Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and
Better Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest
in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons (26-MAY-06, GAO-06-475).
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to
approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to
thwart an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air
carrier received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To
address concerns regarding reports of injuries after the use of
these devices and to ensure that the impacts of these devices
onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report answers
the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government
conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices
onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in
place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier
requests to deploy these devices onboard commercial aircraft?
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-475
ACCNO: A54779
TITLE: Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and
Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed If Air
Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons
DATE: 05/26/2006
SUBJECT: Aircraft safety
Airline security
Aviation security
Commercial aviation
Homeland security
Internal controls
Security policies
Transportation safety
Weapons
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GAO-06-475
* Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects
* The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the
* Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance C
* The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Furth
* A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Ca
* TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Crit
* TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and K
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
May 2006
AVIATION SECURITY
Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls
Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal
Weapons
GAO-06-475
Contents
Letter 1
Scope and Methodology 2
Results in Brief 4
Background 7
Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the
Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board
Commercial Aircraft 11
TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and
Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices 15
Conclusions 19
Recommendations for Executive Action 20
Agency Comments 21
Appendix I TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-Lethal
Weapons requests 23
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 25
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28
Figure
Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD) 8
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
EMDD electro-muscular disruption device
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FFDO Federal Flight Deck Officer
LTL less-than-lethal
NIJ National Institute of Justice
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSL Transportation Security Laboratory
TSNM Transportation Sector Network Management
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 26, 2006
The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve
air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including
electric stun devices1 on board commercial aircraft for the purposes of
thwarting an attack.2 Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September
2001, two domestic and one foreign air carrier requested approval to
deploy electric stun devices on board their commercial aircraft. The two
domestic air carriers sought approval to deploy these devices for flight
deck crew (the pilot and others within the cockpit) but after
approximately 18 months without a disposition from TSA, primarily citing
confusion with the review process chose to no longer pursue their
requests. The foreign air carrier, which sought approval to deploy the
devices on international flights to the United States for use by
government law enforcement officers and specially trained flight
attendants, also experienced extended delays before ultimately receiving
approval in December 2004 to deploy electric stun devices in its passenger
cabins.3 According to air carrier officials we spoke to, since the
establishment of additional security measures such as an expansion of the
Federal Air Marshal Service,4 hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent
passenger and baggage screening, and particularly initiation of the
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program,5 air carrier interest in
deploying electric stun devices to enhance security has diminished.
Notwithstanding the current lack of demonstrated interest, it is possible
that demand among air carriers to deploy these devices could resume in the
future.
1 Less-than-lethal weapons have been developed to provide law enforcement,
corrections, and military personnel with an alternative to lethal force.
Weapons of this type include, among others, chemical, electromuscular
inhibitor devices (more commonly known as electric stun devices), and
impact projectiles. They are designed to temporarily incapacitate,
confuse, delay, and restrain an adversary in a variety of situations.
Less-than-lethal weapons are most often used when, (1) lethal force is not
appropriate; (2) lethal force is justified but less force may subdue an
aggressor; or (3) lethal force is justified but its use could cause
collateral effects, such as injury to bystanders or life threatening
damage to property and environment. By comparing the environment on board
an aircraft with the attributes of various less-than-lethal weapons, the
National Institute of Justice and TSA concluded that electric stun devices
showed the most promise and were the only acceptable less-than-lethal
weapon for use on commercial aircraft. Therefore, this report focuses on
the use of electric stun devices.
2 See, e.g., Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,
S: 126(b), 115 Stat. 597, 632 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. S:
44903(i)). See also, e.g., 49 C.F.R. Pt. 1546.
Due in part to recent reports regarding injuries after the use of electric
stun devices and the lack of regulations governing their general use, the
House Subcommittee on Aviation wants to ensure that the impacts of using
electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft have been fully
evaluated. Given this concern, this report addresses the following
questions:
o What analysis has the federal government conducted to assess
the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board
commercial aircraft?
o What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and
timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun
devices on board commercial aircraft?
To determine what analysis the federal government had conducted to
assess the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on
board commercial aircraft, we conducted a literature search to
identify the extent of past research that had been done by various
federal agencies on the safety and effectiveness of deploying
these devices on board commercial aircraft. We also conducted a
literature search of existing studies addressing the health
effects of these devices. We currently have a separate ongoing
engagement that is evaluating the extent to which claims regarding
the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices are
supported by currently available scientific data. The results of
our literature searches were limited because no federal studies or
reviews examining the use of electric stun devices on board
commercial aircraft have been published since May 2003, and no
studies have been published examining the potential health effects
of these devices on individuals who are on board commercial
aircraft. We examined reviews produced by the Department of
Justice's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and by Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Laboratory
(TSL)6 as well as a TSA report to Congress regarding the use of
less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, on
board commercial aircraft and reviewed the methodologies employed
and the conclusions drawn. We also examined Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) reviews of test data submitted by a
commercial air carrier and spoke to the individual at FAA who
produced those reviews.
To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform
and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun
devices on board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA's handling
of these requests and compared this process to our Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government.7 Specifically, to
determine how TSA ensures uniform and timely review of air carrier
requests, we interviewed cognizant TSA officials regarding their
processing of past requests and reviewed related documentation.
