Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S.
Operations in Haiti (21-FEB-06, GAO-06-331).
The UN employs about 85,000 military and civilian personnel in
peacekeeping operations in 16 countries. The United States has
provided about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping
operations. In addition, the United States has led and
participated in many such operations. UN reports and
congressional hearings have raised concerns about accountability
for UN peacekeeping operations and the need for reforms. We were
asked to provide information relating to the cost and relative
strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In particular, we have (1)
compared the cost of the ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti with the cost that the United States would have incurred
had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and
undertaken without UN involvement; (2) analyzed factors that
could materially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation;
and (3) identified the strengths of the United States and the UN
for leading the operation. We developed our cost estimate of a
U.S.-led operation using cost models from the Departments of
Defense and State. The estimate is based on various military
assumptions, such as the use of primarily active duty troops. It
includes only those costs directly attributable to the operation
that would not otherwise be incurred.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-331
ACCNO: A47357
TITLE: Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and
Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti
DATE: 02/21/2006
SUBJECT: Comparative analysis
Cost analysis
Cost effectiveness analysis
International organizations
International relations
Military operations
Military personnel
United Nations military forces
Cost estimates
Peacekeeping
Haiti
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GAO-06-331
* Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee
on International Relations, House of Representatives
* February 2006
* PEACEKEEPING
* Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in
Haiti
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation Is Twice as High
as Ongoing UN Mission
* Alternative Scenarios with Differing Assumptions Could Generate
Higher Cost Estimates
* Analysis of Alternative Military Assumptions Generated
Higher U.S. Cost Estimates
* Including Nation-Building and Development Assistance in the
Operation's Scope Would Significantly Increase Costs
* U.S. and UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Each Have Key Strengths
* U.S. Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Had Elements Found to Be
Critical for Effective Peacekeeping
* UN Has Multinational Participation, Extensive Experience,
and Structure for Coordinating Nation Building
* Conclusions
* Agency Comments
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives
February 2006
PEACEKEEPING
Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti
Contents
Tables
Figures
February 21, 2006Letter
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher Chairman The Honorable William D. Delahunt
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on International Relations House of Representatives
As of November 2005, the United Nations (UN) maintained about 70,000
peacekeeping troops and about 15,000 related international civil servants
in 16 countries, including Haiti, Lebanon, Georgia, Cyprus, Sudan, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Currently, the United States provides
about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping missions. In addition
to these financial contributions, the United States has led and
participated in a variety of peacekeeping operations, most recently in
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. UN reports and congressional hearings
have raised concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations
and the need for management reforms.
To advance UN reform efforts and determine the value of peacekeeping
operations to the United States, you asked us to provide information
relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping.
In particular, we have (1) compared the cost of a specific UN mission with
the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been
deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN
involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could affect the estimated costs of
a U.S. operation; and (3) identified strengths of U.S. and UN peacekeeping
forces in leading the operation. We selected the UN Stabilization Mission
in Haiti (officially designated "MINUSTAH") as a case study for
comparison. This mission provides a strong basis for estimating costs and
assessing UN and U.S. strengths because it is located in a country in
which both the U.S. and UN have a history of military intervention.
However, given the operational, structural, and doctrinal differences
between the U.S. and UN military and civilian infrastructures, it is
uncertain whether the United States would implement a peacekeeping
operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN, as we have generally assumed
for the purposes of this report. Moreover, because the results of our
review are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all
U.S. and UN peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, we believe this case
study provides some useful insights into cost and effectiveness-related
issues for other peacekeeping missions.
We analyzed detailed cost and operational data from the UN relating to
MINUSTAH for the first 14 months of this mission. Using these data, we
developed a comparable scenario for a U.S. operation, which officials from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated as reasonable; this scenario assumes
deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel
and aircraft in Haiti over the same period. We derived a cost estimate for
the military portion of this scenario using the Department of Defense's
(DOD) Contingency Operation Support Tool, the official DOD cost estimation
mechanism for all contingency military operations. For the civilian
portions, we based cost estimates primarily on historical data and
formulas from the Department of State. We determined that data we
collected for this report are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of
estimating U.S. peacekeeping costs and comparing them with UN budget
figures. We conducted our work from June to February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I for
a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief
We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as
the United Nations to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to
MINUSTAH. According to UN records, the UN budgeted $428 million for the
first 14 months of MINUSTAH, for which the United States is responsible
for 27.1 percent, or $116 million.1 A similar U.S. operation would cost an
estimated $876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be
attributed to three major elements: civilian police, military pay and
support, and facilities, as shown in figure 1. First, the estimated cost
of deploying U.S. civilian police officers is $217 million, compared to
$25 million budgeted by the UN for foreign police officers. Unlike the
U.S. cost estimate, the UN budget does not include police salaries and
compensation, as they are funded voluntarily by police-contributing
nations.2 Compensation rates for U.S. police officers reflect a high
standard of skills and experience. Second, we estimate that military pay
and support would cost $260 million, compared to $131 million in the UN
budget, reflecting high salary and equipment standards for U.S. soldiers
and a higher level of support in health, nutrition, and morale. Third,
facilities-related costs would total about $208 million, compared to $100
million in the UN budget. Under MINUSTAH, mission facilities are donated
by the Government of Haiti, while the U.S. estimate reflects the cost of
posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound.
