    Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil
    Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges
    (31-MAY-06, GAO-06-498).

    To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Congress approved the
    development of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked to
    identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
    high-yield explosive weapons; assess consequences; advise civil
    authorities on response measures; and assist with requests for
    additional support. Thus far, 36 of the 55 approved teams have
    been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National Guard
    Bureau (NGB) is in the process of establishing, certifying, and
    planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was asked
    to address the extent to which (1) the CSTs are ready to conduct
    their mission and (2) effective administrative mechanisms are in
    place for the CSTs.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-498
        ACCNO:   A54907
      TITLE:     Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify
    Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges
         DATE:   05/31/2006
      SUBJECT:   Agency missions
    	     Antiterrorism
    	     Defense contingency planning
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Homeland security
    	     Military training
    	     National Guard
    	     Weapons of mass destruction
    	     Civil support
    	     Strategic planning

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    GAO-06-498

         * Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
           Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
           House of Representatives
              * May 2006
         * HOMELAND DEFENSE
              * National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams'
                Mission and Address Management Challenges
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
              * CSTs Are Prepared to Conduct Their Mission, but the Role of Non-
                WMD Missions Causes Confusion
                   * Certified CSTs Are Ready to Perform Their Mission
                   * Mechanisms Are in Place for CSTs to Operationally Respond to
                     Missions
                   * Role of Non-WMD Missions Causes Confusion
                   * DOD Plans to Expand Role of CSTs Outside the United States
              * CST Program Faces Management Challenges That Could Increase Risk
                to Long- term Sustainment
                   * NGB Is Pursuing Institutional Management Efforts
                        * CSTs Struggle to Fully Staff Teams
                        * CSTs Lack Guidance on Conducting Coordination in Their
                          States
                        * CSTs Face Equipment, Training, Readiness Reporting, and
                          Facilities Challenges
                        * NGB Lacks Guidance to Help State National Guard
                          Commands Oversee and Support CSTs
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendations for Executive Action
              * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Scope and Methodology
         * CST Program Management Efforts
              * Standardization and Evaluation Program
              * Army Training and Evaluation Support
              * CST Working Groups
         * Data Collection Instrument
         * Comments from the Department of Defense
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
    Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
    House of Representatives

    May 2006

    HOMELAND DEFENSE

    National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and
    Address Management Challenges

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    May 31, 2006Letter

    The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National
    Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations Committee on
    Government Reform House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    To help prepare the United States for potential terrorist attacks
    involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD),  1 Congress in 1998 approved
    the development of federally funded, state2 controlled, National Guard WMD
    Civil Support Teams (CSTs). The CSTs' principal mission is to assist civil
    authorities in the United States in responding to incidents involving WMD
    or catastrophic terrorism, including the use of chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons and agents. The
    CSTs are to identify these agents and substances, assess current or
    projected consequences, advise civil authorities on response measures, and
    assist with requests for additional support. Like traditional National
    Guard units, the CSTs are under the control of the governors of their
    respective states and territories, unless they are activated for federal
    service, at which time they would fall under the control of the Department
    of Defense (DOD). However, unlike traditional National Guard units, these
    highly specialized teams are each composed of 22 members who are on
    full-time duty. The teams include both Army and Air National Guard
    personnel who are divided into six sections, including command,
    operations, administration/logistics, medical science, communications, and
    survey. The teams possess highly technical mobile laboratory and
    communications equipment to accomplish their mission.

    Congress initially approved the establishment of 10 CSTs.3 Since 1998,
    Congress has incrementally increased the number of authorized teams to the
    currently approved 55: one in each state; a second team in California; and
    one each in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and
    Guam. DOD established the stationing plan for the CSTs in five phases. The
    National Guard Bureau (NGB), the managing organization for the CSTs,
    executed the establishment, certification, and sustainment program for the
    teams. Phase one comprised 10 teams; phase two 17 teams; phase three 5
    teams; phase four 12 teams; and phase five 11 teams. Each team must be
    certified by the Secretary of Defense as capable of conducting its
    mission. To accomplish this, each team must complete a battery of
    individual and team training, receive all its authorized equipment,
    achieve full staffing, pass an external evaluation by Army experts, and
    apply (via its state adjutant general) to the Secretary of Defense for
    certification. Thirty-six teams have been certified as of May 2006; the
    remaining 19 will be certified by the end of fiscal year 2007. The
    approximate cost for establishing all 55 teams is $424 million, and it
    costs approximately $3.4 million annually to sustain each team.

    The challenges DOD faces in managing its reserve forces and allocating its
    resources across services and programs are some of the many issues that we
    highlighted for Congress as the nation entered the 21st century. For
    example, we issued a report in November 2004 that recommended the
    establishment of readiness standards and measures for the National Guard's
    homeland security missions.4 In 2001, the DOD Inspector General
    highlighted a number of structural and management problems with the CST
    program, including the standards for certification and readiness of the
    teams as well as other problems that may impede the CSTs from conducting
    their mission.

    We examined the operational readiness of the Army National Guard's WMD
    CSTs. Our objectives were to address (1) the extent to which the CSTs are
    ready to conduct their mission and (2) the extent to which there are
    effective administrative mechanisms in place for the CSTs.

    To address these objectives, we reviewed the readiness criteria and
    categories for the two systems used to track CST readiness.5 We also
    incorporated these criteria into our questions as we designed and
    distributed a broad data collection instrument to all 55 CSTs to collect
    information regarding the status and availability of CST equipment,
    training and certification, mission, coordination, and personnel. We
    received complete responses from 52 CSTs. Further, we supplemented this
    information with visits to 14 CSTs, and we conducted interviews with state
    National Guard personnel as well as with local, State, and federal
    officials who currently or will potentially work with CSTs. In preparing
    the data collection instrument, we tested the reasonableness of our
    questions in discussions with the commanders of two CSTs not included in
    our 14 site visits. During several of our site visits, we observed
    exercises, an external evaluation, and other training events. We also
    compared the information collected during our visits, including
    interviews; after-action reports; and existing command, control, and
    coordination mechanisms, with policies and the expectations of officials
    with whom the CSTs must work in the states. We selected the site-visit
    sample to comprise a wide distribution of states and territories based on
    such criteria as geographic distribution, age of team, certification
    status, state size, and population. Additionally we collected cost data
    related to the establishment and sustainment of the CSTs from NGB, state
    National Guard personnel, and the CSTs themselves. We did not
    independently verify cost data, but we interviewed NGB officials who
    manage the data about data quality control procedures. We determined the
    data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Further
    details on our scope and methodology appear in appendix I. We performed
    our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    The certified CSTs have thus far been ready to conduct their mission in
    terms of having the training, equipment, and staff required of them, and
    the teams have a functioning command and control structure. However,
    confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD
    missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission
    could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency
    management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. Congress
    authorized the creation of the CSTs for the primary purpose of assisting
    civil authorities in responding to domestic incidents involving WMD. Based
    on our review of the CSTs' training, equipment, and staffing criteria;
    data we collected for the CSTs in all three areas; our site visits to 14
    CSTs; and our discussions with state, local, and federal responders who
    have worked with those teams, we found the certified teams we visited to
    thus far be ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the states have a
    clear structure for operational control of the CSTs, including procedures
    for who can authorize CST deployment, to whom they should report at an
    incident scene, and when command authority shifts because of a federalized
    effort. State and local officials we interviewed reported that the command
    and control of the teams is well understood and exercised. Though the
    CSTs' mission is focused on WMD events, and the CSTs emphasize this focus
    when coordinating with state and local emergency management officials,
    some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing emergency
    assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. Beyond the
    benefits they provide to civil authorities, the CSTs use such missions to
    prepare for responding to a WMD event. However, the lack of clarity and
    guidance on what types of non-WMD operations the CSTs should use to
    prepare for a WMD response, as well as the desire of civil authorities to
    call upon the teams for other emergencies, is causing confusion among
    state, local, and National Guard officials about the appropriate use of
    the CSTs. This potentially slows coordination between local and state
    responders and the CSTs and coordinated NGB-level responses involving
    multiple CSTs. Also, DOD is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to
    coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of
    a cross-border WMD incident. DOD and NGB are also informally considering
    limited overseas missions for the teams, though they have no plans to
    request a further expansion of the CSTs' mission to encompass overseas
    operations. According to NGB and the CST commanders, some overseas
    missions could provide valuable experience and have a positive effect on
    CST readiness, while other, more demanding missions, such as supporting
    the warfighter, could be detrimental to the CSTs.

    Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the CST
    program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and
    management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer teams
    and the long term sustainment of the program. As the managing authority
    for the CST program, NGB has made progress in establishing an
    administrative management structure for the CSTs, including issuing a
    broad CST management regulation and initiating a standardization and
    evaluation program. However, NGB also faces challenges to the CSTs in such
    areas as staffing, coordination plans, equipment maintenance and
    acquisition, training and exercise oversight, readiness reporting, and
    facilities. Further, NGB guidance explaining state National Guard roles
    and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs is
    insufficient to fully inform the states about the unique nature and
    requirements of the CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into the state
    National Guard command structure. The result has been varied and generally
    problematic oversight and support of CSTs at the state level in such areas
    as staffing and equipment augmentation and designing and building the
    facilities to house the teams. According to CST members and NGB officials
    we interviewed, these challenges have yet to harm readiness, and NGB
    officials recognize the importance of these challenges and have individual
    initiatives to address many of them. If NGB's efforts are not successful,
    the challenges could, in the long run, impede the progress of newer teams
    and compromise the long-term sustainment of the CST program.

