NASA's Deep Space Network: Current Management Structure Is Not	 
Conducive to Effectively Matching Resources with Future 	 
Requirements (27-APR-06, GAO-06-445).				 
                                                                 
The President's Vision for Space Exploration calls for human and 
robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In response, over
the next two decades, NASA may spend $100 billion on new	 
technologies and facilities that will require reliable ground	 
communications to achieve those missions. Presently, that	 
communications capability is provided by NASA's Deep Space	 
Network--a system of antennas located at three sites around the  
world. However, the Network faces challenges that may hinder its 
provision of current and future mission support. This report	 
discusses (1) the significant operational challenges faced by the
Deep Space Network and (2) the extent to which NASA is		 
integrating the Network into its future communications plans.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-445 					        
    ACCNO:   A52659						        
  TITLE:     NASA's Deep Space Network: Current Management Structure  
Is Not Conducive to Effectively Matching Resources with Future	 
Requirements							 
     DATE:   04/27/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Financial analysis 				 
	     Future budget projections				 
	     Mission budgeting					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Space exploration					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Communication devices				 
	     Aerospace research 				 
	     Deep Space Network 				 

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GAO-06-445

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Missi
          * Sustainability of DSN's Infrastructure Is Unknown
          * Limited Capacity to Provide Coverage Is Exacerbated By An In
     * Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match S
          * Agency Space Communications Oversight Board Establishes Limi
          * NASA Efforts Address Mis-Match Between Requirements, Resourc
     * Conclusion
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * GAO Contact
     * Staff Acknowledgements
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, Committee on Science, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

April 2006

NASA'S DEEP SPACE NETWORK

Current Management Structure Is Not Conducive to Effectively Matching
Resources with Future Requirements

GAO-06-445

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2
Background 3
DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Mission
Requirements 6
Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match Space
Communications Resources With Requirements 13
Conclusion 15
Recommendations for Executive Action 16
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19
Appendix II Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration 21
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements 24

Figures

Figure 1: Location of Primary Deep Space Network Communications Sites 4
Figure 2: External corrosion on 70-meter antenna 8
Figure 3: Road Damage to Asphalt Roadway at Goldstone Facility 9
Figure 4: Water Intrusion to Internal Antenna Structure at Goldstone
Facility 10
Figure 5: Voyager I Mission Spacecraft 11
Figure 6: Mars Exploration Rover 12

Abbreviations

DSN Deep Space Network JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory SCAWG Space
Communications Architecture Working Group SCCIB Space Communication
Coordination and Integration Board SMD Science Mission Directorate TOR
Terms of Reference

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 27, 2006 April 27, 2006

The Honorable Mark Udall Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, Committee on Science House of Representatives The Honorable
Mark Udall Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science House of Representatives

In January 2004, the President outlined a Vision for Space Exploration
that calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.
Over the next two decades, NASA plans to spend over $100 billion to
develop a number of new capabilities, supporting technologies, and
facilities that are critical to enabling these missions. These missions
will have at least one thing in common: they will require a reliable
network to handle all communication functions for both manned and unmanned
spacecraft. Most of that functional capability for deep space
communications currently resides in NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN). In
January 2004, the President outlined a Vision for Space Exploration that
calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Over
the next two decades, NASA plans to spend over $100 billion to develop a
number of new capabilities, supporting technologies, and facilities that
are critical to enabling these missions. These missions will have at least
one thing in common: they will require a reliable network to handle all
communication functions for both manned and unmanned spacecraft. Most of
that functional capability for deep space communications currently resides
in NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN).