Figure 1: Comparison of UN Budget for MINUSTAH and Cost Estimate for a
U.S. Operation
Various military and nonmilitary factors can affect the estimated costs of
a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti. We analyzed the influence of three
military factors on the cost estimate: the mix of reserve and active duty
troops, the rate of troop deployment, and the operational tempo. First,
deploying reserve soldiers instead of primarily active duty military
personnel3 could increase the operation's costs by as much as $477
million. Regular pay for active duty soldiers is not included in the cost
estimate, since DOD would incur this cost regardless of where these
soldiers were deployed. However, DOD pays reservists a full salary and
provides other benefits only when they are called into active duty.
Second, deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN-within the first 60
days of the operation instead of 180-would raise estimated U.S. costs by
about $60 million. Third, conducting the operation at a higher operational
tempo, which entails heavier use of vehicles and equipment, would increase
maintenance and support costs by $23 million. Most nonmilitary costs for
nation building and development assistance are not included in the UN and
U.S. estimates, and including them would increase both estimates
substantially. International bilateral and multilateral donors contributed
at least $382 million for such activities during the first year of
MINUSTAH, of which the United States directly funded more than a quarter.
We did not include these costs in our estimate because the United States
would rely on the international community to help achieve such goals in
any case.
Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or
the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation, and, in Haiti, each offers
strengths suited to this responsibility. The United States' strengths
include strong communications, command, and control, which were proven
militarily effective in past Haiti peacekeeping operations. The U.S.
military infrastructure also afforded U.S.-led operations in Haiti three
elements found by UN studies to be critical for effective peacekeeping but
largely absent in MINUSTAH: rapid deployment capacity, tactical
intelligence, and a public information strategy. For example, rapid troop
deployment to Haiti in 1994 enabled a U.S.-led force to achieve its
primary military objectives within 76 days. The UN's strengths are rooted
in the multinational character of its operation as well as its extensive
experience with peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has
developed a structure for coordinating the activities of international
organizations and has access to experienced and skilled international
civil servants, including personnel with diverse language capabilities.
The relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping forces may differ in
other conflict zones. Furthermore, complex political considerations,
including the interests of the United States and other UN member
countries, are likely to influence decisions about the role of the United
States and the UN in any peacekeeping operation.
Background
Both the UN and United States have a long history of peace support
operations upon which to base cost estimates. The UN has carried out 60
peacekeeping missions worldwide since 1948. For each mission, the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) prepares a budget, which is
reviewed in detail at high levels of UN management and is ultimately
approved by the General Assembly. The UN assesses each member for its
allocated portion of this amount based on the country's per capita gross
national income and its membership status on the Security Council. The
United States currently pays about 27 percent of the total for each
mission, and in fiscal year 2005 directly contributed about $1.3 billion
in support of UN peacekeeping operations overall. The United States has
also led and participated in a variety of peacekeeping operations since
World War II, most recently in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. U.S.
military operations are funded largely by DOD appropriations, and, under
DOD regulations, the budgets are based primarily on cost estimates
generated with the department's Contingency Operations Support Tool.4 This
computer model uses financial formulas that draw upon a database of
historical costs from past military operations and other regularly updated
cost information. In addition, the State Department has extensive
experience posting foreign service officers in conflict areas and funding
U.S. police officers to support UN peacekeeping missions, for which it
maintains cost estimation formulas and historical cost databases.
The UN Security Council has authorized five peacekeeping missions in Haiti
since 1993, of which the United States has led two between 1994 and 2004.
The primary task of the ongoing MINUSTAH operation is to provide a secure
and stable environment through its military and police presence and
operational support to the Haitian National Police. MINUSTAH assists the
transitional government in police reform and institutional strengthening;
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; elections monitoring; and
promotion and protection of human rights and the political process. The
initial authorized force strength was 6,700 troops, 1,622 civilian police
officers, and 1,697 civilian administrators and staff. Although initially
authorized for 6 months, the UN Security Council has renewed the mission's
authorization and funding through June 2006.
Criticism and controversy, including allegations of sexual misconduct of
peacekeepers, have brought calls for reform of UN peacekeeping operations
within the UN and from U.S. observers. In 2000, the UN Secretary General
convened a high-level panel to review UN peace and
security, which recommended a variety of reforms.5 The 2005 bipartisan
Task Force on the United Nations highlighted the need for more rapid
deployment and more clearly defined mandates.6 Proposed legislation, the
Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005,7 calls for more oversight
and investigation over UN operations and mandates that the UN adopt and
enforce a code of conduct for all peacekeeping personnel.
Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation Is Twice as High as
Ongoing UN Mission
We estimate that it would cost the United States twice as much as the UN
to conduct an operation similar to MINUSTAH. The higher U.S. cost of
civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for
virtually the entire difference between our estimate and the MINUSTAH
budget, and reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards
for training, troop welfare, and personnel security.