Our ability to obtain complete information at TSA was limited
because, according to TSA officials, individuals involved in
reviewing past requests from air carriers were no longer with the
agency and only limited documentation of the review process or
supporting materials was retained by TSA. However, we were able to
obtain copies of some TSA correspondence and other documents
regarding the review process from private sector officials
involved in the requests. We interviewed officials from FAA
regarding their role and activities in reviewing requests from
commercial air carriers wishing to deploy less-than-lethal
weapons. We also interviewed officials from a nonprobability
sample of eight domestic air carriers selected based on number of
flights per year,8 two of which had requested permission from TSA
to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft. Because
this is a nonprobability sample, results of these interviews
cannot be generalized to the universe of air carriers. We also
interviewed officials from the one foreign air carrier that had
requested and received permission to deploy these devices on their
aircraft. In instances where air carriers had requested approval
to deploy these devices, we asked them to assess their experience
with TSA regarding any guidance provided and responsiveness to
their requests. We also interviewed officials from five domestic
air industry associations and obtained the views of two foreign
air carrier associations to determine their views on the general
efficacy of using electric stun devices on commercial aircraft.9
We conducted our work between June 2005 and April 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
The Transportation Security Administration, DHS Transportation
Security Laboratory, Federal Aviation Administration, and the
National Institute of Justice have conducted reviews addressing
the effect of electric stun devices on aircraft avionics. The TSA
and TSL reviews also addressed the potential security
effectiveness of these devices. In addition, various federal and
other organizations have conducted reviews addressing the health
effects of electric stun devices on individuals. However, no
studies of health effects have been conducted in an in-flight
environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although
electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to
subdue suspects, including individuals who may fall into certain
potentially susceptible populations, there is no independent
research to indicate whether these electric stun devices would be
either safe or unsafe. However, some susceptible populations such
as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of alcohol
and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes.
NIJ recommended that study of these issues be conducted and has
initiated several projects in this area. The TSL and the FAA each
reviewed a study conducted in February 2002 by an air carrier
regarding the effect of one model of electric stun device on
aircraft avionics and concurred with the carrier's conclusion that
the 50,000 volt device tested would be unlikely to harm aircraft
avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the results for
the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect how other
brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under
similar circumstances. For example, according to the TSL review,
it is likely that devices exceeding 100,000 volts would not be
suitable for use on aircraft. In April 2002, the NIJ concluded
that the use of electric stun devices in accordance with
appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for
flight deck crews to thwart an attack.10 Similarly, in a report to
Congress issued in May 2003, which TSA officials told us consisted
primarily of the results of a literature search, TSA generally
concurred with NIJ's conclusion but further concluded that
commercial aviation security may be enhanced through deployment of
these devices. Although both the TSA and the NIJ reports provided
a conceptual framework for determining the suitability of electric
stun devices in an aircraft environment, neither review included
in-flight testing or other empirical analysis to conclude that
electric stun devices offered additional security. In its report,
NIJ also concluded that electric stun devices should not be
deployed in aircraft until extensive testing had been completed in
realistic settings and on various types of aircraft. TSA's current
position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft
environment, is necessary to determine if these devices can be
used safely and effectively.
TSA lacks key internal controls, prescribed in our Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, to help ensure
uniformity in decision making and a clear and transparent process
for reviewing requests to deploy electric stun devices on board
commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA
o lacks a well-defined organizational area or individual with
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests,
o has not established formal criteria for decision making to
approve requests and has not clearly communicated criteria to
external stakeholders, and
o maintains little or no documentation of its decision making and
activities to account for its handling of past requests to deploy
electric stun devices.
Without clearly defined and communicated approval criteria and
organizational point of contact, TSA cannot have reasonable
assurance that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor
can it provide a clear and transparent request and approval
process for air carriers. The lack of a formal system of record
keeping also prevents TSA management from ensuring consistency in
decision making and diminishes TSA's ability to be accountable to
Congress and other stakeholders. TSA officials were not able to
tell us specifically why these controls were not in place when
prior applications were being reviewed. According to TSA, air
carriers have not expressed an interest in deploying electric stun
devices on board their aircraft since October 2004, and TSA does
not currently anticipate additional air carrier requests. However,
TSA stated that it would implement these internal controls for
future requests that may come in from air carriers.
In order to help ensure that TSA's review and approval process for
the use of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
devices, is responsive, uniform, accountable, and serves the
public interest, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to ensure
that there are reliable studies and research supporting the use of
less-than-lethal devices on commercial aircraft should air carrier
interest in deploying these devices resume. Also, in order to help
ensure consistency in decision making and responsiveness to air
carriers, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to implement key
internal controls related to TSA's handling of requests for the
use of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices,
on board commercial aircraft. In commenting on this report, TSA
agreed with our findings and recommendations and has begun to
establish the framework for a review process that will implement
internal controls to more effectively govern the receipt and
review of any future requests by air carriers to deploy LTL
weapons on board their aircraft.
Background
According to NIJ-the research, development, and evaluation agency
within DOJ-less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
devices, are designed to incapacitate, confuse, delay, or restrain
an adversary in a variety of situations. Less-than-lethal weapons
can be grouped into six general categories: electric stun,
chemical, impact projectile, physical restraint, light, and
acoustic. Preliminary reviews conducted by NIJ and TSL identified
that of the six different less-than-lethal weapon categories,
electric stun devices showed the most promise for use on board
commercial aircraft.
