Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past  
Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies	 
(15-MAR-06, GAO-06-447).					 
                                                                 
Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 
billion to significantly increase its inventory of unmanned	 
aircraft systems, which are providing new intelligence, 	 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to U.S.	 
combat forces--including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite  
their success on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft	 
programs have experienced cost and schedule overruns and	 
performance shortfalls. Given the sizable planned investment in  
these systems, GAO was asked to review DOD's three largest	 
unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Specifically, GAO	 
assessed the Global Hawk and Predator programs' acquisition	 
strategies and identified lessons from these two programs that	 
can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) 
program, the next generation of unmanned aircraft.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-447 					        
    ACCNO:   A49159						        
  TITLE:     Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn    
from Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition	 
Strategies							 
     DATE:   03/15/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Performance appraisal				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Procurement practices				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Weapons research and development			 
	     Unmanned aerial vehicles				 
	     Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle		 
	     Gnat 750 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 
	     Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     MQ-1 Predator A					 
	     MQ-9 Predator B					 
	     Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 
	     RQ-4A Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 
	     RQ-4B Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 

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GAO-06-447

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
          * Best Practices for Achieving Successful Acquisition Outcomes
     * Global Hawk and Predator Had Common Beginnings, but Differen
          * Global Hawk Program Has Experienced Relatively Poor Outcomes
          * Predator Program Has Had Better Outcomes than Global Hawk
          * Differences in Global Hawk and Predator Business Practices H
               * Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Is More Risky than Predat
               * Global Hawk's Technologies Are Much Less Mature than Predato
               * Global Hawk and Predator Both Include Concurrent Development
               * Different Leadership Approaches Have Influenced Outcomes in
               * Global Hawk Funding Requirements Are More Compressed than Th
     * J-UCAS Program Can Benefit from Lessons Learned by Global Ha
          * J-UCAS Plans and Acquisition Strategy Continue to Evolve
          * Lessons Learned
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Scope and Methodology
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Committee on Armed

GAO

                             Services, U.S. Senate

March 2006

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

  New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky
                             Acquisition Strategies

GAO-06-447

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less
Risky Acquisition Strategies

  What GAO Found

While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful demonstration
programs, they adopted different acquisition strategies that have led to
different outcomes. With substantial overlap in development, testing, and
production, the Global Hawk program has experienced serious cost,
schedule, and performance problems. As a result, since the approved start
of system development, planned quantities of the Global Hawk have
decreased 19 percent, and acquisition unit costs have increased 75
percent. In contrast, the Predator program adopted a more structured
acquisition strategy that uses an incremental, or evolutionary, approach
to development-an approach more consistent with DOD's revised acquisition
policy preferences and commercial best practices. While the Predator
program has experienced some problems, the program's cost growth and
schedule delays have been relatively minor, and testing of prototypes in
operational environments has already begun.

Since its inception as a joint program in 2003, the J-UCAS program has
experienced funding cuts and leadership changes, and the recent
Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another restructuring into a Navy
program to develop a carrier-based unmanned combat air system. Regardless
of these setbacks and the program's future organization, DOD still has the
opportunity to learn from the lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator
programs. Until DOD develops the knowledge needed to prepare solid and
feasible business cases to support the acquisition of J-UCAS and other
advanced unmanned aircraft systems, it will continue to risk cost and
schedule overruns and delaying fielding capabilities to the warfighter.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Global Hawk and Predator Had Common
Beginnings, but Different

Acquisition Strategies Have Yielded Different Outcomes 6 J-UCAS Program
Can Benefit from Lessons Learned by Global

Hawk and Predator Programs 19 Conclusions 22 Recommendations for Executive
Action 23 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 Scope and Methodology 26

        Appendix I Unmanned Aircraft Systems Included in This Review 29

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

  Tables

Table 1: Defense Budget Requests for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 4 Table 2:
Changes in Global Hawk Funding, Quantity, and Unit

Costs through Completion of the Program 9 Table 3: Changes in Predator B
Funding, Quantity, and Unit Costs

through Completion of the Program 10 Table 4: Comparison of Business Case
and Acquisition Strategy

Factors in Current Global Hawk and Predator Programs 11

  Figures

Figure 1: Comparison of Predator B and Global Hawk Acquisition

Plans with Best Practices Model 15 Figure 2: Performance Characteristics
of Unmanned Aircraft

Systems Reviewed by GAO 30

Abbreviations

ACTD                             advanced concept technology demonstration 
DARPA                            Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DOD                 Department of Defense                                  
J-UCAS              Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems                      
OSD                 Office of the Secretary of Defense                     

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

March 15, 2006

The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion
to develop, procure, and support a rapidly increasing inventory of
unmanned aircraft systems. 1 Unmanned aircraft systems are providing
combat forces-including those in Iraq and Afghanistan-with new
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities that
are helping to transform today's military operations. The success of
unmanned aircraft has led to greatly increased demand for new and improved
platforms to be deployed into the field. While there have been successes
on the battlefield, the development of unmanned aircraft systems has
shared the same problems as other major weapon systems that begin an
acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about requirements,
technology, design, and production. Likewise, the unmanned systems have
also experienced similar outcomes-changing requirements, cost growth,
delays in delivery, and reliability and support problems.

Because of the expanding interest and promise in unmanned systems and
sizable future investments, you asked us to review the Global Hawk,
Predator, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems-DOD's three largest
unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Specifically, you asked us to

(1) assess the Global Hawk and Predator programs' business cases and
acquisition strategies in terms of delivering their weapon systems on time
and within cost, and (2) identify any lessons that can be learned and
applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program as

1

Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as "unmanned aerial
vehicles." The terms "unmanned aircraft" and "unmanned aircraft systems"
are consistent with the Federal Aviation Administration's classification
and emphasizes that the aircraft is one component of the weapon system,
which also includes payloads, ground stations, and communications
equipment.

    Page 1 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

                                Results in Brief

it moves forward to develop a supportable business case and effective
acquisition strategy. 2

To assess these two objectives, we reviewed Global Hawk and Predator
acquisition strategies and business cases and evaluated them according to
best practices criteria utilizing GAO's Methodology for Assessing Risks on
Major Weapons System Acquisition Programs. We assessed budget,
programmatic, and planning documents to determine the extent to which
acquisition strategies were meeting warfighter requirements. We identified
lessons learned from these and other programs and identified common
factors that can contribute to J-UCAS's success. We interviewed DOD and
contractor officials and obtained programmatic data for these three
systems. We leveraged prior work on other systems and on best practices of
leading companies. We performed our review from August 2005 to February
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

The Global Hawk and Predator programs followed different acquisition
strategies that resulted in different outcomes. While both programs began
with top leadership support and accomplished successful, focused
demonstration efforts, Global Hawk switched to a high-risk acquisition
strategy by accelerating development and production of a new larger and
more advanced aircraft. With the substantial overlap in development and
production, the program experienced significant gaps in knowledge about
technology, design, and manufacturing capabilities while requiring sizable
funding. As a result, serious cost and schedule problems have ensued, some
required capabilities have been deferred or dropped, operational tests
have identified performance problems, and the Global Hawk program is being
restructured. In contrast, the Predator program, which has also added a
new, larger and more advanced aircraft, has pursued an acquisition
strategy that is more structured and evolutionary and more consistent with
DOD's revised acquisition guidance and commercial best practices. While
the Predator effort to acquire its larger model also has overlap in
development and production and has experienced some problems, cost growth
and schedule delays to date have been more moderate than those of Global
Hawk, and flight testing of prototypes in operational environments has
already begun.

