Capitol Visitor Center: Results of Risk-based Analysis of
Schedule and Cost (15-FEB-06, GAO-06-440T).
GAO testified before the Senate Subcommittee on the Legislative
Branch, Committee on Appropriations to provide the results of a
risk-based analysis of schedule and cost for the Capitol Visitor
Center (CVC). Our remarks focused on (1) our assessment of the
risks associated with the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC)
December 2005 schedule, and our estimate of a time frame for
opening the project to the public; and (2) the project's costs
and funding, including the potential impact of scheduling issues
that have arisen since the Subcommittee's November 16, 2005,
hearing on the CVC project's schedule and cost.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-440T
ACCNO: A46997
TITLE: Capitol Visitor Center: Results of Risk-based Analysis of
Schedule and Cost
DATE: 02/15/2006
SUBJECT: Construction contracts
Contract administration
Contract oversight
Contract performance
Contractors
Cost analysis
Cost overruns
Facility construction
Federal facilities
Federal funds
Future budget projections
Public visitor-centers
Schedule slippages
Cost estimates
Capitol Visitor Center Project
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GAO-06-440T
* Appendix I: Capitol Visitor Center Critical Construction Mil
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EST
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
CAPITOL VISITOR CENTER
Results of Risk-based Analysis of Schedule and Cost
Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director Terrell Dorn, Assistant Director
Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAO-06-440T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to assist the Subcommittee in monitoring
progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will
focus on (1) our assessment of the risks associated with AOC's December
2005 schedule, and our estimate of a time frame for opening the project to
the public; and (2) the project's costs and funding, including the
potential impact of scheduling issues that have arisen since the
Subcommittee's November 16, 2005, hearing on the CVC project's schedule
and cost.1
Our remarks today are based on our review of schedules and financial
reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its
construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our
observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our
discussions with the CVC team (including AOC and its major CVC
contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the
United States Capitol Police (USCP). We also reviewed applicable
appropriations legislation and AOC's construction management contractor's
periodic schedule assessments and daily reports on the progress of
interior wall and floor stonework.
With the assistance of a consultant, Hulett & Associates, we assessed the
risks associated with AOC's December 2005 schedule for the base CVC
project and used the results of our assessment to estimate a time frame
for completing the base project with and without identified risks and
uncertainties. In January 2006, we and our consultant interviewed project
managers and team members from AOC and its major CVC contractors, USCP
representatives, and AOC's Chief Fire Marshal to identify the risks they
saw in completing the remaining work and the time they considered
necessary to finish the CVC project and open it to the public. Using the
project's November and December 2005 schedules (the most recent schedules
available when we did our work), we asked the team members to estimate how
many workdays would be needed to complete the remaining work. More
specifically, for each major activity that the members had a role or
expertise in, we asked them to develop three estimates of the activity's
duration-the least, the most likely, and the longest time needed to
complete the activity. Using these three-point estimates and a simulation
analysis to calculate different combinations of the team's estimates that
factored in identified risks and uncertainties, we estimated the
completion date for the base project at various confidence levels based on
AOC's December 2005 schedule. Finally, we reviewed AOC's schedule for the
construction of the House and Senate expansion spaces, but did not assess
the risks associated with the work.2
1See GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Update on Schedule and Cost, GAO-06-251T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005).
In addition, we estimated the likely cost of the project at completion,
factoring in risks and uncertainties, using information obtained from our
interviews, contract modifications, the proposed change order log
maintained by AOC's construction management contractor, and the previously
mentioned simulation analysis. We did not perform an audit; rather, we
performed our work to assist Congress in conducting its oversight
activities.
In summary:
Since the Subcommittee's November 16 CVC hearing, AOC and the CVC team
have moved the project's construction forward and significantly revised
the schedule, particularly for the base project. For example, they have
reached agreement with AOC's Chief Fire Marshal on the schedule for
testing the base project's life safety systems and have enhanced the
manner in which the project's operations schedule is incorporated into the
project's master schedule. In addition, they have reviewed and revised the
schedule, postponing the opening dates for the CVC and the House and
Senate expansion spaces by about 2 months each. Under AOC's revised
schedule, the CVC would be open to the public in February 2007 with a
temporary cap on visitor occupancy, and the expansion spaces would be open
in April 2007. However, to allow for possible delays and start-up time for
operations, AOC is proposing to open the CVC in April 2007 and the
expansion spaces in May 2007, at which time the temporary cap on CVC
occupancy would be lifted.
