Mine Safety: MSHA's Programs for Ensuring the Safety and Health  
of Coal Miners Could Be Strengthened (23-JAN-06, GAO-06-370T).	 
                                                                 
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and Education, Senate	 
Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to submit a statement for 
the record highlighting findings from our 2003 report on how well
the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration  
(MSHA) oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical 
types of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections	 
and accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and 
health of underground coal miners.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-370T					        
    ACCNO:   A45518						        
  TITLE:     Mine Safety: MSHA's Programs for Ensuring the Safety and 
Health of Coal Miners Could Be Strengthened			 
     DATE:   01/23/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Coal mining					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Mine safety					 
	     Mining accidents					 
	     Occupational health standards			 
	     Occupational safety				 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Monitoring 					 

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GAO-06-370T

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

GAO

       Before the Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and Education, Committee on
                          Appropriations, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST Monday, January 23,
2006

MINE SAFETY

MSHA's Programs for Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal Miners Could Be
                                  Strengthened

Statement for the Record by Robert E. Robertson, Director Education,
Workforce, and Income Security Issues

GAO-06-370T

MINE SAFETY

MSHA's Programs for Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal Miners Could Be
Strengthened

  What GAO Found

As of 2003, to help ensure the safety and health of underground coal
miners, MSHA staff reviewed and approved mine plans, conducted
inspections, and investigated serious accidents. In these three areas,
MSHA had extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, we concluded
that MSHA could improve its oversight, guidance, and
human-capital-planning efforts.

We found that MSHA was not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA
headquarters did not ensure that 6-month inspections of ventilation and
roof support plans were being completed on a timely basis. This failure
could have led to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine
operators not following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA
officials did not always ensure that hazards found during inspections were
corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA used to
monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency
oversight. Specifically, the agency did not collect information on hours
worked by independent contractors staff needed to compute fatality and
nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it was difficult to link
information on accidents at underground coal mines with MSHA's
investigations.

We also concluded that the guidance provided by MSHA management to agency
employees could be strengthened. Some inspections procedures were unclear
and were contained in many sources, leading to differing interpretations
by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by
specialists and regular inspectors was also unclear, resulting in some
duplication of effort.

Finally, as of 2003, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal
mine inspectors were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years, the
agency had no plan for replacing them or using other human capital
flexibilities available to retain its highly qualified and trained
inspectors.

                    Miners Exiting an Underground Coal Mine

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter                                                                   1 
           Background                                                       2 
                        GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments              11 
Figures                                                                 
                 Figure 1: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal 
                                                                    Mines, 
           1993 to 2002                                                     4 
            Figure 2: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 
                                                                       for 
                       Which Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified 
           Deadlines                                                        9 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on important issues
related to the recent tragedies in the coal mining community. The
oversight that the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) provides over coal mines is an essential element of
properly safeguarding the lives of the thousands of workers who provide us
with much of the fuel needed to meet the increasing energy needs of our
country.

In 1977, Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety
and health of mine workers to MSHA. Since that time, the nation's mines
have become much safer-the number of deaths dropped dramatically in the
past 25 years and injury rates are also lower. However, despite these
trends, mining remains a dangerous industry, as the recent tragic deaths
illustrate. Data collected by MSHA on serious injuries (those involving
days away from work) shows that coal mining remains one of the most
dangerous industries in the United States.

My statement is based on work we reported in September 2003 and presents
key findings and recommendations from that report.1 That work was
completed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

In summary, we reported in 2003 that

o  Although MSHA devoted substantial effort to reviewing and approving
mine plans, it did not provide adequate oversight of the plan approval
process. MSHA had extensive procedures for approving mine plans and, for
two of the three types of plans we reviewed-ventilation and roof support2
plans-assigns highly qualified staff to the review and approval process.
However, MSHA headquarters did not verify that mine operators were
updating the plans as required. As a result, some mines may have been
operating without adequate ventilation or roof support plans, which could
have directly affected the safety and health of mine workers.

1

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Mine Safety: MSHA Devotes Substantial
Effort to Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs
Could Be Strengthened, GAO-03-945 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2003).

2

MSHA refers to these plans as "roof control" plans.

Page 1 GAO-06-370T

                                   Background

     o MSHA had extensive procedures for conducting inspections of mines, had
       highly trained and experienced staff, and conducted most mine
       inspections as required. However, the extent to which the inspections
       process helped ensure the safety and health of mine workers was
       limited by several factors. For example, we found that, from 1993 to
       2002, MSHA headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure
       that mine operators corrected hazards identified during inspections.
       In addition, as of 2003, MSHA had no plan for addressing the fact that
       about 44 percent of its inspectors were going to be eligible to retire
       within 5 years.
     o MSHA had a comprehensive process for conducting investigations of mine
       accidents, but it did not use the process to the fullest extent
       possible to improve the future safety and health of mine workers.
       Weaknesses in the databases MSHA used to track mine accidents and
       accident investigations limited its ability to monitor trends in mine
       hazards and ensure that all serious accidents were investigated.

