Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked	 
Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain (04-APR-06,		 
GAO-06-371T).							 
                                                                 
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of
airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily  
carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. It
has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security 	 
Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and	 
baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses 
on the progress TSA is making in strengthening airline passenger 
and checked baggage screening and the challenges that remain.	 
Particularly, this testimony highlights TSA's efforts to (1)	 
enhance the performance, management, and deployment of the	 
transportation security officer (TSO) workforce; (2) strengthen  
procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage; and (3) 
leverage and deploy screening technologies.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-371T					        
    ACCNO:   A50719						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and    
Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain		 
     DATE:   04/04/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Airport personnel					 
	     Airport security					 
	     Baggage screening					 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Employee training					 
	     Labor force					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Performance management				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Policies and procedures				 

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GAO-06-371T

     

     * Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
     * TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but
     * TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training but Faces Challenges in De
     * Proposed Passenger Checkpoint Screening Procedural Changes A
     * TSA Could Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Screening Pr
     * DHS and TSA Are Taking Steps to Develop and Deploy Technolog
     * TSA Is Focusing Its Checked Baggage Strategic Planning Effor
     * Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, April 4, 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but
Challenges Remain

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director,

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO-06-371T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the progress made and challenges remaining in the physical screening of
airline passengers and their checked baggage, and in the deployment of
explosive detection technologies. Securing commercial aviation is a
daunting task-with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and
thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of
checked baggage. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
enacted on November 19, 2001, created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and mandated actions designed to strengthen aviation
security, including requiring that TSA assume responsibility for
conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at over 400 commercial
airports in the United States by November 19, 2002. It has been over 3
years since TSA assumed this responsibility, and the agency has spent
billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of initiatives to
strengthen the key components of its passenger and checked baggage
screening systems-people, processes, and technology. These components are
interconnected and are critical to the overall security of commercial
aviation.

My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening
airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and the challenges that
remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key areas, including
TSA's efforts to (1) enhance the performance of the transportation
security officer (TSO-formerly referred to as screeners) workforce and
manage and deploy the TSO workforce; (2) strengthen procedures for
screening passengers and checked baggage on passenger aircraft; (3)
leverage and deploy screening technologies; and (4) measure the
effectiveness of its passenger and checked baggage screening systems.

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the
security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our preliminary
observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening
procedures and staffing standards for TSOs. We did our work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains
a list of related GAO products released since September 11, 2001.

Summary

TSA has taken steps to enhance the performance, management, and deployment
of its TSO workforce, but it continues to face staffing and training
challenges. Acknowledging imbalances in the screener workforce, TSA
developed standards for determining TSO staffing for all airports at which
federal screening is required and developed a Screening Allocation Model
(SAM) to determine airport staffing levels. In determining staffing
allocations, the SAM takes into account not only flight and passenger
data, but also data unique to each airport-including flight schedules,
load factors, passenger and baggage distribution curves, and TSA passenger
and baggage screening configurations. However, in interviewing several
Federal Security Directors (FSD)-the ranking authorities responsible for
the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation's
commercial airports-we identified some preliminary concerns about the SAM.
For example, one assumption of the SAM is that 20 percent of the TSO
workforce at airports will be part-time. However, FSDs whom we spoke to
said that it has been a challenge to attract, hire, and retain TSA's
part-time TSO workforce, which has made this goal difficult to achieve.
Further, several of the FSDs we interviewed stated that they had not been
able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels, and that the SAM did
not take into account that TSOs were also being routinely used to carry
out non-screening and administrative duties. TSA has established the
National Screening Force to provide screening support to all airports in
times of special need, and implemented a number of initiatives to reduce
attrition among its TSO workforce. In addition to having an adequate
number of screeners, effective screening involves screeners being properly
trained to do their job. TSA has taken numerous steps to expand training
beyond the basic training requirement to include self-guided courses on
its Online Learning Center; a recurrent training requirement of 3-hours
per week, averaged over a quarter; and training on threat information,
explosives detection, and new screening approaches. However, insufficient
TSO staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity
create impediments to the TSO workforce taking full advantage of training
opportunities.

TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance detection
capabilities, but could strengthen its evaluation of these procedures.
Since April 2005, TSA has gathered proposals for passenger screening
procedural changes from a variety of sources within the agency. Based on
preliminary observations from our ongoing review, we found that most of
these proposed changes for passenger screening were intended to improve
efficiency or TSA's ability to detect prohibited items. Other
security-related changes to passenger screening procedures are made based
on several risk-based factors, including results of covert (undercover,
unannounced) tests that are designed to reveal vulnerabilities in the
screening system. TSA also recently piloted additional procedures that
would incorporate unpredictability into the screening system and allow
TSOs to determine the level of screening passengers should receive based
on suspicious behavior. TSA vets proposed screening procedural changes
through various TSA offices and tests significant proposed changes in an
operational environment. However, our preliminary observations indicate
that TSA's evaluation of procedural changes could be strengthened to
include how the procedure would reduce vulnerability to a terrorist
attack.

TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to
strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and funding
challenges. Effective screening depends on having the right technology in
place to detect threats, and TSA has taken steps to deploy and develop
technologies to strengthen commercial aviation security. However,
challenges in funding and planning created impediments to the technology's
implementation. For example, to improve explosives detection at some
passenger screening checkpoints, TSA has deployed explosives trace portal
machines, which use puffs of air to help detect the presence of explosives
on individuals. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) fiscal year
2007 budget request states that about 434 explosive trace portal machines
will be in operation throughout the country during fiscal year 2007.

However, limited progress has been made in fielding other explosives
detection technology at passenger checkpoints. At baggage screening
checkpoints, TSA has been effective in deploying explosive trace detection
systems (in which TSOs collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which
are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive materials) and
the more efficient explosive detection systems (in which probing radiation
is used to examine objects inside baggage and identify characteristic
signatures of threat explosives). Now that the initial deployment of this
equipment has been completed, however, TSA must focus on deploying
enhanced explosive detection systems, including larger or smaller models
depending on the needs of a particular airport, and on incorporating
explosive detection systems in-line with baggage conveyer systems, to
further enhance efficiency and security. In looking to the future, DHS has
agreed with our recommendations to improve its research and development
(R&D) management and planning, including completing basic research,
strategic planning, and risk assessment efforts; coordinating R&D efforts
with transportation stakeholders; and assessing the costs and benefits of
deploying explosive detection systems-either in-line or stand-alone at the
nation's airports. In February 2006, TSA took a positive step forward by
completing a strategic framework for its checked baggage screening
operations that will help ensure the efficient allocation of limited
resources to maximize technology's effectiveness in detecting threats.
However, additional work will be needed to determine funding and
deployment strategies to support the implementation of in-line baggage
screening systems.

TSA has measures in place to assess the effectiveness of passenger and
checked baggage screening systems. TSA headquarters has conducted covert
testing of passenger and checked baggage screening by having inspectors
attempt to pass threat objects through checkpoints in order to measure
vulnerabilities and identify systematic problems affecting TSO performance
in the areas of training, procedures, and technology. These tests have
identified that, overall, weaknesses and vulnerabilities exist in the
passenger and checked baggage screening systems. Implemented in September
2002, the testing protocols for passenger and checked baggage screening
changed in September 2005 to implement a more risk-based approach and
focus on catastrophic threats to aircraft. Additionally, in February 2004
and February 2005, for passengers and checked baggage, respectively, TSA
issued protocols to help FSDs conduct covert testing of local airport
screening activities. Other ways TSA tests the effectiveness of passenger
and baggage screening include the use of the Threat Image Projection
system, which projects threat images onto a screen as the bag is screened
to test the screener's ability to positively identify the threat; annual
screener recertification testing; and passenger and checked baggage
performance indexes. These performance indexes reflect indicators of
effectiveness, efficiency, and customer satisfaction. However, due to a
lack of targets for each component of the index, TSA may have difficulty
performing meaningful analyses of the parts of the index.