We concur with AOC about the need for postponing the opening dates, but do
not believe that AOC has scheduled enough time to complete several of the
project's critical tasks and to address the problems, challenges, risks,
and uncertainties that AOC and the CVC team are attempting to address. If
they are successful in addressing these issues, we believe that the CVC
can be opened to the public with the temporary cap on visitor occupancy in
May 2007 and that the expansion spaces can be opened beginning in
mid-August to early September 2007. Congress may be able to begin
occupying the expansion spaces earlier if AOC implements a phased opening
plan it is considering. However, if AOC experiences major problems
completing construction, such as with installing interior stone or testing
major building systems, the work could be finished even later than we have
estimated.
2We did not assess the risks associated with the schedule for the
expansion spaces because the CVC team took longer than expected to
complete the December schedule. We did not receive the final December
schedule until January 27, 2006, and therefore did not have enough time to
fully analyze the expansion space schedule before the Subcommittee's
February hearing. Furthermore, CVC project staff told us that they had not
yet had an opportunity to carefully assess the expansion space schedule.
According to our current estimate, the total estimated cost to complete
the entire CVC project is about $555 million without an allowance for
risks and uncertainties. This estimate exceeds our November 16, 2005,
estimate by about $12 million because we and AOC's construction management
contractor are now projecting further delay-related costs. Changes in the
project's design and scope have also been occurring, and more are likely.
For example, the project's fire protection system has been evolving, and
the system is now expected to cost more than previously estimated. To
date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC construction. Thus, we
now estimate that another $25.6 million will be needed to complete
construction without an allowance for risks and uncertainties and taking
into account funding from existing appropriations that AOC is planning to
use. With an allowance for risks and uncertainties, we now estimate that
the project could cost as much as about $584 million at completion, or
about $25 million more than we estimated in November 2005. Estimated costs
for the tunnel connecting the CVC with the Library of Congress are still
within, but are now approaching, the $10 million statutorily mandated
limit.
AOC Has Moved Construction Forward, Revised the Project's Schedule, and
Postponed Opening Dates
AOC and the CVC team have continued to refine the project's schedule since
the November hearing and have made substantive progress in addressing the
issues that we and the Subcommittee have raised, particularly concerning
the base project's schedule. For example, the CVC team reviewed the
sequence and duration of the activities scheduled for interior stonework,
finish work, and work associated with the base project's fire protection
system, including the acceptance testing to be done by AOC's Fire Marshal
Division. To reflect the results of its review, the team revised the
project's December 2005 and January 2006 schedules, and in collaboration
with the team that is planning for CVC operations, enhanced the manner in
which the operations activities are incorporated into the project's master
schedule.3 AOC and its contractors' staff who are involved in planning for
CVC operations agree that the January 2006 schedule identifies the related
construction and operations activities. The CVC team has not yet fully
reassessed the schedule for the expansion spaces and has not yet reached
agreement with the Chief Fire Marshal on the requirements for acceptance
testing of those spaces. Finally, the CVC team has continued to meet
weekly to identify risks facing the project and to discuss mitigation
strategies and actions. As of February 1, 2006, the team had identified 62
risks and developed mitigation strategies for all but 1, which had just
been identified. The plans vary in their level of detail and stage of
implementation.