DSN was established in 1959 to support NASA's exploration of the solar
system. According to agency officials, DSN is designed to communicate with
spacecraft at distances greater than 1.2 million miles from Earth-the
distance defined as deep space. It is currently the only system of its
nature with the capability to serve vast numbers of deep space missions.
Since its inception, the network has returned extensive science data and
has proven to be a linchpin for successful space exploration missions. Its
services are used by NASA, other domestic organizations, and foreign space
agencies. However, over time, DSN officials have had to deal with
maintaining an aged infrastructure and managing coverage time for an
increasing mission set with limited capacity. In addition, although NASA
has not made any definitive decisions in this regard, new deep space
communications requirements are envisioned to support projected missions
to the moon. DSN was established in 1959 to support NASA's exploration of
the solar system. According to agency officials, DSN is designed to
communicate with spacecraft at distances greater than 1.2 million miles
from Earth-the distance defined as deep space. It is currently the only
system of its nature with the capability to serve vast numbers of deep
space missions. Since its inception, the network has returned extensive
science data and has proven to be a linchpin for successful space
exploration missions. Its services are used by NASA, other domestic
organizations, and foreign space agencies. However, over time, DSN
officials have had to deal with maintaining an aged infrastructure and
managing coverage time for an increasing mission set with limited
capacity. In addition, although NASA has not made any definitive decisions
in this regard, new deep space communications requirements are envisioned
to support projected missions to the moon.

In maintaining a reliable deep space communication system for the near
term, while also preparing for the future, NASA will need to effectively
manage its communication needs and the allocation of resources to meet
them. As recently as 2003, the National Research Council reported that DSN
was suffering from insufficient communications capabilities and occasional
failures. In light of these issues, you asked us to: (1) identify the
challenges NASA's DSN program faces in meeting its current and planned
space communications workload and (2) determine the extent NASA is
integrating DSN into its space communications plans for the future. In
maintaining a reliable deep space communication system for the near term,
while also preparing for the future, NASA will need to effectively manage
its communication needs and the allocation of resources to meet them. As
recently as 2003, the National Research Council reported that DSN was
suffering from insufficient communications capabilities and occasional
failures. In light of these issues, you asked us to: (1) identify the
challenges NASA's DSN program faces in meeting its current and planned
space communications workload and (2) determine the extent NASA is
integrating DSN into its space communications plans for the future.

To conduct our work, we reviewed documents and data related to the
operations and capabilities of DSN as well as NASA-wide strategic planning
documents about the Vision for Space Exploration. We interviewed program
officials as well as contractor personnel about challenges they face in
managing and operating DSN. Further, we collected and analyzed information
related to space communications architecture management at NASA and held
discussions with NASA space communications officials about future space
communications architecture requirements, what assets the architecture
will include, and how its development is being managed. We also held
discussions with NASA's Space Communications Organization Study Group,
which was established during the course of our review to develop options
for how to manage space communications at NASA. We met with officials at
NASA Headquarters and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), as well as
ITT Industries contractors at their offices in Monrovia, Calif., and at
the DSN facility in Goldstone, Calif. Complete details of our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We performed our review from May
2005 to April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

                                Results in Brief

NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN) is able to meet most of the requirements
of its current workload, but serious questions exist as to whether it will
be able to keep up with both near-term and future demands. In the near
term, DSN faces a deteriorating infrastructure and a limited capacity to
serve additional missions. System infrastructure, which has been marked by
extensive deferred maintenance, is aging and is likely to become
increasingly fragile and subject to breakdown at a time when demand is
anticipated to increase. The potential exists for the loss of scientific
data that would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace. In addition,
new users will find that, aside from competing for network capacity with
each other, they must also compete with legacy programs that have been
extended far beyond their intended lifetimes, but still return science
data and thus take up considerable network time. For example, the Voyager
mission launched in 1977 still requires DSN support and is envisioned to
rely on DSN for the foreseeable future. Capacity limits constrain the
amount of science data that can be returned from deep space by new
missions that are added to DSN's set of users.

DSN's future utility is also in question because NASA currently has no
mechanism in place to match funding for space communications capabilities
with agency-wide space communications requirements. The agency's Space
Communication Coordination and Integration Board is responsible for
reviewing the technical requirements of space communications programs to
determine whether they fit into an agency wide architecture. However,
according to agency officials, the Board is only advisory in nature and
does not review all program requirements, such as infrastructure needs. As
a result, such program requirements are often not raised at the agency
level. Furthermore, funding for space communications capabilities is
controlled by the individual communications programs and their associated
mission directorates, who may not necessarily consider agency wide goals
when making investments. This disconnect between establishment of
requirements and control of resources creates the potential for programs
to make investments in capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals
for space communications. For example, agency officials noted both the
Deep Space Network and the Ground Network programs recently were on a path
to develop separate array technologies to support overlapping requirements
for the same lunar missions. These efforts would have undercut the
agency's goals of a seamless, integrated architecture for space
communications and would have represented unnecessary duplication of
effort and added costs. After our review was initiated, NASA created a
task group to study how to better manage this gap between agency-level
requirements and program-level funding, but it has not yet made any
recommendations for action to address the situation.

