Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational
Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense
(31-MAY-06, GAO-06-473).
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since
the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming
ballistic missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security
environment after the September 11 attacks, President Bush
directed that an initial set of defensive ballistic missile
capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is developing
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent
need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous
development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess
the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to
operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-473
ACCNO: A54906
TITLE: Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational
Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense
DATE: 05/31/2006
SUBJECT: Ballistic missile defenses
Ballistic missiles
Defense capabilities
Cost analysis
Defense cost control
Operational testing
Transparency
DOD Future Years Defense Program
MDA Ballistic Missile Defense System
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GAO-06-473
* Results in Brief
* Background
* BMDS Capabilities and Elements
* BMDS Development and Force Structure
* Weapon System Operational Costs
* DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but Planni
* DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate the Ballistic M
* Some Operational Planning Has Taken Place
* U.S. Strategic Command Created a Subcommand to Plan and Inte
* Missile Defense Agency and Combatant Commands Have Planned a
* Some Aspects of Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile De
* Planning for New Weapon Systems Generally Includes Identifyi
* DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for the Overall B
* DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for Most Ballisti
* DOD Has Unresolved Security Issues
* Combatant Commands' Training Plans and Readiness Assessments
* DOD Has Not Approved Dual Status for National Guard Unit Com
* Incomplete Planning Creates Uncertainty About the Basis for
* The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete a
* Complete and Transparent Budget Information Facilitates Deci
* Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operation
* Several Factors Impair the Completeness and Transparency of
* Lack of Complete and Transparent Budget Information Impairs
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Matter for Congressional Consideration
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
* Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* Related GAO Products
* Order by Mail or Phone
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 5
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but Planning Is
Incomplete 13
The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete and Transparent
Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs 28
Conclusions 34
Recommendations for Executive Action 36
Matter for Congressional Consideration 37
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 40
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 43
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46
Related GAO Products 47
Tables
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Their Roles 9
Table 2: Missile Defense Agency's Planned Delivery of Ballistic Missile
Defense Elements by Block 11
Table 3: Status of Operational Criteria Development for Ballistic Missile
Defense Elements 20
Figure
Figure 1: Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Engagement 7
Abbreviations
BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System DOD Department of Defense FYDP
Future Years Defense Program OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 31, 2006
The Honorable Terry Everett Chairman The Honorable Silvestre Reyes Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the
mid-1980s to develop the capability to intercept and destroy incoming
ballistic missiles. DOD initially focused its attention exclusively on
research and development activities. In 2002, recognizing the changed
security environment after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
President Bush directed that an initial set of capabilities be put in
place in 2004 to defend against ballistic missiles that may carry weapons
of mass destruction. This missile defense capability is a major part of
DOD's New Triad of capabilities, which also includes offensive nuclear and
conventional capabilities and a revitalized defense infrastructure to
provide more options to address future contingencies.1 In 2003, the U.S.
Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for coordinating global
ballistic missile defense operations. Each combatant command is
responsible for ballistic missile operations in their geographic area and
individual ballistic missile defense elements will be operated by the
services or the Missile Defense Agency.
Acknowledging that hostile states are investing resources to develop
ballistic missiles that could be used against the United States and its
friends and allies, the President directed in 2002 that this initial set
of capabilities be available to the warfighter on an emergency or
contingency basis as the system's development continues. To expedite
development, the Secretary of Defense exempted ballistic missile defense
development from the traditional requirements guidance.2 DOD refers to
this initial capability as limited defensive operations, with the
development and fielding of additional capabilities planned in 2-year
blocks.
1 DOD's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was required by the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub.L. No.
106-398, S: 1041. (2000)), which directed the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to "conduct a comprehensive
review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10
years." The result of this review was DOD's proposal for the New Triad,
which significantly expanded the range of strategic capabilities.
In an era of increased fiscal challenges, DOD and Congress face difficult
decisions concerning how to allocate available defense resources to
provide for the range of capabilities needed to meet 21st century threats.
The ballistic missile defense mission involves a substantial investment
prior to achieving operational status as well as significant ongoing costs
to operate and sustain this capability. Complete information on planned
defense spending for the ballistic missile defense system can assist
decision makers in making choices among the competing demands for DOD's
resources. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a centralized report
to Congress consisting of the budget year and the 4 succeeding years, is
one of the principal tools used to inform DOD senior leaders and Congress
about resources planned to support various programs, and reflects DOD
decisions in allocating federal resources.
You asked us to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in
planning to operate the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), and (2)
the FYDP provides complete and transparent data on ballistic missile
defense operational costs. During this review, we focused on the
warfighter's preparations to operate the ballistic missile defense system.
Specifically, to assess DOD's planning to operate the ballistic missile
defense system, we compared the planning DOD had completed for operating
BMDS with plans and actions that DOD generally performs for new weapon
systems and discussed the results of our comparison with DOD officials. In
this report, our discussion of declaring BMDS operational refers to both
limited defensive operations and subsequent blocks of capability. To
assess the extent to which the FYDP provides complete and transparent data
for ballistic missile defense operational costs, we assessed the FYDP
structure to determine if it could be used to identify program elements
related to BMDS operations. We also corroborated our methodology and data
with agency officials and determined the data were sufficiently reliable
for our purposes. We conducted our work between January 2005 and February
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
See appendix I for a more complete description of our scope and
methodology.
2 Secretary of Defense Memorandum re: Missile Defense Program Direction
(Jan. 2, 2002).
This report is one in a series of reports that we have issued on ballistic
missile defense (see the list of related GAO products at the end of this
report). During this review, we did not evaluate DOD's testing plans,
research and development programs, or the technical effectiveness of
individual elements. Rather, we focused on assessing issues DOD faces in
planning to operate BMDS such as operational criteria, training, security,
and cost transparency. However, we have issued two reports on the status
of BMDS that included assessments of program goals, testing plans, and
progress in developing each element.3 Our March 2005 report found that
system performance remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has not
successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally
representative hardware and software. We also reported in September 2005
on DOD's criteria for transferring missile defense elements to the
services and the need to ensure operational costs are included in future
budgets.4
Results in Brief
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not
established operational criteria or fully completed training, security,
and personnel plans. As part of the planning that has been completed, DOD
has developed procedures for operating the ground-based element to defend
the United States against attacks from incoming ballistic missiles and the
U.S. Strategic Command has established a subcommand focused on supporting
ballistic missile defense operations. However, DOD has not established
formal criteria for what needs to be accomplished before declaring that
limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are
operational. Moreover, issues involving responsibility for funding and
providing security remain unresolved and training and personnel plans are
still evolving. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are
typically established prior to declaring weapon systems operational and
that actions such as identifying personnel requirements, developing
training programs, and establishing unit readiness reporting are generally
part of these criteria in addition to completion of successful system
testing. However, DOD has not developed operational criteria or fully
completed planning for BMDS because its development has been unique in
several aspects, including the pace of the system's development and the
Secretary of Defense's decision to exempt it from some DOD requirements
guidance. Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for the
Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands' and
services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations, and the Secretary may
not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will
become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and
Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning,
clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring
necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to
identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the
necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and
determine whether the return on its significant development investment in
BMDS can be realized. We are recommending that DOD develop operational
criteria, comparable to those developed for new weapon systems, assign
responsibility to specific organizations and hold them accountable for
developing the criteria and ensuring they are met, and develop a
comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be completed before
declaring the system operational for either limited defensive operations
or subsequent blocks of capability.
3 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004); GAO, Defense
Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004,
GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
4 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System,
GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
The FYDP does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic
missile defense operational costs. We and DOD have repeatedly recognized
the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate DOD's decision
making and congressional oversight. For example, we previously recommended
that DOD should identify New Triad costs, and ballistic missile defense is
an important part of the New Triad. However, complete and transparent
ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in DOD's FYDP
because the FYDP's structure does not provide a way to identify and
aggregate these costs, even though DOD plans to field an increasing number
of elements (such as sensors, missiles, launchers, ships, and command and
control nodes) between 2006 and 2011. There is a mechanism in the FYDP,
called defense mission categories, that has been used to identify costs
for certain missions, but this mechanism does not provide a way to
effectively identify operational costs for the ballistic missile defense
system. DOD Comptroller and Program Analysis and Evaluation officials
agreed that ballistic missile defense operational cost data are not
visible in the FYDP; instead, they have to rely on special data requests
to the services and the Missile Defense Agency which may not be answered
using a consistent methodology. These officials agreed, however, that
being able to collect and analyze these data would enable DOD to analyze
trends over time as more elements are added to the system and begin
operating. Four primary factors impair the visibility and transparency of
ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP structure.
First, operational costs are contained in many program elements throughout
the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs.
Second, the Missile Defense Agency is funding some operational costs with
research and development funds, as authorized by statute.5 Third, DOD has
not included all known ballistic missile defense costs in its budget.6
Fourth, DOD has not yet identified all costs associated with the New
Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense system is an important part.
Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile defense
operational costs, neither DOD nor Congress has complete information to
make funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide
assurance that DOD's plans to field ballistic missile defense capabilities
are affordable over time; and assess the costs of operating the New Triad.
