Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the
Clearance Process (17-JAN-06, GAO-06-323R).
On November 9, 2005, GAO testified before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs at a hearing on "Access Delayed: Fixing
the Security Clearance Process, Part II." This letter responds to
three questions for the record that Senator Daniel K. Akaka
posed.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-323R
ACCNO: A45037
TITLE: Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel
Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving
the Clearance Process
DATE: 01/17/2006
SUBJECT: Accountability
Contractor personnel
Contractors
Employees
Internal controls
Performance measures
Quality control
Security clearances
Security investigations
Timeliness
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GAO-06-323R
Link: File-List
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January 17, 200[GAO1] 6
The Honorable George V. Voinovich
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
[GAO2]
Subject: Questions for the Record Related to DOD*s Personnel Security
Clearance Program[GAO3] and the Government Plan for Improving the
Clearance Process
On November 9, 2005, I testified before your subcommittee[GAO4] at a
hearing on *Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part
II.*[GAO5] This letter responds to three questions for the record that
Senator Daniel K. Akaka posed. The questions and my responses
follow.[GAO6]
1. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in testimony before this
Subcommittee in September 2004 and June 2005, indicated that the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) continues to use its investigations contractor
to conduct personnel security clearance investigations for the
contractor*s employees even though GAO raised an internal control concern
about this practice during its 1996 review. Would you please elaborate on
these concerns, and describe whether you believe OPM has taken sufficient
steps to addressing the internal control and quality-control problems
identified by GAO?[GAO7]
Although we have evidence that OPM has not taken steps to correct the
cited internal control weakness that we identified nearly a decade
ago[GAO8] , conclusions about the sufficiency of OPM*s specific quality
control procedures must wait until we complete other work requested by
this subcommittee and others.[GAO9] When OPM was privatizing its
investigative function in 1996, we identified an internal control
concern*OPM*s investigations contractor was conducting personnel security
clearance investigations
on its own employees.[1][GAO10] The February 2005 transfer of the
Department of Defense*s (DOD) federal investigators to OPM resulted in OPM
again having federal investigators available to correct this internal
control weakness[GAO11] , but OPM has not yet used the federal
investigators for that purpose[GAO12] .[2][GAO13] OPM officials have,
however, indicated that they plan to have the federal investigators
perform the personnel security clearance investigations of contract
investigators starting in March 2006.[GAO14] If OPM follows through with
this plan, it would correct the cited internal control weakness.[GAO15]
We have begun work requested by this subcommittee and others to obtain
up-to-date information on the sufficiency of the specific procedures that
OPM uses to monitor the quality of the investigative reports that it
provides to its customers.[GAO16] Our examination of quality control
procedures will include observing the training that investigators receive,
conducting a site visit to OPM*s investigations processing center to
review the step-by-step process used to monitor quality, and reviewing a
sample of the investigative reports that DOD adjudication facilities have
used to determine eligibility for a security clearance.[GAO17]
2. Does GAO have a position on the use and measurement of timeliness
for closed-pending investigative reports?[GAO18]
In our February 2004 report, we noted that OPM*s issuance of closed
pending cases*investigations sent to adjudication facilities without one
or more types of source data*causes ambiguity in defining and accurately
estimating the backlog.[3][GAO19] In our October 1999 report examining
the completeness of clearance investigations supplied by DOD*s Defense
Security Service, we noted that risks to national security are posed when
investigations do not fully comply with federal standards.[4][GAO20] To
lessen the risk associated with incomplete investigative reports, we
recommended DOD adjudication facility officials grant clearances only when
all essential investigative work has been done.[GAO21] Adjudication
facility officials said that they were reluctant to return incomplete
investigations for further investigation because they were concerned about
additional delays.[GAO22]
In fiscal year 2002 (the last year for which we have data), about 10
percent of the 283,480 DOD cases fully closed by OPM were initially
delivered to DOD adjudication facilities as closed pending cases.[GAO23]
When measuring the timeliness of its contractors* performance, OPM defined
completed investigations as cases that (1) have the complete information
required for the type of investigation, (2) are closed pending, or (3)
have been discontinued.[GAO24] If the investigations have not been fully
completed, we believe that closed pending cases should be included in the
investigative portion of the backlog.[GAO25]
3. What are some of the primary criteria that GAO uses to determine
whether or not to remove a program from its high-risk list, and what is
needed for security clearances to be off the list?[GAO26]
In order for DOD*s personnel security clearance program to be removed from
our high-risk list, the program must address (1) the general criteria
outlined in our fiscal year 2001 report and (2) the many recommendations
that we have provided specific to DOD*s program. In our 2001 report, we
identified the following general criteria that are considered in
designating and removing programs from our high-risk list:[GAO27] [5]
. a demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support to
address the risk(s);
. the capacity (that is, the people and other resources) to resolve
the risk(s);
. a corrective action plan that defines the root causes, identifies
effective solutions, and provides for substantially completing corrective
measures in the near term, including but not limited to steps necessary to
implement solutions we have recommended;
. a program instituted to monitor and independently validate the
effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures; and
. the ability to demonstrate progress in having implemented
corrective measures. [GAO28]
Before removing the security clearance process from our high-risk list, we
must determine whether DOD has satisfied all of the criteria we have
established for removing a high-risk designation.[GAO29] As noted in our
November 2005 testimony,[6] DOD must undertake many corrective actions to
implement our recommendations and to correct previously identified
problems before its personnel security clearance program can be removed
from our high-risk list.[GAO30] Perseverance by the administration in
implementing our recommended solutions regarding the personnel security
clearance process and continued oversight and action by Congress are both
essential.[GAO31] When actions, including those in response to our
recommendations, result in significant progress toward resolving a
high-risk problem, we will remove the high-risk designation.[GAO32]
If you or other members of the subcommittee have any additional questions
about DOD*s personnel security program, please contact me at (202)
512-5559 or [email protected]. [GAO33] Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this correspondence. GAO
staff who made major contributions to the correspondence are listed in the
enclosure.[GAO34]
Sincerely yours,
Derek B. Stewart
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
[GAO35]
Enclosure
Enclosure
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments[GAO36]
GAO Contact Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 or
[email protected] [GAO37]
Acknowledgments In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards,
Assistant Director, Kurt A. Burgeson, David Epstein, Sara Hackley, William
J. Rigazio, and Jennifer Young made key contributions to this
correspondence.[GAO38]
(350796)[GAO39]
[1]See GAO, Privatization of OPM*s Investigations Service, GAO/GGD-96-97R
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1996).
