Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments (13-DEC-05, 
GAO-06-49).							 
                                                                 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) consist of an unmanned aircraft; 
sensor, communications, or weapons, carried on board the	 
aircraft, collectively referred to as payloads; and ground	 
controls. UAS have been used successfully in recent operations,  
and are in increasingly high demand by U.S. forces. To meet the  
demand, the Department of Defense (DOD) is increasing its	 
investment in and reliance on UAS, and often deploying them while
still in development. GAO has previously found that DOD's	 
approach to developing and fielding UAS risked interoperability  
problems which could undermine joint operations. GAO was asked to
review (1) UAS performance in recent joint operations and (2) the
soundness of DOD's approach to evaluating joint UAS operational  
performance.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-49						        
    ACCNO:   A43137						        
  TITLE:     Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively 
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments	 
     DATE:   12/13/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Interoperability					 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military policies					 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Standards						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems evaluation 				 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Joint forces					 
	     Unmanned aerial vehicles				 
	     DOD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap		 
	     Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle		 
	     Hellfire Missile					 
	     Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 

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GAO-06-49

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee
on

                    Armed Services, House of Representatives

December 2005

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

 DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance
                                  Assessments

                                       a

GAO-06-49

[IMG]

December 2005

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance
Assessments

  What GAO Found

DOD has achieved certain operational successes using UAS, including
identifying time-critical targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, and striking
enemy positions to defeat opposing forces. Some missions effectively
supported joint operations, and in other cases, the missions were
service-specific. DOD has encountered challenges which have hampered joint
operations at times. First, some UAS cannot easily transmit and receive
data with other communication systems because they are not interoperable.
Although DOD guidance requires interoperability, detailed standards for
interoperability have not been developed; DOD has relied on existing, more
general standards; and the services developed differing systems. For now,
U.S. forces have developed technical patches permitting transmission but
slowing data flow, potentially hampering time-critical targeting. Second,
some sensor payloads cannot be interchangeably used on different UAS
because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard. Some UAS
missions may have to be delayed if compatible unmanned aircraft and
payloads are not available. Based on its experience with UAS in Persian
Gulf operations, U.S. Central Command believes communications
interoperability and payload commonality problems occur because the
services' UAS development programs have been service-specific and
insufficiently attentive to joint needs. Lastly, the electromagnetic
spectrum needed to control the flight of certain unmanned aircraft and to
transmit data is constrained and no standard requiring the capability to
change frequencies had been adopted because the problem was not foreseen.
Thus, some systems cannot change to avoid congestion and consequently some
missions have been delayed, potentially undermining time-critical
targeting. In addition to the joint operational challenges, inclement
weather can also hamper UAS operations. Unmanned aircraft are more likely
to be grounded in inclement weather than manned aircraft and DOD had not
decided whether to require all-weather capability. While DOD has
acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address
bandwidth and weather constraints, little progress has been made. Until
DOD adopts and enforces interoperability and other standards, these
challenges will likely remain and become more widespread as new UAS are
developed and fielded.

DOD's approach to evaluating UAS joint operational performance has been
unsound because it was not systematic or routine. DOD has deployed UAS
before developing a joint operations performance measurement system, even
though results-oriented performance measures can be used to monitor
progress toward agency goals. DOD has generally relied on after-action and
maintenance reports which have useful but not necessarily joint
performance information. DOD has also relied on short-duration study teams
for some performance information but had not established ongoing or
routine reporting systems. Thus, while continuing to invest in UAS, DOD
has incomplete performance information on joint operations on which to
base acquisition or modification decisions. In May 2005, U.S. Strategic
Command began developing joint performance measures.

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

    Letter                                                                  1 
                                  Results in Brief                          2 
                                     Background                             5 
               UAS Have Achieved Certain Mission Successes but DOD Faces 
               Emerging Interoperability and Other Challenges on Joint   
                                     Operations                             9 
                DOD's Approach to Evaluating Joint UAS Performance on    
                      Operational Deployments Has Been Unsound             18 
                                     Conclusions                           20 
                        Recommendations for Executive Action               21 
                         Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                23 

Appendixes

          Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 26 Appendix II: Comments from the
                Department of Defense 28 Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
                                                           Acknowledgments 33

  Related GAO Products

Table Table 1:	Bands in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Used by 12 Types of
Unmanned Aircraft and Sensor Payloads

Figure Figure 1: Predator Unmanned Aircraft with Sensor

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense UAS unmanned aircraft systems

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

December 13, 2005

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)1 consist of unmanned aircraft; sensors,
weapons, and communications equipment carried on board the aircraft, known
as "payloads"; and ground control stations that control the flight of the
aircraft and receive information collected and transmitted by the
payloads. UAS have been used successfully in recent military operations on
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and offensive strike
missions. Due to the successes, U.S. forces are increasingly demanding
that more UAS be supplied to them, prompting the Department of Defense
(DOD) to try and rapidly develop and field these emerging technologies.
Moreover, to meet the demand, DOD has substantially increased its
investment in these systems from about $363 million in fiscal year 2001 to
about $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2005, not including supplemental
appropriations.

In March 2004, we reported that DOD's approach to planning for developing
and fielding UAS did not provide reasonable assurance that its investment
strategy will facilitate their efficient integration into the force
structure.2 We also reported that DOD's approach increased the risk of
future interoperability problems, which could undermine joint operations,
and would likely be insufficient to prevent duplication of effort from one
service-specific program to another. As a result, we recommended that DOD
develop a strategic plan for these systems' development and fielding

1Unmanned aircraft systems were previously known as unmanned aerial
vehicles. In August 2005, the Department of Defense began using the new
term. We have adopted the new term in this report and for clarity will use
it when referring to the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force,
although it was actually known as the Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Planning Task Force prior to August 2005. However, we will refer to
publications by whichever term was used in their titles.

2GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17,
2004).

and assign the UAS Planning Task Force or other appropriate entity within
DOD with sufficient authority to enforce program direction specified in
the plan. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a
strategic plan and nonconcurred with the recommendation to place an entity
in charge. DOD's rationale for nonconcurring was that the Undersecretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and by extension its
UAS Planning Task Force had sufficient authority to develop and enforce
interoperability and other standards, and that the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System process promoted joint war fighting and
thus would avoid interoperability problems.3 In addition, DOD has issued
guidance requiring interoperable communications capabilities in DOD
weapons and other systems.

