Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could  
Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G (26-APR-06, GAO-06-446).	 
                                                                 
The EA-6B has conducted airborne electronic attack for all	 
services since 1996. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD)	 
completed an analysis of alternatives for the EA-6B that	 
concluded the inventory would be insufficient to meet the DOD's  
needs beyond 2009. Since then, the services have embarked on	 
separate acquisition efforts to develop airborne electronic	 
attack assets. In 2003, the Navy started development of the	 
EA-18G aircraft to replace the EA-6B. This report was done under 
the Comptroller General's authority and assesses if (1) DOD's	 
2002 conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient	 
beyond 2009 remains valid for assessing the Navy's future needs, 
and (2) the acquisition approach used to develop the EA-18G is	 
knowledge-based and might mitigate future risks.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-446 					        
    ACCNO:   A52560						        
  TITLE:     Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs
Could Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G			 
     DATE:   04/26/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Air defense systems				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Electronic warfare 				 
	     Equipment upgrades 				 
	     Inventory control					 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Naval aircraft					 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     B-52 Aircraft					 
	     EA-18G Aircraft					 
	     EA-6B Aircraft					 
	     EF-111 Aircraft					 
	     F-35 Aircraft					 
	     F-4G Aircraft					 
	     F/A-18E/F Aircraft 				 
	     Hornet Aircraft					 
	     Joint Strike Fighter				 
	     Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems			 
	     Navy Improved Capability Program III		 
	     Phantom Aircraft					 
	     Prowler Aircraft					 
	     Raven Aircraft					 
	     Wild Weasel Aircraft				 

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GAO-06-446

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * Changes in Operational Concept and Upgrades Extend Operation
          * System of Systems Decision Reduces the Inventory Requirement
          * Electronic Suite Upgrade Is More Capable, but Quantities Are
     * EA-18G Program at Risk of Cost and Schedule Growth because I
          * EA-18G Program Has Entered the Acquisition Phase Where Most
          * Potential for Cost Growth and Redesign Because of Technologi
          * Production Decision Based on Limited Demonstrated Functional
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

GAO

April 2006

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G

GAO-06-446

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce Risk in Development of
EA-18G

  What GAO Found

EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy's suppression of enemy air
defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps
through 2025-- as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted
with upgraded electronics suites. The conclusion that the EA-6B inventory
would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy's requirement
for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that
would meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of
systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be
required to support all of DOD's electronic attack requirements. However,
insufficient quantities of upgraded jamming systems means that the
majority of the EA-6B fleet is equipped with the older jamming system that
is limited in its ability to conduct numerous critical functions. If the
Navy is required to support all services, given the recent Air Force
proposal to terminate its EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs
may require the Improved Capability (ICAP) III upgrade.

The risk of cost growth and schedule delays in the EA-18G program is
increasing because the program is not following a knowledge-based approach
to acquisition. None of its five critical technologies were fully mature
as the system development phase began, and that is still the case today.
Of particular concern is the ALQ-218 receiver, placed in the harsh wingtip
environment on the EA-18G and not the more benign setting of the EA-6B's
tail, for which it was developed. While the EA-18G's design appears
stable, and almost all its design drawings are complete, that may change
once the aircraft is flight-tested. Production of the EA-18G is also
risky: Onethird of the total buy will be procured as low-rate initial
production aircraft based on limited demonstrated functionality.

                EA-18G Mockup: F/A-18F Loaded with Jamming Pods

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 Background 5 Changes in Operational Concept and
Upgrades Extend Operational

Viability of the EA-6B, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet

Identified Requirements 9 EA-18G Program at Risk of Cost and Schedule
Growth because It

Is Not Following a Knowledge-Based Approach 13 Conclusions 18
Recommendations for Executive Action 19 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
19

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

  Figures

Figure 1: EA-6B Improved Capability III 6 Figure 2: Service-Identified
Airborne Electronic Attack System of

Systems 8 Figure 3: Current EA-6B Inventory Decline Projection Showing

Fatigue Effects and Operational Attrition 11 Figure 4: EA-18G Mock-up:
F/A-18F Loaded with ALQ-99 Jamming

Pods 14

Abbreviations

AEA                     airborne electronic attack                         
AoA                     analysis of alternatives                           
CCS                                     Communications Countermeasures Set 
DOD                     Department of Defense                              
FRP                     full-rate production                               
J-UCAS                  Joint Unmanned Combat Air System                   
LD/HD                   low-density/high-demand                            
LRIP                    low-rate initial production                        
OPEVAL                  operational test and evaluation                    
SAM                     surface-to-air missile                             
SOJ                     Standoff Jammer                                    
SoS                     system of systems                                  

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protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

April 26, 2006

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

In conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at great risk
from enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The
services use specialized aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily
degrade enemy air defense systems through either electronic warfare or
physical attack. These aircraft use electronic warfare jammers, which
disrupt enemy radar and communications to temporarily suppress enemy air
defenses. Other specialized aircraft use antiradiation missiles that home
in on radars used by surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery
systems to degrade or destroy them. Because specialized aircraft protect
aircraft of all services in hostile airspace, the suppression mission
necessarily crosses individual service lines.