    This report makes recommendations to help DOD and NGB address management
    challenges and further its efforts to sustain the CST program. We are
    recommending that DOD work with NGB and the Army and Air Force to clarify
    the domestic CST mission, develop guidance to address management
    challenges, and create a clear and effective administrative support
    structure at the state level. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD
    generally agreed with our recommendations and described steps it is taking
    or will take to implement them.

    Background

    In response to an increase in the threat of potential terrorist attacks in
    the United States involving WMDs, Congress directed the federal government
    to enhance its capability to deter, prevent, respond, and recover from
    terrorist attacks using such weapons.6 Among the resulting efforts,
    Congress in fiscal year 1999 approved the development of National Guard
    WMD CSTs.7 The CSTs are designed to support civil authorities in the event
    of a domestic WMD event by identifying WMD agents and substances,
    assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response
    measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support.
    In describing WMD agents, DOD commonly uses the term chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Like traditional
    National Guard units, the CSTs are under the day-to-day control of the
    governors of their respective states and territories. The CSTs can also be
    activated for federal service by the President, at which time they would
    fall under DOD command. Unlike traditional National Guard units, which
    generally consist of part-time soldiers who conduct regular drills, the
    CSTs are composed of full-time Army and Air National Guard members. Each
    22-person team is divided into six sections: command, operations,
    communications, administration and logistics, medical/analytical, and
    survey. The members of the CSTs are trained in their various disciplines
    and operate sophisticated equipment that helps them accomplish their
    mission. Table 1 shows examples of some of the tasks associated with each
    CST section.

    Table 1: Examples of Civil Support Team Section Tasks

             Section       Number of               Examples of tasks
                           personnel
    Command                     2  o Provides command and control of the team

                                      o Interfaces with external agencies and
                                      organizations

                                      o Provides advice to the first responder
                                      community

                                      o Facilitates introduction of follow-on DOD
                                      forces into a consolidated response team

                                      o Ensures that sample collection and
                                      handling procedures are conducted safely
                                      and are accurately documented and the chain
                                      of custody is maintained
    Operations                  4  o Conducts hazard modeling

                                      o Provides information for vulnerability
                                      analysis

                                      o Coordinates and directs CBRNE surveys

                                      o Coordinates and monitors unit training

                                      o Prepares site safety and incident action
                                      plans
    Medical/ analytical         4  o Establishes and maintains medical
                                      surveillance and monitoring programs for
                                      the unit

                                      o Conducts lab analysis of incident-related
                                      samples

                                      o Conducts medical reach-back coordination
                                      with medical labs

                                      o Secures and prepares samples for
                                      transport and subsequent transfer

                                      o Provides emergency medical stability for
                                      CST members
    Communications              2  o Provides voice and data communications
                                      through a variety of networks designed to
                                      support CST operations

                                      o Maintains communications within the team,
                                      with higher headquarters, with other
                                      responding agencies, and with subject
                                      matter experts

                                      o Establishes secure communications links,
                                      as required
    Survey                      8  o Conducts missions in appropriate
                                      protective equipment

                                      o Enters a suspected hot zone to conduct
                                      search for CBRNE hazards

                                      o Collects and preserves incident-related
                                      samples for delivery to analytical
                                      equipment

                                      o Identifies, marks and reports
                                      contaminated areas
    Administration and          2  o Sustains the ability of the CST to
    logistics                      conduct operations

                                      o Maintains logistics status reports

                                      o Procures and stores unit equipment
                                      according to command guidance

    Source: DOD.

    The CSTs employ military-provided equipment that is common to active duty
    military units, such as chemical defense equipment and uniforms. They also
    use a large variety of specialized commercial equipment, such as the
    protective ensembles worn in the hazard zone and much of the teams'
    laboratory equipment. The CSTs employ several vehicles for transporting
    and supporting the six sections of the team. Among these are two specially
    constructed vehicles: the Unified Command Suite, which contains a wide
    range of radio, data, and video communications equipment, and the
    Analytical Laboratory System, which contains such equipment as a gas
    chromatograph/mass spectrometer for organic material analysis and a gamma
    spectrometer for radiological material analysis as well as other
    laboratory support equipment. Figures 1 and 2 show the Unified Command
    Suite and the Analytical Laboratory System, respectively.

    Figure 1: The Unified Command Suite

    Figure 2: The Analytical Laboratory System

    The equipment in the Analytical Laboratory System helps the CSTs conduct a
    "presumptive identification" of a CBRNE sample. If requested by the
    incident commander, the CST then transfers a sample to a Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention-approved laboratory for confirmation and
    official identification.

    NGB is responsible for managing the CST program and is the principal
    channel of communication between DOD and the adjutant general commanding
    the National Guard unit in each state. NGB also coordinates with other DOD
    commands and organizations to support various aspects of the CST program.
    For example, the joint service Chemical and Biological Defense Program
    conducts the acquisition process for much of the CST equipment, and the
    Army's Maneuver Support Center assists in developing CST doctrine and
    conducting key CST-specific training.

    The Secretary of Defense must certify each CST as ready to execute its WMD
    mission.8 This certification involves a series of staffing, equipping, and
    training steps that take from 18 to 24 months. To achieve certification,
    each CST must complete the following steps:

    1.Have the required personnel and equipment resources and be trained to
    undertake the full mission for which it is organized or designed. For
    example, at least 85 percent of assigned personnel must have completed all
    of their CST-specific individual training.

    2.Undergo an external evaluation by Army experts according to the CST's
    approved mission training plan.

    3.Notify its adjutant general that it has completed the above steps,
    whereupon the adjutant general submits a request for certification to NGB,
    which then reviews and forwards the request to the Army Staff and to the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.9

    The Secretary of Defense makes the final determination of approval for CST
    certification. Although certification is a onetime event, a CST that loses
    a significant number of key personnel associated with command and control
    or with medical and assessment capabilities that substantially degrades
    the team's ability to conduct its mission must undergo a revalidation
    process. In addition, each CST undergoes an external evaluation every 18
    months, during which Army experts assess each team's ability to meet
    specific mission standards associated with all related WMD threats.

    Both civil and military responders, including the CSTs, conduct WMD
    response operations in a three-tiered approach based on the National
    Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. The National
    Response Plan represents a comprehensive all-hazards approach intended to
    enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents.
    Fire and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical personnel
    constitute the first tier. If the extent of the event exceeds the ability
    of the first tier to manage the consequences of the situation, the
    state-level civil and military forces may be activated and deployed as the
    second tier. If the governor determines that the forces and resources
    available in the state require additional support, then the governor may
    request assistance from the President of the United States, constituting
    the third tier. The CSTs are generally included in the second tier of the
    response.

    In addition to preparing to respond to WMD and catastrophic terrorist
    events in their respective states, the CSTs also adhere to NGB's Response
    Management Plan. Under this plan, NGB monitors the readiness status of
    each certified CST to ensure that at a given time, a designated number of
    CSTs are always ready to respond to a national need or the need of a state
    without an available CST. To facilitate planning for such responses, the
    plan divides the nation into six response sectors, as shown in table 2.

    Table 2: CST Response Management Plan Sectors

    Response sector                   States or territories
    1               Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode
                       Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine
    2               West Virginia, Virginia, District of Columbia, Maryland,
                       Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin
    3               Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina,
                       Tennessee, Kentucky, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
                       Virgin Islands
    4               Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri,
                       Minnesota, Iowa, and Mississippi
    5               New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado,
                       Hawaii, and Guam
    6               South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho,
                       Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Nebraska

    Source: National Guard Bureau.

    Under the Response Management Plan, the CSTs are scheduled on either
    "bronze," "silver," or "gold" status on a rotating basis. At any given
    time one certified team per response region is in gold status and must be
    ready to deploy a full CST (personnel and equipment) within 3 hours from
    its home station to an incident site within its region, should the need
    arise. At the same time, another certified team per response region is
    placed in silver status. While this team is in a slightly lower state of
    readiness it must be prepared to assume gold status in the event the gold
    team is deployed. The remaining certified teams are in bronze status and
    are focused more on training, block leave, equipment preparation, and
    state-directed missions. Bronze teams must, however, be prepared to
    respond to incidents within their region within 72 hours and to assume
    silver or gold status within 48 and 96 hours, respectively.

    Because the CSTs are state-controlled units, the respective governors are
    the final deployment authority for CST missions and, unless the CSTs are
    federalized, they remain under the command authority of the governors and
    state adjutants general. The CSTs generally conduct three types of
    mission: response, stand-by, and assist. Response missions are deployments
    in support of requests from local, state, or federal agencies, such as a
    CST deployment to help civil authorities identify a potentially toxic
    chemical left by a suspected terrorist. Stand-by missions involve
    providing CST expertise at special events, such as the national political
    conventions. Assist missions include a range of CST involvement, including
    technical assistance, reconnaissance, or assistance with CBRNE
    vulnerability assessments. For example, CST commanders and team members
    may provide technical assistance by phone to a local incident commander at
    a hazardous materials scene. Table 3 summarizes deployments of the CSTs
    for missions other than training exercises.

    Table 3: Summary of CST Nontraining Deployments, 2001-05

            Mission type                  Number           Percentage of missions
    Response                              405                                8
    Stand-by                              580                               11
    Assist                              4,109                               81
    Total                               5,094                              100

    Source: GAO.

