Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and 
Better Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest
in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons (26-MAY-06, GAO-06-475).	 
                                                                 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to
approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, 
including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to  
thwart an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air	 
carrier received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To	 
address concerns regarding reports of injuries after the use of  
these devices and to ensure that the impacts of these devices	 
onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report answers  
the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government	 
conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices
onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in  
place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier	 
requests to deploy these devices onboard commercial aircraft?	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-475 					        
    ACCNO:   A54779						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and	      
Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed If Air	 
Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons	 
     DATE:   05/26/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft safety					 
	     Airline security					 
	     Aviation security					 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Security policies					 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Weapons						 

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GAO-06-475

     

     * Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects
     * The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the
     * Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance C
     * The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Furth
     * A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Ca
     * TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Crit
     * TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and K
     * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls
Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal
Weapons

GAO-06-475

Contents

Letter 1

Scope and Methodology 2
Results in Brief 4
Background 7
Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the
Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board
Commercial Aircraft 11
TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and
Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices 15
Conclusions 19
Recommendations for Executive Action 20
Agency Comments 21
Appendix I TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-Lethal
Weapons requests 23
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 25
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28

Figure

Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD) 8

Abbreviations

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

EMDD electro-muscular disruption device

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FFDO Federal Flight Deck Officer

LTL less-than-lethal

NIJ National Institute of Justice

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSL Transportation Security Laboratory

TSNM Transportation Sector Network Management

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

May 26, 2006

The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve
air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including
electric stun devices1 on board commercial aircraft for the purposes of
thwarting an attack.2 Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September
2001, two domestic and one foreign air carrier requested approval to
deploy electric stun devices on board their commercial aircraft. The two
domestic air carriers sought approval to deploy these devices for flight
deck crew (the pilot and others within the cockpit) but after
approximately 18 months without a disposition from TSA, primarily citing
confusion with the review process chose to no longer pursue their
requests. The foreign air carrier, which sought approval to deploy the
devices on international flights to the United States for use by
government law enforcement officers and specially trained flight
attendants, also experienced extended delays before ultimately receiving
approval in December 2004 to deploy electric stun devices in its passenger
cabins.3 According to air carrier officials we spoke to, since the
establishment of additional security measures such as an expansion of the
Federal Air Marshal Service,4 hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent
passenger and baggage screening, and particularly initiation of the
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program,5 air carrier interest in
deploying electric stun devices to enhance security has diminished.
Notwithstanding the current lack of demonstrated interest, it is possible
that demand among air carriers to deploy these devices could resume in the
future.

1 Less-than-lethal weapons have been developed to provide law enforcement,
corrections, and military personnel with an alternative to lethal force.
Weapons of this type include, among others, chemical, electromuscular
inhibitor devices (more commonly known as electric stun devices), and
impact projectiles. They are designed to temporarily incapacitate,
confuse, delay, and restrain an adversary in a variety of situations.
Less-than-lethal weapons are most often used when, (1) lethal force is not
appropriate; (2) lethal force is justified but less force may subdue an
aggressor; or (3) lethal force is justified but its use could cause
collateral effects, such as injury to bystanders or life threatening
damage to property and environment. By comparing the environment on board
an aircraft with the attributes of various less-than-lethal weapons, the
National Institute of Justice and TSA concluded that electric stun devices
showed the most promise and were the only acceptable less-than-lethal
weapon for use on commercial aircraft. Therefore, this report focuses on
the use of electric stun devices.

2 See, e.g., Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,
S: 126(b), 115 Stat. 597, 632 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. S:
44903(i)). See also, e.g., 49 C.F.R. Pt. 1546.

Due in part to recent reports regarding injuries after the use of electric
stun devices and the lack of regulations governing their general use, the
House Subcommittee on Aviation wants to ensure that the impacts of using
electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft have been fully
evaluated. Given this concern, this report addresses the following
questions:

           o  What analysis has the federal government conducted to assess
           the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board
           commercial aircraft?

           o  What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and
           timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun
           devices on board commercial aircraft?

           To determine what analysis the federal government had conducted to
           assess the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on
           board commercial aircraft, we conducted a literature search to
           identify the extent of past research that had been done by various
           federal agencies on the safety and effectiveness of deploying
           these devices on board commercial aircraft. We also conducted a
           literature search of existing studies addressing the health
           effects of these devices. We currently have a separate ongoing
           engagement that is evaluating the extent to which claims regarding
           the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices are
           supported by currently available scientific data. The results of
           our literature searches were limited because no federal studies or
           reviews examining the use of electric stun devices on board
           commercial aircraft have been published since May 2003, and no
           studies have been published examining the potential health effects
           of these devices on individuals who are on board commercial
           aircraft. We examined reviews produced by the Department of
           Justice's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and by Department of
           Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Laboratory
           (TSL)6 as well as a TSA report to Congress regarding the use of
           less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, on
           board commercial aircraft and reviewed the methodologies employed
           and the conclusions drawn. We also examined Federal Aviation
           Administration (FAA) reviews of test data submitted by a
           commercial air carrier and spoke to the individual at FAA who
           produced those reviews.

