Information Security: The Defense Logistics Agency Needs to Fully
Implement Its Security Program (07-OCT-05, GAO-06-31).		 
                                                                 
The Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) mission is, in part, to	 
provide food, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, spare parts for  
weapon systems, and construction materials to sustain military	 
operations and combat readiness. To protect the information and  
information systems that support its mission, it is critical that
DLA implement an effective information security program. GAO was 
asked to review the efficiency and effectiveness of DLA's	 
operations, including its information security program. In	 
response, GAO determined whether the agency had implemented an	 
effective information security program. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-31						        
    ACCNO:   A39297						        
  TITLE:     Information Security: The Defense Logistics Agency Needs 
to Fully Implement Its Security Program 			 
     DATE:   10/07/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Information security				 
	     Information security management			 
	     Information systems				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 

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GAO-06-31

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Committees

October 2005

INFORMATION SECURITY

The Defense Logistics Agency Needs to Fully Implement Its Security Program

                                       a

GAO-06-31

[IMG]

October 2005

INFORMATION SECURITY

The Defense Logistics Agency Needs to Fully Implement Its Security Program

                                 What GAO Found

Although DLA has made progress in implementing important elements of its
information security program, including establishing a central security
management group and appointing a senior information security officer to
manage the program, it has not yet fully implemented other essential
elements. For example, the agency did not consistently assess risks for
its information systems; sufficiently train employees who have significant
information security responsibilities or adequately complete training
plans; annually test and evaluate the effectiveness of management and
operational security controls; or sufficiently complete plans of action
and milestones for mitigating known information security deficiencies. The
table below indicates with an "X" weaknesses in the implementation of key
information security practices for the 10 DLA systems that GAO reviewed.

Weaknesses in Information Security Practices and Controls

                          DLA systema Risk assessment

Security training and awareness plan Security test and evaluation

                         Plans of action and milestones

X X X

X

                                      X          X          X               X 
                                      X                     X               X 
                                      X                     X               X 
                                      X          X          X               X 
                                      X                     X               X 
                                      X                     X               X 
                                      X                     X               X 
                               10     X          X          X               X 

Source: GAO analysis of information security documentation for selected
systems.

aThe systems selected consisted of local area networks and Web sites that
support a DLA location; production systems, such as those that form the
bulk of the computing environment at a DLA location; or an information
system that has been replicated with the same configuration and has been
deployed at multiple locations.

In addition, DLA has not implemented a fully effective certification and
accreditation process for authorizing the operation of its information
systems.

Key reasons for these weaknesses are that responsibilities of information
security employees were not consistently understood or communicated and
DLA has not adequately maintained the accuracy and completeness of data
contained in its primary reporting tool for overseeing the agency's
performance in implementing key information security activities and
controls. Until the agency addresses these weaknesses and fully implements
an effective agencywide information security program, it may not be able
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its
information and information systems, and it may not have complete and
accurate performance data for key information security practices and
controls.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

     Letter                                                                 1 
                                           Results in Brief                 2 
                                              Background                    4 
                            DLA Has Not Yet Fully Implemented Its Security  9 
                                               Program                     
                                             Conclusions                   19 
                                Recommendations for Executive Actions      20 
                                  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation       21 
Appendixes                                                              
                Appendix I:             Scope and Methodology              25 
               Appendix II:    Comments from the Department of Defense     27 
              Appendix III:     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments      32 
                             Table 1: Weaknesses in Information Security   
     Tables                                 Practices and                  
                                               Controls                    10 
                               Table 2: Percentage of DLA Locations and    
                                         Systems Subjected to              
                               Program Reviews During the Last 3 Years     15 
                             Figure 1: Simplified Overview of the Defense  
     Figure                    Logistics Agency's Information Assurance    
                                       Management and Reporting            
                                              Structure                    

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OMB Office of Management and Budget

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

October 7, 2005

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Information security is a critical consideration for any organization that
depends on information systems and computer networks to carry out its
mission. It is especially important for government agencies, where
maintaining the public's trust is essential. Federal agencies face
increasing security risks from viruses, hackers, and others who seek to
disrupt federal operations or obtain sensitive information that is stored
in federal computers. In our reports to Congress since 1997-most recently
in January 20051-we have identified information security as a
governmentwide high-risk issue.