    As shown in table 3, CSTs deployed on response missions far less often
    than on stand-by and assist missions. The table does not show total
    activity by the CSTs, since the majority of their time is devoted to
    training in order to maintain individual and team readiness. It also may
    not reflect all CST deployments to assist in states affected by hurricanes
    in 2005.

    Each CST costs approximately $7.7 million to establish, or approximately
    $424 million to establish all 55 CSTs. This cost estimate includes initial
    equipment, vehicles, personnel, and training support. Sustaining each CST
    in these categories costs approximately $3.4 million a year, or $189
    million a year to sustain all 55 teams. DOD funds the establishment and
    sustainment of the CST program and NGB manages most of this funding. These
    estimates do not include utilities for CST facilities, which are paid by
    the states via a general calculation of all state facilities requirements
    and funded through NGB. The estimates also do not include federally funded
    costs for construction of CST facilities, since these costs vary widely
    depending on how and where the states decide to station their teams. There
    are also additional federal costs associated with the CST program that are
    not associated with the specific teams themselves. For example,
    approximately $65 million for fiscal year 2006 is associated with the
    following categories:

    o funding for CST airlift;

    o various CST-unique training courses;

    o equipment replenishment and modifications;

    o maintenance of secure Internet access for CSTs;

    o government-owned vehicles;

    o communications links;

    o Unified Command Suite maintenance and support;

    o civilian personnel involved in CST oversight functions; and

    o U.S. Army personnel whose mission is to evaluate, train, and develop
    doctrine for CSTs.

    NGB is also in the process of creating additional units meant to follow
    CSTs in response to WMD events and to be part of larger National Guard
    response forces. The mission of the 17 currently authorized National Guard
    CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) is to support local, state,
    and federal agencies managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by
    providing capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, emergency
    medical services, and casualty search and rescue. Each CERFP comprises
    approximately 186 personnel taken from existing Army and Air National
    Guard medical, engineer, chemical, and other units. Unlike CST members,
    CERFP personnel do not serve in their units on a full-time basis but
    rather must be mobilized for duty. Like CSTs, however, CERFPs are intended
    to be part of the state response to a WMD incident and can also be
    federalized and placed under DOD authority.

    CSTs Are Prepared to Conduct Their Mission, but the Role of Non-WMD
    Missions Causes Confusion

    Based on the CSTs' readiness measures for staffing, training, and
    equipment; the data we obtained from the CSTs on each of these measures;
    the process NGB has in place to maintain and monitor CST readiness; and
    the discussions we had with CSTs and state, local, and federal officials
    in the 14 states and territories we visited, we found that the certified
    CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed to conduct their
    mission. Further, NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for
    operational command and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams
    will operationally respond to a WMD event. However, confusion about the
    types of non-WMD missions the CSTs conduct to help them prepare for WMD
    missions could impede coordination between state, local, and federal
    officials about the appropriate use of the CSTs.

    Certified CSTs Are Ready to Perform Their Mission

    The certified CSTs have thus far had the staff, equipment, and training
    they need to conduct the mission that Congress intended for them.
    Staffing, equipment, and training data we collected from 52 of the 55 CSTs
    in late 2005 confirmed this state of readiness, as did the discussions we
    had with CST personnel in the 14 states and territories we visited and
    state National Guard command staff, CST program managers at NGB, and state
    and local emergency responders. Additionally, NGB has a clear plan to
    maintain, monitor, and periodically evaluate the teams' overall readiness.
    For example, for the certified CSTs we visited, in addition to fulfilling
    initial certification criteria that established strict standards for
    staffing, equipment, and training readiness, these teams have passed the
    external evaluations they are required to undergo every 18 months and have
    continued to prepare and execute training and exercise plans to maintain
    their readiness.

    Based on our review of the mission and training standards for the CST
    program and our interviews and observations of CST personnel during our
    site visits, we found CST members to be motivated soldiers who have
    mastered complex technical tasks and can perform them under duress. The
    teams we visited reported that they maintain high morale in spite of the
    training pressures, the need for around-the-clock availability, and the
    added burden of training to perform the duties of other positions on the
    team so that the CST will have added depth and flexibility. Their fitness
    regimen is designed to keep them in superior physical condition, allowing
    them to perform in physically challenging response environments for an
    extended time. For example, teams are trained to conduct their work in
    fully contained protective suits and masks while carrying their own oxygen
    supply tanks on their backs. This is physically challenging even in
    moderate climate conditions.

    CST personnel are prepared for their mission through a regimen of
    individual training that varies from 376 to 1,148 hours in the first 2
    years, depending upon the duty position. The teams complete an initial
    external evaluation in order to obtain DOD certification, and they undergo
    a similar evaluation every 18 months thereafter. The teams are required to
    conduct 12 collective training events each year to help them develop and
    maintain the skills necessary to complete the WMD response tasks outlined
    in the CST's Mission Training Plan. NGB further monitors the 55 CSTs
    through two readiness reporting databases that inform NGB as to how well
    teams are meeting basic readiness criteria and provide detailed
    information on their personnel, equipment, and training status. One of
    these systems is a primary mechanism for NGB's administration of the
    Response Management Plan.

    DOD assesses the teams' proficiency in their critical tasks through
    external evaluations administered by U.S. Army subject matter experts. We
    observed an external evaluation for a phase one CST that required the team
    to locate and identify small amounts of chemical, biological, and
    radiological substances hidden inside a large warehouse, and it was able
    to do this successfully. Following the event, the Army experts and the CST
    members held an after-action review during which they discussed and
    assessed the team's performance in critical mission areas, highlighting
    processes and procedures that worked well and those that required
    improvement. Army experts administer external evaluations to each CST
    every 18 months to assure both DOD and NGB of the team's continued
    readiness.

    In response to our data collection instrument, 94 percent of CST
    commanders characterized external evaluations as an accurate indicator of
    their readiness. Some CST commanders who responded to our data collection
    instrument said the evaluations were good measures of the basic readiness
    of the teams to conduct their mission but did not adequately assess teams
    for their ability to interact with and support a civilian incident
    commander while at a site in company with multiple other local, state, and
    possibly federal authorities. CST members told us that a multiple-agency
    incident response site will be the normal circumstance for an actual CST
    WMD mission. In addition to the external evaluations, the CSTs conduct a
    number of exercises every year that involve other civil responders with
    which they would work in the event of an actual WMD response. CST members
    and state, local, and federal officials we met with reported that these
    exercises are invaluable for helping all stakeholders understand each
    other's capabilities and how best to work together.

    Emergency responders and state officials who work with CSTs in the states
    and territories we visited gave generally positive reviews of the teams.
    Reflecting mostly on their experience with the CSTs in exercises and other
    coordinating venues, state and local officials we interviewed reported a
    high degree of confidence in the readiness of the CSTs to conduct their
    mission. They also reported that the CSTs' ability to provide on-scene
    initial identification of CBRNE substances, along with their
    communications capability, exceed that of most civilian response teams and
    are vital assets for WMD response in their states.

    Mechanisms Are in Place for CSTs to Operationally Respond to Missions

    NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational command
    and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will operationally
    respond to a WMD event. The basis of CST operational deployment guidance
    is the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management
    System.10 States and territories we visited were in the process of
    updating their emergency response plans, and these plans identify the
    state National Guard's role, and sometimes specifically the CST role, in
    the response. State officials acknowledged that their plans were being
    revised to conform to the National Response Plan. Officials in states and
    territories we visited expressed a need to become better organized to
    address homeland security and WMD threats.

    CSTs have successfully tested their command and control structures by
    deploying to response, stand-by, and assist missions under the authority
    of their respective state governors and adjutants general. To practice
    operational command and control, the CSTs also participate in various
    training exercises with federal, state, local, and nongovernmental
    agencies and organizations. Evaluation data on these missions and
    exercises are limited and often informal. However, the information
    available indicates that CSTs met NGB, state, and local expectations about
    coordination command and control, and comments by state and local
    officials we interviewed were overwhelmingly positive.

    In addition to operations within their states, CSTs have sometimes
    deployed outside their state based on requests for assistance. In these
    cases, the CSTs come under the command and control of the governors and
    adjutants general of the states in which they are operating. The CSTs have
    also been deployed to other states based on NGB requests that they respond
    to an event or disaster. For example, NGB managed the deployment of the
    CSTs to states affected by hurricanes in 2005 using the Response
    Management Plan to maintain enough teams in a high state of readiness in
    each response region. According to after-action reports on these events
    and comments from officials we interviewed during our site visits, the
    CSTs were integrated into the operational command and control of state
    military commands in the Gulf states, reported to incident commanders when
    responding to specific events, and performed their duties according to the
    response plan.

    DOD also has guidance in place for operational command and control of the
    CSTs in the event the teams are federalized. In such an event, the CSTs
    would come under the command of DOD's U.S. Northern Command. To date, no
    CSTs have been federalized.