There are two types of electric stun devices that have potential
use in commercial aircraft according to a May 2003 TSA report. The
first is a handheld device with two probes that, when pressed
against the skin or clothing of an attacker and activated by the
operator, produces a high (50,000) voltage but low current
discharge. When contact is made between the attacker and the
activated device, a circuit is completed, and the subject receives
a debilitating shock. The second type of electric stun device is
technically referred to as an electro-muscular disruption device
(EMDD). An EMDD fires two barbs connected to trailing wires that
lead back to the operator. When the barbs penetrate the subject's
skin or clothing, an electrical circuit is completed, and an
electrical discharge, similar to the direct contact device
discharge, automatically results causing an immediate loss of the
person's neuromuscular control and the ability to perform
coordinated action for the duration of the impulse. This barb type
EMDD device, shown in figure 1, is similar to the type considered
for use by air carriers and is hereafter referred to in this
report as an electric stun device.
Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD)
TSA may provide air carriers operating to, from, or within the
United States with authorization to use less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices, on board their aircraft subject
to legal and regulatory considerations. For example, TSA must
follow the requirements of 49 U.S.C. S: 44903(i) before granting
an air carrier request to arm members of the flight deck crew with
electric stun devices.11 Similarly, air carriers that request
permission to allow the use of such devices by persons other than
flight deck crew (such as government law enforcement officers and
flight attendants-persons situated outside of the cockpit), as was
the case with the foreign air carrier, must seek an amendment to
its TSA-approved security program.12 In the case of a foreign air
carrier, TSA may approve such an amendment if it finds that the
security program, as amended, continues to provide a level of
protection similar to the level provided by U.S. air carriers
servicing the same airports.13
FAA also plays a collateral role in the determination of whether
electric stun devices can be deployed on board commercial
aircraft.14 FAA has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the
safe operation of aircraft within the United States.15 According
to FAA officials, FAA certifies the airworthiness of all domestic
aircraft before they are put into service and performs periodic
safety inspections as part of FAA's safety oversight
responsibilities. FAA's airworthiness certifications, however,
would not address the use of electric stun devices because,
according to FAA, such devices fall within the category of
portable electronic devices that are not considered part of the
aircraft itself. FAA's regulations generally require the operator
of the aircraft to determine whether a portable electronic device
will interfere with the safe operation of the aircraft before
allowing its operation on board.16 Consequently, FAA does not
formally approve the use of portable electronic devices and would
not for electric stun devices.17 According to FAA officials, if
asked by an air carrier and resources permitting, the agency could
render a technical opinion on the safety of such devices, but it
is up to the air carrier to prove that the device will not
interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause catastrophic failure to
the avionics of the aircraft. If FAA's review of the air carrier's
testing indicates that these devices may have some adverse affect
on aircraft avionics, FAA would bring it to the air carrier's
attention. According to FAA officials, the FAA does not issue any
documentation of approval or certification regarding the use of
portable electronic devices on aircraft. In particular, FAA
officials told us that it would not be appropriate for the agency
to provide TSA written approval for the use of any type of
portable electric devices, including less-than-lethal devices.
Further, according to FAA officials, the agency has no specific
safety standard for less-than-lethal devices. Officials added that
for any electric stun devices actually deployed on commercial
aircraft, FAA would consider any safety issues as part of its
normal oversight inspections.
Officials from each of the eight domestic air carriers we
interviewed stated that after the terrorist attacks of September
2001, they reassessed their security procedures in an effort to
upgrade their security posture. Among the security initiatives
each air carrier considered, was arming pilots with electric stun
devices. Representatives from the air carriers had mixed views on
whether electric stun devices or firearms would be their preferred
security measure within the cockpit. However, none of the domestic
air carrier officials we interviewed said their airlines had
considered having electric stun devices available for use by
flight attendants in the cabin, primarily because they believed
carrying these devices is incompatible with flight attendants'
customer-service role. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of
September 2001, two domestic air carriers sought TSA approval to
allow flight-deck crews to use these devices. In addition, one
foreign air carrier made two separate requests and ultimately
received TSA approval in 2004 to deploy electric stun devices to
government law enforcement officers and specially trained flight
attendants situated in the passenger cabin of its aircraft.
Domestic air carrier trade associations we interviewed generally
favored the use of firearms over electric stun devices on the
flight deck due to perceived vulnerabilities of the electric stun
devices against multiple attackers as well as the temporary effect
that the device may have. Similarly, the associations we
interviewed expressed concerns about possible failures of the
devices at critical times and simple countermeasures that could be
used to limit their effectiveness. Since the establishment of
additional security measures after the terrorist attacks of
September 2001, such as an expanded Federal Air Marshal Service,
hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and baggage
screening, and particularly the voluntary arming of pilots through
the FFDO program, air carrier interest in deploying electric stun
devices to enhance security has diminished. Officials from some
air carriers we spoke to stated that the high cost of deployment
of electric stun devices as well as liability concerns, compared
to the liability relief afforded through the FFDO program, made
the use of electric stun devices relatively less attractive.18
According to the Association of European Airlines, it is its
general position that the presence of weapons on board aircraft,
be they lethal or nonlethal, be they on the flight deck or in the
passenger cabin, should be prohibited. Similarly, the Association
of Asian Pacific Airlines said its member airlines are generally
adamant about not arming the cabin crew with any weapon on board
an aircraft and are more in favor of ground-based security
approaches.