From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005-the first 14 months of MINUSTAH-the UN
budgeted mission costs totaled $428 million. This budget assumed a phased
deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 personnel in formed police
units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators and
staff. It included the cost of personnel, operational support, equipment,
facilities, and transportation.8 Using the same basic parameters of troop
and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimated that the United
States would likely budget about $876 million, nearly twice the UN
estimate, for a comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation. (This cost
estimate is based on a variety of assumptions, described in detail in app.
I.) The United States was financially responsible for $116 million of the
budgeted cost of MINUSTAH, based on the U.S. assessed contribution of 27.1
percent of the DPKO regular budget. Hence, we estimate that conducting a
U.S. operation similar to MINUSTAH would cost the United States about 7.5
times as much as its official contribution to the UN for that mission
($876 million versus $116 million).9
Major disparities in the cost for civilian police, military pay and
support, and facilities account for virtually all of the difference
between the UN budget and our cost estimate. Our estimate reflects the
additional expense of paying salaries for personnel that would otherwise
be donated by other countries as well as the cost of ensuring U.S.
standards for police training, the equipment and welfare of military
personnel, and the security of staff posted overseas. (See table 1 for a
detailed comparison of the UN budget and our estimate by major cost
category.)
Table 1: Comparison of UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in
Haiti (dollars in millions)
Major cost categories Budgeted UN Estimated U.S. Difference between UN
cost cost budget and U.S. estimate
Transportation $94 $100 -$6
Facilities and related 100 208 -108
costs
Medical/health costs 5 22 -17
Military personnel pay 131 260 -129
and support
Civilian personnel 63 46 17
(non-police)
Civilian police 25 217 -192
Miscellaneous 10 23 -13
Total cost $428 $876 -$448
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data.
Civilian police. The UN budgeted $25 million to deploy 872 civilian
officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United
States $217 million to deploy the same number of U.S. officers. The UN
does not reimburse countries contributing police for the officers'
salaries and only pays for living expenses, clothing allowance, and death
and disability compensation.10 U.S. costs, however, include salaries,
special pay, benefits, equipment, and special training. Furthermore, U.S.
officers deployed in Haiti under MINUSTAH are required to meet standards
for training, experience, and skills significantly beyond those applied by
the UN. For instance, U.S. officers deployed to Haiti must be proficient
in French or Haitian Creole and have a minimum of 8 years' work experience
with five years in a position of sworn civilian law enforcement.
Candidates must pass several tests that measure physical capabilities and
weapons proficiency. UN-sponsored officers deployed to Haiti are required
by the UN to demonstrate only the ability to operate a firearm and drive a
vehicle; the ability to communicate in French is preferred but not
required.
Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay and support
of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United States $260
million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are based primarily
on a per-soldier payment to contributing nations of up to $1,400 monthly
for basic pay and allowances, clothing, gear, equipment, and ammunition.
U.S. costs include pay and allowances for reservists and active duty
personnel as well as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. The
higher U.S. costs help ensure a basic standard of living for U.S. soldiers
and their families and relatively high standards of welfare in the field
in terms of equipment, nutrition, health, and morale. For example,
estimated costs for food and water for U.S. military personnel total $85
million, compared to $20 million in the UN budget. Medical support for the
military and civilian personnel on a U.S. operation would cost an
estimated $22 million, over four times the UN budgeted cost of $5 million.
According to officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN multinational
forces in Haiti prior to MINUSTAH had difficulty providing adequate troop
support and relied on accompanying U.S. forces for supplementary rations
and health care. A Rand Corporation study of the multinational force
cooperation in Haiti in 1994 indicates that the U.S. forces provided UN
forces with intelligence and training, as well as logistical and
communications support, including housing, food, transportation, and
vehicle maintenance.11
Facilities. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related costs,
while we estimate that the cost to the United States would be $208
million. The UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and
civilian housing and other facility-related equipment and supplies. While
MINUSTAH staff offices are donated by the Government of Haiti, U.S.
facilities must meet State Department security standards, which include
posting civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds.
In addition to administrative and security expenses, U.S. government
agencies with staff in these compounds would be required to contribute a
total of about $12 million to the State Department's Capital Security
Cost-Sharing Program, which funds the construction of secure embassies
worldwide.12
Estimated costs in other categories are likely to be similar for the UN
and the United States. For example, we estimate that the transport of U.S.
troops, civilian personnel, and equipment would cost about $100 million;
the UN budgeted $94 million for these costs.
Alternative Scenarios with Differing Assumptions Could Generate Higher
Cost Estimates
Various military and nonmilitary factors can influence the composition of
a peacekeeping operation and thus impact the estimated cost. We identified
three different military scenarios that could substantially affect the
estimated costs of a U.S. peacekeeping operation. Greater concentration of
reserve troops could almost double the military costs, while a quicker
deployment of forces and higher operational tempo would also increase
costs. Further, the addition of nation-building and development assistance
activities to the scope of an operation in Haiti would increase the
estimated cost substantially.