We are recommending that DOD develop a structure within the FYDP to
identify all ballistic missile defense operational costs.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with our recommendations. However, DOD did not state whether it
plans to take any corrective actions in response to our recommendations,
and for this reason, we have added a Matter for Congress to consider
directing the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive plan which
includes operational criteria and to develop a structure within the FYDP
to identify all ballistic missile defense operational costs. We continue
to believe that the specific actions we recommended are needed to prepare
for conducting BMDS operations and assist in DOD and congressional
oversight of ballistic missile defense operational costs. The department's
comments and our evaluation of them begins on page 37.
Background
In response to the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction, in
December 2002 President Bush signed National Security Presidential
Directive 23, which stated an initial ballistic missile defense capability
to defend the United States and deployed forces should be deployed in
2004. Also in 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense
Agency to develop an integrated system that would have the ability to
intercept incoming missiles in all phases of their flight. The Secretary
of Defense's goals for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
included using prototypes and test assets to provide an early capability
and enable the services to field elements of the system as soon as
possible. In order to develop a system that can more readily respond to a
changing threat and be more easily modified to enhance system performance
using new technologies, the Secretary of Defense exempted the Missile
Defense Agency from the traditional requirements processes.
5 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L.No.
108-375, S: 231 (2004); and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub.L.No. 109-163, S: 233.
6 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System,
GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
BMDS Capabilities and Elements
Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD, simultaneously
involving multiple combatant commands and services employing complex
capabilities that require the development of many elements. Figure 1 shows
how a notional scenario to engage an incoming ballistic missile, including
the commands and services involved, could unfold.
Figure 1: Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Engagement
BMDS is eventually intended to be capable of defeating ballistic missiles
during all three phases of a missile's flight.7 However, the initial
capability is intended to have the capability to intercept missiles in the
midcourse and terminal phases. BMDS requires a unique combination of
elements-space-based sensors, surveillance and tracking radars, advanced
interceptors, command and control, and reliable communications-working
together as an integrated system.8 Table 1 below explains the role of the
BMDS elements that DOD plans to be available to the warfighter between
fiscal years 2006-11.
7 The boost phase is from launch until the missile stops accelerating
under its own power, and typically lasts 3-5 minutes for intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The midcourse phase, lasting for about 20 minutes,
begins after the missile has stopped accelerating and the warhead travels
through space on a predictable path. The final or terminal phase begins
when the warhead reenters the atmosphere and lasts approximately a minute
or less.
8 In viewing the parts of BMDS from a technical and engineering viewpoint,
the Missile Defense Agency has identified certain parts as "elements".
However, in discussing warfighters' operating BMDS and lead service roles,
the Joint Staff refers to the following as BMDS elements: the space-based
sensor; early warning radars; Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense; C2BMC;
Ground-based Midcourse Defense; Terminal High Altitude Area Defense; the
forward-based radar; and the sea-based radar. We continue this practice
throughout this report.
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Their Roles
Element Missile defense role
Aegis Ballistic Missile Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is a ship-based
Defense capability designed to destroy short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles during the
midcourse phase of flight. Its mission is
two-fold: to protect deployed U.S. forces,
allies, and friends against ballistic missile
attacks, and to serve as a forward-deployed BMDS
sensor, especially in support of the ground-based
mission. The Missile Defense Agency plans to
deliver up to 81 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
missiles-the Standard Missile 3-and 18 ships by
the end of fiscal year 2011.
Sensors Sensors include Upgraded Early Warning Radars to
provide updated midcourse missile tracking data
to the ground-based element. The Space Tracking
and Surveillance System is a space-based sensor
to identify and track ballistic missiles from
boost phase through reentry.
Command, Control, Battle C2BMC is the integrating and controlling element
Management, and of the BMDS. Although it was part of the Block
Communications (C2BMC) 2004 defensive capability, its role during this
period was limited to mission planning and
situational awareness-monitoring system status
and missile trajectories.
Ground-based Midcourse This ground-based element is designed to destroy
Defense ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of
flight. Its mission is to protect the U.S.
homeland against ballistic missile attacks from
Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The Missile
Defense Agency plans to field up to 48
interceptors by the end of 2011.
PATRIOT Advanced The Patriot is a hit-to-kill interceptor that
Capability-3 uses active seeker radar and guidance to hit and
destroy targets. The Patriot element defends
against short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, protecting advance forces, strategic
assets, and population centers against tactical
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hostile
aircraft. The Missile Defense Agency plans to
field 862 Patriot PAC-3 missiles by the end of
2011.
Terminal High Altitude The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense is a
Area Defense ground-based element designed to destroy short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles during the
late-midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Its
mission is to defend deployed U.S. forces and
population centers. The Missile Defense Agency
plans to field two units consisting of 24
missiles each, the first one in 2009 and the
second one by December 2011.
X-Band Radars X-band Radars are capable of searching,
detecting, and tracking missiles, as well as
picking out warheads from decoys. After an
interception of an incoming missile, the radar
can provide an assessment of success. The Missile
Defense Agency will field two types of X-band
radars. First, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (built
upon a movable sea platform), will improve the
ability to acquire, track, and discriminate
decoys during the midcourse phase of flight. The
single sea-based radar is expected to be on
station in 2006. Second, the Forward-Based X-Band
Radar is a transportable, land-based radar system
that would be placed in strategic areas overseas
in order to provide additional advance warning of
ballistic missile launches. The first of four
radars is expected to be fielded in 2006.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
BMDS Development and Force Structure
In developing BMDS, the Missile Defense Agency is using an incremental
development and acquisition process to field militarily useful
capabilities as they become available. Under this process, the Missile
Defense Agency will develop ballistic missile defense elements and then
transition elements to the military services for operation after approval
by DOD senior leadership. In preparing for each element's transition, the
Missile Defense Agency is expected to collaborate with the services to
develop agreements explaining each organization's responsibilities,
including which organization will pay for operational costs. Most of these
transition plans are currently being drafted. The only BMDS element that
has transferred to a service is the Patriot, which was transferred to the
Army in 2003.
The Missile Defense Agency plans to develop and field capabilities in
2-year blocks. The configuration of a given block is intended to build on
the work completed in previous blocks. Block 2004, which was scheduled to
be deployed during calendar years 2004-2005, is the first biennial
increment of BMDS that is intended to provide an integrated set of
capabilities. Table 2 below shows, for each block of capability, the
cumulative total number of each element that the Missile Defense Agency
plans to deliver. The capabilities in bolded text show cumulative totals
and show new or additional capabilities from the previous block.
Table 2: Missile Defense Agency's Planned Delivery of Ballistic Missile
Defense Elements by Block
December 2005 December 2007 December 2009 December 2011
Fixed Site o 8 o Up to 20 o Up to 36 o 36
Interceptors Ground-Based Ground-Based Ground-Based Ground-Based
Interceptors, Interceptors, Interceptors, Interceptors,
Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska
o 2 o 2 o 2 o 2
Ground-Based Ground-Based Ground-Based Ground-Based
Interceptors, Interceptors, Interceptors, Interceptors,
California California California California
o 10
Ground-Based
Interceptors,
Europe
Fixed Site o Cobra Dane o Cobra Dane o Cobra Dane o Cobra Dane
Sensors Radar, Alaska Radar, Alaska Radar, Alaska Radar, Alaska
o 2 Upgraded o 2 Upgraded o 3 Upgraded o 3 Upgraded
Early Warning Early Warning Early Warning Early Warning
Radars (1 Radars Radars Radars
expected to o Clear
be integrated Radar, Alaska
into the
system in
2006)
Mobile/ o 1 o 1 o 1 Sea-Based o 1 Sea-Based
Transportable Sea-Based Sea-Based X-Band Radar, X-Band Radar,
Sensors X-Band Radar, X-Band Radar, Alaska Alaska
Alaska Alaska o 3 o 4
(expected to o 2 Forward-Based Forward-Based
be integrated Forward-Based X-Band Radars X-Band Radars
into the X-Band Radars o 1 o 2
system in o 7 Aegis Discrimination Discrimination
2006). Search & X-Band Radar X-Band Radars
o 1 Track o Initial
Forward-Based Destroyers Space Tracking
X-Band Radar and
(expected to Surveillance
be integrated Satellites
into the
system in
2006).
o 10 Aegis
Search &
Track
Destroyers
Mobile o 2 Aegis o 3 Aegis o 3 Aegis o 3 Aegis
Interceptors Engagement Engagement Engagement Engagement
Cruisers Cruisers Cruisers Cruisers
o 9 Standard o 7 Aegis o 15 Aegis o 15 Aegis
Missile-3s Engagement Engagement Engagement
o 313 Destroyers Destroyers Destroyers
Patriot PAC-3 o 24 o 54 Standard o 81 Standard
missiles Standard Missile-3s Missile-3s
Missile-3s o 24 Terminal o 48 Terminal
o 534 High Altitude High Altitude
Patriot PAC-3 Area Defense Area Defense
missiles Missiles Missiles
o 734 Patriot o 862 Patriot
PAC-3 missiles PAC-3 missiles
Command and o C2BMC o C2BMC o 2 C2BMC o C2BMC
Control, Suites at Suites at Suites at Suites at 2
Battle U.S. U.S. Central locations to locations to
Management, Strategic Command, U.S. be determined be determined
and Command, U.S. European o Upgraded o Upgraded
Communication Northern Command, C2BMC Suites C2BMC Suites
(C2BMC) Command, U.S. other at U.S. at 3 locations
Pacific locations to Central to be
Command, and be determined Command, U.S. determined
the Joint o Upgraded European
National C2BMC Suites Command, and
Integration at U.S. other
Center Strategic locations to
Command, U.S. be determined
Pacific (incorporate
Command, U. new
S. Northern situational
Command awareness)
(Incorporate
new
situational
awareness)
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
Note: Aegis Engagement cruisers and destroyers can perform the search and
track function as well as fire standard missiles at incoming targets.