We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Labor designed
improve MSHA's ability to protect the safety and health of coal miners by
providing better oversight over its operations and improving its mine plan
review and approval, inspections, and accident investigation processes. We
are pleased that MSHA has taken action to implement these recommendations.
We have not, however, examined the effectiveness of the agency's actions
or the extent to which these actions have addressed the issues we reported
in 2003.

In passing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine
Act"), Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety
and health of mine workers to MSHA. Under the stringent requirements of
the Mine Act, MSHA must protect the health and safety of miners by
thoroughly inspecting each underground coal mine at least four times a
year, citing mine operators for violations of the Mine Act, ensuring that
hazards are quickly corrected, restricting operations or closing mines for
more serious violations, and investigating serious mine accidents. In
addition, MSHA must approve the initial plans that mine operators prepare
for essential systems that protect mine workers-such as ventilation and
roof support systems-and revisions to the plans. To carry out these
responsibilities, in 2003, MSHA had approximately 350 inspectors and 210
specialists in eleven district offices.

At the end of 2002, the United States had approximately 2,050 coal
mines-about 700 underground coal mines and 1,350 surface mines. From 1993
to 2002, the number of underground and surface coal mines in the United
States declined and the number of mine workers decreased. Despite this
decrease in the number of mines and miners, production remained constant
because of the increased use of mechanized mining equipment and more
efficient mining techniques. In addition, over the past several decades,
coal production has shifted from primarily underground mines to large
surface mines, including mines in Wyoming and other areas west of the
Mississippi that produce millions of tons of coal annually.

Underground coal mines are more dangerous than surface mines for several
reasons. One critical factor that contributes to the hazardous working
conditions is highly explosive methane gas, which is often produced in
large quantities when coal is extracted from underground mines. Additional
factors are the geological conditions in many areas of the country that
make the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by fire in an
underground mine, coal and silica dust that can cause silicosis and
pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), and the close proximity of unknown
areas of abandoned mines, which can lead to flooding of the mine. As shown
in figure 1, for the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002, fatality rates for
underground coal mines were much higher than those for surface mines.

MSHA Devoted Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Did Not
Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process

 Figure 1: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 1993 to 2002

MSHA had extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving two
of the three types of plans we reviewed-ventilation and roof support
plans-and most of these plans were reviewed and approved on a timely
basis. However, MSHA headquarters did not adequately monitor completion of
required inspections of the ventilation and roof support plans; data
maintained by the district offices indicates that some districts were not
completing these inspections as required. In addition, MSHA headquarters
had not provided clear guidance to the districts on coordinating
inspections related to mine plans with quarterly inspections of
underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district
staff. Finally, staffing shortages prevented MSHA from reviewing and
approving plans for containing debris produced by the mines on a timely
basis.

MSHA had extensive procedures for approving ventilation and roof support
plans. Mine operators were required to submit their initial ventilation
and roof support plans to the MSHA district in which the mine was located
for approval prior to operating a mine and were required to submit revised
plans to the district for approval at least every 6 months.3 The district
managers were ultimately responsible for approving ventilation and roof
support plans submitted to their districts. Generally, districts were
required to approve ventilation and roof support plans within 45 days of
receipt unless problems are found that must be resolved. In some of the
districts we visited, state mine agencies were also required to approve
the mine plans. We reviewed this information for a 5-year period, 1998 to
2002, and found that most districts approved these plans on a timely
basis.

However, MSHA headquarters did not adequately monitor completion of
required inspections of ventilation and roof support plans by the district
offices. Districts were required to conduct inspections at least once
every 6 months of the ventilation and roof support plans in order to
ensure that mine operators were following the requirements of the plans
and that they were updating the plans to reflect changes in the
ventilation and roof support systems. The specialists who reviewed the
mine plans during the approval process also conducted many of these
inspections. Our analysis of the information submitted by the district
offices to MSHA headquarters on the completion of these inspections for
the 5-year period from 1998 to 2002 indicated that several districts had
not completed the inspections as required. As a result of districts not
completing these inspections, some mines may have been operating without
adequate ventilation or roof support plans.

Inspections of the mines' ventilation and roof support plans are essential
in ensuring adequate airflow and controlling the accumulation of dust
particles in underground coal mines as well as ensuring that the roofs are
adequately supported. Inadequate ventilation systems or roof support
systems can directly affect the safety and health of mine workers. For
example, our review of MSHA's data on fatalities at underground coal mines
from 1998 to 2002 showed that problems related to ventilation and roof
support systems accounted for high proportions of fatalities in
underground coal mines. For this 5-year period, ignitions or explosions
from excessive gas or coal dust accounted for the third largest percentage
of all fatalities-14 percent-and roof falls accounted for the largest
percentage-34 percent.

