2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress 
(01-MAR-06, GAO-06-465T).					 
                                                                 
Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps	 
ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census	 
Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 
billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our	 
country's history, even after adjusting for inflation. GAO was	 
asked to testify on (1) the Bureau's progress in preparing for	 
the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and  
Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities, and, (3) more
broadly, the importance of planning for a range of events that	 
could severely disrupt the census.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-465T					        
    ACCNO:   A48019						        
  TITLE:     2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making  
Progress							 
     DATE:   03/01/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Census						 
	     Cost control					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Mechanization					 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Population statistics				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Surveys						 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     2000 Decennial Census				 
	     2010 Decennial Census				 

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GAO-06-465T

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Federalism and the Census, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

2010 CENSUS

Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell Acting Director Strategic Issues

GAO-06-465T

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Clay, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to provide the subcommittee
a progress report on the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) preparations for
the 2010 Census. For the past several years, we have issued several
reports on the Bureau's 2010 planning and testing efforts at the
subcommittee's request.1 My remarks today highlight some of the key
findings in our reports on preparations for 2010, as well as present the
preliminary results of ongoing work we plan to issue in the near future on
the Bureau's efforts to build a complete and accurate address list.
Additionally, I will provide our preliminary observations on the
challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau's
future activities and, more broadly, for the Bureau's continuity of
operations planning to help it prepare for a range of events that could
severely disrupt the census.

Importantly, our perspective on the census goes well beyond these recent
studies. Because the decennial has grown in cost and complexity since
1970, we have been reviewing the national enumeration for decades on
behalf of Congress. Over the years, through scores of reports and
testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives us
a historical view of the key ingredients of a successful census.

Today's hearing is particularly timely. The Bureau is holding a test
census in the central portion of Travis County, Texas, and at the Cheyenne
River American Indian Reservation and Tribal Trust Lands in South Dakota,
where it is evaluating key operations and equipment it plans to employ for
the full enumeration in 2010. "Census Day" for this exercise is April 1,
2006; after this, the Bureau will have only one more major opportunity to
assess its census taking-procedures-a "dress rehearsal" scheduled for
2008. Moreover, the actual census is little more than 4 years away, and
before too long the Bureau will transition from preparatory to operational
activities, leaving little room for delays and missteps.

With this in mind, I commend the subcommittee for calling today's hearing,
as past experience has shown that strong and continuing congressional
involvement-especially while there is still time to make decisions and
influence the direction of the census-is essential to the decennial's
ultimate success. An accurate population count is critical because the
Constitution requires a census to apportion seats in the House of
Representatives. Census data are also used to redraw congressional
districts, allocate approximately $200 billion in federal assistance to
state and local governments each year, and for numerous other public and
private sector purposes.

1 See for example, GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be
Addressed Soon, GAO-04-37 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004), and GAO, 2010
Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges Need Prompt
Resolution, GAO-05-9 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2005).

My remarks are based on our analysis of Bureau documents and data, and
interviews with key Bureau officials. In addition, to get a street-level
perspective of the performance of key operations, we visited the Texas and
South Dakota test sites, as well as Queens, New York, and several counties
in rural south-central Georgia, where an earlier field test was held in
2004. During these visits, we interviewed local census office managers and
staff, viewed various data collection activities, and observed training
sessions the Bureau held for two different field worker positions: address
canvassers, who go door-to-door verifying addresses as part of the
Bureau's effort to build a complete and accurate address list, and
enumerators, who collect information from those households that do not
return their initial census questionnaire.

My major point today is that the Bureau is further along in planning the
2010 Census compared to a similar point during the 2000 Census cycle.
Particularly noteworthy is (1) the re-engineered design of the census,
which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining accuracy; (2)
the Bureau's early planning process which was more rigorous than for the
2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater willingness to outsource key
census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to carry out on
its own.

At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues
that pose a risk to a successful census. Specific steps we have
recommended in our prior work include (1) improving the reliability of the
hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) the Bureau plans to use for
collecting field data, (2) ensuring census workers follow prescribed
procedures, and (3) strengthening its human capital efforts so that it has
the skill mix necessary to meet its future requirements. The Bureau is
aware of these issues and has taken actions to address them. Future tests
will shed light on the effectiveness of the Bureau's efforts.