DOD's framework for BMDS ground and flight testing through block 2006
(December 2007) is established in the Integrated Master Test Plan. This
plan defines the test plans for the BMDS and its elements and identifies
test objectives. In 2006, the Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct 10
flight tests-3 for the Aegis ballistic missile defense element, 4 for the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense element, and 3 for the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense element. We reported last year that the Missile Defense
Agency has conducted a variety of tests that provide some degree of
confidence that the limited defensive operations will operate as intended.
However, we also pointed out that some elements have not been fully tested
and that performance of the system remains uncertain because the Missile
Defense Agency has not conducted an end-to-end flight test using
operationally representative hardware and software.9 In addition, DOD's
fiscal year 2005 annual test report states that "...there is insufficient
evidence to support a confident assessment of Limited Defensive
Operations..."
Whereas the Missile Defense Agency is the developer of BMDS, the U.S.
Strategic Command is responsible for coordinating ballistic missile
defense operations that will be conducted by multiple commands, such as
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command. Strategic Command
developed an overall strategic concept of operations for ballistic missile
defense in November 2003 that explains how all aspects of the system are
to be integrated. Strategic Command is also tasked with directing,
coordinating, and reporting Military Utility Assessments of the ballistic
missile defense system. Military Utility Assessments are iterative,
event-driven assessments that document the combatant commanders' views on
the expected military utility of the system. These assessments are
intended to independently examine the degree to which delivered
capabilities support the warfighter's ability to execute the missile
defense mission, record all data and results from flight tests, ground
tests, and wargame/exercises, and focus on the overall ballistic missile
defense system rather than the individual elements. As of January 2006,
one assessment had been completed (April 2005) and the scope was limited
due to the system's immaturity at that time.
9 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program
in 2004, GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
Weapon System Operational Costs
Operations and support costs (hereafter called operational costs) are the
resources required to operate and support a weapon system and include
maintenance of equipment/infrastructure, operations of forces, training
and readiness, base operations, personnel, and logistics. Operational
costs for weapons systems typically account for 72 percent of a weapon
system's total life-cycle cost and can generally be found in the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a DOD centralized report
consisting of thousands of program elements10 that provides information on
DOD's current and planned budget requests. It is one of DOD's principal
tools to manage the spending for its capabilities and is available to help
inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to
make resource decisions in light of competing priorities. The FYDP is a
report that resides in an automated database, which is updated and
published to coincide with DOD's annual budget submission to Congress. It
provides projections of DOD's near and midterm funding needs and reflects
the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year.
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but Planning Is Incomplete
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS, but aside from testing
issues we have previously reported on, planning is incomplete in that it
lacks several critical elements such as establishing operational criteria,
resolving security issues, and completing training plans. DOD has
developed procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate
contingency plans, and planned and conducted some training and exercises.
However, this planning lacks critical elements such as development of
operational criteria, resolution of security issues, completion of
training plans, and approval of dual status for the commanders of the
National Guard units responsible for operating the ground-based element.
DOD's operational planning is incomplete because it is developing BMDS in
a unique way and exempted BMDS from the department's traditional
requirements guidance. DOD officials agreed that planning for new weapon
systems generally includes critical planning elements such as development
of training plans, assessment of military specialties, identifying support
requirements, and successful operational testing. U.S. Strategic Command
officials agreed that this level of detailed planning is necessary but has
not been done because BMDS is being developed in a nontraditional way, and
further stated that warfighters are ready to use the system on an
emergency basis. However, without a comprehensive plan establishing what
needs to be accomplished before declaring BMDS operational and assigning
responsibility for doing such planning, the Secretary of Defense may not
have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become
more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress
considers requests to fund operations. Moreover, it may be difficult for
DOD to identify and prioritize actions and determine whether the return on
its significant development investment can be realized.
10 Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that
represent organizational entities, their related resources, and
descriptions of various DOD missions. Program elements may be aggregated
in different ways, such as to show total resources assigned to a specific
program or to identify selected functional groupings of resources.
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense
System
DOD has taken positive steps in planning to operate the BMDS. For example,
some operating plans and guidance are either in development or in place.
In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command has created a subcommand, the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, to
integrate planning and operational support for missile defense.11 The
Missile Defense Agency and the combatant commands have also been actively
planning and conducting training and exercises.
Some Operational Planning Has Taken Place
DOD has developed some operational plans, established guidance, and
conducted capability demonstrations to refine operating procedures. In
2003, the U.S. Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for planning,
integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations including
developing a concept of operations. Since then, U.S. Strategic Command has
coordinated development of plans and orders that explain how the ballistic
missile defense mission will be conducted, including command
relationships, who authorizes missile launches, and other policies. For
example, some combatant commands have developed plans that specify how
they will defend against incoming ballistic missiles and how they will
support other combatant commands in doing so. DOD has also developed
tactics, techniques, and procedures for how the ballistic missile defense
mission would be conducted. Strategic Command's subcommand for missile
defense is working with the combatant commands to ensure these plans are
integrated. The services have also published service doctrine and DOD is
currently developing joint doctrine that will explain concepts for
planning, coordinating, and conducting the ballistic missile defense
mission. The doctrine will be revised as BMDS capabilities increase and as
procedures for conducting the mission evolve.
11 U.S. Strategic Command established several subcommands, each
responsible for a specific mission area. In this report, the term
subcommand refers specifically to the Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense.
In addition to developing plans, DOD has established some policy guidance
clarifying command and control for the ballistic missile defense mission.
The Joint Staff has issued several orders providing guidance for ballistic
missile defense mission planning which reflect policy decisions made by
senior DOD leadership. For example, orders issued in fall 2005 resolved
policy issues regarding weapons release authority, defined various system
readiness conditions and defense priorities, and explained the rules of
engagement and the relationships between combatant commands.
Since the fall of 2004, DOD has been in a transitional period (called
"shakedown") to move from development to operations. As part of this
process, the Missile Defense Agency, in conjunction with operational
commanders and contractors, has completed 11 capability demonstrations and
U.S. Strategic Command's subcommand for missile defense is planning the
twelfth for March 2006. The capability demonstrations are being conducted
to practice and refine procedures for transitioning BMDS from a
developmental configuration to an operational configuration and maintain
the system in the operational configuration for a specific time period.
The purpose behind these demonstrations is to reduce operational risks by
demonstrating capabilities prior to combat use, using trained military
personnel to exercise procedures in an operational environment. According
to officials, there is no plan to conduct a specific number of these
capability demonstrations; rather, they will be conducted as needed. In
addition, U.S. Strategic Command officials said that the subcommand for
missile defense will conduct readiness exercises to practice and refine
warfighter tactics and procedures.
U.S. Strategic Command Created a Subcommand to Plan and Integrate Ballistic
Missile Defense Operations
Because U.S. Strategic Command has several other broad missions in
addition to missile defense, it created a subcommand to integrate planning
and operational support for ballistic missile defense. This subcommand,
called the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense, was created in early 2005 for the purpose of integrating and
globally synchronizing missile defense plans to meet strategic objectives.
This subcommand is drafting a global concept of operations for ballistic
missile defense and is working with other combatant commands to integrate
their ballistic missile defense operating plans. The subcommand is also
operating the BMDS asset management process, which is a tool for
scheduling and tracking the status of each ballistic missile defense
element. This process uses a real-time database that shows when each BMDS
element is being used for testing, exercises, maintenance, development, or
operations. The asset management process schedules activities for the
coming fiscal year and is updated throughout the year.
Missile Defense Agency and Combatant Commands Have Planned and Conducted Some
Training and Exercises
The Missile Defense Agency and combatant commands have planned and
conducted some training and exercises for ballistic missile defense to
practice and refine command and control, tactics, procedures, and firing
doctrine specified in the contingency and supporting plans. The Missile
Defense Agency works with the combatant commands to incorporate ballistic
missile defense training into each other's exercises. For example, the
combatant commands will include training on their mission-essential tasks
during the Missile Defense Agency's exercise and wargame program, and the
Missile Defense Agency will try to incorporate ballistic missile defense
training into the exercises scheduled by the combatant commands. For
example, U.S. Strategic Command integrated ballistic missile defense with
all of its other missions in its fall 2005 command exercise and will
include ballistic missile defense to a limited extent in the command's
upcoming spring exercise for the first time.