According to AOC's December 2005 and January 2006 schedules, the CVC base
project will be ready to open to the public with a temporary certificate
of occupancy on February 13, 2007, and the House and Senate expansion
spaces will be ready on April 24, 2007. To allow for possible delays and
start-up time for operations, AOC has proposed an April 2007 opening date
for the base project and a May 2007 occupancy date for the expansion
spaces. By the April opening date for the base project, AOC believes, all
construction work in the CVC and East Front will be completed, but the
CVC's occupancy at any one time will be temporarily limited to 3,500,
compared with about 4,200, the normal anticipated occupancy level. This
temporary limit will be necessary because the "horizontal exits," or
passages, through the expansion spaces, which the life safety code
requires for exiting the base CVC project, will not be available until
later. These horizontal exits cannot be used until the fire alarm system
in the expansion spaces has been fully tested and accepted-work that is
not slated to be completed until after the base CVC is scheduled to open.
Some additional work will likely be required to provide temporary
emergency exit routes from the CVC, but the CVC team does not believe that
this work or its costs should be substantial.
Mr. Chairman, a brief explanation of AOC's rationale for proposing a CVC
opening with a temporary cap on visitor occupancy may be helpful at this
point. The current project schedule calls for completing the construction
of both the CVC and the expansion spaces before December 31, 2006, but
would delay the start of acceptance testing the portions of the fire alarm
system in the expansion spaces until such testing for the base CVC project
is completed in February 2007. AOC is planning this approach because it
believes that starting the acceptance testing for the expansion spaces
earlier would prolong the completion of the acceptance testing in the base
project and thereby delay the base project's opening to the public. More
specifically, the fire protection devices for the atriums, which are a
part of the horizontal exits ultimately required by code for full
occupancy of the base project, would undergo acceptance testing with the
expansion spaces, rather than with the base CVC project. To accommodate
this change, AOC shifted the finish work in the atriums from the base CVC
schedule to the expansion space schedule, and is planning to conduct the
acceptance testing for the atriums and the expansion spaces at the same
time, after the acceptance testing for the base CVC project is done. Until
the acceptance testing for the expansion spaces has been completed, AOC's
Chief Fire Marshal has said that the expansion spaces, including the exits
through the atriums, cannot be used as emergency exit routes, and
therefore AOC must take measures to provide temporary emergency exit
routes from the base CVC project and reduce the number of occupants who
can be in the base project until the exit routes are available.
3The January 2006 project schedule reflects revisions in various
activities, but the completion dates for the CVC and expansion spaces did
not change from the December 2005 project schedule.
Our Analysis Indicates Later Opening Dates in Light of Problems, Challenges,
Risks, and Uncertainties
Our work to date in monitoring the CVC project and the results of our
recently completed risk assessment of the project's schedule point to
later opening dates than the schedule indicates. Although the schedule for
the base project goes a long way toward responding to our concerns about
the amount of time previously provided for a number of activities and
extends their duration, CVC team managers and members we interviewed
believe that certain work will take longer to complete than the revised
schedule allows. For example, they believe that interior stonework and
finish work for the base project and the East Front are likely to take
longer. According to our risk analysis, which reflects the CVC team's
input and assumes that AOC will successfully address the challenges it
faces, the CVC is more likely to be ready for opening with a temporary
certificate of occupancy between late April and mid-May 2007 than in
February, as indicated in AOC's current schedule. AOC is now proposing an
April 2007 opening date to provide time for possible construction
slippages and operations preparation. The additional time AOC says is
necessary for operations preparation after construction completion would
mean that the CVC would be ready for opening with a temporary cap on
visitor occupancy by about the end of May 2007, according to our analysis.
Similarly, our analysis suggests that the House and Senate expansion
spaces are more likely to be ready in mid August or early September 2007
than in April or May 2007. We believe the later time frames are more
likely because (1) AOC has scheduled the acceptance testing of the
expansion spaces after the acceptance testing of the base project and,
according to our work, the base project testing will take longer than
scheduled and (2) AOC's Chief Fire Marshal believes that the acceptance
testing of the expansion spaces will take longer than scheduled.
We have discussed the results of our analysis with AOC, and it continues
to believe that it will be able to meet its April and May 2007 time frames
for the CVC and the expansion spaces, respectively. Furthermore, AOC said
that it and the CVC team will continuously review the schedule to identify
opportunities for improvement. For example, AOC pointed out that it may be
able to have the acceptance testing of the expansion spaces done in
segments so that Members and staff will not have to wait for the entire
facility to be tested before they can occupy their space. AOC also
believes it may be able to revise the scheduling of some East Front
mechanical work to save time. We agree that AOC should continuously look
for ways to improve the schedule and that improvements may be possible.