As a backdrop to these findings, I want to highlight several broad themes
that have emerged from our work over the years-lenses really-through which
to view the Bureau's business environment. They are important because they
ultimately affect the Bureau's readiness to conduct the census and the
quality of the results.

           o  First, because the scale of the census is enormous, streamlined
           and efficient operations are critical for cost-effectiveness. For
           example, during the 2000 Census, the Bureau hired more than
           500,000 enumerators, temporarily making it one of the nation's
           largest employers; opened nearly 24,000 questionnaire assistance
           centers; processed 1.5 billion pieces of paper; and, in 10 weeks,
           followed up with 42 million households that did not mail back
           their census questionnaires. The size of the census means that
           small problems can magnify quickly, and big problems could be
           overwhelming. For example, 60 seconds might seem like an
           inconsequential amount of time, but in 2000, if enumerators had
           spent just 1 minute more at each household during nonresponse
           follow-up, it could have added almost $10 million in labor costs
           to the census, assuming a pay rate of around $13 per hour (wages
           ranged from $8.25 to $18.50 per hour for enumerators in 2000,
           depending on location).
           o  A second theme is the importance of sound risk management, as
           the risks to a successful census are interrelated, and a
           shortcoming in one operation could trigger other activities to
           spiral downward. For example, a low mail response rate would drive
           up the follow-up workload, which in turn would increase staffing
           needs and costs. Of course the reverse is also true, where a
           success in one operation could have a number of positive
           downstream impacts. Rigorous up-front preparations, testing, and
           where feasible, contingency planning, are the best ways to stave
           off problems. Likewise, management information systems capable of
           tracking key operations with real-time measures are essential
           because they enable the Bureau to quickly address trouble spots.
           The Bureau did this successfully in recruiting enumerators for the
           2000 Census where, to help ensure it had a steady supply of
           candidates for its 500,000 enumerator positions, it set a
           recruiting goal of 2.4 million qualified applicants. Because the
           Bureau tracked the progress local census offices were making in
           meeting their individual goals, it was able to quickly raise pay
           rates and take other actions at those offices where recruiting was
           lagging. Partly as a result of its monitoring efforts, the Bureau
           exceeded its recruitment goal by 100,000 people.
           o  Third, it is important for the Bureau to stay on schedule, as
           the census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable deadlines
           and an elaborate chain of interrelated pre- and post-Census Day
           activities are predicated upon those dates. Specifically, the
           Secretary of Commerce is legally required to (1) conduct the
           census on April 1 of the decennial year, (2) report the state
           population counts to the President for purposes of congressional
           apportionment by December 31 of the decennial year, and (3) send
           population tabulations to the states for purposes of redistricting
           no later than one year after the April 1 census date. To meet
           these reporting requirements, census activities need to take place
           at specific times and in the proper sequence. Moreover,
           considerable risk could accompany any significant design changes
           that occur late in the decade because of the difficulties in
           properly testing, evaluating, and integrating them with existing
           operations. As Census Day approaches, the tolerance for any
           operational delays or changes becomes increasingly small.
           o  Fourth, the decennial census is a shared national undertaking,
           where Congress, other federal agencies, state and local
           governments, nonprofit and private organizations, and ultimately
           the American public, all play vital roles in securing a complete
           and accurate population tally. Recognizing this, the Bureau
           fosters partnerships with these various entities to help with such
           activities as recruiting census workers, boosting participation,
           and building the Bureau's master address list. Mobilizing and
           coordinating these organizations requires an enormous effort on
           the Bureau's part. During the 2000 Census, about 140,000
           organizations participated in its partnership program, according
           to the Bureau.

Collectively, these themes point to the following: The decennial census is
an inherently fragile endeavor. On the one hand, if all the enumeration
activities perform as planned, the response rate is as expected, the
Bureau meets its enumerator hiring goals, and operations stay on schedule,
the 2010 Census will likely produce acceptable results. On the other hand,
everything from a technological glitch to national and world events could
trigger a chain of setbacks that could jeopardize the accuracy and
completeness of the count. This is why it is so important for Congress to
follow the census closely and help ensure it stays on track.

                                   Background

Thorough and comprehensive planning is crucial to the success of any
large, long-term project, especially one with the cost, complexity, and
high stakes of the decennial census. Indeed, the Bureau's past experience
has shown that the lack of proper planning can increase the costs and
risks of downstream operations.