Background

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the President signed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act into law on November 19, 2001,
with the primary goal of strengthening the security of the nation's
aviation system. To this end, ATSA created TSA as an agency with
responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including
aviation.1 As part of this responsibility, TSA oversees security
operations at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports, including
passenger and checked baggage screening operations. Prior to the passage
of ATSA, the screening of passengers and checked baggage had been
performed by private screening companies under contract to the airlines.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible for ensuring
compliance with screening regulations. Today, TSA security activities,
including passenger and checked baggage screening at airports, are
overseen by Federal Security Directors-the ranking authorities responsible
for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the
nation's commercial airports. Each FSD is responsible for overseeing
security activities, including passenger and checked baggage screening, at
one or more commercial airports.

1ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation
(DOT) with responsibility for securing all modes of transportation,
including aviation. Pub. L. No. 107-71, S: 101, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). The
Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on November 25, 2002,
transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department of Homeland Security
Pub. L. No. 107-296, S: 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178.

TSA reported that between October 2004 and September 2005, about 735
million passengers were physically screened. In addition, 550 million bags
were screened using explosive detection systems with standard screening
procedures.

Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening

In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for passenger
and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA set forth specific
enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement, with deadlines
for completing many of them. These requirements included

           o  assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations
           at more than 400 commercial airports by November 19, 2002;
           o  establishing a basic screener training program composed of a
           minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of
           on-the-job training;
           o  conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners;
           o  conducting operational testing of screeners;2 
           o  requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an
           operational test; and
           o  screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives
           detection systems by December 31, 2002.3

           Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel
           inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage
           of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other
           dangerous item onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.4 TSOs
           (formerly referred to as screeners) must inspect individuals for
           prohibited items at designated screening locations.5 The four
           passenger screening functions are (1) X-ray screening of property,
           (2) walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, (3)
           hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and (4) physical
           search of property and trace detection for explosives.

           Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized
           security screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter,
           detect, and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive,
           incendiary, or weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage
           screening is accomplished through the use of explosive detection
           systems6 (EDS) or explosive trace detection (ETD) systems,7 and
           through the use of other means, such as manual searches, canine
           teams, and positive passenger bag match,8 when EDS and ETD systems
           are unavailable.

           The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS
           appropriations act allocates about $3.6 billion to TSA for
           passenger and checked baggage screening operations, of which about
           $2.4 billion is for the TSO workforce and the remaining amount is
           for private sector TSOs,9 equipment purchase, installation and
           maintenance, and support functions associated with the TSO
           workforce, such as training and other human resource functions.10
           The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request includes about
           $3.5 billion for passenger and checked baggage screening, of which
           about $2.5 billion would support the TSO workforce.

           TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen its management
           and deployment of the TSO workforce, but it continues to face
           challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and checked baggage
           TSOs. To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient
           number of passenger and checked baggage TSOs trained and certified
           in the latest screening procedures and technology. We reported in
           February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had
           hindered the ability of some FSDs to provide sufficient resources
           to staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at
           their checkpoints without using additional measures such as
           overtime.11 TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts
           created imbalances in the screener workforce and has since been
           taking steps to address these imbalances over the past 2 years.

           The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
           required TSA to develop and submit to Congress standards for
           determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at
           which screening is required.12 The act also directed GAO to review
           these standards, which we are doing. These staffing standards are
           to provide for necessary levels of airport security, while also
           ensuring that security-related delays experienced by airline
           passengers are minimized. In June 2005, TSA submitted its report
           on aviation security staffing standards to Congress. Known as the
           Screening Allocation Model (SAM), these standards are intended to
           provide an objective measure for determining TSO airport staffing
           levels, while staying within the congressionally mandated limit of
           45,000 full-time equivalents (FTE) screeners. 13

           Whereas TSA's prior staffing model was demand-driven based on
           flight and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand
           data but also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through
           the airport and the availability of the workforce. In determining
           the appropriate TSO staffing levels, the SAM first considers the
           workload demands unique to each individual airport-including
           flight schedules, load factors and connecting flights, and number
           of passenger bags. These demand inputs are then processed against
           certain assumptions about the processing of passengers and
           baggage-including expected passenger and baggage processing rates,
           required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment, and
           equipment alarm rates. Using these and various other data, the SAM
           determines the daily workforce requirements and calculates a work
           schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a recommended
           mix of full-time and part-time staff and a total number of TSO FTE
           needed to staff the airport, consistent with a goal of 10 minutes
           maximum wait time for processing passengers and baggage.

           For fiscal year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of
           42,170 TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay
           within a 43,000 TSO FTE budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006, TSA
           officials reduced the number of FTEs allocated to airports to
           42,056, which allowed it to fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the National
           Screener Force-a force composed of TSOs who provide screening
           support to all airports------and to maintain a contingency of 329
           TSO FTEs in reserve to meet unanticipated demands, such as a new
           air carrier coming on line at an airport.14 As of January 2006,
           there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and 5,782 part-time TSOs on board
           nationwide, representing an annualized rate of 41,085 TSO FTEs.
           According to TSA headquarters officials, the SAM can be adjusted
           to account for the uniqueness of particular airport security
           checkpoints and airline traffic patterns. Further, it is up to the
           FSDs to ensure that all of the data elements and assumptions are
           accurate for their airports, and to bring to TSA's attention any
           factors that should be reviewed to determine if changes to the SAM
           are appropriate. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests
           a total of 45,121 FTEs for TSO personnel compensation and
           benefits.

           As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified
           several preliminary concerns about TSA's efforts to address its
           staffing imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport
           passenger and checked baggage screening checkpoints, which we are
           continuing to assess. At the five airports we visited, FSD staff
           raised concerns about the SAM assumptions as they related to their
           particular airports.15 Among other things, they noted that the
           recommendation for 20 percent part-time TSO workforce-measured in
           terms of FTEs-often could not be reached, the expected processing
           rates for passenger and baggage screening were not being realized,
           non-passenger screening at large airports was higher than assumed,
           and the number of TSO FTEs needed per checkpoint lane and per
           baggage screening machine was not sufficient for peak periods.
           Regarding the SAM assumption of a 20 percent part-time TSO FTE
           level across all airports, FSD staff we visited stated that the 20
           percent goal has been difficult to achieve because of, among other
           things, economic conditions leading to competition for part-time
           workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass
           transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002,
           and part-time workers' desire to convert to full-time status.
           According to TSA headquarters officials, while the nationwide
           annual TSO attrition rate is about 23 percent (compared to a rate
           of 14 percent reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent
           for part-time TSOs. TSA has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs
           since it began actively recruiting them in the summer of 2003. In
           February 2004, we reported that FSDs at several of the airports we
           visited stated that they experienced difficulty in attracting
           needed part-time screeners, which they believed to be due to many
           of the same factors, such as low pay and benefits, undesirable
           hours, the location of their airport, the lack of accessible and
           affordable parking or public transportation, and the high cost of
           living in the areas surrounding some airports.16 These FSDs stated
           that very few full-time screeners were interested in converting to
           part-time status-a condition that still exists-and TSA officials
           stated that attrition rates for part-time screeners were
           considerably higher than those for full-time screeners.

           At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing
           review of the SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been
           able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels. In February
           2004, we reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed
           concern that TSA's hiring process was not responsive to their
           needs and hindered their ability to reach their authorized
           staffing levels and adequately staff screening checkpoints.
           Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with the lack of a continuous
           hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and
           their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis.
           We reported that TSA was taking steps to make the hiring process
           more responsive to FSDs' needs. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs
           with more input into the hiring process in an effort to streamline
           the process and enable FSDs to more quickly meet their staffing
           needs.