           To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform
           and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun
           devices on board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA's handling
           of these requests and compared this process to our Standards for
           Internal Control in the Federal Government.7 Specifically, to
           determine how TSA ensures uniform and timely review of air carrier
           requests, we interviewed cognizant TSA officials regarding their
           processing of past requests and reviewed related documentation.
           Our ability to obtain complete information at TSA was limited
           because, according to TSA officials, individuals involved in
           reviewing past requests from air carriers were no longer with the
           agency and only limited documentation of the review process or
           supporting materials was retained by TSA. However, we were able to
           obtain copies of some TSA correspondence and other documents
           regarding the review process from private sector officials
           involved in the requests. We interviewed officials from FAA
           regarding their role and activities in reviewing requests from
           commercial air carriers wishing to deploy less-than-lethal
           weapons. We also interviewed officials from a nonprobability
           sample of eight domestic air carriers selected based on number of
           flights per year,8 two of which had requested permission from TSA
           to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft. Because
           this is a nonprobability sample, results of these interviews
           cannot be generalized to the universe of air carriers. We also
           interviewed officials from the one foreign air carrier that had
           requested and received permission to deploy these devices on their
           aircraft. In instances where air carriers had requested approval
           to deploy these devices, we asked them to assess their experience
           with TSA regarding any guidance provided and responsiveness to
           their requests. We also interviewed officials from five domestic
           air industry associations and obtained the views of two foreign
           air carrier associations to determine their views on the general
           efficacy of using electric stun devices on commercial aircraft.9

           We conducted our work between June 2005 and April 2006 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                               Results in Brief
		   
		   The Transportation Security Administration, DHS Transportation
           Security Laboratory, Federal Aviation Administration, and the
           National Institute of Justice have conducted reviews addressing
           the effect of electric stun devices on aircraft avionics. The TSA
           and TSL reviews also addressed the potential security
           effectiveness of these devices. In addition, various federal and
           other organizations have conducted reviews addressing the health
           effects of electric stun devices on individuals. However, no
           studies of health effects have been conducted in an in-flight
           environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although
           electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to
           subdue suspects, including individuals who may fall into certain
           potentially susceptible populations, there is no independent
           research to indicate whether these electric stun devices would be
           either safe or unsafe. However, some susceptible populations such
           as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of alcohol
           and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes.
           NIJ recommended that study of these issues be conducted and has
           initiated several projects in this area. The TSL and the FAA each
           reviewed a study conducted in February 2002 by an air carrier
           regarding the effect of one model of electric stun device on
           aircraft avionics and concurred with the carrier's conclusion that
           the 50,000 volt device tested would be unlikely to harm aircraft
           avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the results for
           the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect how other
           brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under
           similar circumstances. For example, according to the TSL review,
           it is likely that devices exceeding 100,000 volts would not be
           suitable for use on aircraft. In April 2002, the NIJ concluded
           that the use of electric stun devices in accordance with
           appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for
           flight deck crews to thwart an attack.10 Similarly, in a report to
           Congress issued in May 2003, which TSA officials told us consisted
           primarily of the results of a literature search, TSA generally
           concurred with NIJ's conclusion but further concluded that
           commercial aviation security may be enhanced through deployment of
           these devices. Although both the TSA and the NIJ reports provided
           a conceptual framework for determining the suitability of electric
           stun devices in an aircraft environment, neither review included
           in-flight testing or other empirical analysis to conclude that
           electric stun devices offered additional security. In its report,
           NIJ also concluded that electric stun devices should not be
           deployed in aircraft until extensive testing had been completed in
           realistic settings and on various types of aircraft. TSA's current
           position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft
           environment, is necessary to determine if these devices can be
           used safely and effectively.

           TSA lacks key internal controls, prescribed in our Standards for
           Internal Control in the Federal Government, to help ensure
           uniformity in decision making and a clear and transparent process
           for reviewing requests to deploy electric stun devices on board
           commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA

           o  lacks a well-defined organizational area or individual with
           responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests,

           o  has not established formal criteria for decision making to
           approve requests and has not clearly communicated criteria to
           external stakeholders, and

           o  maintains little or no documentation of its decision making and
           activities to account for its handling of past requests to deploy
           electric stun devices.

           Without clearly defined and communicated approval criteria and
           organizational point of contact, TSA cannot have reasonable
           assurance that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor
           can it provide a clear and transparent request and approval
           process for air carriers. The lack of a formal system of record
           keeping also prevents TSA management from ensuring consistency in
           decision making and diminishes TSA's ability to be accountable to
           Congress and other stakeholders. TSA officials were not able to
           tell us specifically why these controls were not in place when
           prior applications were being reviewed. According to TSA, air
           carriers have not expressed an interest in deploying electric stun
           devices on board their aircraft since October 2004, and TSA does
           not currently anticipate additional air carrier requests. However,
           TSA stated that it would implement these internal controls for
           future requests that may come in from air carriers.

           In order to help ensure that TSA's review and approval process for
           the use of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
           devices, is responsive, uniform, accountable, and serves the
           public interest, we are recommending that the Secretary of
           Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to ensure
           that there are reliable studies and research supporting the use of
           less-than-lethal devices on commercial aircraft should air carrier
           interest in deploying these devices resume. Also, in order to help
           ensure consistency in decision making and responsiveness to air
           carriers, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland
           Security direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to implement key
           internal controls related to TSA's handling of requests for the
           use of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices,
           on board commercial aircraft. In commenting on this report, TSA
           agreed with our findings and recommendations and has begun to
           establish the framework for a review process that will implement
           internal controls to more effectively govern the receipt and
           review of any future requests by air carriers to deploy LTL
           weapons on board their aircraft.

                                    Background
		   
		   According to NIJ-the research, development, and evaluation agency
           within DOJ-less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
           devices, are designed to incapacitate, confuse, delay, or restrain
           an adversary in a variety of situations. Less-than-lethal weapons
           can be grouped into six general categories: electric stun,
           chemical, impact projectile, physical restraint, light, and
           acoustic. Preliminary reviews conducted by NIJ and TSL identified
           that of the six different less-than-lethal weapon categories,
           electric stun devices showed the most promise for use on board
           commercial aircraft.