Past experience has also underscored the importance of strong oversight of
the census to (1) inform congressional decision making on budgetary and
operational matters, (2) raise Congress's confidence that the Bureau has
chosen an optimum design and will manage operations and control costs
effectively, and (3) help ensure the progress the Bureau has made thus far
in refining, planning, and testing census-taking activities, continues as
the Bureau shifts into the operational phases of the decennial.

Given the escalating cost of the census in an era of serious national
fiscal challenges, oversight will be particularly important. Bureau
officials estimate the total life-cycle cost of the 2010 Census will be
around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our
country's history, even after adjusting for inflation.2

Although some cost growth can be expected, in part, because the number of
housing units-and hence the Bureau's workload-has grown, the cost
escalation has far exceeded the housing unit increase. The Bureau
estimates that the number of housing units for the 2010 Census will
increase by 10 percent over 2000 Census levels; meanwhile, the average
cost per housing unit for 2010 is expected to increase by approximately 29
percent from 2000 levels (from $56 to $72), nearly five and a half times
greater than the $13 it cost to count each household in 1970 (see fig. 1).

2 The census life cycle extends over a number of years. For the 2000
Census, the life-cycle spanned from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year
2003 when the Bureau completed its evaluation activities.

Figure 1: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit (in Constant
Fiscal Year 2000 Dollars)

A key reason for the increasing cost of the census is that because of
various societal trends such as concerns over personal privacy, more
non-English speakers, and more people residing in makeshift and other
nontraditional living arrangements, the Bureau is finding it increasingly
difficult to locate people and get them to participate in the census. As a
result, the Bureau needs to spend more money simply to achieve the
accuracy of earlier enumerations. This can be seen, for example, in the
rising cost of securing public participation in the census. During the
1990 Census, the Bureau spent an average of $0.88 per housing unit (in
2000 dollars) to market the census and was able to rely on a pro-bono
advertising campaign. The response rate was 65 percent. For the 2000
Census, recognizing that extra effort would be needed to motivate
participation, the Bureau used a paid advertising campaign developed by a
consortium of private-sector advertising agencies. It cost an average of
$3.19 per housing unit (in 2000 dollars) and achieved a response rate of
64 percent. As the Bureau plans for 2010, maintaining cost effectiveness
will be one of the single greatest challenges confronting the agency.

 The Bureau's Preparations for 2010 Are Progressing but Certain Challenges Will
                              Need to Be Addressed

The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along
than at a similar point during the planning cycle for the 2000 Census. For
example, the fundamental design of the 2010 Census has the potential to
contain costs and improve coverage and accuracy, and the Bureau's planning
process for 2010 is generally more thorough than was the case for the 2000
Census. At the same time, the 2004 test and, to date, the 2006 test, have
identified areas where improvements are needed. Uncovering trouble spots
is an important objective of any test, thus it is not surprising, and, in
fact, should be expected and commended that problems were found. Moreover,
the Bureau has taken steps to resolve the issues that have surfaced.
Remaining activities in the 2006 test, and the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, will
help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau's efforts.

The Design of the 2010 Census Shows Promise

The Bureau developed a design for the 2010 Census early in the decade, and
Congress has been supportive of the Bureau's approach. The situation 10
years ago was vastly different. In testimony before Congress in late 1995,
we expressed concern that Congress and the Bureau had not agreed on the
fundamental design and budget of the census, and that the longer this
situation continued, the opportunity for a well-planned census would be
lost and the greater the risk that hundreds of millions of dollars would
be spent inefficiently.3

Key features of the design of the 2010 Census include the following:

           o  Enhancing procedures for building its address list, known as
           the Master Address File, and its associated geographic information
           system, called the Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding
           and Referencing (TIGER)(R) database;4 
           o  Replacing the census long-form questionnaire with the American
           Community Survey (ACS)5; and
           o  Conducting a short-form-only decennial census supported by
           early research and testing.

           Also noteworthy is the fact that for the 2010 Census, the Bureau
           plans to make the most extensive use of contractors in its
           history, turning to the private sector to supply a number of
           different mission-critical functions, including the Bureau's
           nationwide data processing activities, and improvements to the
           Master Address File and TIGER. The Bureau estimates that of the
           $11.3 billion total cost of the census, around $1.9 billion
           (approximately 17 percent) will be spent via its seven largest
           contracts which include information technology systems,
           advertising, and the leasing of local census offices.

