    hazard information and evacuation maps to hotels. Regarding tsunami signs,
    9 of the 12 communities reported posting tsunami hazard or evacuation
    route signs in their communities, such as those shown in figure 9,
    although in a few locations, local emergency managers reported that the
    signs are frequently stolen.

                          Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs

    Source: Oregon Emergency Management.

    According to emergency management officials and other emergency
    preparedness experts, focusing on educating youth-the adults of
    tomorrow-has considerable promise for increasing tsunami

    22

    In Hawaii, evacuation maps are printed in each county's telephone book.

    preparedness. Specifically, two key efforts-developing and implementing
    school curricula and conducting tsunami evacuation drills in schools- may
    help improve tsunami preparedness now and in the future. Of the six
    at-risk states and territories we visited, only two-Oregon and
    Washington-have developed tsunami specific curricula and are teaching them
    in schools, according to state emergency managers.23 The Washington state
    curriculum is targeted at two age groups-grades K through 6 and grades 7
    through 12-and provides various lessons to help students plan ahead for a
    tsunami and protect themselves and their families when a tsunami occurs.
    In addition, Hawaii has developed a tsunami specific curriculum that will
    be tailored to each of its counties. Oregon and Hawaii also require
    schools in tsunami inundation areas to conduct tsunami drills at least
    once a year, often in conjunction with Tsunami Awareness month activities.
    For example, in Hilo, Hawaii, an elementary school located in a known
    tsunami inundation area conducts an annual evacuation drill in which
    students practice responding to a tsunami warning by walking from the
    school to a safe location. Three of the communities we visited in
    Washington, Puerto Rico, and Alaska also reported conducting tsunami
    evacuation drills in schools at least once a year, even though the states
    do not require them.

    All six of the at-risk states and territories we visited have conducted a
    variety of education and outreach activities to distribute tsunami hazard
    information to communities. For example, the states we visited have
    developed a variety of print materials, produced videos, made tsunami
    information available on the Internet, and conducted forums and other
    workshops to educate citizens on tsunami risks and preparedness. At the
    community level, 11 of the 12 emergency managers we visited stated that
    forums and workshops have been conducted to educate residents and tourists
    about tsunami hazards.24 However, only two local emergency managers
    reported meeting with special needs populations, such as

    23

    In 1995, the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 378, requiring that at
    least 30 minutes of earthquake, tsunami, and other disaster-related
    education be taught in schools each month, among other things. Or. Rev.
    Stat. S: 336.071 (2003).

    24

    One comprehensive education effort was funded by the NTHMP. In September
    2004, the city of Seaside, Oregon, launched a 9-month Tsunami Awareness
    Program to determine the feasibility of educating the public on tsunami
    hazards and preparedness practices. The community implemented five
    outreach strategies to reach target audiences, including a neighborhood
    educator project, business workshop, school outreach program, public
    workshop, and a tsunami evacuation drill that included Seaside residents,
    businesses, and visitors.

    States and Localities Have Undertaken Few Efforts to Protect
    Infrastructure from Potential Tsunami Damage

    community hospitals and senior centers, to distribute tsunami hazard
    information and encourage them to develop tsunami evacuation plans.

    All of the at-risk states and territories acknowledged the need for
    additional education and outreach but cited two primary challenges to
    increasing and sustaining such efforts. First, many of the state emergency
    managers whom we spoke with noted that they are responsible for other,
    higher priority hazards-such as floods and wildland fires-that occur more
    frequently than tsunamis. Second, the states have limited funding
    dedicated to tsunami preparedness activities. Of the approximately
    $275,000 in NTHMP funds provided annually to each state, the states have
    chosen to use most of it to develop or upgrade existing tsunami inundation
    maps rather than for education or outreach efforts. Local emergency
    managers echoed these challenges. Moreover, in many areas that depend on
    tourism, local emergency managers said that businesses are reluctant to
    post tsunami hazard information because it may scare tourists and
    negatively impact the economy. Many noted, however, that since the
    December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the subsequent June 2005 tsunami
    warning on the west coast, community interest in workshops and forums has
    increased. Local businesses-in particular hotels and motels- have become
    increasingly interested in receiving tsunami hazard information to
    distribute to patrons.