We are making recommendations to NASA that the DSN program identify its
current and future requirements in more comprehensive terms and how those
requirements might be supported as well as items that NASA's task group on
space communications should consider to better align program requirements
with agency space communications goals. In written comments on a draft of
this report, NASA concurred with our recommendations.

                                   Background

NASA established DSN over 40 years ago with the intention of coordinating
all deep space communications through a single ground system to improve
efficiency and minimize duplication. Today, DSN consists of communications
antennas at three major sites around the world-Goldstone, Calif.; Madrid,
Spain; and Canberra, Australia.1 These sites are specifically positioned
to offer complete coverage to deep space mission craft regardless of their
positions around the Earth. DSN officials informed us that while
contractor personnel operate all three sites, NASA owns the physical
assets and is responsible for funding all operations at the sites. Each
site has a 70-meter antenna, which can provide communications with the
most distant spacecraft, and several smaller antennas that can facilitate
communications with closer spacecraft or can be arrayed to communicate
with more distant missions. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory is
responsible for management of DSN and also serves as the distribution
point for data collected from deep space.

1The relationships between the United States and Spain and Australia are
outlined in international agreements. According to DSN officials, in
exchange for use of land by NASA's assets in these foreign countries, the
Spanish and Australian space agencies have full access to all deep space
science collected by NASA spacecraft.

Figure 1: Location of Primary Deep Space Network Communications Sites

DSN supports an average of 35 to 40 deep space missions each year.
According to program officials, as a mission is being developed, a
representative from the DSN program works with the mission team to
establish the amount of coverage the mission will need from DSN assets
during its lifetime. This coverage includes the amount of time per day for
routine communications and also critical coverage of major mission events.
In most cases, missions must negotiate with the DSN program because they
desire more coverage than DSN can provide. Once the amount of coverage
time is established and major mission events are scheduled, DSN commits to
that coverage in a Service Agreement with the mission. Within the
agreement, DSN commits to providing coverage for 95 percent of the time
agreed to with its mission customers, while the remaining 5 percent allows
for unexpected disruptions during that coverage. This 95 percent
commitment almost guarantees that all critical mission events will be
covered without disruption. Once this is put into place, missions are
generally free to trade time amongst themselves if priorities change or a
particular mission gets kicked off the network due to an unexpected
anomaly in the system. The missions that DSN supports are not charged for
their usage of the system, unless they require a unique technology that
DSN must add to its system in order to provide coverage. This is a
relatively rare phenomenon, however. DSN is primarily funded through its
managing entity, the Science Mission Directorate, and receives resources
consistent with its performance the previous year and its previous year's
budget.

DSN works in conjunction with NASA's other space communications assets to
provide coverage to missions at all distances from the Earth. The Ground
Network provides communications capabilities to spacecraft in low-Earth
orbit. Additionally, the Space Network, including the Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite System, is an Earth-based satellite relay system that also
facilitates missions in low-Earth orbit. In order for a spacecraft to
receive support from all of these communications assets, NASA must ensure
they are coordinated and can provide the capabilities for which they are
intended.

Throughout its history, NASA has had different management structures
trying to achieve this coordination. According to NASA officials, from the
Apollo missions in the 1960s through 1995, space communications was
managed through an agency wide communications entity with budgetary
authority to provide appropriate investments in system capabilities. In
1995, this management and budget authority was devolved to a central
contract managed out of the Johnson Space Center in an effort to cut costs
and streamline maintenance to the assets. The savings from this
realignment were never realized for the agency and the communications
assets were severely underfunded as a result of how they were managed
under this arrangement. Subsequently, management and budget authority for
these assets were brought back to NASA headquarters in 2001 and aligned
with the mission directorate responsible for the customers each asset
served. NASA then created the Space Communication Coordination and
Integration Board to oversee the technical integration of these assets
into a seamless space communications architecture. This is how space
communications assets, including the DSN program, are managed currently at
NASA.