Analysis of Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost
Estimates
According to U.S. experts in military operations and cost estimation we
consulted, various factors could significantly influence the cost estimate
for a U.S. peacekeeping operation. These factors include the number of
troops and types of military units deployed, the pace of deployment, the
intensity or operational tempo, the modes of transportation for
deployment, and the mix of active duty and reserve troops. These factors
depend heavily on the needs of the operation and demands of other military
commitments; decisions about such factors involve complex military,
political, and financial considerations that can change rapidly.
We analyzed the potential impact of three principal cost factors by
altering the assumptions of our cost estimate to reflect (1) military
forces comprised entirely of reserve soldiers, (2) deployment of military
forces within the first 60 days of the operation rather than 180 days, and
(3) higher operational tempo (more intensive use of vehicles and
equipment). Figure 2 illustrates how altering the assumptions for these
factors affects the cost estimate.
Figure 2: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for Hypothetical
U.S. Operation
Deployment of all-reserve forces. Our base cost estimates assume that the
military contingent of a U.S. operation would consist primarily of active
duty forces (85 percent). Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
confirmed that this is one of a number of possible scenarios, depending on
the availability of active duty and reserve troops, ongoing military
commitments, specific operational needs, and other factors. A change in
this fundamental assumption can have a significant impact on the estimated
cost of the operation, as pay for troops is one of the largest components
of the estimate. We altered this assumption to reflect an operation
comprised entirely of reserve forces, which increased the cost estimate by
$477 million. This difference has such a significant impact because DOD
does not include regular pay for active duty troops in the cost estimates;
the department would incur these costs regardless of whether the troops
were deployed in Haiti, the United States, or elsewhere. In contrast, pay
for reserve troops is considered a direct cost of the operation since DOD
would pay reservists full salaries only when activated for the operation.
More rapid deployment. Although the UN Security Council Resolution
establishing MINUSTAH calls for an immediate deployment of peacekeeping
forces, the MINUSTAH budget reflects full military deployment within 180
days of mission authorization. Thus, similar to the UN budget, our base
cost estimate assumes a military force strength below authorized levels
during the first six months of the operation. We altered this assumption
to reflect full deployment within the first 60 days. We estimate that this
would increase U.S. costs by about $60 million, consisting essentially of
military pay and support for additional troops deployed during the
operation's initial months.
Higher operational tempo. DOD measures the intensity of a military
operation, or operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3, with normal
operations being level 1.13 The higher the operational tempo, the more
heavily the forces use equipment and vehicles and the higher the cost for
fuel, operations, and maintenance. Military experts we consulted at the
Institute for Defense Analysis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated
that a peacekeeping operational tempo would normally be considered to be
at level 1.5, as reflected in our base cost estimate. We altered this
assumption to reflect a slightly higher operational tempo, level 2, which
increased the estimated military costs by $23 million due to increased
equipment, maintenance, and other support costs.
Including Nation-Building and Development Assistance in the Operation's
Scope Would Significantly Increase Costs
Our estimate does not include costs for complementary nation-building and
development activities, which would be needed to support the economic and
political goals of a peacekeeping operation. In 2004, to bolster MINUSTAH,
official donors agreed with the Government of Haiti on an Interim
Cooperative Framework, to which they pledged a total of $1.3 billion for
an array of activities to strengthen political governance and promote
national dialogue, strengthen economic governance and contribute to
institutional development, promote economic recovery, and improve access
to basic services. From July 2004 to March 2005, bilateral and
multilateral donors have spent more than $382 million for such activities
(see table 2). The United States directly funded over 27 percent of this
total, or $102 million, through its bilateral aid programs in Haiti.14 The
United States has made additional contributions to this aid effort through
its financial support of UN agencies and multilateral financial
organizations, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank. Table 2 shows the distribution of funding for these activities by
donor and type of activity.
Table 2: Additional MINUSTAH-Related Funding Disbursed by Donor, July 2004
to March 2005 (dollars in millions)
Type of United Canada European Japan World Inter-American UN Total
assistance States Community Bank Development agencies
Bank
Political $6.9 $19.7 $1.3 $0 $0 $0 $1.3 $29.2
governance
Economic 7.6 2.5 4.3 0 47.8 18.6 3.8 $84.6
governance
Economic 24.6 0.8 10.4 0.4 1.1 2.7 1.0 $41.0
recovery
Access to 66.1 35.7 30.8 5.7 1.1 4.0 28.5 $171.9
basic
services
Other 0 14.8 10.4 0.4 0.5 3.6 25.8 $55.5
Total $105.2 $73.5 $57.2 $6.5 $50.5 $28.9 $60.4 $382.2
Source: UN Development Program.
Note: UN agencies include the UN Population Fund; the UN Children's Fund;
the Food and Agriculture Organization; the UN Organization for Education,
Science and Culture; the World Health Organization/Pan-American Health
Organization; the UN Development Program; and the World Food Program.