As requested, we reviewed (1) the operational performance of UAS in recent
joint operations and (2) the soundness of DOD's approach to evaluating
joint UAS operational performance. To evaluate the operational performance
of UAS in recent operations, we examined DOD or service regulations,
directives, instructions, after-action reports, performance evaluations,
and other documents. We also met with key DOD and service officials to
discuss current UAS operational status, future plans, initiatives to
address emerging challenges, and related issues. To review DOD's approach
to evaluating joint UAS performance, we obtained relevant DOD directives,
instructions, and other documents, and met with DOD and service officials
to identify the performance measurement systems in place and operating. We
determined that the data on the numbers and types of missions performed by
UAS were sufficiently reliable for this review. We performed our work from
July 2004 to October 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Results in Brief	DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS
but communications and payload interoperability, electromagnetic spectrum,
and inclement weather challenges have all emerged to hamper recent joint
operations or prevent timely UAS employment. On the one hand, U.S. forces
have used unmanned aircraft and sensor and weapons payloads to locate and
engage targets in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002 on both joint

3The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System is a
collaborative system that DOD uses to identify capability gaps and
integrated solutions to resolve these gaps.

and service-specific missions.4 For example, the Air Force used its Global
Hawk unmanned aircraft to locate 55 percent of time-critical targets to
suppress enemy air defenses in Iraq in 2003 and the Predator unmanned
aircraft on over 5,800 sorties or about 80,000 hours of flight on
intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance, and armed strike missions from
2002 to 2005 in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, in 2004, an Army force
used its Hunter unmanned aircraft to locate certain antiaircraft
artillery; the Air Force sent an armed Predator unmanned aircraft to
engage the antiaircraft artillery; and the Army sent the Hunter back for
battle damage assessment. On the other hand, interoperability problems
have emerged despite the DOD guidance requiring interoperability and the
2002 edition of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-20275
identifying interoperability as a key goal. Specifically, some sensor or
communications payloads and ground stations cannot easily exchange data,
sometimes even within a single service, because they were not designed to
interoperable communication standards. Moreover, the 2002 Roadmap
specifies some communications standards, but the 2005 edition of the
Roadmap acknowledges that the detailed standards for interoperability have
not been developed. To use noninteroperable sensors or communications
payloads and ground stations, U.S. forces have relied on technical patches
to link them. However, the technical patch process can delay receipt of
the information by forces needing it, potentially preventing time-critical
targeting.

In addition, U.S. forces have also encountered another interoperability
problem: they are unable to interchangeably use some payloads from one
type of unmanned aircraft on another, a capability commonly called
"payload commonality." DOD has at least six different types of sensor
payloads, each able to collect different types of information. However,
some cannot be used interchangeably on differing unmanned aircraft because
DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard to make them modular
and thus permit attachment to most unmanned aircraft. As a result,
commanders may have to delay missions if the appropriate sensor is
available but no unmanned aircraft are able to carry it. Interoperability
and payload commonality problems have arisen because the services' UAS
development programs have been service-specific and insufficiently

4Joint missions involve UAS from more than one service, whereas
service-specific missions involve UAS from only one service.

5Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap
2002-2027 (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).

attentive to joint operational needs, according to U.S. Central Command.
In addition to interoperability and payload commonality problems, certain
electromagnetic spectrum frequencies are congested by the large number of
UAS and other weapons or communications systems using the same frequency
simultaneously. While some unmanned aircraft, sensor or communications
payloads, and ground stations can change to different, less congested,
frequencies, DOD had not required that the capability be included on UAS
as of the time of our review, and most were consequently built without the
ability to change. Thus, commanders have had to delay certain missions
until frequency congestion cleared and DOD acknowledges that missions
could eventually be delayed or cancelled if the problem worsens.

Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded in inclement weather than
manned aircraft due in part to their lighter weight. DOD has neither
required all-weather capability nor evaluated the performance trade-off
that may arise from developing it even though it established all-weather
capability as a goal in the 2002 Roadmap. DOD acknowledges that it (1) did
not foresee the rapid technology development experienced with unmanned
aircraft, sensor or communications payloads, and ground stations; (2) has
provided unmanned aircraft and payloads rapidly to deployed forces to meet
forces' demands for them; and (3) has not always adopted standards that
might have prevented or mitigated some of these problems. While DOD also
acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address
bandwidth and weather constraints that undermine unmanned aircraft
operations, little progress has been made. Until DOD and the services take
steps to ensure that interoperable communications and payloads,
electromagnetic spectrum reprogramming, and all-weather flying standards
are developed and enforced for UAS, these problems are likely to continue
and become more widespread as DOD continues to deploy these systems to
meet forces' demands for them.

DOD's approach to evaluating UAS joint operational performance has been
unsound because it is not systematically focused on joint operations and
is not routine. While results-oriented performance measures can be used to
monitor progress toward agency goals, DOD has not developed adequate
indicators of performance on joint operations or baselines against which
to measure performance for developmental systems that are being used. In
the meantime, DOD and the services have generally relied on available
information including after-action and maintenance reports. Nonetheless,
such information is not necessarily targeted to UAS and does not
necessarily include reporting on key indicators to measure performance on

joint operations, since the indicators have not been identified, and does
not include baselines against which to apply the indicators to permit
insight into performance. DOD has acknowledged that it tried to meet
combat forces' increasing demands for UAS and consequently deployed the
systems as quickly as possibly but without first developing the
performance indicators and baselines. DOD had begun to develop performance
measures by the time of our review. Performance reporting has also not
been routine. Instead, DOD and the services have relied on short-duration
study teams rather than ongoing processes for obtaining performance
information on joint operations. While these teams have produced some
useful information, the approach does not routinely provide information
that would permit systematic performance assessments since the teams are
not permanently established and did not employ consistent study
parameters. DOD has acknowledged the need for systematic joint performance
reporting and in May 2005 tasked U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for
developing appropriate performance measures and reporting systems. Until
DOD develops a systematic approach to UAS performance measurement and
reporting on joint operations, it will have incomplete information on
which to base acquisition or system modification decisions.