    Role of Non-WMD Missions Causes Confusion

    While the CSTs principally focus on responding to WMD and catastrophic
    terrorist attacks,11 some CSTs are preparing for this mission by
    responding to non-WMD events, causing confusion among civilian as well as
    National Guard officials about when the CSTs should and should not be
    employed. This confusion results from a lack of clear guidance
    interpreting the legislation that establishes the CST mission to "prepare
    for or to respond to" WMD or terrorist attacks12 and from DOD's use of the
    term chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
    explosives (CBRNE) in its characterization of the CSTs' official mission.
    In a 2004 memo, the NGB's Deputy Director for Domestic Operations advised
    all state National Guard headquarters that approve missions for their
    respective CSTs to ensure that their teams responded only to intentional
    uses of WMD, to terrorist attacks, or to threatened terrorist attacks. He
    cautioned that the military's formal definition of CBRNE included
    unintentional events, such as accidental hazardous materials spills, that
    were outside the scope of the CSTs' mission. As part of their coordination
    efforts with state and local emergency management officials, CST members
    highlight the WMD and catastrophic terrorism mission limitation of the
    CSTs. While CST commanders and team personnel accepted this formal
    limitation on their mission, they also reported that it is sometimes
    necessary for mission readiness purposes to respond to events that have no
    connection to WMD or terrorism. For example, 61 percent of CST commanders
    who responded to our data collection instrument consider it to be part of
    their respective CST's mission to respond to CBRNE incidents that are
    known to be the result of accidents or acts of nature-that is, to
    incidents that are not attacks. Additionally, 92 percent of commanders who
    responded thought that this type of response should be part of their
    mission, and many of those with whom we met endorsed responding to
    non-CBRNE events as well.

    CST commanders value non-WMD and nonterrorism responses for a variety of
    reasons, and NGB officials agreed. Deployments to actual incidents,
    regardless of the cause, can function as a valuable means of exercising
    the CSTs' core capabilities, such as communication and coordination with
    state, local, and federal responders and authorities, and help CSTs
    prepare for responses to incidents that are WMD related. Moreover, CST
    commanders and other officials explained that it is often difficult to
    determine the cause of a destructive event until the CST arrives on
    scene-only then can the possibility of terrorism be conclusively
    dismissed.

    The Hurricane Katrina response provides a recent example of CST
    deployments that were not directly related to WMD or terrorism but
    provided CSTs with real-life opportunities to exercise their capabilities
    to respond to WMD events. Following an NGB request, 18 teams sent
    personnel and vehicles to assist in the response effort. This assistance,
    often in the form of satellite communications capabilities, enabled local
    authorities to coordinate with each other as well as with state and
    federal officials. For example, one southeastern CST sent personnel to
    establish a communications outpost just outside the Louisiana Superdome.
    According to NGB officials, there were lengthy discussions about whether
    these types of responses were appropriate CST missions. They ultimately
    concluded that response to large-scale disasters like Katrina were within
    the CSTs' mandate to prepare for or respond to WMD or terrorism events.

    The use of CSTs for missions that do not involve catastrophic terrorist
    acts or WMD, as well as deployment criteria that can differ across 54
    state and territorial governments, can lead to confusion at the local
    level and the potential for unmet expectations. Local responders we met in
    the 14 states and territories we visited reported that they value the
    CSTs' expertise and capabilities and think that they can be put to wider
    use within their communities, although they recognized the need to protect
    the CSTs from overuse. But there remains no guidance that would assist
    CSTs or state and local officials in understanding what types of non-WMD
    missions are appropriate for the CSTs to conduct in preparing for their
    WMD terrorism mission. As a result, the parameters of allowable CST
    missions vary across states and among state civilian authorities, state
    National Guard headquarters staff, CST commanders, and others involved in
    approving CST missions. For example, some states did not acknowledge NGB's
    requests for use of their CSTs for hurricane response operations, and at
    least one state refused to allow its team to participate. Following the
    destruction of the space shuttle Columbia in February 2003, multiple CSTs
    were involved in collecting debris across five states; but some state
    authorities and CST commanders declined to assist because they did not
    consider it to be a legitimate deployment. Further, in their responses to
    our data collection instrument, 59 percent of CST commanders recognized a
    need for their CSTs to provide operational support to local hazardous
    materials teams prior to those teams' deployment to an incident scene,
    while 41 percent did not. Seventy-eight percent of commanders who
    responded identified a need to support hazardous materials teams during
    the response itself, while 22 percent did not.

    NGB officials acknowledged that while the conduct of non-WMD specific
    operations by the CSTs is a valuable way for the teams to satisfy their
    mission to prepare for or respond to WMD or catastrophic terrorist
    attacks, some confusion results among the CSTs and state and local
    officials. They also acknowledge that NGB needs to work with DOD to
    clarify the types of missions that are appropriate for CSTs to perform as
    part of the preparation to respond to a WMD or catastrophic terrorist
    attack. A February 2006 report by the White House on lessons learned from
    the Hurricane Katrina operations recommended that the option of expanding
    the role of CSTs to an all-hazards approach should be explored.13 Further,
    DOD has requested that Congress expand the CSTs' mission to include
    man-made and natural disasters. If the types of such non-WMD missions in
    which the CSTs participate are not made clear, this could exacerbate
    confusion at the state and local levels about the mission of the CSTs.

    DOD Plans to Expand Role of CSTs Outside the United States

    The CSTs are currently limited to conducting operations within the borders
    of the United States and its territories. However, DOD has requested that
    Congress allow CSTs to operate in conjunction with officials in Mexico and
    Canada in order to help accomplish their mission in states bordering these
    countries. CST members and NGB and DOD officials also told us that there
    have been informal discussions within DOD regarding a range of potential
    overseas operations for CSTs, including training, cooperative programs
    with foreign countries, prestaged support missions, as well as possibly
    direct support to the warfighter. However, DOD officials could not
    identify for us whether there is a validated requirement for CSTs to
    operate overseas, and they told us they have no plans to request a further
    expansion of the CST's mission to encompass overseas operations.

    Legislation governing the CST program specifically prohibits the CSTs from
    conducting operations outside the borders of the United States or its
    territories.14 This law emphasizes this restriction by requiring that any
    request by the Secretary of Defense for a legal change be submitted with a
    justification for the request and a written plan to sustain the CSTs'
    capabilities. Regulations detailing the composition, management, training,
    and doctrine of the CSTs explicitly define the CST mission as supporting

    civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site, whether the CSTs are
    operating in a state or federal status.15

    DOD has requested that Congress allow CSTs to coordinate and operate with
    Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD
    incident. The CSTs in border states are currently not permitted to conduct
    exercises and coordination that involve cross-border movement, which may
    limit their effectiveness in planning for WMD events in their regions.
    Therefore, the legislative change DOD proposed could improve the
    effectiveness of state WMD emergency planning. DOD officials said that the
    CSTs would be federalized in order to conduct operations across the
    border.

    Some CST members we spoke with during our site visits said they would like
    to engage in training outside the United States in order to exploit unique
    or superior training opportunities. For example, several CSTs expressed a
    desire to train at facilities such as the Defense Research and Development
    Center in Alberta, Canada, in order to undergo live-agent training, which
    several CST members told us would significantly enhance their training and
    exercise efforts. They also pointed out that the U.S. Marine Corps'
    Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force has trained at the
    Canadian facility and greatly benefited as a result. CST members with whom
    we spoke said that permitting the CSTs to train at superior or unique
    facilities in other countries could increase their knowledge, skills, and
    experience, better preparing them to execute their mission.

    DOD and NGB are also informally considering such limited overseas missions
    as assisting foreign nations in developing CBRNE response teams similar to
    the CSTs and prepositioning CSTs at international events, such as the
    Olympics, to help provide critical monitoring and response support. CST
    commanders with whom we spoke told us that limited overseas roles for
    CSTs, such as foreign assistance and prestaged support missions, may
    provide them valuable experience and therefore have a positive effect on
    CSTs' readiness to perform their stated mission.

    During the course of our work, we heard from NGB and DOD officials and
    some CST commanders that NGB and DOD have also informally considered even
    more demanding overseas missions for the CSTs, including assisting
    warfighting forces in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD officials
    could not identify for us whether a validated requirement exists for any
    of these more expansive overseas missions, and they told us that they have
    no plans to request that Congress expand the CSTs' mission to encompass
    them. Should such overseas missions be contemplated in the future,
    however, our review of CST capabilities, along with our discussions with
    CST members, indicates that support to the warfighter in places like Iraq
    and Afghanistan is not practicable because of inappropriateness of the
    CSTs' commercial-grade equipment for use in austere conditions. Further,
    such operations would likely have a negative effect on CST readiness and
    availability, drawing much more heavily on existing CST equipment and
    personnel and reducing states' access to CSTs, a critical component of the
    domestic WMD response infrastructure.

    CST Program Faces Management Challenges That Could Increase Risk to
    Long-term Sustainment

    NGB has made progress in establishing an institutional management approach
    to sustain the CST program once all 55 teams are certified. However, NGB
    faces several challenges to the program in such areas as staffing,
    coordination planning, equipment maintenance and acquisition, training and
    exercise oversight, readiness reporting, facilities, and varying state
    oversight and support of their CSTs. Although these challenges have not
    yet affected the overall readiness of the CSTs, if the current efforts to
    address them are unsuccessful, they could impede the progress of the newer
    teams and increase the risk to the long-term sustainment of the program.

    NGB Is Pursuing Institutional Management Efforts

    NGB recognizes that the CST program-with 19 teams not yet certified-is
    still in the development process. In seeking to fully establish and
    sustain the CST program, NGB has made progress in developing institutional
    mechanisms that should facilitate standardization and continuous
    improvement within individual CSTs and across the program as a whole. For
    example, NGB's CST standardization program is an attempt to establish a
    baseline level of interoperability among all CSTs in critical areas, such
    as training, logistics, personnel administration, and budgeting. One of
    the CST program managers responsible for developing the standardization
    program explained that it was initiated to ensure total program oversight
    and accountability for the CSTs and to assist the states in their CST
    oversight responsibility. Under the standardization program, NGB will
    evaluate each CST every 18 months. This evaluation will be coordinated
    with state-level command inspections that the Army requires. Program
    personnel have completed a series of test visits to uncertified CSTs, and
    NGB expects to begin formal evaluative visits in May 2006.