The Missile Defense Agency also provides some ballistic missile defense
training programs and course development for individuals, units, and
combatant command staffs. The Missile Defense Agency provides initial
operator training on specific elements and the crews are subsequently
certified by their unit commanders. The agency also provides training to
combatant command staffs on BMDS policy and procedures and command and
control. For example, during an exercise we observed at the training
center in Colorado, the Northern Command staff, Army crews from the
battalion in Alaska, and Navy crews from the Aegis training center in
Virginia were linked electronically. In the future, this type of training
will be enhanced via the Distributed Multi-echelon Training System, which
will enable warfighters to participate in live, virtual, and integrated
training from their duty station. The Missile Defense Agency also cochairs
the Integrated Training Working Group with U.S. Strategic Command to
address training and education goals, objectives, roles, missions, and
policy decisions among the combatant commands and services.
Some Aspects of Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System Are
Incomplete
Despite the progress made since 2002, DOD's planning to operate BMDS is
incomplete and lacks several critical elements. DOD officials agreed that
planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements guidance
generally includes critical planning elements such as establishing
operational criteria, identifying personnel requirements, developing
training programs, completing successful testing, and establishing
readiness reporting. However, DOD's BMDS planning is missing several of
these critical elements, such as specific operational criteria for the
overall BMDS and most of the system's elements that must be met before
declaring that either limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of
capability are operational. Furthermore, security issues involving
responsibility for and funding of necessary security remain unresolved and
training plans are still evolving. In addition, DOD has not approved dual
status for the commanders of the National Guard units responsible for
operating the ground-based element. U.S. Strategic Command officials
agreed that this level of detailed planning is necessary but has not been
done because BMDS is being developed in a nontraditional way and further
stated that warfighters are ready to use the system. However, without
comprehensive planning laying out steps that need to be completed before
declaring the system operational, development of operational criteria, and
assigning responsibility for doing such planning, DOD may face uncertainty
about the basis that will be used to declare BMDS operational. This, in
turn, may make it difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions
needed to achieve this end effectively and efficiently. Moreover, the
Secretary of Defense and Congress may not have a sound basis for assessing
the system's status and progress toward an operational capability.
Planning for New Weapon Systems Generally Includes Identifying Specific
Actions and Criteria
Prior to initially employing a new weapon system, DOD customarily prepares
planning documents that identify actions that must be taken and criteria
that must be met before the system can be declared operational. DOD
officials agree that requirements guidance states that these planning
documents identify any changes needed to doctrine, organizations,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.
Our prior work on successful management of complex defense programs shows
that such planning provides a basis for knowing what steps need to be
completed before a weapon system can be declared operational.
As part of the planning for new weapon systems, DOD guidance, as well as
DOD practices based on discussions with defense officials, requires
initial operating capability criteria (hereafter called operational
criteria) to be met to ensure that necessary planning has been completed
to initially employ a new weapon system. These operational criteria12
include critical elements such as:
12 These criteria are generally contained in specific documents required
by DOD's traditional requirements and acquisition processes.
o an assessment of the military specialties needed;
o identification of personnel requirements;
o development of individual, unit, and joint training programs;
o system supportability, including identifying logistics and
maintenance requirements;
o successful operational testing; and
o the ability to report system and unit readiness.
If the new system is a part of a system of systems, then these
operational criteria are to be integrated with those of the
related system elements. DOD officials told us that these
operational criteria also describe actions that the services
typically take to prepare to operate a new system.
Likewise, the services have developed instructions that embody
these principles for new systems. For example, an Air Force
instruction states that an initial operating capability can be
declared for a system when it has successfully completed
operational testing, key logistics support is in place, and the
personnel necessary to operate, maintain, and support the system
are trained. This instruction further states that the following
items should be met before declaring that operational capability
has been achieved: concept of operations, system training plan,
personnel plan, operational protection guide, logistics support
plan, system security design, successful operational testing and
completion of a successful trial period, and the ability to report
readiness at a certain level. Army and Navy regulations also
specify operational criteria. For example, new Army weapon systems
must have adequately trained operators who are equipped and
supported to execute the mission before the system can be declared
operational. Furthermore, a Navy instruction states that a
logistic support strategy, identification of personnel
requirements, manpower estimates, and a plan for training shall be
developed for new weapon systems.
As of February 2006, according to DOD officials, DOD had not yet
developed any overarching operational criteria to be met before
declaring the overall BMDS operational either for limited
defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability. Instead,
officials stated that the Secretary of Defense will declare BMDS
operational based on test results, confidence in the system,
threat, and recommendations from the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, the Commander of the subcommand for missile defense,
commanders of other combatant commands, and the Director, Missile
Defense Agency. Additionally, the Missile Defense Support Group,
which was formed to advise senior DOD leaders on policy,
operations, acquisition, and resources for BMDS, has not defined
any criteria with which to make recommendations about operational
capability. DOD officials have told us that while operational
criteria describe actions that services customarily take to
prepare to operate a new system, these actions have not been taken
for BMDS. Some DOD officials have suggested that DOD should not
have to meet operational criteria due to the urgency of emplacing
a ballistic missile capability as soon as possible.
DOD has done some assessments in which warfighters raised issues
in areas that the operational criteria are intended to address.
For example, combatant commanders have raised concerns about
security and personnel. Recognizing that there may be planning
gaps, the Army Space and Missile Defense Command13 has begun to
identify what actions need to be taken-such as security planning,
force design analysis, personnel requirements, training
sustainment program, and system training plan-for the warfighter
to use the BMDS and some of the elements. The officials
acknowledged that, ideally, a master plan should be developed to
track these actions. However, even though the Army Space and
Missile Defense Command's preliminary analysis and the other DOD
assessments may provide a foundation for developing operational
criteria, the Command officials stated they are not responsible
for doing so and have not been tasked with ensuring that the
services do so when an element is transitioned to the service.
In August 2005, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command recognized
that as BMDS approached operational status, DOD needed to take
necessary actions to put the ballistic missile defense elements in
the hands of the warfighters that would address base operations,
manning, force protection, and other aspects of military support.
The Commander recommended a lead service be named for each BMDS
element. This lead service would be responsible for developing
doctrine, training, organizations, and personnel. This concept was
briefed to the Joint Staff in November 2005 and in January 2006.
The Joint Staff recommended that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics name a lead
service for only two elements-Army was recommended to be lead
service for the forward-based radar and the Air Force was
recommended to be lead service for the ballistic missile defense
mission of the Cobra Dane radar. On February 11, 2006, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense approved this recommendation.
According to DOD officials, operational criteria also have not
been developed for most BMDS elements. As shown in table 3, DOD
has not developed any operational criteria for five of eight
ballistic missile defense elements and criteria for two more are
being drafted.
Table 3: Status of Operational Criteria Development for Ballistic
Missile Defense Elements
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Table includes only those elements expected to be fielded by
2011.
DOD has developed and approved operational criteria for only one
BMDS element, the Patriot PAC-3 Missile System. The Army developed
operational criteria to ensure the Army was prepared to operate
Patriot and specified these criteria in two capabilities documents
(dated November 2000 and July 2003).14 These documents included
criteria in areas such as support equipment, training and training
support for system users, a logistics support concept and
logistics standards, security, maintenance planning, and
personnel. The Army determined these criteria were met and
declared operational capability15 was achieved in June 2004 after
the system transferred to the Army from the Missile Defense Agency
in 2003.
Although DOD is developing plans to transition some BMDS elements
to the services,16 these plans, according to DOD officials, are
not required to include operational criteria. However, the Air
Force and the Army have elected to develop operational criteria
for two BMDS elements as part of the transition plans. For
example, Air Force Space Command officials stated they have
drafted operational criteria for the Upgraded Early Warning Radar
that include:
o testing to demonstrate the radar meets required performance
standards for existing missions and the ballistic missile defense
mission;
o training for operators, maintainers, and logistics support
personnel;
o a successful trial period to validate system performance; and
o adequate support capability and sufficient spare parts.
The draft plan to transition the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense element to the Army is also supposed to include
operational criteria such as:
o system training plan and identification of leader development
courses;
o system security requirements;
o supportability strategy;
o manpower estimate; and
o development of a Capabilities Development Document which,
according to DOD guidance, typically includes operational
criteria.
DOD officials stated that operational criteria-such as the
criteria in DOD guidance required to be met before initially
employing a new weapon system-for some elements may not be
developed. For example, operational criteria will probably not be
developed for elements that either are not likely to transition
from the Missile Defense Agency to a service or are expected to be
contractor operated, such as the sea-based radar and the
forward-based radar.17 Moreover, the Navy has not developed
operational criteria for the Aegis ballistic missile defense
element. Navy officials stated that they would only develop
operational criteria and establish a timeline for achieving an
initial capability if the Navy decides to buy ballistic missile
defense capability for more ships than the Missile Defense Agency
currently plans to buy.