2

The committee also asked us to review the Army's Extended
Range/Multi-Purpose unmanned aircraft system, which we will report on
separately.

Page 2 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

                                   Background

The J-UCAS program and its offspring could benefit from the lessons
learned in the Global Hawk and Predator programs. Since its inception, the
J-UCAS program has been in flux. Program management and goals have changed
several times, and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed
another restructuring into a Navy program to demonstrate a carrier-based,
air-refuelable unmanned combat air system. The Air Force plans to consider
J-UCAS technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new
long-range strike capability. Before DOD commits to major acquisition
system development programs, it has the opportunity and time to develop
the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases and to
adopt a disciplined, evolutionary strategy consistent with DOD acquisition
policy preferences and best practices.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to
limit the production of Global Hawk B aircraft until integrated systems
are demonstrated in testing and that the Global Hawk office update its
business case to reflect the restructured program and justify future
investments. We are also recommending that the Secretary direct the Navy
and Air Force to advance with prudence in J-UCAS and follow-on efforts to
ensure a sound business case and evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy
guide any future programs and that the services remain committed to
developing common components and operating systems to be more
cost-effective and interoperable. DOD concurred with our J-UCAS
recommendations, but did not concur with our Global Hawk recommendations.
DOD stated that limiting Global Hawk production will incur significant
costs and schedule delays, that risk and concurrency are being adequately
managed, and that ongoing cost and evaluation efforts are thorough. We
continue to believe that limiting Global Hawk procurement to allow
technology to mature and thorough testing to occur will reduce future
problems and lead to better program outcomes. Given the magnitude of
changes and challenges facing the program, we also believe a comprehensive
business case to justify and guide investments is needed.

DOD expects unmanned aircraft systems to transform the battlespace with
innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures and take on the so-called
"dull, dirty, and dangerous missions" without putting pilots in harm's
way. The use of unmanned aircraft systems in military operations has
increased rapidly since the fall of 2001, with some notable successes.
Potential missions considered appropriate for unmanned systems have
expanded from the original focus on the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance mission area to limited tactical strike capabilities with
projected plans for persistent ground attack, electronic warfare, and
suppression of enemy air defenses. The Global Hawk, Predator, and Joint
Unmanned Combat Air Systems are DOD's three largest unmanned aircraft
programs in terms of cost. (For more details on the three systems and
their performance characteristics, see app. I.)

Since the terror attacks in September 2001, defense investments in
unmanned aircraft systems have exponentially increased. In the 10 years
prior to the attacks, DOD invested a total of about $3.6 billion compared
to the nearly $24 billion it plans to invest in the subsequent 10 years.
DOD currently has about 250 unmanned aircraft in inventory and plans to
increase its inventory to 675 by 2010 and to 1,400 by 2015. (These numbers
are the larger systems and do not count numerous small and handlaunched
systems used by ground forces.)

In the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, Congress set a goal
that by 2010, one-third of DOD's deep strike force will be unmanned in
order to perform this dangerous mission; 3 this would significantly
increase the number of unmanned aircraft in DOD's inventory. In addition,
foreign countries and other federal agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security and the Interior Department, are expressing interest in
unmanned aircraft systems. Table 1 shows the funding in the fiscal year
2006 Defense budget for research, development, procurement, and support of
current and planned unmanned aircraft systems.

Table 1: Defense Budget Requests for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(in millions of dollars by year of appropriation)
                2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010     2011     Total 
Development $1,998.5 $1,670.3 $1,734.8 $1,983.8 $2,550.0 $2,643.4 $2,771.1 $15,351.9 
and                                                                        
procurement                                                                
Operations    $167.3  $275.4   $338.7   $265.6   $295.4   $308.6    $342.0  $1,993.0 
a                                                                          
Basic and                                                                   $2,553.0 
applied                                                                    
researchb                                                                  
Total       $2,165.8 $1,945.7 $2,073.5 $2,249.4 $2,845.4 $2,952.0 $3,113.1 $19,897.9 

Source: "Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030," Office of the
Secretary of Defense.

a

Does not include 2005 supplemental funding for combat operations.

b

Annual breakdown of basic and applied research funding is not provided.

Pub. L. No. 106-398, Appendix H.R. 5408, sec. 220 (2000).

    Best Practices for Achieving Successful Acquisition Outcomes

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review contained a number of decisions that
would further expand investments in unmanned systems and their use in
military operations. The report states DOD's intent to nearly double
unmanned aircraft coverage by accelerating the acquisition of the Predator
and the Global Hawk. It also restructures the J-UCAS program to develop an
unmanned, long-range carrier-based aircraft to increase naval reach and
persistence. It further establishes a plan to develop a new land-based,
penetrating long-range strike capability by 2018 and sets a goal that
about 45 percent of the future long-range strike force be unmanned.
Officials told us that elements of the J-UCAS effort will be considered in
Air Force analyses and efforts supporting future long-range strike
capability.

Unmanned aircraft systems are being developed under DOD's acquisition
policy, which emphasizes a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to
acquiring major weapon systems. This approach separates technology
development from product development, as suggested by best practices. In
implementing the policy, a critical first step to success is formulating a
comprehensive business case that justifies the investment decision to
begin development. The business case should validate warfighter needs and
match product requirements to available resources, including proven
technologies, sufficient engineering capabilities, adequate time, and
adequate funds. Several basic factors are critical to establishing a sound
business case for undertaking a new product development. First, the user's
needs must be accurately defined, alternative approaches to satisfying
these needs properly analyzed, and quantities needed for the chosen system
must be well understood. The developed product must be producible at a
cost that matches the users' expectations and budgetary resources.
Finally, the developer must have the resources to design the product with
the features that the customer wants and to deliver it when it is needed.
If circumstances substantially change, the business case should be
revisited and revised as appropriate. If the financial, material, and
intellectual resources to develop the product are not available, a program
should not move forward.

Best practices indicate that the business case is best accomplished using
an evolutionary (or incremental) approach that plans to deliver an early
but relevant capability first, followed by definable and doable increments
that ultimately achieve the full capability. Each increment is expected to
have its own decision milestones and baseline-cost, schedule, and
performance requirements. An acquisition strategy is the disciplined
process employed by the service program office and prime contractor to
manage the acquisition, deliver knowledge at key junctures to make

  Global Hawk and Predator Had Common Beginnings, but Different Acquisition
  Strategies Have Yielded Different Outcomes

further investments, and continue the program. The strategy implements the
business case; sets schedules for developing, designing, and producing the
weapon system; and establishes exit/entrance criteria to guide acquisition
managers and executives through key program milestones to control and
oversee the acquisition.