The federal government has conducted limited reviews addressing
the effect of electric stun devices on individuals or aircraft
avionics and on their security effectiveness, none of which was
supported by empirical analysis or testing in an aircraft
environment. Although various federal and other organizations have
reviewed the health effects that electric stun devices have on
individuals, studies have not been conducted in an in-flight
environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, there is no
independent research to indicate whether these electric stun
devices would be either safe or unsafe regarding certain
potentially susceptible populations. TSL and FAA each reviewed a
study conducted by an air carrier regarding the effect of one
model of electric stun device on aircraft avionics and concurred
with its conclusion that the device tested would be unlikely to
harm aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that
the results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily
reflect how other brands and models of electric stun devices may
perform under similar circumstances. NIJ concluded that the use of
these devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training
may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an
attack. Similarly, in a report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA
generally concurred with NIJ's conclusion and further concluded
that commercial aviation security may be enhanced through
deployment of these devices. However, it concluded that electric
stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until extensive
testing has been completed in realistic settings and on various
types of aircraft.
Federal agencies and other organizations have conducted reviews
addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on
individuals. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although
electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to
subdue suspects, including individuals who may fall into certain
potentially susceptible populations, there is no independent
research to indicate whether these electric stun devices would be
either safe or unsafe. However, some susceptible populations such
as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of alcohol
and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes.
NIJ recommended that study of these issues be conducted and has
initiated several projects in this area.
The federal government has conducted limited analysis to determine
if electric stun devices would adversely affect aircraft avionics.
In April 2002, FAA, in its role of ensuring the safe operation of
aircraft, within the United States, reviewed test data submitted
by a domestic air carrier, regarding one specific electric stun
device and its potential effect on aircraft avionic systems.19 FAA
officials told us that they did not publish any results of this
preliminary review but did communicate to TSA that based on the
air carriers' test results; it did not believe the particular
device tested would have an adverse affect on aircraft avionics.
FAA officials added that if electric stun devices were actually
deployed on commercial aircraft, FAA would consider any safety
issues as part of its normal oversight inspections. Similarly, TSL
published a review of the same test data in September 2002. TSL's
review focused on technical and airworthiness factors including
potential levels of electromagnetic interference from discharging
the electric stun device. Although FAA and TSL have not performed
any in-flight testing of their own, both concurred with the
conclusion of the air carrier study that the one type of 50,000
volt electric stun device tested would be unlikely to harm
aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the
results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily
reflect how other brands and models of electric stun devices may
perform under similar circumstances. For example, according to the
TSL review, it is likely that devices exceeding 100,000 volts
would be unsuitable for use on aircraft.
In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun
devices, used in accordance with appropriate policies and
training, may have the potential to allow flight deck crews to
thwart an attack while an aircraft is in flight-i.e. interrupt an
attack, control an aggressor, or delay an attack while the flight
crew safely lands the aircraft. However, the report did not
include any empirical testing of electric stun devices in an
aircraft setting to demonstrate how they would enhance security.
Rather, information for its report was derived by reviewing
existing information on electric stun devices as well as meeting
with experts from the aviation industry and persons experienced in
the design and use of less-than-lethal technology in settings
other than aircraft. To determine whether electric stun devices
have the potential to enhance aviation security, NIJ first
identified certain desirable characteristics in less-than-lethal
weapons given the environment that exists in an aircraft.
Specifically, in commercial aircraft (1) sensitive critical flight
instruments are in continual use; and (2) passenger and crew
spaces are crowded and confined. According to NIJ, given this
environment, less-than-lethal weapons that would be used to thwart
attacks on board commercial aircraft should exhibit the following
characteristics
o immediately incapacitate an aggressor;
o have quickly reversible and controllable effects;
o be usable in a confined space;
o be simple to operate;
o have multishot capability; and
o not damage critical avionics (navigational, etc.).
Next, NIJ compared various categories of less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices, against these criteria. It
concluded that electric stun devices showed the most promise for
use by flight deck crews.
TSL, in a report issued in September 2002, concurred with NIJ's
earlier findings and similarly concluded that less-than-lethal
weapons may provide an additional layer of security and deterrence
in the aviation environment. However, the report focused primarily
on the effects on airworthiness and technical issues associated
with electric stun devices. References in the TSL report regarding
the security benefits associated with these weapons were based
primarily on work previously conducted by NIJ.
In a separate report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA concluded
that commercial aviation security could be enhanced through the
deployment of electric stun devices. Although this report provided
a conceptual framework for evaluating the suitability of different
categories of less-than-lethal weapons for use in an aircraft
environment, like the NIJ study, no weapons were tested against
various threat scenarios including air piracy threats. TSA
officials told us that this report was hurriedly put together to
meet a congressional mandate and that it relied primarily on the
earlier NIJ study and a review of other literature. When asked
about their current position regarding the use of electric stun
devices on board aircraft, TSA officials told us that empirical
data and operational case studies, particularly in the aircraft
environment, would be necessary to determine whether these devices
can be deployed safely, effectively, and in a tactically
reasonable manner.
Similar to NIJ, TSA, to conduct its review, assessed the
characteristics of various categories of less-than-lethal
weapons-including electric stun devices, chemical (conventional),
chemical (sedative), impact projectile, physical restraint, light,
and acoustic and malodorous weapons-against a predetermined set of
criteria to determine their suitability for use in a commercial
aircraft environment. These criteria covered the following aspects
related to the devices
o currently used in law enforcement;
o potential to cause collateral damage;
o potential to cause catastrophic aircraft failure;
o how quickly effects occur;
o reversibility of effects;
o potential for unintended consequences or other deployment
concerns; and
o relative effectiveness to deter or defeat threats.