    According to tsunami experts, land-use planning and zoning strategies- for
    example, designating tsunami hazard areas for open-space uses, such as
    parks, and locating new infrastructure and critical facilities (i.e.,
    police stations, hospitals, and potable water systems) out of tsunami
    hazard areas-can mitigate loss of life and property from a devastating
    tsunami.25 However, many of the at-risk states we visited have not adopted
    any landuse planning strategies to address the tsunami threat. Oregon is
    the only at-risk state we visited that has passed a land-use statute
    placing limits on the construction of certain high occupancy structures
    within tsunami inundation areas.26 Alaska also places restrictions on
    development in certain designated "natural hazard" areas, including
    coastal areas potentially affected by tsunamis.27 One at-risk community
    also has been

    25

    Designing for Tsunamis: Seven Principles for Planning and Designing for
    Tsunami Hazards. NTHMP, March 2001.

    26

    Or. Rev. Stat. S:S: 455.446-447 (2003).

    27

    Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, S: 112.210 (2006).

    Page 34 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    successful in implementing a land-use strategy to mitigate future tsunami
    losses. The city of Hilo, Hawaii, developed an Urban Renewal Plan-based on
    the devastation from the 1960 tsunami-that set aside certain "open areas"
    for limited use in order to minimize the danger of loss of life or damage
    to property in areas potentially subject to inundation from tsunamis.28

    Tsunami experts believe that constructing new buildings in a tsunami
    inundation area to better withstand tsunami forces can reduce loss of life
    and property damage in cases where land-use planning and zoning are not
    feasible. Building design and construction in the United States is
    governed at the local level by building codes that establish minimum
    acceptable requirements for preserving public safety. Although the Uniform
    Building Code contains design requirements and standards for fire, wind,
    floods, and earthquakes, it does not include requirements for
    tsunami-resilient design.29 Nonetheless, two communities we visited, Hilo
    and Honolulu, Hawaii, have developed guidelines for constructing
    tsunami-resilient structures. For example, a 2000 Honolulu building
    ordinance requires, among other things, that the inhabitable space in
    buildings at-risk from tsunamis must be elevated above the regulatory
    flood elevation through the use of posts, piles, piers or shear walls
    parallel to the expected flow of a tsunami wave.30 None of the at-risk
    states we visited have developed guidelines for constructing
    tsunami-resilient structures although legislation establishing tax
    incentives for such construction is pending in Washington.31 Hawaii's
    state legislature is currently considering a bill to develop a state
    building code based on the International Building Code, which, according
    to state emergency management officials, would strengthen buildings
    against tsunamis and other hazards.32 In commenting on a draft of this
    report, FEMA noted that, the International Building Code, which has
    replaced the Uniform Building Code as the national model code, also does
    not contain specific requirements addressing the tsunami

    28

    Urban Renewal Plan for the Kaiko'o Project, Hawaii Redevelopment Agency,
    County of Hawaii, Hilo, Hawaii, June 1965.

    29

    Most local building codes in the Pacific states are based on the Uniform
    Building Code prepared by the International Conference of Building
    Officials.

    30

    Revised ordinances of Honolulu, Ch. 16-11, available at
    http://www.co.honolulu.hi.us/refs/roh/16a11.htm.

    31

    H.B.
               1022, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2006).

    H.B.
               3230, 23rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Hi. 2005).

    32

    hazard. However, structures built in conformance with the International
    Building Code are likely to perform better during a tsunami because of
    other code provisions, particularly seismic requirements.

    Several states, including California and Oregon, have adopted laws and
    ordinances for retrofitting existing buildings to reduce losses from
    future earthquakes.33 For existing infrastructure, earthquake retrofits
    may improve tsunami resistance, or help minimize floating debris that can
    damage nearby buildings.34 Earthquake retrofits could be particularly
    important in the case of a locally generated tsunami off the west coast of
    the United States, where a magnitude 9.0 or greater earthquake is likely
    to precede a tsunami. FEMA has developed guidance for rehabilitating
    buildings to resist earthquake forces.35

    Most of the states and coastal communities we visited have not attempted
    to mitigate tsunami risk through land-use planning and infrastructure
    requirements for several reasons. First, state and local emergency
    managers said that although they recognize the need for additional
    infrastructure protections, such decisions typically reside with a
    community's city council or other governing body. Second, many coastal
    communities rely on coastal-dependent development such as ports and
    harbors that, by their nature, must be situated on the coast; and in other
    cases, communities have already built to capacity in tsunami hazard areas,
    and relocation is not a practical or cost-effective option. Finally, few
    states or coastal communities have adopted tsunami building codes because
    model codes generally have not included requirements for designing
    tsunami-resilient structures and few have implemented retrofitting
    projects because of their high costs.

