Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's	 
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to  
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (01-FEB-06, GAO-06-365R).		 
                                                                 
GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state, and 
local preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. This correspondence contains GAO's preliminary 
findings.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-365R					        
    ACCNO:   A46177						        
  TITLE:     Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to  
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita					 
     DATE:   02/01/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Disaster relief aid				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     National Response Plan				 

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GAO-06-365R

     

     * 06365Renc.pdf
          * Clear and Decisive Leadership
          * Strong Advance Planning, Training, and Exercise Programs
          * Capabilities for a Catastrophic Event

February 1, 2006

The Honorable Thomas Davis

Chairman

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

House of Representatives

Subject: Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state,
and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Enclosed is a statement for the record of GAO's
preliminary findings.

GAO will continue work on a wide range of issues relating to the
preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to the
hurricanes. We expect to provide Congress with more detailed findings,
with a comprehensive summary of what went well and why, what did not go
well and why, and what specific changes, if any, are called for in the
National Response Plan. If you or your staff has any questions about this
statement, please contact Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director for Homeland
Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected] .

           Sincerely yours,
           David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States
           Enclosure

Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller General David M.
Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and
Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

In recent months, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal,
state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I am here today to provide some preliminary
observations based on our work to date. GAO is supporting Congress through
a range of strategic and integrated audit and evaluation engagements to
determine what went well, what did not, and what lessons learned are
critical to improving government's abilities to do better in the future.
The Inspectors General of the various federal departments are conducting
detailed Hurricane Katrina-related work on fraud, waste, and abuse in
individual federal programs.

GAO staff has visited the affected areas. They have interviewed officials
and analyzed information from the various involved federal agencies such
as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and local
organizations, including state emergency management agencies; state
adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from
nongovernmental agencies. I have also personally toured southern
Mississippi, southern Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans. I have also
had discussions with many governmental and other officials, including the
governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the mayor of New
Orleans; the primary federal official on the scene; and the joint task
force commander of active duty forces. In addition, GAO has done a great
deal of work on prior disasters, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and
the terrorist attacks in 2001.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's
history and because of its size and strength, will have long standing
effects for years to come. It exacted terrible human costs with the loss
of significant numbers of lives and resulted in billions of dollars in
property damage. At present, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
reports that FEMA has distributed nearly $4.4 billion in federal aid to
more than 1.4 million households. Forty-four states and the District of
Columbia have been given emergency declarations to cover expenses related
to sheltering millions of evacuees forced from their homes by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Furthermore, many who survived now face the disruption
of being dislocated and separated from their normal way of life, the
prospect of rebuilding their lives in other locations, and, for those who
desire to return home, the continuing uncertainties regarding what kind of
life the future may hold.

Significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to respond
to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, along with significant participation
from charitable and private sector organizations. However, the
capabilities of several federal, state, and local agencies were clearly
overwhelmed in response to Hurricane Katrina, especially in Louisiana.
Therefore, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of
preparedness and the collective response. As events unfolded in the
immediate aftermath and ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina's final
landfall, responders at all levels of government-many victims
themselves-encountered significant breakdowns in vital areas such as
emergency communications as well as obtaining essential supplies and
equipment.

The causes of these breakdowns must be well understood and addressed in
order to strengthen the nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from major catastrophic events in the future--whether natural or
man-made. Unfortunately, many of the lessons emerging from the most recent
hurricanes in the Gulf are similar to those GAO identified more than a
decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, which leveled much of
South Florida in the early 1990s. For example, in 1993, we recommended
that the President designate a senior official in the White House to
oversee federal preparedness for, and response to, major catastrophic
disasters.

There are several key themes that, based on our current preliminary work,
underpin many of the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane
Katrina and reflect certain lessons learned from past disasters. The
following three key themes seem to be emerging.

                         Clear and Decisive Leadership

First, prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels
must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to
facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing
for and in the early hours and days after the event. As we recommended in
1993, we continue to believe that a single individual directly responsible
and accountable to the President must be designated to act as the central
focal point to lead and coordinate the overall federal response in the
event of a major catastrophe. This person would work on behalf of the
President to ensure that federal agencies treat the catastrophe as a top
priority and that the federal government's response is both timely and
effective. In cases where there is warning, such as the high probability
of a major hurricane (e.g., a category 4 or 5), the senior official should
be designated prior to the event, be deployed appropriately, and be ready
to step forward as events unfold. Neither the DHS Secretary nor any of his
designees, such as the Principal Federal Official (PFO), filled this
leadership role during Hurricane Katrina, which serves to underscore the
immaturity of and weaknesses relating to the current national response
framework. More specifically with regard to the lessons to be learned from
Hurricane Katrina:

           o  No one was designated in advance to lead the overall federal
           response in anticipation of the event despite clear warnings from
           the National Hurricane Center. Furthermore, events unfolded both
           before and immediately after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina
           that made it clear that governmental entities did not act
           decisively or quickly enough to determine the catastrophic nature
           of the incident. For example, the DHS Secretary designated
           Hurricane Katrina as an incident of national significance on
           August 30th-the day after final landfall. However, he did not
           designate the storm as a catastrophic event, which would have
           triggered additional provisions of the National Response Plan
           (NRP), calling for a more proactive response.1 As a result, the
           federal posture generally was to wait for the affected states to
           request assistance. At the same time, some federal responders such
           the Coast Guard and DOD did "lean forward" in proactive efforts
           anticipating a major disaster. Furthermore, other federal agencies
           took proactive steps to prepare for and respond to the disaster,
           such as the U.S. Postal Service and the National Finance Center.