After comparing each category of less-than-lethal weapon to the
criteria, like NIJ, TSA concluded that only electric stun devices
may be suitable for aircraft deployment.
In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that each type of
less-than-lethal weapon poses either safety or effectiveness
issues that should be tested further in multiple aircraft settings
before any deployment. It also concluded that systematic testing
of the weapons' effects on critical aircraft avionics is essential
to ensure they will not damage or disable flight systems. Further,
the report noted that the most important unknown with these
devices is the potential effect of a high-voltage electrical
discharge on aircraft avionics. Therefore, NIJ concluded that
electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until
extensive testing has been completed in realistic settings and on
various types of aircraft.
TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing
requests from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on
board their aircraft that include (1) well defined key areas of
authority and responsibility, (2) clearly communicated information
regarding decision-making criteria to TSA decision makers and
their external stakeholders, and (3) a records system to account
for handling of requests and supporting documentation-three key
internal controls called for by the Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government. TSA officials were not able to tell us
specifically why these controls were not in place when prior
applications were being reviewed. TSA officials stated that they
currently do not plan to establish these controls because air
carriers have not expressed an interest to TSA in deploying these
devices since October 2004, and officials do not anticipate
additional air carrier requests.
TSA does not have a well-defined organizational area or individual
with responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests from air
carriers interested in requesting approval to deploy electric stun
devices on board their aircraft to enhance security. Internal
control standards in the federal government state that to have an
effective control environment it is important for agencies to
clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility.
Officials from all three air carriers that had submitted requests
to TSA to deploy electric stun devices on board commercial
aircraft told us that they had experienced confusion regarding the
status and disposition of their requests and were unaware to whom
they should have directed inquiries. For example, an official from
one domestic air carrier stated that it was in contact with
multiple TSA personnel but were not sure which individual was in
charge of reviewing electric stun device requests or whether the
information it received from TSA was accurate and authoritative.
We also noted during our review of TSA documentation that in at
least one instance, a TSA official requested information from an
air carrier that had previously been received by the agency.
As the National Strategy for Homeland Security indicates and as we
have reported in previous work, securing the nation requires
effective partnerships with the private sector.20 Air carriers
that seek to enhance security measures on board their aircraft
offer an opportunity for such partnership. However, without a
clearly defined organizational area or individual within TSA to
review requests and communicate effectively with the requesting
air carrier officials, TSA cannot be a responsive and effective
partner.
According to TSA officials, there is currently no organizational
area or individual responsible for receipt or review of requests
from air carriers that may wish to deploy electric stun devices on
board their aircraft because of the lack of demonstrated interest
from air carriers.
TSA has not established and communicated a formalized set of
criteria to evaluate air carriers' requests to deploy electric
stun devices as a security measure on board their aircraft.
Internal control standards in the federal government state that
for a federal agency or private sector entity to run and control
its operations effectively, it must have relevant, reliable, and
timely communications relating to internal as well as external
events. Although TSA received requests from three air carriers to
deploy these devices, it did not have criteria established within
the agency and communicated to air carriers that would (1) help
ensure uniform decision making and (2) make requirements for
approval clear to all parties.
The lack of established and well-communicated criteria resulted in
inefficient handling of requests that made the process more
difficult for the air carriers. In particular, TSA made multiple
requests for nearly a year and a half for information from the two
domestic air carriers that requested permission to deploy electric
stun devices, without clearly communicating what would be required
for approving their requests or clearly explaining why additional
information was being requested. Ultimately, one domestic air
carrier withdrew its request to use electric stun devices in June
2003, primarily citing confusion over TSA's protracted approval
process. The other domestic air carrier that had requested
permission to deploy the devices did not formally withdraw its
request, but also made the decision in June 2003 not to further
pursue the initiative. One of these air carriers also cited
mitigating security measures such as the FFDO program and
reinforced cockpit doors that had been implemented as an
additional reason why it did not continue pursuing the deployment
of electric stun devices and also the additional costs of
implementing a less-than-lethal weapons program.
In its May 2003 report to Congress, TSA proposed a number of key
criteria for evaluating requests from air carriers to deploy
less-than-lethal devices on board their aircraft. Among these
criteria was the need for (1) an appropriate training regimen, (2)
procedures of use, and (3) assurance from the air carriers that
the devices would provide passenger safety. However, these
criteria were not formally established for use by TSA decision
makers when evaluating air carrier requests nor communicated to
air carriers interested in requesting permission to use these
devices. We have included a list of these proposed criteria in
appendix I of this report. In addition to making the request
process consistent and clear, establishing criteria can help the
agency ensure that any approvals for the use of electric stun
devices on board commercial aircraft are compatible with TSA's
mission to ensure the security of the nation's transportation
system and the traveling public. For example, in the case of
criteria governing training, we have previously reported that any
civilian electric-stun-device training curriculum should have a
very explicit use-of-force policy. Unlike police officers,
civilians are not generally experienced in deciding whether the
use of force is justified and, if so, to what extent. Therefore,
it should be the goal of any training curricula for persons
authorized to utilize electric stun devices, such as aircraft
flight deck or cabin crew members, to involve as many scenarios as
possible so that the trainee understands what level of force is
appropriate.21
Although TSA has no supporting documentation of having applied the
criteria proposed in its 2003 report to requests submitted by
commercial air carriers, according to agency officials, TSA took
into account these considerations when ultimately approving the
foreign air carrier request in December 2004. TSA officials
further told us that any additional requests would be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis using similar considerations. However,
without establishing and clearly communicating criteria and
information needs both internally and externally, TSA cannot have
reasonable assurance that its decision making will be uniform,
consistent, compatible with its mission and clear and transparent
for air carriers seeking approval to deploy these devices. TSA
officials stated that they still consider the criteria contained
in the May 2003 report to the Congress appropriate and current for
use in handling any requests by air carriers to implement a
less-than-lethal weapons program.