Although DOD has developed security policies specifically for
BMDS, unresolved security issues remain and it is not clear when
these issues will be resolved. Specifically, DOD has not resolved
issues of who is responsible for security of BMDS elements and
which organization is financially responsible for funding required
security. In addition, DOD may have difficulty meeting security
requirements at some locations because not all the funding has
been allocated. Despite this situation, Joint Staff and combatant
command officials stated that a decision to declare BMDS
operational does not necessarily depend on resolving these issues.
In July 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the
highest security level for BMDS when it is operational because
damage to this system would harm the strategic capability of the
United States.18 The Deputy Secretary also designated U.S.
Strategic Command as the oversight authority responsible for
coordinating security issues with other combatant commands, the
services, and the Missile Defense Agency. This was done, in part,
to identify budget requirements. This policy was further clarified
in a May 2005 memo stating that the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command has the authority to designate the security level for each
BMDS element and is responsible for developing security standards,
policies, and procedures for BMDS. In October 2005, U.S. Strategic
Command issued a directive specifying the standards for BMDS
security and setting the security level for each BMDS element.
Despite these directives, however, combatant commands have
expressed concerns about which DOD commands are responsible for
actually providing and paying for BMDS security, particularly for
those elements that will be contractor operated and are expected
to be available to the warfighter in fiscal year 2006. According
to U.S. Strategic Command officials, BMDS elements at the highest
security level require, for example, two lines of defensive
security, including sensor fences and sufficient personnel to
achieve a specific response rate; integrated electronic security
systems; entry control; and access delay and denial systems. These
measures are expensive-the Missile Defense Agency estimated that
security measures for three BMDS elements will cost about $350
million over fiscal years 2006-2011.19 However, Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Joint Staff, and other DOD officials said that service estimates
of security requirements (personnel and costs) are generally
higher and that some of these costs are not budgeted by either the
services or the Missile Defense Agency. Furthermore, although U.S.
Strategic Command has oversight responsibility and has conducted
some security inspections, Command officials told us that ensuring
security requirements are met will actually be done by a service
or the combatant command where the element is located.
As discussed above, the U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff
recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics assign a "lead service" for
each BMDS element that would be responsible for providing
security, ensuring security standards are met, and budgeting for
any associated costs in the next Future Years Defense Program
(which will be for fiscal years 2008-13). Although negotiations on
this issue are ongoing, the Missile Defense Agency agreed in
December 2005 to fund the sea-based radar and forward-based radar
costs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Air Force Cobra Dane radar
costs for fiscal year 2007, and contractor logistic support
through fiscal year 2013. However, DOD officials stated that there
are significant disagreements between the services and the Missile
Defense Agency over the levels of support and force protection
required. Further, the services and the Missile Defense Agency
have not resolved disagreements over which organization will fund
operational costs or which organization will provide and fund
force protection beyond fiscal year 2007. It is not clear whether
the recent designation of lead service for only two BMDS elements
will help resolve these issues in time to be reflected in the
development of the fiscal years 2008-13 Future Years Defense
Program.
Funding issues could prevent DOD from meeting security
requirements at some locations before the system is declared
operational. For example, both Vandenberg and Schreiver Air Force
Bases require a combination of additional security personnel and
technology improvements to meet security requirements. Although
some personnel were recently added and the Air Force has requested
funding for the technology improvements, as of February 8, 2006,
not all the required personnel and technology were in place. The
Army also had to increase the military police unit to protect the
missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the cost for snow
removal is nearly a million dollars a year. Security will become
increasingly important and costly as additional BMDS elements are
placed in more locations, particularly those outside the
continental United States (see table 2). For example, DOD is
planning a third site for the ground-based element and is planning
for four forward-based radars, and officials have noted that the
estimated cost for protecting the forward-based radar could double
for austere locations.
Although DOD has made progress in developing some training, the
training plans prepared by the combatant commands under the Joint
Training System are evolving as are readiness assessments for
BMDS. The Joint Training System20 is DOD's authoritative process
for combatant commands and others to develop training plans,
conduct training, and assess proficiency. This system requires
combatant commands to develop annual training plans based on the
mission-essential tasks required to perform assigned missions. The
Joint Training System also includes an automated, Web-based system
to track progress. The mission-essential tasks are also the basis
for DOD readiness assessments such as the Defense Readiness
Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.
DOD has not yet completed all the planning as part of the Joint
Training System for ballistic missile defense. For example, the
U.S. Strategic Command subcommand for missile defense is
developing but has not yet completed an annual training plan and a
list of mission-essential tasks under the Joint Training System.
Although some combatant commands have individually drafted some
mission-essential tasks for ballistic missile defense, the
subcommand's efforts are intended to develop a list that will be
standardized and integrated across combatant commands. Once
developed, these mission-essential tasks need to be entered into
the Joint Training System's Web-based tracking system, which
currently does not include ballistic missile defense tasks.
The roles of organizations involved in ballistic mission defense
training are evolving and DOD is still developing some important
aspects of its training program. The Missile Defense Agency has
done a lot of work to develop BMDS element and command training as
well as develop and conduct exercises for the combatant commands
and services. However, the U.S. Strategic Command's subcommand is
beginning to assume more responsibilities for training, such as
developing the annual training plan and mission-essential tasks.
The two organizations are negotiating which organization will
assume which training functions, but, as of November 2005,
according to DOD officials, no final decisions had been made. The
subcommand, with a supporting working group, is working on several
important aspects of ballistic missile defense training that are
not yet complete even though additional elements, such as the
forward-based radar and the sea-based radar, are expected to be
made available to the warfighter in 2006. The subcommand and
working group are also developing:
o an overarching training vision,
o a global BMDS employment guide for how to "fight the system"
with more elements than just the ground-based element,
o a method to systematically integrate ballistic missile defense
into the Joint Staff's exercise program and crosswalk these
exercises with the ballistic missile defense annual training plan,
and
o a training and certification program for nonservice-owned
elements such as the sea-based radar and the forward-based radar.
Development of a standardized list of joint mission-essential
tasks will form the basis for DOD readiness assessments such as
the Defense Readiness Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly
Readiness Review.21 Joint Staff officials told us that in some of
the recent quarterly reviews, U.S. Strategic Command submitted a
subjective evaluation of ballistic missile defense as part of the
review. However, the officials said that the Joint Staff could not
assess the Command's input during the review because there is not
yet an approved, common list of mission tasks and the system has
not been declared operational; thus, there was no "yardstick" for
them to use to assess the readiness to conduct the ballistic
missile defense mission. Regarding input into the Defense
Readiness Reporting System, U.S. Strategic Command officials
stated that inputs are usually based on the mission-essential
tasks, which are assessed using objective effectiveness measures
and some subjective commander's judgment. However, since the
mission-essential tasks are evolving and the combatant commands
are just beginning to develop measures of effectiveness, the
inputs into this system are currently limited and predominantly
subjective.
Although the Secretary of the Army recently approved the model for
using National Guard units to operate the ground-based BMDS
element, DOD has not approved dual status for the commanders of
these units, according to DOD officials.22 The Army decided in
1999 to establish National Guard units to perform the ballistic
missile defense mission. In 2003, the Army assigned National Guard
soldiers to the Colorado Army National Guard 100th Missile Defense
Brigade and the Alaska Army National Guard 49th Missile Defense
Battalion.23
The model for using these National Guard units and
roles/responsibilities of all parties involved are specified in a
memorandum of agreement between the Army's Space and Missile
Defense Command, National Guard Bureau, and the Colorado and
Alaska State Adjutants General, which was signed in December 2005.
The model states that once BMDS is declared operational, the
National Guard soldiers will serve in a federal status when
performing ballistic missile defense mission duties, including
controlling, operating, maintaining, securing, or defending the
ground-based element or site. Otherwise, the soldiers will serve
in a state status and be responsible for performing National Guard
duties, such as organizing, administering, recruiting,
instructing, or training reserve components. Until BMDS is
declared operational, the National Guard soldiers are in a state
status all of the time.24 The Secretary of the Army approved this
model on March 3, 2006.
The model states that the commanders of these National Guard units
will serve in a dual status-meaning they can command soldiers in
either a federal or state status. According to an official in the
Secretary of the Army's office, the governors of Colorado and
Alaska have signed the document authorizing dual status of the
unit commanders. However, according to Army officials, either the
Secretary of Defense or the President must sign approval for
dual-status authority. As of March 3, 2006, this had not been
done. However, DOD officials stressed that these National Guard
soldiers are trained and certified by their unit commanders and
are thus prepared to operate the ground-based BMDS element
whenever the system is declared operational.
DOD's incomplete planning to operate BMDS has created uncertainty
about the basis that will be used to declare the system
operational. DOD does not have a comprehensive plan laying out
steps that need to be taken and criteria that should be met before
declaring that either the limited defensive operations or
subsequent system blocks are operational. DOD officials agreed
that planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements
guidance generally includes critical planning elements such as
development of operational criteria, a plan to adequately staff
units, provide security, and complete training and personnel
plans. However, no organization has been officially assigned
responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan-to include
operational criteria-specifying what needs to be accomplished
before declaring that BMDS is operational either for limited
defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability. Although
DOD has conducted some assessments that could be used to form the
basis for developing operational criteria, no organization is
clearly in charge of developing such criteria and ensuring they
are met. Some DOD officials have suggested that the "lead service"
could do this planning, but DOD has not clearly defined lead
service responsibilities and has not fully implemented this
proposal.