To address the emerging challenges that have hampered joint operations or
prevented effective employment of UAS, we are making recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense to develop or adjust communications
interoperability, payload commonality, and electromagnetic spectrum
reprogramming standards; ensure that the new performance measurement
system includes indicators that can be used to assess progress in
overcoming communications interoperability, payload commonality, and
electromagnetic spectrum challenges; and also ensure that the new
performance measurement system includes other appropriate performance
indicators for collection, baselines against which to apply the
indicators, and a systematic means to collect joint operations performance
information and report it to organizations that develop and field UAS. In
written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially or fully
concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it had initiated
actions to address them. DOD's comments and our evaluations of them are
provided later in this report.

Background	DOD defines UAS as a powered aircraft that does not carry a
human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic
forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be
expendable

or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally,
UAS consist of the aircraft; a flight control station; information and
retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes, wheeled land vehicles
that carry launch and recovery platforms. UAS carry a payload including
sensors for intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance to provide
real-time intelligence to battlefield commanders. When used on an
intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance mission, generally, the
aircraft carries a sensor payload capable of detecting heat, movement, or
taking photographs or video of ground-based targets. This information is
then transmitted to ground stations or satellites via a communications
payload for retransmission to forces needing the information to support
operations. Unmanned aircraft can also be armed for offensive strike
missions and be used to attack ground-based targets. UAS require adequate
intra- or intertheater communications capabilities using the
electromagnetic spectrum to permit operators to control certain aircraft,
and also permit communications equipment to transmit the information
obtained by the sensor payload to ground commanders or other users.

Effective joint operations are critical because combatant commanders
operate in a joint environment by applying military force appropriate for
their operational circumstance using the unique capabilities of each of
the services. In a changing security environment, joint operations are
becoming more important given the complex nature of military operations.
This importance is being driven by the combatant commands' need to combine
the capabilities of multiple services to address the global threat, as
well as the growing interdependence of capabilities among the services.
Moreover, effective joint operations permit combatant commanders to
leverage the capabilities associated with each service to accomplish
operational missions. As with manned aircraft, UAS provide another
capability that can be applied by combatant commanders in joint
operations.

    Evolution of UAS Development and Use

Initially, UAS were seen as complementary systems that augmented existing
war fighting capabilities. However, UAS are also evolving into more
significant roles, for which they can provide primary capability. For
example, the Global Hawk UAS may eventually replace the U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Aerial System may eventually perform
electronic warfare missions currently performed by the EA-6 Prowler
aircraft as well as offensive deep strike missions. Moreover, UAS are
figuring prominently in plans to transform the military into a more
strategically responsive force and are expected to be an integral part of
this

information-based force. For example, the Army is developing the Future
Combat System and a new generation of unmanned aircraft and other systems
to enable information to flow freely across the battlefield.

Since 2001, DOD has significantly increased its planned expenditure for
UAS and associated systems, and, more recently, the systems have continued
to be heavily used in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, over 10 different
types of UAS have been used in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the UAS
Planning Task Force, as of August 2005, DOD had approximately 1,500
unmanned aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the budget request
for UAS grew significantly between fiscal years 2001 and 2005, from about
$363 million to about $2.2 billion, and further growth is likely. These
figures do not include any supplemental appropriations.

Fewer than half of the UAS in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of our
report had reached full-rate production or initial operating capability.
They were still considered developmental, and consequently were covered by
DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System and DOD Instruction
5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, both issued in May
2003.6 The directive mandates that systems, units, and forces shall be
able to provide and accept data, information, materiel, and services to
and from other systems, units, and forces, and shall effectively
interoperate with other U.S. forces, among other things. The instruction
implements the directive and is intended to provide DOD officials with a
framework for identifying mission needs and technology to meet the needs,
as the basis for weapons system acquisitions. Finally, the 2002 Roadmap
emphasizes the need for interoperable unmanned aircraft and payloads by
identifying a number of existing standards that are to be complied with in
systems' development in such areas as common data links, interoperable
data links for video systems, and electromagnetic spectrum frequencies
that should be used for data transmission under a variety of
circumstances.7

6DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003 and
DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May
12, 2003.

7In August 2005, DOD issued an updated version of the roadmap. See Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030
(Washington, D.C.: August 2005).

    Prior GAO Reviews of DOD's Planning for Developing and Fielding UAS

In March 2004, we reported that DOD's approach to planning for developing
and fielding UAS does not provide reasonable assurance that its investment
will facilitate efficient integration into the force structure and avoid
interoperability problems, although DOD had taken some steps to improve
UAS program management. For example, in 2001, DOD established the Joint
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Planning Task Force (now known as the UAS
Planning Task Force) in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). To communicate its vision and
promote commonality of UAS, the Task Force published the 2002 Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Roadmap, which described current programs, identified
potential missions, and provided guidance on emerging technologies. While
the Roadmap demonstrated some elements of a strategic plan, neither it nor
other key documents represented a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure
that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that complement each
other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the
Task Force served in an advisory capacity to the Undersecretary, but had
little authority to enforce program direction. For their part, service
officials told us that they developed service-specific planning documents
to meet their own needs and operational concepts without considering those
of other services or the Roadmap. In consequence, we concluded that
without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority
to enforce program direction, DOD risked interoperability problems, which
could undermine joint operations. Thus, in our 2004 report, we recommended
that DOD establish a strategic plan and assign an office authority and
responsibility to enforce program direction communicated in the plan to
promote joint operations.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish a strategic
plan and nonconcurred with our recommendation to assign an office with
authority and responsibility to enforce program direction. DOD asserted
that the Undersecretary had sufficient authority to integrate UAS into
joint operations and that the Task Force had been established to promote
payload commonality, develop and enforce interface standards, and ensure
multiservice coordination. Moreover, DOD indicated that the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process focuses on
developing integrated joint warfighting capabilities and thus would avoid
interoperability problems that we believed were likely.