           o  Although the DHS Secretary designated a PFO to be the federal
           government's representative under the NRP structure and to
           coordinate the federal response, the efforts of all federal
           agencies involved in the response remained disjointed because the
           PFO's leadership role was unclear. In the absence of timely and
           decisive action and clear leadership responsibility and
           accountability, there were multiple chains of command, a myriad of
           approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance,
           and confusion about who should be advised of requests and what
           resources would be provided within specific time frames.

1As defined by the National Response Plan, an incident of national
significance is an actual or potential high-impact event that requires a
response by a combination of federal, state, and local governments and/or
private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and
provides the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation
activities. A catastrophic incident is one that results in extraordinary
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or
government functions.

            Strong Advance Planning, Training, and Exercise Programs

Second, to best position the nation to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from major catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina, there must be
strong advance planning, both within and among responder organizations, as
well as robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in
advance of a real disaster. Although the NRP framework envisions a
proactive national response in the event of a catastrophe, the nation does
not yet have the types of detailed plans needed to better delineate
capabilities that might be required and how such assistance will be
provided and coordinated. In addition, we observed that the training and
exercises necessary to carry out these plans were not always developed or
completed among the first responder community. The leadership to ensure
these plans and exercises are in place must come from DHS in conjunction
with other federal agencies, state and local authorities, and involved
nongovernmental organizations. More specifically,

           o  By their very nature, major catastrophic events involve
           extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption
           that likely will immediately overwhelm state and local responders,
           circumstances that make sound planning for catastrophic events all
           the more crucial. Our previous work on Hurricane Andrew also
           highlighted the importance of such plans focused specifically on
           major catastrophic events. Our initial review of the NRP base plan
           and its supporting catastrophic provisions as well as lessons
           based on Hurricane Katrina suggest the need for these documents to
           be supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust
           implementation plans. Our previous work has also underscored the
           need to prepare for both natural disasters and man-made disasters
           such as terrorist events.

           o  Planning should also include further defining and leveraging
           any military capabilities as might be needed in a major
           catastrophe. Prior disasters and the actual experience of
           Hurricane Katrina show that DOD is likely to contribute
           substantial support to state and local authorities, including
           search and rescue assets, evacuation assistance, provision of
           supplies, damage assessment assets, and possibly helping to ensure
           public safety. In fact, military support to Hurricane
           Katrina-affected areas reflected an unprecedented domestic
           response of 70,000 personnel-far greater than in any other
           domestic disaster, including Hurricane Andrew. This response
           involved about 20,000 active duty troops and about 50,000 National
           Guard troops. More detailed planning would provide greater
           visibility and understanding of the types of support DOD will be
           expected to provide following a catastrophic incident, including
           the types of assistance and capabilities that might be provided,
           what might be done proactively and in response to specific
           requests, and how the efforts of the active duty and National
           Guard would be integrated. It would also avoid the type of
           confusion that occurred in Louisiana regarding the types of
           military support needed and requested, and the respective
           contributions of active duty and National Guard forces.

           o  Planning also must explicitly consider the need for and
           management of the contractor community. In this regard, we found
           that agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting
           in a major contingency situation. We also noted the competing
           tension between the selection of national contractors and the
           requirement under the Stafford Act for a preference for
           contractors from the affected area. Better planning could
           ameliorate those tensions.

           o  Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way
           to test emergency management plans. In our previous work on
           Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo, we identified the need for the federal
           government to upgrade training and exercises for state and local
           governments specifically geared towards catastrophic disaster
           response. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the benefits of applying
           lessons learned from training exercises and experiences with
           actual hurricanes as well as the dangers of ignoring them. FEMA's
           "Hurricane Pam" exercise-conducted between 2004 and 2005 to
           simulate the impacts of a category 3 hurricane-identified the
           impacts such as widespread flooding, extensive evacuations,
           sheltering thousands of individuals left homeless after a storm,
           and disposing of tons of debris similar to Hurricane Katrina's
           results. Not all capabilities-related issues identified in the
           Hurricane Pam exercise were addressed before Hurricane Katrina
           hit. In addition, we observed that an incomplete understanding of
           roles and responsibilities under the NRP lead to
           misunderstandings, problems, and delays, an area that training
           might be able to correct. One overall challenge is ensuring that
           key officials participate in training and exercises so that they
           are better prepared to deal with real life situations.