However, we also believe that AOC will be challenged to meet even the
later opening dates we have identified given the problems, challenges,
risks, and uncertainties the project faces. A discussion of these follows:
o Delivery of stone and pace of stone installation remain
critical. Although the CVC team has made progress in installing
interior wall and floor stone, work on the wall stone has fallen
behind schedule in several areas, and the project still faces
significant challenges, risks, and uncertainties in this area.
These include whether sufficient quantities of the appropriate
wall stone will be received in time and whether the pace of
installation will be sufficient to complete this work as
scheduled. According to information provided by the sequence 2
contractor on February 10, the wall stone supplier still had a
20-truckload backlog and was not shipping wall stone at the
scheduled rate, resulting in a delivery shortfall of about 6,000
cubic feet. According to AOC's construction management contractor,
stone supply is not affecting interior wall stone installation
because a large quantity of stone is currently on site; however,
the contractor is concerned about the ability of the stone
supplier to meet current and future requirements that include
stone for the East Front, adequate stone to maintain productivity,
and the 20-truckload backlog. The pace of installation is also an
issue. The sequence 2 contractor has recently increased the number
of stone masons working on the project and has begun meeting the
installation targets in its work plan. However, if the wall stone
installation targets are not achieved, whether because the masons
are less productive than planned or work spaces are not ready for
stonework to begin, completion delays are likely. The sequence 2
contractor has already encountered work spaces in the service
level, the orientation lobby, and the East Front that were not
available for stonework because concrete was out of tolerance or
masonry walls were not ready for wall stone to be hung. Finally,
the sequence 2 contractor still needs to install about 120,000
square feet of floor stone in the CVC and could have problems
meeting the scheduled completion dates if not enough masons are
available, the amount of floor space available is insufficient
because other finish work is not done, or other trades are working
in the areas where floor stone is to be laid. As of February 10,
AOC had not received a floor stone installation plan requested
from the sequence 2 contractor, but the sequence 2 contractor said
that it intends to finish the plan soon.
o Stacking of trades could delay completion. Continued delays,
particularly in wall stone installation, could adversely affect
the sequence 2 contractor's ability to accomplish all of the
required finish work on schedule. The sequence 2 contractor has
been making progress relative to its current plan for installing
wall stone in the auditorium and the orientation lobby, but
according to the current project schedule, wall stone installation
is delayed in other areas, such as the East Front, the great hall,
and the orientation theaters' exterior walls. Furthermore, as of
February 10, although the contractor had completed 10 of the 13
milestones relating to wall stone that are being tracked for the
Subcommittee, none of the 10 was completed by the date set in the
September 2005 baseline schedule, and only 4 were completed by the
date set in the November 2005 schedule. (See app. I.) If delays
continue, a stacking of trades such as we described at the
Subcommittee's November hearing could hold up finish work, such as
drywall or ceiling installation, electrical and plumbing work,
plastering, or floor stone installation.4 Such a situation could
also increase the risk of accidents and injuries. The CVC team has
also identified "trade stacking" as a high risk. The sequence 2
contractor acknowledges the risk, but said that it has structured
its schedule to avoid the risk and plans to monitor progress
closely to avoid problems. We acknowledge that these steps can be
helpful; however, the more the wall stone schedule slips, the
greater is the likelihood of "trade stacking," since more and more
work will have to be done in less time to meet the schedule. AOC's
construction management contractor agrees that this is a serious
potential problem.
o Complex building systems remain a significant risk. The CVC
will contain complex building systems, including systems for
heating, air conditioning, and ventilation; fire protection; and
security. These systems not only have to perform well
individually, but their operation has to be integrated. If the CVC
team encounters any significant problems with their functioning,
either individually or together, during commissioning or testing,
the project could be seriously delayed. AOC and the CVC team are
aware of these risks and have been taking steps to mitigate them
as part of their risk management process. Yet despite these steps,
a significant problem could arise during commissioning or testing,
and it is important that the team be prepared for such an event.