Without comprehensive planning, the services and the combatant
commands may not be as well prepared to operate the complex,
integrated BMDS as they are for other new weapon systems for which
DOD establishes criteria for achieving operational capability.
Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for the
Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands' and
services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations, and the
Secretary may not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS
operational, which will become more important as capabilities are
added in subsequent blocks. Further, operational criteria are
important because they specify actions that need to be completed
for users to be prepared to use the system, such as security,
training, and personnel. Without resolving the outstanding
security issues, there is uncertainty about personnel
requirements, and which organization will provide security for
each element and pay the related costs. Without complete training
plans, it is unknown how training for the integrated BMDS and some
elements will be conducted, particularly the radars that will be
fielded in 2006. Furthermore, it is not clear which
mission-essential tasks will be used in DOD readiness assessments.
The absence of comprehensive planning to operate BMDS may result
in uncertainty about the basis that will be used to declare the
system operational for limited defensive operation and subsequent
blocks of capability. Thus, it may be difficult for DOD to
identify and prioritize actions across the department needed to
achieve this end effectively and efficiently and identify specific
DOD organizations responsible and accountable for making this
happen. As a result, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not
have the information to assess the system's status and progress
toward an operational capability as they consider funding requests
from DOD.
The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) does not provide complete
and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs for
use by either DOD or Congress. The FYDP is a major source of
budget information that reports projected spending for the current
budget year and at least 4 succeeding years.25 We and DOD have
repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities
to facilitate DOD's decision making and congressional oversight.
However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense
operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's
structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these
costs, even though DOD plans to field an increasing number of
elements between fiscal years 2006-2011. Several factors impair
the visibility of ballistic missile defense operational costs. For
example, we have reported that although expected operational costs
for fiscal years 2005-2011 total $1.7 billion, DOD has not
included all known operational costs in its budget.26 Also, these
operational costs are contained in many program elements
throughout the FYDP and are not linked in any way, making it
difficult to compile these costs. Without the ability to clearly
identify and assess the total ballistic missile defense
operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress
has complete information to use when making funding and trade-off
decisions among competing priorities; provide assurance that DOD's
plans to field ballistic missile defense capabilities are
affordable over time; and assess the costs of operating the New
Triad.
Complete and transparent budget information facilitates the
ability of DOD officials to make informed resource decisions,
which is increasingly important given the current strategic
environment and growing demand for resources at a time when the
department is facing significant affordability challenges. DOD
acknowledged in its fiscal year 2004 Performance and
Accountability Report that transparent budget submissions will
facilitate DOD leaders' ability to make better-informed resource
decisions. In addition, DOD has acknowledged that defense decision
making requires accurate, consistent computation of costs for each
type of military capability and thus has modified the FYDP over
time to capture the resources associated with particular areas of
interest, such as space activities. Moreover, we have previously
recommended DOD take actions designed to provide greater
visibility of projected spending and future investments. For
example, our report on DOD's New Triad explained that ballistic
missile defense is an important element of the New Triad and the
current FYDP structure does not readily identify and aggregate New
Triad-related costs. We recommended in June 2005 that DOD
establish a virtual major force program to identify New Triad
costs.27 Subsequently, because DOD disagreed with our
recommendation in its comments on our report, we also recommended
that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to
establish a virtual major force program to identify New Triad
costs and report annually on these funding levels.28
Complete and transparent budget information also facilitates
congressional oversight of DOD programs. To this end, we
recommended in 2004 that DOD enhance its FYDP report to provide
better information for congressional decision makers' use during
budget deliberations.29 Also, a congressional committee has
expressed specific interest in obtaining ballistic missile defense
cost data. For example, in the Report of the House Committee on
Appropriations on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill
for Fiscal Year 2006, congressional committee members noted that
the large level of funding in individual program elements
"obscures funding details and creates significant oversight
issues." Another committee also expressed frustration with the
lack of transparency in budgeting and, in the Conference Report on
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
(December 18, 2005) directed the Comptroller General to conduct a
study of the current program element structure (for research,
development, test, and evaluation projects), particularly those
that employ the system of systems concept.
Complete costs to operate ballistic missile defense elements that
will be fielded between fiscal years 2006-2011 are not visible to
DOD or Congress in the FYDP because the current FYDP structure
does not provide a way to identify and aggregate all ballistic
missile defense system operational costs. Officials in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller and Program, Analysis, and
Evaluation agreed that such data are necessary in making fully
informed resource decisions and will become more important as more
ballistic missile defense elements are fielded over time; however,
these officials also agreed that these data are not transparent in
the FYDP and that they have not developed a new structure for
capturing these costs.
We analyzed the fiscal year 2006 FYDP30 to determine whether the
program elements related to ballistic missile defense operations
could be identified. In 1995, DOD's Office of Program, Analysis,
and Evaluation created a defense mission category structure in the
FYDP to identify resources devoted to different military missions,
because this type of data was not available from the FYDP. This
defense mission category structure can be used to identify the
program elements and costs for various missions such as
suppression of enemy air defenses because they are linked to
related program elements in the FYDP. Our analysis showed, and a
Program, Analysis, and Evaluation official agreed, that neither
the current FYDP structure nor its associated defense mission
categories provides a way to effectively identify and aggregate
ballistic missile defense operational costs.
In our analysis, we identified eight defense mission categories
related to ballistic missile defense such as "ballistic missile
defense forces" and "theater missile defense". Even though our
analysis identified 135 ballistic missile defense program elements
that were linked to these ballistic missile defense mission
categories, our analysis also showed that these program elements
did not provide a complete and accurate list for identifying and
aggregating ballistic missile defense operational costs. For
example, 88 of the 135 (65 percent) program elements linked to
ballistic missile defense mission categories were not related to
the current BMDS-for example, one of these was for Special
Operations Command. Also, the 135 program elements identified did
not include some programs that are part of the BMDS such as the
upgraded early warning radar. In addition, the 135 program
elements did not include many program elements that service
officials said contain BMDS operational costs. Specifically, we
documented 28 BMDS-related program elements from the services,
such as those for sensors and radars supported by the Air Force,
ground-based missile defense supported by the Army, and the Aegis
ballistic missile defense radar supported by the Navy. When we
compared this list of program elements to the 135 we identified
using the FYDP defense mission categories, we found that 24 of the
28 service-provided program elements did not match any of the 135
identified via our analysis of FYDP defense mission categories for
ballistic missile defense.
We discussed the results of our analysis with officials from the
Office of Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis
and Evaluation, and they agreed that our methodology was
reasonable. They also agreed that our analysis showed that
complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational
costs are not visible in the FYDP. Since there is no structure in
the FYDP to accurately identify and aggregate ballistic missile
defense operational costs, the Comptroller's office must request
these data from each service and the Missile Defense Agency. The
data are added together to determine an estimate of the total
operational cost for the ballistic missile defense system. The
Comptroller's office estimated that the services' operational
costs for fiscal years 2004-2006 totaled $259 million. However,
the officials acknowledged that these data may not have been
gathered consistently across all these organizations, because
there is no standardized methodology specifying which costs to
include.
The completeness and transparency of operational costs for
ballistic missile defense system elements are impaired by four
primary factors: (1) operational costs are included in many
program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile
these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use
research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3)
DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget
estimates, and (4) DOD has not yet identified all costs associated
with the New Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense system
is an important part. Officials from the Office of Secretary of
Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis and Evaluation agreed
that complete and transparent ballistic missile defense
operational costs are not visible in the FYDP for the reasons
cited above.
First, operational costs are included in many program elements
throughout the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link the FYDP
program elements together so that total operational costs can be
compiled. A further complication is that some of these program
elements also include costs for items that are not related to
ballistic missile defense. For example, one program element
entitled Theater Missile Defense is defined as including costs for
theater missiles of all classes, including tactical, cruise, and
air-to-surface missiles. Another program element includes all
costs for all the Navy's destroyers, and does not distinguish the
15 destroyers that DOD will operate to perform the ballistic
missile defense mission. Even though there is no FYDP structure to
identify and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational
costs, there is no plan to modify the FYDP structure to allow
identification of ballistic missile defense program elements,
according to an official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, because they have not
received direction to do so.
Second, the Missile Defense Agency is authorized by statute to use
research and development funds to pay for some operational
costs.31 However, officials we spoke with from the Office of
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis, and
Evaluation said that this practice makes it much more difficult to
derive an accurate estimate of operational costs, because the
research and development funds come from a different appropriation
and are not typically used to pay operational costs. These
officials told us that operational costs are usually paid from the
operations and maintenance appropriation, not the research and
development appropriation.
Third, we reported in September 2005 that operational costs for
fiscal years 2005-2011 totaled $1.7 billion but that DOD has not
included all known operational costs for BMDS in its budget.