    NGB has also issued a CST regulation that details the processes and
    procedures for CST management.16 One of the CST program managers described
    the regulation as a desk reference guide for state officials as well as
    for the CSTs themselves. It clarifies CST operations in many areas,
    including mission requests and validation, command and control, personnel
    and administration, reporting requirements, funding, and certification.

    Other general management efforts NGB has led or helped coordinate include
    the following:

    o The recent consolidation of Army-directed training and external
    evaluation responsibilities for the CSTs. This should facilitate progress
    and consistency across the program in terms of collective training and
    external evaluations.

    o Establishment of working groups at both the CST and program management
    levels to facilitate improvements in doctrine, organization, training,
    materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities for the CST
    program.

    o Development and oversight of doctrine and other guidance to assist the
    establishment of the 55 CSTs.17 In creating this doctrine and guidance,
    NGB and the Army organization responsible for writing the doctrine have
    sought to incorporate lessons learned by the teams from the first few
    phases of the program as they established themselves in their respective
    states and territories.

    Further information on DOD management efforts related to the CSTs can be
    found in appendix II.

    CSTs Struggle to Fully Staff Teams

    NGB faces several challenges to the CST program that could impede the
    progress of the newer teams as well as hinder the long-term sustainment of
    the CST program. One challenge is that CSTs struggle to maintain their
    official allotment of 22 fully trained, mission-capable personnel because
    of turnover, team structure, and retention challenges.

    NGB officials reported that CST positions exhibit an annual turnover rate
    of 25 to 35 percent. This is due to team members departing after their
    tours are complete, dismissal of team members for a variety of reasons,
    and reassignments within teams to replace departed personnel. After vacant
    positions are filled, new CST members are away from their teams for the
    first year, satisfying training requirements. Once they return they must
    be integrated into the team's collective exercises and other existing
    operations. As a result, CSTs sometimes conduct their missions with less
    than full unit strength, and 75 percent of CST commanders responding to
    our data collection instrument reported that the ability of CSTs to
    perform their mission is adversely affected by the lack of available
    personnel because of training, leave, and other manpower issues. However,
    the commanders also said that their teams remain ready to conduct their
    mission, reporting, for example, that a CST can perform its mission with
    less than 22 people as long as other members of the team can substitute
    for a gap.

    The CST structure also creates a staffing challenge because few of the
    advanced military occupational specialties on the team are represented by
    more than one person. For example, the nuclear medical science officer,
    who is responsible for operating the CST's mobile laboratory and is
    critical to the CST's ability to identify CBRNE substances, is the only
    member of the team with that special skill. Likewise, there is a single
    physician's assistant and a single modeler assigned to each team. If these
    or other highly technical positions remain vacant for an extended period,
    the team must rely upon cross-trained personnel within the team or borrow
    key personnel from other teams. Seventy-nine percent of CST commanders
    responding to our data collection instrument reported that this lack of
    depth among key personnel adversely affects the team's ability to perform
    its mission. Additionally, 88 percent of commanders who responded report
    that there are too few duty positions in the team's eight-member survey
    section. CST commanders reported to us that the survey teams should have
    more people and that responding with too few personnel restricts a CST's
    ability to make multiple entries into an incident scene in search of
    suspected CBRNE substances, degrades its ability to remain on scene for
    long periods without relief, and increases the time required for
    resolution of an incident. CSTs reported that their teams have still been
    able to conduct their missions and that cross-training other team members
    to add depth to various team sections may actually increase their overall
    capabilities.

    CST staffing challenges are further exacerbated by recruiting and
    retention difficulties. When key personnel such as the nuclear medical
    science officer or physician's assistant depart, the resulting open spots
    are especially hard to fill because qualified applicants are difficult to
    attract from the civilian world and are not widely represented within the
    military. CST commanders and NGB officials explained that the lack of
    promotion opportunity within the teams was another major factor affecting
    a soldier's decision to become or remain a CST member, and that career
    progression is particularly limited for the team's Air Guard contingent.
    They also listed other factors that frustrate a team's ability to recruit
    and retain CST members, including the team's substantial training
    requirements and its full-time alert status for possible deployment.

    NGB has pursued a number of efforts aimed at addressing these staffing
    challenges. For example, during live responses, NGB augments the lead CST
    with additional individuals and sometimes with entire teams. NGB has also
    been working to fund and conduct a limited operational experiment to
    validate the CSTs' personnel and equipment list. Recommendations for
    adjustments to the number of authorized personnel may result from this
    experiment.

    In a further attempt to address staffing challenges, NGB is currently
    compiling the latest turnover data and other relevant personnel
    information to send to the service secretaries to encourage them to
    authorize $150 per month incentive pay for CST personnel in accordance
    with Title 37 United States Code, Section 305(b).

    Although these efforts may ease some of the staffing challenges discussed
    above, it is too early to know whether they will fully address them.

    CSTs Lack Guidance on Conducting Coordination in Their States

    Another challenge is that NGB provides little guidance to the CSTs on how
    they should coordinate with state and local emergency responders and
    officials, potentially lengthening the amount of time it takes new teams
    to become incorporated into their home state emergency response
    infrastructure. CST coordination and outreach efforts vary in nature and
    scope from state to state, and they include practices such as briefing
    state and local officials and responders on the mission and capabilities
    of the CST, developing protocols for working with emergency responders and
    state officials, participating in training with other responders,
    conducting exercises with other responders, and offering technical advice
    to other responders.

    Established CSTs, state and local officials, and state and local
    responders have identified CST coordination and outreach efforts as being
    critical to the success of CST operations. Such efforts increase the CSTs'
    visibility at the local level, improve responders' understanding of the
    CST mission (for example, when they can be legitimately deployed),
    solidify working relationships and open communication between the CSTs and
    state and local responders, and increase the CSTs' familiarity with the
    vulnerabilities and strategic targets in all areas of their states.

    Some CSTs reported a learning curve with respect to conducting successful
    coordination and outreach. For example, a few CSTs initially did not have
    good relationships with other emergency responders until outreach efforts
    clarified the role of the CST as working to support local and state
    emergency responders. One CST we visited coordinated closely with its
    state and local partners to prepare a clear set of written protocols and
    coordination mechanisms that it found to be highly successful. Some state
    officials reported that their CSTs have not yet developed written
    coordination protocols for state and local emergency responders, even
    though responders expressed confusion regarding CST capabilities and
    mission. NGB has not issued any guidance or requirements regarding the
    development, implementation, or assessment of CST coordination plans and
    outreach efforts. NGB has not included such outreach efforts in CST
    regulations as a mission-essential task, there is no formal system in
    place for sharing coordination best practices across teams, and there are
    no requirements to develop written protocols with local and state
    officials and responders.

    NGB officials told us that they recognize the importance of coordination
    and outreach to ensure the success of CSTs in their home states. However,
    they have not yet considered formal guidance for the teams on the subject.

    CSTs Face Equipment, Training, Readiness Reporting, and Facilities
    Challenges

    CSTs experience other challenges that NGB recognizes as important, and it
    has efforts under way to address them. Many of these efforts are new or
    ongoing, and it is therefore not clear how effective they will be in
    addressing the specific challenges. While these challenges have not yet
    affected the CSTs' overall readiness, if the current efforts to address
    them are unsuccessful, the challenges could threaten the long-term success
    and sustainability of the program.

    One of challenges the CSTs face is maintaining and replacing military and
    commercial equipment at the pace required to sustain CST readiness. CST
    members told us that they experience varying or poor maintenance support
    for their military equipment, which is the responsibility of the National
    Guard in each state. They, as well as state National Guard and NGB
    officials, told us that the varying degree of state National Guard support
    stems mostly from the state National Guards' lack of understanding of the
    unique nature of the CST as a unit as opposed to a more traditional
    National Guard military unit. CST members reported that maintenance
    support for their commercial equipment, which is done through the
    NGB-managed Consequence Management Support Center in Lexington, Kentucky,
    tends to be better. They also expressed concern that the pace of equipment
    replacement and development is too slow to ensure that the CSTs have the
    most relevant equipment available to accomplish their mission and that
    their existing equipment is updated to prevent its being worn out. NGB
    officials report that NGB and DOD have heard these concerns from the CSTs
    and are taking the following steps to address these equipment-related
    challenges:

    o NGB is working with the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
    Biological Defense and the Army Maneuver Support Center to plan for future
    generations of CST equipment.

    o NGB Logistics is assessing the cost of each piece of CST equipment and
    developing new items where appropriate.

    o NGB Resource Management is requesting an increase in funds in future
    years to maintain the CST equipment sets.

    These efforts may help address some equipment challenges, such as adequate
    equipment update and re capitalization plans, but it is not yet clear
    whether they will be successful in the near or long term. NGB's
    standardization program may help the state National Guard organizations
    provide better maintenance support for the CSTs' military equipment, but
    it will take time and cooperation between NGB, the CSTs, and their
    respective state National Guard commands to accomplish this.