o Building design continues to evolve. The CVC has undergone a
number of design changes, and design changes are continuing for a
number of building components, such as the exhibit gallery and the
fire protection and security systems. Some of these changes have
resulted in delays, such as in the exhibit gallery and in the East
Front. In addition, designs or shop drawings for some elements of
the project, such as aspects of the facility's fire protection
systems, have not yet been fully approved and are subject to
change. At this stage of the project's construction, one might
expect the number of design changes to dwindle. However, this is
not the case. For example, more than 20 design changes or
clarifications were issued last month. Additional design changes
are being considered, and the potential exists for such changes to
further adversely affect the schedule.
o Multiple critical activity paths complicate schedule
management. In its report on the project's January 2006 schedule,
AOC's construction management contractor identified 18 critical
activity paths-4 more than in the contractor's report on the
project's October 2005 schedule-that are crucial to meeting the
scheduled completion date. In addition, the construction
management contractor said that several noncritical activities
have fallen behind schedule since November 2005, and a number of
these have moved closer to becoming critical to the project's
completion. As we have previously said, having a large number of
critical and near-critical activities complicates project
management and increases the risk of missing completion dates. We
believe that the CVC team will be particularly challenged to
manage all of these areas concurrently and to deal effectively
with problems that could arise within these areas, especially if
multiple problems arise at the same time.
We currently estimate that the total cost to complete the entire
CVC project is about $555 million without an allowance for risks
and uncertainties and could be as much as about $584 million with
such an allowance. As table 1 indicates, our current estimate
without an allowance for risks and uncertainties is about $12
million higher than the estimate without such an allowance that we
presented at the Subcommittee's November 16, 2005, hearing.5 This
$12 million increase is largely attributable to additional
o delay costs estimated by AOC's construction management
contractor and
o actual and anticipated changes in the design and scope of the
project.
Table 1: Comparison of November 2005 and February 2006 CVC
Construction Cost Estimates
Source: GAO analysis of AOC data.
In particular, changes in the project's fire protection system,
which we discussed at the Subcommittee's October 18, 2005, CVC
hearing, are now expected to cost more than previously estimated.
Specifically, the system's acceptance testing is expected to be
more extensive and to take place later than originally
anticipated, and additional temporary construction may be required
to ensure fire safety if the CVC is opened to the public before
the Senate and House expansion spaces are completed. This
additional construction would involve designing and installing-and
then removing-temporary walls and perhaps taking other fire
protection measures to create emergency exits from the CVC. As
discussed in more detail earlier in this statement, the need for
temporary construction may be reduced or eliminated if the fire
safety acceptance testing of the expansion spaces and of the CVC
can be performed concurrently, rather than over two separate
periods, as would be likely if the CVC is opened to the public
before the expansion spaces are completed. We discussed this issue
during the Subcommittee's July 14, 2005, CVC hearing6 and
recommended then that AOC estimate the cost of these temporary
measures so that Congress could weigh the costs and benefits of
opening the CVC before the expansion spaces are completed. AOC has
agreed to provide this estimate to Congress when it has more
information on the status of construction progress on the CVC and
expansion spaces and the specific steps that will be necessary to
provide adequate temporary exit routes.7
We now estimate that the total cost to complete the entire project
with an allowance for risks and uncertainties could be as much as
$584 million, or about $25 million more than we estimated in
November 2005. This increase reflects the potential for the
project to incur additional costs if
o difficulties arise in commissioning and testing its complex and
sophisticated fire protection, ventilation, and security systems;
o significant problems with the building's design are identified
and need to be corrected during construction;
o delays cost more than anticipated;8 and
o significant discretionary changes in the project's design and
scope are requested.
