Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and	 
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to Other Countries (14-MAR-06, GAO-06-311).  
                                                                 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993
and 2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking  
in nuclear and radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the  
Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State),	 
have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and	 
training to border security personnel in other countries. GAO	 
examined the (1) progress U.S. programs have made in providing	 
radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including  
the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) challenges 
U.S. programs face in this effort; and (3) steps being taken to  
coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other	 
countries.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-311 					        
    ACCNO:   A48897						        
  TITLE:     Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to Other Countries				 
     DATE:   03/14/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Border security					 
	     Equipment management				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International relations				 
	     Nuclear materials					 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Nuclear radiation monitoring			 
	     Program management 				 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Program costs					 
	     DOE Second Line of Defense Program 		 

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GAO-06-311

     

     * Report to Congressional Requesters
          * March 2006
     * COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
          * Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S.
            Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other
            Countries
     * Contents
          * Results in Brief
          * Background
          * Three U.S. Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide
            Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future
            Spending Requirements for Some Programs Are Uncertain
               * DOE, DOD, and State Had Spent a Combined Total of About $178
                 Million through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 to Provide
                 Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries
                    * DOE Has Spent About $131 Million Providing Radiation
                      Detection Equipment and Related Training
                    * DOD Has Spent About $22 Million to Provide Handheld
                      Radiation Detection Devices to Eight Countries and to
                      Install Portal Monitors in Uzbekistan
                    * State Has Spent About $25 Million to Provide Radiation
                      Detection Equipment and Related Training to 31
                      Countries
               * Future U.S. Spending on Radiation Detection Assistance Is
                 Uncertain
          * The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance
            Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs
            to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
               * Possible Corruption of Border Guards Poses a Threat to the
                 Effective Operation of U.S.-Funded Radiation Detection
                 Equipment
               * Some Border Crossings Remain More Vulnerable to Nuclear
                 Smuggling Because DOE Has Not Upgraded Less Sophisticated
                 Equipment Installed by Other U.S. Agencies
               * Concerns Exist About Maintenance of Some Handheld Radiation
                 Detection Equipment
               * Limited Infrastructure and Harsh Environmental Conditions at
                 Some Border Sites Pose Equipment Problems
          * State's Efforts to Coordinate U.S. Assistance Are Limited by
            Deficiencies in the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Lack of a
            Comprehensive List of Equipment Provided by U.S. Programs
               * State Coordinates U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment
                 Assistance through an Interagency Working Group and In-
                 Country Advisors
               * The Interagency Strategic Plan to Coordinate U.S. Radiation
                 Detection Equipment Assistance Overseas Lacks Key Components
               * State Has Not Maintained Accurate Information on All
                 Previously Provided Handheld Equipment, Which Inhibits Its
                 Ability to Effectively Coordinate U.S. Assistance
          * Conclusions
          * Recommendations for Executive Action
          * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Scope and Methodology
     * Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at
       the Department of Energy
          * Second Line of Defense "Core" Program
               * DOE's Maintenance of Equipment Previously Installed by Other
                 U.S. Agencies
          * Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer Project
     * Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at
       the Department of Defense
          * Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative
          * International Counterproliferation Program
     * Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at
       the Department of State
          * Export Control and Related Border Security Program
               * Russian Federal Customs Service Central Command Center
          * Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
          * Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Program
     * Comments from the Department of Energy
     * Comments from the Department of State

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts
to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries

Contents

Table

Figures

Abbreviations

March 14, 2006Letter

Congressional Requesters

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and
2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and
radiological materials, and the number of reported cases has risen
dramatically since 2002. Many of these cases involved material that could
be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses
conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty
bomb," or radiological dispersal device). Especially in the aftermath of
the attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that
terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into
the United States. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the consequences
could be devastating to our national and economic interests. In April
2004, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for
every member state to put in place appropriate effective border controls
and law enforcement to detect, deter, prevent, and combat the illicit
trafficking and brokering in nuclear materials and other items related to
weapons of mass destruction.1

In response to the growing concern about nuclear smuggling, three U.S.
agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State
(State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and
related training to border security personnel and customs officials in
other countries.2 Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear
smuggling were focused on nuclear materials originating in the former
Soviet Union. As a result, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear
smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at
borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, DOD and State provided fixed radiation
detection equipment, known as radiation portal monitors, and handheld
radiation detection equipment to a number of countries in this region. In
1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense "Core" (SLD-Core)
program,3 which has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear
materials trafficking by providing radiation detection equipment to the
Federal Customs Service of Russia. In coordination with State, DOE,
through its National Nuclear Security Administration,4 has recently
expanded its efforts in the SLD-Core program to include countries other
than Russia, including installing radiation detection equipment at border
sites in Greece as part of the overall U.S. effort to provide security
assistance prior to the 2004 Olympic Games.5 In addition to DOE's efforts
through the SLD-Core program, six other programs-one at DOE, two at DOD,
and three at State-have provided radiation detection equipment to assist
foreign governments in combating nuclear smuggling. Further, State is the
lead interagency coordinator of U.S. nuclear detection assistance
overseas.

As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to combat
nuclear smuggling by examining (1) the progress U.S. programs have made in
providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including
the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) the challenges U.S.
programs face in deploying or operating radiation detection equipment in
foreign countries; and (3) the steps being taken to coordinate U.S.
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries. To address these
objectives, we analyzed documentation on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling from DOE and its contractors, both at DOE's national
laboratories and in the private sector; DOD and its contractors; State;
and DHS and conducted interviews with key program officials at each of
these agencies. We also visited six countries (Georgia, Greece, Macedonia,
Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), where U.S. agencies have provided
radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection
equipment in operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs
with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary
information from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS; performed a data reliability
assessment of this data; and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials on
the reliability of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from April
2005 to February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Results in Brief

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation
detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to
combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these
agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven
different programs. Specifically, as of fiscal year 2005, DOE's SLD-Core
program had completed installation of radiation portal monitors at 83
border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania at a cost of about $130
million. DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of
about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570
million. A second DOE program has provided handheld radiation detection
equipment to regulatory agencies and patrol officers in 9 countries at a
cost of about $1 million. In addition to DOE's efforts, two DOD programs
have spent about $22 million to provide radiation portal monitors,
handheld equipment, and radiation detection training to 8 countries in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. DOD plans to complete its
Uzbekistan Portal Monitoring project in fiscal year 2009 at a total cost
of about $54 million. Furthermore, DOD also plans to continue providing
limited amounts of handheld radiation detection equipment to other
countries in the future. Similarly, three Department of State programs
have provided radiation detection equipment and training to 31 countries
at a cost of about $25 million. However, future spending requirements for
State's radiation detection assistance programs are uncertain, in part,
because State's Export Control and Related Border Security program
provides radiation detection equipment to foreign countries on an as
needed basis as a part of its effort to increase export control
enforcement in foreign countries. In coordination with DOE, this program
also selectively funds more expensive radiation portal monitors to certain
sites on a case-by-case basis, such as at one site in Armenia, where State
believes the imminence of a smuggling threat warranted immediate action.

U.S. efforts to provide radiation detection equipment to other countries
face a number of challenges that can impact the effective operation of
this equipment, including: possible corruption of border security
officials in some countries, technical limitations of radiation detection
equipment previously deployed by State and other agencies, inadequate
maintenance of some equipment deployed by DOD and State, and the lack of
infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites.

o According to officials from several recipient countries we visited,
corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of border security
organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned
that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the
effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either
turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To mitigate this threat, DOE and
DOD plan to deploy communications links between individual border sites
and national command centers so that alarm data can be simultaneously
evaluated by multiple officials, thus establishing redundant layers of
accountability for alarm response. In addition, DOD plans to implement a
program in Uzbekistan to combat some of the underlying issues that can
lead to corruption through periodic screening of border security
personnel. State also conducts anticorruption training as part of its
overall export control assistance to foreign countries.

o Some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies
previously installed at foreign border sites have technical limitations
and can only detect gamma radiation, which makes them less effective at
detecting weapons-usable nuclear material than equipment with both gamma
and neutron radiation detection capabilities. Since 2002, DOE has
maintained this equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the
exception of one site in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new
implementing agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies within
the governments of each of the countries where the old equipment is
located are needed before DOE can install more sophisticated equipment.
According to DOE officials, these agreements are important because they
exempt DOE from paying foreign taxes and require host governments to
provide DOE with data on detections of illicit trafficking in nuclear
materials. Until these border sites receive equipment with both gamma and
neutron detection capability, they will remain vulnerable to certain forms
of nuclear smuggling.

o Regarding problems with equipment maintenance, DOE has not
systematically maintained handheld radiation detection equipment provided
by State and other agencies. As a result, many pieces of handheld
equipment, which are vital for border officials to conduct secondary
inspections of vehicles or pedestrians, may not function properly. For
example, in Georgia, we observed border guards performing secondary
inspections with a handheld radiation detector that had not been
calibrated (adjusted to conform with measurement standards) since 1997.
According to the detector's manufacturer, yearly recalibration is
necessary to ensure that the detector functions properly.

o Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do not
have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines, and
other infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment
and associated communication systems. Additionally, environmental
conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can affect the performance
of equipment. To mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and State have
provided generators and other equipment at remote border sites to ensure
stable supplies of electricity and, when appropriate, heat shields or
other protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection
equipment.