           There are two types of electric stun devices that have potential
           use in commercial aircraft according to a May 2003 TSA report. The
           first is a handheld device with two probes that, when pressed
           against the skin or clothing of an attacker and activated by the
           operator, produces a high (50,000) voltage but low current
           discharge. When contact is made between the attacker and the
           activated device, a circuit is completed, and the subject receives
           a debilitating shock. The second type of electric stun device is
           technically referred to as an electro-muscular disruption device
           (EMDD). An EMDD fires two barbs connected to trailing wires that
           lead back to the operator. When the barbs penetrate the subject's
           skin or clothing, an electrical circuit is completed, and an
           electrical discharge, similar to the direct contact device
           discharge, automatically results causing an immediate loss of the
           person's neuromuscular control and the ability to perform
           coordinated action for the duration of the impulse. This barb type
           EMDD device, shown in figure 1, is similar to the type considered
           for use by air carriers and is hereafter referred to in this
           report as an electric stun device.

           Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD)

           TSA may provide air carriers operating to, from, or within the
           United States with authorization to use less-than-lethal weapons,
           including electric stun devices, on board their aircraft subject
           to legal and regulatory considerations. For example, TSA must
           follow the requirements of 49 U.S.C. S: 44903(i) before granting
           an air carrier request to arm members of the flight deck crew with
           electric stun devices.11 Similarly, air carriers that request
           permission to allow the use of such devices by persons other than
           flight deck crew (such as government law enforcement officers and
           flight attendants-persons situated outside of the cockpit), as was
           the case with the foreign air carrier, must seek an amendment to
           its TSA-approved security program.12 In the case of a foreign air
           carrier, TSA may approve such an amendment if it finds that the
           security program, as amended, continues to provide a level of
           protection similar to the level provided by U.S. air carriers
           servicing the same airports.13

           FAA also plays a collateral role in the determination of whether
           electric stun devices can be deployed on board commercial
           aircraft.14 FAA has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the
           safe operation of aircraft within the United States.15 According
           to FAA officials, FAA certifies the airworthiness of all domestic
           aircraft before they are put into service and performs periodic
           safety inspections as part of FAA's safety oversight
           responsibilities. FAA's airworthiness certifications, however,
           would not address the use of electric stun devices because,
           according to FAA, such devices fall within the category of
           portable electronic devices that are not considered part of the
           aircraft itself. FAA's regulations generally require the operator
           of the aircraft to determine whether a portable electronic device
           will interfere with the safe operation of the aircraft before
           allowing its operation on board.16 Consequently, FAA does not
           formally approve the use of portable electronic devices and would
           not for electric stun devices.17 According to FAA officials, if
           asked by an air carrier and resources permitting, the agency could
           render a technical opinion on the safety of such devices, but it
           is up to the air carrier to prove that the device will not
           interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause catastrophic failure to
           the avionics of the aircraft. If FAA's review of the air carrier's
           testing indicates that these devices may have some adverse affect
           on aircraft avionics, FAA would bring it to the air carrier's
           attention. According to FAA officials, the FAA does not issue any
           documentation of approval or certification regarding the use of
           portable electronic devices on aircraft. In particular, FAA
           officials told us that it would not be appropriate for the agency
           to provide TSA written approval for the use of any type of
           portable electric devices, including less-than-lethal devices.
           Further, according to FAA officials, the agency has no specific
           safety standard for less-than-lethal devices. Officials added that
           for any electric stun devices actually deployed on commercial
           aircraft, FAA would consider any safety issues as part of its
           normal oversight inspections.

           Officials from each of the eight domestic air carriers we
           interviewed stated that after the terrorist attacks of September
           2001, they reassessed their security procedures in an effort to
           upgrade their security posture. Among the security initiatives
           each air carrier considered, was arming pilots with electric stun
           devices. Representatives from the air carriers had mixed views on
           whether electric stun devices or firearms would be their preferred
           security measure within the cockpit. However, none of the domestic
           air carrier officials we interviewed said their airlines had
           considered having electric stun devices available for use by
           flight attendants in the cabin, primarily because they believed
           carrying these devices is incompatible with flight attendants'
           customer-service role. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of
           September 2001, two domestic air carriers sought TSA approval to
           allow flight-deck crews to use these devices. In addition, one
           foreign air carrier made two separate requests and ultimately
           received TSA approval in 2004 to deploy electric stun devices to
           government law enforcement officers and specially trained flight
           attendants situated in the passenger cabin of its aircraft.

           Domestic air carrier trade associations we interviewed generally
           favored the use of firearms over electric stun devices on the
           flight deck due to perceived vulnerabilities of the electric stun
           devices against multiple attackers as well as the temporary effect
           that the device may have. Similarly, the associations we
           interviewed expressed concerns about possible failures of the
           devices at critical times and simple countermeasures that could be
           used to limit their effectiveness. Since the establishment of
           additional security measures after the terrorist attacks of
           September 2001, such as an expanded Federal Air Marshal Service,
           hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and baggage
           screening, and particularly the voluntary arming of pilots through
           the FFDO program, air carrier interest in deploying electric stun
           devices to enhance security has diminished. Officials from some
           air carriers we spoke to stated that the high cost of deployment
           of electric stun devices as well as liability concerns, compared
           to the liability relief afforded through the FFDO program, made
           the use of electric stun devices relatively less attractive.18
           According to the Association of European Airlines, it is its
           general position that the presence of weapons on board aircraft,
           be they lethal or nonlethal, be they on the flight deck or in the
           passenger cabin, should be prohibited. Similarly, the Association
           of Asian Pacific Airlines said its member airlines are generally
           adamant about not arming the cabin crew with any weapon on board
           an aircraft and are more in favor of ground-based security
           approaches.