           The Bureau is relying more heavily on contractors because it
           recognizes it needs to look outside the agency to obtain the
           expertise and services essential for a successful enumeration.
           That said, the Bureau's contracting efforts during the 2000 Census
           did not always go smoothly, and it will be important for Bureau
           management to focus on its procurement activities to help ensure
           the 2010 contractors fulfill the Bureau's expectations. Our
           companion testimony at today's hearing provides greater detail on
           two of the Bureau's information technology contracts.6

           In concept, the Bureau's approach has the potential to achieve its
           principal goals for the 2010 Census which include (1) increasing
           the relevance and timeliness of data, (2) reducing operational
           risk, (3) increasing coverage and accuracy, and (4) containing
           costs. However, some aspects of the design, including the use of
           technology that has never been employed for the decennial, as well
           as the heavy reliance on contractors, introduce new risk. This is
           not inappropriate as the need to secure a complete count and
           addressing problems with past censuses call for bold new
           initiatives that entail risk. What will be important is how
           effectively the Bureau manages those risks.

           Another sign of progress can be found in the thoroughness of the
           Bureau's planning process where the Bureau has taken several
           positive steps to correct problems it encountered when planning
           past censuses. For example, early in the decade, senior Bureau
           staff considered various goals for the 2010 Census and articulated
           a design to achieve those goals. Moreover, staff with operational
           experience in the census participated in the 2010 design process.
           According to Bureau officials, this was a departure from the 2000
           planning effort when Bureau staff with little operational
           experience played key roles in the design process, which resulted
           in impractical reform ideas that could not be implemented.

           At the same time, the Bureau's planning process could benefit from
           an overall business or project plan that (1) includes milestones
           for completing key activities; (2) itemizes the estimated cost of
           each component; (3) articulates a clear system of coordination
           among project components; and (4) translates key goals into
           measurable, operational terms to provide meaningful guidance for
           planning and measuring progress. Some, but not all of this
           information is available in various documents, but one would need
           to piece it together. Noting the importance of this information to
           inform congressional decision-making and oversight of the census,
           as well as to improve the Bureau's planning process, in our
           January 2004 report, we recommended that the Bureau combine this
           information into a single, comprehensive document. The Bureau
           disagreed with the recommendation although it said it would
           develop such a plan nonetheless and provide it to GAO, Congress,
           and other stakeholders. The Bureau has not yet issued this
           document.

           A complete and accurate address list is the cornerstone of a
           successful census because it identifies all households that are to
           receive a census questionnaire, and serves as the control
           mechanism for following up with households that fail to respond.
           Although the Bureau went to great lengths to build a complete and
           accurate Master Address File for the 2000 Census, of the 116
           million housing units contained in the database, the Bureau
           estimates it incorrectly included 2.3 million housing units and
           missed another 2.7 million housing units. In light of these and
           other problems, the Bureau concluded that enhancements to the
           Master Address File and TIGER were necessary to make census data
           more complete and accurate.

           In the preliminary results of our ongoing work on enhancements to
           the Master Address File and TIGER, we found that the Bureau has
           developed procedures to help resolve each of the broad categories
           of problems experienced in 2000 including addresses that were
           duplicated, missed, deleted, and incorrectly located on a map (a
           problem known as geocoding error). The Bureau has several ongoing
           evaluations that should provide valuable information on the
           effectiveness of these procedures.

           The Bureau is also taking steps to improve the accuracy of the
           TIGER maps which, among other benefits, should help prevent
           geocoding errors. In June 2002, the Bureau awarded an 8-year
           contract, in excess of $200 million intended to, among other
           tasks, correct in TIGER the location of every street, boundary,
           and other map feature so that coordinates are aligned with their
           true geographic locations. According to the Bureau, the contractor
           completed this work for 250 counties in 2003, 602 counties in
           2004, and 623 counties in 2005. Furthermore, the contractor plans
           to deliver the remaining 1,758 county maps between 2006 and 2008.