Mine operators were required to submit revised ventilation and roof
support plans to the district for approval whenever significant changes
were made to the plans.

Page 5 GAO-06-370T

In addition, MSHA did not always effectively coordinate its inspections of
mine plans with the comprehensive quarterly inspections of underground
coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district staff. In
two of the five districts we visited, we found that, in some instances,
the specialists who conduct the inspections of mine plans and inspectors
who conduct quarterly inspections were duplicating each other's work,
resulting in an inefficient use of MSHA's resources.

MSHA is also responsible for approving plans for containing mine debris,
called impoundment plans.4 As of 2003, MSHA had responsibility for
approximately 600 coal impoundments. Many of these plans are extremely
complex and require highly qualified engineers who are familiar with
technical areas such as dam building techniques, hydrology, and soil
conditions. Failure of an impoundment can be devastating to nearby
communities, which may be flooded with water and sludge, and to the
environment, affecting streams and water supplies for years afterwards.
Because of the potential for failure, such as the impoundment dam failure
in 1972 in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, in which 125 people were killed
and 500 homes were destroyed, MSHA is extremely careful about approving
impoundment plans. 5

At the time of our 2003 report, MSHA had conducted two reviews of its
procedures for approving impoundment plans, and has begun to take steps
for improving the process. One review identified several weaknesses in the
procedures, including the need for the agency to develop guidance for
determining which impoundment plans should receive expedited review as
well as evaluating the staffing levels needed to ensure timely and
complete review of the plans. MSHA officials acknowledged that the delays
in the review and approval of impoundment plans had been a problem for a
number of years. They also told us that they had taken a number of steps
to alleviate these delays, such as hiring additional engineers to review
impoundment plans and provide assistance to staff in its district offices.

4

MSHA refers to the large embankment dams built to contain debris produced
by the mines (debris that consists mainly of water, rock, and coal) as
"impoundments."

5

The Bureau of Mines had responsibility for overseeing impoundments at the
time of the Buffalo Creek disaster.

MSHA Had Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducted Most
Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process Could Have
Been Improved

MSHA's procedures for conducting inspections of underground coal mines
were comprehensive; its inspectors were highly qualified; and it conducted
almost all quarterly inspections as required, but the agency's inspection
process could be improved in a number of ways. Although MSHA had extensive
inspection procedures, some of them were unclear, while others were
difficult to locate because they were contained in so many different
sources. In addition, MSHA conducted over 96 percent of required quarterly
inspections each year over the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002, but MSHA
headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure that its
district offices followed through to make sure that unsafe conditions
identified during inspections were corrected by the deadlines set by
inspectors. And, although MSHA had highly qualified inspectors, as of
2003, it had no plan for addressing the fact that about a large percentage
of them (44 percent) were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years.
Finally, MSHA did not collect all of the information it needed to assess
the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts because it did not collect
data on contractor staff who work at each mine.

Although MSHA had extensive inspection procedures, we found that some of
them were unclear and were located in so many different sources that they
could be difficult to find. Some procedures did not clearly specify the
criteria inspectors should use in citing violations. For example, several
district officials in two of the districts we visited told us that the
lack of specific criteria for floating coal dust made it difficult to
determine what was an allowable level. 6 As a result, mine inspectors had
to rely on their own experience and personal opinion to determine if the
accumulation of floating coal dust was a safety hazard that constituted a
violation. In some instances, according to the inspectors and district
managers, this led to inconsistencies in inspectors' interpretations of
the procedures; inspectors have cited violations for levels of floating
coal dust that have not brought citations from other inspectors. In
addition, the inspections procedures were located in so many different
handbooks, manuals, policy bulletins, policy letters, and memorandums that
it could be difficult for inspectors to make sure that they were using the
most recent guidance and procedures. MSHA headquarters officials told us
that they were working to clarify the agency's procedures and consolidate
the number of sources in which they were located.

6

MSHA referred to this as "float" coal dust. It is extremely combustible
and can cause explosions in underground coal mines.

Page 7 GAO-06-370T

MSHA's data on its quarterly inspection completion rates indicated that,
from fiscal year 1993 to 2002, its district offices completed over 96
percent of these inspections as required. However, MSHA headquarters did
not monitor district office performance to ensure that inspectors followed
up with mine operators to determine that unsafe conditions identified
during these inspections were corrected. The deadlines that inspectors set
for mine operators to correct safety and health hazards varied based on a
number of factors, including the degree of danger to miners affected by
the violation. They ranged from 15 minutes from the time the inspector
wrote the citation to 27 days afterwards. MSHA's procedures required
inspectors to follow up with mine operators within the deadline set or to
extend the deadline. Inspectors could extend the deadlines under certain
circumstances, such as when a mine had temporarily shut down its
operations or when a mine operator was unable to obtain a part needed to
correct a violation cited for a piece of equipment.