State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. radiation detection
equipment assistance overseas, but its ability to carry out its role as
lead coordinator is limited by shortcomings in its strategic plan for
interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all
U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance. In response to a
recommendation we made in 2002, State led the development of a
governmentwide plan to coordinate U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance overseas. This plan broadly defines a set of interagency goals
and outlines the roles and responsibilities of participating agencies.
However, the plan lacks key components we recommended, including overall
program cost estimates, projected time frames for program completion, and
specific performance measures. Without these elements in the plan, State
will be limited in its ability to effectively measure U.S. programs'
progress toward achieving the interagency goals. Additionally, in its role
as lead interagency coordinator, State has not maintained accurate
information on the operational status and location of all radiation
detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. While DOE has
responsibility for maintaining information on previously deployed
U.S.-funded portal monitors, State primarily works through its in-country
advisors to gather and maintain information on handheld radiation
detection equipment provided by State and other U.S. agencies. However,
four of nine in-country advisors we spoke with, who are stationed in
countries that have received significant amounts of handheld radiation
detection equipment, said that they did not have up-to-date information
regarding the operational status and location of this equipment.
Furthermore, while DOE, DOD, and State each maintain lists of radiation
detection equipment provided by their programs, they do not regularly
share such information, and there is no comprehensive list of all
equipment provided by U.S. programs. Without such a coordinated master
list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if
equipment is operational and being used as intended; determine the
equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance; or
detect whether an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.

To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, revise the long-term cost projections for
the SLD-Core program to account for the cost of providing specific
anticorruption measures and upgrade portal monitors previously provided by
other U.S. government agencies and currently maintained by DOE that do not
have both gamma and neutron detection capability as soon as possible.
Additionally, to strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation detection
assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working
with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, ensure maintenance is provided
for all handheld radiation detection equipment supplied by U.S. programs;
strengthen the Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S.
Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas by including specific
performance measures, overall cost estimates, and projected time frames
for completion of U.S. efforts; and compile, maintain, and share a master
list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance.

We provided the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State with draft
copies of this report for their review and comment. DOE and State
generally agreed with our conclusions and recommendations. DOD had no
written comments on our report. DOE provided additional information
clarifying its prioritization process, anticorruption measures, and
maintenance efforts. State disagreed with our emphasis on the interagency
working group and in-country advisors as the primary mechanisms for
coordination of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance programs.
State believes that informal coordination between State program officers
and their interagency counterparts in Washington, D.C., is the primary
coordination mechanism. We have added language that notes the existence of
such informal coordination. However, State's own Strategic Plan for
Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance
Overseas does not mention such informal mechanisms. Rather, State's plan
emphasizes the role of the interagency working group and states that such
coordination is "vital to the overall success of U.S. nuclear detection
assistance efforts." DOE, DOD, and State also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.

Background

Since our May 2002 report on nuclear smuggling, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported 481 additional confirmed cases of the
smuggling of nuclear and/or radiological materials.6 One of these cases
involved nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon.7 The
majority of new cases IAEA reported involved radiological sources, which
could be combined with conventional explosives to create a "dirty bomb."
According to IAEA, the majority of all reported incidents with
radiological sources involved criminal activity, most frequently theft.
Radiological sources and devices in which they are used can be attractive
for thieves because of their perceived high resale value or the value of
their ability to shield or encapsulate illegally shipped materials within
legal shipments of radioactive materials. Some of the reported cases
indicate a perceived demand for radioactive materials on the black market,
according to IAEA. From 2003 to 2004, the number of incidents reported by
IAEA substantially increased. IAEA indicated that improved reporting may,
in part, account for this increase. As of December 2004, 82 of IAEA's
Member States were participating in contributing to the database.8

Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material is
complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern-highly
enriched uranium-is among the most difficult materials to detect because
of its relatively low level of radioactivity. Uranium emits only gamma
radiation so detection equipment, which generally contains both gamma and
neutron detection capabilities, only detects uranium from the gamma
detector. However, gamma radiation emissions can be shielded by encasing
nuclear material within another high density material, such as lead.
Another nuclear material of great concern is plutonium, which emits both
gamma and neutron radiation. However, shielding nuclear material generally
does not prevent the detection of neutron radiation and, as a result,
plutonium can be detected by neutron detectors regardless of the amount of
shielding from high density material. According to DOE officials, neutron
radiation alarms are only caused by man-made materials, such as plutonium,
while gamma radiation alarms are caused by a variety of naturally
occurring sources including commercial goods such as bananas, ceramic
tiles, and fertilizer, in addition to dangerous nuclear materials, such as
uranium and plutonium.

The most common types of radiation detection equipment are radiation
portal monitors; handheld equipment, including both survey meters and
radioactive isotope identification devices; and radiation pagers. The
radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide to foreign
countries is commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. Radiation
portal monitors are stationary pieces of equipment designed to detect
radioactive materials being carried by vehicles, pedestrians, or railcars.
Radiation portal monitors currently being provided by U.S. agencies have
the ability to detect both gamma and neutron radiation, which is important
for detecting highly enriched uranium and plutonium, respectively.
According to DOE, radiation portal monitors with both gamma and neutron
detectors cost between about $28,000 and $55,000, plus the additional
costs associated with installing the equipment and communication systems
necessary to operate it.9 Figure 1 shows a picture of radiation portal
monitors with both gamma and neutron detectors.

Figure 1: Radiation Portal Monitors Containing Both Gamma and Neutron
Radiation Detectors at a Border Site in Northern Greece

In 2002, we reported that some U.S. agencies, primarily State, provided
radiation portal monitors that did not have the ability to detect neutron
radiation to foreign governments.10 Because this equipment is capable of
detecting only gamma radiation, it is less effective in detecting certain
nuclear material, such as plutonium that has been shielded with high
density material. Replacement cost for similar equipment (capable of
detecting only gamma radiation), is about $5,000, not including
installation costs, according to DOE officials. Figure 2 shows an example
of such a radiation portal monitor.

Figure 2: Older Radiation Portal Monitor Able to Detect Only Gamma
Radiation at a Border Site in Georgia

Handheld radiation detection equipment, such as survey meters and
radioactive isotope identification devices, are used by customs officials
and border guards to conduct secondary inspections,11 the aim of which is
to localize the source of an alarm and determine the nature of the
material present. Survey meters can be used to detect the level of
radiation by providing a count of the radiation level in the area.
Radioactive isotope identification devices, commonly known as RIIDs,
identify the specific isotope of the radioactive source detected. In
addition, U.S. programs often provide radiation pagers, which are small
radiation detection devices worn on belts by border security personnel to
continuously monitor levels of radiation in the area. Pagers are
considered personal safety devices and, therefore, should not be relied
upon to implement secondary inspections.12

Three U.S. Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future Spending Requirements for
Some Programs Are Uncertain

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million
to provide radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the
overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. However, because some
U.S. agencies provide radiation detection equipment to foreign countries
on an as needed basis, future U.S. government spending requirements for
such assistance are uncertain.

DOE, DOD, and State Had Spent a Combined Total of About $178 Million
through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to 36 Countries

DOE has spent about $131 million to provide radiation detection equipment
and training to 12 countries and to maintain certain types of equipment
previously installed by other U.S. agencies in 23 countries. DOD has also
spent almost $22 million to provide radiation portal monitors, handheld
radiation detection devices, and radiation detection training to 8
countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, State
has spent about $25 million to provide various types of radiation
detection equipment and related training to 31 countries. (See table 1.)

Table 1: U.S. Spending by Program on Radiation Detection Equipment and
Related Training Provided to Foreign Countries through the End of Fiscal
Year 2005

                                        

Dollars in millions                                           
         Agency                         Program                  Expenditures 
DOE                 Second Line of Defense "Core" program           $129.5 
DOE                 Cooperative Radiological Instrument                1.2 
                       Transfer project                          
DOD                 Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation          7.9 
                       Prevention Initiative                     
DOD                 International Counterproliferation                14.5 
                       Program                                   
State               Export Control and Related Border                 15.4 
                       Security program                          
State               Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund              9.1 
State               Georgia Border Security and Law                    0.2 
                       Enforcement program                       
Total                                                               $177.8 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

Note: Figures have been rounded.

DOE Has Spent About $131 Million Providing Radiation Detection Equipment
and Related Training

Since fiscal year 1998, DOE has spent about $130 million through its
SLD-Core program to provide radiation detection equipment and training at
83 border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania and to maintain certain
types of equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies
in 23 countries.13 DOE recently signed implementing agreements with the
governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine and will begin
work in those countries in fiscal year 2006. Through its SLD-Core program,
DOE currently plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of
about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at an estimated total cost of $570
million.

In addition, DOE spent about $1 million to provide radiation detection
equipment to nine countries through its Cooperative Radiological
Instrument Transfer project (CRITr), which began in 2004. Through CRITr,
DOE refurbishes previously decommissioned handheld radiation detection
equipment located at various DOE sites and provides this equipment to
foreign law enforcement officers. DOE plans to provide handheld equipment
to six additional countries through the CRITr project in fiscal year
2006.14

DOD Has Spent About $22 Million to Provide Handheld Radiation Detection
Devices to Eight Countries and to Install Portal Monitors in Uzbekistan

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent about $22 million
through two programs to provide handheld radiation detection devices to
eight countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to
install fixed radiation portal monitors in Uzbekistan. Specifically,
through its Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention
Initiative (WMD-PPI), DOD spent about $0.2 million to provide various
types of handheld radiation detection equipment to three countries and
about $6.4 million to install radiation portal monitors at 11 sites in
Uzbekistan.15 DOD plans to complete installation at 6 more sites in
Uzbekistan by the end of fiscal year 2006 and to finish all associated
radiation detection work in Uzbekistan by fiscal year 2009 at a total cost
of about $54 million. In fiscal year 2006, DOD plans to transfer
responsibility for maintenance of the equipment it has provided to
Uzbekistan to DOE's SLD-Core program.16

Through its International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), DOD has
spent about $15 million to provide handheld radiation detection equipment
and training on weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention to 6
countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, DOD
has provided a variety of training on weapons of mass destruction
proliferation to 17 additional countries. Through ICP, DOD plans to
continue to provide limited amounts of handheld radiation detection
equipment to other countries in the future.17

State Has Spent About $25 Million to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment
and Related Training to 31 Countries