The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 contains a requirement that the NASA
Administrator submit a plan for updating NASA's space communications
architecture for low-Earth orbital operations and deep space exploration
so that it is capable of meeting NASA's needs over the next 20 years. 2
This plan is due to be submitted to the House Committee on Science and the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation no later than
February 17, 2007. In addition, the Conference Report accompanying the
Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Law,
20063 requires that NASA include a 10-year funding profile for DSN in its
fiscal year 2007 budget request.4

  DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Mission Requirements

DSN is currently able to meet most requirements of its existing workload.
However, according to program officials, DSN's current operational ability
is no predictor of future success, and they have significant concerns
about the ability of the system to continue to meet customer requirements
into the future. These concerns are based on the system's aging
infrastructure and projected additional workload on top of servicing
existing missions.

Sustainability of DSN's Infrastructure Is Unknown

DSN suffers from an aged, fragile infrastructure. Significant parts of
that infrastructure-including many antennas-were first built in the 1950s
and 1960s and are showing their age. DSN program officials stated that the
Goldstone complex is down, on average, 16 hours per week for maintenance
and repairs due to problems associated with its age. While Goldstone
contains some of the oldest equipment in the system and the poor condition
of much of its equipment characterizes the underlying fragility of the
network, operational disruptions occur across the entire network. For
instance, the 70-meter dishes are widely regarded by program officials and
mission customers as increasingly fragile, which calls into question
expectation of their continued reliability. In fact, mission customers
shared similar concerns that DSN's infrastructure is not in the
appropriate condition that it should be to support their missions. With
increasing use of these assets, they fear service will only deteriorate
and more disruptions will occur during service to their missions. Program
officials and mission customers provided some examples, as follows, of
disruptions that have occurred during service as a result of
infrastructure deterioration:

2See sec. 102(c)(1), Public Law 109-155.

3See H.R. Conference Report 109-272 accompanying Public Law 109-108.

4This profile was not included in NASA's fiscal year 2007 budget request.

           o  During a critical event for the Deep Impact Mission on July 4,
           2005, corrosion of the sub reflector on the 70-meter dish at DSN's
           Madrid site caused an unexpected disruption in service. In
           response, program managers had to shift coverage to alternative
           antennas. While they were able to provide adequate coverage of the
           event for the Deep Impact Mission, the shift to back-up antennas
           forced other users off at that time, which meant they lost
           coverage.
           o  In October 2005, a significant power disruption caused by
           corrosion to a major power line resulted in multiple antennas at
           the Goldstone complex going offline, resulting in several hours of
           downtime and a subsequent loss of scientific data.5 
           o  In November 2005, failure of a prime network server resulted in
           several hours of unexpected downtime, which in turn caused
           considerable loss of data to four research projects. During this
           anomaly, the Stardust, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, Mars Odyssey
           and Mars Global Surveyor missions lost a total of 241 minutes of
           coverage to their missions.

Program officials also expressed concern about the possibility of massive
antenna failure due to metal fatigue. Ultimately, such a failure would
result from a partial or total collapse of an antenna structure. Although
no DSN antenna has yet collapsed from fatigue, an antenna in West Virginia
similar in design and age to those already used by the DSN program
collapsed unexpectedly in 1988. DSN program managers are in the process of
finding an engineering firm to conduct a survey of the program's antenna
assets to assess their structural reliability. Beyond that action, program
officials rely mostly on their experience and visual observations to
assess the condition of these assets.

5Although we requested the amount of science data lost due to this
disruption, the program could not provide it.

Figure 2: External corrosion on 70-meter antenna

Deferred maintenance also poses a significant challenge to the
sustainability of DSN assets. Since 2002, the program has consistently
deferred approximately $30 million in maintenance projects each year.
These projects are commonly associated with infrastructure that is not
directly related to system performance and have been given lower priority
when more pressing needs limit the system's ability to provide coverage
for its customers. For example, several roadway, water and electrical
projects at the Goldstone facility have consistently been deferred due to
the need to address system maintenance needs considered to have become
more pressing. Although the program does seek to prioritize its most
pressing projects and direct resources to them once its budget is
allotted, operating aging facilities and systems inevitably results in the
need for new repairs rising unexpectedly, which forces program managers to
constantly have to juggle priorities to address them.