           During our five airport visits, some FSD staff also cited another
           limitation of the SAM-specifically, that the model does not
           account for screeners who are performing administrative or other
           duties. The officials also noted that, because they are not
           authorized to hire a sufficient number of mission support staff,
           TSOs are being routinely used-in some cases full time-to carry out
           non-screening and administrative duties, including supporting
           payroll, scheduling, uniform supplies, legal support, logistics,
           and operations center activities. At the five airports we visited
           in January and February 2006, out of a total of 2,572 TSO FTEs
           on-board at those airports, roughly 136 FTEs (just over five
           percent) were being used for administrative duties. FSD staff
           stated that some of these TSOs are being used on a part-time
           basis, while others are used on a full-time basis. The use of TSOs
           in these support functions could adversely affect the ability of
           FSDs to adequately staff their screening checkpoints.

           To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational
           flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October
           2003, TSA established a National Transportation Security Officer
           (TSO) Force (formerly known as the Mobile Screening Force
           established in November 2002) to provide screening support to all
           airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other
           special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners
           than regularly available to FSDs. In February 2004, we reported
           that the National Screening Force consisted of over 700 full-time
           passenger and baggage TSOs. TSA officials stated that while these
           screeners have a home airport to which they are assigned, they
           travel to airports in need of screening staff approximately 70
           percent of the year.

           TSA budgeted for 615 FTEs for the National Screening Force in
           fiscal year 2006. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request
           includes $35 million for operational expenses of the force (not
           including salaries and benefits of force members). According to
           the budget request, in fiscal year 2007, the National Screening
           Force will generally be deployed only to those airports
           experiencing significant staffing shortfalls associated with
           increased seasonal traffic or when a special event, such as a
           Super Bowl or a large national conference, occurs requiring an
           immediate influx of additional TSO support. At one category X
           airport we recently visited, the FSD stated that because of
           challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he
           currently had 59 members of the National Screening Force deployed
           to his airport, and had been relying on this force since 2004. The
           President's fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA will
           continue to review methods for reducing costs associated with this
           force, including ensuring that each airport has a sufficient
           staffing program in place to address short-term needs.

           In February 2006 in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget
           request, TSA identified a number of initiatives it has under way
           to address the management of the TSO workforce, including

           o  requesting $10 million to support TSO retention programs,
           including utilizing workforce retention flexibilities to
           potentially include pay for performance, performance bonuses,
           retention allowances, college credit reimbursement, and flexible
           staffing; and

           o  establishing retention incentives for part-time screeners.

           We will continue to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing
           work on TSA's aviation security staffing standards.

           Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003,17 TSA has
           taken a number of actions designed to strengthen training
           available to the TSO workforce as part of its efforts to enhance
           the performance of TSOs. Additionally, TSA's Office of Inspections
           (OI, formerly the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review)
           makes recommendations to TSA leadership in its reports on covert
           (undercover, unannounced) testing results. These recommendations
           address deficiencies identified during testing and are intended to
           improve screening effectiveness. As of December 2005, OI had
           issued 29 reports to management on the results of its checkpoint
           and checked baggage covert testing. In total, the reports include
           19 distinct recommendations related to passenger and checked
           baggage screening.18 Of these 19 recommendations, 11 relate to
           screener training.

           In September 2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or
           deployed a recurrent training program for passenger TSOs. At that
           time, little training was available to TSOs once they completed
           their basic TSO training. Since then, TSA has expanded training
           available to the TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online
           Learning Center that makes self-guided courses available over
           TSA's intranet and the Internet and expanding training available
           to supervisory TSOs. TSA also established a recurrent training
           requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a quarter, and
           provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate and enhance TSO
           training, including at least one modular bomb set kit-containing
           components of an improvised explosive device (IED)-and at least
           one weapons training kit. TSA has also instituted a program called
           "Threat in the Spotlight" that, based on intelligence TSA
           receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat information
           regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past screening
           checkpoints. Additionally, in December 2005, TSA reported
           completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000
           TSOs. This training included both classroom and hands-on
           experiences, and focused particularly on identifying X-ray images
           of IED component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. TSA
           plans for the remaining TSO workforce to receive this training by
           June 2006 through the Online Learning Center or other delivery
           methods. TSA also has developed new training curricula to support
           new screening approaches. For example, TSA recently developed a
           training curriculum for TSOs in behavior observation and analysis
           at the checkpoint to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors
           indicative of stress, fear, or deception.

           However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and
           a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the
           Online Learning Center have made it difficult for all TSOs at many
           airports to receive required training and has limited TSO access
           to TSA training tools.19 As previously discussed, TSA is taking
           steps to address the TSO staffing challenges. However, it is too
           soon to determine whether TSA's efforts will address TSA's ability
           to provide required training while maintaining adequate coverage
           for screening operations. In terms of access to the Online
           Learning Center, TSA plans to complete the deployment of
           high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to airports during
           fiscal year 2007. TSA established its Online Learning Center to
           provide passenger and baggage screeners with online, high-speed
           access to training courses. However, effective use of the Online
           Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access,
           which TSA had not been able to provide to all airports. In May
           2005, we reported that as of October 2004, about 45 percent of the
           TSO workforce did not have high speed Internet/intranet access to
           the Online Learning Center. The President's fiscal year 2007
           budget request reports that approximately 220 of the more than 400
           airport and field locations have full Information Technology (IT)
           infrastructure installation, to include high-speed network
           connectivity, while the rest of the airports operate with dial-up
           access to TSA systems. According to the budget request, TSA will
           use $120 million in fiscal year 2006 to deploy high-speed
           connectivity to all category X and I airports and preliminary
           high-speed connectivity to all category II, III, and IV airports.
           The budget request includes a request for a total of $90 million
           to support this effort in fiscal year 2007, of which $54 million
           is needed to complete the deployment of high-speed connectivity at
           category II, III, and IV airports.20

           Our preliminary analysis of TSA data indicates that since April
           2005, TSA has considered 70 proposed changes to passenger
           checkpoint screening procedures.21 Most of these proposed changes
           were generated by TSA airport officials and TSA's Security
           Operations division, which is responsible for developing and
           overseeing the implementation of checkpoint screening procedures.
           TSA headquarters also formally solicited input from TSA airport
           staff by initiating a field review of standard operating
           procedures (SOP), which involved representatives from airports
           across the nation. This review resulted in 120 suggested revisions
           to the passenger checkpoint screening procedures. To a lesser
           extent, changes to checkpoint screening procedures are recommended
           by TSA senior leadership, such as the Assistant Administrator of
           Security Operations or the Assistant Secretary. Congress has also
           proposed and subsequently mandated changes to checkpoint screening
           procedures, such as adding lighters to the list of items
           prohibited on aircraft. According to a senior TSA official, recent
           suggestions for procedural changes, such as removing small
           scissors from the prohibited items list to allow TSOs to focus on
           higher risk items, were generated by a TSA task force focused on
           improving the agency's ability to detect explosives at the
           screening checkpoint.