Our cost estimate assumes that the United States and other donors would
spend the same amount on these programs and activities regardless of
whether the United States undertook a peacekeeping operation in Haiti.
Historically, the United States has depended on other official donors and
multilateral organizations to participate in reconstruction and rebuilding
efforts following an armed conflict.
U.S. and UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Each Have Key Strengths
In addition to cost, other factors would be considered when determining
the most appropriate role of the United States and the UN in conducting
peacekeeping operations. The United States and the UN each have strengths
that can affect the achievement of peacekeeping objectives in Haiti. Past
U.S. operations in Haiti have benefited from a strong central
communications, command and control structure and a vast military
infrastructure supporting its operations, particularly in terms of troop
deployment, military intelligence, and public information. Among the
strengths of a UN mission are its multinational participation, its
extensive experience in peace operations, and a coordinated network of
agencies to assist nation building.
U.S. Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Had Elements Found to Be Critical for
Effective Peacekeeping
U.S. peacekeeping operations have benefited from strong communications,
command and control structures, direct access to well-trained military
personnel and equipment, and other advantages of a large, well-established
military infrastructure. U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti have been
widely recognized as operationally effective, having achieved their
military objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. As we
previously reported, U.S. leadership has enhanced operational
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in Haiti.15 In the 1995 UN Mission to
Haiti, the United States provided leadership to multinational forces that
ensured adequate troops and resources were available to carry out assigned
tasks, used its command and control structure for the operation, and
applied its doctrine for "operations other than war" to help guide
actions. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with experience with
more recent multinational forces in Haiti also highlighted rigorous
training, a reliable communications infrastructure, and a cohesive command
structure as key factors that made U.S. forces operationally effective
there.
Furthermore, by virtue of the vast U.S. military infrastructure of DOD and
other U.S. agencies, U.S. peacekeeping forces have many elements that UN
peacekeeping studies have identified as critical for mission
effectiveness, particularly in Haiti. In March 2000, the UN high-level
panel reviewing UN peace and security identified elements critical to
effective peacekeeping. In
May 2005, a UN Security Council evaluation of MINUSTAH16 emphasized the
particular importance of three of these elements for operations in
Haiti-rapid troop deployment, effective tactical intelligence, and a
public information strategy-noting that MINUSTAH was hindered by
weaknesses in these elements.
Dedicated DOD organizations support U.S. military operations in these
three elements, and have contributed to military successes in past
operations in Haiti. Funding for these organizations is not reflected in
cost estimates in this report because they are part of the infrastructure
that supports all DOD objectives and operations, and costs are not readily
attributable to specific contingency operations.
Rapid deployment. The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated that it was
important to fully deploy an operation within 30 to 90 days after the
adoption of a Security Council Resolution establishing the mission.
According to the report, the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or
peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace
and a credible new operation; opportunities lost during that period are
hard to regain. At DOD, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Readiness is responsible for developing and overseeing policies and
programs, including training, to ensure the readiness of U.S. forces for
peacetime contingencies, crises, and warfighting. Military readiness of
both personnel and equipment is a major objective throughout DOD. The
department spends more than $17 billion annually for military schools that
offer nearly 30,000 military training courses to almost 3 million military
personnel and DOD civilians. With continued heavy military involvement in
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is also spending billions of
dollars sustaining or replacing its inventory of key equipment items. The
United States has historically deployed troops in Haiti relatively
rapidly. (Fig. 3 illustrates deployment of U.S. marines in Haiti.) For
example, in 1994 the United States deployed an operation in Haiti within
60 days of the issuance of a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing
the restoration of Haiti's constitutionally elected leadership to power.
The 20,000-member force quickly established itself in 500 locations
throughout Haiti and achieved its primary goals within 76 days.
Figure 3: U.S. Marines Arrive in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Via C-17 Military
Transport in March, 2004
Intelligence apparatus. The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated that
missions should be afforded the necessary field intelligence and other
capabilities to mount an effective deterrence against violent challengers.
For its intelligence needs in an operation in Haiti, DOD can draw upon the
extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting of a
wide array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the U.S.
government. The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, employing over
7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages
foreign military intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and
force planners in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The
Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air
Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to
U.S. military operations. U.S. forces had these resources at their
disposal when they led multinational forces in Haiti in 1994-95,
successfully disbanding the Haitian army and paramilitary groups and
confiscating the weapons caches held by government opponents within 7
months.
Public information. The 2000 UN report indicated that an effective
communications and public information capacity is an operational necessity
for nearly all UN peacekeeping operations. According to the report,
"effective communication helps to dispel rumor, to counter disinformation,
and secure the cooperation of local populations." Furthermore, it can
provide leverage in dealing with leaders of local rival groups and enhance
the security of UN personnel. The report recommends that such strategies
and the personnel to carry them out be included in the very first elements
deployed to help start up a mission. At DOD, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs is responsible for developing programs and
plans relating to DOD news media relations, public information, internal
information, community relations, and public affairs in support of DOD
objectives and operations. DOD developed a public affairs strategy that
was a central element of the operation it led in Haiti in 2004; it
included issuing regular press releases and briefing local and
international media frequently on the progress and developments of the
operation. U.S. military forces in Haiti were met with relatively little
violent opposition, resulting in a minimal loss of life, either Haitian or
American.