While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful advanced
concept technology demonstration (ACTD) programs, they have since adopted
different strategies in system development that have led to different
outcomes. The Global Hawk adopted a riskier acquisition strategy that has
led to significant cost, schedule, and performance problems. Conversely,
the Predator program pursued a more structured and evolutionary strategy
more consistent with DOD's acquisition policy guidance and has thus far
experienced fewer negative outcomes.

    Global Hawk Program Has Experienced Relatively Poor Outcomes

Following a successful ACTD, DOD approved an acquisition program in 2001
to incrementally develop and acquire systems similar to the demonstrators,
now designated the RQ-4A (Global Hawk A). In 2002, the Global Hawk program
was substantially restructured to more quickly develop and field a new,
larger, and more advanced aircraft, designated the RQ-4B (Global Hawk B).
The new acquisition strategy was now highly concurrent, overlapping
technology development, design, testing, and production. Our November 2004
report on Global Hawk, raised concerns about the revised strategy and its
elevated risks of poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. 4 We
recommended limiting procurement to only those aircraft needed for testing
to allow product knowledge to more fully mature and the design and
technologies to be tested before committing resources to the full program.
DOD officials did not agree because, in their opinion, we overstated some
risks and they were effectively mitigating other risks.

The Global Hawk program is already experiencing problems that are
associated with high concurrency and gaps in product knowledge. Production
of the larger Global Hawk B aircraft began in July 2004 with

4

GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition
Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks , GAO-05-6 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 5, 2004).

Page 6 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

immature technologies and an unstable design. The design had been expected
to be very similar to the smaller Global Hawk A, whose performance had
been proven in the ACTD, but as the larger aircraft design matured and
production geared up, the differences were more extensive, complex, and
costly than anticipated. Within a year, there were more than 2,000
authorized engineering drawing changes to the total baseline of 1,400
drawings, and more than half were considered major changes. Also, once
manufacturing began, there were recurring quality and performance issues
on the work of several key subcontractors. The subcontractor building the
tail scrapped seven of the first eight main structural components because
of design changes and manufacturing process deficiencies. The wing
manufacturer had to terminate a key subcontractor because of poor
performance and quality. Other suppliers delivered parts late and with
defects. These specific problems have mostly been resolved, but the
potential for even greater problems exists when the major subsystems,
still in development, are integrated into the new larger aircraft already
being produced.

Outcomes so far have not been good, as the program has experienced
significant cost increases. Extensive design changes contributed to a $209
million overrun in the development contract and resulted in a more
expensive production aircraft than forecast. Requirements growth,
increased costs of airframe and sensors, and increased support
requirements significantly increased procurement costs. In April 2005, the
Air Force reported to Congress a Nunn-McCurdy breach in procurement unit
costs-an 18 percent increase over the program's cost baseline approved in
2002. 5 In December 2005, we reported the Air Force had failed to report
$401 million in procurement costs and that the procurement unit cost had
actually increased 31 percent. 6 Subsequently, in December 2005, the Air
Force renotified Congress that, if these additional costs were included,
the procurement unit costs had actually increased by over 25 percent and
that program acquisition unit costs (including development and military
construction costs in addition to procurement) had also breached the
thresholds established in the law. Under the law, DOD must

5

To provide for oversight of cost growth in DOD major defense acquisition
programs, Congress passed legislation in 1982, commonly referred to as
Nunn-McCurdy, that, as amended, requires DOD to notify Congress when a
program's unit cost growth exceeds (or breaches) the latest approved
acquisition program baseline by at least 15 percent. This requirement is
codified at 10 U.S.C. 2433.

6

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Unit Price Increases
Understated in Nunn-McCurdy Report , GAO-06-222R (Washington, D.C.:
December 15, 2005).

now certify the program to Congress. 7 The Air Force is currently
restructuring the Global Hawk program-the fourth restructuring since it
began as a major acquisition.

Program schedules and performance have also been negatively affected. For
example, the start of operational assessment of the Global Hawk A slipped
about 1 year, and the planned start of initial operational testing of the
Global Hawk B design has slipped 2 years. The Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, reports that operational assessment of the Global Hawk A
identified significant deficiencies in processing and providing data to
the warfighter, communication failures, and problems with engine
performance at high altitudes. In addition, planned delivery dates have
continued to slip, the procurement for two aircraft were moved to later
years, and some development work content was deferred or deleted; this
means that the warfighter will not get anticipated capability at the time
originally promised. For example, defensive subsystems required by Air
Combat Command have been pushed off the schedule, and it is not known
whether they will be added in the future.

The frequent deployment of Global Hawk demonstrator aircraft to support
combat operations has further affected costs and schedule, according to
officials. Support to the warfighter is the program's top priority.
Deployments have resulted in increased costs and time delays for
acquisition but, at the same time, provide a valuable, realistic test for
the system and its employment concepts to improve its performance and
responsiveness to the warfighter. Fleet flying hours now exceed 8,000
hours, more than half in combat operations.

The following table shows changes in cost and quantities since the program
started in March 2001. The restructured program tripled development costs,
reflecting the addition of the new Global Hawk B aircraft with advanced
capabilities still in technology development. Total procurement costs
increased moderately, resulting from higher costs for the new aircraft
tempered by a reduction in the number of aircraft to be acquired for
reasons of affordability and changed requirements. Total program
acquisition and procurement unit costs have increased 73 percent

If the cost growth has increased at least 25 percent over the baseline,
the Secretary of Defense must certify to Congress that (1) the program is
essential to national security, (2) no alternatives exist which will
provide equal or greater military capability at less cost, (3) new program
acquisition or procurement unit cost estimates are reasonable, and (4) the
management structure is adequate to control unit cost.

Page 8 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

    Predator Program Has Had Better Outcomes than Global Hawk

and 35 percent, respectively, and aircraft quantities decreased by 19
percent. Thus far, seven Global Hawk As have been delivered to the Air
Force-14 percent of the combined fleet-and 34 percent of the planned
budget to completion has been invested.

Table 2: Changes in Global Hawk Funding, Quantity, and Unit Costs through
Completion of the Program

                    (in millions of base year 2006 dollars)

                  Cost March 2001 January 2006 Changes Percent

                   Development $925.2 $2,459.1 $1,533.9 166%

                    Procurement $3,836.2 $4,197.5 $361.3 9%

                      Total $4,761.4 $6,656.6 $1,895.2 40%

                                    Quantity

                            Aircraft 63 51 -12 -19%

                         Ground stations 14 10 -4 -29%

                                   Unit Costs

                      Total program $75.6 $130.5 $54.9 73%

                     Procurement only $60.9 $82.3 $21.4 35%

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.

Note: Procurement costs include costs for aircraft, ground stations,
support equipment, and spares. Military construction funding is not
included.

The Predator program began in 1994 as an ACTD to demonstrate and deliver
what would become the MQ-1 (Predator A). It evolved from an earlier
unmanned aircraft, the Gnat, allowing delivery of an initial demonstrator
aircraft to DOD 6 months after contract award. The Predator ACTD concluded
in 1996 and transitioned to the Air Force in 1997 when the Defense
Acquisition Board approved the Predator A for production. A limited strike
capability, to launch Hellfire missiles against ground targets, was later
added. On the basis of the success of the Predator A, the contractor
designed and built two prototypes of a larger aircraft capable of armed
reconnaissance and surveillance. This new aircraft would evolve into the
second generation MQ-9 (Predator B), a larger and higher-flying aircraft
with more strike capability. In February 2004, the Predator B program was
approved as a new system development and demonstration program. It is
managed separately from Predator A and has its own schedule and management
reviews.