    33

    See e.g., Cal. Gov. Code S: 8875 (2006); S.B. 2-5, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
    (Or. 2005).

    34

    Retrofitting is making changes to an existing building to protect it from
    flooding, or other hazards such as high winds and earthquakes.

    35

    FEMA-172, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, Handbook of
    Techniques for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings.

    Page 36 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    Community Participation in NOAA's TsunamiReady Hazard Preparedness Program
    Is Limited

    Of the approximately 500 coastal communities at-risk from a tsunami in
    five Pacific states and Puerto Rico, only 25 communities-including 7 of
    the 12 we visited-have been recognized by NWS as TsunamiReady, the primary
    federal effort to encourage communities to prepare for tsunami hazards.36
    According to NWS, the program was developed to provide minimum standard
    guidelines for communities to follow and to enhance tsunami readiness by
    increasing public awareness and understanding of the tsunami hazard, among
    other things.37 Communities that meet program standards are provided signs
    such as those shown in figure 10.

    36

    In January 2006, FEMA developed a proposal that encourages communities to
    map and manage tsunami hazards by providing credits in the Community
    Rating System that reduce their flood insurance rates. The Community
    Rating System, part of the National Flood Insurance Program, is a
    voluntary incentive program that recognizes and encourages community
    floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum program
    requirements. Communities that participate in the National Flood Insurance
    Program receive federally subsidized flood insurance.

    37

    As of March 2006, there were a total of 27 TsunamiReady recognized
    communities in the United States, including 2 on the East Coast - Indian
    Harbour Beach, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia. All counties in the state
    of Hawaii are also recognized as TsunamiReady.

    Source: NWS.

    While the majority of at-risk coastal communities have not joined the
    TsunamiReady program, we found that four of the five at-risk communities
    we visited that are not yet recognized as TsunamiReady do plan to pursue
    recognition in the future. Two of the four communities are currently
    taking steps to meet program requirements by installing additional warning
    infrastructure, such as NOAA Weather Radios. Emergency management
    officials generally agreed that the TsunamiReady program is a good first
    step toward helping communities mitigate the potential impact of a
    tsunami. Specifically, in the TsunamiReady communities we visited, most
    officials stated that they sought recognition to increase community
    tsunami awareness, and officials noted that the TsunamiReady signs had
    helped them move toward that goal. One emergency manager whom we spoke
    with stated that the TsunamiReady recognition had "opened doors" to
    conduct outreach with hotels and that hotel managers had begun seeking
    tsunami hazard information. However, some of the state emergency managers
    with whom we spoke expressed three concerns about the TsunamiReady
    program: (1) it is too limited in scope-for

      Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is Occurring
      in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning

    example, emphasizing warning infrastructure but not requiring tsunami
    specific evacuation and mitigation plans; (2) it should be more focused on
    education, particularly regarding the local tsunami threat; and (3) the
    name "TsunamiReady" promotes a false perception of readiness, since
    preparedness is a continuous process.

    NOAA officials believe that the lack of program participation may be due
    to community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high cost
    versus benefit, but the agency has not formally assessed the program to
    identify barriers to participation or potential program modifications to
    encourage participation. The agency's 2005 Report to Congress on the
    Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation Plan, identifies achieving
    tsunami preparedness recognition for at-risk communities in the United
    States as a vital part of its tsunami activities.38 To that end, according
    to the report, the agency has committed to work with each atrisk coastal
    community across the nation to ensure that community and emergency
    management officials fully understand the tsunami hazard and take action
    to prepare.

    A significant expansion of federal tsunami detection, warning, and related
    activities, as well as the NTHMP, is under way; however, the future
    direction of these efforts is unclear because NOAA has not developed
    long-range strategic plans to guide them. In 2005, NOAA combined its
    various tsunami-related activities into a single program and is currently
    strengthening and expanding certain elements of the program. However, NOAA
    has not yet adopted a comprehensive strategic plan that sets specific
    program goals and objectives, defines performance measures, ensures
    coordination of existing activities, and establishes risk-based priorities
    to guide the expansion of the warning program into the future.
    Furthermore, with the likely expansion of the NTHMP from 5 state
    participants to potentially 28 state and territorial participants in 2006,
    it will be difficult for NOAA to ensure that the most threatened states
    receive the resources they need to continue and to complete key mitigation
    activities without an updated, risk-based strategic plan.