The Department of State, through three programs-the Export Control and
Related Border Security program (EXBS), the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF), and the Georgia Border Security and Law
Enforcement program (GBSLE)-has spent about $25 million since fiscal year
1994 to  provide radiation detection equipment and related training to 31
foreign countries. State's EXBS program has spent approximately $15.4
million to provide radiation portal monitors, various types of handheld
radiation detection devices, X-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors,
and training on how to use this equipment to 30 countries mainly in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, through NDF, State
spent about $9.1 million from fiscal year 1994 through 2001 to, among
other things, install portal monitors in countries other than Russia,
provide handheld radiation detectors, and provide vans equipped with X-ray
machines to countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
Lastly, through its GBSLE program, State spent $0.2 million in 1999 to
provide border guards and customs officials in the Republic of Georgia
with 137 radiation pagers. State has not provided any additional radiation
detection equipment assistance through NDF since 2001 or through its GBSLE
program since 1999.18

Future U.S. Spending on Radiation Detection Assistance Is Uncertain

Because some U.S. programs provide radiation detection equipment to
foreign countries on an as needed basis and DOE has yet to gain agreements
with all of the countries where it would like to install equipment, future
U.S. government spending requirements for radiation detection assistance
remain uncertain. For example, although DOE is the primary U.S. agency
responsible for installing radiation portal monitors in foreign countries,
State selectively funds projects to provide radiation portal monitors to
foreign countries through its EXBS program. State officials told us that
State coordinates its work in this area with DOE to avoid duplication, and
it conducts these projects on an as needed basis to provide a quick
response to emerging nuclear smuggling threats. For example, in December
2005, State installed portal monitors and provided handheld radiation
detection equipment to one site in Armenia at a cost of about $0.5
million, in part because it believed that the threat of nuclear smuggling
warranted immediate installation of this equipment. State officials we
spoke with told us that they coordinated with DOE to ensure State's work
in Armenia is consistent with overall U.S. goals and that the specific
equipment installed met minimum detection standards. Furthermore, State
officials also told us that the newly installed radiation portal monitors
at this site in Armenia provide a redundant layer of security with DOE's
planned work to install equipment on the opposite side of the border in
the Republic of Georgia.

Because State selectively funds portal monitor projects through its EXBS
program to provide a quick U.S. government response to emerging security
threats of nuclear smuggling, it is uncertain how many other projects
State will fund in this area, in what countries these projects will be
conducted, or how much they will cost. Additionally, State officials also
told us that they have yet to determine whether or not they will fund any
future projects to provide radiation detection equipment assistance to
foreign countries through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund or the
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program. As a result, it is
uncertain how many other projects State will fund through either of these
two programs or how much they will cost.

DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of about 350 sites in
31 countries by 2012 at an estimated cost of $570 million based on a
strategy that analyzes and prioritizes countries for receiving
installations. However, it cannot be certain which countries will be
included in the SLD-Core program until it signs the necessary agreements
with these countries' governments. For example, DOE planned to complete
installations in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, and Ukraine in fiscal year
2005. However, installations in Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine will not be
completed until at least fiscal year 2006 because of delays in signing
implementing agreements with these countries. Additionally, DOE is still
in the process of trying to reach agreement with Kazakhstan. In fiscal
year 2004, DOE reallocated a portion of its funding to directly fund its
planned work at certain border sites in Kazakhstan. However, difficulty in
reaching agreement with Kazakhstan continues to delay this work. If DOE
continues to experience delays in signing agreements with foreign
countries, or cannot reach agreements with all of the countries where it
currently plans to install equipment, it may need to alter its planned
scope of work and overall cost estimates for the program. Furthermore,
once DOE reaches agreement with a certain country, it still needs to
conduct individual site assessments to determine at which sites providing
radiation detection equipment will be cost-effective, as well as the
amount of equipment each site will require. Therefore, DOE is limited in
its ability to determine the total cost of the SLD-Core program until it
signs implementing agreements with the governments of countries where it
plans to work and conducts assessments to determine which specific sites
within those countries require radiation detection equipment and in what
amounts.

The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance Problems,
and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear
Smuggling

U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment to foreign
governments face a number of challenges that affect the installation and
effective operation of radiation detection equipment, including: the
threat of corruption of border security officials in some foreign
countries, technical limitations of radiation detection equipment
previously deployed by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance of
some handheld equipment, and the lack of infrastructure necessary to
operate radiation detection equipment and harsh environmental conditions
at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State have taken some steps to address
these challenges, such as providing multitiered communications systems to
mitigate corruption so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed at
several levels of authority and supplying protective casings for radiation
portal monitors to prevent damage from vandals or extreme heat.

Possible Corruption of Border Guards Poses a Threat to the Effective
Operation of U.S.-Funded Radiation Detection Equipment

According to U.S. and foreign government officials, corruption is a
pervasive problem within the ranks of border security organizations.
Specifically, because foreign border guards are often poorly paid and
geographically isolated, there are concerns that foreign officials could
be bribed and turn off the radiation detection equipment and allow nuclear
smuggling to occur. For example, an official might turn off the equipment
to allow a nuclear smuggler to pass through a border crossing. According
to a Russian press report, in October 2004, a Russian customs agent at a
site in western Russia was fired because he was aiding a smuggling ring.
Additionally, in July 2005, after the newly elected President of Ukraine
took office, he reorganized many agencies within the government, including
the Customs Service, because of concerns about corruption.

DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt
foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of
U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment
or ignoring alarms. As a result, U.S. programs that provide fixed
radiation portal monitors are taking some steps to evaluate the degree to
which corruption is present in the countries and regions where they are
working or plan to work. For example, DOE's SLD-Core program commissioned
three studies to better understand corruption and the challenges that it
could bring to the program. Additionally, DOE includes countrywide
corruption assessments as part of its efforts to help program officials
prioritize countries to include in the SLD-Core program. In addition, DOD
and State also include anticorruption courses as part of the radiation
detection training they provide to foreign border security personnel.

Some U.S. programs also have taken or plan to take other specific steps to
mitigate the threat of corruption, such as (1) providing multitiered
communications systems so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed at
several levels of authority, (2) implementing programs to combat some of
the underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic
screening of border security personnel, and (3) installing radiation
portal monitors on both sides of a particular border if there are concerns
about corruption of personnel in these countries. For example, DOE and DOD
are deploying communication systems that link the activities at individual
border sites with regional and national command centers. By doing so,
alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by officials both at the site
and up the chain of command, thus establishing redundant layers of
accountability for responding to alarms. As a result, if a local official
turns off the radiation detection equipment at a site, higher level
officials can quickly be made aware of the incident and investigate the
reasons for the alarm. Additionally, DOD plans to implement an Employee
Dependability Program in Uzbekistan that includes background checks,
personal interviews of applicants, monitoring of performance and behavior,
and annual refresher training to combat some of the underlying issues that
can lead to corruption among border security personnel. DOE officials told
us that they are considering implementing such a screening program in some
countries where the SLD-Core program works. Lastly, U.S. programs are
installing radiation portal monitors on both sides of some borders to
create redundant coverage to increase the likelihood of detection and
interdiction. In fiscal year 2006, DOE plans to install radiation portal
monitors at a number of sites in Georgia. At one site in Armenia, across
the border from a planned DOE installation, State installed radiation
portal monitors in December 2005, in part, because of concerns about
corruption on both sides of the border at this location. DOE is also
considering employing this type of redundant coverage at other locations
throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

While DOE has taken steps to determine the level of corruption in some
countries and regions where it works and includes countrywide corruption
assessments as part of its prioritization model, DOE is still in the
process of determining in what countries it will provide specific
anticorruption measures and how much it will cost to do so based on its
analysis of the corruption threat. For example, DOE estimates that it will
spend about $1 million to provide radiation detection equipment and
related communications systems at a typical foreign border crossing. DOE
officials noted that the standard communication systems the SLD-Core
program provides with radiation portal monitors have some anticorruption
value because radiation alarms require more than one official to review
and close out before the system can be reset. However, DOE has not
included the costs associated with other specific anticorruption measures
in the long-term cost estimates for its SLD-Core program.

Some Border Crossings Remain More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling Because
DOE Has Not Upgraded Less Sophisticated Equipment Installed by Other U.S.
Agencies

In 2002, DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining some radiation
detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies
in 23 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However,
DOE has not upgraded any of this less sophisticated equipment, with the
exception of one site in Azerbaijan.19 Through an interagency agreement,
DOE assumed responsibility for ensuring the long-term sustainability and
continued operation of radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans equipped
with radiation detectors that State and other U.S. agencies provided to
these countries. Through this agreement, DOE provides spare parts,
preventative maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through regularly
scheduled maintenance visits. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE had
conducted maintenance and sustainability activities for equipment in 21 of
the 23 countries where equipment had been provided. DOE officials told us
that, although Belarus received a significant amount of radiation
detection equipment from DOD, DOE is currently prohibited from maintaining
this equipment by restrictions placed on U.S. assistance to Belarus.20 As
a result, the maintenance status of the 38 portal monitors and almost 200
pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment DOD provided to Belarus
is unknown. Additionally, at the request of the Turkish government, DOE no
longer maintains 41 portal monitors and over 150 pieces of handheld
radiation detection equipment State previously provided to Turkey.