Over the past decade, we have issued several reports calling attention to
the possibility that our nation's ability to counter such defenses is
being degraded. In 1996, for example, we reported that the Department of
Defense (DOD) had decided to eliminate the F-4G and EF-111 suppression
aircraft without first fielding comparable replacements. 1 Because no
replacements were available, the Navy's EA-6B aircraft became DOD's only
standoff radar jammer aircraft, providing suppression support for all
services. In January 2001, we called attention to the acknowledged gap

1

GAO, Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses May Be Too Low, GAO/NSIAD-96-128, (Washington, D.C.: April 10,
1996).

    Page 1 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare

between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. 2 The gap
was a consequence of the increasing modernization of enemy air defenses
that had outpaced DOD's effort to improve its suppression capabilities. At
that time, DOD stated that the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for airborne
electronic attack (AEA) would provide a basis for its future strategy and
lead to a balanced set of acquisition programs for the services. Urgency
to complete such an analysis of alternatives was motivated by a projected
shortfall of the EA-6B inventory, primarily caused by attrition, and the
increasing cost of operating such aging aircraft. The study found that the
EA-6B aircraft inventory was declining faster than had been projected and
concluded that it would be insufficient to meet DOD's needs beyond 2009.
In November 2002 we recommended that a comprehensive strategy was needed
to remedy the situation. 3 Since then, the military services have embarked
on separate acquisition efforts to develop a future AEA system of systems
(SoS) for DOD. In 2003 the Navy started development of the EA-18G aircraft
to replace the EA-6B as its contribution to the DOD AEA SoS.

We examined the analysis of alternatives and planned acquisition efforts
to determine (1) whether the key conclusion that the projected inventory
of EA-6Bs would be insufficient beyond 2009 for all services remains valid
for projecting the Navy's future needs and (2) whether the acquisition
management approach to developing the Navy's airborne electronic attack
core component, the EA-18G, is knowledge-based and can help mitigate
future risks. We conducted this work under the Comptroller General's
authority and are addressing the report to you because of your committees'
jurisdiction on these issues.

To address these objectives, we reviewed the 2002 analysis of
alternatives; pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing
the status of the EA-6B inventory; plans for maintaining them; status of
EA-6B suppression capabilities; testing conducted for the EA-6B Improved
Capability (ICAP) III program; the AEA system of systems; gaps in the AEA;
and potential solutions for AEA. We interviewed officials from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Strategic Command (Offutt, Nebraska);
Commander Electronic Attack Pacific Fleet (Whidbey Island); and officials

2

GAO, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppression of
Enemy Air Defenses , GAO-01-28 ( Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2, 2001).

3

GAO, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for
Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses , GAO-03-51, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25,
2002).

    Page 2 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare

                                Results in Brief

responsible for requirements and programs for the Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps. We interviewed personnel responsible for ICAP III electronic
warfare testing at the Office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (Washington, D.C.); Commander of Operational Test and
Evaluation Navy (Norfolk, Virginia); and VX-9 personnel responsible for
ICAP III testing at China Lake, California. We discussed airborne
electronic attack issues and EA-18G development and production with
contractor personnel at Boeing Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri and El
Segundo, California. We discussed software matters with officials at China
Lake and Point Mugu, California. We met with pilots at Patuxent River
Naval Air Station; China Lake, California; Whidbey Island Naval Air
Station, Washington; Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada; and Boeing
Corporation to discuss pilot workload issues, the nature of the threat,
ICAP III testing, and tactics developed for AEA. As with our past work on
the EA-18G development effort conducted under our annual assessment of
selected major defense acquisition programs, we focused our work to
determining whether the program was following a knowledge-based
acquisition approach. We met with Navy EA-18G program officials currently
involved with the development effort to document the maturity status of
the aircraft's critical technologies, and the status of its design effort
and plans for producing the aircraft. We performed our review from May
2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory would
be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy's requirement for 90
aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet
the needs of all services. The subsequent decision to move to a system of
systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be
required to support all of DOD's electronic attack requirements. As a
result, EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy's suppression of
enemy air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine
Corps through 2025-as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are
outfitted with ICAP III electronics suites. However, insufficient
quantities of upgraded jamming systems means that the majority of the
EA-6B fleet is equipped with the older ICAP II jamming system, which is
limited in its ability to conduct numerous critical functions. If the Navy
is required to support all services, given the recent Air Force proposal
to terminate its EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may
require the ICAP III upgrade.

While the EA-18G program is currently on cost and schedule, the risk of
future cost growth and schedule delays in the program is increasing
because the development effort is not fully following the knowledge-based
approach inherent in best practices and DOD's acquisition guidance. A
knowledge-based approach encourages managers to attain high levels of
knowledge at key points to support investment decisions, ensuring, for
example, that technologies are mature before starting development and that
the design is stable before beginning manufacturing. The EA-18G entered
system development without demonstrating that its five critical
technologies had reached full maturity, and that is still the case today.
Although three technologies are now very close to maturity, two have not
been demonstrated as they will exist on the aircraft. While the EA-18G's
design appears stable, the potential for costly design changes remains
until all its technologies are mature. Driven by the expected decline in
the EA6B inventory, the program plans to make a decision to enter low-rate
initial production in April 2007 to meet a required 2009 initial
operational capability. DOD acknowledges that the EA-18G development
schedule is aggressive. By adhering to this target, whose premise is no
longer valid given the Navy's projected needs; the development schedule is
unnecessarily compressed. Further, one-third of the aircraft will be
purchased during low-rate initial production based on limited demonstrated
functionality. This could result in the need to retrofit already produced
EA-18G aircraft, a possibility that the Navy is already anticipating.
Software mature enough to test whether the aircraft is fully functional
will not be available until after the production decision. A fully
functioning EA-18G aircraft, one that meets or exceeds the upgraded EA6B
ICAP III capability, will not complete operational testing until January
2009-3 months before the projected full-rate production decision.