           However, based on this time line, it appears that several hundred
           county TIGER maps will not be updated in time for the Local Update
           of Census Addresses (LUCA) program, through which the Bureau gives
           local and tribal government officials the opportunity to review
           and suggest corrections to the address lists and maps for their
           jurisdictions. LUCA is to begin in July 2007 when, according to
           the current schedule, the Bureau will still have 368 counties to
           update in 2008 alone. These counties will not have the most
           current maps to review but will instead be given the most recent
           maps the Bureau has available. According to the Bureau, some of
           the maps have been updated for the American Community Survey, but
           others have not been updated since the 2000 Census, which could
           affect the quality of a local government's review. The Bureau is
           aware of the overlapping schedules, but told us that it needs to
           start LUCA in 2007 in order to complete the operation in time for
           address canvassing.

           LUCA is an example of how the Bureau partners with external
           entities, tapping into their knowledge of local populations and
           housing conditions in order to secure a more complete count. In
           1994, Congress required the Bureau to develop a local address
           review program to give local and tribal governments greater input
           into the Bureau's address list development process.7

           When the Bureau conducted LUCA for the 2000 Census, the results
           were mixed. In our 1999 congressional testimony, we noted that
           many local governments said they were satisfied with specific
           aspects of the materials and assistance the Bureau provided to
           them. At the same time, LUCA may have stretched the resources of
           local governments, and participation in the program could have
           been better. 8

           The census schedule will also be a challenge for an operation
           called address canvassing, where census workers are to walk every
           street in the country, verifying addresses and updating maps as
           necessary. The Bureau has allotted 6 weeks to verify the nation's
           inventory of 116 million housing units. This translates into a
           completion rate of over 2.75 million housing units every day. The
           challenge in maintaining this schedule can be seen in the fact
           that for the 2000 Census, it took the Bureau 18 weeks just to
           canvass "city-style" address areas, which are localities where the
           U.S. Postal Service uses house-number and street-name addresses
           for most mail delivery.

           Of particular concern is the previous unreliability of the MCDs
           the Bureau plans to use for its address canvassing and nonresponse
           follow-up operations (see fig. 2).

           Figure 2: The Census Bureau Plans to Use Mobile Computing Devices
           to Collect and Transmit Field Data

           For address canvassing, the MCDs are to be loaded with address
           information and maps; for nonresponse follow-up, they will be used
           in lieu of paper questionnaires and maps to collect household
           information. The MCDs are also equipped with global positioning
           system (GPS) receivers, a satellite-based navigational system to
           help enumerators locate street addresses and to collect
           coordinates for each structure in their assignment area. Bureau
           officials expect the MCDs will help improve the cost-effectiveness
           of the census by allowing it to eliminate millions of paper
           questionnaires and maps, improve the quality of address data, and
           update enumerators' nonresponse follow-up workload on a daily
           basis.

           The move from paper to digital was a very positive step. At the
           same time, rigorous testing is essential to assess their
           durability, functionality, and that enumerators are able to use
           them. The MCDs were first evaluated for nonresponse follow-up as
           part of the 2004 Census Test, and for address canvassing in 2005
           as part of the 2006 Census Test. The Bureau will use MCDs next
           month for nonresponse follow-up in the 2006 test.

           In both our prior and ongoing work, we found the test results have
           been mixed. On the one hand, the census workers we observed had
           little difficulty using the MCDs. For example, address canvassers
           we interviewed said the electronic maps were accurate and that
           they were able to find their assignment areas with relative ease.
           On the other hand, the reliability of the MCDs proved troublesome
           during the 2004 and to date, the 2006 test. For example, in 2004,
           the MCDs experienced transmission problems, memory overloads, and
           difficulties with a mapping feature--all of which added
           inefficiencies to the nonresponse follow-up operation.

           The Bureau is using MCDs made by a different manufacturer for the
           2006 test which resolved some of these problems, but other
           difficulties emerged during address canvassing. For example, the
           device was slow to pull up and exit address registers, accept the
           data entered by the canvassers, and link map locations to
           addresses for multi-unit structures. Furthermore, the MCDs would
           sometimes lock up, requiring canvassers to reboot them.

           Canvassers also found it difficult to transmit an address and map
           location that needed to be deleted from the master list. The
           Bureau was unable to fix this problem so canvassers had to return
           to the local census office where technicians dealt with the
           problem. The reliability of the GPS was also problematic. Some
           workers had problems receiving a signal, and when a signal was
           available, it was sometimes slow to locate assignment areas and
           correct map locations.