Further, we reported that the Missile Defense Agency and the
services disagreed as to which organization should pay operational
costs for developmental assets, even though these assets may be
available for operational use.32 In discussing our analysis with
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller,
and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, the officials noted that
DOD's estimate of ballistic missile defense operational costs does
not reflect total costs, because it does not include combatant
commanders costs such as the costs for the new Strategic Command
subcommand for missile defense. In addition, an official in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller stated that their
estimate of operational costs over fiscal years 2006-2011 is not
complete because the services and the Missile Defense Agency are
negotiating who will pay operational costs in the future.
Fourth, as we previously reported, DOD has not identified all
costs associated with the New Triad, of which ballistic missile
defense is an important part. We reported that the current FYDP
structure does not expressly identify and aggregate New Triad
program elements that would allow identification of New Triad
spending. Since ballistic missile defense is a part of the New
Triad, DOD would need to be able to identify these costs as part
of the New Triad. In fact, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command suggested that creating a virtual major force program
could be necessary for each of the New Triad legs because of the
diversity and scope of New Triad capabilities.33
The lack of complete and transparent budget information about
ballistic missile defense operational costs impairs the ability of
DOD officials to make informed resource decisions. DOD officials
agreed that complete and transparent data on ballistic missile
defense operational costs are necessary to make informed funding
and trade-off decisions among competing priorities. Without the
ability to identify and assess total BMDS operational costs,
neither DOD nor Congress has complete information to know whether
DOD's plans to field ballistic missile defense capabilities are
affordable over time. Furthermore, if the funds budgeted for BMDS
support turn out to be insufficient since not all costs are
included, DOD will either have to take funds from other programs
or spend less on missile defense and potentially accept risks in
security, training, personnel, or other areas. This is
particularly important when considering the Missile Defense
Agency's plans to deliver an increasing number of systems and
units over fiscal years 2006 -2011. The Missile Defense Agency may
face increasing budget pressure because, although it will be
supporting more BMDS elements, the agency's budget for contractor
logistic support is expected to remain relatively constant.
Finally, we reported in 2005 that decision makers need complete
data about the resources being allocated to the New Triad-of which
ballistic missile defense is a part-in making trade-offs among
efforts to develop capabilities. Without these cost data, DOD will
be limited in its ability to guide and direct its efforts to
integrate New Triad capabilities and Congress will not have full
visibility of the resources being allocated to these efforts.34
Preparing to perform the ballistic missile defense mission is
highly complex, involves many different DOD organizations, and
requires seamless integration across multiple combatant commands.
At the same time that the warfighters are developing and refining
their training, operations, and security plans, the Missile
Defense Agency continues to develop blocks of BMDS capabilities.
Although DOD faces the twin challenges of simultaneously
developing the system and beginning operations, comprehensive
planning could alleviate users' concerns before declaring that
either limited operations or each subsequent block of capability
is operational. Although DOD has plans for additional tests that
are designed to resolve technical performance issues, the absence
of a comprehensive plan for operational issues creates uncertainty
across DOD on what remains to be done and how remaining actions
should be prioritized before the department declares BMDS
operational. Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for
the Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands'
and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations and the
Secretary may not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS
operational, which will become more important as capabilities are
added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund
operations. Until an organization is assigned responsibility for
developing a comprehensive plan that includes operational
criteria, DOD may be hindered in its ability to identify and
prioritize actions across the department effectively and
efficiently. Considering that DOD guidance generally includes this
type of planning and operational criteria to be developed for new
weapon systems such as radars or fighter aircraft, it is even more
important to bring discipline into the process for the highly
complex and integrated BMDS. Considering the significant changes
DOD plans for each block of BMDS, this disciplined approach is
important to apply not only to the initial capabilities, but to
each subsequent block. Without adequate planning, clear criteria,
and identifying responsibility for ensuring necessary actions, it
may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions and
assure itself or Congress that all of the necessary pieces will be
in place before declaring either limited defense operations or
subsequent blocks of capability operational. In addition, it will
be difficult for DOD to determine whether the return on its
significant development investment in BMDS can be realized.
Complete and transparent information on expected costs for
important missions (such as ballistic missile defense) and
investment efforts (such as the New Triad) facilitates DOD and
congressional decision making when allocating resources. Complete
and reliable data are needed to assess and understand cost trends
over time, which is particularly important as warfighters begin to
use ballistic missile defense elements and as an increasing number
of elements are fielded over fiscal years 2006-2011. However,
because the FYDP is currently not structured to transparently
identify and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational
costs, DOD's ability to make strategic investment decisions based
on knowledge of complete BMDS operational costs is impaired. In
addition, the consequences of not having this information means
that neither DOD nor Congress has the benefit of complete and
adequate data to make fully informed trade-off decisions in a
resource-constrained environment. As a result, the investment
decisions made may not truly reflect the desired relative priority
of ballistic missile defense within DOD's overall defense
strategy.
We are making the following two recommendations for executive
action. First, to help DOD identify and prioritize actions across
the department needed to declare limited defensive operations as
well as each subsequent block of capability operational, and to
dispel uncertainty and bring needed discipline to the process, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions
in consultation with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the
services, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
o Develop operational criteria for each ballistic missile defense
element and the overall BMDS system for limited defensive
operations and each subsequent block of capability. These criteria
should be comparable to the operational criteria that are
currently developed for new weapon systems.
o Assign responsibility to specific organizations and hold these
organizations accountable for developing the criteria and ensuring
these criteria are met before operational capability is declared.
o Develop a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be
completed with completion deadlines. The plan should cover the
range of doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and
facilities actions that are normally required to be developed and
in place for new weapon systems, should integrate these actions
across elements, and should address actions needed for the
overall, integrated BMDS.
Second, to provide decision makers in Congress and DOD with
complete, transparent data on the resources required to operate
the ballistic missile defense system and to clearly identify costs
for an important piece of the New Triad, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Program, Analysis, and
Evaluation, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and the services, to develop a structure within the
FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense operational costs,
which can be included as part of an annual report on the funding
levels for New Triad activities that GAO recommended DOD provide
annually to Congress.35
Given the significance of BMDS to national defense and the
billions of dollars spent in developing this system, Congress
should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop:
o A comprehensive plan (including operational criteria)
specifying actions that must be completed by the services and
combatant commands before declaring BMDS operational for limited
defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability.
o A structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile
defense operational costs which can be included as part of an
annual report on the funding levels for New Triad activities.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations.
The department's comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix III. The department also provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations to develop
operational criteria and a comprehensive plan specifying actions
that must be completed before declaring BMDS operational and also
agreed with our recommendation to assign responsibility for doing
so to a specific organization which would be held accountable for
completing these tasks. However, while DOD's response addressed
the warfighters' role in providing input to the Missile Defense
Agency to guide the system's technical development, it did not
address the need for operational criteria prior to declaring the
BMDS or elements of the system operational. Moreover, DOD's
comments do not indicate what, if any, process it plans to use to
develop operational criteria for assessing combatant commands' and
services' preparedness to conduct BMDS operations or whether it
plans to assign responsibility. We continue to believe that the
warfighters, specifically the combatant commands and services
under the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command, should have the
lead in developing and ensuring operational criteria are met as
opposed to the developers-the Missile Defense Agency and system
development program offices. Without comprehensive planning and
objective operational criteria, the services and the combatant
commands may not be as well prepared to operate the complex,
integrated BMDS as they are for other new weapon systems.
Furthermore, such planning and criteria would provide an objective
basis for assessing combatant commands' and services' preparedness
to conduct BMDS operations and provide a transparent basis for
declaring BMDS operational. In addition, without an organization
assigned responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan which
includes operational criteria, DOD may be hindered in its ability
to identify and prioritize actions across the department
effectively and efficiently.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a
structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile
defense operational costs that could be included as part of an
annual report on New Triad funding that we had previously
recommended DOD provide annually to Congress. Considering that
there is no common methodology to identify and aggregate BMDS
operational costs, we continue to believe that corrective action
is needed so that Congress and DOD have adequate information to
assess whether DOD's plans to field ballistic missile defense
capabilities are affordable. Complete and transparent BMDS
operational cost information is important to assess cost trends
over time, particularly as an increasing number of BMDS elements
are fielded during the next several years. Without this
information, neither DOD nor Congress will have the benefit of
complete and adequate data to make fully informed trade-off
decisions within projected defense spending levels. With respect
to DOD's nonconcurrence on our previous recommendation to account
for New Triad costs in the FYDP, we note that the Report of the
House Armed Services Committee on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed the Secretary of
Defense to modify the FYDP to identify and aggregate program
elements associated with the New Triad which, as we state in this
report, includes ballistic missile defense.
We continue to believe that the specific actions we recommended
are needed for DOD to prepare for conducting BMDS operations and
to assist in DOD and congressional oversight of ballistic missile
defense operational costs. Because DOD did not indicate that it
plans to implement our recommendations, we have added a matter for
Congress to consider directing DOD to develop a comprehensive plan
which includes operational criteria and to develop a structure
within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense
operational costs.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense;
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Commander, U.S.