    Another challenge the CSTs face is a lack of oversight and evaluation of
    exercises required of CSTs each year. Unlike the external evaluations the
    CSTs undergo before certification and every 18 months thereafter, the 12
    or more exercises the CSTs plan for and conduct each year do not follow
    the same specific set of objectives and criteria and are not evaluated to
    determine the extent to which those objectives were met. NGB officials
    told us that they recognize the need for more oversight of these exercises
    at the NGB and state levels. NGB and DOD have the following efforts under
    way to help address the lack of exercise oversight and evaluation:

    o NGB and the Army Maneuver Support Center revised the CST Commanders
    Pre-Command Course to include instruction on training management.

    o NGB is incorporating into its ongoing standardization initiative
    training management components to ensure teams are adhering to Army
    training regulation.

    o NGB is bringing a member of the standardization initiative to NGB to
    assist in training oversight.

    o DOD is consolidating Army-directed external evaluations and related
    training responsibilities under U.S. Army North to facilitate progress and
    consistency across the CST program.

    These efforts should help NGB and the states better oversee and evaluate
    the effectiveness of the CST program. However, since many of the
    initiatives are new, particularly the standardization program, it is not
    clear how effective they will be.

    The CSTs use two separate systems to report their readiness measures. CST
    members we interviewed said that one system, the standard Army readiness
    system (DOD's Status of Resources and Training System), is ill suited to
    the unique nature of the CSTs. They also said that while the other
    system-maintained by NGB-is better suited to the CSTs as a unit, the
    system requires constant effort by team members to update and involves
    using secure Internet connections the teams do not always have readily
    available at their home stations. Many of the CST members we interviewed
    said that because the two systems overlapped, they should be merged or one
    should be eliminated. NGB officials explained that the system they
    maintain is critical for administering the Response Management Plan and is
    not meant to supplant the standard Army system. They also said that DOD is
    transitioning to the new Defense Readiness Reporting System. NGB expects
    the CSTs to replace the two existing systems with the new one in October
    2006. This should solve the problem of having two separate readiness
    reporting systems. However, until the new system is in place and NGB and
    CST members can evaluate the extent to which it suits the unique nature of
    the CSTs and helps NGB administer the Response Management Plan, it remains
    unclear how fully the new system will address this challenge.

    Finally, some CSTs have reported that their facilities are inadequate in
    terms of vehicle, storage, and training space. NGB recognizes that some
    CST facilities are not adequate and has issued revised planning templates
    for CST facilities to the states. However, as we discuss further below,
    the varying degree to which states understand how to use these templates
    and fully meet the needs of their CSTs indicates that the challenge
    remains to be fully addressed.

    NGB Lacks Guidance to Help State National Guard Commands Oversee and
    Support CSTs

    NGB has made progress in issuing guidance that explains state National
    Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs,
    but this has been insufficient to fully inform the states about the unique
    nature and requirements of the CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into
    the state National Guard command structure. The result has been varied
    oversight of the CSTs at the state level in important administrative areas
    and varied support to their CSTs in areas such as staffing and equipment
    augmentation and designing and building the facilities to house the teams.

    According to NGB officials and the certified teams we visited, DOD
    established the first CSTs without the benefit of a great deal of
    direction and guidance that would help create a unique unit from scratch
    and incorporate that unit into a state National Guard structure that is
    unaccustomed to such units. Subsequently, NGB issued its CST management
    regulation, which listed responsibilities for state National Guard
    headquarters to exercise fiscal and administrative management and
    oversight of the CSTs in their states or territories.18 This guidance
    includes state National Guard responsibility for such CST oversight as
    issuing training guidance, approving mid- and long-range training plans
    and objectives, property accountability, and conducting readiness and
    compliance inspections. While this guidance represents progress in
    clarifying the roles of NGB and the states in overseeing and supporting
    the CSTs, it is not as detailed as NGB's guidance on operational command
    and control and mission-related topics in explaining roles and
    responsibilities.

    Although the CST program has been under way for over 7 years, CST members
    and state National Guard officials with whom we met said the guidance on
    how the states should integrate the CSTs into their National Guard
    structures and how CST oversight and support should be conducted is still
    lacking. NGB officials told us that they recognized that the states have
    varied widely in how they have integrated the CSTs into their state
    National Guard structures. They also said they are planning to issue
    further guidance to clarify how states should integrate their CSTs into
    the new state Joint Force Headquarters organizations but that they are
    waiting for these organizations to be fully in place.

    Because of the lack of clear guidance from NGB on how state National Guard
    organizations should oversee and support their CSTs, the level and quality
    of oversight and support for CSTs varies by state. Some states and
    territories we visited did not have formal plans in place at their
    National Guard headquarters or at the CST level for evaluating the
    effective use of resources, and very few of those states conducted
    periodic internal reviews of the CSTs. The states set up budget and
    accounting records to ensure funds for the CSTs were available when and
    where needed, but they conducted no regular program reviews for the CSTs.

    Many of the states and territories we visited did not have specific
    objectives for collective training, and they did not measure
    accomplishments against previously determined specific mission objectives.
    Therefore, those states could not identify deficiencies or make command
    management decisions based on such analyses. As a result, NGB and the
    states were not in a position to know if they were making the most
    effective use of CST resources.

    Again, because NGB has no clear guidance to the states, state National
    Guard support of the CSTs also varies widely in terms of staffing,
    equipment, and facilities. One state we visited provides additional
    administrative support to its CST through the use of three or four regular
    part-time National Guard members. This arrangement also allows those
    part-time members access to some CST training and, in the event those
    individuals apply for vacant permanent CST positions, can cut down on
    hiring and training delays. Another state hired an additional full-time
    duty member to support the team's logistics. Some states provided limited
    amounts of additional equipment to support their CSTs, such as laptop
    computers. Other states do not augment their CSTs. Among the reasons some
    state National Guard officials reported for why their state's National
    Guard headquarters did not augment their CSTs were a lack of money and
    lack of interest by the headquarters in the CSTs because they are small
    units. NGB officials acknowledged that they need to help the states
    understand that the CSTs are unique units and should therefore be
    considered high priority.

    During our site visits, we found inconsistencies in how states interpret
    and apply procurement guidance to CST equipment requests. As a result,
    some states approved equipment for a CST while other states did not. For
    example, NGB guidance permits the purchase of nonstandard uniforms with
    state funds only and if necessary for CSTs to accomplish their mission by
    blending in with other police and first responder personnel. However, some
    states we visited refused to purchase uniforms for their teams, even
    though the teams indicated a need. Other states did support the purchase
    of the nonstandard uniforms. While NGB, state National Guard, and CST
    officials stated that they believed it was important to have the
    flexibility to make purchases that best support the CSTs' mission, some
    CST commanders however thought this subjectivity sometimes negatively
    affected the CSTs' ability to obtain material support.

    States have also had difficulties designing and renovating or building
    facilities that meet the needs of the CSTs. State National Guard officials
    said the unique nature of the CST mission made it more difficult for
    states to understand the support requirements and expectations placed upon
    their CSTs. For example, in addition to the need for climate controlled
    spaces for sensitive equipment, most CST members we interviewed said that
    there is a need for enclosed bays for all vehicle storage because it
    facilitates ready-to-roll deployment, improves vehicle security, and
    provides an all-weather maintenance and training area. However, 78 percent
    of the CST commanders who responded to our data collection instrument
    reported that their facilities are not large enough to hold all vehicles
    and other CST equipment. Approximately half reported that their facilities
    are not large enough for all personnel to have an adequate workspace.
    National Guard officials in the states and territories we visited also
    identified inadequacies with their facilities. They said they followed
    Army procurement and budgeting guidance, which sometimes affected whether
    identified changes could be made to the design or construction. Sometimes
    the state National Guard did not recognize the unique mission of the CST
    as compared to building an armory, and sometimes the design was set before
    the CST commander or other members had a chance to review the plans.
    Because of varying interpretations, some states have constructed new or
    remodeled facilities that are in need of further remodeling. Other CSTs we
    visited were satisfied with their facilities, despite believing that such
    things as vehicle bay space were not completely adequate. These CST
    members reported that their state National Guard headquarters worked well
    with the CST to design the most effective facility they could to meet the
    unique needs of the team.

    In addition to the CST management regulation, NGB instituted the CST
    standardization program partially in response to its concerns that states
    were not adequately monitoring the CSTs' implementation of key Army
    management controls in training, logistics, budgeting, and other areas.
    According to preliminary standardization program reviews, state National
    Guard headquarters have done few periodic reviews and inspections. NGB
    officials told us they intend to use these reviews to increase state
    participation in oversight of the CSTs and will also spell out in greater
    detail for the states the type of interaction NGB believes is necessary
    and required by regulation. If pursued consistently, the standardization
    program should help NGB better coordinate with the states on how to
    oversee and support the CSTs, though a significant NGB-state National
    Guard cooperative effort will be needed to facilitate success.

    Conclusions

    In managing the CST program, DOD and NGB have made significant progress
    toward establishing 55 highly specialized teams in every state and U.S.
    territory. The focus has thus far been on reaching the goal of certifying
    all 55 teams. As the CST program seeks to institutionalize its key
    processes and sustain itself in the long term, we see four areas that
    could increase the risk to that effort.

    First, confusion about what types of non-WMD deployments the CSTs can and
    should use to help them accomplish their mission of preparing for or
    responding to WMD events could make it more difficult to effectively
    coordinate efforts at the state and local levels and possibly inhibit
    regional and national coordination between the states and the federal
    government. Expanding the CSTs' mission to encompass natural and man-made
    disasters may not sufficiently clarify what types of such missions are
    appropriate for the CSTs to conduct, possibly exacerbating confusion among
    state and local officials about the mission of the CSTs.