Figure 3: Road Damage to Asphalt Roadway at Goldstone Facility

Figure 4: Water Intrusion to Internal Antenna Structure at Goldstone
Facility

Limited Capacity to Provide Coverage Is Exacerbated By An Increasing Mission Set

DSN also faces increasing competition between new and old users for
coverage time on the system. There is a growing demand for a level of
service that DSN is not likely to be able to provide to its customers. DSN
promises 95 percent availability to its mission customers for routine
mission coverage. According to program officials, the remaining 5 percent
is reserved for unexpected failures and downtimes during mission coverage.
They said DSN can maintain its 95 percent commitment to its mission
customers within its current mission set. However, as that mission set
increases, officials become less confident in their ability to continue to
achieve that level of service.

New missions are continuing to increase as they have in the past-by some
350 percent over the last 20 years. By the year 2020, DSN is projected to
be required to support twice the number of missions it does currently. DSN
officials thus find themselves faced with the need to balance this new
demand with an equally compelling demand from existing "legacy" missions
that have remained operational beyond their original lifetimes but are
still returning science data and need to be maintained. Such legacy
missions include the following:

           o  The Voyager missions-two similar spacecraft launched in 1977 to
           conduct close-up studies of Jupiter and Saturn, Saturn's rings,
           and the larger moons of the two planets-are still supported by DSN
           today even though their primary missions were completed in 1989.
           Each mission receives approximately 12 hours of coverage each day
           using one of the network's 70-meter dishes.

Figure 5: Voyager I Mission Spacecraft

           o  The Mars Rover missions, although scheduled to end their prime
           missions in mid-2004, have gone well beyond their forecasted
           lifetimes. Program officials pointed out that even though they did
           not have a role in the decision to extend the missions, the
           program continues to allocate funds to support their operations
           through present day.

Figure 6: Mars Exploration Rover

It is up to the DSN program to determine how best to provide service to
its many mission customers, but this task is becoming increasingly
complex. The effort to balance conflicting program priorities is a
continuing struggle for DSN program managers. So far, DSN has been able to
avoid stressing the capacity of the system because a select number of
missions it was scheduled to support were either canceled or failed before
requiring significant support. However, according to program officials, if
the number of missions the system is scheduled to support begins to
increase, the amount of service the system can provide will be limited.
Further, officials expect that any commitments to provide support for
manned missions under the coming Vision for Space Exploration, in addition
to what it currently must support, will prevent them from being able to
provide necessary coverage to new mission customers or maintain the
service guarantee of 95 percent availability to any customer.

In addition, the DSN program is planning to begin decommissioning its 26
meter antennas in 2006 due to costs of maintenance associated with their
age. Officials told us that they believe the program's remaining 34- and
70-meter antennas will be unable to sustain the anticipated workload in
the very near future, and one projection is that the system will reach
capacity in 2013. If this occurs, the opportunity to continue adding new
mission customers will be limited and the potential for lost deep space
science is significant.

Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match Space Communications
                          Resources With Requirements

DSN's future utility is also in question because NASA currently does not
have a mechanism in place to match funding for space communications assets
with program requirements, such as infrastructure and technology
development needs, from an agency wide perspective. At the end of 2003,
NASA created the Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board
with the intent of reviewing requirements for integration of space
communications assets into a seamless architecture, but according to
agency officials, the Board does not review individual program
requirements or have any authority over the allocation of resources to the
space communications programs. Instead, funding for space communications
capabilities is controlled by the individual communications programs and
their associated mission directorates, who may not consider agency wide
goals when making investments. This disconnect between requirements and
resources has caused program level requirements to be given low priority
by the agency, which in turn has forced programs to make tradeoffs to
maintain functionality and has offered the potential for programs to make
investments that may undercut agency wide goals for space communications.
In light of this problem, NASA has recently established a task group to
identify ways to better address how to match agency requirements with
program resources.