           Based on our preliminary analysis, the majority of proposed SOP
           changes considered by TSA in April 2005, August 2005, September
           2005, and December 2005 were not specifically designed to enhance
           the security of the screening process.22 Of the 70 proposed
           checkpoint screening SOP changes considered by TSA, 23 were
           intended to improve the efficiency of the screening process (e.g.
           passenger flow) such as modifying the HazMat reporting
           requirements to exclude torch lighters and pepper spray in
           quantities less than 4 ounces. Seven of the 70 proposed changes
           considered by TSA during this period were intended to specify or
           clarify procedures for passengers requiring special consideration,
           such as law enforcement officers. Ten of the proposed changes were
           specifically intended to improve TSA's ability to detect
           prohibited items. Sixteen proposed changes were intended to
           enhance customer service or clarify the wording of the SOP.
           Fourteen of the 70 proposed changes were not included in these
           categories.23

           According to TSA, security-related proposed changes to checkpoint
           screening procedures are based on risk-based factors, including
           previous terrorist incidents, threat information, vulnerabilities
           of the screening system, as well as operational experience and
           stakeholder concerns. For example, according to TSA officials, the
           initial change to the pat-down procedure in September 2004 was
           based on the attacks carried out on two Russian aircraft.
           According to TSA, the pat-down procedure was further revised in
           response to passenger concerns that the procedure was too
           invasive. TSA officials stated that the pat-down procedure was
           changed a third time based on additional threat information. TSA
           also informed us that reported threat information led them to
           further amend the pat-down procedure in December 2005.

           Recommended changes to passenger checkpoint screening procedures
           are also generated based on the results of covert testing
           conducting by TSA's Office of Inspections and the DHS Office of
           Inspector General (OIG). Covert tests are designed to assess
           vulnerabilities in the checkpoint screening system to specific
           threats, such as vulnerability to the various methods by which
           terrorists may try to conceal hand guns, knives, or IEDs. OI and
           the DHS OIG identified vulnerabilities in the checkpoint screening
           system, which existed, in part, due to deficiencies in screening
           procedures. To address these vulnerabilities, since March 2005, OI
           and the DHS OIG recommended four changes to the passenger
           checkpoint screening procedures.24 TSA has also made procedure
           changes in response to operational experience and stakeholder
           concerns. For example, TSA changed the SOP to specify the
           "individual tester" instead of "supervisor" to alleviate field
           confusion that supervisors were the only ones allowed to perform a
           particular task. Also, based on field input, TSA is changing the
           SOP to allow TSOs to instruct passengers with long hair to hold
           their hair during the explosives trace portal (ETP) screening
           process. TSA also made changes due to stakeholder concern, such as
           modifications to the pat-down procedure. After passengers
           expressed discomfort with the invasive nature of the procedure,
           TSA modified it to be less invasive while maintaining its security
           effectiveness.

           As previously mentioned, TSA airport staff and headquarters
           officials suggest changes to checkpoint screening procedures to
           generally improve the efficiency, effectiveness and clarity of
           screening procedures. These proposed procedural changes are
           periodically gathered and vetted through various TSA offices, and
           ultimately the Assistant Administrator of Security Operations, for
           approval. The offices involved in the review process for SOP
           changes include Security Operations, Office of Chief Counsel, and
           the Office of Training. As required, proposed procedural changes
           are also evaluated by other offices including the Office of
           Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Civil Rights, and Office of
           Passengers with Disabilities. Representatives of these component
           divisions meet informally or formally to discuss proposed changes
           and determine whether the changes should be incorporated into the
           checkpoint screening SOP.

           In addition, TSA officials informed us that the agency evaluates
           all significant proposed changes in an operational environment
           prior to determining whether such changes should be implemented
           nationwide. Specifically, under the current Assistant Secretary,
           TSA pilot tests changes that require substantial training or that
           may generate concerns from the traveling public. The significant
           changes implemented in December 2005 include revisions to the
           pat-down procedure, the procedure for searching carry-on luggage,
           the process for screening selectee passengers,25 and the list of
           items prohibited on aircraft. The major changes also include a new
           procedure for screening passengers for IEDs. While TSA evaluated
           these procedures in an operational environment, our preliminary
           analysis suggests that the evaluations primarily focused on the
           operational feasibility of the procedures, and less on how these
           procedures would reduce vulnerability to a terrorist attack. TSA
           assesses the vulnerability of the existing checkpoint screening
           system by conducting covert tests in which persons attempt to
           carry prohibited items through the checkpoint without the items
           being detected. However, TSA officials questioned whether covert
           testing could be used to assess statistically whether new
           procedures would decrease the vulnerability of the screening
           system. For example, TSA officials stated that since some
           procedures are only piloted in the operational environment for a
           few days, TSA could not run enough covert tests for the results to
           allow for comprehensive analysis of reduced vulnerability. TSA
           officials also stated that because the agency implements a layered
           approach to passenger screening, it would be difficult to
           determine the extent to which any one layer reduces vulnerability
           of the checkpoint screening system.

           During the course of our review, we met with five aviation
           security experts, four of which identified covert testing as the
           best way to assess the security effectiveness of new and existing
           procedures. However, they also acknowledged the difficulty of
           using covert testing to assess the extent to which specific
           procedures would reduce vulnerabilities, especially considering
           that the effectiveness of a procedure also relies on the
           capability of TSOs and screening equipment.

           TSA also recently piloted additional procedures that would
           incorporate unpredictability into the screening system and that
           would allow TSOs to determine the level of screening passengers
           should receive based on suspicious behavior. While TSA has not yet
           determined whether to incorporate these new procedures into the
           SOP, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA did not have a
           formal evaluation plan in place when piloting these procedures.
           Regarding screening passengers based on suspicious behavior, TSA
           officials stated that this method has been successful for law
           enforcement officials, including those operating in airports, as
           well as aviation officials in other countries such as Israel. FSD
           staff at three airports that participated in the piloting of these
           procedures identified factors TSA headquarters should consider
           prior to implementing these procedures, one of which is the lack
           of TSOs to conduct these procedures. FSD staff at one airport said
           that they had to close a screening lane in order to have a
           sufficient number of TSOs to implement the piloted procedure. FSD
           staff at all three airports also reported that some TSOs had to
           work overtime so that other TSOs could be trained to implement
           these procedures. TSA headquarters staff stated that the
           prohibited items list and changes to other programs would offset
           the additional TSO resources needed to implement these procedures.
           However, FSD staff with whom we spoke at 2 of the airports that
           piloted these procedures stated that the changes made did not free
           up screening resources as was planned.

           DHS's and TSA's research and development efforts for passenger and
           checked baggage screening are part of a broader DHS program
           focused on researching and developing technologies to detect,
           prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats. History has shown that
           terrorists will adapt their tactics and techniques in an attempt
           to bypass increased security procedures, and are capable of
           developing increasingly sophisticated measures in an attempt to
           avoid detection. This ever changing threat necessitates the need
           for continued R&D of new technologies and the fielding of these
           technologies to strengthen aviation security.

           In March 2005, the DHS OIG reported that significant improvement
           in screener performance may not be possible without greater use of
           new technology. The DHS OIG encouraged TSA to expedite its testing
           programs and give priority to technologies that will enable the
           screening workforce to better detect both weapons and explosives.
           In addition, the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request
           states that checkpoints do not currently have the ability to
           accurately and quickly detect explosives on all passengers, and
           only a minimal number of airline passengers are directed to a
           selectee lane for further inspection in which they are manually
           searched for explosives. The request further states that "many
           travelers are allowed to pass through the checkpoints without
           complete testing and detection," and recognizes the importance of
           filling this detection gap. TSA officials stated that the agency
           is addressing this issue through a variety of security measures.
           TSA has recently put increased focus on the threats posed by IEDs
           and is investing in technology for this purpose. For example,
           about 60 explosives trace portal machines have been installed at
           over 20 airports. This new technology uses puffs of air to help
           detect the presence of explosives on individuals. DHS's fiscal
           year 2007 budget request states that TSA expects that about 434
           explosive trace portal machines will be in operation throughout
           the country by September 2007. TSA is also developing backscatter
           technology, in which backscatter signals interact with explosives,
           plastics and metals, giving them shape and form and making them
           easy to visually interpret. However, limited progress has been
           made in fielding this technology at airport passenger screening
           checkpoints. We will soon begin a review of DHS's and TSA's
           progress in planning for, managing, and deploying their R&D
           programs in support of passenger checkpoint screening operations.