    38

    NOAA, FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-13),
    Report to Congress on NOAA's Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation
    Plan.

    Page 39 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    NOAA Is Expanding Elements of Its Tsunami Program, but the Program Lacks a
    Long-Range Strategic Plan

    Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami, NOAA's various tsunami-related
    activities, such as warning center operations, the TsunamiReady program,
    and tsunami-related research were not managed as a formal, integrated
    program within the agency. The administration's initiative to expand
    NOAA's tsunami activities-and the receipt of supplemental funding from the
    Congress for that purpose-led NOAA in April 2005, to establish an
    integrated national Tsunami Program. NOAA is strengthening the Tsunami
    Program by (1) expanding the Pacific warning center and National Data Buoy
    Center facilities by the end of 2005;39 (2) expanding tsunami warning
    center operating hours to 24 hours, 7 days a week in April 2006; (3)
    upgrading and expanding water level observation capabilities by November
    2006; (4) expanding and upgrading the earthquake detection network by the
    end of 2006; (5) establishing a long-term tsunami data archive by late
    2007; (6) increasing DART tsunami detection stations in the Pacific,
    Atlantic, and Caribbean by early 2008; (7) expanding TsunamiReady
    participation nationwide through 2012; and (8) developing a tsunami
    forecast system, including 75 inundation forecast models by 2013.

    While NOAA has developed a schedule for strengthening elements of the
    Tsunami Program, it has not developed a long-range strategic plan that
    includes specific detection, warning and mitigation outcome goals, and
    performance measures to evaluate progress in achieving them. For example,
    NOAA does not have program outcome goals and performance measures for
    reducing false alarms or other critical tsunami-related activities such as
    mapping, modeling, research, education, and outreach. Although strategic
    planning is required for the major functions and operations of agencies by
    the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, it is not specifically
    required for individual programs within agencies. However, our work
    related to the act and the experience of leading organizations have shown
    the importance of identifying long-term goals and establishing performance
    measures to guide program operations and help policy makers determine if
    program activities are achieving the desired results. In addition, the
    Department of Commerce's Inspector General has identified improving
    strategic planning as a top priority and

    39

    The National Data Buoy Center, under the NWS, designs, develops, operates,
    and maintains a network of data collecting buoys and coastal stations.

    Page 40 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    reported on the need for NOAA's programs to improve how they report and
    measure performance toward achieving specific outcomes.40

    In this context, a strategic plan would provide NOAA a framework for
    ensuring that its tsunami-related activities are planned and implemented
    in a risk-based manner. Our recent reports have emphasized the importance
    of federal agencies using risk-based planning. For example, in a June 2005
    testimony on the Department of Homeland Security's resource allocation, we
    reported that the department must carefully weigh the benefit of
    activities and allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risks is
    worth the additional cost.41 Any actions taken by NOAA absent risk-based
    analysis have the potential to divert funds away from locations, such as
    the Pacific and Caribbean regions, where the tsunami hazard-particularly
    from local tsunamis-is well documented. Some of NOAA's activities designed
    to strengthen the tsunami program are scheduled in a manner that raises
    questions about the extent to which they are risk-based. For example,
    there is little historical evidence of tsunamis on the Atlantic coast or
    Gulf coast, yet expansion activities already implemented or scheduled in
    2006 include the placement of DART stations in the Atlantic Ocean, tsunami
    forecast modeling of an east coast community, and recognition of new
    TsunamiReady communities on the east coast. In addition, NOAA's initial
    strengthening efforts emphasize detection and warning for distant
    tsunamis, while the greater risk to most locations in the United
    States-according to NOAA data as well as the National Science and
    Technology Council's December 2005 report on tsunami risk reduction-are
    likely to be posed by local tsunamis. For example, the deployment of DART
    stations and warning center enhancements will not reduce the local tsunami
    risk as directly as other strategies such as educating vulnerable
    populations to immediately head for high ground when the earth shakes near
    the coast. According to NWS officials, they are

    40

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements Needed in
    the Reporting for NOAA GOALS-Build Sustainable Fisheries, Recover
    Protected Species, and Predict and Assess Decadel to Centennial Climate
    Change, Final Audit Report No. FSD-15989-4-0001, September 2004; National
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements Needed in the
    Reporting of Performance Measures Related to Promoting Safe Navigation and
    Sustaining Healthy Coasts, Audit Report No. FSD-14998-3-0001, February
    2003; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements
    Needed in the Reporting of Performance Measures Related to Goals for
    Advancing Shortterm Warnings and Implementing Seasonal to Interannual
    Climate Forecasts, Audit Report No. FSD-15643-3-0001, September 2003.