Agency Space Communications Oversight Board Establishes Limited Requirements

At the end of 2003, NASA created the Space Communication Coordination and
Integration Board to establish technical requirements for the integration
of NASA's space communications assets into a seamless communications
architecture for the future. According to NASA officials, the Board is
technical in nature and not intended to manage space communications, but
rather focus on integrating the architecture. Further, officials said that
no other agency-level entity reviews requirements for individual
communications programs or establishes broader mission requirements for
space communications. As a result, they informed us that program
requirements, such as infrastructure and technology development needs,
have consistently been given low priority by the agency. They said that
the DSN program is forced to make tradeoffs to maintain functionality, but
it is not able to fully address its requirements and has concerns about
its ability to continue supporting the operations for which it is
entrusted.

Currently, identification of appropriate investment resources (in line
with decisions made about the architecture) is performed by the mission
directorate with responsibility over the program and the program's
customers. There is no overarching entity for space communications
management at NASA to consider the specific investment needs of the
programs and direct funding accordingly. And while all programs are
supposed to consider the broader needs of the agency and other programs in
their investment decisions, officials informed us that there is no formal
oversight mechanism to ensure that investment decisions made at the
program level are in line with those broader requirements.

As a result of this mismatch between agency level requirements and
investment decisions for the programs that support those requirements,
NASA has limited ability to prevent competing programs from making
investments that, while supporting individual program requirements,
undercut broader agency goals. For example, several agency officials noted
both the Deep Space Network and the Ground Network programs recently were
on a path to develop separate array technologies to support overlapping
requirements for the same lunar missions, which would have undercut agency
efforts to create a seamless, integrated architecture for space
communications and would have represented unnecessary duplication of
effort and added costs. But officials said these pilot efforts were
terminated after much of the planning for them had taken place. However,
the termination was a result of budget constraints and lack of clearly
defined requirements, as opposed to a decision by an authority with an
agency wide investment perspective. In addition, another potential DSN
customer-the Solar Dynamic Observatory-recognized that DSN could not
provide it with the service it needed, so it invested in its own
communications antennas to provide the coverage it needed. Such
duplication undermines the original intent of DSN to be an efficient,
single network for NASA's deep space communications on Earth.

NASA Efforts Address Mis-Match Between Requirements, Resources

During the course of our review, NASA established a task group to address
how best to manage the agency's space communications programs so program
resources are invested in a way that supports agency wide goals. The task
group has yet to make any recommendations to address these issues.

Currently, the task group must consider two primary competing viewpoints
within the agency. One viewpoint holds that the current structure of space
communications, in which mission directorates and programs control
resources, is ideal because it allows communications support to be
controlled by the same entity that establishes and funds the programs that
use the system. For example, DSN is funded by the Science Mission
Directorate, which also supports the vast majority of missions that the
DSN serves. Some agency officials believe that this approach provides
better customer service, since resource trade-offs can be made by those
closest to both the customers and the service provider. However, under
this current structure, maintenance requirements for DSN have consistently
been deemed a low priority.

Alternatively, others in the agency point to the success of a more
centralized space communications structure, as was in place before 1995.
Under this structure, resource decisions can be made in light of an
overall agency perspective on which communications program can best
fulfill agency wide communications goals. However, one official suggested
that under this structure, maintenance requirements for DSN could become
an even lower priority as the requirements of other programs are
considered. In the former case, a program like DSN must compete for
funding against individual missions. In the latter case, a program like
DSN will compete for funding against other space communications assets.

                                   Conclusion

By establishing DSN as the primary communications system for supporting
deep space missions, NASA will be reliant on the system for mission
successes-both now and in the distant future. By virtue of this reliance,
NASA has a responsibility to ensure that the system is operationally sound
and meets user needs. The system faces challenges that call into question
how well it will continue to be able to adequately support deep space
missions. The potential for more significant system failure and major
disruption to the deep space exploration program, both manned and
unmanned, looms large if nothing is done to address the condition of DSN.
As NASA continues to depend on the program for meeting its deep space
communications requirements, the program and the agency will have to
determine what those requirements are and how they can best meet those
requirements with a viable system for the future. Establishing these
requirements in terms more comprehensive than just being able to provide
coverage for 95 percent of committed time will provide for a better
understanding of what is needed by the program. Furthermore,
quantification and characterization of such requirements in more
comprehensive terms will be critical to the development of a plan as
required under the 2005 NASA Authorization Act.