As we originally reported in 2002, at some sites in foreign countries,
State and other U.S. agencies installed portal monitors that contained
only gamma radiation detectors, which are less effective in detecting
certain nuclear material, such as plutonium, than detectors with both
gamma and neutron detection capability. Although State's current policy is
to install radiation detection equipment with both gamma and neutron
detection capability, according to DOE officials, because of their
configuration and sensitivity, these older portal monitors are less likely
to detect small quantities of highly enriched uranium or nuclear material
that is shielded, for example, by a lead container or certain parts of a
vehicle. When it assumed responsibility for maintaining this equipment,
DOE conducted an initial assessment of these portal monitors to determine
whether they were functional and what maintenance was required. During the
course of this analysis, DOE found that much of the equipment was damaged
and required total replacement or major repairs. In such cases, DOE
installed similar equipment with gamma radiation detectors but chose not
to upgrade the equipment with newer portal monitors that would be capable
of detecting both gamma and neutron radiation. DOE's policy was to replace
this equipment in-kind and wait to upgrade the equipment as part of a
countrywide deployment through the SLD-Core program. However, according to
SLD-Core program officials, DOE did not have funds earmarked for upgrading
the equipment in the absence of a countrywide deployment through the
SLD-Core program.

Additionally, SLD-Core program officials stated that DOE would need to
sign new agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies within the
governments of the countries where State and other agencies had previously
installed equipment before DOE could invest "substantial resources" to
upgrade the equipment. DOE officials noted that replacing the less
sophisticated portal monitors with similar equipment usually costs less
than $5,000, plus installation costs, while deploying a comprehensive
system comprised of portal monitors that can detect both gamma and neutron
radiation, associated communication systems, and related training can cost
up to $1 million per site. The agreements are important because they
exempt DOE from payment of host government taxes, customs duties, or other
charges per congressional guidance. In addition, these agreements require
the host government to provide DOE with data on detections of illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials gathered as a result of assistance DOE
provided through the SLD-Core program. Though the SLD-Core program has
signed agreements with some countries where the less sophisticated
equipment was installed, such as Ukraine, DOE has yet to upgrade any of
the equipment in these countries, with the exception of one site in
Azerbaijan, primarily because the details of the countrywide installations
are still being determined. According to DOE officials, as countries with
older equipment sign agreements with DOE to implement the full SLD-Core
program, sites in these countries with less sophisticated equipment will
be upgraded.

In November 2005, DOE completed an assessment of the maintenance
activities it performs on equipment provided by other U.S. agencies. DOE
found that equipment failures at many of these sites go unattended, often
for months. DOE determined that its maintenance of X-ray vans previously
provided by State was not critical to the mission of the SLD-Core program.
As a result, DOE is planning to phase out its maintenance of X-ray vans
after fiscal year 2007. According to DOE officials, the budget of the
SLD-Core program cannot sustain what DOE considers "non-mission critical
work." In fiscal year 2005, DOE bore the full financial responsibility for
all maintenance activities because State provided no funding to DOE for
this work. In addition to the X-ray vans, DOE evaluated the sites where
portal monitors were previously installed by State and other agencies and
identified those monitors that should no longer be supported by the
SLD-Core program. DOE assessed each location where less sophisticated
portal monitors are maintained and prioritized which sites should receive
upgraded equipment. DOE plans to work with State to upgrade selected sites
and decommission some sites that have equipment that is not being used or
is beyond repair.

Concerns Exist About Maintenance of Some Handheld Radiation Detection
Equipment

DOE and State signed an interagency agreement in 2002 giving
responsibility for maintaining most radiation detection equipment
previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies to DOE. However,
this agreement did not make DOE responsible for maintaining handheld
radiation detection equipment previously deployed by these agencies. State
has also not assumed responsibility for maintaining about 1,000 handheld
radiation detectors provided by its programs that are vital to border
officials for conducting secondary inspections of vehicles and
pedestrians, and, as a result, much of this equipment is in disrepair.21
For example, at one site in Georgia, we observed border guards performing
secondary inspections with a handheld radiation detector, previously
provided by State, which had not been calibrated since 1997 (see fig. 3).
According to the detector's manufacturer, yearly recalibration is
necessary to ensure that the detector functions properly. Furthermore, DOE
officials we spoke with told us that-similar to radiation portal
monitors-handheld radiation detection devices require periodic maintenance
checks and recalibration to ensure that they remain operable and continue
to meet minimum detection standards.

Figure 3: Handheld Radiation Detector in Georgia Needing Recalibration

Batteries used in some handheld radiation detection equipment typically
need to be replaced every 2 years and some types of handhelds are fragile
and can be easily broken, requiring that replacement devices or spare
parts be readily available. At the request of State, DOE is currently
evaluating the costs associated with maintaining this handheld equipment.
Specifically, DOE has asked its contractor currently responsible for
maintaining the portal monitors and X-ray vans in these countries to
develop a proposal for assuming responsibility for maintenance of the
handheld equipment as well. According to DOE officials, maintenance of
handheld equipment could be conducted during regularly scheduled visits
for maintenance of

portal monitors and X-ray vans.22 As a result, DOE officials believe that
no additional travel funds would be required for this activity. However,
DOE officials also told us that if they were to assume full responsibility
for maintaining the handheld equipment at sites where they are maintaining
radiation portal monitors installed by State and other agencies they would
need additional funding for labor and to provide replacement equipment and
spare parts.

Limited Infrastructure and Harsh Environmental Conditions at Some Border
Sites Pose Equipment Problems

Limited infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some foreign
border sites create challenges to the installation and operation of
radiation detection equipment. For example, many border sites are located
in remote areas, which often do not have access to reliable supplies of
electricity, fiber optic lines, and other infrastructure needed to operate
radiation portal monitors and associated communication systems. Prior to
providing radiation portal monitors, U.S. programs typically perform site
assessments to determine the details surrounding how radiation detection
equipment will be installed at a given site. The assessment includes the
operational needs of the equipment depending on the infrastructure
available at the site. To address the needs identified, DOE, DOD, and
State provide generators at some sites to supply electricity to the
radiation detection equipment because the electric power supply shuts down
periodically or may be very low at these remote sites. Additionally, the
communication systems that are provided to report activities from the
radiation detectors require fiber optic cabling for their operation. If no
cabling exists, underground cabling or radio wave operated communication
systems must be installed to perform this function. Finally, at some
border sites, the radiation portal monitors are located significant
distances from the control and communication system center. U.S. program
officials we spoke with expressed concern that theft could occur because
of the remote location of this equipment. To prevent such interference
with the equipment, antitampering measures such as protective cages are
used to protect the integrity of the portal monitors (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Rail Portal Monitor in Western Uzbekistan with Antitampering
Protection

Additionally, environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme
heat, can compromise the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment.
Extreme heat can accelerate the degradation of components within

radiation detection equipment and, as a result, can affect the performance
and long-term sustainability of the equipment. DOD placed a protective
casing around the radiation portal monitors it installed in Uzbekistan as
a heat shield to ensure the effective long-term operation of the equipment
(see fig. 5).

Figure 5: Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan with Heat Shield
Enclosure

State's Efforts to Coordinate U.S. Assistance Are Limited by Deficiencies
in the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Lack of a Comprehensive List of
Equipment Provided by U.S. Programs

State coordinates U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas
through an interagency working group and in-country advisors. However, its
ability to carry out its role as lead interagency coordinator is limited
by deficiencies in the strategic plan for interagency coordination and by
its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection
assistance. Specifically, the interagency strategic plan lacks key
components, such as overall program cost estimates, projected time frames
for program completion, and specific performance measures. Additionally,
State has not maintained accurate information on the operational status
and location of all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S.
programs.

State Coordinates U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance through an
Interagency Working Group and In-Country Advisors

As the lead coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance
overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate the efforts of U.S.
programs that provide this type of assistance to foreign countries.
State's coordination takes place primarily through two methods: an
interagency working group and State's in-country advisors. The main
coordination mechanism for U.S. radiation detection assistance programs is
the interagency working group, chaired by State, which consists of program
representatives from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS. According to State, this
working group holds meetings about once every 2 months to coordinate the
activities of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment and
export control assistance overseas. These interagency meetings attempt to
identify and prevent overlap among the various U.S. programs through
discussion of such issues as funding, upcoming program activities, and
recent trips to countries receiving U.S. assistance. Meetings are attended
by program managers responsible for overseeing and implementing radiation
detection equipment assistance programs in foreign countries. While DOD
and DOE officials we spoke with told us that these interagency meetings
are somewhat beneficial, they stated that meetings primarily facilitate
coordination at a high level and typically lack the specific detail
necessary to identify and prevent program overlap within countries and
regions where multiple U.S. programs provide radiation detection equipment
assistance. Through this working group, State also maintains an
interagency schedule that provides information on planned activities,
training, and site visits of U.S. programs.

State also coordinates U.S. programs through in-country advisors,
stationed in more than 20 foreign countries. While State funds these
advisors, State officials told us that they work on behalf of all U.S.
programs that provide nuclear detection assistance in their respective
countries. According to State officials, these advisors serve as the
on-the-ground coordinators of U.S. export control and border security
assistance and are the primary sources of information concerning past and
present provision of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance in
their respective countries. State officials also noted that frequent
informal coordination takes place between program managers at State and
their counterparts in Washington, D.C., at other federal agencies.

In addition to State's coordination efforts, DHS recently created the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with responsibilities including
coordinating nuclear detection research and developing a global nuclear
detection architecture.23 According to DHS, though DNDO is principally
focused on domestic detection, its coordinating work will enhance U.S.
efforts overseas through the design of a global nuclear detection
architecture implemented under current agency responsibilities. Equally,
while detection technologies developed by DNDO will be directed primarily
by operational requirements for domestic applications, many technologies
developed could have application in overseas radiation detection equipment
assistance programs. However, DOE, DOD, and State officials we spoke with
were unclear on what specific future role DNDO would play in coordinating
activities of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment
assistance to foreign countries. These agencies are working with DNDO to
clarify the future role that the office will play.