[2]According to OPM officials, these federal investigators are currently
being used to help reduce the existing backlog of DOD security clearance
investigations.
[3]GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[4]GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27,
1999).
[5]GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High
Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: November 2000).
[6]GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some
Long-standing Problems with DOD*s Program, But Concerns Remain,
GAO-06-233T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005).
[GAO1]Date of issuance
[GAO2]R7, 350778 Request Letter (CCAR#06-0085) pg. 1. R2, A, B, C\
R1, GAOHQ-#1471158-QFR: OFFICIAL QUESTION FROM CR
[GAO3]GAO Statement
[GAO4]R4, GAOHQ-#1449726-DEREK'S NOVEMBER 2005 STATEMENT ON PERSONNEL
CLEARANCES, Cover
[GAO5]R7, 350778 Request Letter (CCAR#06-0085) pg. 1
R1, GAOHQ-#1471158-QFR: OFFICIAL QUESTION FROM CR
[GAO6]See below.
[GAO7]R1, GAOHQ-#1471158-QFR: OFFICIAL QUESTION FROM CR pg. 3
[GAO8]Statement based on remainder of this paragraph
[GAO9]Second paragraph and request letters for 350734 (See: R14, CCAR#
05-1129 and R16, CCAR# 05-1146)
[GAO10]Privatization of OPM*s Investigations Service R17,
(GAO/GGD-96-97R) pg. 13-14
[GAO11]R5, GAO-05-842T, p. 2, 5 lines from the bottom of the page
[GAO12]R6, GAOHQ-#1471100-OPM: KATHY DILLAMAN'S RESPOND TO AKAKA QUESTION
[GAO13]This footnote was inserted in response to a referencing comment
and is supported by R6, GAOHQ-#1471100-OPM: KATHY DILLAMAN'S RESPOND TO
AKAKA QUESTION
[GAO14]GAO Conclusion based on R6, GAOHQ-#1471100-OPM: KATHY DILLAMAN'S
RESPOND TO AKAKA QUESTION
[GAO15]GAO Opinion. Derek added this statement as part of his 01-04-06
comments on the draft.
[GAO16]GAO statement identifying current work. Restructured existing
information in response to Derek*s 01-04-06 comments on draft.
[GAO17]R8, 350734 ERS info on steps to examine quality (p. 2)
[GAO18]R1, GAOHQ-#1471158-QFR: OFFICIAL QUESTION FROM CR pg. 3
[GAO19]R11, GAO-04-344, p. 11, para 2, sentence 1
[GAO20]R12, GAO/NSIAD-00-12, p. 11, para last on page, sentence 1 and the
supporting first 2 bullets immediately above the paragraph
[GAO21]R11, GAO-04-344, p. 11, para 2, sentence 3
[GAO22]R12, GAO/NSIAD-00-12, p. 17, para 1, sentence 1
[GAO23]R11 GAO-04-344,, p. 11, para 2, sentence 4
[GAO24]R11 GAO-04-344,, p. 11, para 2, sentence 5
[GAO25]R11 GAO-04-344,, p. 11, para 2, sentence 6
[GAO26]R1, GAOHQ-#1471158-QFR: OFFICIAL QUESTION FROM CR pg. 3
[GAO27]R10, GAO-01-159SP, Performance and Accountability Challenges and
High Risks, p. 15 (Title for Figure 7), p. 13. FOOTNOTE 3 pg. 1
R10, GAO-01-159SP, Performance and Accountability Challenges and High
Risks, p. 15 (Title for Figure 7).
[GAO28]R10, GAO-01-159SP,
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, p.
15.
[GAO29]R4, GAO-06-233T
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD*s Program, But Concerns Remain. P. 3, second paragraph.
[GAO30]R4, GAO-06-233T
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD*s Program, But Concerns Remain. P. 3, second paragraph.
[GAO31]R13, GAO-05-207), High-Risk Series: An Update, Highlights page.
[GAO32]R10, GAO-01-159SP,
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, p.
14.
[GAO33]R18, GAOHQ-#1474909-REF: CONFIRMING DEREK STEWART'S CONTACT
INFORMATION
[GAO34]See below.
[GAO35]R18, GAOHQ-#1474909-REF: CONFIRMING DEREK STEWART'S CONTACT
INFORMATION
[GAO36]See below.
[GAO37]R18, GAOHQ-#1474909-REF: CONFIRMING DEREK STEWART'S CONTACT
INFORMATION
DCM Phone Listing
[GAO38]R9, GAOHQ-#1471411-STAFF MEMBERS 350796 QUESTION FOR THE RECORD
[GAO39]ERS: 350796
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