This report recommends that the Secretary of Defense consider the option
of procuring the necessary number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP III to deal
with the existing and near-term capability gap. It also recommends that if
DOD follows this course, the Secretary direct extension of ICAP III
production for the EA-6B. It further recommends that if DOD acquires
additional ICAP III capability, it restructure the EA-18G procurement so
that it demonstrates the aircraft is fully functional before committing to
a large low-rate initial production plan. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD agreed that
refinement of Navy Electronic Attack inventory is needed, but believes
that it was premature to make a decision on ICAP III production until ICAP
III inventory requirements are determined. Determination of this and other
AEA issues are expected on September 15, 2006 after completion of an AEA
study directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

  Background

The four-seat EA-6B Prowler aircraft conducts missions for all services.
The AEA mission is focused on protecting U.S. aircraft and ground forces
by disabling enemy electronic capabilities. The EA-6B performs this
mission with a complement of electronic receivers and jammers, referred to
as its electronic suite, which are located on the aircraft structure and
in external pods attached to its wings. A development effort is currently
under way to replace the EA-6B with a two-seater electronic attack variant
of the F/A-18F, designated the EA-18G Growler.

The EA-6B joined the Navy's fleet in January 1971. The EA-6Bs's initial
deployment was in 1972 over the skies of Southeast Asia. Since the early
1990s, use of the EA-6B has steadily increased. In 1991 the aircraft was
used in Operation Desert Storm and in support of Iraqi "no-fly" zones
instituted after that war. In 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the
sole tactical radar support jammer for all services after the Air Force
decided to retire its fleet of EF-111 aircraft. This decision resulted in
increased use of the EA-6B. Since 1995 the Prowler force has provided AEA
capability during numerous joint and allied operations against both
traditional and nontraditional threats. It was used to provide support for
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and for peacekeeping operations over
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, and is currently being used against
traditional and nontraditional target sets in support of ground forces.
These capabilities continue to be demonstrated in the Global War on
Terrorism, in which EA-6B operations in Afghanistan and Iraq protect
coalition forces and disrupt critical communications links.

There have been several upgrades to the EA-6B's electronic suite since it
was initially fielded to address increased threats faced by U.S. forces.
The standard version, fielded in 1971, was quickly replaced in 1973 with
the expanded capability EA-6B, which augmented the electronic
countermeasure coverage of the aircraft. In 1977, the Improved Capability
version entered service, and was followed by a more sophisticated ICAP II
version, first deployed in 1984. The EA-6B/ICAP II featured updated
receivers, displays, and software to cover a wider range of known
surveillance and surface-to-air missile radars. As a result of heavy use
and the limited inventory of the EA-6B, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed
that the inventory of EA-6Bs be managed as low-density/high-demand (LD/HD)
assets. Low-density/high demand assets are force elements consisting of
major platforms, weapon systems, or personnel that possess unique mission
capabilities and are in continual high demand to support worldwide joint
military operations. In 1998 an ICAP III upgrade was initiated to address
capability gaps against threats from mobile surface-to-air missile
systems. In addition, concerns surfaced about an anticipated decline in
the EA-6B inventory because of structural fatigue issues. As a result, an
AEA analysis-of-alternative was started in 1999 to find a replacement for
the EA-6B. At that time it was anticipated that the EA-6B would remain in
the inventory until at least 2015.

Plans, as recently as December 2001, were to upgrade all 123 EA-6B
aircraft in the inventory to the ICAP III configuration. The ICAP III
provides rapid emitter detection, identification, geolocation, selective
reactive jamming, and full azimuth coverage. Also, ICAP III-equipped EA6Bs
will have the ability to integrate multiple EA-6Bs to match any threat
density, and to control other manned or unmanned assets. The upgrade is
needed to address capability gaps in the ICAP II electronic suite
presently installed in EA-6B aircraft. The EA-6B ICAP III production line
is currently scheduled to shut down after the fiscal year 2006 buy.

                    Figure 1: EA-6B Improved Capability III

Source: U.S. Navy.

The AoA report, published in 2002, concluded that an EA-6B replacement
would be needed in 2009 to meet the services needs. The AoA further
concluded that two components are needed to provide a complete AEA
solution that is able to meet DOD's collective needs. These two components
are a recoverable "core" component and an expendable "stand-in" component.

The AEA AoA report identified 27 platform combinations that were capable
of delivering jamming support. The study concluded that the final AEA
solution must address both anticipated short-term platform shortfalls, as
well as how best to implement the follow-on capability based on the menu
of alternatives developed by the AoA. In addition, the study concluded
that before a service can begin a formal acquisition program, the
discussion should consider, among other things, whether one service will
provide all DOD core component capability, and whether the AEA core
component will reside on a single platform.