  UAS Have Achieved Certain Mission Successes but DOD Faces Emerging
  Interoperability and Other Challenges on Joint Operations

DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS including
collecting intelligence with unmanned aircraft sensor payloads and
conducting offensive strike missions with weapons payloads in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Nonetheless, U.S. forces employing UAS have encountered certain
communications and payload interoperability problems (called payload
commonality problems), electromagnetic spectrum constraints, and inclement
weather groundings of unmanned aircraft during recent operations. While
DOD has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address
bandwidth and weather constraints that undermine unmanned aircraft
operations, little progress has been made.

    UAS Have Played an Integral Role in Mission Accomplishments

DOD has achieved certain operational successes from its use of a variety
of unmanned aircraft and their sensor, communications, and armaments
payloads. In operations in Iraq or Afghanistan since 2002, U.S. forces
have used UAS in integral roles on intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and offensive strike joint or service-specific missions.
For example:

o 	The Air Force used its Predator unmanned aircraft with sensor or
armaments payloads on over 5,800 sorties or totaling more than 80,000
hours of flight on a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; close air support; armed strike; and other missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 through 2005.8 For example, the Predator's
sensor and communications payloads have provided video images to ground
forces to support their operations or to strike enemy targets with
Hellfire missiles.

o 	Certain Air Force units used the Global Hawk unmanned aircraft's sensor
payloads to identify 55 percent of the time-critical targets to defeat
enemy air defenses in Iraq in March and April 2003. To enhance joint
operations, the Air Force developed procedures and tactics to allow the
Global Hawk's sensor payloads to provide more direct support to ground
force missions.

o 	In 2004, an Army force used its Hunter unmanned aircraft and sensor
payload to locate an enemy antiaircraft artillery weapon that had been
firing at coalition force aircraft. Then the Air Force sent a Predator

8This is the latest information available at the time of our review.

armed with a Hellfire missile to attack the enemy weapon. Within minutes
of the Predator strike, the Army unit sent its Hunter back to transmit
information needed for battle damage assessment.

o 	In 2004, an Army force operating an I-Gnat unmanned aircraft in Iraq
detected a potential ambush of Marine Corps forces and the Army unit used
information from the I-Gnat's sensor payload to successfully adjust mortar
fire onto the enemy position.

o 	Recently, the Air Force, Army and Marine Corps forces have used their
unmanned aircraft and their sensor and communications payloads to locate
numerous targets in Iraq and Afghanistan to permit U.S. forces to destroy
the targets.

                    UAS Interoperability Remains a Challenge

While achieving certain successes with the use of unmanned aircraft and
their payloads, certain interoperability challenges have also emerged
during recent operations despite certain DOD directives requiring
interoperability and the emphasis on interoperability in the 2002 Roadmap.
First, DOD Directive 5000.1 specifies that systems, units, and forces
shall be able to provide and accept data and information to and from other
systems and shall effectively interoperate with other U.S. forces. Second,
the Roadmap specifies five data standards for formatting data, a
communication standard to ensure adoption of a common data link, and a
variety of file transfer, physical media, and other standards applicable
to unmanned aircraft or their sensor and communications payloads. However,
the 2005 edition of the Roadmap indicates that the detailed standards for
interoperability have not been developed. In effect, the absence of such
standards has led to the development of UAS that are not interoperable. In
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, interoperability problems have
emerged. Specifically, during operations, DOD has learned that unmanned
aircraft sensor and communications payloads and ground stations were not
designed to common data standards and thus are not interoperable, even
within a single service in certain circumstances. For example:

o 	Army forces operate both the Shadow and Hunter unmanned aircraft and
associated ground stations but discovered that these systems are not
interoperable. Specifically, while the Shadow's sensor and communications
payload is able to transmit information to its own ground station, it is
unable to transmit to a Hunter ground station. Similarly, the Hunter's
sensor and communication payloads are able to

transmit to a Hunter ground station but not Shadow's. Onward transmission
to forces needing the information is equally constrained if they do not
have compatible equipment for receiving the information. As a result, the
Army has missed an opportunity to effectively leverage the technology
inherent in either system for the benefit of operational forces that need
the information. At the time of our review, the Army had begun an
initiative to make the Shadow and Hunter unmanned aircraft ground stations
compatible with either aircraft.

When communication systems are incompatible, operating forces may be
prompted to operate their own UAS, thus increasing the numbers of systems
operating in the same area. To permit the sharing of tactical intelligence
obtained by unmanned aircraft sensor payloads, the services or combatant
commands have developed certain technical patches permitting compatibility
but slowing data transmission. As we pointed out in 2003, in some cases,
DOD needs hours or days to transmit information to multiple services.9
However, slow intelligence data transmission can undermine U.S. forces'
ability to attack time-critical targets or allow the targets to escape.
U.S. Central Command acknowledges that timely data dissemination is
critical to combat operations.

Communications interoperability problems are a long-standing problem. In
2001, we reported that each of the military services plans, acquires, and
operates systems to meet its own operational concepts but not necessarily
the requirements of joint operations in spite of the DOD directive
requiring interoperability.10 In our 2004 unmanned aerial vehicle report,
we reported that the services engaged in little coordination in developing
their unmanned aerial vehicle roadmaps and that they did not view the UAS
Planning Task Force's 2002-2027 Roadmap as a strategic plan or an
overarching architecture for integrating UAS into the force structure. In
the absence of adequately developed and implemented standards and in
contravention of the DOD guidance, the services have continued to develop
their unmanned systems to their own standards, but without regard to the
others' standards. At the same time, DOD continues to develop and field
UAS without adjusting the standards, likely causing the problem to become
even more widespread. Moreover, the UAS used in current operations

9GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of
Systems That Process Intelligence Data, GAO-03-329 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
31, 2003).

10GAO, Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time Critical Targeting, GAO-02-204R
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2001).

were built before the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System became fully operational and thus has had little impact on the
problem. Consequently, the information collected cannot always be quickly
transmitted to users needing it, undermining joint operations and
potentially leading to future costly initiatives to modify existing
unmanned aircraft, sensors and communications payloads, and ground
stations to overcome interoperability problems.