    Second, some limited overseas missions, such as coordinating with
    officials from Canada and Mexico or training at live agent facilities, may
    be beneficial to CST training and operational effectiveness. Though DOD
    indicates that it is not planning to request that Congress expand the
    CSTs' role to encompass more demanding overseas missions, to the extent
    missions such as regular CST support to overseas combatant commands are
    considered in the future, they would likely have a detrimental impact on
    the readiness and availability of the teams to perform their original
    mission to support domestic WMD response.

    Third, despite the progress NGB has made in fully establishing the CST
    program and formalizing institutional sustainment plans for the teams,
    many areas of the program face significant challenges that require
    specific guidance and action from NGB. NGB understands these challenges,
    particularly in the areas of team staffing, coordination guidance,
    equipment maintenance and acquisition, training and exercise oversight,
    readiness reporting, and facility adequacy. While individual team
    readiness has not yet suffered, if current and planned NGB efforts to
    address these challenges are not successful, the challenges could
    eventually cause harm to overall CST readiness.

    Fourth, despite NGB's progress in establishing such unique and specialized
    units as the CSTs, there remains a need for additional guidance on the
    administrative oversight structure for the CSTs at the state level. Small
    differences between the way each state manages its CST may be expected,
    given the fact of 54 different military commands. While NGB's plans for
    additional guidance on the oversight and support of the CSTs and its
    standardization program should help states better integrate the CSTs,
    further guidance and coordination efforts between NGB, the CSTs, and the
    state National Guard commands is warranted.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To help address management challenges and further efforts to sustain the
    CST program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with
    the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Army and
    of the Air Force, take the following three actions:

    o Clarify the types of non-WMD responses that are appropriate for CSTs as
    part of their mission to prepare for domestic WMD and catastrophic
    terrorist attacks.

    o Fully incorporate into ongoing management efforts to sustain the CST
    program a plan with goals, objectives, and evaluation mechanisms to
    address challenges such as team staffing issues, coordination guidance,
    equipment maintenance and acquisition, training and exercise oversight,
    readiness reporting, and facilities requirements.

    o Develop clear guidance for the states on how CSTs should be integrated
    into state National Guard commands in order to facilitate an effective
    administrative oversight and support structure for the CSTs in each state
    that reflects familiarization with the role, mission, and requirements of
    these specialized units, and work with state adjutants general and federal
    financial officers at the state level to find appropriate ways to exchange
    ideas and best practices for ensuring effective NGB-state National Guard
    partnership in overseeing the CST program. One such method could be to
    create or modify an existing working group or team to allow state National
    Guard membership.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the
    intent of our recommendations. DOD discussed steps it is currently taking
    as well as actions it plans to take to address these recommendations. DOD
    also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the
    report where appropriate.

    In response to our recommendation that DOD clarify the types of non-WMD
    responses that are appropriate for CSTs, DOD reported that it has
    requested that Congress authorize the CSTs to respond to catastrophic
    events of intentional or unintentional origin and that if this is enacted,
    DOD will direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to develop
    implementing instructions. DOD reiterated its view that the CSTs have been
    participating in non-WMD responses as training. Expanding the CSTs'
    mission to include both WMD and non-WMD events should help clarify the
    role of the latter in the CSTs' overall mission. We continue to believe
    that as NGB develops implementing instructions, it should provide clear
    guidance on the types of non-WMD responses that are appropriate for the
    CSTs. This should help alleviate confusion about the CSTs' mission and
    prevent their being overemployed to the detriment of their WMD-related
    training and mission requirements.

    In its comments on our recommendation regarding incorporation into ongoing
    CST management efforts of a plan to address critical challenges to the CST
    program, DOD highlighted some of the CST management efforts we discussed
    in our report, such as the CST Working Group and the CST standardization
    program. DOD further stated that additional management efforts should be
    deferred until the effectiveness of the standardization program can be
    assessed. We agree that the program offers the potential of a good
    evaluation tool for NGB, the CSTs, and the states' National Guard
    headquarters and that further information on many of the challenges we
    highlight in our report may be gleaned from the results of the
    standardization program. To the extent the program further highlights
    these and other challenges for which no immediate corrective measures are
    in place, we would expect the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to take
    the appropriate management action.

    In response to our recommendation that NGB develop clear guidance for the
    states on how CSTs should be integrated into state National Guard commands
    to facilitate effective administrative oversight and support, DOD
    indicated that in addition to guidance on state oversight of the CSTs in
    the recently published CST management regulation, the CST standardization
    program and NGB-conducted formal training for state National Guard
    leadership provide additional measures to review and reinforce state
    National Guard administrative oversight of their CSTs. DOD further
    recognized the value of currently available venues for coordination
    between NGB, the CSTs, and the states' National Guard commands. As we
    state in our report, we believe that if pursued consistently, the
    standardization program should help NGB better coordinate with the states
    on how to oversee and support the CSTs. This should help NGB and the
    states provide an effective long-term partnership to sustain the CST
    program. To the extent necessary based on the result of standardization
    program evaluations, we would expect NGB to expand its efforts to assist
    state National Guard commands to provide effective oversight and support
    of their CSTs.

    DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after its date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate
    congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
    the Army. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
    addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov . Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

    the last page of this report. Key staff members who contributed to this
    report are listed in appendix V.

    Sincerely yours,

    Davi M. D'Agostino Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

    Appendix I  Scope and Methodology

    To assess the extent to which the Civil Support Teams (CST) are prepared
    to conduct their mission, we gathered information on the categories and
    process of the two CST readiness measurement mechanisms; reviewed
    readiness-related documents for the 14 teams we visited; included similar
    readiness information in a data collection instrument sent to all 55 CSTs;
    and discussed CST readiness with local, state, and federal officials who
    have worked with CSTs. We observed the external evaluation of 1 CST by
    U.S. Army officials and attended the after action review following the
    evaluation. We also observed an exercise that included one CST and a
    number of local and state responders. During our site visits, we discussed
    operational command and control mechanisms with CST members and their
    National Guard headquarters officials. We compared the published mission
    of the CSTs to the types of missions the CSTs are performing and discussed
    the extent to which their mission is well understood with CST members and
    local, state, and federal officials. Further, we discussed the potential
    effect of overseas missions on CST readiness with CST members and civilian
    emergency management officials in the states and territories we visited.

    To assess the extent to which effective administrative mechanisms are in
    place for the CSTs, we compared National Guard Bureau (NGB) regulations
    and guidance on management of the CSTs with the practices in place at the
    14 CSTs we visited. We also discussed operational and administrative
    issues with CST members in those states and their National Guard
    headquarters officials. We collected similar information in the data
    collection instrument sent to all 55 CSTs. During our site visits, we
    discussed with CST members those challenges they believed could inhibit
    CST readiness in future. We categorized these challenges, discussed them
    with NGB officials, and compared the challenges to information on NGB
    efforts related to those areas. We also collected cost data related to the
    establishment and sustainment of the CSTs from NGB, state National Guard
    personnel, and the CSTs themselves. We did not independently verify cost
    data, but we interviewed NGB officials who manage the data about data
    quality control procedures. We determined the data were sufficiently
    reliable for the purposes of this report.

    To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the
    Department of Defense (DOD), including the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, NGB, U.S. Army Forces Command,
    First Army, Fifth Army, and United States Northern Command. During each
    state site visit we met with members of the CST and officials from the
    state National Guard headquarters, state emergency management and homeland
    security officials, representatives from local community emergency
    response agencies (such as fire and police departments), and
    representatives of federal agencies and organizations (such as the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation and Department of Energy).

    Our site visits to 14 of the 55 CSTs were conducted from August through
    December 2005. We selected the 14 teams in order to obtain a reasonable
    sample of CSTs based on a number of criteria, including geographic
    distribution, age of team, certification status, state size, state
    population, state government emergency management and homeland security
    organization, and DOD-related command structure. We visited the following
    locations:

    o Alabama

    o Alaska

    o Colorado

    o Iowa

    o Massachusetts

    o Montana

    o New Mexico

    o New York

    o North Carolina

    o Puerto Rico

    o Rhode Island

    o Tennessee

    o Texas

    o Washington

    To supplement the interviews we conducted during the site visits, we
    collected supporting documents from the CSTs and individuals we
    interviewed and made physical observations of CST facilities in every
    state we visited.

    To further address our objectives, we designed a broad data collection
    instrument for all 55 CSTs that would collect information regarding CST
    personnel, equipment, training, certification, costs, coordination, and
    mission scope. Within these major topic areas, we developed and tested
    relevant questions based upon previous GAO work, current research, and
    interviews at both the NGB and CST level. After two formal pretests with
    the command staff of 2 separate CSTs, we deployed the data collection
    instrument simultaneously to the National Guard's state supervisory
    auditors for all 55 teams and asked that they be forwarded to the CST
    commanders in each of their respective states or territories. The data
    collection instrument was administered via e-mail using an ActiveX-
    enabled Microsoft Word attachment.

    Although every team received an identical version of the data collection
    instrument, we advised the team commanders that because of differing
    experiences, locations, certification statuses, and lengths of service, we
    recognized that not all teams would be able to respond to every question.
    Each section of the instrument contained questions that could be answered
    by both certified and uncertified teams, as well as questions that were
    applicable to certified teams only. The data collection instrument was
    addressed to the 55 unit commanders, and while these individuals were
    explicitly responsible for the overall content of the completed data
    collection instruments, we permitted them to delegate specific questions
    or sections to other appropriate members within the CST. To ensure a full
    and candid response, we noted that individual responses would be
    attributed neither to individual CSTs nor to their individual members.
    Further, we requested that the teams transmit their responses over a
    secure e-mail channel to safeguard any sensitive information.