The Predator program overall has experienced fewer cost, schedule, and
performance problems than the Global Hawk program has experienced. As of
February 2006, the Predator A program has a stable design with little cost
growth and the Air Force recently increased its planned buys. Although
early in the acquisition cycle, cost increases in the Predator B program
have been moderate and schedule changes few. The fiscal year 2005 report
of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, cited favorable
developmental testing results and recommended refining acquisition and
fielding strategies to permit more focused and effective operational
testing. To date, about 59 percent of the combined fleet (as presented in
last year's budget) has been delivered for about 56 percent of the current
planned budget. Deliveries include 129 Predator As and 2 prototype and six
production Predator Bs. The combined fleet has tallied 120,000 flight
hours since 1995. Congress has been supportive of both Predators,
typically adding to annual funding requests and quantities.

Table 3 summarizes changes in the Predator B program estimates to
completion since its start of system development.

Table 3: Changes in Predator B Funding, Quantity, and Unit Costs through
Completion of the Program
(in millions of base year 2006 dollars)
Cost               February 2004       January 2006       Changes  Percent 
Development                  $153.6             $177.5      $23.9      16% 
Procurement                  $935.1           $1,031.9      $96.8      10% 
        Total                 $1,088.7           $1,209.4     $120.7      11% 
Quantity                                                          
Aircraft                          63                63       $0.0       0% 
Unit Costs                                                        
Total program                    $17.3          $19.2        $1.9      11% 
Procurement only                 $14.8          $16.4        $1.5      10% 

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.

Note:. Procurement costs include costs for aircraft, ground stations,
support equipment, and spares. Military construction funding is not
included. Totals may not equal 100 because of rounding.

Page 10 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

    Differences in Global Hawk and Predator Business Practices Have Contributed
    to the Programs' Outcomes to Date

The Global Hawk and Predator began with top leadership support and
successful demonstration efforts as ACTDs, but differences in their
business practices have been the primary contributors to different cost,
schedule, and performance outcomes so far in these programs. Both programs
were under pressure to field capabilities quickly to support the
warfighter. Original models of both systems have proven to be valuable
assets in combat operations, and both transitioned from technology
demonstrations into weapon system acquisition programs with sound
strategies to complete development and acquire initial systems with
enhanced capabilities. However, Global Hawk subsequently changed to a
riskier acquisition strategy that plans to develop technologies
concurrently with the system design, testing, and production phases of the
program. Predator, while not immune to typical developmental problems, has
pursued a more disciplined, structured approach intended to evolve new
capability in separate programs. Its decisions have been more consistent
with DOD's acquisition policy preferences. Table 5 shows some of the
differences of the current programs that have led to greater success in
the Predator program so far.

Table 4: Comparison of Business Case and Acquisition Strategy Factors in Current
                       Global Hawk and Predator Programs

                    Acquisition factors Global Hawk Predator

                 Acquisition strategy Quantum leap Incremental

                      Technologies Immature Mostly mature

Concurrency Significant overlap of technology development, Moderate
overlap of technology development, design, testing, and production
testing, and production

Leadership Less directive and more risk-tolerant Direction to follow acquisition
                               policy preferences

 Funding Optimistic and compressed into a few years Moderate and balanced over
                                      time

Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Is More Risky than Predator's

Source: GAO analysis of DOD program data.

The current Global Hawk acquisition strategy is risky. It plans to develop
a new, larger, and more capable aircraft by integrating as yet
undemonstrated technologies into a new airframe, also undemonstrated, to
provide a quantum leap in performance over its ACTD. The Predator also
added plans for a new, larger aircraft, but chose an incremental approach
by managing the new investment in a separate program with separate
decision points.

The Global Hawk program began in 1994 as an ACTD, managed first by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and, since 1998, by the Air
Force. Seven demonstrator aircraft were built, logged several thousand
flight hours, completed several demonstrations and other tests, and passed
a military utility assessment. Demonstrators subsequently provided
effective support to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD
judged the demonstration a success, but tests identified the need to make
significant improvements in reliability, sensor performance, and
communications before producing operationally effective and suitable
systems.

In March 2001, DOD approved the Global Hawk for a combined start of system
development and limited initial production of six aircraft. The Air
Force's acquisition strategy approached best practices standards in terms
of technology and design maturity. Officials planned to first acquire
basic systems very similar to the successful demonstrators and then
incrementally develop and acquire systems with more advanced sensors as
critical technologies were demonstrated, using the same platform.
Officials planned to acquire a total of 63 aircraft (Global Hawk As), and
14 ground stations for mission launch, recovery, and control. These
aircraft would all be dedicated to single missions, some having imagery
intelligence capabilities and others having signals intelligence
capabilities.

In 2002, the Air Force radically restructured the Global Hawk program to
develop and acquire a larger and more advanced aircraft system, the Global
Hawk B. The decision to acquire the larger aircraft was driven by the
desire to have multimission capabilities (both signals intelligence and
imagery intelligence sensors on the same aircraft) and to deliver new
capabilities associated with advanced signals intelligence and radar
technologies still in development. The new acquisition strategy abandoned
an incremental approach and moved toward a strategy that called for
concurrent development of technologies, systems integration, testing, and
production. The Air Force planned to set and approve requirements and
mature technologies over time, instead of at the start of development, and
to do this at the same time as it designed and produced the new larger and
heavier aircraft that had never been built or flight-tested.

For affordability reasons and changing requirements, the restructured
program also reduced quantities to 51 aircraft-7 Global Hawk As and 44
Global Hawk Bs-and 10 ground stations. Most of the Global Hawk Bs are
planned to have multimission capabilities, including the advanced signals
intelligence sensor, and some will have single-mission capabilities,
including the advanced radar. Low-rate production was tripled from the 6
Global Hawk As approved at program start to 19 aircraft as restructured- 7
Global Hawk As and 12 Global Hawk Bs-about 40 percent of the entire fleet.
To speed up development and field these new capabilities sooner, DOD also
approved the program to streamline and accelerate acquisition processes,
bypassing some normal acquisition policy requirements and controls when
considered appropriate. For example, the Global Hawk B business case did
not include a comprehensive analysis of alternatives that is intended to
rigorously compare expected capabilities of a new system with the current
capabilities offered by existing weapon systems, such as the signals
intelligence capabilities provided by U-2 aircraft.

Although the program could have reduced cost and schedule risks by
managing a series of discrete increments to develop and acquire the
different configurations, the Air Force chose to manage it as one program,
with one baseline and one set of decision milestones. This revised
strategy attempts to deliver capability to the warfighter that
significantly surpasses that of the former Global Hawk A program. And the
Air Force has committed up-front to produce the larger Global Hawk B
aircraft in order to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter sooner,
but the signals intelligence sensor and advanced radar technologies
critical to meeting requirements are still immature and are not expected
to be delivered and integrated until very late in the program.