Subsequent to the AoA report, the Navy and the Air Force each decided to
develop their own unique aircraft from the 27 platform combinations
identified in the AoA to perform the core component of AEA, as shown in
figure 2. The Navy opted to develop the EA-18G Growler, a derivative of
the F/A-18F, as its core component. The Air Force decided to develop an
electronic attack variant of the B-52, designated the EB-52 SOJ (Standoff
Jammer), to function as its core component of the AoA solution and an
unmanned combat air vehicle and an unmanned decoy as the expendable
stand-in components of its AEA AoA solution. The Marine Corps opted to
continue using the EA-6B with the ICAP III electronic suite in
anticipation of an electronic variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35)
being developed as a replacement for its EA-6Bs. The combination of these
service AEA solutions is shown below in the DOD AEA system of systems.

Figure 2: Service-Identified Airborne Electronic Attack System of Systems

                               Systems of Systems

B-52

      Compass Call

EA-18G

      F/A-18 E/F, F-22, EA-6B JSF AESA J-UCAS & MALD-J

      Stand-off Mod-Escort

Outside Inside Defended Airspace Defended Airspace

Penetrating Escort Stand-In

Inside Inside

Kinematic Range No Escape Range

      of Known SAMs of Known SAMs

Source: DOD.

Note: SAMs are surface-to-air missiles.

As a result of these changes the services have updated a memorandum of
agreement that would allow Navy expeditionary EA-6B squadrons to be
decommissioned between fiscal years 2009 and 2012, to be replaced by

U.S. Air Force electronic attack capability. The Navy's aircraft would be
dedicated to providing carrier-based AEA support to the Navy. The Navy
determined that an inventory of 90 aircraft would be needed to support the
Navy's core component requirement. In 2001 it was projected that an
inventory of 108 EA-6Bs would be needed if the Navy were to continue to
provide AEA mission support to all the services.

In February 2006, DOD proposed to terminate two major components of the
system of systems: the B-52 Standoff Jammer system and the Joint Unmanned
Combat Air System (J-UCAS). The goal of the B-52 SOJ program was to
provide long-range jamming of sophisticated enemy air defense radars and
communications networks, using high-powered jamming equipment. The Air
Force believes that a standoff jamming capability is still required, and
it is investigating the solution options,

  Changes in Operational Concept and Upgrades Extend Operational Viability of
  the EA-6B, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet Identified Requirements

platform numbers, and mix to deliver this capability. As part of the
cancellation of the B-52 SOJ, the Air Force is investigating other
solution options and platforms to provide the standoff capability,
including examining how the B-52 SOJ cancellation affects Navy plans to
retire the expeditionary squadrons of EA-6Bs. The goal of the J-UCAS
program is to demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value
of a networked system of high-performance and weaponized unmanned air
vehicles.

The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory would
be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy's requirement for 90
aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet
the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of systems
using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be required to
support all of DOD's electronic attack requirements. As a result, EA-6B
aircraft will be able to meet the Navy's suppression of enemy air defense
needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps through 2025
as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted with ICAP III
electronics suites. If the Navy is required to support all services, given
the recent Air Force proposal to terminate the EB-52 standoff jammer
program, additional EA-6Bs may require the ICAP III upgrade.

According to program officials, the EA-6B ICAP III electronic suite
upgrade was determined to be operationally effective and suitable in 2005
and has proven to be significantly better than the ICAP II electronic
suite that is currently in use on all but a few EA-6Bs. However, while the
EA-6B inventory decline has been postponed, the planned number of aircraft
that would receive the ICAP III electronic suite upgrade has been
significantly reduced, leaving most EA-6Bs with a shortfall in electronic
attack capability against some current and future threats. Production of
the EA6B ICAP III upgrade is scheduled to end after the 2006 buy.

    System of Systems Decision Reduces the Inventory Requirement for the Navy

Program officials said that DOD's 2002 decision to move to a system of
systems concept has reduced the inventory requirement for the Navy from
108 aircraft to 90 aircraft. The Navy determined that an inventory of 90
aircraft would be needed to support Navy's core component requirement. An
inventory of 108 EA-6Bs would be needed if the Navy were to continue to
provide electronic attack mission support to all the services. The
memorandum of agreement between the services, in which the EA-6B has been
the sole provider of electronic attack since 1996, allows the Navy
expeditionary squadrons to be decommissioned between fiscal year 2009 and
2012 and replaced by the U.S. Air Force's EB-52 standoff jammer. However,
the Air Force has recently canceled the EB-52 jammer.

As shown in figure 3, the EA-6B inventory levels are now expected to be
sufficient to meet the Navy's requirement for 90 aircraft through at least
2017 and the Marine Corps requirement for 31 aircraft through 2025.
Procurement and replacement of 114 wing center sections for the EA-6B,
begun in 1998, have been made on 94 aircraft and are ongoing. A few
aircraft have received more than one wing center replacement because of
heavy use. As a result, program officials identified the fatigue life of
the fuselage as the determining factor in projected inventory levels. The
official estimated life analysis of the EA-6B was conducted between 1984
and 1988. The aircraft used in that analysis had 1,873 actual flight hours
when the test began, and program management believes that factor was not
considered in determining the current fuselage life limit. Program
management has asked that updated fatigue life charts be developed based
on this information. Program management predicts that this will result in
an increase in fuselage life to 14,000 hours, as shown in the solid line
in figure 3. In addition, according to program officials extended
inventory life can be obtained by procuring 32 additional EA-6B wing
center sections at an estimated cost of $170 million. This would result in
an inventory of over 90 EA-6Bs through 2019. This projected inventory is
represented by the dashed line in figure 3. However, according to program
officials, Northrop Grumman Corporation will wrap up wing center section
production late this summer, and any new wing center section production
would have to be placed on order this year to avoid additional startup and
production break costs.