TSA officials said that they could not fully explain the delays in
addressing the early requests from the air carriers because the
persons involved with the initial request reviews are no longer
with the agency. Officials stated that at the time of the initial
requests, there was a high rate of turnover and a rapid rate of
change associated with the formation of TSA as a new agency.
Officials further stated that the agency was not fully ready to
address requests to deploy electric stun devices before the time
the foreign air carrier request was reviewed in 2004. Even at that
point, TSA officials said that they planned to review each
application that was received on a case-by-case basis since they
did not expect a high demand from air carriers to deploy these
devices. According to TSA officials, since 2004, no other carriers
have expressed an interest in electric stun devices as a security
measure. TSA officials told us that because of this lack of
interest, no program requirements or criteria were ever formalized
regarding the use of electric stun devices on commercial aircraft;
however, if future requests are received, TSA would take steps to
formalize these criteria into specific guidelines for the
application review process.
We asked TSA officials how they planned to address any potential
future requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-lethal
weapons including electric stun devices on board their aircraft.
They stated that the TSA Transportation Sector Network Management
(TSNM) Airlines office would take the lead for any requests from
domestic air carriers. For foreign air carriers, TSNM's
International Division will take the lead. Further, a working
evaluation group, consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service,
Office of Chief Counsel, and other program offices at the
discretion of the administrator will be involved in the review
process. According to TSA, this group will provide their
respective expertise and recommendations to the lead office. Each
lead office will be responsible for resolving differences, keeping
diligent records of the review process, the ultimate approval or
disapproval decision, and responding to the requesting air
carriers in a timely manner.
For the three requests submitted, TSA did not record (1) the
rationale for and outcome of its decision making regarding
requests to deploy electric stun devices or (2) the information
and documentation exchanged between the agency and air carriers.
According to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, agency activities should be promptly recorded to
maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling
operations and making decisions. This applies to the entire
process, from initiation and authorization through final
classification. Moreover, to help ensure accountability and
internal oversight, this documentation should be readily available
for examination by TSA management, Congress, and other appropriate
external parties. Although, in its 2003 report to Congress, TSA
stated that its Office of Aviation Operations would maintain a
system of records for requests to deploy electric stun devices,
few records were kept. Agency officials told us that they
maintained only limited documentation regarding the foreign air
carrier's request and maintained no documentation regarding the
receipt and review of request materials submitted by the two
domestic air carriers. Without a system of documentation, TSA
management will not be able to review decisions to help ensure
consistency and responsiveness to air carriers making requests,
nor will TSA be able to readily make documentation available for
examination by Congress and other appropriate external parties. As
we noted above, TSA told us that, in the future, it plans to keep
diligent records of the review process and ultimate approval or
disapproval decisions for all requests from air carriers.
Conclusions
Due primarily to other enhancements in aviation security since
2001, there appears to be no demonstrated interest on the part of
air carriers to introduce less-than-lethal weapons, including
electric stun devices, on their aircraft. However, should interest
in such measures resume, federal government reviews to date have
identified areas in need of further study before these devices are
deployed on board commercial aircraft. In particular, it would be
important for TSA to know the appropriateness of the devices in an
aircraft environment, effects on the safe operation of the
aircraft, effects on passenger safety, and how such devices would
enhance security.
Also, should interest in using less-than-lethal devices on
aircraft resume, TSA would not be in the best position to address
new requests in an efficient and effective manner. Without
internal controls to govern its process for receiving and
reviewing requests from air carriers, TSA would lack assurance
that its decision making is appropriate and necessary and serves
the public interest. Specifically, without a well-defined
organizational area or individual with responsibility for
receiving and reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a responsive and
effective partner with private sector air carriers. In addition,
it will not be able to provide a clear and transparent request
process for air carriers. Without established and clearly
communicated information regarding decision-making criteria,
within TSA and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable
assurance that its decision making will be uniform, consistent,
and compatible with its mission. Although TSA outlined criteria in
a 2003 Report to Congress for use in examining requests from air
carriers, the agency never formalized any criteria for use by
decision makers, nor did it communicate clear criteria to air
carriers making requests for approval. Finally, without
documentation of key activities and decisions related to
less-than-lethal device requests, TSA cannot ensure accountability
in handling such requests and the availability of documentation
for examination by Congress and other external parties.
Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to help ensure TSA's review and approval process for the
use of any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
devices, is responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied
and serves the public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration, to take the following two actions, should
commercial air carrier interest in deploying these devices resume:
o Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting
the use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a
minimum, address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique
aircraft environment, including passenger safety, how the use of
these devices would enhance security, and the effects of these
devices on the safe operation of the aircraft.
o Establish appropriate internal controls to govern air carriers'
requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including electric
stun devices on board their aircraft, including (1) clearly
defining the organizational area or individual within TSA with the
authority and responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests;
(2) establishing a records system to help ensure accountability;
and (3) formalizing and clearly communicating criteria for
approving requests both within the responsible area of TSA and to
interested air carriers.
Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, FAA and
NIJ. FAA and NIJ provided technical comments, which have been
incorporated in this report where appropriate. We received written
comments from DHS on May 5, 2006. DHS agreed with our report and
recommendations stating that our findings and recommendations will
aid in the development of a more effective and efficient review
process if interest by air carriers in less-than-lethal (LTL)
weapons resumes at a future date. According to DHS, since our
review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for a review
process if additional applications for LTL weapons are received.
For future LTL weapons applications, the Transportation Sector
Network Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM
International Division will take the lead for domestic and
international applications respectively. An evaluation working
group, consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of
Chief Counsel, and other program offices, at the discretion of the
administrator, will be involved in the review process. This group
will provide their respective expertise and recommendations, with
the lead office responsible for ensuring progress, resolving
differences, and keeping diligent records of the review and
ultimate approval or disapproval. The full text of DHS's comments
is included as appendix II.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 18 days from the date of this report. At that time, we will
send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security;
the Director, Office Management and Budget; and any other
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it
further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at
[email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. See appendix III for a list of major contributors to this
report.
Sincerely yours,
Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice
o Separate requests-There must be a separate request
(application) for each type of LTL device that is proposed for
use.
o Method of deployment must be articulated-Where and how will the
LTL device be transported, utilized, and stored aboard aircraft.
o Aircrew selection-What are the air carrier's procedures to
ensure that an unqualified crew member does not obtain access to
the LTL devices? This would include crew members identified in
need of anger management assistance.
o Well-documented incoming information-Incoming correspondence
must be well documented and articulate clearly why a device that
is being submitted for approval. The information contained must,
at the very least, provide evidence that the product is known to
the industry, with viable and recent studies and research
supporting its use in the aircraft environment and that the
product meets safety standards set by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
o Threshold of protection-The correspondence must contain
language that enumerates how an LTL device meets the threshold of
protection for the cockpit, aircraft and passenger safety. It must
include any completed studies on LTL devices and their use in the
cockpit and cabin of the aircraft, the appropriateness for their
usage in this unique environment and how it would not produce
catastrophic failure of the aircraft.
o Enumerate procedures-The air carrier must clearly state its
policy and the procedures it will employ, including legal
considerations and similar issues. The air carrier would
articulate the escalation/de-escalation for the use of force
(Common Strategy and DOJ Use of Force Policy). This could include
awareness of problem, deterrence, avoidance, verbalization, empty
hand control, intermediate device (LTL device) and any other
self-defense techniques.
o Procedures for the LTL device-The procedures for the use of an
LTL device must accompany any written request explaining the
process for use of a product. Details of procedures to ensure that
any LTL device is not deployed on aircraft destined for
international venues must be included.
o Training regimen-The air carrier must be able to articulate its
training regimen and the manner in which pilots and/or flight
attendants have been educated and trained on the requested device
to be used and re-certification protocols. TSA's Office of
Training and Quality Performance will review any proposal, make
recommendations, and in conjunction with Office of Aviation
Operations, approve training manuals and processes associated with
initial and re-certification training as a part of the carrier's
request to employ LTL devices.
o Provide documented evidence-The requesting air carrier must
provide documentary evidence, including testimony about the
devices by subject matter experts. These should be attached to the
carrier's proposal.
o Provide documentation of FAA approval-A letter from the FAA
approving the use of an less-than-lethal device based on its
meeting safety standards imposed by the FAA demonstrating that the
device will not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause
catastrophic failure to the avionics of the aircraft.
(Foregoing is TSA text.)
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777
The following teams and individuals contributed to this report:
William W. Crocker III, Assistant Director; Robert J. Rivas, J.
Michael Bollinger, John P. Stradling, and Kathryn E. Godfrey,
Homeland Security and Justice; David P. Alexander, Applied
Research & Methodology; and Thomas F. Lombardi, Office of General
Counsel
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Scope and Methodology
3 The foreign air carrier initially requested to deploy these devices on
international flights to the U.S. in March 2002. It subsequently renewed
its request in May 2004. Obtaining TSA authorization to deploy such
devices required the foreign air carrier to amend, and TSA to approve, its
security program. See 49 C.F.R. S: 1546.105.
4 The Federal Air Marshal Service consists of trained and armed civil
aviation security specialists that are deployed on board aircraft to
protect passengers, crew, and aircraft from terrorist activities on both
domestic and international fights.
5 Commercial pilots who volunteer to participate in the Federal Flight
Deck Officers Program are trained and equipped with firearms to protect
the aircraft cockpit. The pilots are deputized as federal flight deck
officers. See 49 U.S.C. S: 44921.
6 The Transportation Security Laboratory was within the Transportation
Security Administration until October 2005 when it was transferred to the
Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.
7 GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
8 Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations are
selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using specific
characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from nonprobability
samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because in a
nonprobability sample some elements of the population being studied have
no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
9 The domestic trade associations were the Air Line Pilots Association,
Air Transport Association, Association of Flight Attendants, Coalition of
Airline Pilots Associations, and Regional Airline Association. The foreign
airline associations we contacted were Association of European Airlines
and the Association of Asian Pacific Airlines.