As NASA prepares to take on extensive exploration initiatives under the
President's Vision for Space Exploration, the agency needs to position
itself to make investment decisions from an agency-wide perspective.
Currently, because NASA does not consider program level requirements when
planning agency wide commitments for space communications, many of these
program requirements, such as infrastructure needs, are not being
addressed, which means they will worsen and inhibit the agency's ability
to support future space exploration initiatives. Also, since space
communications programs have the ability to direct resources to
investments, investments made may not support agency wide requirements
conducive to a broader and possibly more efficient space communications
capability for the agency. As NASA begins to commit more resources to deep
space exploration in the future, the agency must ensure that it properly
addresses the communications needs of all of its missions and makes
investments from that viewpoint. NASA has the opportunity to address this
issue through a newly created task group charged with analyzing how this
can best be achieved.

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

To better position the Deep Space Network to meet existing workload
challenges and prepare the network for future deep space communications
responsibilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator direct DSN to
(1) identify total program requirements for deep space communications
capabilities for the near and long term, in terms better defined than the
single coverage commitment of 95 percent, (2) determine the extent to
which the program's current capabilities can support those identified
requirements and (3) develop a plan to address any gap between those
capabilities and requirements and identify the estimated costs of any
enhancements needed.

As NASA's task group on space communications considers how program
requirements can be better integrated into overall agency goals for space
communications capabilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator
direct the group to consider the following in carrying out its task: (1)
identify what priority program-level requirements have in agency-level
decisions affecting space communications, (2) determine how program-level
requirements for space communications programs can be identified and
communicated to agency-level decision makers, and (3) establish how the
agency can identify program-level investments needed to address program
requirements that support agency wide goals for space communications and
how to coordinate those investments to avoid duplication and additional
costs. While considering these recommendations and the task at hand, the
group should also consider the importance of having shared knowledge and
communication about these issues openly with all entities involved.

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

NASA concurred with our recommendations. In commenting on the draft of our
report, NASA pointed out that it already had a plan in place that
addresses our first set of recommendations, namely the need for the agency
to identify all DSN requirements for the near and long-term, how it will
meet those requirements, and identify costs associated with meeting those
requirements. While we recognize that NASA has a DSN Roadmap, the agency
still lacks a detailed strategy for addressing DSN needs for the future
that includes all program requirements, i.e. deferred maintenance, in
addition to the already projected mission needs. Furthermore, the DSN
Roadmap does not include estimation of costs and does not address the
impact of unmet needs on its ability to meet mission requirements.

NASA also commented that the DSN has not been responsible for the loss of
missions. Our report does not state that missions were lost because of the
DSN. However, NASA officials provided GAO evidence that mission science
had been lost as a result of disruptions in the operation of DSN, and that
point is characterized in the report.

As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, we
will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. At
that time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator and interested
congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
website at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged
in appendix III.

Allen Li, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix I: Objectives,
Scope, and Methodology

To identify the challenges facing NASA's Deep Space Network program in
meeting its current and planned space communications workload, we
performed the following:

           o  We obtained and analyzed NASA documents and briefing slides
           related to the operation and capabilities of the Deep Space
           Network, including budget submissions and funding breakouts,
           workforce projections, missions lists, fiscal year 2004 and fiscal
           year 2005 Program Operating Plans, the DSN Strategic Roadmap,
           mission agreements, the memorandums of agreement with the host
           countries of the foreign DSN sites, a 2004 NASA-wide facilities
           condition assessment, deferred maintenance information and work
           breakdown system data, risk assessments for various aspects of the
           network, return on investment analyses for various technology
           upgrades and system performance and reliability data, including
           records of downtimes.

           o  We reviewed the NASA Vision for Exploration roadmaps and the
           National Research Council reports on those roadmaps, the Vision
           for Exploration Architecture report, and NASA Strategic Plan for
           2005 and Beyond for information about the role of DSN in the
           Vision. We also reviewed previous GAO reports on infrastructure
           investment, technology development and deferred maintenance.

           o  We interviewed NASA mission officials to receive their feedback
           on the performance of DSN, including performance shortfalls, in
           meeting their needs and collected information related to those
           specific missions. We also discussed the nature of challenges
           experienced by the program through interviews with NASA and Jet
           Propulsion Laboratory officials and DSN contractor personnel and
           received written and oral responses from all.