In addition to communications interoperability problems, payload
interoperability (commonly referred to as "payload commonality") problems
also exist. DOD has developed at least six different sensor payloads each
able to collect different types of information. These sensor payloads are
attached to an unmanned aircraft and flown over operational areas to
observe activity of interest on the ground in a target area and to
transmit observations to ground or air forces or other users as tactical
intelligence. As an example, figure 1 displays a Predator unmanned
aircraft with a sensor payload attached underneath.

Figure 1: Predator Unmanned Aircraft with Sensor

Source: Air Force.

However, many sensor payloads can be attached to only one type of unmanned
aircraft because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard even
though this problem was identified nearly 20 years ago. As a result,
commanders may have to delay missions if the appropriate sensor is
available but no unmanned aircraft is able to carry it. We discussed this
problem in 1988 when we reported that DOD had not adequately emphasized
payload commonality for unmanned aircraft and that Congress had stressed
the need for DOD to consider payload commonality in 1985.11 The 2002
Roadmap acknowledged the need for sensor payload commonality where
practical, but limited progress has been made.

In addition to the flexibility inherent in the communications standards,
according to U.S. Central Command based on its experience in Persian Gulf

11GAO, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 1988).

operations, unmanned aircraft development has been service-centric and
lacks an overarching employment doctrine to shape development to achieve
aircraft and sensor interoperable communications and payload commonality.
Furthermore, a Joint Forces Command official told us that combatant
commanders can not take full advantage of the dissimilar unmanned aircraft
or the sensor payload data produced due to the interoperability problems.

    Congested Electromagnetic Spectrum Has Hampered UAS Operational
    Effectiveness

Unmanned aircraft and their sensor, armaments, and communications payloads
depend on reliable access to the electromagnetic spectrum.12 However, the
spectrum is increasingly constrained, potentially undermining joint
operations by requiring delays in an unmanned aircraft flight or, if the
problem worsens, cancellation. Unmanned aircraft operators use the
electromagnetic spectrum to maintain contact with the aircraft to control
its flight, fire its weapons if armed, and receive information collected
by the sensor payloads. Certain spectrum frequencies are sometimes
referred to as bands and the amount of the spectrum needed to permit
transmission of information is referred to as bandwidth. DOD officials
told us that more bandwidth is needed to transmit video and other
information obtained by sensor payloads than to maintain flight control of
the aircraft. Numerous weapons also use electromagnetic spectrum and share
it with UAS but they can interfere with each other during operations if
they operate on the same frequency at the same time.

The military services have experienced bandwidth capacity constraints,
limiting both the number of UAS and other systems that can be effectively
operated simultaneously and the amount of available data that can be
transmitted from the unmanned aircraft communications payload. For
example, insufficient bandwidth limits U.S. forces' ability to download
video and radar images via satellite from more than one aircraft at a
time. As a result, data transmission and relay are delayed, undermining
U.S. forces' ability to engage time-critical targets and possibly
permitting the target to escape, unless alternative information sources
are available on a timely basis. Army officials informed us that data link
limitations are due primarily to frequency congestion. Table 1 displays
the bands used by 12 different unmanned aircraft or models of unmanned
aircraft for flight

12The electromagnetic spectrum refers to the range of radio frequencies
used in wireless communication.

control and sensor payload data transmission. As shown in the table,
several UAS rely on the C-band for their data transmission capability, and
only 2 of the 12 UAS can be reprogrammed to another band.

Table 1: Bands in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Used by 12 Types of
Unmanned Aircraft and Sensor Payloads

                        Band         Flight control         Data transmission 
                      C Band                      3 
                     Ku Band                      3 
                C or Ku Band                      2 
                       Other                      4 
                       Total                     12 

Source: DOD.

The 2002 Roadmap established a goal of modifying the Army's Shadow UAV to
permit it to operate a common tactical data link in Ku-band and not the
more congested C-band. This goal had not been met at the time of our
review and the Shadow unmanned aircraft still operated in C-band.
Similarly, the 2002 Roadmap established a goal of moving the Air Force's
Predator unmanned aircraft video sensor payload from C-band to Ku-band for
line of sight operations. However, the goal had not been met at the time
of our report.

Moreover, the problem cannot be easily overcome without potentially costly
modifications to existing systems because DOD has not required unmanned
aircraft or sensor payloads to be reprogrammable from one band to another
and therefore has not established such standards. As a result, most have
been designed and built without the flexibility to operate in differing
frequencies or bands to avoid congested frequencies, thus sometimes
preventing timely information transmission or delaying their flight
without interfering with or experiencing interference from other UAS or
other weapons systems.

Inclement Weather Limits Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded
by inclement weather Some Unmanned Aircraft than manned aircraft due in
part to their lighter weight. Dust storms, Operations strong winds, rain,
or icing prevent some unmanned aircraft from flying,

thus denying U.S. forces critically needed information unless alternative

data collection or offensive strike capabilities are available.
Specifically,

winds up to 80 miles per hour in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced the
availability of most unmanned aircraft and dust storms have undermined the
use of some sensor payloads. Moreover, the 2002 Roadmap indicates that
icing has been a primary factor in two accidents involving the Hunter
unmanned aircraft and three crashes of the Predator unmanned aircraft. The
Roadmap established a goal to incorporate all-weather capabilities into
future UAS. However, little progress has been made because DOD has not
adopted standards for all-weather capability to be considered in
development, despite the Roadmap's stating the goal. As a result, systems
have been developed without it. At the same time, according to a UAS
Planning Task Force official, developing unmanned aircraft with allweather
capabilities may result in some degradation in performance, such as a
reduced flying range. At the time of our review, DOD had not determined
whether all-weather capability was worth the trade-off of potentially
degraded performance.