           The federal government has conducted limited reviews addressing
           the effect of electric stun devices on individuals or aircraft
           avionics and on their security effectiveness, none of which was
           supported by empirical analysis or testing in an aircraft
           environment. Although various federal and other organizations have
           reviewed the health effects that electric stun devices have on
           individuals, studies have not been conducted in an in-flight
           environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, there is no
           independent research to indicate whether these electric stun
           devices would be either safe or unsafe regarding certain
           potentially susceptible populations. TSL and FAA each reviewed a
           study conducted by an air carrier regarding the effect of one
           model of electric stun device on aircraft avionics and concurred
           with its conclusion that the device tested would be unlikely to
           harm aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that
           the results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily
           reflect how other brands and models of electric stun devices may
           perform under similar circumstances. NIJ concluded that the use of
           these devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training
           may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an
           attack. Similarly, in a report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA
           generally concurred with NIJ's conclusion and further concluded
           that commercial aviation security may be enhanced through
           deployment of these devices. However, it concluded that electric
           stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until extensive
           testing has been completed in realistic settings and on various
           types of aircraft.

           Federal agencies and other organizations have conducted reviews
           addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on
           individuals. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although
           electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to
           subdue suspects, including individuals who may fall into certain
           potentially susceptible populations, there is no independent
           research to indicate whether these electric stun devices would be
           either safe or unsafe. However, some susceptible populations such
           as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of alcohol
           and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes.
           NIJ recommended that study of these issues be conducted and has
           initiated several projects in this area.

           The federal government has conducted limited analysis to determine
           if electric stun devices would adversely affect aircraft avionics.
           In April 2002, FAA, in its role of ensuring the safe operation of
           aircraft, within the United States, reviewed test data submitted
           by a domestic air carrier, regarding one specific electric stun
           device and its potential effect on aircraft avionic systems.19 FAA
           officials told us that they did not publish any results of this
           preliminary review but did communicate to TSA that based on the
           air carriers' test results; it did not believe the particular
           device tested would have an adverse affect on aircraft avionics.
           FAA officials added that if electric stun devices were actually
           deployed on commercial aircraft, FAA would consider any safety
           issues as part of its normal oversight inspections. Similarly, TSL
           published a review of the same test data in September 2002. TSL's
           review focused on technical and airworthiness factors including
           potential levels of electromagnetic interference from discharging
           the electric stun device. Although FAA and TSL have not performed
           any in-flight testing of their own, both concurred with the
           conclusion of the air carrier study that the one type of 50,000
           volt electric stun device tested would be unlikely to harm
           aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the
           results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily
           reflect how other brands and models of electric stun devices may
           perform under similar circumstances. For example, according to the
           TSL review, it is likely that devices exceeding 100,000 volts
           would be unsuitable for use on aircraft.

           In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun
           devices, used in accordance with appropriate policies and
           training, may have the potential to allow flight deck crews to
           thwart an attack while an aircraft is in flight-i.e. interrupt an
           attack, control an aggressor, or delay an attack while the flight
           crew safely lands the aircraft. However, the report did not
           include any empirical testing of electric stun devices in an
           aircraft setting to demonstrate how they would enhance security.
           Rather, information for its report was derived by reviewing
           existing information on electric stun devices as well as meeting
           with experts from the aviation industry and persons experienced in
           the design and use of less-than-lethal technology in settings
           other than aircraft. To determine whether electric stun devices
           have the potential to enhance aviation security, NIJ first
           identified certain desirable characteristics in less-than-lethal
           weapons given the environment that exists in an aircraft.
           Specifically, in commercial aircraft (1) sensitive critical flight
           instruments are in continual use; and (2) passenger and crew
           spaces are crowded and confined. According to NIJ, given this
           environment, less-than-lethal weapons that would be used to thwart
           attacks on board commercial aircraft should exhibit the following
           characteristics

           o  immediately incapacitate an aggressor;
           o  have quickly reversible and controllable effects;
           o  be usable in a confined space;
           o  be simple to operate;
           o  have multishot capability; and
           o  not damage critical avionics (navigational, etc.).

           Next, NIJ compared various categories of less-than-lethal weapons,
           including electric stun devices, against these criteria. It
           concluded that electric stun devices showed the most promise for
           use by flight deck crews.

           TSL, in a report issued in September 2002, concurred with NIJ's
           earlier findings and similarly concluded that less-than-lethal
           weapons may provide an additional layer of security and deterrence
           in the aviation environment. However, the report focused primarily
           on the effects on airworthiness and technical issues associated
           with electric stun devices. References in the TSL report regarding
           the security benefits associated with these weapons were based
           primarily on work previously conducted by NIJ.

           In a separate report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA concluded
           that commercial aviation security could be enhanced through the
           deployment of electric stun devices. Although this report provided
           a conceptual framework for evaluating the suitability of different
           categories of less-than-lethal weapons for use in an aircraft
           environment, like the NIJ study, no weapons were tested against
           various threat scenarios including air piracy threats. TSA
           officials told us that this report was hurriedly put together to
           meet a congressional mandate and that it relied primarily on the
           earlier NIJ study and a review of other literature. When asked
           about their current position regarding the use of electric stun
           devices on board aircraft, TSA officials told us that empirical
           data and operational case studies, particularly in the aircraft
           environment, would be necessary to determine whether these devices
           can be deployed safely, effectively, and in a tactically
           reasonable manner.