           According to the Bureau, these problems reduced the productivity
           of the canvassers, and the Bureau stopped the operation 10 days
           after it was scheduled to finish. Even with the extension,
           however, the Bureau was unable to complete the job, leaving census
           blocks in both Austin and on the Cheyenne Indian Reservation
           unverified.

           According to the Bureau, the problems were caused by unstable
           software and insufficient memory. The Bureau delayed the start of
           address canvassing for a month at both test sites to troubleshoot
           the MCDs. However, it was unable to fix all the problems and
           decided to move forward with the test.

           The MCDs will be evaluated again next month as part of the 2006
           Census Test and we will be on-site to assess the extent to which
           the Bureau has fixed the MCD problems. However, even if the MCDs
           prove to be more reliable, questions remain for the future. The
           Bureau has acknowledged that the MCD's performance is an issue,
           but believes it will be addressed as part of its contract for the
           Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program, which is aimed at
           automating the Bureau's field data collection efforts, and is
           scheduled to be awarded later this month (the MCDs used for the
           2006 test are off-the-shelf purchases that were customized by the
           Bureau).

           As a result, the 2008 Dress Rehearsal will be the first time the
           entire system-including the contractor's MCD-will be tested under
           conditions that are as close as possible to the actual census. If
           new problems emerge, little time will be left to develop and test
           any refinements.

           Our field observations also suggest that the training of census
           workers could be improved to help ensure they follow proper
           procedures. Failure to do so could affect the reliability of
           census data. During the 2004 test, for example, we observed
           enumerators who did not read the coverage and race/ethnicity
           question exactly as worded, and did not properly use flashcards
           the Bureau had developed that were designed to help respondents
           answer specific questions. During the address canvassing operation
           for the 2006 test, we observed workers who were not properly
           verifying addresses, or were unsure of what to do when they
           happened upon dwellings such as duplex housing units. In our past
           work, we recommended that the Bureau take a more strategic
           approach to training, and that local census offices include in
           their instruction special modules covering the unique living
           arrangements that might be prevalent in that particular
           jurisdiction.9

           The Bureau acknowledged that the shortcomings we identified
           require improvement, and indicated that for the 2006 test, it will
           enhance training to reinforce the procedural requirements. The
           Bureau also intends to incorporate additional training to prepare
           enumerators to handle realistic situations encountered in their
           work. As part of our field work for the 2006 test, we will review
           the improvements the Bureau made to its training procedures.

           If the operational challenges of conducting a census were not
           daunting enough, the Bureau faces the additional challenge of a
           possible brain drain. In our June 2005 report, we noted that the
           Bureau has projected that 45 percent of its workforce will be
           eligible to retire by 2010.10 The Bureau has long benefited from
           its core group of managers and experienced staff who developed
           their expertise over several census cycles; their institutional
           knowledge is critical to keeping the census on track. Indeed,
           according to Bureau officials, many experienced employees retired
           or left the agency after the 1990 Census which affected planning
           efforts for the 2000 Census.

           Leading organizations go beyond simply backfilling vacancies, and
           instead focus on strengthening both current and future
           organizational capacity. In this regard the Bureau acknowledges
           that re-engineering the 2010 Census requires new skills in
           project, contract, and financial management; advanced programming
           and technology; as well as other areas. To help address this
           important human capital issue, the Bureau has implemented various
           succession planning and management efforts to better position the
           agency to meet its future skill requirements.

           Still, we found that the Bureau could take additional steps to
           enhance its succession planning and management efforts and
           recommended that the Bureau (1) strengthen the monitoring of its
           mission-critical workforce, (2) seek appropriate opportunities to
           coordinate and share core succession training and development
           programs with other outside agencies, and (3) evaluate core
           succession training and development programs to gauge the extent
           to which they contribute to enhancing organizational capacity. The
           Bureau agreed with our recommendations and indicated it was taking
           steps to implement them.

           On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the coastal
           communities of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama. A few
           weeks later, Hurricane Rita plowed through the border area of
           Texas and Louisiana.