Figure 3: Current EA-6B Inventory Decline Projection Showing Fatigue
Effects and Operational Attrition

Number of aircraft 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

                      20052006200720082009201020112012201

                      320142015201620172018201920212022202

                          3202420252026202720282029200

                                       1

                                       2

                                     33320

                                       4

                                       5

                                       6

                                       7

                                       8

                                   920402041

                             3320320320320320320320

                                       20

Year of inventory

    Electronic Suite Upgrade Is More Capable, but Quantities Are Insufficient to
    Meet Requirements

While the inventory of EA-6Bs is now projected to meet the Navy's
inventory needs through 2017, most of that inventory will be less able to
address some current and future threats than recently anticipated.
According to program documents, the ICAP II tactical jamming system,
currently installed on most EA-6B aircraft, is limited in its ability to
conduct numerous critical functions. Its receivers and integrated
connectivity are limiting factors in the ICAP II's ability to detect,
locate, and react to threat systems. Threat systems have become more
sophisticated and incorporate advanced technology, severely limiting
current ICAP II equipped EA-6Bs' receivers' ability to detect and identify
threats. The ICAP III upgrade, at an estimated cost of $11.7 million per
aircraft for the last four upgrades, provides selective reactive jamming
capability; accurate emitter geolocation; full azimuth coverage; and a
flexible command and control warfare core system that can integrate and
coordinate multiple EA-6Bs to match any threat density, as well as the
ability to integrate and control other manned or unmanned command and
control warfare assets. Program officials project that a lower unit cost
could be achieved if higher quantities are procured.

Recent operational test and evaluation (OPEVAL) results for the EA-6B
equipped with the ICAP III electronic suite have determined it to be
operationally effective and suitable. Since these results, Navy operations
and training units have flown and observed two EA-6B squadrons upgraded
with ICAP III and found the upgrade to be significantly more capable than
EA-6B aircraft equipped with the ICAP II electronic suite. According to
Navy users who flew the EA-6B with ICAP III during a recent training
detachment, the ICAP III system demonstrated a 30 percent increase in
jamming effectiveness over the ICAP II. More data on the superior
performance of ICAP III relative to the ICAP II system will become
available as results from its first deployment, which just recently
occurred, develop.

Although the ICAP III-equipped EA-6Bs have been found to be significantly
more capable, the numbers of aircraft that are funded to receive the ICAP
III upgrade has been reduced compared with earlier DOD intentions to fully
upgrade all EA-6Bs. Currently 14 EA-6B aircraft have been funded to
receive the ICAP III upgrade, because of funding reductions, development
test results, and the decision in 2003 to replace the EA-6B with the
EA18G.

According to Navy and Marine Corps requirements officials, fitting only 14
EA-6Bs with ICAP III is not sufficient to allow for the transition to the
EA18G without leaving them with an airborne electronic attack capability
shortfall against some current and future threats. They believe that
between 21 (to meet the Navy requirement) and 31 (to meet the Marine Corps
requirement) EA-6Bs should be fitted with ICAP III to address this
shortfall. However, an analysis provided by the EA-6B program office
concluded that 44 ICAP III aircraft would be needed to meet both Navy and
Marine Corps requirements. We have not validated the number of aircraft
Navy and Marine Corps officials identified as needed. Because of recent
decisions affecting Air Force electronic attack near-term capabilities,
additional EA-6Bs may be needed if the Navy is tasked to support the
electronic attack requirements of all services beyond 2010. However,
increasing the number of EA-6Bs with ICAP III will not be an option if
ICAP III production ends in 2006 as currently planned.

  EA-18G Program at Risk of Cost and Schedule Growth because It Is Not Following
  a Knowledge-Based Approach

The EA-18G development schedule is aggressive according to program
officials and the DOD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's 2005
annual report. While the program is currently on cost and schedule
according to program officials, our analysis shows that the program is not
fully following the knowledge-based approach inherent in best practices
and DOD's acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost growth
and schedule delays. In addition, we have found that most research and
development cost growth is reported after a program has passed the
critical design review--the acquisition phase the EA-18G recently entered.
Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work examining
weapon system acquisition in terms of lessons learned from best system
development practices. Successful programs attain high levels of knowledge
in three aspects of a new product or weapon: technology, design, and
production. If a program is not attaining high levels of knowledge, it
incurs increased risk of problems, with attendant cost growth and schedule
delays. The EA-18G airborne electronic attack program entered system
development with immature technologies, and some of these technologies are
still not mature. Also, while most of the design drawings are complete, it
is possible that redesign may be needed in the future as the technologies
mature. In addition, the Navy plans to procure a large percentage of the
total EA-18G aircraft during low-rate initial production based on limited
knowledge of the aircraft's ability to perform the electronic attack
mission. This could result in the need to retrofit already produced EA-18G
aircraft, shown in mock-up form in figure 4, a possibility that the Navy
is already anticipating.

    EA-18G Program Has Entered the Acquisition Phase Where Most Cost Growth is
    Reported

       Figure 4: EA-18G Mock-up: F/A-18F Loaded with ALQ-99 Jamming Pods

                   Source: Copyright 2001 the Boeing Company.