The Interagency Strategic Plan to Coordinate U.S. Radiation Detection
Equipment Assistance Overseas Lacks Key Components

In 2002, we reported that U.S. efforts to help other countries combat
nuclear smuggling needed strengthened coordination and planning to link
U.S. programs through common goals and objectives, strategies and time
frames for providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating

the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.24 State, as the lead coordinator of
U.S. nuclear detection assistance overseas, led the development of a
governmentwide interagency strategic plan to guide the efforts of U.S.
programs that provide this assistance.25 The plan broadly defines a set of
interagency goals and objectives, establishes minimum technological
standards for radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide,
and outlines the roles and responsibilities of each agency. However, the
plan does not include several elements necessary to effectively link U.S.
programs together, prevent duplication, and guide their efforts toward
completion.

While the plan provides U.S. agencies with a broad framework for
coordinating this type of assistance by defining a set of interagency
goals and outlining the roles and responsibilities of each agency, it does
not include specific performance measures, overall program cost estimates,
or projected time frames for program completion. Without incorporating
these key elements into its plan, State will be limited in its ability, as
lead coordinator, to effectively link U.S. programs and guide their
efforts toward achieving interagency goals. For example, a primary goal in
its plan is that recipient countries possess a comprehensive capability to
detect and interdict illicitly trafficked nuclear and radiological
material. However, without incorporating specific performance measures
into its plan, State has no transparent way to effectively measure the
performance of U.S. programs in this regard or to determine the degree to
which they are reaching this or other interagency goals discussed in its
plan. Finally, without incorporating overall program cost estimates and
time frames for program completion into its plan, State cannot effectively
determine the amount of U.S. government resources that will be required to
achieve interagency goals and objectives or under what time frames these
resources will be required. If State does not take steps to include these
key elements in its plan, it will continue to be limited in its ability to
effectively track the progress of U.S. programs, measure their performance
toward achieving interagency goals and objectives, and determine the
amount of funding required to achieve these goals and under what time
frames these resources will be needed.

State Has Not Maintained Accurate Information on All Previously Provided
Handheld Equipment, Which Inhibits Its Ability to Effectively Coordinate
U.S. Assistance

State, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, has not maintained
accurate information on the operational status and location of all the
handheld radiation detection equipment previously provided by U.S.
programs. While DOE has taken responsibility for maintaining information
on previously deployed U.S.-funded radiation portal monitors, State
primarily works through its in-country advisors and its interagency
working group to gather and maintain information on handheld radiation
detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. State, through its EXBS
program, assumed direct management of the in-country advisors from DHS in
February 2005. As part of their duties, State's in-country advisors are
required to maintain a record of the transfer of all U.S.-provided
export/border control equipment, including radiation detection equipment,
within their respective countries and to follow up to ensure it is at the
locations specified by the recipient government and is properly
maintained. However, four of the nine advisors we spoke with, who are
stationed in countries that have received a combined total of about 1,000
pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment from U.S. programs,
acknowledged that they did not have up-to-date information regarding the
present operational status or location of this equipment. Additionally,
five of nine advisors we spoke with were unaware that, as part of their
duties, they are required to maintain a record of all U.S.-provided
equipment within their country. However, some advisors we spoke with
stated that they attempt to determine this information but are sometimes
limited in their ability to do so because other U.S. programs have not
always coordinated with them before providing equipment in their country.
As a result, it is necessary for some advisors to follow up with the host
government to determine the status and location of U.S.-provided radiation
detection equipment. According to some advisors, however, host governments
may not always provide accurate information on what equipment has been
provided in the past, where it is currently located, and its current
operational status.

According to State officials, there is no comprehensive interagency list
of radiation detection equipment that has been previously provided to
foreign governments by U.S. programs. In 2002, we recommended that State,
as the lead interagency coordinator, work with DOE and DOD to develop such
a list. Officials we spoke with at DOE and DOD stated that having access
to accurate information on past provisions of all radiation detection
equipment provided by U.S. programs is essential to interagency
coordination, preventing overlap among programs, as well as appropriately
assessing a specific country's equipment needs. During the course of our
review, program officials at DOE, DOD, and State provided us with lists of
radiation detection equipment their programs had provided to other
countries. According to information we received from program managers at
DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld radiation
detection equipment, including radiation pagers and radioactive isotope
identification devices, had been provided to 36 foreign countries through
the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of this equipment was provided
to the same countries by multiple agencies and programs, it is difficult
to determine the degree to which duplication of effort has occurred. For
example, since fiscal year 1994, a total of 17 different countries have
received handheld radiation detection equipment from more than one U.S.
agency. However, although DOE, DOD, and State programs each maintain their
own lists of radiation detection equipment provided to foreign countries,
officials at these agencies told us that they do not regularly share such
information with each other. Without the development of a comprehensive
interagency list of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment, program
managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess the equipment
needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance, may unknowingly
provide duplicative sets of equipment, and cannot determine if the
equipment is being used for its intended purpose or is in need of
maintenance and repair.

Conclusions

Since the mid-1990s, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million to
provide a variety of radiation detection equipment to countries around the
world, and it is important that this equipment be properly maintained so
that it can be effectively used to combat nuclear smuggling overseas.
Since taking over responsibility for maintaining portal monitors deployed
by other agencies in 2002, DOE has worked to ensure that this equipment is
functioning and being used as intended. However, because DOE's interagency
maintenance agreement with State did not include maintaining handheld
radiation detection equipment previously provided by State and other
agencies, much of this equipment may not be properly functioning. Handheld
radiation detection equipment is vital for border officials to conduct
secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians. Without taking steps to
ensure that all previously provided radiation detection equipment,
specifically handheld equipment, is adequately maintained and remains
operational, State cannot ensure the continued effectiveness or long-term
sustainability of this equipment.

Because corrupt officials could undermine the effectiveness of U.S.
radiation detection assistance programs overseas by turning off radiation
detection equipment or not properly responding to alarms, it is important
for U.S. programs to employ anticorruption efforts, such as multitiered
communication systems for radiation alarms, training, employee
dependability programs, and redundant installations of equipment when
providing such assistance. While we are encouraged that DOE, DOD, and
State employ some corruption mitigation measures in their programs, DOE is
still in the process of determining in which countries it will provide
these specific anticorruption measures and how much such assistance would
cost to implement.

In addition, though DOE has maintained less sophisticated radiation portal
monitors previously deployed by other agencies since 2002, it has not
upgraded the equipment at any of these sites. As a result, border sites
with less sophisticated radiation portal monitors are more vulnerable to
nuclear smuggling than sites with equipment that can detect both gamma and
neutron radiation. We originally reported on this problem in our May 2002
report. In its official comments on that report, DOE stated that these
less sophisticated monitors "are not as reliable [as monitors with both
gamma and neutron radiation detection capabilities], and have limited or
no ability to detect shielded plutonium." Although it is encouraging that
DOE has recently undertaken an assessment of the equipment it maintains
that was installed by other U.S. agencies, DOE has not yet improved the
neutron detection capabilities of any of these less sophisticated
monitors, with the exception of one site in Azerbaijan. As a result, these
sites remain just as vulnerable to certain types of nuclear smuggling as
they were when we first reported this deficiency in May 2002.

Finally, we believe that, unless key components such as overall program
cost estimates, projected time frames for completion, and specific
performance measures are incorporated into the interagency strategic plan,
State will be limited in its ability to determine the amount of resources
and time needed to achieve the broader interagency goals discussed in its
plan or to effectively measure U.S. programs' progress toward achieving
these goals. Furthermore, without accurate information on the current
status and location of radiation detection equipment previously provided
by U.S. programs, State cannot effectively fulfill its role as interagency
coordinator of U.S. assistance. Because there are at least seven U.S.
programs at three federal agencies that provide radiation detection
equipment to foreign countries, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State
need access to a "master list" that shows the status and location of all
U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance to more accurately determine
the needs of specific countries and to avoid duplication of effort among
U.S. programs. Without such a list, the potential exists for programs to
provide duplicative sets of radiation detection equipment to the same
country.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, take the following two actions:

o Integrate projected spending on specific anticorruption measures into
the long-term cost estimates for the SLD-Core program.

o Upgrade less sophisticated portal monitors previously installed by other
U.S. agencies where DOE has determined this to be appropriate as soon as
possible and include funding to accomplish this in DOE's planning and
budgeting process.

To strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working
with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, take the following three
actions:

o Ensure continued maintenance of all radiation detection equipment
provided to foreign governments, including all handheld equipment
previously provided by State and other agencies.

o Strengthen the Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S.
Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas by including in the plan
(1) specific performance measures to more effectively track and measure
the progress U.S. programs are making toward achievement of interagency
goals and objectives and (2) overall cost estimates and projected time
frames for completion of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance
efforts to determine the amount of U.S. government resources required to
achieve interagency goals and objectives and under what time frames these
resources will be required.

o To the extent possible, account for all U.S.-funded radiation detection
equipment provided to foreign governments, especially handheld equipment,
by creating, maintaining, and sharing among all agencies a comprehensive
list of such assistance.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOE and State agreed in general with our conclusions and recommendations.
DOD had no written comments on our report. DOE, DOD, and State provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, DOE wrote that it does not believe that our report
adequately reflects the department's efforts to maintain handheld
radiation detection equipment provided by State and other agencies because
DOE has a process in place to identify and replace handheld equipment used
at sites where DOE maintains radiation portal monitors installed by State
and other agencies. However, we believe that the extent of DOE's program
is fairly presented because this effort does not cover all handheld
equipment previously provided by State and other agencies-only equipment
at the selected sites visited by DOE's maintenance teams is maintained.
Further, the current operational status of the vast majority of handheld
radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State and other
agencies cannot be determined, in large part, because State has not
maintained a comprehensive list of such equipment.