           Damage was widespread. In the wake of Katrina, for example, the
           Red Cross estimated that nearly 525,000 people were displaced.
           Their homes were declared uninhabitable, and streets, bridges, and
           other landmarks were destroyed. Approximately 90,000 square miles
           were affected overall and, as shown in figure 3, entire
           communities were obliterated.

           Figure 3: Aerial Photograph of the Devastation in the Lower 9th
           Ward in New Orleans

           The destruction and chaos caused by the storms underscore the
           nation's vulnerability to all types of hazards, and highlights how
           important it is for government agencies to consider disaster
           preparedness and continuity of operations as part of their
           planning. We have had a preliminary discussion with the Bureau on
           this topic and will continue to assess the Bureau's contingency
           planning as part of our oversight of the 2010 Census.

           Moreover, it will be important for the Bureau to assess the impact
           the storms might have on its census-taking activities, as well as
           whether the affected areas have any special needs for data.
           Securing a complete count, a difficult task under normal
           circumstances, could face additional hurdles along the Gulf Coast,
           in large part because the baseline the Bureau will be working
           with-streets, housing stock, and the population itself-will be in
           flux for some time to come. According to the Bureau, different
           parts of the agency work on hurricane-related issues at different
           times, but no formal body has been created to deal with the
           hurricanes' impact on the 2010 Census. The Bureau anticipates that
           by 2008, as it is preparing to conduct address canvassing, people
           will have decided whether or not to return. At that time, the
           Bureau believes it will be in a better position to identify
           vacant, occupied, and new construction for 2010.

           Although Census Day is still several years away, preliminary
           activities, such as operations for building the Master Address
           File, are to occur sooner. Consequently, a key question is whether
           the Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the
           migration that has taken place along the Gulf Coast, the various
           types of dwellings in which people live, and the changes to roads
           and other geographic features that have occurred, or does the
           Bureau need to develop enhanced and/or additional procedures to
           account for them? For example, new housing and street construction
           could require more frequent updates of the Bureau's address file
           and maps, while local governments' participation in LUCA might be
           affected because of the loss of key personnel, information
           systems, or records needed to verify the Bureau's address lists
           and maps.

           It will also be important for the Bureau to work with Congress and
           state and local governments to determine whether the
           hurricane-affected areas have any special data needs to track the
           economic and social well-being of the region and benchmark the
           recovery process. Although the decennial census would not be the
           instrument to collect this information, it might be feasible doing
           so through one of the Bureau's other survey programs. To date, the
           Bureau plans to do a special tabulation of its American Community
           Survey (ACS) data for the areas affected by Katrina that will
           provide information on the population that remained in the region.
           However, because of several methodological issues, it will not be
           an "official" ACS data product. The Bureau is also trying to use
           data from administrative records to update its population
           estimates of the area.

           Building on these efforts, some key considerations for the future
           include the following:

                        1. How have the hurricanes affected the counties and
                        parishes in the Gulf Coast region and what are the
                        implications, if any, for the Bureau's future
                        operations?
                        2. Which external and internal stakeholders including
                        federal, state, and local government agencies, as
                        well as nonprofit organizations and specific areas of
                        expertise need to be included in the Bureau's
                        decision-making process?
                        3. To what extent does the Bureau have a plan
                        (including objectives, tasks, milestones, etc.) for
                        assessing and acting on any new requirements imposed
                        by the hurricanes?
                        4. Do the hurricane-affected areas have any special
                        data requirements, and if so, how should they be
                        addressed and which stakeholders need to be involved?

           In summary, over the last few years, the Bureau has put forth a
           tremendous effort to help ensure the success of the 2010 Census.
           The Bureau is moving forward along a number of fronts, and has
           been responsive to the recommendations we made in our past work
           aimed at improving its planning process, address file, MCDs,
           training, human capital, and other census-taking activities.
           Still, some aspects of the census are proving to be problematic
           and a number of operational questions need to be resolved.

           To be sure, challenges are to be expected in an endeavor as vast
           and complex as the decennial census. Moreover, shortcomings with
           prior censuses call for the Bureau to consider bold initiatives
           for 2010 that entail some risk. Thus, in looking toward the
           future, as the planning and testing phases of the 2010 Census
           begin to wind down, it will be important for Congress to monitor
           the Bureau's progress in (1) identifying and diagnosing problems,
           (2) devising cost-effective solutions, and (3) integrating
           refinements and fixes in time to be evaluated during the Dress
           Rehearsal in 2008. Indeed, while the ramp-up to 2010 is making
           progress, past experience has shown that Congress has every reason
           to remain vigilant. As we have done throughout the past several
           decades, we look forward to supporting the subcommittee in its
           decision-making and oversight efforts.