According to program officials, the EA-18G program is currently on cost
and schedule. While it held its critical design review in April 2005, it
is now in the phase where most research and development cost growth is
recognized and reported. We recently reviewed the development cost
experience of 29 programs that have completed their product development
cycle--the time between the start of development and the start of
production. 4 We found a significant portion of the recognized total
development cost increases of these programs took place after they were
approximately halfway into their product development cycle. These
increases typically occurred after the time of the design review of the
programs. The programs experienced a cumulative increase in development
costs of 28.3 percent throughout their product development. Approximately
8.5 percent of the total development cost growth occurred

4

The 29 programs include ATIRCM/CMWS, AEHF, AESA Radar, AIM-9X/Air to Air
Missile, ATACMS BAT, B-1B CMUP, Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 Upgrade,
CH-47F, CEC, EELV, F/A-18E/F, F-22A, GMLRS Tactical Rocket, JASSM, JDAM,
JPATS, JSOW, Longbow Hellfire, M1A2 Abrams, MCS, MM III GRP, MIDS-LVT,
NAS, SDB, Strategic Sealift, Stryker Family of Vehicles, Tactical
Tomahawk, Tomahawk TBIP, and V-22. The average design review is based on
21 of the 29 programs that either reported a critical design review date
in the annual Selected Acquisition Reports or was provided to us by
program officials.

Potential for Cost Growth and Redesign Because of Technological Immaturity

up until the time of the average critical design review. The remaining
19.7 percent occurred after the average critical design review. 5

Our work shows that the demonstration of technology maturity by the start
of system development phase is a key indicator of achieving a match
between program resources (knowledge, time, and money) and customer
requirements. We recently reported that the cost effect of proceeding into
product development without mature technologies can be dramatic. 6
Research, development, and test and evaluation costs for programs that
started development with mature technologies increased by an average of

4.8 percent, while those that began with immature technologies increased
by an average 34.9 percent.

In December 2003, after a truncated concept exploration phase, the EA18G
was approved to enter system development, in order to achieve a 2009
initial operational capability date directed by the Chief of Naval
Operations. Prior to entering system development, the program office
assessed the readiness of the EA-18G's technologies and concluded that the
system was not developing or advancing any new technologies and that only
proven systems with minor modifications using mature technologies would be
utilized. In addition, program officials stated that the EA-18G
development benefited from the maturity of the F-18F platform and the
airborne electronic attack suite currently flown on the EA-6B.

Our assessment of the technology maturity of the EA-18G, however, differs
from that offered by program officials. Over the last few years, we have
reported on the system's progress in our annual assessment of selected
major defense acquisition programs. We have reported that at the start of
system development 7 none of the program's five critical technologies were
fully mature, and as recently as our March 2005 report this had not

5

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs
GAO-06-391 ( Washington, D.C., March 2006).

6 GAO-06-391.

7

Milestone B-the stage of system development focused on reducing
integration and manufacturing risk; ensuring operational suitability and
reducing the logistics footprint; implementing human systems integration;
designing for producibility; ensuring affordability and protection of
critical program information; demonstrating system integration,
interoperability, safety, and utility.

changed. 8 While they are similar to the mature technologies found on the
EA-6B and the F/A-18F, integrating those technologies on the EA-18G
involves form and fit challenges. Three of the critical technologies--the
ALQ-99 jamming pods, the F/A-18F aircraft, and the tactical terminal
system--are approaching full maturity; two other technologies-the
communications countermeasure set and the ALQ-218 receiver--are less
mature.

The Communications Countermeasures Set (CCS) provides communications
detection and processing to the EA-18G. Among other things, it is used to
degrade the effectiveness of the communications components that make up
enemy integrated air defense systems. The existing set used on legacy
EA-6Bs is out of production, and a replacement system is needed for use in
the EA-18G. The new one is to be composed of new components, and it will
function in a new environment. We believe that putting the CCS into the
space constraints of the EA-18G platform may be a challenge and thus
should be considered a technology risk to the program.

The EA-6Bs fitted with ICAP III have a new technologically mature
receiver, the ALQ-218, which is housed in the large space on the
aircraft's vertical tail. The ALQ-218 receiver for the EA-18G, however, is
being split and redesigned so it can be integrated into the aircraft's
smaller wingtip pods. The wingtip environment is also known to be harsh,
with noise and vibration that are known to be particularly severe and can
degrade the reliability of receiver components. Isolators will be used in
an attempt to lower the vibration levels. Since the ALQ-218 antenna
elements will be subject to flexing of the wing that could reduce system
performance, accelerometers will be placed in the wingtip pods to measure
relative movement between the wingtips so that accurate threat locations
can be made. In addition, many subcomponents also include new and modified
parts, so the receiver's performance and delivery schedule are being
tracked as risks to the program. Furthermore, the unique ALQ-218 wingtip
covers, or radomes, have recently surfaced as potentially problematic.
There are technical risks with the radome's electrical characteristics and
environmental specifications--especially its ability to withstand hail
strike requirements. The radome is being tracked as a high risk to the
program because it may not meet a performance requirement. Flight tests on
the

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-05-301, (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005).

Page 16 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare

    Production Decision Based on Limited Demonstrated Functionality, and Initial
    Capability Provided Will Be Less than That of EA6B ICAP III

EA-18G to measure the impact of noise and vibration on completed
components will not start until February 2007. The performance of the
ALQ-218 radome will not be known until flight tests that demonstrate its
capability are conducted later this year. The maturity of the full ALQ-218
will not be fully known until the EA-18G aircraft completes flight tests
with these components during developmental testing scheduled to start in
April 2008.