           Similar to NIJ, TSA, to conduct its review, assessed the
           characteristics of various categories of less-than-lethal
           weapons-including electric stun devices, chemical (conventional),
           chemical (sedative), impact projectile, physical restraint, light,
           and acoustic and malodorous weapons-against a predetermined set of
           criteria to determine their suitability for use in a commercial
           aircraft environment. These criteria covered the following aspects
           related to the devices

           o  currently used in law enforcement;
           o  potential to cause collateral damage;
           o  potential to cause catastrophic aircraft failure;
           o  how quickly effects occur;
           o  reversibility of effects;
           o  potential for unintended consequences or other deployment
           concerns; and
           o  relative effectiveness to deter or defeat threats.

           After comparing each category of less-than-lethal weapon to the
           criteria, like NIJ, TSA concluded that only electric stun devices
           may be suitable for aircraft deployment.

           In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that each type of
           less-than-lethal weapon poses either safety or effectiveness
           issues that should be tested further in multiple aircraft settings
           before any deployment. It also concluded that systematic testing
           of the weapons' effects on critical aircraft avionics is essential
           to ensure they will not damage or disable flight systems. Further,
           the report noted that the most important unknown with these
           devices is the potential effect of a high-voltage electrical
           discharge on aircraft avionics. Therefore, NIJ concluded that
           electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until
           extensive testing has been completed in realistic settings and on
           various types of aircraft.

           TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing
           requests from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on
           board their aircraft that include (1) well defined key areas of
           authority and responsibility, (2) clearly communicated information
           regarding decision-making criteria to TSA decision makers and
           their external stakeholders, and (3) a records system to account
           for handling of requests and supporting documentation-three key
           internal controls called for by the Standards for Internal Control
           in the Federal Government. TSA officials were not able to tell us
           specifically why these controls were not in place when prior
           applications were being reviewed. TSA officials stated that they
           currently do not plan to establish these controls because air
           carriers have not expressed an interest to TSA in deploying these
           devices since October 2004, and officials do not anticipate
           additional air carrier requests.

           TSA does not have a well-defined organizational area or individual
           with responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests from air
           carriers interested in requesting approval to deploy electric stun
           devices on board their aircraft to enhance security. Internal
           control standards in the federal government state that to have an
           effective control environment it is important for agencies to
           clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility.
           Officials from all three air carriers that had submitted requests
           to TSA to deploy electric stun devices on board commercial
           aircraft told us that they had experienced confusion regarding the
           status and disposition of their requests and were unaware to whom
           they should have directed inquiries. For example, an official from
           one domestic air carrier stated that it was in contact with
           multiple TSA personnel but were not sure which individual was in
           charge of reviewing electric stun device requests or whether the
           information it received from TSA was accurate and authoritative.
           We also noted during our review of TSA documentation that in at
           least one instance, a TSA official requested information from an
           air carrier that had previously been received by the agency.

           As the National Strategy for Homeland Security indicates and as we
           have reported in previous work, securing the nation requires
           effective partnerships with the private sector.20 Air carriers
           that seek to enhance security measures on board their aircraft
           offer an opportunity for such partnership. However, without a
           clearly defined organizational area or individual within TSA to
           review requests and communicate effectively with the requesting
           air carrier officials, TSA cannot be a responsive and effective
           partner.

           According to TSA officials, there is currently no organizational
           area or individual responsible for receipt or review of requests
           from air carriers that may wish to deploy electric stun devices on
           board their aircraft because of the lack of demonstrated interest
           from air carriers.

           TSA has not established and communicated a formalized set of
           criteria to evaluate air carriers' requests to deploy electric
           stun devices as a security measure on board their aircraft.
           Internal control standards in the federal government state that
           for a federal agency or private sector entity to run and control
           its operations effectively, it must have relevant, reliable, and
           timely communications relating to internal as well as external
           events. Although TSA received requests from three air carriers to
           deploy these devices, it did not have criteria established within
           the agency and communicated to air carriers that would (1) help
           ensure uniform decision making and (2) make requirements for
           approval clear to all parties.

           The lack of established and well-communicated criteria resulted in
           inefficient handling of requests that made the process more
           difficult for the air carriers. In particular, TSA made multiple
           requests for nearly a year and a half for information from the two
           domestic air carriers that requested permission to deploy electric
           stun devices, without clearly communicating what would be required
           for approving their requests or clearly explaining why additional
           information was being requested. Ultimately, one domestic air
           carrier withdrew its request to use electric stun devices in June
           2003, primarily citing confusion over TSA's protracted approval
           process. The other domestic air carrier that had requested
           permission to deploy the devices did not formally withdraw its
           request, but also made the decision in June 2003 not to further
           pursue the initiative. One of these air carriers also cited
           mitigating security measures such as the FFDO program and
           reinforced cockpit doors that had been implemented as an
           additional reason why it did not continue pursuing the deployment
           of electric stun devices and also the additional costs of
           implementing a less-than-lethal weapons program.

           In its May 2003 report to Congress, TSA proposed a number of key
           criteria for evaluating requests from air carriers to deploy
           less-than-lethal devices on board their aircraft. Among these
           criteria was the need for (1) an appropriate training regimen, (2)
           procedures of use, and (3) assurance from the air carriers that
           the devices would provide passenger safety. However, these
           criteria were not formally established for use by TSA decision
           makers when evaluating air carrier requests nor communicated to
           air carriers interested in requesting permission to use these
           devices. We have included a list of these proposed criteria in
           appendix I of this report. In addition to making the request
           process consistent and clear, establishing criteria can help the
           agency ensure that any approvals for the use of electric stun
           devices on board commercial aircraft are compatible with TSA's
           mission to ensure the security of the nation's transportation
           system and the traveling public. For example, in the case of
           criteria governing training, we have previously reported that any
           civilian electric-stun-device training curriculum should have a
           very explicit use-of-force policy. Unlike police officers,
           civilians are not generally experienced in deciding whether the
           use of force is justified and, if so, to what extent. Therefore,
           it should be the goal of any training curricula for persons
           authorized to utilize electric stun devices, such as aircraft
           flight deck or cabin crew members, to involve as many scenarios as
           possible so that the trainee understands what level of force is
           appropriate.21