    41

    GAO, Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate
    Resources to Highest Priorities, GAO-05-824T (Washington, D.C.: June 29,
    2005).

    Concerns Exist about the Management and Direction of the Expanded National
    Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program

    in the process of evaluating outcome goals and performance measures for
    the Tsunami Program, and expect to finalize a strategic plan in 2006. In
    commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that it will work with
    its partners to begin a risk assessment following the completion of a
    tsunami hazard assessment in November 2006, which will improve its future
    ability to allocate funds in a manner consistent with established risk
    management practices.

    Since its inception in 1996, NOAA has used the Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
    Implementation Plan to guide NTMHP activities. The plan has four specific
    goals: (1) raise awareness of affected populations, (2) supply tsunami
    inundation and evacuation maps, (3) improve tsunami warning systems, and
    (4) incorporate tsunami planning into state and federal all-hazards
    mitigation programs. In August 2001, an expert panel reviewed the NTHMP's
    progress and performance under the plan and provided a number of
    suggestions for improving the program. While the thenchairman of the NTHMP
    drafted some goals based on the suggestions, NOAA did not update or revise
    the plan to incorporate the experts' suggestions or the proposed goals
    because, according to the subsequent chairman, the plan's four original
    goals had not yet been achieved.

    Five years later, two key issues raised by the expert panel review remain
    concerns of the state NTHMP participants. First, the positive impacts of
    the program were being largely assumed and not effectively measured. State
    members of the NTHMP still believe that more needs to be done to measure
    the effectiveness of tsunami mitigation activities-such as surveys to
    measure the effectiveness of public education programs. Second, the NTHMP
    was "seriously out of balance," in terms of focusing on detection and risk
    assessment at the expense of working with communities to educate and
    modify behaviors in ways that could save lives. State members of the NTHMP
    remain concerned about the focus on detection and warning systems
    improvements, which are perceived as "federal solutions," rather than
    state and local educational and behavioral activities, such as conducting
    tsunami preparedness drills, which they see as key to community
    preparedness, particularly for local tsunamis.

    The NTHMP had planned to conduct another program review and develop an
    updated implementation plan in 2006. These plans have been placed on hold,
    according to the chairman of the NTHMP, because the decision to make the
    NTHMP a nationwide program-likely including representatives of the 23
    states on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts as well as the two
    commonwealths and three U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and

    Page 42 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    Caribbean Sea-raised significant issues that needed to be settled before
    any revisions to the program's goals and objectives could be considered.42
    However, failing to conduct a program review now means that the program
    will not have vital information regarding (1) what has worked or not
    worked in implementing the program since 2001 and (2) what tsunami
    mitigation activities remain incomplete in the five original Pacific area
    states with high tsunami hazards. A program review could contribute to the
    development of a risk-based strategic plan that ensures that the
    activities that remain uncompleted in areas with the greatest threat get
    the highest priority for funding.

    According to NOAA officials, the agency expects to implement the nine
    recommended actions for the NTHMP and the Tsunami Program contained in the
    National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on tsunami
    risk reduction. The report, developed by NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and other
    federal agencies, recommends actions such as developing standardized and
    coordinated tsunami hazard and risk assessments for all U.S. coastal
    areas, improving tsunami detection and warning data and infrastructure,
    enhancing tsunami forecast and warning capabilities, promoting the
    development of model mitigation measures, and increasing outreach to
    communities. However, because the report and recommendations were
    developed without the participation of the NTHMP members, they question
    whether the recommendations and priorities represent the best strategic
    direction for the NTHMP. All of the state NTHMP members agree that full
    participation in program decision making by individuals with state and
    local level knowledge of tsunami mitigation activities is key to the
    efficiency and success of the NTHMP.