The Predator transitioned from its ACTD program in 1997, when the Defense
Acquisition Board approved the Predator A for production, skipping the
system development and design phases. The transition was not without
difficulty because the focus during the demonstration effort had been to
quickly ascertain operational capabilities, but without emphasis on design
and development aspects that make a system more reliable and
supportable-typically key aspects of a development program. The Air Force
had to organize a team to respond to these issues until reliability and
supportability issues could be resolved. Senior leadership, however, kept
the strategy simple and focused on buying additional Predators very
similar to the ACTD models.

In February 2004, the Predator B program was approved as a new system
development and demonstration program. The Predator B program was approved
without two fundamental elements of a good business case: formal
requirements documentation and an analysis of alternatives. According to
the Air Force, these were not prepared because of the exigencies of the
Global War on Terror. Officials initially planned to adopt an acquisition
strategy similar to the Global Hawk's, but senior leadership intervened
and the acquisition strategy adopted was incremental and more consistent
with DOD acquisition policy preferences. Under the revised strategy, the
Air Force manages the Predator A and B acquisitions as separate programs.
The new Predator B program balanced requirements and resources for a first
increment and included its own sets of milestone decision points.
Subsequent increments will evolve when future requirements and resources
can be matched.

Figure 1 contrasts notional Predator B and Global Hawk schedules for
implementing their respective acquisition strategies with that espoused by
best practices and DOD acquisition policy. Predator's incremental approach
with less overlap of technology and system development is more similar to
best practices.

 Figure 1: Comparison of Predator B and Global Hawk Acquisition Plans with Best
                                Practices Model

Global Hawk's Technologies Are Much Less Mature than Predator's

Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.

Critical technologies were not sufficiently mature to support the start-up
of the Global Hawk B program-particularly those associated with the
signals intelligence and advanced radar, the very capabilities that drove
the decision to acquire the larger aircraft. Likewise, the larger and
heavier

Page 15 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Global Hawk and Predator Both Include Concurrent Development and
Production

aircraft was neither prototyped nor demonstrated. The Predator B's
technologies were mostly mature at program start, and the aircraft has
been built and flown. Mature technologies can leverage the potential for
success in development, providing early assurance that the warfighter's
requirements can be met within cost and schedule goals.

Although Global Hawk A technologies were demonstrated in the ACTD, the
level of technology maturity significantly declined when Global Hawk B was
approved for development. In particular, the new signals intelligence and
multiplatform radar systems were still in technology development, not
expected to be mature and be tested in an operational environment until
sometime between 2009 and 2011. The spillover of technology development
into product development and overall immaturity of technology increase
risks of poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. For example, as
the advanced sensors mature and become ready to be integrated into the
aircraft, there is risk that the aircraft, already being produced, will
not have sufficient space, power, or cooling or that the sensor systems
will weigh more than planned, reducing aircraft performance and ability to
meet overall mission requirements-altitude, speed, and endurance.

Predator A has been in production since 1997 and its technologies are
mature. All Predator B technologies, except for one, are mature. This one
meets the DOD standard for maturity-demonstration in a lab environment-but
has not yet met best practice standards that require demonstrations in an
operational environment. This technology is important to manage the
weapons that Predator B will carry and launch- more than those on Predator
A. It relies on a data link that enables the operator to release the
weapon from the ground. Program officials have stated that the current
problems with this technology are related to its integration into the
Predator B weapon system. In unmanned aircraft, unlike manned aircraft,
there is no one in the cockpit to fire the weapon. To develop this
capability required revisions to software, cryptologic controls,
navigation sensors, and flight operations. The Air Force expects this
capability to be demonstrated in an operational environment after it has
been integrated into a Predator B in May 2006.

The Global Hawk's restructured program includes a significant overlap of
technology, design, and production. The Predator B program is also
concurrent, but to a lesser degree. Concurrency-the overlapping of
development, test, and production schedules-is risky and can be costly and
delay delivery of a usable capability to the warfighter if testing shows
design changes are necessary to achieve expected system performance.

Different Leadership Approaches Have Influenced Outcomes in Both Programs

Once in production, design changes can be an order of magnitude greater
than changes identified during the design phase.

By requiring a larger air vehicle to carry new advanced technologies while
speeding up the acquisition schedule, the Air Force accepted much higher
risks than the original plan, which followed a more evolutionary approach.
The Air Force restructured the Global Hawk program, extending the
development period, delaying testing, and accelerating aircraft production
and deliveries, resulting in substantial concurrency. The development
period was expanded by 5 years, and production deliveries were accelerated
and compressed to fewer years, creating significant overlap from fiscal
years 2004 to 2010. As a result, the Air Force plans to buy almost half of
the new larger Global Hawk aircraft before a production model is
flight-tested and operational evaluations are completed to show that the
air vehicle design works as required. Substantially more than half of the
aircraft will be purchased before the airborne signals intelligence and
multiplatform radar, the two technologies that are required for the larger
aircraft, complete development and are integrated for flight testing.

The Predator B program's revised strategy also overlapped development and
production. For example, 21 Predator aircraft will be purchased before
initial operational test and evaluation has been completed. Air Force
officials acknowledge that the concurrency will require them to modify
about 10 of these aircraft to bring them up to the full first increment
capability. Modifications will include the installation of the system to
manage and launch weapons and the digital electronic engine controller.

Top management attention set the stage for the early success of Global
Hawk. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics became personally involved in establishing the original plan for
development. Leadership insisted on fielding an initial capability that
could be developed within a fixed budget while providing for an
evolutionary process to add enhancements to succeeding versions. The
result was a very successful ACTD program that produced seven
demonstrators, logged several thousand flight hours, passed its military
usefulness assessment, and has since very effectively supported combat
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Once the Global Hawk was approved as a
major acquisition program, however, senior Air Force leaders diverted
Global Hawk to a high-risk spiral development strategy that featured
frequent changes to development plans and time frames. They also approved
the larger Global Hawk B with immature critical technologies

Global Hawk Funding Requirements Are More Compressed than Those of the
Predator

and a highly concurrent test and production program-much of this contrary
to best practices and defense acquisition policy preferences.

The Predator also had top management attention early in the program and
has maintained its high visibility through a high-ranking group of Air
Force executives known as Task Force Arnold. Established in 2002 as a
senior oversight body for the Predator, Task Force Arnold has provided
guidance and headquarters-level direction to Air Combat Command on the
needs and capabilities for the system. The group has played a valuable
role in helping the Predator program maintain a tight focus on program
requirements and direction. Once the Predator A became operational, Air
Combat Command was besieged by requests from combatant commanders for
additional enhancements or capabilities. To alleviate the problem, the
task force acted as the arbiter for operational requirements. New
capabilities had to be vetted and prioritized through the task force
before they were incorporated. This kept a balance between requirements
and available resources and reduced the burden on Air Combat Command and
the program office, enabling the program to better manage its
requirements.