    DOD Has Made Little Progress in Addressing the Challenges

While DOD has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and
address bandwidth and weather constraints that undermine unmanned aircraft
operations, little progress has been made. On the one hand, to begin to
address the problems, DOD has taken a number of steps as listed below:

o 	In August 2005, DOD issued an updated version of its roadmap, entitled
2005 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, to guide acquisition and
interoperability. Among other things, the 2005 Roadmap establishes the
goal of enhancing joint service collaboration as a means to improve joint
operations.

o 	At the time of our review, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was
preparing an action plan to address a number of shortfalls including
interoperability and other problems within U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility, although the plan was limited to just this command and
would not necessarily solve the problems that UAS might encounter
elsewhere.

o 	DOD plans to reemphasize the role that the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System could play in all new UAS developments
by trying to ensure that DOD develops systems to support joint operations,
achieve commonality to the extent practical, and identify gaps in DOD's
ability to carry out its warfighting missions.

o 	U.S. Joint Forces Command has developed certain initiatives to improve
UAS interoperability by conducting experiments to demonstrate aircraft
modifications and new concepts of operations, although such modifications
can be costly.

In addition, on June 1, 2005, DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council
established a new Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Center of Excellence and a
Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overarching Integrated Process Team. The
Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overarching Integrated Process Team has
subsequently been renamed the Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Material
Review Board. These joint forums will help the services manage development
of new UAS or modifications to existing UAS, and they will help the
services to develop new or revised concepts of operations for more
effective use. At the same time, the UAS Planning Task Force will try to
ensure that the services' UAS acquisition programs are coordinated, and a
Task Force representative is to be a member of the Joint Overarching
Integrated Process Team. DOD views these changes as means to more
effectively manage service UAS programs. While these changes appear to be
steps in the right direction, it is too early for us to tell if they will
solve the interoperability and other problems that we identified.

Furthermore, payload commonality, interoperability of communications and
data transmission systems, and inclement weather flying capabilities that
we identified as impacting recent operations, had been identified
previously as problems already occurring or likely to occur. First, our
1988 unmanned aerial vehicle report indicated that DOD had not adequately
emphasized payload commonality for these aircraft. Second, our 2001 report
found interoperability problems due to the services' continued practice of
acquiring systems to support their own operations but not necessarily that
of the other services. Third, DOD's guidance requires interoperability but
the detailed standards have not been developed. Lastly, the 2002 edition
of the Roadmap identified the need to improve interoperability of
communications systems for UAS and also identified inclement weather
capability as a problem undermining UAS operations and established goals
to address it. Despite all the emphasis, problems related to
communications and payload interoperability, and all-weather capability
problems remain. DOD acknowledges that it (1) did not foresee the rapid
technological development experienced with unmanned aircraft, sensor or
communications payloads, and ground stations; (2) has provided unmanned
aircraft and payloads rapidly to deployed forces to meet forces' demands
for them; and (3) has not always adopted new or enforced existing
standards that might have prevented or mitigated some of these

problems. As a result, while DOD has issued a directive, instructions,
guidance, and roadmaps, and established at least five different
organizations to promote UAS interoperability and address other unmanned
aircraft and payload developmental needs, no organization has or has
exercised sufficient authority to enforce program direction, or ensure
that the standards and guidance are in concurrence. As a result, the
services continued to develop and field these systems without fully
complying with the interoperability requirements stated in key guidance or
addressing known payload commonality problems.

  DOD's Approach to Evaluating Joint UAS Performance on Operational Deployments
  Has Been Unsound

DOD's approach to evaluating joint UAS performance on operational
deployments is unsound because it has not implemented a systematic
approach to evaluating such performance. Instead, DOD has relied on
systems for evaluating performance that are not focused on joint
operations and are nonroutine, and as a result the department has little
assurance that the information that has been collected represents the key
performance indicators needed to assess performance on joint operations.

    DOD Lacks Performance Indicators to Assess Certain Joint UAS Performance

DOD has not implemented a systematic approach to evaluating joint UAS
performance on operational deployments. As we previously noted in our 2004
report, the Government Performance and Results Act's strategic planning
framework specifies that results-oriented performance measures can be used
to monitor progress toward agency goals and that such performance
measurements should be developed and used to monitor progress. At the time
of our report, DOD was only beginning to decide on key indicators of
performance that would be used to assess unmanned aircraft, payload, and
ground station performance on joint operations. To date, DOD has relied on
service-specific information that addressed certain UAS performance. For
example, some forces filed after-action reports and maintenance reports
addressing UAS performance. While producing some useful information, these
reports have not necessarily been specifically targeted to joint UAS
operations, nor do they systematically identify key indicators for
collection which could be used to develop joint operational performance
baselines and permit performance measurement against the baseline. Thus,
DOD has little assurance that the information that has been collected
represents the key performance indicators needed to assess joint
operations performance.

DOD officials told us that they have tried to keep pace with operating
forces' demands for more unmanned aircraft and their payloads, and
therefore the services have deployed them while still under development
within the DOD acquisition system. These deployments have often occurred
before identification of key performance indicators that would need to be
collected to be used to evaluate performance. In effect, the services have
bought and deployed unmanned aircraft, sensor and communications payloads,
and ground stations and tried to evaluate their effectiveness all at the
same time. On the one hand, this has permitted DOD to provide operating
forces with new capabilities represented by the aircraft and their
payloads. On the other hand, it has also resulted in DOD and the services
sometimes learning of joint performance problems based on reporting from
actual operations only if after-action reports or other reporting
mentioned the problem. Nonetheless, without appropriate performance
measures and baselines against which to assess performance on joint
operations, even anecdotal information can have limited utility because
officials are less likely to be able to assess the magnitude of the
problem, or even become aware of it if no reports identify it.

DOD has acknowledged the need to develop specific performance indicators
for unmanned aircraft and their payloads on joint operations and had begun
to develop them at the time of our report. First, the Army recently began
an initiative to develop performance indicators and a baseline against
which to assess performance. However, while this approach may produce
useful information on which to assess the performance of Army-operated
unmanned aircraft, payloads, and ground stations, it was not designed to
address joint performance. The other three services had not started to
develop specific performance indicators and baselines for unmanned
aircraft at the time of our review. Second, in May 2005, DOD assigned U.S.
Strategic Command responsibility for the development of joint performance
indicators but the effort was just getting started at the time of our
review.