    In addition, state NTHMP members are particularly concerned that the
    program's funding decisions and strategic direction may become less
    riskbased with the inclusion of numerous eastern and southern coastal
    states with lower known tsunami hazards. These members want to ensure that
    communities facing the greatest threat obtain the greatest benefits from
    the program, particularly since many tsunami preparedness activities
    remain incomplete and unfunded in the original five at-risk states. For
    example, in 2005, the Director of the California Governor's Office of
    Emergency Services estimated that in California alone over the next five
    years about $19.5 million was needed for state preparedness activities and

    The commonwealths are Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, and
    the territories are American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

    Page 43 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

                                      Conclusions

    about $7.5 million for local government activities. As such, state NTHMP
    members were surprised to learn that some eastern states have already
    submitted proposals for NTHMP funding.

    In the hazardous Pacific region, NOAA and its federal and state partners
    are working to help prepare communities for tsunamis. However, much is
    left to be done to improve tsunami hazard assessment, detection, warning,
    and mitigation for these areas and other at-risk areas of the United
    States. It is particularly important that when at-risk states complete
    their inundation mapping, they then conduct comprehensive assessments of
    the expected damage from a tsunami. Without this basic information,
    emergency managers will not be able to effectively formulate plans to
    mitigate potential tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure. In
    addition, improved technical capabilities to detect tsunamis will be of
    limited value if the warning systems and processes that NOAA depends on to
    disseminate this information cannot reliably ensure that all threatened
    individuals and communities will receive an accurate and timely warning.

    Because tsunamis are an infrequent hazard that may be overlooked due to
    higher priority reoccurring natural hazards such as hurricanes and
    flooding, NOAA and its federal and state partners face a significant
    challenge ensuring that communities are sufficiently engaged in
    preparedness activities. The Indian Ocean tsunami, however, has created a
    window of opportunity by spotlighting the devastation and destruction that
    can result from a lack of planning, preparedness, and education for such
    an event-no matter how rare. We believe that federal and state partners
    can take advantage of this current sense of urgency and develop a
    strategic approach that will ensure that the significantly increased
    resources that have been made available to expand U.S. tsunami detection
    and preparedness programs are being effectively targeted. As part of this
    effort, all federal tsunami-related activities, including the TsunamiReady
    program and the NTHMP, should be reassessed to determine how to increase
    their effectiveness. Moreover, NOAA needs to address the lack of
    long-range, risk-based strategic planning for these activities. Without
    strategic planning and performance measures to guide these efforts, the
    Congress and the public will lack important information about the extent
    to which resources are being directed to activities that are of the
    greatest benefit to the most vulnerable communities and to what extent
    measurable progress is being made toward the desired results. We believe

    U.S. tsunami programs guided by long-term strategic plans with
    demonstrable achievements will be better able to sustain their efforts for
    vulnerable coastal communities into the future.

    To help improve national tsunami preparedness, we are recommending

      Recommendations for

    that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take
    theExecutive Action following six actions:

         o work with the FEMA Director and the USGS Director to create
           standardized tsunami loss estimation software to help communities
           determine the potential impact of tsunamis and identify appropriate
           mitigation actions;
         o reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms by (1) completing
           the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, (2) reexamining
           NWS's rules dictating when a warning will be issued and to which
           areas, (3) establishing a routine process for other federal and state
           experts to formally review and comment on the centers' use of seismic
           data, and (4) setting performance goals to guide improvements;
         o work with the states to conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the
           tsunami warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency
           Alert System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a
           tsunami emergency;
         o evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any,
           exist to participation and what modifications are needed to encourage
           more high-risk communities to participate;
         o evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well in the past and
           what high priority activities remain to be completed and to help
           inform strategic planning efforts, and;
         o develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami
           Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program that consider
           input from states and federal partners and include metrics for
           measuring progress toward achieving program goals.

                           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Departments of
    Commerce, Homeland Security and the Interior for their review and comment.
    Commerce, representing NOAA, concurred with all six recommendations and
    generally agreed with our findings, although it provided technical and
    factual clarifications, which we have incorporated into the report as
    appropriate. However, in its comments, NOAA suggested a revision to one of
    the recommendations with which we disagree. In response to our
    recommendation that NOAA evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine
    what barriers, if any, exist to participation and what

    Page 45 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    modifications are needed to encourage more high-risk communities to
    participate, NOAA suggested changing the recommendation's focus from
    "high-risk" to "at-risk" communities. According to NOAA all U.S. coastal
    communities should be prepared for a tsunami no matter how rare. While we
    agree that preparing all U.S. coastal communities for a tsunami may be a
    laudable long-term goal, given the agency's limited resources, it may be
    an unrealistic goal in the short-term. Therefore, we believe that NOAA
    should use a risk-based approach and target initial participation in the
    TsunamiReady program to those communities that face the greatest risk.
    Commerce's specific comments and our detailed responses are presented in
    appendix I.