The design of the EA-18G appears stable because almost all of its design
drawings are complete. However, the order in which knowledge is built
throughout product development is important to delivering products on time
and within costs. Our past work has shown that knowledge gaps have a
cumulative effect. For example, design stability cannot be attained if key
technologies are not mature. Until all the EA-18G critical technologies
demonstrate maturity, the potential for design changes remains. While the
program held its system-level critical design review in April 2005, flight
tests will be needed to verify the loads and environment used for some of
these designs and determine the maturity of the critical technologies.

The EA-18G production decision scheduled for April 2007 will be based on
limited demonstrated functionality. The initial capability demonstrated in
support of the production decision will be less than that of the ICAP III
on the EA-6B. Four EA-18G aircraft will be built to conduct operational
tests during the system development and demonstration test phase. The Navy
plans to procure an additional one-third, or 30, of the EA-18G aircraft
during low-rate initial production (LRIP), at an estimated cost of
$2,297.1 million for the two low-rate initial production lots in fiscal
year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. This low-rate initial production quantity
is significantly higher than the recommended DOD acquisition target of 10
percent. The program does not plan to demonstrate through flight tests a
fully functional production representative prototype until testing in
April and May of 2008. In addition, program plans call for procuring 56
EA-18G full- rate production (FRP) aircraft to achieve the procurement
objective of 90 aircraft. As a result, full funding for 56 of the 90
EA-18G aircraft and 34 of the 56 airborne electronic attack suites will be
committed prior to the completion of operational testing and evaluation. 9
This creates a risk, acknowledged by the program office, that redesign and
retrofitting may be

9

The EA-18G is composed of the aircraft and an airborne electronic attack
suite.

                                  Conclusions

needed, since it will not be known how effective and suitable the EA-18G
will be or what changes are required until after those tests are
completed.

The EA-18G requirements are to meet, and in some cases exceed, those of
the EA-6B ICAP III, adding an air-to-air intercept capability and the
ability to communicate while jamming. However, according to program
documents the first operational test, scheduled to be completed in
February 2007, 2 months before the low-rate initial production decision,
will demonstrate a much more limited capability, primarily the ability to
radiate a simple, single-source jamming assignment and the ability to
receive, identify, and display limited simple emitters. Test results
demonstrating full ICAP III equivalent capabilities will not be available
until the operational evaluation scheduled to be completed in January
2009, 3 months before the projected full-rate production decision, when
the third and final software release will be available for testing.

The test plan is driven by software development, and the EA-18G software
will be available for testing in three releases, or builds. Software is on
the critical path to program completion and will provide the functionality
that is available for testing before each production decision. While the
program officials responsible for managing the software appear to be
tracking all major cost, schedule, and quality markers, software
development is still considered a moderate risk. Problems or delays in the
initial software releases could affect the start of the operational
evaluation. Even before that, the current software development schedule
will not allow the program to demonstrate that the EA-18G system can fully
function until after the program office has committed to producing all 30
of the low-rate initial production aircraft. Under the current schedule,
operational testing of the final software release needed to demonstrate
the desired functionality of EA-18G aircraft will not be completed until
January 2009 - 3 months before the projected full-rate production
decision.

Should the Air Force decisions to terminate its EB-52 jammer and
Joint-Unmanned Combat Air System programs stand, the airborne electronic
attack framework that arose after the 2002 analysis of alternatives will
not materialize as planned. These decisions and the emergence of irregular
threats place an added burden on the Navy's EA-6B and EA-18G airborne
electronic attack assets and may result in an even larger gap in DOD's
capability.

A reduction in plans to upgrade Navy EA-6B with ICAP III electronic suites
creates a transition shortfall in capability until the EA-18G becomes
operational. Potential delays in the EA-18G development and testing effort
would only aggravate this shortfall. The EA-18G development schedule is
based on a premise--EA-6B inventory will not be sufficient beyond
2009--that is no longer valid for assessing the Navy's future needs. The
inventory of EA-6B aircraft is now projected to be sufficient to meet Navy
and Marine Corps needs for another decade or longer. In addition, the
compressed and aggressive schedule, a direction given to the program
office, does not allow decision makers to benefit from the demonstration
of knowledge at critical junctures, a proven mitigator of risk.

The availability of EA-6B aircraft allows DOD to consider an alternative
to its current strategy. After determining how it will fulfill the
warfighter's needs and address capability shortfalls, DOD could outfit
additional EA-6B aircraft with upgraded ICAP III electronic suites. This
option is made possible by the successful integration of the ICAP III
electronic suite with the EA-6B aircraft and structural improvements.
However, this would necessitate not closing production of these electronic
suites in 2006, as presently planned.

To mitigate the effects accruing from the shortfall in upgraded EA-6B
aircraft, the risk of delay in the development of the EA-18G, and the
proposed cancellation of the EB-52 jammer and the Joint-Unmanned Combat
Air System, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following
two actions:

     o Determine the number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP III electronic
       suites necessary to deal with the existing and near-term capability
       gaps.
          * Consider procuring this necessary number of ICAP III upgrades. If
            DOD implements the option, we recommend that the department
               o continue the EA-6B ICAP III production line after the fiscal
                 year 2006 buy, and
               o restructure its EA-18G low-rate initial production plans so
                 that procurement of the aircraft occurs after the aircraft
                 has demonstrated full functionality.