    DOD's UAS Joint Performance Reporting Has Not Been Routine

In addition to anecdotal performance reporting, DOD has not established
routine performance reporting mechanisms for UAS operations but instead
has relied on sometimes short-duration study teams to gather relevant
joint operational performance information. For example, in November 2004,
DOD established a group known as a "Tiger Team" to identify opportunities
for improving the joint operational effectiveness of UAS. However, this
team was established on a temporary basis and had a limited mission to
identify improvements only in the U.S. Central Command area of

responsibility. The Tiger Team did identify a number of areas needing
improvement. For example, it determined that forces in the region need
Full Motion Video capability to provide images of actual events as they
occur. The team also determined that a need exists to address
electromagnetic spectrum limitations hampering UAS operations. However,
the team identified the electromagnetic spectrum problem only after the
UAS had been deployed and U.S. forces had tried to use them on operational
missions. In addition, also in 2004, another DOD shortduration study team
evaluated the operational performance of the Shadow unmanned aircraft.
Lastly, the Army conducted a one-time comprehensive review of the
effectiveness of its UAS in theaters of operations. While these teams
developed useful performance information, the approach does not represent
a systematic or long-term means to obtain joint UAS performance
information since the teams are not permanently established and they did
not use consistent study parameters.

Finally, even in the instances where some ongoing processes were used, the
information obtained was relevant only on a service-specific but not a
joint basis. For example, the Marine Corps uses its Operational Advisory
Group process to determine needed improvements in its UAS operations.
While this group has developed useful information that may assist the
Marine Corps in enhancing its ability to effectively use UAS in
operations, the information developed is likely to have limited utility
for joint operations.

DOD acknowledges that the speed with which unmanned aircraft, payloads,
communications, and associated technology are being developed, along with
the imperative to provide emerging technologies quickly to operating
forces, have resulted in the deployment of developmental systems before
adequate performance reporting systems have been established.
Consequently, while the systems are being successfully used in overseas
operations, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that it is well
informed on opportunities to further enhance the ability of operational
forces to take advantage of UAS capabilities.

Conclusions	DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS but
certain challenges have also emerged that have hampered joint operations
or prevented effective employment of UAS. These challenges are caused by
the limited attention paid to interoperability standards for UAS and the
lack of detailed interoperability standards. Development and
implementation of appropriate interoperability, payload commonality, and
other standards

help to ensure that such problems are addressed during development and any
problems are fixed prior to deployment. Moreover, until DOD assesses the
extent to which a lack of detailed standards undermines the purpose of the
broad standards by allowing development of noninteroperable systems and
enforces common standards among the services, problems are likely to
continue and possibly be repeated and made more widespread as new unmanned
aircraft, sensor and communication payloads, ground stations, and related
equipment are developed and fielded. In addition, costly modifications
might be needed later.

The unsoundness in the approach DOD has taken to assessing joint UAS
performance in operational deployments was due to a lack of accepted
performance indicators and a routine system for collecting performance
information. Until DOD develops specific indicators of UAS joint
operational performance, establishes appropriate baselines against which
to measure performance, and communicates which indicators operating forces
should systematically collect and report to appropriate users, DOD will
lack reasonable assurance that it is adequately informed on UAS
performance on joint operations. Moreover, DOD may also be poorly informed
as to its progress in addressing interoperability and other problems and
may therefore be less likely to avoid the same problems in future UAS
development and fielding.

Lastly, in our 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish a strategic
plan and an office with sufficient authority to enforce program direction
to avoid interoperability problems and for other purposes. In
nonconcurring with our recommendation to assign an office with sufficient
authority to enforce program direction, DOD indicated that the UAS
Planning Task Force and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System had sufficient authority and would address interoperability,
payload commonality, and other problems. However, these problems persist.
Consequently, we continue to believe that sustained management attention
is warranted. Without such attention, DOD continues to risk undercutting
the benefit of its continued investment in UAS. Consequently, we continue
to believe that our prior recommendation has merit, but we are not
reiterating it because DOD indicated that it will not implement it.

Recommendations for 	To address the challenges emerging in joint
operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Undersecretary of Defense

Executive Action (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the service secretaries, and other appropriate organizations to
work together to take the following four actions

o 	develop or adjust communications interoperability standards and
electromagnetic frequency reprogramming capabilities standards and ensure
that they are applied to new or modified unmanned aircraft, sensor and
communications payloads, ground stations, and related equipment;

o 	develop sensor and other payload commonality standards where practical
and enforce such standards when modifying existing unmanned aircraft or
payloads and developing new ones;

o  develop appropriately detailed UAS interoperability standards; and

o 	determine whether unmanned aircraft need all-weather flying
capabilities, identify any performance degradation associated with
allweather flying capabilities, and obtain all-weather capabilities where
appropriate.

To improve joint operational performance reporting, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command to
ensure that the performance measurement system being developed by the
command at a minimum

o 	measures how effectively UAS perform their missions by identifying
quantifiable goals and comparing results with desired outcomes;

o 	identifies the specific performance indicator information that needs to
be collected to adequately assess joint performance;

o 	develops indicators that assess communications and payload
interoperability, and the extent to which electromagnetic spectrum
congestion is undermining joint operations;

o 	establishes baselines and applies the identified indicators against the
baselines to gauge success in joint UAS performance; and

o 	develops a way to systematically collect identified performance
information and routinely reports it to organizations that develop and
field UAS.

  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. We made five
recommendations and DOD fully or partially concurred with them. It also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as
appropriate.

First, DOD concurred with our recommendation for the appropriate DOD
organizations to work together to develop or adjust communications
interoperability standards and electromagnetic frequency reprogramming
capabilities standards and ensure that they are applied to new or modified
unmanned aircraft, sensor and communications payloads, ground stations,
and related equipment. In concurring, DOD indicated that it recognized the
utility of communications interoperability and the need to improve this
capability and will direct the services to use common frequencies and data
links to enhance communications interoperability.

Second, in partially concurring with our recommendation to develop and
enforce sensor and other payload commonality standards where practical,
DOD commented that it does not typically focus on payload
interchangeability. Instead, DOD pointed out that unmanned aircraft
payload procurement is a service responsibility and is dependent on
service mission requirements, unmanned aircraft physical design
limitations, and rapid technological evolution. Our report recognizes that
it is not practical for all unmanned aircraft sensors and payloads to be
common due to the various sizes of some aircraft and we worded our
recommendation accordingly.