           To enhance checked baggage screening, TSA is developing and
           testing next-generation EDS machines. Most of the currently
           deployed EDS technology was developed prior to the passage of ATSA
           and was based on criteria set forth by Congress in the Aviation
           Security Improvement Act of 1990. According to TSA, since the
           large-scale deployment of EDS machines in 2002 and 2003,
           manufacturers have only marginally improved false alarm rates and
           throughput capabilities of the equipment. The maximum number of
           bags an EDS machine can screen per hour is 500, which can be
           achieved only when the machines are integrated in-line with the
           baggage conveyor system. New EDS equipment was certified in 2005,
           including a smaller EDS machine designed to replace ETD machines
           used for primary screening and an upgraded large EDS machine. In
           September 2005, TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to
           purchase 72 smaller EDS machines to be installed at 24 airports.
           The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for TSA includes
           funding to support research and development for EDS machines that
           can operate at up to 900 bags per hour and employ new threat
           detection concepts. In its February 2006 strategic framework for
           checked baggage screening, TSA identified development of
           high-throughput EDS machines and lowering of false alarm rates as
           key arenas for improving investment management of next-generation
           technologies.

           We reported in September 2004 that DHS and TSA have made some
           progress in managing transportation security R&D programs
           according to applicable laws and R&D best practices. However, we
           found that their efforts were incomplete in several areas,
           including preparing strategic plans for R&D efforts that contain
           measurable objectives, preparing and using risk assessments to
           select and prioritize R&D projects, and coordinating with
           stakeholders-a condition that increases the risk that their R&D
           resources will not be effectively leveraged. We also found that
           TSA and DHS delayed several key R&D projects and lacked both
           estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D
           projects and adequate databases to effectively manage their R&D
           portfolios. We recommended that DHS and TSA (1) conduct some basic
           research in the transportation security area; (2) complete their
           strategic planning and risk assessment efforts; (3) develop a
           management information system that will provide accurate,
           complete, current, and readily accessible project information for
           monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios; and (4) develop a
           process with the Department of Transportation to coordinate
           transportation security R&D efforts and share this information
           with transportation stakeholders. DHS and TSA agreed that the
           recommendations were key to a successful R&D program. We will
           examine DHS's and TSA's efforts to implement these recommendations
           as part our upcoming review of TSA's checkpoint R&D program.

           TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD
           systems at the nation's airports-mainly as part of interim lobby
           screening solutions-to provide the capability to screen all
           checked baggage for explosives, as mandated by Congress. Although
           TSA made progress in fielding EDS and ETD equipment at the
           nation's airports, TSA placed this equipment in a stand-alone
           mode-usually in airport lobbies-to conduct the primary screening
           of checked baggage for explosives, rather than integrating EDS
           machines in-line with airports' baggage conveyor systems. TSA
           officials stated that they employed these interim solutions
           because of the significant costs required to install in-line
           systems and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage
           conveyor systems to accommodate the equipment. These interim
           screening solutions led to operational inefficiencies, including
           requiring a greater number of screeners and screening fewer bags
           for explosives each hour, as compared with using EDS machines
           in-line with baggage conveyor systems. Performing primary
           screening using ETD machines, as is the case for more than 300
           airports, is more labor intensive and less efficient than
           screening using the EDS process. TSA's placement of stand-alone
           EDS and ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in passenger
           crowding, which presented unsafe conditions and may have added
           security risks for passengers and airport workers. In May 2004,
           TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis on nine
           airports with agreements to install in-line screening systems and
           found that significant savings and other benefits, including
           reduced screener staffing requirements and increased baggage
           throughput, may be achieved through the installation of in-line
           systems. TSA estimated that in-line baggage screening systems at
           these nine airports would save the federal government about $1
           billion over 7 years,26 compared with stand-alone EDS systems, and
           that initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1
           year.27 TSA's analysis also showed that a cost savings may not be
           achieved for all airports. According to TSA's data, federal cost
           savings varied from about $50 million to over $250 million at
           eight of the nine airports, while at one airport, there was an
           estimated $90 million loss.28

           With the objective of initially fielding this equipment largely
           accomplished, TSA is shifting its focus from equipping airports
           with interim screening solutions to systematically planning for
           the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems,
           although identifying the resources to fund the systems on a
           large-scale basis continues to be a challenge. To assist TSA in
           planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening
           systems, we recommended in our March 2005 report that TSA
           systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports,
           including the costs and benefits of installing in-line baggage
           screening systems-explosive detection systems integrated in-line
           with airport baggage conveyor systems-at airports that do not yet
           have in-line systems installed. We suggested that part of such
           planning should include analyzing which airports should receive
           federal support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems based on
           cost savings that could be achieved from more effective and
           efficient baggage screening operations and on other factors,
           including enhanced security. Also, for airports where in-line
           systems may not be economically justified because of high
           investment costs, we suggested that a cost-effectiveness analysis
           be used to determine the benefits of additional stand-alone EDS
           machines to screen checked baggage in place of the more
           labor-intensive ETD machines. We also recommended that TSA
           consider the costs and benefits of the new technologies being
           developed through its research and development efforts, which
           could provide smaller EDS machines that have the potential to
           reduce the costs associated with installing in-line EDS baggage
           screening systems or to replace ETD machines currently used as the
           primary method for screening at over 300 airports nationwide. DHS
           agreed with our recommendations and stated that TSA had initiated
           an analysis of deploying in-line EDS machines and was in the
           process of formulating criteria to identify those airports that
           would benefit from an in-line EDS system. DHS also stated that TSA
           had begun conducting an analysis of the airports that rely heavily
           on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening
           technology to identify those airports that would benefit from
           augmenting ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment.

           On February 8, 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress outlining a
           framework for a strategic plan for its TSA Checked Baggage
           Screening Program. TSA plans to finalize the plan, including
           funding and cost-sharing strategies for in-line baggage screening
           systems, in Spring 2006. The framework introduces a strategy
           intended to increase security through deploying EDS to as many
           airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for the program,
           minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and
           provide a flexible security infrastructure for accommodating
           growing airline traffic and potential new threats. The framework
           addresses the following issues:

           o  Optimized checked baggage screening solutions-finding the ideal
           mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening
           solutions.
           o  Funding prioritization schedule by airport-which airports
           should receive funding for an in-line baggage screening system
           based on quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other
           factors.
           o  Deployment strategy-a plan for the acquisition of
           next-generation EDS systems, the redeployment of existing EDS
           assets, and investment in life-cycle extension programs.
           o  EDS Life-Cycle Management Plan-structured guidelines for EDS
           R&D investment, procurement specifications for next-generation EDS
           systems, and the redeployment of existing EDS assets and
           investment in life-cycle extension programs that minimize the cost
           of ownership of the EDS systems.
           o  Stakeholder collaboration plan-TSA plans to work closely with
           airport operators and other key stakeholders to develop
           airport-specific screening solutions, refine the nationwide EDS
           deployment strategy, and investigate alternative funding programs
           that may allow for innovative as well as non-federal sources of
           funding or financing, including formulas for sharing costs between
           different government entities and the private sector.

           This strategic framework is a positive step forward in
           systematically planning for TSA's checked baggage screening
           program. The completion of a strategic plan for this program
           should help TSA ensure that it is efficiently allocating its
           limited resources to maximize the effectiveness of its checked
           baggage screening operations. However, it will be important for
           TSA to complete their analysis and plans for the funding of
           in-line EDS systems, which has been the primary obstacle to the
           deployment of these systems over the past few years.

           TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the
           various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening
           systems-people, processes, and technology-but results of covert
           testing identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to
           exist. In November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to
           strengthen its efforts to measure the performance of its aviation
           security system.29 At that time, TSA had collected limited data on
           the effectiveness of its aviation security programs and
           initiatives. Specifically, limited covert testing had been
           performed, the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system30 was not
           fully operational at passenger screening checkpoints and was not
           available for checked baggage screening systems, and TSA had not
           fully implemented a congressionally mandated annual screener
           proficiency review (referred to as the recertification program).
           Since then, TSA has implemented and strengthened efforts to
           collect performance data in these areas.

           In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the
           amount of passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it
           performs and recently changed its approach to covert testing to
           focus its resources on catastrophic threats-threats that can take
           down an airplane or blow up an airplane. These tests, in which
           undercover OI inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through
           passenger screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are
           designed to measure vulnerabilities in passenger and checked
           baggage screening systems and to identify systematic problems
           affecting performance of TSOs in the areas of people (training),
           processes (procedures), and technology. OI began conducting covert
           testing in September 2002, conducting test scenarios for the
           passenger checkpoint and for checked baggage. These scenarios were
           carried over from tests developed and conducted under FAA, but OI
           reported using more updated weapons than those used by FAA and
           more robust tests. TSA considers its covert testing as a snapshot
           of a TSO's ability to detect threat objects at a particular point
           in time, as one of several indicators of systemwide screener
           performance, and as an important mechanism for identifying areas
           in passenger and checked baggage screening needing improvement.

           In September 2003, we reported that OI had conducted limited
           covert testing, but planned to double the amount of tests it
           conducted during fiscal year 2004, based on an anticipated
           increase in its staff from about 100 full-time equivalents to
           about 200 full-time equivalents.31 TSA officials stated that based
           on budget constraints, OI's fiscal year 2004 staffing
           authorization was limited to 183 full-time-equivalents.32 Despite
           a smaller than expected staff increase, by the end of the second
           quarter of fiscal year 2004, OI had already surpassed the number
           of tests it had performed during fiscal year 2003-conducting a
           total of 836 tests in fiscal year 2003 and 1,233 in the first two
           quarters of fiscal year 2004.33

           Our analysis of TSA's covert testing results for tests conducted
           between September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall,
           weaknesses existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat
           objects on passengers, in their carry-on bags, and in checked
           baggage. Covert testing results in this analysis cannot be
           generalized either to the airports where the tests were conducted
           or to airports nationwide.34

           During the first 3 years of covert testing, OI decided to maintain
           the same test scenarios and same level of difficulty so that test
           results would be comparable over time.35 In July 2005, OI began
           revamping its covert testing program based on the results of the
           Secretary of DHS's Second Stage Review-a review of the
           department's programs, policies, operations, and structure.36
           Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA, instructed OI
           to implement a more risk-based approach and focus its resources on
           catastrophic threats-threats that can take down an airplane or
           blow up an airplane. In August 2005, the Assistant Secretary of
           DHS, TSA, further instructed OI to discontinue its former covert
           testing program and implement the revamped covert testing program.
           OI began implementation of its revamped testing in September 2005.
           OI conducted 117 tests over a 1-week period at one airport
           focusing on catastrophic threats and incorporated additional
           testing elements that had not previously been included. According
           to OI officials, this testing involved over 50 personnel from
           various TSA components. Since then, OI has conducted tests at
           three additional airports.37 OI officials stated that TSA
           leadership is considering these initial tests in making final
           determinations regarding the revised testing program that OI will
           implement, and that final decisions regarding the structure,
           content, and frequency of these tests have not yet been made.

           In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct
           their own covert testing of local airport passenger screening
           activities-a practice that TSA had previously prohibited.38
           Between May 2004 and April 2005, FSDs conducted a total of 17,954
           local covert tests at 350 airports; as of February 2006, TSA
           reported that FSDs had conducted a total of 48,826 local covert
           tests. In February 2005, TSA released a general procedures
           document for local covert testing at checked baggage screening
           locations. Between March 2005 and September 2005, 1,370 local
           tests of EDS screening were conducted at 71 airports. TSA
           headquarters officials stated that a key challenge FSDs face in
           conducting local testing is the lack of available federal staff to
           conduct the testing, particularly at smaller airports. In May
           2005, we reported that TSA officials stated that they had not yet
           begun to use data from local covert testing to identify training
           and performance needs because of difficulties in ensuring that
           local covert testing is implemented consistently nationwide.39 TSA
           officials stated in March 2006 that data is available for use by
           FSDs to identify training needs and TSO performance.

           Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security
           effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening
           procedures and technologies in the operating environment in
           addition to other TSA measures that assess the performance of
           passenger and checked baggage TSOs. One other source of
           information on TSO performance in detecting threat objects is the
           results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test passenger
           screeners' detection capabilities by projecting threat images,
           including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as
           they are screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible
           for identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be
           searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether
           the threat is real and then records the TSO's performance in a
           database that could be analyzed for performance trends.40 TIP
           threat detection results in conjunction with OI covert test
           results and local testing are intended to assist TSA in
           identifying specific training and performance improvement efforts.

           In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP
           as planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but 1
           of the more than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide. In December
           2005, TSA reported that it has further expanded the image library
           to include additional images of IEDs and IED components as part of
           its effort to improve TSOs' detection of explosives. Additionally,
           the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA
           plans to maximize the training benefits of the TIP system by
           tailoring TIP sessions to address individual TSO weaknesses
           revealed in user performance data. For example, if a TSO has
           particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the TIP would trigger the
           projection of a higher proportion of simulated IEDs while that TSO
           was operating the machine than under standard circumstances. While
           there have been improvements in TIP for passenger screening, TIP
           is not yet available for checked baggage screening. In April 2004,
           we reported that TSA officials stated that they were working to
           resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for checked
           baggage screening on EDS machines and have started EDS TIP image
           development.41 However, in December 2004, TSA officials stated
           that because of severe budget reductions, TSA will be unable to
           begin implementing a TIP program for checked baggage in fiscal
           year 2005. Officials did not specify when such a program might
           begin.

           Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual
           recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an
           annual proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet
           all qualifications and standards required to perform the screening
           function. To meet this requirement, TSA established a
           recertification program. The first recertification program-which
           was conducted during the period October 2003 through March
           2004-was composed of two assessment components, one of TSOs'
           performance and the other of TSOs' knowledge and skills. During
           the performance assessment component of the recertification
           program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and individual
           goals, such as maintaining the nation's air security, vigilantly
           carrying out duties with utmost attention to tasks that will
           prevent security threats, and demonstrating the highest levels of
           courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of satisfaction
           with screening services. The knowledge and skills assessment
           component consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard
           operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical
           demonstration of skills.

           Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification
           testing for the first 2 years the program was in place, with about
           1 percent of TSOs subject to recertification failing to complete
           this requirement. In both years, TSOs faced the greatest
           difficulty on their first attempt to pass the practical
           demonstration of skills module-a hands-on simulated work sample
           used to evaluate a screener's knowledge, skill, and ability when
           performing specific screener tasks along with the ability to
           provide customer service.42 According to TSA officials, at the
           completion of recertification at an airport, TSA management has
           access to reports at both the individual TSO and airport level,
           which identify the specific areas that were missed during testing.
           National level reports are also available that isolate areas that
           need improvement and can be targeted in basic and recurrent
           training. In fiscal year 2004, TSA established a performance
           measure for the recertification program.43

           During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function
           TSOs who were actively working as both passenger and checked
           baggage TSOs were required to take only the recertification test
           for passenger TSOs. They were therefore not required to take the
           recertification testing modules required for checked baggage, even
           though they worked in that capacity.44 TSA's second annual
           recertification testing, which began in October 2004, included
           components for dual-function TSOs, but did not include an image
           recognition module for checked baggage TSOs-which would include
           dual-function screeners performing checked baggage screening. TSA
           officials stated that a decision was made to not include an image
           recognition module for checked baggage TSOs during this cycle
           because not all checked baggage TSOs would have completed training
           on the onscreen resolution protocol by the time recertification
           testing was conducted at their airports.45 In October 2005, TSA
           released guidance for screener recertification that included an
           image recognition module for checked baggage and dual-function
           screeners trained in the onscreen alarm resolution protocol.