UN Has Multinational Participation, Extensive Experience, and Structure
for Coordinating Nation Building
The UN's strengths in peacekeeping in Haiti are rooted in the
multinational character of its operation as well as extensive experience
with peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN's experience has
enabled it to develop a structure for coordinating international
organizations involved in nation building and give it access to a pool of
experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel
with diverse language capabilities.
Multinational participation. The multinational cooperation on UN
peacekeeping missions, such as in MINUSTAH, provides some notable
advantages. According to a 2005 study sponsored by the Rand Corporation,
the UN may have the ability to compensate for its relatively small
military presence with its reputation of international legitimacy and
local impartiality.17 Furthermore, its multinational character likely
lends the UN a reputation for impartiality that a single nation may not
enjoy. The study concluded that this has afforded the UN a degree of
success with relatively small missions that include both security and
nation-building components. MINUSTAH represents a multinational effort
that is not dominated by any single country. (Fig. 4 illustrates
multinational peacekeeping operations under MINUSTAH.) During its first
year of operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH comprised 7,624 military staff and
police personnel from 41 countries. Unlike earlier U.S.-led operations,
where the U.S. troops represented up to 90 percent of military personnel,
U.S. participation on the ground in MINUSTAH was limited to 29 U.S.
military and police personnel-less than 1 percent of the total. As
officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, development of
coalition partners through multinational operations is important not only
for strengthening ongoing and future operations in Haiti, but also for
building strong international capacity for facing future military
challenges globally. The advantages for the United States include a lower
overall cost for peacekeeping and reduced exposure of U.S. personnel to
the inherent dangers of operating in conflict zones. However, according to
DOD and State Department officials, the multinational nature of a military
force may also limit its operational effectiveness by introducing
variations in training among the personnel from different nations and
difficulties in communications, command, and control.
Figure 4: MINUSTAH Peacekeepers from Jordan Prepare to Patrol The Slum of
Cite Soleil in Haiti, July 2005
Experienced peacekeeping officials. The UN has developed a cadre of senior
officials that has gained experience with peacekeeping and nation-building
activities over many missions. While there are acknowledged deficiencies
in UN peace operations, the UN established a best practices unit in DPKO
in 1995 to study and adopt lessons learned. Senior MINUSTAH officials,
including the Chilean UN Special Representative and his deputies, the
Brazilian Force Commander,18 and the Canadian Police Commissioner bring
experience in peacekeeping and development activities from diverse
geographic areas, and particularly from other countries in the region. The
international nature of the UN also provides access to a large pool of
civil servants and security personnel with native language speaking
abilities and translation skills. In Haiti, 11 French-speaking countries
have provided peacekeeping troops and police officers for MINUSTAH.
Structure for coordinating international assistance. The UN has fostered a
network of agencies and development banks. UN peacekeeping missions can
draw directly upon this network in coordinating the extensive humanitarian
and developmental activities that are related to operations with
expansive, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti,
MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination integral to the
mission's organization. With UN co-sponsorship, official donors in this
network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank,
have pledged $1.3 billion in development assistance. The UN Development
Program coordinates the efforts of nine agencies in Haiti, which, during
the first year of MINUSTAH, disbursed $60 million in development
assistance. To help ensure that these funds are well coordinated and
support MINUSTAH's objectives, these UN agencies operating in Haiti report
directly to a senior MINUSTAH official, who also serves as the chief UN
Development Program representative for Haiti.
Conclusions
While a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti would be more expensive than
the current UN mission, it would be subject to higher operational
standards and supported by an extensive military infrastructure. Strong,
well-trained, and quickly deployed U.S. forces have proven militarily
effective in short-term operations in Haiti in the past. However,
involving the international community extensively in peacekeeping
operations such as MINUSTAH has notable advantages for leveraging
development funding, experience, and other resources of nations and
organizations. The situation in other peacekeeping missions may differ
significantly from the conditions in Haiti, and complex domestic and
international political considerations may ultimately weigh heavily in
determining the role of U.S. and UN peacekeepers in future operations.
Chief among these are the political interests of the United States and
other UN member states.
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense and State
and the United Nations for their comment. They provided technical
corrections, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate, but
they had no further comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We will also make
copies available to others on request. In addition, it will be available
at no cost on our Web site at h ttp://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-8979 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in
appendix II.
Joseph A. Christoff Director, International Affairs and Trade
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix I
To compare the cost of a specific United Nations (UN) mission with the
cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been
deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN
involvement, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the UN and the U.S.