    Homeland Security, representing FEMA, commented on one of the six
    recommendations and indicated that while it concurred with the
    recommendation that NOAA work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized
    tsunami loss estimation software, it was concerned that FEMA did not have
    the funding or the staff resources to pursue such a request and that such
    a request from NOAA would have to address these resource needs. Homeland
    Security also noted that the report did not mention other programs such as
    FEMA's Pre-disaster Mitigation Program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant
    Program, which can be used by states and communities to fund tsunami
    mitigation projects. We revised the report to mention that these programs
    have funded tsunami mitigation projects. Finally, Homeland Security stated
    that the report's description of the TsunamiReady program as it relates to
    response, preparedness, and mitigation activities is unclear. We believe
    that we have clearly characterized the program as providing minimum
    guidelines that communities can use to enhance tsunami readiness and
    therefore have not revised the report in response to this comment.
    Homeland Security's specific comments and our detailed responses are
    presented in appendix

    II.

    The Department of the Interior commented that the report was a thorough
    well-researched examination of the nation's tsunami warning system and
    that it correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the
    federal, state, and local levels to have an effective tsunami warning
    system. Interior also said that it supports the need for a risk-based
    approach to prioritizing federal investments in this system and is
    actively collaborating with NOAA to provide the hazard assessments
    necessary for such an approach. In addition, Interior said that one area
    it felt was inadequately addressed in the report was the importance of a
    long-term federal role in research to improve tsunami warnings and
    mitigate tsunami risks and noted that none of our recommendations involved
    improving or expanding

    Page 46 GAO-06-519 U.S. Tsunami Preparedness

    research. While we agree that tsunami-related research is an important
    issue, it was not included in the scope of our review, and consequently,
    this report does not cover issues related to tsunami research or offer any
    recommendations in this area. Interior's specific comments and our
    detailed responses are presented in appendix III.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce,
    Homeland Security, and the Interior; appropriate congressional committees;
    and other interested Members of Congress. We also will make copies
    available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
    of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
    listed in appendix IV.

    Anu K. Mittal

    Director, Natural Resources and Environment

                  Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce

    The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Commerce's letter
    dated May 8, 2006.

    1. Having all coastal communities be prepared for a tsunami may be a

      GAO Comment

    worthwhile long-term goal; however, given limited resources, in the
    short-term we believe that it is important to prioritize the efforts of
    the TsunamiReady program to encourage higher-risk communities to
    participate.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland Security's
    letter dated May 12, 2006.

    1. We revised the text to show the correct title for the FEMA Director.

    1. We describe FEMA's Community Rating System in a report footnote. For
           this reason, we did not revise the report.
    2. We revised the report to indicate that FEMA's Pre-disaster Mitigation
           Program and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program have funded tsunami
           mitigation activities.
    3. We believe that the report clearly describes the TsunamiReady program
           as providing minimum guidelines for communities to use to enhance
           tsunami preparedness, not as a program that requires all of the
           activities that could be taken to maximize community protection. For
           this reason, we did not revise the report.
    4. We believe that the report adequately describes the NTHMP's federal
           and state partnership as well as the roles of emergency management
           organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, not only for
           warning systems, but also for planning, education and outreach, and
           infrastructure protection mitigation activities. For this reason, we
           did not revise the report.
    5. We revised the report to clarify that vertical evacuation should only
           occur in buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial
           earthquake and subsequent tsunami.
    6. We revised the report to clarify the extent to which building codes
           address the tsunami hazard.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior

    The following is GAO's comment on the Department of the Interior's letter
    dated May 4, 2006.

    1. The analysis of the federal role in research on tsunami warnings and

      GAO Comment

    mitigation was not included in the scope of this report. Consequently, we
    did not examine issues related to tsunami research or offer any
    recommendations.

                             Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841

    In addition to those named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant Director;

      Staff

    Brad C. Dobbins; Joel A. Green; Ryan S. Lambert; and Susan M.

    Acknowledgments Zimmerman made key contributions to this report. Also
    contributing to the report were Claudia K. Becker; John W. Delicath;
    Gregory A. Marchand; John G. Smale, Jr.; Anne O. Stevens; and Randall B.
    Williamson.

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