To determine the extent NASA is integrating DSN into its space
communications plans for the future, we performed the following:

           o  We collected and analyzed information related to space
           communications architecture management at NASA, including the NASA
           4.0 Communication and Navigation Capability Roadmap, space
           communication architecture plans, descriptions of the various
           space communications assets intended to play a role in the future
           architecture, Memorandum of Agreement for the Management of NASA's
           Space Communications Networks, and a description of the history of
           space communications management at NASA.

           o  We held discussions with NASA space communications officials
           about future space communications architecture requirements, what
           assets the architecture will include, and how its development is
           being managed by the Space Communication Coordination and
           Integration Board (SCCIB) and Space Communications Architecture
           Working Group (SCAWG). We reviewed the charter of the SCAWG. We
           also discussed the budget development and execution process for
           DSN at the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) level, and how that
           impacts integration of the DSN into the overall agency space
           communications architecture.

           o  We met with NASA's Space Communications Organization Study
           Group, which was established during the course of our review, to
           discuss its task of identifying options for the management of
           space communications for the future of NASA space exploration. We
           also reviewed the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this group to
           better understand its goals and time frames.

To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials responsible
for DSN operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif.; and ITT Industries contractor
officials at their offices in Monrovia, Calif., and at the DSN site
complex in Goldstone, Calif. At NASA Headquarters, we met with officials
from the Science Mission Directorate, including lead representatives from
the Deep Space Network program, the Exploration Missions Directorate and
the Space Operations Mission Directorate, including the Space
Communications Architecture Working Group. We also met with DSN mission
officials from the Mars Rovers, Deep Impact, Cassini-Huygens, and Stardust
programs.

We conducted our review from May 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Appendix II: Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration

Appendix III: GAOA Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

GAO Contact

Allen Li (202) 512-4841

Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the individual named above, Brendan Culley, James Morrison,
Sylvia Schatz, Robert Swierczek, Trevor Thomson, Hai Tran and Thomas
Twambly made key contributions to this report.

(120458)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-445 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-445 , a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, House of
Representatives

April 2006

NASA'S DEEP SPACE NETWORK

Current Management Structure Is Not Conducive to Effectively Matching
Resources with Future Requirements

The President's Vision for Space Exploration calls for human and robotic
missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In response, over the next two
decades, NASA may spend $100 billion on new technologies and facilities
that will require reliable ground communications to achieve those
missions. Presently, that communications capability is provided by NASA's
Deep Space Network-a system of antennas located at three sites around the
world. However, the Network faces challenges that may hinder its provision
of current and future mission support.

This report discusses (1) the significant operational challenges faced by
the Deep Space Network and (2) the extent to which NASA is integrating the
Network into its future communications plans.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making several recommendations to NASA that will assist the agency
in better aligning resources for the Deep Space Network with overall
agency requirements for future space exploration. NASA concurred with
GAO's recommendations.

While NASA's Deep Space Network can meet most requirements of its current
workload, it may not be able to meet near-term and future demand. The
system-suffering from an aging, fragile infrastructure with some crucial
components over 40 years old-has lost science data during routine
operations and critical events. In addition, new customers find they must
compete for this limited capacity, not just with each other, but also with
legacy missions extended past their lifetimes, such as NASA's Voyager,
that nonetheless return valuable science. Program officials doubt they can
provide adequate coverage to an increasing set of new mission customers,
especially if they increase dramatically under the President's Vision.

The Deep Space Network's future utility is also in question because NASA
does not currently match funding for space communications capabilities
with agency wide space communications requirements. While NASA created an
agency level entity to review the technical requirements for integrating
assets like the network into an agency wide space communications
architecture for the future, that entity does not address program level
requirements nor influence investment decisions. Control over such
requirements and funding remains with the mission directorates and
programs themselves. This disconnect allows programs to invest in
capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals for space communications.
After this review was initiated, NASA began to study how to better manage
this gap between agency-level requirements and program-level funding, but
no recommendations for action have yet been proposed.

Panoramic of Goldstone, Calif., facility antennas
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