The task force was instrumental in revising the Predator B plans and
acquisition strategy. On the basis of an assessment from Task Force
Arnold, the Secretary of the Air Force directed that the program office
field an interim combat capability to balance an urgent operational need
with new acquisition. The Secretary also directed that the program office
revise its acquisition strategy to incrementally develop the Predator.
Accordingly, the Air Force restructured the program, dropping the spiral
development plan for an incremental approach. This strategy extended the
production schedule by 5 years and delayed initial operating capability by
3 years-lessening the degree of concurrency and providing more time to
mature technology and design. Whereas the original strategy called for
procuring 8 operational aircraft by August 2005, the revised, more
conservative strategy plans to acquire 6 aircraft delivered 1 year later.

Global Hawk funding requirements are optimistic, have changed, and
continue to increase. In 2002 Global Hawk tripled estimated development
costs and compressed the procurement of aircraft into fewer years. Program
funding, which previously had been allocated relatively evenly across 20
years, was compressed into roughly half the time, tripling Global Hawk's
budgetary requirements in certain years. This adds to funding risk should
large annual amounts be unaffordable as they compete with other defense
priorities. The Air Force is currently preparing a new acquisition
baseline estimate, its fourth baseline since the program started in March
2001.

In contrast, Predator funding requirements are less optimistic and are
spread over a longer production period. The stable Predator A program has
been in production since 1997 and had been focused on replacing aircraft
lost through attrition. However, the Air Force increased its buy
quantities in the fiscal year 2007 budget to reflect increased future
force requirements. The revised acquisition strategy for the Predator B
extended the production period by 5 years and decreased annual buy
quantities, resulting in more even and achievable levels of annual
funding. Annual funding for both Predators has been increased by Congress
in recent years, enabling the Air Force to procure additional Predator
systems or make enhancements to the fielded systems.

J-UCAS represents the next generation of unmanned aircraft. In addition to
providing intelligence and surveillance capabilities, J-UCAS is being
designed as a heavily weaponized and persistent strike aircraft. The joint
Air Force and Navy technology demonstration combined the two services'
separate efforts to develop early models of advanced unmanned attack
systems. Since the pre-acquisition program was initiated in 2003, it has
experienced funding cuts and leadership changes. The recent Quadrennial
Defense Review calls for again restructuring the program into a Navy
effort to demonstrate an unmanned carrier-based system. Regardless of
future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the
lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs to develop the knowledge
needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support advanced
unmanned aircraft acquisitions.

  J-UCAS Program Can Benefit from Lessons Learned by Global Hawk and Predator
  Programs

    J-UCAS Plans and Acquisition Strategy Continue to Evolve

Before J-UCAS was established as a joint program, the Air Force and Navy
had separate unmanned combat aircraft projects under way, each in
partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In
2003, we reported that the Air Force's original business plan provided
time to mature technologies and was a relatively low-risk approach, but
that plans and strategy had changed to a much accelerated and higher-risk
approach. 8 The new plan proposed to increase

8

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success, GAO-03-598 ( Washington
D.C.: June 30, 2003).

Page 19 GAO-06-447 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

requirements and accelerate the schedule for development and production,
substantially increasing concurrency of development, test, and production
activities. The gaps in product knowledge and the unfinished technology
development added significant risks of poor cost, schedule, and
performance outcomes. Therefore, we supported DOD's decision, under
discussion at the time of our review, which advocated a new joint service
approach and which reduced risks by significantly slowing down the Air
Force's plans.

DARPA was then designated to lead a joint demonstration program with Air
Force and Navy participation. The joint office began operations in October
2003 and devised a $5 billion pre-acquisition program that would develop
and demonstrate larger and more advanced versions of the original Air
Force and Navy prototypes (three from each contractor for a total of six
aircraft). The office planned to conduct an operational assessment
starting in 2007 and use the results to inform Air Force and Navy
decisions for possible system acquisition starts in 2010. The
demonstrators were expected to meet both the Air Force and Navy
requirements and to share a common operating system, sensors, and weapons.
Compared with the revised Air Force plans, the joint approach provided a
more knowledge-based strategy with decreased risks of poor outcomes. The
joint strategy delayed the start of system development, providing more
time to mature the technologies, incorporate new requirements, and conduct
demonstrations with prototype aircraft.

In December 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reduced
programmed funding by $1.1 billion and directed that funding and
leadership be transitioned to the Air Force, with Navy participation, and
that the joint program be restructured. The funding and leadership
perturbations added about 19 months to the schedule for completing
technology demonstration and deciding whether to start new system
developments. The plan then was to develop and demonstrate five aircraft
to inform system development decisions in fiscal year 2012. Now it appears
the J-UCAS program will change one more time as the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review directed its restructuring into a Navy program to develop
an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being
air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and
launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence. The
Quadrennial Defense Review also directed speeding up efforts to develop a
new land-based, penetrating long-range capability to be fielded by 2018.
The Air Force is expected to use the accomplishments and technologies from
the restructured J-UCAS program to inform the upcoming analysis of
alternatives for the next generation long range strike program. The Air
Force has a goal that approximately 45 percent of its future long-range
strike force will be unmanned. Although the J-UCAS and follow-on efforts
appear somewhat unstable as they go through these changes, we see benefits
to this. Addition of requirements and changes in user needs can be
determined prior to full program initiation. If done after an acquisition
begins systems integration, these perturbations would be much more costly.

Lessons Learned The Navy's restructured J-UCAS program, the Air Force's
new long-range strike effort, and other future programs have opportunities
to learn lessons from the Global Hawk and Predator programs. As originally
envisioned, the J-UCAS demonstration effort provided for an extended
period of time to define warfighter requirements, mature and demonstrate
technologies, inform the design with systems engineering, and conduct a
thorough operational assessment to prove concepts and military utility.
These kinds of actions would establish a foundation for a comprehensive
business case and effective acquisition strategy. Key lessons that can be
applied to J-UCAS and its offspring include

     o maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to
       that experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of
       Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the
       Predator's Task Force Arnold;
     o establishing a clear business case that constrains individual program
       requirements to match available resources based on proven technologies
       and engineering knowledge before committing to system development and
       demonstration;
     o establishing an incremental acquisition strategy that separates
       technology development from product development and minimizes
       concurrency between testing and production;
     o establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and
       demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and
       used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward and
       investing more money; and
     o managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully
       resource product development and production based on a cost estimate
       that has been informed by proven technologies and a preliminary
       design.

Additionally, lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator transitions from
ACTDs into production and operation are important. The advanced concept
technology demonstration can be a valuable tool to prove

                                  Conclusions

concepts and military utility before committing time and funds to a major
system acquisition. However, designing in product reliability and
producibility and making informed trade offs among alternative support
approaches are key aspects of development. If these operational aspects of
system development are not addressed early before production, they can
have major negative impacts on life cycle costs.

Finally, as the J-UCAS evolves one more time-and efforts return to the
individual services-some key challenges will exist to maintain the
advantages that were offered by a joint effort. The services need to be
aware of those advantages and not arbitrarily reject them for parochial
reasons. For example, exploiting past plans for common operating systems,
components, and payloads is important to affordability. Common systems
offer potential for cost savings as well as improved interoperability. In
particular, the common operating system pursued by DARPA is a cutting edge
tool to integrate and provide for interoperability of air vehicles,
allowing groups of unmanned aircraft to fly in a coordinated manner and
function autonomously (without human input).