In its comments, State disagreed with our lack of emphasis on the
"informal coordination role played by the department's front-line country
program officers." State considers informal consultations between these
officials and their interagency counterparts to be the "primary means of
coordination of its efforts concerning radiation detection equipment
provisions." State believes that such informal coordination is "much more
important than coordination through the interagency working group or with
State's in-country advisors." We have added language to our report noting
the role of informal coordination in these programs. However, State's
emphasis on them as its primary means of coordinating radiation detection
assistance programs conflicts with its own planning documents. In its
Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear
Detection Assistance Overseas, State claims that "a standing sub-working
group, the International Nuclear Detection Interagency Working Group, will
routinely coordinate nuclear detection, interdiction, and investigation
assistance provided by U.S. government agencies." State's plan emphasizes
the role of the interagency working group and states that such
coordination is "vital to the overall success of U.S. nuclear detection
assistance efforts." State's plan does not, however, emphasize or even
mention informal coordination mechanisms as a method for State's
coordination of U.S. radiation detection assistance programs.

State also believes that its in-country advisors are unfairly criticized
for not maintaining comprehensive lists of radiation detection equipment
in countries where they are responsible. State cited competing claims on
the advisors' time, their many responsibilities within the EXBS program,
and the limited resources at their disposal. However, State's own guidance
to its in-country advisors states that the advisors' "general duties
include...maintaining a record of the transfer of all U.S.
government-provided nonproliferation export/border control equipment, and
following-up to ensure that it is operational, being used for intended
purposes at the locations previously specified by the recipient
government, and in accordance with U.S. laws and policies."

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary
of Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the Secretary
of Homeland Security; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
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charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include R.
Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Chris Ferencik,
Gregory Marchand, and Jim Shafer.

Gene Aloise Director, Natural Resources and Environment

List of Requesters

The Honorable Susan M. Collins Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs United States Senate

The Honorable Norm Coleman Chairman Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell Ranking Minority Member Committee on Energy
and Commerce House of Representatives

Scope and Methodology Appendix I

We performed our review of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection
equipment assistance to foreign countries at the Departments of Energy
(DOE), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and State (State) in
Washington, D.C.; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New
Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Additionally, we also visited a "nonprobability" sample of six countries
(Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) where U.S.
agencies have provided radiation detection equipment.1 We visited these
six countries to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment in
operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs with foreign
officials. We determined which specific countries to visit based on
several criteria, such as historic U.S. government spending to provide
radiation detection equipment within that country; countries receiving
radiation detection equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and programs;
countries receiving significant amounts of handheld equipment; countries
with an in-country advisor stationed at a U.S. Embassy; countries where
DOE maintains radiation detection equipment previously installed by State
and other U.S. agencies; the current political environment within the
country; and our ability to travel from country to county within a
reasonable amount of time.

To address the progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation
detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we reviewed documents
and had discussions with officials from DOE's Second Line of Defense
"Core" (SLD-Core) program, Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer
project, and International Nuclear Export Control program; DOE's Office of
General Counsel; and DOE's private sector contractors-SI International,
Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, Bechtel-Nevada, TSA Systems, and Miratek. We
also reviewed documents and interviewed relevant officials from DHS's
Customs and Border Protection; State's Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) program, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, and
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program; DOD's Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI), International
Counterproliferation Program (ICP), and Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
DOD's private sector contractor-Washington Group International; Los Alamos
National Laboratory; Sandia National Laboratories; and Oak Ridge National
Laboratory.

In addition, in October 2004, we visited Greece and Macedonia to interview
Greek and Macedonian officials and to see U.S. radiation detection
assistance provided in each country. In August 2005, we visited Georgia,
Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to see where U.S. agencies have provided
radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection
equipment in operation, and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs
with foreign officials. We also visited Belgium to meet with officials
from the European Union to discuss radiation detection equipment
assistance provided to foreign countries by that organization. During our
visit to Greece, we spoke with Greek officials from the Greek Atomic
Energy Commission; the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance; and Customs
Directorate General (Greek Customs Service). While in Greece, we toured
two border crossings where DOE had installed radiation detection equipment
through the SLD-Core program, SLD-Core installations at Athens
International Airport, and a small research reactor in Athens that
received physical security upgrades from DOE prior to the 2004 Olympic
Games. While in Macedonia, we interviewed Macedonian officials and toured
one border site where radiation detection equipment had previously been
provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of
State.

While in Russia, we spoke with officials from the Federal Customs Service
of Russia, ASPECT (a Russian company that develops radiation detection
equipment), and DOE officials responsible for implementing the SLD-Core
program in Russia. During our visit to Russia, we toured DOE installations
at three airports and one seaport, the Federal Customs Service Central
Command Center where Russian Customs officials gather and respond to
portal monitor alarm data, and the Federal Customs Service Training
Academy in Saint Petersburg. While in Uzbekistan, we spoke with officials
from DOD's WMD-PPI program, Washington Group International, State and DOD
officials at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan's Institute of
Nuclear Physics, and the Uzbek State Customs Committee. While in
Uzbekistan, we toured the Tashkent Airport and a land border crossing
where DOD had provided radiation detection equipment assistance through
the WMD-PPI program. We also toured a small research reactor in Uzbekistan
that previously received physical security upgrades from DOE, such as
barbed-wire fences and video surveillance cameras. During our visit to
Georgia, we spoke with officials from State's Georgia Border Security and
Law Enforcement program, Department of Georgian State Border Defense,
Georgia Border Security Coordinating Group, and Georgia's Andronikashvili
Institute of Nuclear Physics. We toured a land border crossing where State
had previously provided radiation detection equipment and visited the
Georgian Border Guard Training Academy. While in Ukraine, we spoke with
DOE, DOD, and State officials at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine's
Border Security Coordinating Group, Ukraine's Border Guard Service, and
toured a land border crossing where State had previously provided
radiation detection equipment that DOE currently maintains.

We discussed coordination issues with U.S. in-country advisors stationed
in countries receiving U.S. assistance, including Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We
developed a structured interview guide with a standard set of questions,
which we asked all of our interviewees. We designed our interview guide
with the assistance of a GAO methodologist. The practical difficulties of
asking questions may introduce other types of errors. For example,
differences in how a particular question is interpreted or the sources of
information available to respondents can introduce unwanted variability
into the responses, so we included steps to minimize such errors. We
pretested the content and format of the interview guide with two
individuals and made minor changes as appropriate.

We chose which specific in-country advisors to interview based on several
criteria that include advisors who are stationed in the countries we would
be visiting, advisors who are stationed in countries receiving significant
amounts of radiation detection equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and
programs, and advisors who are stationed in countries where DOE maintains
radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S.
agencies. Once we determined which specific advisors to interview, we
created a list, which we then randomly ordered to provide an unbiased
approach to conducting our interviews. Our goal was to talk with all the
advisors on the list, but we knew that circumstances might prevent that so
we used a randomized list to provide the order of contacting the advisors.
We initiated contact with each advisor from this list, but if we could not
establish contact with that advisor, we attempted to establish contact
with the next advisor on our list. In some instances, we slightly modified
our list due to unforeseen developments. For example, during our visit to
the Republic of Georgia, we became aware of a Department of State project
to install radiation detection equipment in Armenia opposite the Georgian
border. Since this met our criteria for including a country in our pool of
interviewees, we agreed it was appropriate, for the purposes of this
review, to add Armenia. We then contacted the in-country advisor stationed
in Armenia to learn more about this project. In addition, we removed the
responses from the advisor in Russia from our total list of advisors
because he failed to respond to more than half of our questions and stated
that his role in coordinating this type of assistance in Russia is
nonexistent because DOE, through its SLD-Core program, conducts and
coordinates radiation detection assistance provided to Russia. Lastly, we
interviewed the advisor responsible for overseeing implementation of U.S.
assistance to the Republic of Georgia because Georgia has received
radiation detection equipment in the past from multiple U.S. programs. To
obtain responses to our structured interview questions, we generally used
e-mail and phone interviews. However, during our visits to Georgia and
Ukraine, we were able to meet with the in-country advisors to obtain
responses to our questions.

To assess the current and expected future costs of U.S. programs that
provide radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we
reviewed documents from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS detailing program
expenditures, projected costs, and schedule estimates. We reviewed
contract data for expenditures through the end of fiscal year 2005 and met
numerous times with officials from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS to discuss the
data. We obtained responses from key database officials to a number of
questions focused on data reliability covering issues such as data entry
access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of
the data. Follow-up questions were added whenever necessary. Caveats and
limitations to the data were noted in the documentation where necessary.
For example, in our discussions with the DOD official who manages its
financial database, she stated that program support costs were prorated
between WMD-PPI's projects based on usage. Therefore, the expenditure
amount added for the program support cost for Uzbekistan is a reasonable
approximation but may not be exact. We determined that the data we
received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based
on work we performed.

To identify challenges U.S. programs face in deploying and operating
radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, we examined documents
and spoke with officials from DOE, DOD, State, DHS, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Washington Group International,
and several nongovernmental entities, including the Transnational Crime
and Corruption Center at American University. Additionally, during our
visits to Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan we
spoke with various foreign officials to better understand the challenges
they face in operating radiation detection equipment provided by U.S.
programs. We also attended a National Academies of Science conference on
nonintrusive technologies for improving the security of containerized
maritime cargo and the National Cargo Security Council conference on
radiation detection and screening.

To understand the steps U.S. programs take to coordinate radiation
detection equipment assistance provided by multiple U.S. programs, we met
with program officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and
reviewed pertinent documents, including individual agency's assistance
plans and State's Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S.
Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas. We also assessed
coordination through the interagency group headed by State and met with
the lead official of that effort-the Director of Export Control and
Cooperation-and members of his staff. We discussed coordination issues
with U.S. advisors stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance
including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. Several of these advisors were responsible
for tracking assistance efforts in more than one country. For example, the
advisor stationed in Poland is also responsible for Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. Finally, we relied on our previous reviews of the U.S.
nonproliferation programs within DOE, DOD, and State. At State, we
interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and
met with officials from the Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation. We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We
performed our review from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at the
Department of Energy Appendix II

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Second Line of Defense "Core" program
provides comprehensive radiation detection equipment packages to foreign
countries to combat nuclear smuggling. Its associated maintenance program
focuses on maintaining equipment previously provided by the Department of
State and other U.S. agencies. In addition, DOE implements another program
within its Office of Global Threat Reduction that provides handheld
radiation detection equipment to foreign countries.