           Although TSA has no supporting documentation of having applied the
           criteria proposed in its 2003 report to requests submitted by
           commercial air carriers, according to agency officials, TSA took
           into account these considerations when ultimately approving the
           foreign air carrier request in December 2004. TSA officials
           further told us that any additional requests would be evaluated on
           a case-by-case basis using similar considerations. However,
           without establishing and clearly communicating criteria and
           information needs both internally and externally, TSA cannot have
           reasonable assurance that its decision making will be uniform,
           consistent, compatible with its mission and clear and transparent
           for air carriers seeking approval to deploy these devices. TSA
           officials stated that they still consider the criteria contained
           in the May 2003 report to the Congress appropriate and current for
           use in handling any requests by air carriers to implement a
           less-than-lethal weapons program.

           TSA officials said that they could not fully explain the delays in
           addressing the early requests from the air carriers because the
           persons involved with the initial request reviews are no longer
           with the agency. Officials stated that at the time of the initial
           requests, there was a high rate of turnover and a rapid rate of
           change associated with the formation of TSA as a new agency.
           Officials further stated that the agency was not fully ready to
           address requests to deploy electric stun devices before the time
           the foreign air carrier request was reviewed in 2004. Even at that
           point, TSA officials said that they planned to review each
           application that was received on a case-by-case basis since they
           did not expect a high demand from air carriers to deploy these
           devices. According to TSA officials, since 2004, no other carriers
           have expressed an interest in electric stun devices as a security
           measure. TSA officials told us that because of this lack of
           interest, no program requirements or criteria were ever formalized
           regarding the use of electric stun devices on commercial aircraft;
           however, if future requests are received, TSA would take steps to
           formalize these criteria into specific guidelines for the
           application review process.

           We asked TSA officials how they planned to address any potential
           future requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-lethal
           weapons including electric stun devices on board their aircraft.
           They stated that the TSA Transportation Sector Network Management
           (TSNM) Airlines office would take the lead for any requests from
           domestic air carriers. For foreign air carriers, TSNM's
           International Division will take the lead. Further, a working
           evaluation group, consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service,
           Office of Chief Counsel, and other program offices at the
           discretion of the administrator will be involved in the review
           process. According to TSA, this group will provide their
           respective expertise and recommendations to the lead office. Each
           lead office will be responsible for resolving differences, keeping
           diligent records of the review process, the ultimate approval or
           disapproval decision, and responding to the requesting air
           carriers in a timely manner.

           For the three requests submitted, TSA did not record (1) the
           rationale for and outcome of its decision making regarding
           requests to deploy electric stun devices or (2) the information
           and documentation exchanged between the agency and air carriers.
           According to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
           Government, agency activities should be promptly recorded to
           maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling
           operations and making decisions. This applies to the entire
           process, from initiation and authorization through final
           classification. Moreover, to help ensure accountability and
           internal oversight, this documentation should be readily available
           for examination by TSA management, Congress, and other appropriate
           external parties. Although, in its 2003 report to Congress, TSA
           stated that its Office of Aviation Operations would maintain a
           system of records for requests to deploy electric stun devices,
           few records were kept. Agency officials told us that they
           maintained only limited documentation regarding the foreign air
           carrier's request and maintained no documentation regarding the
           receipt and review of request materials submitted by the two
           domestic air carriers. Without a system of documentation, TSA
           management will not be able to review decisions to help ensure
           consistency and responsiveness to air carriers making requests,
           nor will TSA be able to readily make documentation available for
           examination by Congress and other appropriate external parties. As
           we noted above, TSA told us that, in the future, it plans to keep
           diligent records of the review process and ultimate approval or
           disapproval decisions for all requests from air carriers.

                                 Conclusions
		   
		   Due primarily to other enhancements in aviation security since
           2001, there appears to be no demonstrated interest on the part of
           air carriers to introduce less-than-lethal weapons, including
           electric stun devices, on their aircraft. However, should interest
           in such measures resume, federal government reviews to date have
           identified areas in need of further study before these devices are
           deployed on board commercial aircraft. In particular, it would be
           important for TSA to know the appropriateness of the devices in an
           aircraft environment, effects on the safe operation of the
           aircraft, effects on passenger safety, and how such devices would
           enhance security.

           Also, should interest in using less-than-lethal devices on
           aircraft resume, TSA would not be in the best position to address
           new requests in an efficient and effective manner. Without
           internal controls to govern its process for receiving and
           reviewing requests from air carriers, TSA would lack assurance
           that its decision making is appropriate and necessary and serves
           the public interest. Specifically, without a well-defined
           organizational area or individual with responsibility for
           receiving and reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a responsive and
           effective partner with private sector air carriers. In addition,
           it will not be able to provide a clear and transparent request
           process for air carriers. Without established and clearly
           communicated information regarding decision-making criteria,
           within TSA and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable
           assurance that its decision making will be uniform, consistent,
           and compatible with its mission. Although TSA outlined criteria in
           a 2003 Report to Congress for use in examining requests from air
           carriers, the agency never formalized any criteria for use by
           decision makers, nor did it communicate clear criteria to air
           carriers making requests for approval. Finally, without
           documentation of key activities and decisions related to
           less-than-lethal device requests, TSA cannot ensure accountability
           in handling such requests and the availability of documentation
           for examination by Congress and other external parties.