Global Hawk's high-risk acquisition strategy resulted in increased costs
and delays. The restructured Global Hawk program is very different from
the original program that was approved in 2001 for a combined start of
development and limited production. The restructured program replaced the
original strategy to slowly and incrementally develop and acquire enhanced
versions of the proven demonstrator, with a highly concurrent and
accelerated strategy to develop and acquire a substantially new aircraft
with much advanced capabilities still in technology development. Despite
these major changes, officials essentially overlaid the new plans on the
old and did not prepare a comprehensive business case to support the
larger aircraft and justify specific quantities of the advanced signals
intelligence and advanced radar capabilities. Predator B's strategy is
less risky, and as a result, the program has had moderate cost growth and
has delivered assets in a timely manner.

There are trends that run consistently through the Global Hawk and
Predator programs, similar to trends in other major defense acquisition
programs that we have reviewed. That is, when DOD provides strong
leadership at an appropriate organizational level, it enables innovative,
evolutionary, and disciplined processes to work. Once leadership is
removed or diminished, programs have tended to lose control of
requirements and add technical and funding risks. We have also found that
after successful demonstrations to quickly field systems with existing
technologies, problems were encountered after the programs transitioned
into the system development phase of the acquisition process. The services
pushed programs into production without maturing processes and also began
to add new requirements that stretched beyond technology and design
resources. Inadequate technology, design, and production knowledge
increased risk and led to cost, schedule, and performance problems.

J-UCAS has had a bumpy road with several changes in leadership and
strategic direction. However, J-UCAS and its offspring as directed by the
Quadrennial Defense Review will be at a good juncture to establish a sound
foundation for developing the business case and an effective acquisition
strategy for follow-on investments by better defining warfighter needs and
matching them with available resources. Refining requirements based on
proven technologies and a feasible design based on systems engineering are
best accomplished in the concept and technology development phase that
precedes the start of a system acquisition program. During this early
phase, the environment is conducive to changes in requirements that can be
accomplished more cost-effectively than after systems integration begins
and large organizations of engineers, suppliers, and manufacturers are
formed to prepare for the start of system production.

We are making following recommendations to reduce program risk and

  Recommendations for

increase the likelihood of more successful program outcomes by Executive
Action delivering capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within
available resources. Specifically,

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Global Hawk program office to

     o limit production of the Global Hawk B aircraft to the number needed
       for flight testing until the developer has demonstrated that signals
       intelligence and radar imagery subsystems can be integrated and
       perform as expected in the aircraft, and
     o update business case elements to reflect the restructured program to
       include an analysis of alternatives, a justification for investments
       in the specific quantities needed for each type of Global Hawk Bs
       being procured (signals intelligence and advanced radar imagery), and
       a revised cost estimate.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Navy and Air Force
organizations responsible for the development efforts stemming from the

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

former J-UCAS program to not move into a weapon system acquisition program
before

     o determining requirements and balancing them to match proven
       technologies, a feasible design based on systems engineering by the
       developer, and available financial resources;
     o developing an evolutionary and knowledge-based acquisition strategy
       that implements the intent of DOD acquisition policy; and
     o establishing strong leadership empowered to carry out the strategy
       that will work in conjunction with the other services to ensure the
       design and development continue to incorporate commonality as
       initiated under the DARPA-managed joint program.

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments appear in appendix II. DOD concurred with our three
recommendations on the J-UCAS, but did not concur with our two
recommendations on the Global Hawk. Separately, DOD provided technical
comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

Regarding our recommendation to limit Global Hawk procurement, DOD stated
that the program is managing risk and would test the signals intelligence
sensor and advanced radar on other systems and transition them to Global
Hawk when mature. DOD stated that our recommendation would stop the
production line and incur significant cost and schedule delays.

We continue to believe that limiting further Global Hawk B procurement to
units needed for testing until the aircraft and its advanced technologies
are integrated and operationally evaluated will lead to better program
outcomes. The Global Hawk program is experiencing significant cost,
schedule, and performance problems, and reducing procurement should lessen
future program risks and allow more time to mature and test the new
aircraft design and technologies before committing funds for most of the
fleet. No Global Hawk B aircraft has completed production yet and first
flight is not expected until November 2006. Initial operational test and
evaluation of the basic aircraft design with only imagery intelligence
capabilities has slipped into fiscal year 2009. According to the Air
Force's current budget plans, more than one-half of the total Global Hawk
B fleet will have been purchased before starting initial operational test
and evaluation. Schedules for follow-on operational tests of the aircraft
integrated with the advanced signals intelligence and radar technologies-
the capabilities that drove the decision to acquire the larger
aircraft-have also slipped. While we support Air Force efforts to first
test these new capabilities on surrogate systems, our concern is again
that, by the time the Air Force tests fully integrated Global Hawk systems
in an operational environment, most of the aircraft will already be built
or on order. If problems are revealed during testing of the aircraft and
its technologies, they could require costly redesign and remanufacture of
items already produced and further delay getting these capabilities to
combatant commanders.

There are several other compelling reasons to limit procurement plans:

     o Projected delivery dates for the Global Hawk B continue to slip.
       Estimated delivery schedules in the fiscal year 2007 budget show that
       deliveries have slipped an average of almost 10 months since Global
       Hawk B production started in July 2004 and by an average exceeding 6
       months in the last year alone. If any further slippage occurs,
       production may be a year or more behind what the Air Force's strategy
       and financial plan was built upon. With these delays, the Air Force
       should be able to reduce near-term buys and rebalance subsequent
       procurements without materially affecting the flow of production.
     o Procurement through fiscal year 2006 will complete its approved
       lowrate initial production quantity of 19 aircraft. By law, a major
       weapon system cannot proceed beyond the low-rate quantity until
       initial operational test and evaluation has been satisfactorily
       completed as reported by the Director, Operational Test and
       Evaluation. Again, initial operational test and evaluation has been
       delayed until fiscal year 2009. In his annual report, the Director
       stated that low-rate production quantities should not be increased on
       the Global Hawk until after an adequate initial operational test and
       evaluation of the Global Hawk B aircraft and ground segments.
     o Operational assessment of the smaller Global Hawk A is not yet
       complete. Testing and flight operations have experienced engine
       shutdowns, communication failures, and imagery data processing
       deficiencies. These problems directly affect the Global Hawk B because
       it uses the same engine and similar communication and data processing
       systems.

Regarding our recommendation to update the Global Hawk's business case,
DOD stated that the department's current Nunn-McCurdy certification
evaluation and program rebaselining is thorough and provides

  Scope and Methodology

department leaders with the information they need to make informed
decisions. Because the Nunn-McCurdy certification and rebaselining effort
is ongoing, we cannot comment on whether these documents will make up a
comprehensive business case. However, given the magnitude of the program's
continuing changes and challenges discussed in this report, we are
concerned that these efforts will fall short. A business case should be
rigorously updated to reflect significant restructurings, to justify
specific investments in new and emerging technologies, and to match
revised requirements to available resources.