           In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of
           TSOs, TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure
           the effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening
           systems. These indexes measure overall performance through a
           composite of indicators and are derived by combining specific
           performance measures relating to passenger and checked baggage
           screening, respectively. Specifically, these indexes measure the
           effectiveness of the screening systems through machine probability
           of detection and covert testing results;46 efficiency through a
           calculation of dollars spent per passenger or bag screened; and
           customer satisfaction through a national poll, customer surveys,
           and customer complaints at both airports and TSA's national call
           center. We reported in May 2005 that the screening performance
           indexes developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but
           without targets for each component of the index, TSA will have
           difficulty performing meaningful analyses of the parts that make
           up to the index. For example, without performance targets for
           covert testing, TSA will not have identified a desired level of
           performance related to screener detection of threat objects.
           Performance targets for covert testing would enable TSA to focus
           its improvement efforts on areas determined to be most critical,
           as 100 percent detection capability may not be attainable. In
           January 2005, TSA officials stated that the agency planned to
           track the performance of individual index components and establish
           performance targets against which to measure these components.

           Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant accomplishments
           in meeting congressional mandates related to establishing
           passenger and checked baggage screening operations. With the
           initial congressional mandates now largely met, TSA has turned its
           attention to assessing and enhancing the efficiency and
           effectiveness of its passenger and checked baggage screening
           systems. As threats and technology evolve, it is vital that TSA
           continue to enhance training and procedures for the TSO workforce.
           Over the past several years, TSA has strengthened its TSO training
           program in an effort to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge and
           skills needed to successfully perform their screening functions.
           However, without addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing
           training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport
           training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a
           screening workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to
           perform at a desired level. TSA is also revising existing
           screening procedures and developing new procedures to enhance
           security effectiveness, many of which are risk-based, as we have
           previously advocated. Additionally, TSA has developed a staffing
           model intended to provide the necessary levels of TSOs to support
           security activities at the nation's airports. However, given the
           challenges TSA faces in determining appropriate staffing levels at
           airports-to include hiring the appropriate mix of part-time TSOs
           needed to support screening functions-it is critical that TSA
           carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys, and
           manages its TSO workforce to help strengthen its passenger and
           checked baggage screening programs.

           As TSA works towards improving the performance of individual TSOs
           and screening operations, it will also be important that the
           agency deploy and leverage screening equipment and technologies,
           sustain its research and development efforts, and strengthen its
           R&D management and planning efforts. We are encouraged that TSA is
           currently undertaking efforts to systematically analyze the cost
           and benefits of in-line baggage screening systems and to identify
           innovative funding and financing options. This planning should
           help TSA support future funding requests by demonstrating enhanced
           security, improved operational efficiencies, and cost savings to
           both TSA and the affected airports.

           Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
           answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee
           may have at this time.

           For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen
           A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or [email protected] . Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this statement.

           In addition to the contact named above, Kristy Brown, Philip
           Caramia, Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Christine Fossett, Tom
           Lombardi, Laina Poon, and Maria Strudwick made key contributions
           to this testimony.

           Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
           Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security
           Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T . Washington,
           D.C.: February 9, 2006.

           Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
           Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203 . Washington, D.C.:
           November 28, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic
           Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 . Washington, D.C.: October 17,
           2005.

           Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the
           Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935 .
           Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
           Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.
           GAO-05-781 . Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
           Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight
           Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken
           Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R . Washington,
           D.C.: July 22, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment
           of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T . Washington,
           D.C.: July 13, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
           Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457 . Washington,
           D.C.: May 2, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under
           Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.
           GAO-05-356 . Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
           Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365 .
           Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using
           Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324 .
           Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

           Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
           Resources. GAO-05-357T . Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.

           Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to
           Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening
           Services. GAO-05-126 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.

           General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
           but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to
           Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144 . Washington, D.C.: November 10,
           2004.

           Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
           of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728 .
           Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.

           Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention
           Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544 .
           Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
           GAO-04-785T . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.

           Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
           Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519
           . Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
           Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T .
           Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
           Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of
           Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T .
           Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
           Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
           Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R . Washington, D.C.: March 5,
           2004.

           Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
           Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385 .
           Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
           Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T .
           Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.

           The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a
           Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development
           Program. GAO-04-341R . Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.

           Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
           Security Programs. GAO-04-285T . Washington, D.C.: November 20,
           2003.

           Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing
           Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional
           Actions Needed. GAO-04-242 . Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.

           Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
           Challenges. GAO-04-232T . Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.

           Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
           Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173 . Washington, D.C.:
           September 24, 2003.

           Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
           Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T . Washington, D.C.: September 9,
           2003.

           Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
           Efforts. GAO-03-1154T . Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.

           Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
           Security Challenges. GAO-03-843 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

           Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides
           Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T .
           Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.

           Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and
           Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T . Washington, D.C.: April 1,
           2003.

           Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to
           Cover Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T .
           Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2003.

           Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
           a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190 . Washington, D.C.: January
           17, 2003.

           Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
           DOT's Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22 . Washington, D.C.: January
           10, 2003.

           Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
           the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344 . Washington, D.C.: December 20,
           2002.

           Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
           Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253 . Washington, D.C.: November 22,
           2002.

           Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects
           Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington,
           D.C.: October 15, 2002.

           Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses
           Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T . Washington, D.C.: October 2,
           2002.

           Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
           Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T . Washington,
           D.C.: July 25, 2002.

           Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
           Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.

           Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for,
           Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T . Washington,
           D.C.: September 25, 2001.

           Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
           Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T . Washington,
           D.C.: September 21, 2001.

           Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's
           Efforts. GAO-01-1158T . Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

           Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to
           Improve Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T .
           Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

           Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
           Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T . Washington, D.C.: September 20,
           2001.

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2TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a
screener conducted by TSA, on any screening function, to assess the
screener's threat item detection ability or adherence to TSA-approved
procedures.

3Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for screening all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems was, in effect, extended
until December 31, 2003.

4Sterile areas are areas located within the terminal where passengers wait
after screening to board departing aircraft. Access to these areas is
generally controlled by TSA screeners at checkpoints where they conduct
physical screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage for weapons
and explosives.

5TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual or
property that has not been screened or inspected in accordance with
passenger screening standard operating procedures. If an individual
refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must not be allowed
into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft.

6Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine objects
inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat
explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode.

7Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials.

8Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening
checked baggage that requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft
as the checked baggage.

9ATSA required that TSA begin allowing all commercial airports to apply to
TSA to transition from a federal to a private TSO workforce. To support
this effort, TSA created the Screening Partnership Program to allow all
commercial airports an opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use
qualified private screening contractors and private sector screeners.
Currently, private screening companies provide passenger and checked
baggage screening at six airports.

TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of Its
TSO Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges

TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but Faces Challenges in
Hiring, Deploying, and Retaining TSOs

10Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-90, 119 Stat. 2064 (2005); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 49-50
(2005).

11GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 12, 2004).

12Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, S: 4023, 118 Stat 3638, 3723-24.

13One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime
hours.

14This budgetary FTE limit is not to be confused with the 45,000 FTE
screener cap imposed by Congress in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act that
limits the total number of FTE screeners available to TSA.