  Recommendations for Executive Action

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments appear in appendix II.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense determine the necessary number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP

Page 19 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare

III electronic suites to deal with the existing and near-term capability
gap. DOD agreed that the Navy's airborne electronic attack inventory needs
review and has directed a study of department wide airborne electronic
attack forces to be issued on September 15, 2006. However, it is unclear
from DOD's response if the department's review will specifically identify,
as we recommended, the necessary number of ICAP III-equipped EA-6Bs needed
to address the existing and near-term capability gap. In light of the end
of planned ICAP III production this year, DOD needs to identify this
specific number, as it is a necessary prerequisite to our second
recommendation.

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense consider procuring the determined number of ICAP III upgrades and
that if DOD takes this option, the department (1) continue ICAP III
production and (2) restructure the EA-18G low-rate initial production
plans so that the procurement of the aircraft occurs after the aircraft
has demonstrated full functionality. Regarding the first part of our
recommendation, DOD agreed that it should consider procuring the required
ICAP III upgrades, as determined by the ongoing airborne electronic attack
review, but stated that it is premature to make a decision until the ICAP
III inventory levels are determined. We agree that such determination is a
prerequisite and have so stated in our first recommendation. However, that
determination needs to be completed before the ICAP III production line
ends in fiscal year 2006. With regard to the second part of our
recommendation, DOD stated that the current EA18G low-rate initial
production plan provides the best balance of risk and cost to
expeditiously meet warfighters' needs. We remain concerned that producing
EA-18G aircraft before testing demonstrates that the design is mature
unnecessarily increases the likelihood of design changes that will lead to
cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. In the past,
Congress has raised concerns about the costly outcomes of highly
concurrent development and production efforts that are not "flying before
buying." Starting production before flight tests demonstrate the full ICAP
III equivalent capability works as intended places the $2,297.1 million
lowrate initial production investment at significant risk. The procurement
of additional ICAP-III-equipped EA-6Bs would allow the time to properly
test the EA-18G before making a production decision and reduce the risk of
costly retrofitting of the initially produced EA-18Gs. Therefore, we
continue to believe that our recommendation should be implemented.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force,
and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of

Page 20 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare

Management and Budget. We will provide copies to others on request. This
report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or any of your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our
offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Principal contributors to this report were David
Best Assistant Director, Jerry Clark, Robert Ackley, Michael Aiken, Judy
Lasley, Chris Miller, and Robert Swierczek.

Allen Li Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine if the key conclusion reached in the Department of Defense's
(DOD) May 2002 airborne electronic attack (AEA) analysis of alternatives
(AoA)--the projected inventory of EA-6Bs would be insufficient beyond
2009--is still valid, we interviewed officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; the Strategic Command (Offutt, Nebraska); the
Commander Electronic Attack, Pacific Fleet (Whidbey Island); and officials
responsible for Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps AEA requirements. We
interviewed personnel responsible for Improved Capability (ICAP) III
electronic warfare testing at the Office of the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation (Washington, D.C.); Commander of Operational Test and
Evaluation Navy (Norfolk, Virginia); and VX-9 personnel responsible for
ICAP III testing at China Lake, California. In addition to the reviewing
2002 AEA AoA, we reviewed pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents
addressing the status of the EA-6Bs inventory, plans for maintaining the
status of EA-6B suppression capabilities, testing conducted for the EA-6B
ICAP III program, the AEA system of systems, gaps in the AEA, and
potential solutions for AEA.

To determine whether the acquisition management approach to the Navy's
airborne electronic attack core component, the EA-18G, is knowledgebased
and can help forestall future risks, we reviewed pertinent DOD, service,
and contractor documents addressing the status of the EA-18G development
effort. We discussed airborne electronic attack issues and EA-18G
development and production with contractor personnel at Boeing Corporation
in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California. We discussed software
matters with officials at China Lake and Point Mugu, California. We met
with pilots at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, China Lake, Whidbey
Island Naval Air Station, Fallon Naval Air Station, and Boeing Corporation
to discuss pilot workload issues given the transition to the two-seat
EA-18G from the four-seat EA-6B. As with our past work on the EA-18G
development effort conducted under our annual assessment of selected major
defense acquisition programs, we focused our work to determining whether
the program was following a knowledge-based acquisition approach. We met
with Navy EA-18G program officials currently involved with the development
effort to document the maturity status of the aircraft's critical
technologies, the status of its design effort, and plans for producing the
aircraft.

We performed our review from May 2005 through March 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.

Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential
Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment.
GAO-06-141. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, But
More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2003.

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to Improve
DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393. Washington,
D.C.: March 1, 2004.

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing
Enemy Air Defenses. GAO-03-51. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2002.

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy
Air Defenses. GAO-01-28. Washington, D.C.: January 3, 2001.

Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses Challenges.
GAO/NSIAD-00-164 . Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2000.

Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can Be Improved.
GAO/NSIAD-97-77 . Washington, D.C.: February 26, 1997.

Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
May Be Too Low. GAO/NSIAD-96-128 . Washington, D.C.: April 10, 1996.

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program
and Budget Decisions. GAO/NSIAD-96-177 . Washington, D.C.: September 20,
1996.

(120440)

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