Our analysis of MSHA's data for the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002
showed that, for almost half of the 536,966 citations for which a deadline
was established, inspectors did not follow up in a timely manner to make
sure mine operators had corrected the hazards.7 However, as shown in
figure 2, of the citations for which the inspectors did not follow up on a
timely basis, they followed up on most within 4 days of the deadline and,
for all but 11 percent of the citations, they followed up within 14 days.

MSHA did not set a deadline for correction of every type of violation. For
example, inspectors were not required to set a deadline for an order in
which the mine was closed due to "imminent danger."

Page 8 GAO-06-370T

Figure 2: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for Which
Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified Deadlines

The more serious type of violations-"significant and substantial"
violations-accounted for a significant proportion of the citations for
which inspectors did not follow up by the deadlines. For the over 235,447
significant and substantial violations from 1993 to 2002 for which a
deadline was specified, inspectors did not follow up on more than 48
percent of the citations by the deadline. However, inspectors followed up
on all but about 10 percent of the citations for significant and
substantial violations within 14 days of the deadline.

MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that there were many
different reasons why inspectors may not have followed up by the deadlines
specified in their citations. One of these, according to several district
officials, was scheduling conflicts that prevented inspectors from
visiting the mine within the specified deadline. In addition, there were
circumstances in which inspectors were not able to follow up, such as when
a mine operator suspended a mine's operations. However, in these
instances, the inspector should have updated the database to show that the
deadline was extended.

In addition, although we found that, as of 2003, about 44 percent of
MSHA's highly trained and experienced underground coal mine inspectors
would be eligible to retire within 5 years-and the agency's historic
attrition rates indicated that many of them would actually retire-the
agency had not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors. MSHA also
had fewer inspector trainees on board than vacancies that would need

MSHA Had a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident Investigations,
but Did Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future Accidents

to be filled when inspectors retired. MSHA headquarters officials told us
that it would be difficult for them quickly hire and train replacements
for the inspectors who retired. In addition to the fact that at least 18
months were needed to train each new inspector, it took the agency several
months from the date an individual retired to advertise and fill each
vacant position. As a result of losing these inspectors, MSHA may find it
difficult to complete all quarterly inspections of underground coal mines.

MSHA also did not collect all of the information on contractor staff who
work in underground coal mines needed to assess the effectiveness of its
enforcement activities. Because MSHA does not collect information on
injuries to or hours worked by contractor staff who mine coal in each
underground coal mine, it cannot calculate accurate fatality or nonfatal
injury rates for mines that use contractor staff to mine coal-rates used
to evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts. In addition,
MSHA could not track trends in fatal or nonfatal injury rates at specific
mines to use to target its enforcement resources. The fact that MSHA did
not track the number of contractor staff who worked in each mine was
important because the proportion of miners who work for contractors had
grown significantly since 1981, when they represented only 5 percent of
all mine workers. Our analysis showed that the percentage of underground
coal miners who work for contractors increased from 13 percent in 1993 to
18 percent in 2002, and the percentage who incurred nonfatal injuries also
increased over this period.

MSHA had extensive guidance and thorough procedures for conducting
accident investigations, but it did not use these investigations to the
fullest extent to improve the future safety of mine workers. Although MSHA
had detailed policies and rigorous requirements for how investigations
must be conducted and reported, weaknesses in its databases made it
difficult for MSHA to track key data on mine hazards and potentially
useful indicators of its own performance.

We made several recommendations in our report designed to improve MSHA's
operations. We recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct the
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to

     o monitor the timeliness of inspections of ventilation and roof control
       plans to ensure that all inspections are completed by district offices
       as required;
     o monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that
       mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on
       a timely basis;
     o update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on
       plan approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and
       outdated instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating
       regular quarterly inspections of mines with other inspections;
     o develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of
       qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including
       considering options such as streamlining the agency's hiring process
       and offering retention allowances;
     o amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in
       high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the
       number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA
       can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used
       to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and
     o revise the systems MSHA uses to collect information on accidents and
       investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier
       to link injuries, accidents, and investigations.

MSHA did not comment on the recommendations in its written response to the
report and disagreed with some of our findings. However, MSHA later agreed
to implement all of the recommendations and provided us with information
on how it had implemented or was in the process of implementing them. We
are pleased that MSHA has taken action to implement these recommendations
but note that we have not examined the effectiveness of the agency's
actions or the extent to which these actions have addressed the issues we
reported in 2003.

For further information, please contact Robert E. Robertson at (202) 512

  GAO Contact and

7215. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Staff
Revae Moran and Karen Brown.

  Acknowledgments

    (130553)

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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