                    Recommendations for Executive Action

           In order to help ensure TSA's review and approval process for the
           use of any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
           devices, is responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied
           and serves the public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of
           Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation
           Security Administration, to take the following two actions, should
           commercial air carrier interest in deploying these devices resume:

           o  Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting
           the use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a
           minimum, address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique
           aircraft environment, including passenger safety, how the use of
           these devices would enhance security, and the effects of these
           devices on the safe operation of the aircraft.

           o  Establish appropriate internal controls to govern air carriers'
           requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including electric
           stun devices on board their aircraft, including (1) clearly
           defining the organizational area or individual within TSA with the
           authority and responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests;
           (2) establishing a records system to help ensure accountability;
           and (3) formalizing and clearly communicating criteria for
           approving requests both within the responsible area of TSA and to
           interested air carriers.
		   
      		                    Agency Comments

           We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, FAA and
           NIJ. FAA and NIJ provided technical comments, which have been
           incorporated in this report where appropriate. We received written
           comments from DHS on May 5, 2006. DHS agreed with our report and
           recommendations stating that our findings and recommendations will
           aid in the development of a more effective and efficient review
           process if interest by air carriers in less-than-lethal (LTL)
           weapons resumes at a future date. According to DHS, since our
           review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for a review
           process if additional applications for LTL weapons are received.
           For future LTL weapons applications, the Transportation Sector
           Network Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM
           International Division will take the lead for domestic and
           international applications respectively. An evaluation working
           group, consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of
           Chief Counsel, and other program offices, at the discretion of the
           administrator, will be involved in the review process. This group
           will provide their respective expertise and recommendations, with
           the lead office responsible for ensuring progress, resolving
           differences, and keeping diligent records of the review and
           ultimate approval or disapproval. The full text of DHS's comments
           is included as appendix II.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its
           contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
           until 18 days from the date of this report. At that time, we will
           send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security;
           the Director, Office Management and Budget; and any other
           interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
           upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
           charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

           If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it
           further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at
           [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
           Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
           report. See appendix III for a list of major contributors to this
           report.

           Sincerely yours,

           Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice

           o  Separate requests-There must be a separate request
           (application) for each type of LTL device that is proposed for
           use.

           o  Method of deployment must be articulated-Where and how will the
           LTL device be transported, utilized, and stored aboard aircraft.

           o  Aircrew selection-What are the air carrier's procedures to
           ensure that an unqualified crew member does not obtain access to
           the LTL devices? This would include crew members identified in
           need of anger management assistance.

           o  Well-documented incoming information-Incoming correspondence
           must be well documented and articulate clearly why a device that
           is being submitted for approval. The information contained must,
           at the very least, provide evidence that the product is known to
           the industry, with viable and recent studies and research
           supporting its use in the aircraft environment and that the
           product meets safety standards set by the Federal Aviation
           Administration.

           o  Threshold of protection-The correspondence must contain
           language that enumerates how an LTL device meets the threshold of
           protection for the cockpit, aircraft and passenger safety. It must
           include any completed studies on LTL devices and their use in the
           cockpit and cabin of the aircraft, the appropriateness for their
           usage in this unique environment and how it would not produce
           catastrophic failure of the aircraft.

           o  Enumerate procedures-The air carrier must clearly state its
           policy and the procedures it will employ, including legal
           considerations and similar issues. The air carrier would
           articulate the escalation/de-escalation for the use of force
           (Common Strategy and DOJ Use of Force Policy). This could include
           awareness of problem, deterrence, avoidance, verbalization, empty
           hand control, intermediate device (LTL device) and any other
           self-defense techniques.

           o  Procedures for the LTL device-The procedures for the use of an
           LTL device must accompany any written request explaining the
           process for use of a product. Details of procedures to ensure that
           any LTL device is not deployed on aircraft destined for
           international venues must be included.

           o  Training regimen-The air carrier must be able to articulate its
           training regimen and the manner in which pilots and/or flight
           attendants have been educated and trained on the requested device
           to be used and re-certification protocols. TSA's Office of
           Training and Quality Performance will review any proposal, make
           recommendations, and in conjunction with Office of Aviation
           Operations, approve training manuals and processes associated with
           initial and re-certification training as a part of the carrier's
           request to employ LTL devices.

           o  Provide documented evidence-The requesting air carrier must
           provide documentary evidence, including testimony about the
           devices by subject matter experts. These should be attached to the
           carrier's proposal.

           o  Provide documentation of FAA approval-A letter from the FAA
           approving the use of an less-than-lethal device based on its
           meeting safety standards imposed by the FAA demonstrating that the
           device will not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause
           catastrophic failure to the avionics of the aircraft.

           (Foregoing is TSA text.)

           Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777

           The following teams and individuals contributed to this report:
           William W. Crocker III, Assistant Director; Robert J. Rivas, J.
           Michael Bollinger, John P. Stradling, and Kathryn E. Godfrey,
           Homeland Security and Justice; David P. Alexander, Applied
           Research & Methodology; and Thomas F. Lombardi, Office of General
           Counsel

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                             Scope and Methodology

3 The foreign air carrier initially requested to deploy these devices on
international flights to the U.S. in March 2002. It subsequently renewed
its request in May 2004. Obtaining TSA authorization to deploy such
devices required the foreign air carrier to amend, and TSA to approve, its
security program. See 49 C.F.R. S: 1546.105.

4 The Federal Air Marshal Service consists of trained and armed civil
aviation security specialists that are deployed on board aircraft to
protect passengers, crew, and aircraft from terrorist activities on both
domestic and international fights.

5 Commercial pilots who volunteer to participate in the Federal Flight
Deck Officers Program are trained and equipped with firearms to protect
the aircraft cockpit. The pilots are deputized as federal flight deck
officers. See 49 U.S.C. S: 44921.

6 The Transportation Security Laboratory was within the Transportation
Security Administration until October 2005 when it was transferred to the
Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.