Third, DOD fully concurred with our recommendation that the appropriate
DOD organizations work together to develop appropriately detailed UAS
interoperability standards. DOD indicated that the UAS Roadmap 20052030
released in August 2005 discusses the preferred framework, methodology,
and standards for achieving UAS interoperability. DOD outlined a number of
actions that it has taken to address UAS interoperability standards,
including ratifying a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standards
Agreement aimed at achieving joint and combined interoperability. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff has tasked the newly formed Joint UAS Material
Review Board and Joint UAV Center of Excellence to provide recommendations
for continuing to improve UAS interoperability.

Fourth, DOD fully concurred with our recommendation to determine whether
unmanned aircraft need all-weather flying capabilities, identify

any performance degradation associated with all-weather capabilities, and
obtain all-weather capabilities where appropriate. DOD commented that
combatant commanders should expect UAS to support operations in diverse
weather conditions. Further, DOD indicated that as UAS capabilities
improve, the weather conditions these systems will need to operate in will
also increase. However, DOD also points out that it is not cost effective
to expect all classes of unmanned aircraft to have an allweather
capability. We agree. The intention of our recommendation is for DOD to
determine those UAS for which all-weather capabilities are cost effective
and to add such capabilities when appropriate.

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that U.S.
Strategic Command ensure that the performance measurement system being
developed at a minimum includes quantifiable goals, performance baselines,
systematic collection procedures, measures of communications and payload
interoperability, and performance indicators against which to measure
performance. DOD indicated that the U.S. Strategic Command has drafted a
Joint Functional Component Concept of Operations that includes metrics to
gauge the force's ability to meet intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance requirements. Moreover, DOD stated that in conjunction with
the services, intelligence community, combatant commanders, and other DOD
organizations, this action would facilitate not only the evaluation of UAS
performance but would enable DOD to have the necessary information
available to assess such factors as UAS requirements, mission
accomplishment, UAS capabilities, and customer satisfaction. DOD also
pointed out that the performance measures are in development and will
require service participation to define the specific data and methodology
which will result in useful information. While we acknowledge that these
actions should address many of the data elements that we believe are
necessary to evaluate UAS, we continue to believe that effective
communications, interoperability, and avoidance of frequency congestion
are important contributors to the success of joint operations. Therefore,
we continue to believe that DOD should ensure that, at a minimum, the U.S.
Strategic Command includes the data elements we recommended in its
performance measurement system. In addition, we agree that other
organizations including the services, should participate in the
development of this measurement system if appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to other
interested parties upon request. In addition, the report will be available
at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
at
(202) 512-9619 or email at [email protected]. Contact points for our Office
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. The GAO contact and key contributors are listed in
appendix III.

Sharon Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

To evaluate the operational performance of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
in recent operations, we examined the Department of Defense (DOD)
regulations, directives, and instructions as well as service guidance and
documentation on UAS. We met with key DOD and service officials, including
those from the UAS Planning Task Force and UAS program managers, to
discuss the current status and future plans for these systems. We reviewed
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027 because this document
establishes an overall DOD management framework for developing and
employing UAS DOD-wide and the update, 2005 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Roadmap. During discussion and visits with DOD and service officials, we
obtained and reviewed DOD and service analyses, briefings, and summary
reports describing each of the UAS used in supporting recent combat and
combat support operations. This included obtaining detailed information on
current and future UAS operational capabilities. Additionally, we obtained
information on the numbers and types of missions performed by UAS, as well
as the methods used by the services to evaluate UAS performance in
accomplishing those missions. To assess the reliability and types of
missions provided to us by DOD, we (1) interviewed knowledgeable officials
about the processes for collecting and maintaining the data and (2)
reviewed the data for completeness and reasonableness by comparing it to
other sources of information. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. DOD and service
officials also provided specific examples of operational successes and
emerging challenges. We discussed actions taken and processes used by DOD
and service officials and the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System to address identified challenges. We also held
discussions with Joint Staff officials to discuss their efforts to address
joint UAS issues via the Tiger Team.

The specific military activities that we visited and/or obtained written
responses to questions from include the following:

o 	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) and its Joint UAS Planning Task Force; Washington, D.C.;

o  Headquarters, Department of the Army; Washington, D.C.;

o  U.S. Army Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama;

o  U.S. Marine Corps, Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia;

Appendix I
Scope and Methodology

o 	U.S. Navy Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Station Patuxent River,
Maryland;

o 	U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command Directorate of Requirements, Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia;

o 	U.S Air Force, Air Force Material Command, Wright Patterson Air Force
Base Dayton, Ohio;

o  U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia;

o  U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida;

o 	U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa,
Florida;

o  U.S. Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., and

o  U.S Strategic Command, Omaha, Nebraska.

We also obtained documents describing the mission and planned operations
of the new Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Center of Excellence and Joint
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overarching Integrated Process Team.

To assess the soundness of DOD's approach to evaluating UAS operational
performance, we interviewed DOD and service officials to discuss the
criteria and processes used to assess performance. We also obtained and
reviewed DOD and Army UAS Operations Assessments to identify issues and
concerns regarding performance. Additionally, we held discussions with
U.S. Strategic Command officials to obtain information on the status of
their efforts to establish measures for assessing joint UAS performance.
We also held discussions with service officials to determine the extent to
which they are required to capture information on the use and performance
of UAS in their existing lessons-learned systems. Finally, we obtained and
reviewed DOD and service specific UAS or unmanned aerial vehicle roadmaps.

We performed our work from July 2004 to October 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                  Appendix II

                    Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III

                     GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619

Acknowledgments	In addition to the person named above, Brian J. Lepore,
Assistant Director; Harry E. Taylor, Jr.; Patricia F. Albritton; Jeanett
H. Reid; Elisha T. Matvay; Robert B. Brown; Cheryl A. Weissman; Ron La Due
Lake; and Kenneth E. Patton also made major contributions to this report.

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD-97138.
Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy Fleet
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short-Range System Still in
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
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Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
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