Government.
o To determine the UN costs for peacekeeping operations, we analyzed the
2004-2005 budget and supporting documents for the UN Stabilization Mission
to Haiti (MINUSTAH). We spoke with officials of the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and other UN departments, offices, and agencies at
UN headquarters in New York about the assumptions, cost factors and
ratios, and cost estimation methods used to generate the budget. We used
MINUSTAH as our case study because it illustrates the various categories
of cost for a contemporary mission located in a country where the United
States has an expressed national interest. Additionally, we believe this
case provides a strong basis for estimating costs, given the long history
of U.S. and UN military intervention in Haiti. We chose the period May 1,
2004 to June 30, 2005 for analysis because it reflected the first approved
mission budget and incorporated the initial start-up costs. According to
UN officials, the budget provides a reasonable estimate of costs, though
actual expenses may vary from the budget. We also discussed with UN
officials the methodology for determining the U.S. assessment for
MINUSTAH, which was 27.1 percent of the mission budget. We did not include
peacekeeping support costs, which are indirect costs allocated to the
mission for overhead and administrative expenses incurred outside of Haiti
(at UN headquarters and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy), as the
U.S. Government does not allocate corresponding overhead and
administrative costs to individual operations in a comparable way.
o To estimate the military costs of a unilateral U.S. operation, we
developed a comparable U.S. operational scenario based on the MINUSTAH
budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of
military, civilian, and police peacekeeping personnel and aircraft in
Haiti over a similar time period of time (14 months). To devise the
military portion of the scenario, we interviewed DOD officials and
contractor staff involved in developing cost estimates for U.S.
contingency operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the
Comptroller and its contractor, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),
generated cost estimates for the military components of this scenario
using the DOD's Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST), since DOD
financial management regulations designate COST as the department's common
cost-estimating platform. The cost estimate DOD provided included only the
incremental costs of the operation-those directly attributable to the
operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place.
We based the scenario, and hence the cost estimate, on the following
assumptions, which correspond closely with MINUSTAH budget assumptions and
actual UN personnel deployments.
o Military contingents: 6,594 total personnel divided as follows:
Hospital units: 500 personnel
Engineers: 200 personnel
Military police: 820 personnel
Light infantry: 5,074 personnel less the number of aviation support
personnel for 8 UH-60 Black Hawk and 10 CH-47 Chinook helicopters.
o Type of military personnel: 85 percent active duty, 15 percent reserve.
o Theater of operations: Haiti.
o Operation dates: orders provided April 30, 2004; costs end June 30,
2005.
o Deployment schedule: gradual deployment to theater over 180 day period;
30-day pre-deployment and deployment phase for active duty units and 60
days for reserve units; 6-month rotation period for all units; 7-day
re-deployment for all units.
o Operational tempo: level 1.5 for pre-deployment, deployment, and
sustainment.
o Construction of troop housing equivalent to semi-rigid soft wall
dormitory tents.
o Transportation: departure from Columbus, Georgia, to Port-au-Prince,
Haiti; personnel deployed and rotated by commercial air; all equipment
shipped by sea.
We obtained input on the scenario design from DOD's Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who validated it as reasonable. However, the military component of the
scenario and the corresponding cost estimate have some limitations. An
actual U.S. military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan, due
to differences between U.S. and UN military infrastructures in operations,
structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation.
Additionally, we did not include reconstitution-the cost of returning
equipment to useable standards after operation-in our cost estimate, since
the UN does not include this cost in its peacekeeping mission budgets, and
we assumed that reconstitution would occur after the initial budget cycle
on which our comparison is based. Further, some cost factors used in COST,
such as some pre-deployment costs and transportation for certain supplies
and mail, are based on various contingency operations, such as Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and may not be representative of costs in Haiti.
o To estimate civilian police costs, we obtained and analyzed data from
the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs on actual contract costs for providing civilian police
to support UN missions. As these contracts do not include the costs for
daily subsistence and transportation, we calculated these additional costs
based on the U.S. government meals and incidental expense rate for
Port-au-Prince and published contract airfare schedules. We applied the
average costs per officer to the total number of civilian police officers
included in the MINUSTAH budget. Formed police units were not calculated
in this manner, as we assumed that such personnel would be provided in the
military portion of the operation as military police and are included as
such in that estimate.
o To estimate U.S. civilian personnel costs for the operation, we obtained
and analyzed data from the Department of State to determine the average
annual cost of a foreign service officer in Haiti during fiscal year 2005,
including salary and benefits, office furnishings, housing, residential
furnishings, post differential, airfare, shipping, rest and recuperation,
danger pay, cost of living adjustments, educational allowance for one
child, and miscellaneous expenses. We applied this average cost to the
number of non-administrative international staff included in the MINUSTAH
budget. (We subtracted several senior executive positions from this
number, as the ambassador and U.S. Agency for International Development
mission director and other senior U.S. officials already posted to Haiti
would likely serve their functions.) To estimate the cost of
locally-employed national staff, we obtained staffing information for the
U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 from the
Department of State and calculated the average annual salary for
locally-employed national staff in Haiti. We applied this figure to the
number of non-administrative national staff included in the MINUSTAH
budget. We calculated benefits for this staff at 27.6 percent of salaries,
per information on these costs provided by the Department of State.