10 Section 126(a) of Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
required the National Institute of Justice to assess the range of
less-than-lethal weaponry available for use by a flight deck crew member
to temporarily incapacitate an individual who presents a clear and present
danger to the safety of the aircraft, its passengers, or individuals on
the ground and report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation within 90 days after the date of enactment of the act. See
National Institute of Justice, Less-than-lethal Weaponry for Aircraft
Security (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2002).
Background
11 Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S: 44903(i), TSA may authorize members of a
flight deck crew to carry less-than-lethal weapons if, in accordance with
recommendations of the NIJ, it determines, with approval of the Attorney
General and Secretary of State, that deploying such weapons is
appropriate, necessary, and would effectively serve the public interest in
avoiding air piracy. Upon granting such authority TSA must prescribe rules
for training such crew members in the proper use of the weapons and
guidelines setting forth circumstances under which the weapons may be
used.
12 For example, the foreign air carrier sought to amend its TSA-approved
security program to allow for the use of electric stun devices by armed
law enforcement officers and specially trained flight attendants in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. S: 1546.105.
13 See 49 C.F.R. S: 1546.103(a)(1) (providing that a foreign air carrier
security program is only acceptable to TSA if it provides passengers a
similar level of protection); but see 49 U.S.C. S: 44906 (requiring that
the foreign air carrier security program adhere to identical measures
(emphasis added)).
14 For example, 49 U.S.C. S: 114(f) (13) imposes upon TSA a duty to work
in conjunction with FAA regarding any actions or activities that may
affect aviation safety or air carrier operations. In addition, S:
114(l)(4) prohibits TSA from taking an aviation security action if the FAA
Administrator notifies TSA that the action could adversely affect the
airworthiness of an aircraft. TSA may then only proceed with such action
if the Secretary of Transportation subsequently approves the action.
15 FAA is responsible for ensuring the safe flight of domestic air
carriers, but also has responsibilities, though more limited in scope, for
the safety of foreign air carriers operating to, from, or within the
United States. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 129.
16 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. S: 91.21 (governing the use of portable electronic
devices on board aircraft). FAA regulations do not require air carriers to
submit findings to FAA or obtain the agency's approval before authorizing
the use of a portable electronic device on board the aircraft.
17 Regardless, air carriers must obtain TSA authorization before deploying
or allowing electric stun devices on board aircraft flying to, from, or
within the U.S. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. S: 1544.201(d).
Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the Safety
and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board Commercial Aircraft
18 49 U.S.C. S: 44921(h) provides liability protections to air carriers
and FFDO's from liability arising out of an FFDO's use or failure to use a
firearm.
Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects of Electric Stun
Devices, but NIJ Officials Recommended More Study
The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the Effects of Electric
Stun Devices on Critical Aircraft Avionics
19 The domestic air carrier tested one model of electric stun device in a
number of aircraft models within its fleet and on the ground.
Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial Aviation
Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited
The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Further Research
Regarding Electric Stun Devices
TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and Timely
Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices
A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Carriers' Confusion
Regarding the Status of Their Requests
TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Criteria or Guidelines
for Decision Making to Internal or External Stakeholders
20 GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges
Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-05-33
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).
21 GAO, Taser Weapons: Use of Tasers by Selected Law Enforcement Agencies,
GAO-05-464 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). For example, pursuant to any
authorization granted by TSA for an air carrier's flight deck crew members
to carry a less-than-lethal weapon under S: 44903(i), TSA must prescribe
rules requiring that any such crew member be trained in the proper use of
the weapon and guidelines setting forth the circumstances under which such
weapons may be used.
TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and Key Decisions Related
to Electric Stun Device Requests
Agency Comments
Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating
Less-than-Lethal Weapons requests Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of
Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-Lethal Weapons requests
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Appendix
II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
(440425)
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Highlights of GAO-06-475 , a report to the Honorable John L. Mica,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives
May 2006
AVIATION SECURITY
Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls
Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal
Weapons
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve
air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including
electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart an attack.
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier received approval to
deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns regarding reports of
injuries after the use of these devices and to ensure that the impacts of
these devices onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report
answers the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government
conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices onboard
commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in place to help
ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy these
devices onboard commercial aircraft?
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that should air carrier interest in deploying these
devices resume, TSA should ensure that there is reliable research
supporting their use in an aircraft environment and that the agency
implement internal controls to govern receipt and review of air carrier
requests. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with our
recommendations.
The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of
electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as other
organizations examined the health effects that electric stun devices have
on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have been conducted in
an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), although electric stun devices have been used successfully
many times to subdue suspects, certain susceptible populations, such as
the elderly and those with a history drug and alcohol abuse, may be at
risk for negative outcomes. In April 2002, NIJ concluded that the use of
electric stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training
may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack but
should not be deployed without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003
report to Congress, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusions. But,
neither review included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these
devices that would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA's
position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment,
is necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and
effectively.
TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision
making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric
stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a
well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and review
requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision making to
approve requests and has not communicated criteria to external
stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its decision
making and activities to account for its handling of past requests.
Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of contact, TSA
cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is uniform and
consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and approval process
for air carriers.
Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD)
Source: GAO; Prince George's County, Md., Sheriff's Office.
*** End of document. ***