    We distributed the data collection instrument via e-mail on September 26,
    2005, and it was deployed through December 27, 2005. Out of the 55
    deployed, we received 52 completed data collection instrument responses
    during our 3-month response window.1 To analyze the results of the
    completed responses, we noted responses for all questions and highlighted
    those we deemed significant, such as responses where there was
    overwhelming agreement among CST commanders. These responses and others
    were compared with preliminary results from our site visits and used to
    verify that the GAO site visit teams had not overlooked significant
    widespread CST issues.

    Percentage results from the data collection instrument are discussed in
    the letter. In some cases, there are fewer than 52 respondents for a given
    question. Because some respondents did not answer all questions, the
    percentages we report are calculated using the base of respondents who
    answered the question. In no cases did fewer than 48 of the 52 respondents
    answer a question whose percentage results appear in the report.

    Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors.
    However, the practical difficulties of conducting any data collection
    effort may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors.
    For example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in
    the sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how
    the data are entered into a database or are analyzed, can introduce
    unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in the
    development of the data collection instrument, the data collection, and
    the data analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, GAO
    staff with subject matter expertise designed the data collection
    instrument in collaboration with social science survey specialists. Then,
    the draft questionnaire was pre-tested with the command staff of two CSTs
    to ensure (1) the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to
    comprehend; (2) terminology was used correctly; (3) the questionnaire did
    not place an undue burden on the respondents; (4) the information was
    feasible to obtain; and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased.
    Finally, when the data were analyzed, a second, independent analyst
    checked all computer programs.

    The entire data collection instrument appears in appendix III.

    We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II  CST Program Management Efforts

    NGB has focused much of its management on establishing and certifying all
    55 of the authorized CSTs. But NGB also recognizes that a significant
    amount of effort is required to ensure that the CST program is sustained
    for the long term, while it also provides for the continued improvement of
    the process for establishing the teams and modifying doctrine, training,
    equipment, and operational considerations as necessary. Some of the
    institutional efforts NGB has coordinated or led include a CST
    standardization program, coordinating Army-directed CST training and
    evaluations, and establishing working groups to evaluate and recommend
    improvements to the CST program.

    Standardization and Evaluation Program

    The standardization program is scheduled to evaluate each CST every 18
    months and is intended to be coordinated with state-level command
    inspections that the Army requires. The process begins with a
    precoordination meeting 6 months prior to the scheduled standardization
    visit that explains the purpose, evaluation method, and desired outcome
    for the upcoming visit. Ninety days prior to the scheduled visit, a second
    coordination meeting is held to resolve any remaining administrative
    details and to allow the standardization team personnel responsible for
    conducting the evaluation to become familiar with the CST's location.
    During the visit itself, these personnel conduct compliance-oriented
    evaluations using a series of checklists that monitor various subtasks
    within the evaluated areas. For example, the training checklist assesses
    55 items, including whether the CST has an approved Mission Essential Task
    List, whether the team publishes quarterly training guidance, and whether
    the team conducts after-action reports for all training. Each checklist
    item is evaluated as "go," "no-go," or "not applicable." Items that are
    initially characterized as needing improvement (no-go) may be upgraded to
    satisfactory (go) as a result of on-the-spot corrections. At the
    evaluation's conclusion, standardization team personnel will present the
    results of their evaluation to the state adjutant general. They must issue
    a formal report to the adjutant general within 6duty days after the end of
    their visit. Among the standardization program's objectives is integrating
    with state and intermediate command inspections that could reduce the
    total amount of time committed to the inspection process, as well as
    imposing CST-specific management controls to assist in the prevention of
    fraud, waste, and abuse of Army resources. Program personnel have
    completed a series of test visits to CSTs, and they expect to begin formal
    evaluation visits in May 2006.

    Army Training and Evaluation Support

    As of October 1, 2005, Fifth Army assumed sole responsibility for all CST
    external evaluations and related training, with the exception of CSTs in
    Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam, which remain under U.S. Army Pacific. Under
    Fifth Army, the organization and protocols of all CST training and
    evaluation teams should be standardized. Army, NGB, and CST officials
    report that training, education, and experience requirements of
    trainer/evaluators will also be standardized. They indicate that this
    standardization should increase the consistency of external evaluations
    and related collective training across all teams. Consolidation of Army
    training, readiness, and oversight responsibilities could also promote
    better information sharing and guidance development both across the Fifth
    Army training and evaluation teams and the program as a whole.
    Responsibility for all CST external evaluations and related training was
    previously divided geographically between the First Army and Fifth Army
    under the U.S. Army Forces Command, with the exception of Hawaii, Alaska,
    and Guam. Although both First and Fifth Armies were required to train and
    evaluate teams to the standards set forth in the CSTs' Mission Training
    Plan, Army field manuals and other regulations, each Army organized its
    CST training and evaluation teams differently and followed different
    protocols for executing training and external evaluations.

    CST Working Groups

    In April 2005 NGB formally established the Civil Support Team Working
    Group to (1) increase the operational effectives of CSTs by providing
    operationally relevant advice on gaps, shortfalls, and improvements to CST
    doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
    personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF); (2) assist in implementing any
    resulting plans, and (3) promote standardization and interoperability
    among CSTs. The working group process had already been working informally
    since the establishment of the first 10 CSTs. In addition to NGB, working
    group membership includes the CST commanders and representatives from the
    Army Maneuver Support Center1 and the joint service Chemical and
    Biological Defense Program. The working group is organized to include
    several technical working groups and subgroups that focus on specific
    aspects (e.g., equipment, personnel, and training) or components (e.g.,
    operations, survey, medical and science assessment, communications,
    computer and information systems, and logistics/sustainment) of the CST
    program. In June 2004 the Army Maneuver Support Center and NGB initiated
    the Integrated Concept Team to determine the tasks, schedules, milestones,
    and products required to develop operational concepts and provide DOTMLPF
    solutions to support the CST program. In addition to directing the efforts
    of the other CST working groups with regard to DOTMLPF responsibilities,
    the Integrated Concept Team is also tasked with more broadly addressing
    CST issues within the larger scope of DOD force management and operational
    capabilities plans.

    Appendix III  Data Collection Instrument

    Appendix IV  Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix V  GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Davi M. D'Agostino (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov

    In addition to those named above, Ann Borseth, Assistant Director; Bari L.
    Bendell; Jaclyn A. Bowland; David A. Brown; Carole F. Coffey; Lee Cooper;
    Joseph W. Kirschbaum; David A. Mayfield; Walter K. Vance; and Tamika S.
    Weerasingha made key contributions to this report.

    (350687)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-498 .

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
    dagostinod@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-498 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
    National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
    Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

    May 2006

    HOMELAND DEFENSE

    National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and
    Address Management Challenges

    To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD), Congress approved the development of National
    Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked to identify chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons; assess
    consequences; advise civil authorities on response measures; and assist
    with requests for additional support. Thus far, 36 of the 55 approved
    teams have been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National
    Guard Bureau (NGB) is in the process of establishing, certifying, and
    planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was asked to
    address the extent to which (1) the CSTs are ready to conduct their
    mission and (2) effective administrative mechanisms are in place for the
    CSTs.

    What GAO Recommends

    To ensure the sustainment of CSTs, the Secretary of Defense should work
    with NGB and the Secretaries of the Army and of the Air Force to clarify
    the types of non-WMD response efforts that belong in the CST mission;
    develop guidance to address CST management challenges; and develop
    guidance and work with state adjutants general to clarify administrative
    oversight and support structures for CSTs. The Department of Defense (DOD)
    generally agreed with our recommendations.

    The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and
    have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic
    mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types
    of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD
    terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and
    local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs.
    CSTs were created to focus on assisting civil authorities in domestic WMD
    events. Based on its review of the CSTs' training, equipment, and staffing
    criteria; analysis of CST readiness data; site visits to 14 CSTs; and
    discussions with state, local, and federal responders, GAO found the
    certified teams visited to be ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the
    states have a clear structure for operational command and control of the
    CSTs. Though current NGB guidance and the CSTs' message to state and local
    officials emphasize the CST mission as being focused on WMD events, some
    CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing emergency
    assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. While NGB
    views such missions as useful preparations for WMD events, guidance has
    not been clarified to reflect the type of non-WMD missions that would be
    appropriate. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, local,
    and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts. Also, DOD is
    proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with
    Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD
    incident. DOD and NGB are informally considering limited overseas missions
    for the teams, though they have no plans to request a further expansion of
    the CSTs' mission to encompass overseas operations. According to NGB and
    the CST commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable
    experience and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more
    demanding missions, such as supporting the warfighter, could be
    detrimental to the readiness and availability of the CSTs.

    Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the CST
    program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and
    management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer teams
    and the long-term sustainment of the program. NGB has made progress in
    establishing an administrative management structure for the CSTs,
    including issuing a broad CST management regulation and initiating a
    standardization and evaluation program. However, the CSTs face challenges
    in personnel, coordination plans, equipment acquisition and planning,
    training objectives, readiness reporting and facilities. Further,
    insufficient NGB guidance on state National Guard roles and
    responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs has resulted in
    varied support at the state National Guard level. NGB is aware of the
    challenges and has efforts under way to address them. While these
    challenges have not yet undermined CST readiness, if NGB efforts are
    unsuccessful, the progress of newer teams could be impeded and the
    long-term sustainment of the CST program put at greater risk.
    *** End of document. ***