                     Capabilities for a Catastrophic Event

Response and recovery capabilities needed during a major catastrophic
event differ significantly from those required to respond to and recover
from a "normal disaster." Key capabilities such as emergency
communications, continuity of essential government services, and logistics
and distribution systems underpin citizen safety and security. In
addition, as these capabilities are brought to bear, streamlining,
simplifying, and expediting decision making must quickly replace "business
as usual" approaches to doing business. The following provides examples of
capabilities we have identified in our preliminary work. All of these
areas require better contingency plans and the resources to carry them
out.

           o  Hurricane Katrina exposed difficulties in continuing or rapidly
           restoring essential government operations, particularly at the
           local level. Local government infrastructure was destroyed and
           essential government employees, including many first responders,
           were evacuated or victimized themselves by the storms, resulting
           in limited continuity of operations for essential public safety
           and key service agencies. Also, because of storm damage, emergency
           communications to meet everyday internal and emergency
           communication requirements and interoperability needs were
           severely compromised and backup systems were often limited or
           nonexistent.

           o  The scope of the devastation, including the flooding in the New
           Orleans area, made a comprehensive damage assessment and an
           estimate of services victims might need very difficult. After
           Hurricane Andrew, similar to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
           it was several days before local authorities had a full picture of
           the situation to determine how much and what types of assistance
           were needed. A catastrophic event will overwhelm the capacity of
           state and local officials to assess damage, and our preliminary
           work indicates that the military's significant capabilities in
           assessing damage-a capability used for Hurricanes Katrina and
           Rita, and other past disasters-should be an explicit part of
           future major catastrophic disaster plans.

           o  While there were aspects that worked well, it appeared that
           logistics systems for critical resources were often totally
           overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina, with critical resources
           apparently not available, properly distributed, or provided in a
           timely manner. In addition, our preliminary work assessing agency
           acquisition practices for responding to the hurricanes indicates
           that those agencies needed additional capabilities to be able to:
           (1) adequately plan for and anticipate requirements for needed
           goods and services, (2) clearly communicate responsibilities
           across agencies and jurisdictions, and (3) deploy sufficient
           numbers of personnel to provide contractor oversight. These
           capabilities are critical to ensuring that agencies receive the
           goods and services needed to accomplish their missions in a timely
           manner and at fair and reasonable prices.

           o  The magnitude of the affected population in a major catastrophe
           also calls for greater capabilities in several areas. For example,
           evacuation capabilities must include evacuating special needs
           populations such as those in hospitals and nursing homes,
           coordinating transportation assets, and ensuring that receiving
           shelters are not overwhelmed. Search and rescue and mass care
           should work together in a seamless transition so that victims are
           not just rescued, but can be taken to a place of shelter.

           o  Mass care-sheltering, feeding, and related services-following
           Hurricane Katrina required the integrated efforts of many
           organizations, including volunteer groups, charities and other
           nongovernmental groups, organizations providing mutual aid, and
           the military. Although many of these efforts were successful, it
           appeared that Hurricane Katrina seriously challenged the capacity
           of organizations such as the American Red Cross and FEMA to
           provide expected services to certain populations and in certain
           areas and at certain times. Housing beyond short-term shelters
           also became-and remains-a major problem, especially for victims
           who either cannot return to their community or require housing
           options in their community if they do return.

           o  Additional capability will be needed to effectively manage and
           deploy volunteers and unsolicited donations. Our early work
           indicates that because of the magnitude of the storms, volunteers
           and donations, including from the international community were not
           generally well integrated into the overall response and recovery
           activities. For example, there were challenges in integrating the
           efforts of the Salvation Army and smaller organizations, often
           local churches and other "faith-based" organizations. In addition,
           federal agencies involved in managing the international assistance
           were not prepared to coordinate, receive, distribute, or account
           for the assistance. Agency officials involved in the cash and
           in-kind international assistance told us the agencies had not
           planned for the acceptance of international assistance for use in
           the United States and, therefore, had not developed processes and
           procedures to address this scenario.

           o  Lastly, beginning and sustaining community and economic
           recovery, including restoring a viable tax base for essential
           services, calls for immediate steps so residents can restore their
           homes and businesses. Removing debris and restoring essential gas,
           electric, oil, communications, water, sewer, transportation and
           transportation infrastructure, other utilities, and services such
           as public health and medical support are vital to recovery and
           rebuilding. In less severe disasters, restoring these lifelines is
           easier. However, the magnitude and scope of Hurricane Katrina
           painfully makes visible the many challenges in effectively
           addressing these issues.

GAO will continue our work on a wide range of issues relating to the
preparation, response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to the
hurricanes that I have discussed today. We have over 30 engagements
underway and look forward to reporting on them throughout 2006. We will
provide Congress and the American people with a comprehensive summary of
what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and what, if any,
specific changes are called for in the National Response Plan.

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