Our apprehension is not unfounded. In November 2004, we similarly
recommended that DOD delay further procurement of the Global Hawk B until
a new business case-one that reduced risk and applied a knowledge-based
approach-was completed. DOD chose not to concur with this recommendation,
arguing that the department was effectively mitigating risk. Despite DOD's
assurances, events that triggered the Nunn-McCurdy review in April 2005
not only indicate that the risk mitigation measures were ineffective but
underscore the wisdom of making a new business case. In addition to cost
increases, schedule delays, and performance problems that have altered
many of the program's conditions and plans as they were originally
envisioned, officials said they are rethinking Global Hawk test plans and
low-rate quantities, which could affect the elements on which a business
case is made. Our past work on major weapon systems acquisitions has
clearly shown the value of preparing and maintaining a comprehensive
business case to justify and guide investments, and the need to revisit
the business case if circumstances substantially change, as they have on
Global Hawk.

To determine the extent to which Global Hawk and Predator acquisition
strategies and business cases were effective in meeting warfighter
requirements we reviewed budget and planning documents. We also utilized
GAO's Methodology for Assessing Risks on Major Weapon System Acquisition
Programs to assess their acquisition strategies and business cases with
respect to best practices criteria. The methodology is described from the
best practices and experiences of leading commercial firms and successful
defense acquisition programs. We interviewed DOD and contractor officials
and obtained programmatic data and reports for the Global Hawk and
Predator. We incorporated our recent Global Hawk and Predator Quick Look
efforts and past GAO reports and testimony. We reviewed management plans,
cost reports, progress briefings, and risk data to identify execution
efforts and results to date.

The primary comparisons made in the report are for the most part focused
on the combined Global Hawk program and the Predator B program.
Information on the Predator A program mainly provides a historical
perspective and lessons learned from that older and more mature system. We
received DOD comments questioning whether the Global Hawk and Predator B
programs can reasonably be compared given the differences in time frames;
Global Hawk's system start was in March 2001, 3 years earlier than
Predator B's start in February 2004.

While we agree that there may sometimes be a period of time before
problems in a newer program become evident, we believe the two programs
can be compared to provide valuable lessons for future acquisitions.
First, concerns about acquisition strategy, concurrency, and funding
profiles are not particularly dependent on time frames. Second, the DOD
policy preference for incremental acquisitions used as criteria in
comparing programs was in effect when both programs started. Third, the
Global Hawk B, which comprises most of the Global Hawk program, did not
begin production until after the start of Predator B. In a comparable time
frame since then, the Predator B program has provided some interim combat
capability and has production models flying and undergoing tests, while
the first Global Hawk B is expected to make its first flight later this
year.

To identify what lessons can be learned and applied on the J-UCAS program,
or its offspring, we interviewed DOD and contractor officials and obtained
programmatic data and reports on J-UCAS. We used our comparisons of the
Global Hawk and Predator, as well as past audit work on unmanned and
manned systems, to identify factors conducive to successful programs and
development of effective business cases and implementation strategies. We
monitored the changes in J-UCAS leadership, priorities, and support within
the department and Congress, including the most recent decisions by the
Quadrennial Defense Review. We utilized also information obtained in past
Quick Look and budget review efforts concerning J-UCAS.

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials
from the Global Hawk, Predator, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems
Program Offices, all at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Air Combat
Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Northrop Grumman Integrated
Systems, Rancho Bernardo and Palmdale, California; General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems, San Diego and Palmdale, California; and DOD Task
Force for Unmanned Systems, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

We performed our review from August 2005 to February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, and the Secretary of the Navy, and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please call me at (202)
5124841. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs are listed on the last page of this report. The following
staff made key contributions to this report: Michael Hazard, Assistant
Director, Bruce Fairbairn, Rae Ann Sapp, Charlie Shivers, Adam Vodraska,
and Karen Sloan.

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Issues

Appendix I: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Included in This Review

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a
successful technology demonstration, the system entered development and
limited production in March 2001. Considered a transformational system,
the program was restructured twice in 2002 to acquire 7 air vehicles
similar to the original demonstrators (the Global Hawk A) and 44 of a new,
larger, and more capable model (the Global Hawk B). Seven Global Hawk As
have been delivered to the Air Force. Global Hawk Bs are in production
with first flight and first delivery expected in fiscal year 2007.
Demonstrators have seen combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
first Global Hawk As recently arrived in-theater.

The Predator began as a technology demonstration in 1994 and transitioned
to an Air Force program in 1997. Predators have supported combat
operations since 1995. Originally designed to provide tactical
reconnaissance, the Predator A was modified in 2001 to employ Hellfire
missiles, giving it a limited ground strike capability. In response to the
Global War on Terror initiatives, the Air Force proposed a larger model
carrying more weapons and flying higher and faster. The Predator B was
approved as a new system development and demonstration program in February
2004. Funding plans at the time of our review were to procure a total of
232 Predators-181 A models and 63 B models-with additional future buys
expected. Through calendar year 2005, 137 aircraft have been delivered, 8
Predator Bs and the rest Predator As.

The Joint Unmanned Combat Systems (J-UCAS) program is a joint Air Force
and Navy effort begun in October 2003 to develop and demonstrate the
technical feasibility and operational value of a networked system of
high-performance, weaponized unmanned aircraft. Planned missions include
suppression of enemy air defenses, precision strike, persistent
surveillance, and potentially others such as electronic attack as
resources and requirements dictate. The program consolidated two formerly
separate service efforts and was to develop and demonstrate larger, more
capable, and interoperable aircraft to inform decisions on starting
acquisition program(s) in fiscal year 2012. The Quadrennial Defense Review
calls for restructuring J-UCAS into a Navy effort to develop an unmanned
carrier-based aircraft, while the Air Force will consider J-UCAS
technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new,
landbased long-range strike capability.

Figure 2 compares the salient performance characteristics of these
unmanned aircraft systems.

Appendix I: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Included in This Review

 Figure 2: Performance Characteristics of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Reviewed by
                                      GAO

                           Global Hawk   Predator                J-UCAS
                       RQ-4A   RQ-4B     MQ-1A      MQ-9B     X-45C     X-47B 
Maximum        65,000 ft.  60,000   25,000 ft.  40,000    40,000    40,000 
altitude                     ft.                  ft.       ft.        ft. 
Maximum speed   350 knots 340 knots 118 knots  225 knots 460 knots     460 
                                                                        knots 
Endurance         32 hrs.  28 hrs.   24 hrs.    16 hrs.   7 hrs.    9 hrs. 
Payload        1,950 lbs.   3,000    450 lbs.  3,800       4,500     4,500 
capacity                    lbs.               lbs.        lbs.       lbs. 
Take-off           26,750  32,250   2,250 lbs. 10,500     36,500    46,000 
weight               lbs.   lbs.               lbs.        lbs.       lbs. 
Wingspan          116 ft.  131 ft.    49 ft.    66 ft.    49 ft.    62 ft. 
Fuselage                                                                   
length             44 ft.  48 ft.     27 ft.    36 ft.    39 ft.    38 ft.

Sources: Northrop Grumman Corporation; General Atomics-Aeronautical
Systems, Incorporated; The Boeing Company; and DOD data.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to
Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2005.

DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-05-301.
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can
Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2005.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. November 5, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.

GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development
and Fielding Efforts. GAO-04-530T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, but
More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2003.

Related GAO Products

Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices.
GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better
Weapons System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C. April 25,
2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999.

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