15We interviewed FSD staff at 3 category X airports, 1 category I
airports, and 1 category III airport. TSA classifies the commercial
airports in the United States into one of five security risk categories
(X, I, II, III, IV, and V) based on various factors, such as the total
number of takeoffs and landings annually, and other special security
considerations. In general, category X airports have the largest number of
passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest.

16 GAO-04-440T.

TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training but Faces Challenges in Delivering the
Training

17GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,
2003).

18Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports issued by
OIAPR.

19GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington D.C.: May 2,
2005).

20According to the budget request, the remaining $36 million is needed to
support operations and maintenance costs, including recurring costs for
routers, switches, circuits, cabinets, racks, and network monitoring.

TSA Is Making Changes to Its Passenger Screening Procedures to Enhance
Detection Capabilities Based on Risk and Other Factors, but Could
Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Procedures

Proposed Passenger Checkpoint Screening Procedural Changes Are Generally Based
on Operational Experience and Risk-Based Assessments

21In April 2005, TSA began documenting proposed changes to passenger
checkpoint screening procedures.

22TSA does not review proposed SOP changes on a regular basis. Rather, the
administration accumulates proposed changes and reviews them periodically
on an as-needed basis. Since TSA began documenting proposed changes to
checkpoint screening procedures, the agency has conducted three reviews of
proposed changes, which took place in April 2005, August 2005, and
September 2005.

23TSA attributed nine proposed changes to senior leadership direction, and
TSA did not categorize five proposed changes from 2005.

TSA Could Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Screening Procedural Changes
Based on our Preliminary Observations

24Office of Inspections recommended two additional changes to checkpoint
screening procedures prior to March 2005.

25A selectee is a person identified for additional screening by a
computer-assisted passenger screening system or another process as
determined and approved by TSA.

TSA Is Supporting the Development and Deployment of Technologies to
Strengthen Commercial Aviation Security, but Faces Management and Funding
Challenges

DHS and TSA Are Taking Steps to Develop and Deploy Technologies for Screening
Passengers and Checked Baggage, but Further Planning Is Needed to Focus R&D
Efforts

TSA Is Focusing Its Checked Baggage Strategic Planning Efforts on Deployment of
In-line EDS Systems, but Faces Challenges in Funding These Systems on a
Large-Scale Basis

26This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if
received up front.

27For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94
stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to compute the present
value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real discount rate. Following
Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost savings are $1.14 billion.
In addition, in TSA's analysis, the federal government does not pay for
$319 million, or 25 percent, of project costs. Accounting for these costs
to reflect total costs, as recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall
savings to $820 million.

28The relatively large costs for upfront in-line EDS at one airport are
not offset by the modest amount of estimated operation and maintenance
cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS system may be more costly than
EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another airport the upfront costs of
in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone EDS, and there is a substantial
amount of estimated operation and maintenance cost savings. Therefore, the
in-line EDS system for this latter airport may be less costly than
stand-alone EDS.

TSA Has Strengthened Its Efforts to Measure the Effectiveness of Screening
Systems

29GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges, GAO-04-232T , (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).

30The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs' detection
capabilities by projecting threat images, including images of guns and
explosives, into bags as they are screened. TSOs are responsible for
positively identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be
searched.

31 GAO-03-1173 .

32Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time assignment for
the majority of OI staff. According to OI, 14 full-time-equivalent
positions in headquarters are dedicated fully to the covert testing
program, which includes covert testing of all modes of transportation, not
just airports. These 14 full-time-equivalents are in a special group that
forms the core of team leaders for the covert testing trips.

33OI conducted a total of 2,369 passenger and checked baggage covert tests
in fiscal year 2004.

34Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were not
identified using the principles of probability sampling. In a probability
sample to assess screener detection of threat objects, each screening of a
passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of being selected. A
well-designed probability sample would enable failure rates to be
generalized to all airports. However, for cost and operational reasons,
probability sampling may not be feasible for passenger and checked baggage
screening because it would require a very large sample size and an
exhaustive examination of each sampled passenger or baggage to determine
if there was a threat object to detect.

35In August 2004, OI began piloting various enhanced covert test scenarios
based on more current threat information.

36The review examined elements of the Department of Homeland Security in
order to recommend ways that DHS could better manage risk in terms of
threat, vulnerability, and consequence; prioritize policies and
operational missions according to this risk-based approach; and establish
a series of preventive and protective steps that would increase security
at multiple levels.

37OI conducted testing at two of the three airports twice during September
2005 through December 2005.

38The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004 and August
2004 to provide information on alternative testing methods.

39 GAO-05-457.

40The TIP database records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false alarm rate.
These two results are used to determine the probability of detection and
probability of false alarm, which determine overall TIP performance. The
TIP performance measure is classified as sensitive security information.

41GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-505T (Washington,
D.C.: April 22, 2004).

42We cannot reported on the specific results of the testing due to the
security classification of this testing.

43Information related to the measures is sensitive security information.

44As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce included
approximately 25,947 dual-trained TSOs who were certified to serve as
passenger or baggage TSOs.

45TSA's onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS machine
alarm goes off, indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA screeners,
by reviewing computer-generated images of the inside of the bag, attempt
to determine whether or not a suspect item or items are in fact explosive
materials. If the screener is unable to make this determination, the bag
is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an area where it receives a
secondary screening by a screener with an ETD machine.

46According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are established
by the certification standards for each particular model of machine, and
machines are not deployed unless they have met those standards.

Concluding Observations

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Highlights of GAO-06-371T , a testimony before the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate

April 4, 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but
Challenges Remain

Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task-with hundreds of airports,
thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of
passengers and pieces of checked baggage. It has been over 3 years since
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility
for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony
focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening airline passenger
and checked baggage screening and the challenges that remain.
Particularly, this testimony highlights TSA's efforts to (1) enhance the
performance, management, and deployment of the transportation security
officer (TSO) workforce; (2) strengthen procedures for screening
passengers and checked baggage; and (3) leverage and deploy screening
technologies.

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen aviation security, to include passenger and checked baggage
screening operations. TSA generally agreed with our recommendations and is
taking actions to implement them. GAO also has several ongoing reviews
related to the issues addressed in this testimony, and will issue separate
reports related to these areas at later dates, with additional
recommendations as appropriate.

TSA has taken steps to enhance the TSO workforce's performance,
management, and deployment, yet continues to face challenges in allocating
staff and ensuring that training is available. For example, TSA developed
a Screening Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at
commercial airports. However, some assumptions in the model-such as that
20 percent of the TSO workforce will be part-time-may be flawed, given
that federal security directors (the lead TSA authorities at U.S.
airports) have had difficulty filling this quota and some said they have
not been able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels. In addition,
while TSA has taken steps to improve the training offered to its TSO
workforce, insufficient staffing and a lack of electronic connectivity to
access on-line learning have prevented TSOs from taking full advantage of
training opportunities.

TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance detection
capabilities in part based on risk assessments, as GAO has previously
advocated. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered, vetted, and tested a
variety of new procedures for passenger and baggage screening. Some
passenger screening procedure changes are based on risk-related factors,
including results of covert (undercover, unannounced) tests that are
designed to reveal system vulnerabilities. Our ongoing work on how TSA
makes these changes indicates that TSA could do more evaluation to ensure
the changes achieve the desired results.

TSA has taken steps to develop and deploy technologies to strengthen
commercial aviation security; however, challenges in funding and planning
have created impediments to implementation. For example, TSA has deployed
explosives detection systems-either stand-alone or incorporated in-line
with baggage conveyor systems-to detect explosives in checked baggage. A
TSA cost-benefit analysis of the in-line systems being installed at 9
airports showed that they could yield significant savings for the federal
government. However, their deployment has been hampered by a lack of
planning and funding strategies. TSA is currently assessing financing
options to support the deployment of in-line systems and has begun
prioritizing which airports would benefit from their deployment.
*** End of document. ***