7 GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

8 Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations are
selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using specific
characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from nonprobability
samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because in a
nonprobability sample some elements of the population being studied have
no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.

9 The domestic trade associations were the Air Line Pilots Association,
Air Transport Association, Association of Flight Attendants, Coalition of
Airline Pilots Associations, and Regional Airline Association. The foreign
airline associations we contacted were Association of European Airlines
and the Association of Asian Pacific Airlines.

10 Section 126(a) of Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
required the National Institute of Justice to assess the range of
less-than-lethal weaponry available for use by a flight deck crew member
to temporarily incapacitate an individual who presents a clear and present
danger to the safety of the aircraft, its passengers, or individuals on
the ground and report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation within 90 days after the date of enactment of the act. See
National Institute of Justice, Less-than-lethal Weaponry for Aircraft
Security (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2002).

                                   Background

11 Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S: 44903(i), TSA may authorize members of a
flight deck crew to carry less-than-lethal weapons if, in accordance with
recommendations of the NIJ, it determines, with approval of the Attorney
General and Secretary of State, that deploying such weapons is
appropriate, necessary, and would effectively serve the public interest in
avoiding air piracy. Upon granting such authority TSA must prescribe rules
for training such crew members in the proper use of the weapons and
guidelines setting forth circumstances under which the weapons may be
used.

12 For example, the foreign air carrier sought to amend its TSA-approved
security program to allow for the use of electric stun devices by armed
law enforcement officers and specially trained flight attendants in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. S: 1546.105.

13 See  49 C.F.R. S: 1546.103(a)(1) (providing that a foreign air carrier
security program is only acceptable to TSA if it provides passengers a
similar level of protection); but see 49 U.S.C. S: 44906 (requiring that
the foreign air carrier security program adhere to identical measures
(emphasis added)).

14 For example, 49 U.S.C. S: 114(f) (13) imposes upon TSA a duty to work
in conjunction with FAA regarding any actions or activities that may
affect aviation safety or air carrier operations. In addition, S:
114(l)(4) prohibits TSA from taking an aviation security action if the FAA
Administrator notifies TSA that the action could adversely affect the
airworthiness of an aircraft. TSA may then only proceed with such action
if the Secretary of Transportation subsequently approves the action.

15 FAA is responsible for ensuring the safe flight of domestic air
carriers, but also has responsibilities, though more limited in scope, for
the safety of foreign air carriers operating to, from, or within the
United States. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 129.

16 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. S: 91.21 (governing the use of portable electronic
devices on board aircraft). FAA regulations do not require air carriers to
submit findings to FAA or obtain the agency's approval before authorizing
the use of a portable electronic device on board the aircraft.

17 Regardless, air carriers must obtain TSA authorization before deploying
or allowing electric stun devices on board aircraft flying to, from, or
within the U.S. See, e.g.,  49 C.F.R. S: 1544.201(d).

 Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the Safety
and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board Commercial Aircraft

18 49 U.S.C. S: 44921(h) provides liability protections to air carriers
and FFDO's from liability arising out of an FFDO's use or failure to use a
firearm.

Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects of Electric Stun
Devices, but NIJ Officials Recommended More Study

The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the Effects of Electric
Stun Devices on Critical Aircraft Avionics

19 The domestic air carrier tested one model of electric stun device in a
number of aircraft models within its fleet and on the ground.

Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial Aviation
Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited

The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Further Research
Regarding Electric Stun Devices

  TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and Timely
           Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices

A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Carriers' Confusion
Regarding the Status of Their Requests

TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Criteria or Guidelines
for Decision Making to Internal or External Stakeholders

20 GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges
Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-05-33
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).

21 GAO, Taser Weapons: Use of Tasers by Selected Law Enforcement Agencies,
GAO-05-464 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). For example, pursuant to any
authorization granted by TSA for an air carrier's flight deck crew members
to carry a less-than-lethal weapon under S: 44903(i), TSA must prescribe
rules requiring that any such crew member be trained in the proper use of
the weapon and guidelines setting forth the circumstances under which such
weapons may be used.

TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and Key Decisions Related
to Electric Stun Device Requests

                                  

                      

                                Agency Comments

Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating
Less-than-Lethal Weapons requests Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of
Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-Lethal Weapons requests

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Appendix
II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

(440425)

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Highlights of GAO-06-475 , a report to the Honorable John L. Mica,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

May 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls
Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal
Weapons

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve
air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including
electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart an attack.
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier received approval to
deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns regarding reports of
injuries after the use of these devices and to ensure that the impacts of
these devices onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report
answers the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government
conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices onboard
commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in place to help
ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy these
devices onboard commercial aircraft?

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that should air carrier interest in deploying these
devices resume, TSA should ensure that there is reliable research
supporting their use in an aircraft environment and that the agency
implement internal controls to govern receipt and review of air carrier
requests. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with our
recommendations.

The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of
electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as other
organizations examined the health effects that electric stun devices have
on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have been conducted in
an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), although electric stun devices have been used successfully
many times to subdue suspects, certain susceptible populations, such as
the elderly and those with a history drug and alcohol abuse, may be at
risk for negative outcomes. In April 2002, NIJ concluded that the use of
electric stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training
may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack but
should not be deployed without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003
report to Congress, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusions. But,
neither review included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these
devices that would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA's
position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment,
is necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and
effectively.

TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision
making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric
stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a
well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and review
requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision making to
approve requests and has not communicated criteria to external
stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its decision
making and activities to account for its handling of past requests.
Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of contact, TSA
cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is uniform and
consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and approval process
for air carriers.

Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD)

Source: GAO; Prince George's County, Md., Sheriff's Office.
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