Second Line of Defense "Core" Program

In 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense "Core" (SLD-Core)
program, which has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear
materials trafficking by providing radiation detection equipment to the
Federal Customs Service of Russia. DOE recently expanded its efforts in
the SLD-Core program to include countries other than Russia. SLD-Core
activities focus on providing radiation detection equipment, software and
hardware communications equipment and support, and training/processes to
foreign countries' border sites. The radiation detection equipment DOE
provides is U.S.-made, except in Russia where Russian-made equipment is
installed. The communication systems DOE installs provide important
information on the radiation detector alarms, such as the radiation
profile of the substance detected. In addition to training at sites where
equipment is installed, DOE provides other training courses at the
Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response training center at
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's SLD-Core program had completed
installation of radiation portal monitors at 83 sites in Greece,
Lithuania, and Russia at a cost of about $130 million. In fiscal year
2005, DOE planned to complete 29 sites in seven countries: Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. However, due to delays
in signing implementing agreements with the governments of some of these
countries, many of these sites were not completed. As of December 2005,
DOE had signed implementing agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia,
and Ukraine, and plans to commence work in these countries in fiscal year
2006 (see fig. 6). Additionally, the SLD-Core program will be installing
radiation detection equipment at some foreign ports, referred to as
"feeder" ports, to assist the work done by DOE's Megaports Initiative.1

Figure 6: Map of Countries Where DOE's SLD-Core Program Has Installed
Equipment and Signed Agreements to Begin Work

DOE has been cooperating with the Federal Customs Service of Russia since
1998, and, coupled with the large number of sites where Russia has
installed equipment on its own, the nature of DOE's work through the
SLD-Core program in Russia is evolving. DOE is transitioning its
activities in Russia from installation of new equipment to sustainability
of equipment it has previously installed. DOE and the Federal Customs
Service of Russia signed an agreement in April 2005 that details plans for
the long-term sustainability of radiation detection equipment DOE has
provided to Russia. DOE is also now supporting other activities in Russia,
such as regional radiation alarm response exercises and rechecks of
previously installed equipment.

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE spent about $66 million
installing radiation portal monitors at 78 border sites in Russia, 4 sites
in Greece, 1 site in Lithuania, and to conduct preliminary site
assessments in other countries. DOE spent about $50 million on various
program integration activities, which are costs not directly associated
with installing equipment at a particular site within a specific country.
Of this amount, about $15 million was spent on advanced equipment
procurement activities, which include the purchase and storage of portal
monitors and associated spare parts for use at future installations. DOE
also spent almost $16 million on program oversight activities, such as
program cost and schedule estimating, technical assistance provided by
participating national laboratories, and translation services. In
addition, DOE spent over $5 million to develop and maintain its
prioritization model for the SLD-Core program, maintained by Los Alamos
National Laboratory, which is used to rank foreign countries, as well as
specific sites within a country, in terms of their attractiveness to a
potential nuclear material smuggler. DOE also spent about $4 million on
equipment testing and evaluation to test the effectiveness and performance
of the radiation detection equipment that it provides through the program.
DOE spent over $8 million on the development of materials and curricula
for training foreign customs agents on the use of radiation detection
equipment.2 Finally, DOE spent almost $2 million on other program
integration activities. See figure 7 for more information on program
integration expenditures.

Figure 7: DOE Spending on the SLD-Core Program through the End of Fiscal
Year 2005

Note: Figures have been rounded.

DOE's Maintenance of Equipment Previously Installed by Other U.S. Agencies

In 2002, DOE assumed the responsibility for maintaining certain radiation
detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans with
gamma radiation detection capability, previously installed in 23 countries
by State and other U.S. agencies (see fig. 8). Through the end of fiscal
year 2005, DOE has successfully conducted maintenance and sustainability
activities for this equipment in 21 of 23 countries.3 DOE contractors
service these radiation portal monitors annually and X-ray vans
biannually. Since 2002, DOE has spent about $8 million to provide spare
parts, preventative

maintenance, and repairs for this equipment.4 DOE anticipates that the
future scope of the maintenance program will be reduced as the SLD-Core
program expands into countries where equipment was previously installed by
other U.S. agencies.

Figure 8: Map of Countries Where DOE Maintains Equipment Previously
Provided by Other U.S. Agencies

aDOE has not maintained equipment DOD provided to Belarus.

bAt the request of the government of Turkey, DOE has not maintained
equipment State provided to that country.

cState provided Malta with both radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans.

If DOE is notified that there are problems with the radiation portal
monitors in a certain country, they will add this repair onto a scheduled
maintenance trip of a nearby country. According to the DOE maintenance
contractor, this occurs 5-6 times a year. However, DOE officials often are
not made aware of specific problems with equipment prior to arriving at
the site to conduct regular servicing. As a result, DOE's maintenance
teams must be equipped with a wide variety of components in the event that
major repairs are required. At times, maintenance teams have had to
improvise temporary repairs for equipment due to a lack of necessary
replacement parts. For example, during our visit to a border site in
Ukraine, DOE's maintenance team discovered that a truck had struck and
damaged a pole holding the wiring for the radiation detection equipment's
communication systems. The truck's impact caused the wiring to snap in
numerous places. Because the maintenance team was unaware of this damage
prior to our arrival at the site, it had to repair the cable using
connectors rather than replacing the entire wire as they would have
preferred to do. DOE officials told us that, during the next scheduled
maintenance visit to this site, the wiring will be replaced.

Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer Project

In 2004, DOE established the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer
project (CRITr) within its Global Threat Reduction Initiative.5 In this
project, DOE partners with Interpol, which provides knowledge of foreign
law enforcement to determine the countries to select for assistance and
coordinates all CRITr training logistics within its member countries.6
Through the CRITr project, DOE collects and refurbishes handheld radiation
detection devices deemed surplus by DOE national laboratories and provides
this equipment to first responders in foreign countries. The handheld
radiation detection equipment DOE provides through CRITr

consists mostly of survey meters and does not include radiation pagers.7
In addition to providing radiation detection equipment through the CRITr
project, DOE provides training for foreign officials on how to use the
equipment. DOE originally provided assistance through the CRITr project in
Greece by providing over 100 handheld radiation detection devices prior to
the Olympic Games in 2004. According to DOE officials, in fiscal year
2004, with Interpol's assistance, DOE selected seven additional countries
to receive assistance through the project: Croatia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Uzbekistan (see fig. 9). DOE also
provided radiation detection equipment to Tanzania in fiscal year 2005.
Through the CRITr project, DOE spent almost $0.5 million in fiscal year
2004 and almost $0.6 million in fiscal year 2005, according to DOE
officials. DOE has budgeted almost $0.4 million for fiscal year 2006 to
supply instruments and training to law enforcement officials in Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and
Uganda and to provide additional equipment to Tanzania.

Figure 9: Map of Countries Where DOE's CRITr Project Has Provided and
Plans to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment

Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at the
Department of Defense Appendix III

The Department of Defense (DOD) implements two programs that assist other
countries in combating nuclear smuggling: the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) and the International
Counterproliferation Program (ICP). As figure 10 shows, DOD spent about
$22 million on these programs between fiscal years 1994 and 2005.

Figure 10: DOD Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance
Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 2005

Note: Figures have been rounded.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative

WMD-PPI was created as a project within the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program1 and is implemented by DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency with
oversight and policy guidance from the Office of

the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. In the 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act, the Congress created WMD-PPI with a $40 million budget
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
related materials and technologies from the former Soviet Union.2 WMD-PPI
seeks to accomplish this mission through three projects: the Uzbekistan
Land Border project, the Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention
project in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine Land and Maritime
Border projects.

o In Uzbekistan, DOD is installing radiation portal monitors at 17 sites;
11 of which were completed by the end of fiscal year 2005. To date,
WMD-PPI has spent over $6 million to install radiation portal monitors in
Uzbekistan. However, this spending total is misleading because DOD has
obligated over $19 million to three contracts for program costs associated
with installing radiation detection equipment, such as communication
systems and training. Because DOD only executes spending on these
contracts after all work has been completed, these contracts were not paid
in fiscal year 2005. DOD projects that the Uzbekistan Portal Monitoring
project will cost about $54 million and be completed in fiscal year 2009.
Once these portal monitors are installed in fiscal year 2006, DOE will
maintain the equipment within its Second Line of Defense "Core" program.

o The Caspian Sea project focuses on improving command and control,
surveillance, detection and interception of WMD, operation, and
sustainability along the Caspian Sea border by providing training and
associated equipment, including handheld radiation detection devices. In
Azerbaijan, the project's cost is estimated at $63.4 million and, in
Kazakhstan, it is estimated at $60.6 million.

o In Ukraine, WMD-PPI is implementing a similar project along the Black
Sea border. The Maritime Border Security Project in Ukraine is expected to
cost over $39 million and will be finished in fiscal year 2009. The
Ukrainian Land Border Forces Proliferation Prevention project focuses on
securing the points of entry and the green border-border that is not a
formal crossing point between countries-between Moldova and Ukraine. It
seeks to improve Ukraine's capabilities to detect and interdict WMD and
related materials by providing equipment and training. Radiation detection
equipment, such as pagers, is included in this equipment assistance. DOD
expects this project will cost over $51 million and be completed in fiscal
year 2008.