Northern Command; and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. We
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202)
512-4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Janet A. St. Laurent Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)
has made progress in planning to operate the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS), and to determine whether the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on
total ballistic missile defense operational costs, we conducted
various analyses, reviewed key documentation, and interviewed
relevant DOD officials. During this review, we focused on
assessing issues DOD faces in planning to operate the BMDS such as
operational criteria, training, security, and cost transparency.
We did not evaluate DOD's testing plans, research and development
programs, or the technical effectiveness of individual elements as
we have addressed these issues in other reports. Specifically, we
have issued two reports on the status of BMDS that included
assessments of program goals, testing plans, and progress in
developing each element.1 Our March 2005 report found that system
performance remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has not
successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using
operationally representative hardware and software.
To assess DOD's progress in planning to operate the BMDS, we
obtained and reviewed relevant documents on ballistic missile
defense operations such as the National Security Presidential
Directive 23 dated December 16, 2002; the Unified Command Plan
dated January 10, 2003; various combatant command contingency
plans; BMDS Tactical Handbook; various Joint Staff orders; DOD,
Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and service instructions and
regulations; DOD memoranda providing guidance for implementing the
ballistic missile defense program; Integrated Training Working
Group briefings; Missile Defense Agency briefings and documents
explaining program status and plans; and briefings by DOD
officials. We also observed an exercise that involved the services
and combatant commands.
To identify areas where planning was incomplete, we compared what
DOD had done with the planning principles for new weapon systems
embodied
in DOD acquisition and requirements guidance2 and service
instructions3 and training plans explained in DOD's Joint Training
System.4 We then discussed the results of our comparisons with
officials in the U.S. Strategic Command; the Army's Space and
Missile Defense Command; Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Joint Staff; and Missile
Defense Agency.
To determine the extent to which the FYDP provides complete and
transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs,
we analyzed the FYDP structure to determine whether it was
designed to readily identify the program elements that contain
ballistic missile defense operational costs and assessed whether
these FYDP program elements included all BMDS elements. In
addition, we obtained and reviewed documentation at the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force to
identify program elements that would include ballistic missile
defense operational costs. We met with DOD officials from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Office of
the Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, and the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to discuss our approach and they agreed it was
reasonable. We assessed the reliability of the data by
corroborating our list of defense mission categories and some
program elements with knowledgeable agency officials. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes.
In addition, other organizations we visited to gain an
understanding of their roles in operating elements of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System included the Joint Staff, U.S.
Army Headquarters and Space and Missile Defense Command, the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations' Surface Warfare division,
Air Force Headquarters and Space Command, the office of the
National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the Air
National Guard. To document how various commands would employ BMDS
in performing the ballistic missile defense mission, we met with
officials from the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and
the U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and
observed an exercise.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for their review and
incorporated their comments where appropriate. Our review was
conducted between January 2005 and February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402
In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe,
Assistant Director, Brenda M. Waterfield, Pat L. Bohan, Amy J.
Anderson, Jeffrey R. Hubbard, John E. Trubey, and Renee S. Brown
made key contributions to this report.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate Funding
for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System. GAO-05-817 . Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach. GAO-05-962R . Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach. GAO-05-540 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program
in 2004. GAO-05-243 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514 .
Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability. GAO-04-409 . Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254 .
Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System
for Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600 . Washington,
D.C.: August 21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597 .
Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but
Risks Remain. GAO-03-441 . Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce
Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631 . Washington, D.C.:
July 12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early
National Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124 . Washington,
D.C.: February 28, 2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New
Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153 . Washington, D.C.: June
29, 2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be
Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-131 . Washington, D.C.: May
31, 2000.
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DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for the Overall BMDS
13 The Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command is also the
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense. Staff in both organizations are working
together to identify actions that need to be taken for the warfighter to
use BMDS elements.
DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for Most Ballistic Missile Defense
System Elements
Without Operational With
operational criteria in operational
BMDS element criteria development criteria
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense X
Command, Control, Battle Management, X
and Communications
Forward-based X-Band Radar X
Transportable
Ground-based Midcourse Defense X
Sea-based X-Band Radar X
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense X
Upgraded Early Warning Radars X
Patriot Advanced Capability - 3 X
14 The Missile Defense Agency was not involved in developing or approving
these Army capabilities documents.
15 The DOD dictionary defines initial operational capability as the first
attainment of the capability to employ effectively a weapon, item of
equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics, and which is
manned and operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and supported
military force or unit.
16 As discussed in the Background section, the transfer plans are being
negotiated between the Missile Defense Agency and one of the services for
each BMDS element and will specify tasks and milestones, funding
requirements, and identify how the service, combatant commander, and the
Missile Defense Agency will share responsibilities.
DOD Has Unresolved Security Issues
17 DOD plans to operate these elements using contractor personnel.
18 According to U.S. Strategic Command officials, the command is not
recommending protecting the BMDS sites to the same degree as nuclear
sites.
19 These three elements are the sea-based radar, the forward-based radar,
and the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska.
Combatant Commands' Training Plans and Readiness Assessments for BMDS Are
Evolving
20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01B, Joint
Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States (Dec. 31, 1999).
21 The Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System measures and
reports on the readiness of military forces to execute the National
Military Strategy as assigned by the Secretary of Defense. This system is
supported by the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review, a scenario-based
assessment to identify capability shortfalls and risks in executing
missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
DOD Has Not Approved Dual Status for National Guard Unit Commanders
22 The ground-based element, known as Ground-based Midcourse Defense,
consists of interceptors and a fire control system. The ground-based
element relies on other sensors and radars for tracking data.
23 The brigade is an approved Army Multiple Component Unit with active
Army and Colorado National Guard soldiers, while the battalion is solely
comprised of Alaska National Guard Soldiers. Soldiers performing the
ballistic missile defense mission are on full-time National Guard duty
through the Active Guard/Reserve program. When the proposed model is
approved, the National Guard soldiers are expected to alternate between
federal status (Title 10) and state status (Title 32).
Incomplete Planning Creates Uncertainty About the Basis for Declaring the BMDS
Operational
24 According to Army officials, these National Guard soldiers would be
federalized if an emergency occurred before the manning model is approved.
The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete and Transparent
Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs
25 The FYDP submitted with DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget includes data
through fiscal year 2011.
Complete and Transparent Budget Information Facilitates Decision Making and
Oversight
26 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding
for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System,
GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
27 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach,
GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs Are Not
Visible in DOD's FYDP
28 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach,
GAO-05-962R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2005).
29 GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington,
D.C.: May 7, 2004).
30 The FYDP submitted with DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget includes data
through fiscal year 2011. The FYDP contains thousands of program elements
that are intended to capture the total cost of a program.
Several Factors Impair the Completeness and Transparency of Ballistic Missile
Defense Operational Costs
31 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L. No.
108-375, S: 231 (2004); and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-163, S: 233.
32 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding
for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System,
GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
Lack of Complete and Transparent Budget Information Impairs Decision Making
Conclusions
33 GAO-05-540 .
34 GAO-05-540 .
Recommendations for Executive Action
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
35 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach,
GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
1 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: April 2004); GAO, Defense
Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004,
GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
2 DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May
12, 2003; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff Manual 3170.01B,
Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,
May 11, 2005.
3 Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-601, Declaration of Initial
Operating Capability and Full Operational Capability, Dec. 2, 1997.
4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01B, Joint
Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, Dec. 31, 1999.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix II: Comments
from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: GAOA Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Acknowledgments
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Highlights of GAO-06-473 , a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
May 2006
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the
mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles.
In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the September 11
attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of defensive
ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is
developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent
need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous
development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess the
extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to operate the BMDS,
and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and
transparent data on BMDS operational costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD develop operational criteria that must be met
and a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be taken before
declaring BMDS operational, and provide Congress and DOD complete data on
BMDS operational costs. Although DOD concurred or partially concurred with
our recommendations, DOD did not state that they planned to take
corrective actions. Therefore, GAO added a Matter for Congressional
Consideration because GAO continues to believe its recommended actions are
needed to prepare for BMDS operations and assist oversight.
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not
established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS
operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training
and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are
typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and
that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements,
developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance
requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created an
organization to integrate planning and operational support, and conducted
some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established formal
criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent
blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security,
training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing
BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements
guidance. Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense
will not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands'
and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a
transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more
important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress
considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear
criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary
actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and
prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces
are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine
whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can
be realized.
The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide complete
and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs. DOD
and GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to
capabilities to facilitate decision making and oversight. However,
complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are
not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's structure does not provide a
way to identify and aggregate these costs. Four primary factors impair the
visibility of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current
FYDP structure: (1) operational costs are included in many program
elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2)
the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development
funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known
operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not identified
all costs associated with the New Triad, of which BMDS is an important
part. Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile
defense operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress
has complete information to make funding and trade-off decisions among
competing priorities; provide assurance that ballistic missile defense
capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of employing
the New Triad.
Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
May 2006
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for
Ballistic Missile Defense
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