o To estimate civilian facilities and administrative costs, we obtained
and analyzed data provided by the Department of State and the U.S. embassy
in Port-au-Prince. The department's Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program
requires agencies posting staff overseas to pay fees into a cost-sharing
pool that funds construction of secure embassies and consulates. We used
data on these fees to calculate the total cost-sharing fee for the
civilian staff in our U.S. operational scenario for Haiti. To determine
administrative support costs, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the
Department of State's International Cooperative Administrative Support
Services program for the Port-au-Prince embassy for fiscal year 2004. We
calculated the average administrative cost per non-administrative foreign
service officer and applied this amount to the total number of
non-administrative civilian personnel in the MINUSTAH budget.
o To estimate the cost of deploying civilian volunteers, we obtained and
analyzed data from two U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations that
contract with the U.S. government to provide volunteers for development
and humanitarian activities overseas. These organizations provided the
cost estimates for deploying 153 volunteers in Haiti for 14 months, which
corresponds to the parameters of the MINUSTAH budget for volunteers. Our
cost estimate includes the average of these two estimates.
For all of the cost data used in these estimates, we obtained and analyzed
supporting information or discussed the data source with the corresponding
officials and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report.
To analyze factors that could substantially affect the estimated costs of
the U.S. operation, we developed alternative scenarios and cost estimates,
varying one major assumption for each scenario. We identified the
assumptions to vary through discussions with DOD and Institute for Defense
Analysis officials, who identified those factors they believed, based on
their experience, would have the most influence on the cost estimate for
the operation's military component. The three variations we selected were
(1) an all-reserve force, (2) deployment of all troops in Haiti within the
first 60 days of the operation, and (3) an operational tempo of 2. DOD
generated alternative cost estimates for each scenario, using COST, and we
compared these with the base estimate to identify and explain the major
differences associated with each alternative scenario.
To identify and assess the strengths of the United States and the UN in
leading peacekeeping operations in Haiti, we obtained and analyzed UN
reports and evaluations relating to MINUSTAH and information on past
U.S.-led operations in Haiti. We interviewed officials from DOD, the
Department of State, and the UN, as well as peacekeeping experts from the
Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., to discuss their views on factors that
contribute to successful peacekeeping operations. We also reviewed
published reports from various organizations relating to the effectiveness
of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations.
We conducted our review from June through February 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Joseph Christoff, (202) 512-8979
Key contributors to this report include Tetsuo Miyabara (Assistant
Director), James Michels, Charles Perdue, Kendall Schaefer, Suzanne Sapp,
Grace Lui, Lynn Cothern, Joseph Carney, and Sharron Candon.
(320356)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-331 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-331 , a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives
February 2006
PEACEKEEPING
Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti
The UN employs about 85,000 military and civilian personnel in
peacekeeping operations in 16 countries. The United States has provided
about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping operations. In
addition, the United States has led and participated in many such
operations. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised concerns
about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the need for
reforms.
We were asked to provide information relating to the cost and relative
strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In particular, we have (1) compared
the cost of the ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti with the cost
that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in
the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement; (2)
analyzed factors that could materially affect the estimated costs of a
U.S. operation; and (3) identified the strengths of the United States and
the UN for leading the operation.
We developed our cost estimate of a U.S.-led operation using cost models
from the Departments of Defense and State. The estimate is based on
various military assumptions, such as the use of primarily active duty
troops. It includes only those costs directly attributable to the
operation that would not otherwise be incurred.
We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as
the United Nations (UN) to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the
current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (designated "MINUSTAH"). The UN
budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of this mission. A U.S.
operation in Haiti of the same size and duration would cost an estimated
$876 million, far exceeding the U.S. contribution for MINUSTAH of $116
million. Virtually all of the cost difference is attributable to (1)
civilian police, (2) military pay and support, and (3) facilities, and
reflects high U.S. standards for police training, troop welfare, and
security.
Comparison of Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation and UN MINUSTAH Budget
Various military and nonmilitary factors can substantially affect the
estimated costs of a U.S. operation. We analyzed three military factors:
the mix of reserve and active duty troops, the rate of deployment, and the
operational tempo. Deploying all reserve troops would increase the cost
estimate by $477 million, since it would require paying more reservists a
full salary. Deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN-within the
first 60 days instead of 180-would cost an additional $60 million.
Conducting the operation at a higher tempo-with more intensive use of
vehicles and equipment-would increase estimated costs by $23 million. In
addition to military considerations, including nation-building and
development assistance activities in the scope of the operation would
increase the cost significantly. Official donors, including the United
States, distributed $382 million for these activities during the first
year of MINUSTAH.
Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or
the UN should lead an operation, and each offers strengths for this
responsibility. U.S.-led operations in Haiti between 1994 and 2004
benefited from a vast military infrastructure, which provided strong
communications, command and control, readiness to deploy, tactical
intelligence, and public information. The UN's strengths include
multinational participation, extensive peacekeeping experience, and an
existing structure for coordinating nation-building activities. Complex
political considerations are likely to influence decisions about the role
of the United States and the UN in peacekeeping.
*** End of document. ***