Figure 11: Map of Countries Where DOD's WMD-PPI Program Has Provided
Radiation Detection Equipment or Signed Agreements to Install Equipment

International Counterproliferation Program

The 1995 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to establish a program to improve efforts to deter
the possible proliferation and acquisition of WMD and related materials
across the borders and through the former Soviet Union, the Baltic region,
and Eastern Europe.3 Similarly, the 1997 National Defense Authorization
Act directed DOD to work with U.S. Customs to carry out programs to assist
customs officials and border guards in those regions in preventing
unauthorized transfer and transportation of WMD and related materials.4
DOD established ICP in response to these requirements. The program is
implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. According to DOD
officials, ICP policy guidance comes from DOD's Eurasia Department because
of its strong ties and contacts within the regional scope of the program.
Through ICP, DOD provides a range of law enforcement and border security
training and equipment, including handheld radiation detection equipment,
to foreign law enforcement officials in participating countries. According
to an ICP official, the program does not currently provide much radiation
detection equipment because, in many countries, other U.S. programs have
already provided such equipment. ICP coordinates with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to conduct training of foreign government personnel. In
some participating countries, ICP provides both equipment and training,
and in others it provides only training, depending upon the needs of the
country.

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent over $14 million to
provide radiation detection equipment and radiation detection training to
foreign countries through ICP. Of this amount, DOD spent over $0.5 million
to provide handheld radiation detection equipment to six countries (see
fig. 12). The remaining funds were spent on a variety of training related
to radiation detection, WMD interdiction, and crime scene investigation.5
Figure 13 shows the flowchart of training DOD provides to participating
countries through ICP.

Figure 12: Map of Countries Where DOD's ICP Has Provided Radiation
Detection Equipment

Figure 13: Flowchart of ICP Training Courses

According to ICP officials, the program has worked in 23 countries,
including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and
Montenegro, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In the National Defense

Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005,6 DOD was given permission by the
Congress to expand ICP's scope outside of the original region. According
to a DOD official, ICP plans to initiate programs in Malaysia, Singapore,
and Pakistan.

Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at the
Department of State Appendix IV

Since fiscal year 1994, the Department of State (State) has provided
various types of radiation detection equipment assistance to 31 foreign
countries. State has provided this assistance, primarily through three
programs (1) the Export Control and Related Border Security program
(EXBS), (2) the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), and (3) the
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program (GBSLE). As figure 14
shows, State spent about $25 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal
year 2005 on radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign
countries.

Figure 14: State Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance
Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 2005

Note: Figures have been rounded.

Export Control and Related Border Security Program

State's Export Control and Related Border Security program, which began in
1998, is a comprehensive U.S. government effort to help foreign countries
improve their export controls and border security capabilities.1 The
program provides a broad array of assistance to foreign countries, such as
workshops to assist foreign countries draft and implement new export
control laws and regulations, as well as various types of equipment and
training for foreign border control agencies. Assistance provided through
the program focuses on five core areas: (1) laws and regulations, (2)
licensing, (3) enforcement, (4) government and industry cooperation, and
(5) interagency cooperation and coordination. While the original focus of
the program was to provide assistance to potential "source countries" in
the former Soviet Union or to countries that produce munitions or dual-use
items,2 State later expanded the program's focus to include states on
potential smuggling routes in Eastern and Central Europe, East Asia,
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America, and Africa, as well as
potential "source countries" in South Asia and countries with major
transshipment hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, State has spent $15.4 million to
provide a variety of radiation detection equipment assistance to 30
countries (see fig. 15).

Figure 15: Map of Countries Where State's Export Control and Related
Border Security Program Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment

In addition, State also provided funding to the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (formerly known as U.S.
Customs) to implement certain types of radiation detection equipment
assistance on behalf of its Export Control and Related Border Security
program. Specifically, from fiscal year 1999 through 2005, DHS and its
predecessor organizations spent about $10.5 million to provide radiation
detection equipment and training to 30 countries. This equipment included,
among other things, radiation pagers that border officials wear on their
belts and radioactive isotope identification devices. Training provided by
DHS included assistance in operating the X-ray vans equipped with
radiation detectors, hands-on instruction in using radiation detection
equipment to detect nuclear smuggling, teaching techniques for
investigating smuggling operations, and tracking the movements of
smugglers between ports of entry. In addition, DHS also stationed 22
in-country advisors covering 25 countries, on behalf of the program, to
assist in implementing and coordinating U.S. government assistance in
these countries. In February 2005, State, through its EXBS program,
assumed direct responsibility of the in-country advisors from DHS.
According to State officials, this management change was done to better
address coordination and responsiveness issues in the advisor program.

Russian Federal Customs Service Central Command Center

In addition to providing radiation detection equipment assistance to
foreign countries, State has also provided other types of assistance
designed to better ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection
equipment previously provided to foreign countries through U.S. programs.
Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, State, through its EXBS program, spent
about $1.5 million to fund construction of a national command center for
the Federal Customs Service of Russia. Through this project, portal
monitors located at various Russian border sites can be directly linked to
a national command center, located at Federal Customs Service headquarters
in Moscow. By doing so, alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by
Russian officials both at the site and up the chain of command, thus
establishing redundant layers of accountability for responding to alarms.
For example, when a portal monitor alarms at a specific land border site,
airport, or seaport, information will immediately be sent from the site
directly to the command center enabling Russian officials to identify
which specific site an alarm occurred at, quickly analyze it, and respond
appropriately. Prior to the initiation of this project, the Federal
Customs Service did not have an effective way to coordinate and integrate
all of the information at its borders. While the total scope of work to be
done at the command center has not been clearly defined yet, State
officials told us that the primary activity will be to maintain and
respond to alarm data from the various border sites. State officials we
spoke with stated that linking alarm data from the local alarm station at
individual border sites to a centrally located command center will enhance
Russia's ability to (1) ensure that U.S. provided equipment is being
properly operated, (2) mitigate the possibility of corruption or other
nefarious acts being committed by its border guards, and (3) effectively
respond to any alarms and/or seizures of illicitly trafficked nuclear or
radiological materials.

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund spent approximately $9.1
million, from fiscal year 1994 through 2001, to provide various types of
radiation detection equipment assistance to 21 countries (see fig. 16).
This assistance included vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans equipped
with X-ray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation
detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. For example, in fiscal year
2001, State approved a $1.3 million NDF project to install vehicle portal
monitors at 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to assist
another country's upgrading its domestically produced portal monitors in
order to better detect nuclear material. State also provided $0.8 million
to DHS to provide radiation detection equipment and training to seven
countries under a project called "Project Amber." Of this amount, DHS
spent $0.6 million to implement the project in these countries. In fiscal
year 2001, State began to consolidate its assistance provided to foreign
countries for the purposes of combating nuclear smuggling under its EXBS
program. However, State officials told us that they have not yet
determined whether or not they will fund any future projects to provide
radiation detection equipment to foreign countries through NDF. As a
result, it is uncertain how many other projects State will fund through
NDF, in what countries these projects will be conducted, or how much they
will cost.

Figure 16: Map of Countries Where State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment

Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Program

State's Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program focuses on
developing the Republic of Georgia's border infrastructure by assisting
the Georgian Customs Administration and Georgian Border Guards in gaining
control of the country's borders and seacoast and strengthening its border
security against any type of crime. The program primarily focuses on
establishing a transparent land border regime with Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Turkey and strengthening border security against nuclear smuggling. As
such, the program has provided assistance to enhance the Georgian Border
Guards' capabilities to prevent, deter, and detect potential weapons of
mass destruction smuggling. Through the program, State has provided a
limited amount of radiation detection equipment assistance. Specifically,
in fiscal year 1999, State spent $0.2 million to provide 137 radiation
detection pagers to Georgia. According to State officials, no radiation
detection equipment has been provided through the program since fiscal
year 1999. However, State officials also told us that they have not yet
determined if they will provide any additional radiation detection
equipment assistance through the program to the Republic of Georgia in the
future. As a result, it is uncertain what additional equipment State might
provide or how much it will cost.

Comments from the Department of Energy Appendix V

Comments from the Department of State Appendix VI

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain.
GAO-06-389 . Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T .
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future
Olympics. GAO-05-547 . Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing
Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports.
GAO-05-375 . Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. GAO-05-157 . Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment. GAO-03-235T . Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.
GAO-02-989T . Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-426
. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

(360560)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-311 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-5841 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-311 , a report to congressional requesters

March 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts
to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and
2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and
radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy
(DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State), have programs that provide
radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel in
other countries. GAO examined the (1) progress U.S. programs have made in
providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including
the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) challenges U.S.
programs face in this effort; and (3) steps being taken to coordinate U.S.
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of Energy and State to
(1) integrate cost projections for anticorruption measures into long-term
program cost estimates; (2) upgrade less sophisticated portal monitors;
(3) provide maintenance for all handheld radiation detection equipment
provided by U.S. programs; (4) revise the interagency strategic plan; and
(5) compile, maintain, and share a master list of all U.S. radiation
detection equipment assistance.

DOE and State generally agreed with our conclusions and recommendations.
DOD did not provide comments on the report.

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation
detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to
combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these
agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven
different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE's Second Line of
Defense "Core" program, which has installed equipment mostly in Russia
since 1998.

U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection
equipment in other countries face a number of challenges including:
corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical
limitations of some radiation detection equipment, inadequate maintenance
of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some
border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned
that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the
effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either
turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In addition, State and other
agencies have installed equipment at some sites that is less effective
than equipment installed by DOE. Since 2002, DOE has maintained the
equipment but has only upgraded one site. As a result, these border sites
are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with more
sophisticated equipment. Further, while DOE assumed responsibility for
maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment, some handheld equipment provided
by State and DOD has not been maintained. Lastly, many border sites are
located in remote areas that often lack infrastructure essential to
operate radiation detection equipment.

As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection
equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate
U.S. efforts. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead
coordinator is limited by shortcomings in the strategic plan for
interagency coordination. Additionally, State has not maintained an
interagency master list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment
overseas. Without such a list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State
cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and being used as
intended; determine the equipment needs of countries where they plan to
provide assistance; or detect if an agency has unknowingly supplied
duplicative equipment.

DOD-Funded Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan
*** End of document. ***