           Mr. Chairman, Mr. Clay, this concludes my prepared statement. I
           would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other
           members of the subcommittee might have.

           For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
           Brenda S. Farrell on (202) 512-3604, or by e-mail at
           [email protected] .

           Individuals making contributions to this testimony included Betty
           Clark, Robert Goldenkoff, Carlos E. Hazera, Shirley Hwang, Andrea
           Levine, Anne McDonough-Hughes, Lisa Pearson, Michael Volpe, and
           Timothy Wexler.

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3 GAO, Decennial Census: Fundamental Design Decisions Merit Congressional
Attention, GAO/T-GGD-96-37 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 25, 1995).

4 TIGER is a registered trademark of the U.S. Census Bureau.

5 ACS is intended to be a monthly survey of 250,000 households.

The 2010 Planning Process Is Generally More Rigorous Than for Past Efforts

6 GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management of Key
2010 Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T , (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2006).

Address File and Map Improvements Could Help Resolve Past Problems if
Operational Challenges Are Resolved

7 Census Address List Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-430, Oct. 31, 1994.

The Unreliability of Mobile Computing Devices Has Been Problematic

8 GAO, 2000 Census: Local Address Review Program Has Had Mixed Results to
Date, GAO/T-GGD-99-184 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1999).

    Succession Planning and Management Will Be Important in the Years Ahead

9 See GAO-05-9 , p. 30.

10 GAO, Human Capital: Selected Agencies Have Opportunities to Enhance
Existing Succession Planning and Management Efforts, GAO-05-585
(Washington D.C.: June 30, 2005).

 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Highlight the Importance of Disaster Preparedness

                          Contact and Acknowledgments

(450472)

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Highlights of GAO-06-465T , a report to the Subcommittee on Federalism and
the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

March 1, 2006

2010 CENSUS

Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress

Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps ensure greater
effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates
the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 billion, which would make it the
most expensive census in our country's history, even after adjusting for
inflation. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the Bureau's progress in
preparing for the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities, and, (3) more
broadly, the importance of planning for a range of events that could
severely disrupt the census.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations at this time, but past reports have
contained GAO's views on steps the Bureau needs to take to improve its
planning processes, MCDs, enumerator training, human capital planning, and
other aspects of the census. The Bureau generally concurred with these
prior recommendations and has taken action to implement some of them.

The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census are making progress along
several fronts. Of particular note is (1) the re-engineered design of the
census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining
accuracy; (2) the Bureau's early planning process which was more rigorous
than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater willingness to
outsource key census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to
carry out on its own.

Census Costs Are Increasing (Average Cost per Housing Unit in Constant
Fiscal 2000 Dollars).

At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues
that pose a risk to a successful census. For example, the Bureau plans to
use hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to develop the census address
list and collect data from millions of households that do not respond to
the initial census questionnaire. The MCDs are an important step forward
because they are designed to replace many of the paper questionnaires and
maps that were used in past censuses, and are a key element of the
Bureau's Field Data Collection Automation program. The Bureau has never
before used the devices in a decennial. In tests held in 2004 and 2006 to
date, census workers found the MCDs easy to use, but sometimes unreliable,
which reduced efficiency. Some workers also deviated from prescribed
procedures which points to the need for better training. The Bureau has
taken steps to address these issues and future tests will help determine
the effectiveness of the Bureau's actions. The Bureau also faces a
possible brain drain, as 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to
retire by 2010. Although the Bureau has taken preventative measures, it
could improve those efforts by, among other actions, strengthening the
monitoring of its mission-critical workforce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
highlight the importance of contingency planning and examining whether the
Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the demographic
and physical changes that have occurred along the Gulf Coast.

Overall, as the Bureau's preparations for 2010 continue, it will be
important for Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in (1) identifying
and diagnosing problems, (2) devising solutions, and (3) integrating
refinements in time to be evaluated during the Census Dress Rehearsal
scheduled for 2008.
*** End of document. ***