To date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC
construction. This amount does not include about $7.7 million that
was made available for either CVC construction or operations.9
According to AOC, it expects to use about $2 million of this
amount for construction. To obtain the additional funding that it
expected to need to complete the project's construction, AOC, in
December 2005, requested $20.6 million as part of its budget
request for fiscal year 2007. This request was based, in part, on
discussions with us and took into account our November 16, 2005,
estimate of the cost to complete the project's construction
without an allowance for risks and uncertainties and funding from
existing appropriations. The request also reflected updates to our
November estimate through mid-December 2005. At that time, the
$20.6 million request for additional appropriations, coupled with
the additional funds that AOC planned to use from existing
appropriations, would have been sufficient to cover the estimated
cost to complete construction without an allowance for risks and
uncertainties.
Our work since mid-December 2005 indicates that AOC will need
about $5 million more, or about $25.6 million in additional funds,
to complete construction without an allowance for risks and
uncertainties.10 This increase reflects
o the number and magnitude of potential change orders that CVC
team members and we believe are likely and
o additional costs associated with extending the project's
expected completion date beyond March 31, 2007, the date
contemplated in our last cost estimate.
AOC generally agrees with our estimate, particularly with respect
to having sufficient contingency funds available for necessary
design or scope changes or for additional delay-related costs.
Public Law 108-83 limits to $10 million the amount of federal
funds that can be obligated or expended for the construction of
the tunnel connecting the CVC with the Library of Congress. As of
February 14, 2006, AOC estimated that the tunnel's construction
would cost about $9.8 million, and AOC's total obligations for the
Library of Congress tunnel construction work totaled about $8.7
million. AOC's remaining estimated costs are for potential
changes.
On February 13, 2006, AOC awarded a contract for the work to
connect the tunnel to the Jefferson Building. This work is costing
more than AOC had estimated-a possibility we raised in our
November 16 testimony before the Subcommittee. Because this work
involves creating an opening in the building's foundation and
changing the existing structure, we believe that AOC is likely to
encounter unforeseen conditions that could further increase its
costs. Therefore, we included additional contingency funds for
this work in our $555 million estimate of the cost to complete the
CVC project's construction. Both AOC and we plan to monitor the
remaining tunnel and Jefferson Building construction work closely
to ensure that the statutory spending limit is not exceeded.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, AOC has responded to many of the
schedule-related concerns we have identified, but its planned
opening date for the CVC is still somewhat optimistic. For AOC to
meet even our estimated opening time frame, we believe that it is
critically important for the CVC team to do the following:
o Aggressively take all necessary and appropriate actions to
install interior wall and floor stone as expeditiously as
possible, including seeing that sufficient quantities of masons,
stone, and work space are available when needed to meet the wall
stonework plan and the forthcoming floor stone installation plan.
o Closely monitor construction to identify potential "trade
stacking" and promptly take steps to prevent it or effectively
address it should it occur.
o Reassess its risk mitigation plans to ensure that the team
takes the steps necessary to prevent a major building system
problem during commissioning or testing and has measures in place
to deal quickly with problems should they arise.
o Carefully consider the necessity of proposed scope and design
changes and attempt to minimize the impact of necessary changes on
the project's schedule and cost.
o Reassess the capacity of the CVC team (AOC and its contractors)
to effectively manage and coordinate the schedule and work from
this point forward, particularly with respect to the large number
of activities that are currently critical, or close to being
critical, to the project's timely completion.
o Identify and consider the pros and cons (including the
estimated costs) of opening the CVC and expansion spaces at about
the same time and provide this information to Congress.
We have discussed these actions with AOC, and it generally agrees
with them. It pointed out that it would be in a better position to
assess the pros and cons of opening the CVC and the expansion
spaces concurrently when construction is further along and it
becomes clearer when the work will actually be done. This appears
reasonable to us.
We would be pleased to answer any questions that you or Members of
the Subcommittee may have.
For further information about this testimony, please contact
Bernard Ungar at (202) 512-4232 or Terrell Dorn at (202) 512-6923.
Other key contributors to this testimony include Shirley Abel,
John Craig, Maria Edelstein, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brett
Fallavollita, Jeanette Franzel, Jackie Hamilton, Bradley James,
and Scott Riback.
Source: AOC's September and November 2005 CVC sequence 2
construction schedules for the scheduled completion dates and AOC
and its construction management contractor for the actual
completion dates.
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4Stacking of trades can occur when workers from different trades, such as
stone masons, electricians, plumbers, or plasterers, have to work in the
same area at the same time to meet a schedule, sometimes making it
difficult to ensure sufficient space and resources for concurrent work.
Estimated Project Costs Exceed Funding Provided as of February 2006
Dollars in millions
February 15, November 16,
Estimate 2006 2005 Difference
With risks and uncertainties $584 $559 $25
Without risks and uncertainties $555 $543 $12
Allowance for risks and
uncertainties/Difference $29 $16 $13
5Our work identified one project element-the acquisition and installation
of USCP's technical security equipment-that is now expected to cost less
than budgeted. Although the $12 million net increase reflects a decrease
in estimated cost for this element without an allowance for risks and
uncertainties, our $584 million estimate recognizes that there is some
risk associated with this item and thus includes funding for such risk.
6GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Update on Status of Project's Schedule and
Costs, GAO-05-910T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005).
7The temporary work necessary will depend on various factors, such as
whether the sprinkler and smoke control systems are fully functional.
8It is important to note that the delay-related costs included in our
estimates have been made for budgetary purposes only and do not reflect an
assessment of the government's responsibility for any delays. Furthermore,
it should be recognized that estimating the government's costs for delays
that occurred after November 2004 is difficult because delays have
occurred for different reasons and it is unclear who ultimately will bear
responsibility for the various delays that have occurred.
9Public Law 108-447, enacted on December 8, 2004, provided that up to
$10.6 million could be transferred from AOC's Capitol Building
appropriation account for the use of the CVC project. The use of the
amount transferred is subject to the approval of the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations. In June 2005, AOC received approval to use
about $2.8 million of this $10.6 million, leaving a balance of about $7.7
million that can be used in the future after a rescission amounting to
$84,800.
10AOC has asked for additional funds in its fiscal year 2007 budget
request under its general administration budget for contractual support to
its Fire Marshal Division which includes support for acceptance testing
for the CVC. This request is not included in our cost-to-complete estimate
or estimate of additional CVC funds needed for fiscal year 2007.
Estimated Construction Costs for Library of Congress Tunnel Close to, but under,
Limit
Contacts and Acknowledgments
Appendix I: Capitol Visitor Center Critical Construction Milestones
November 16, 2005-February 15, 2006
September 2005 November 2005
scheduled scheduled Actual
Activity Location finish date finish date finish date
Orientation Lobby Perimeter CMU 10/13/05 12/02/05
walls 12/29/05
East Front Interior CMU 10/02/05 12/06/05
Subbasement walls
Exhibit Gallery Wall Stone 10/31/05 12/07/05 12/23/05
Area 2 base
Exhibit Gallery Wall Stone 11/10/05 12/02/05 12/28/05
Area 3 base
Orientation Lobby Interior CMU 11/15/05 12/30/05
walls 12/09/05
Exhibit Gallery Wall Stone 11/16/05 12/16/05 01/06/06
Area 1
Congressional Wall Stone 11/17/05 12/05/05 01/13/06
Auditorium Area 2
Congressional Wall Stone 12/05/05 02/06/06 01/13/06
Auditorium Area 3
Upper Level Wall Stone 12/13/05 01/13/06 01/11/06
Assembly Room Area 1
Exhibit Gallery Wall Stone 12/14/05 01/16/06 01/06/06
Area 3
Upper Level Wall Stone 12/29/05 01/30/06 01/20/06
Assembly Room Area 2
Upper Level Wall Stone 1/11/06
Orientation Lobby Area 1
Pedestals 02/09/06
Upper Level Wall Stone 1/23/06
Orientation Lobby Area 2
Pedestals 02/21/06
Utility Tunnel Install Walls 11/04/05 12/06/05 12/23/05
Sta. 1+00-
2+00
Utility Tunnel Install Roof 11/28/05 12/16/05 01/05/06
Sta. 1+00-
2+00
Utility Tunnel Install Roof 12/05/05 12/21/05 12/07/05
Sta. 0+00-1+00
(543158)
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