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) relies extensively on information
systems in supporting America's military forces with food, fuel, medical
supplies, clothing, spare parts for weapons systems, and construction
materials. To protect the information and information systems that support
its operations and assets, it is critical that DLA implement an effective
information security program. Recognizing that the major underlying cause
for the majority of information security problems in federal agencies is
the lack of an effective information security program, Congress passed the
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which set
forth a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of
information security controls over the information resources that support
federal operations and assets.

1GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 required us to
review the efficiency and effectiveness of DLA's operations. In response
to this mandate, we previously evaluated the effectiveness of information
system general controls2 at one of DLA's critical business support units
and reported significant findings, conclusions, and recommendations in a
"limited official use only" report in January 2004. As agreed with your
offices, the objective for this review was to determine whether DLA has
implemented an effective agencywide information security program.

We performed our review at DLA facilities in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area; Columbus, Ohio; and Denver, Colorado, from September
2004 to July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Details of our scope and methodology are contained in
appendix I.

Results in Brief	DLA has not yet fully implemented an effective agencywide
information security program to protect the information and information
systems that support its operations and assets. While DLA has implemented
important elements of its information security program-including
establishing a central security management group, appointing a senior
information security officer to manage the program, and ensuring that
employees and contractors receive information security awareness
training-it has not yet fully implemented other elements of its program.
Specifically, risks that could result from the unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, or destruction of information or information systems were not
consistently assessed; employees who had significant information security
responsibilities did not receive sufficient training, and security
training plans sometimes lacked key information; security testing and
evaluation of management and operational controls were not annually
performed; and plans of action and milestones for mitigating known
information security deficiencies were not sufficiently completed. In
addition, DLA has not implemented a fully

2Information system general controls affect the overall effectiveness and
security of computer operations as opposed to being unique to any specific
computer application. These controls include security management,
operating procedures, software security features, and physical protection
designed to ensure that access to data is appropriately restricted,
computer security functions are segregated, only authorized changes to
computer programs are made, and backup and recovery plans are adequate to
ensure the continuity of essential operations.

effective certification3 and accreditation4 process for authorizing the
operation of its information systems.

Key reasons for these weaknesses are that the responsibilities of key
information security employees were not consistently understood or
communicated and DLA has not maintained the accuracy and completeness of
the data contained in its central management database- the primary
reporting tool for managing and overseeing the agency's performance in
implementing key information security activities and controls. Until DLA
addresses these weaknesses and fully implements an effective, agencywide
information security program, it may not be able to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and
information systems.

To assist DLA in fully implementing its information security program, we
are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the DLA
Director to take several actions to fully implement key information
security practices and controls, including strengthening the process for
certifying and accrediting information systems, and maintaining the
accuracy and completeness of the data contained in DLA's primary reporting
tool.

In providing written comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) agreed with 7 of our 10
draft recommendations and described ongoing and planned efforts to address
them. For the remaining recommendations, however, the Deputy Under
Secretary gave reasons for the department's disagreement that did not
address the intent of our recommendations. Accordingly, we have revised
our draft recommendations to make our intent clear. Written comments from
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) are
reprinted in appendix II.

3Certification is a comprehensive evaluation of security controls that
provides the necessary information for a designated approving authority to
formally declare that a system is approved to operate at an acceptable
level of risk.

4Accreditation is the authorization of an information system to process,
store, or transmit information that provides a form of quality control.
The accreditation decision is to be based on the implementation of an
agreed-upon set of management, operational, and technical controls for a
system and is supported by a comprehensive evaluation or certification of
these security controls that provides the necessary information for a
designated approving authority to formally declare that a system is
approved to operate.

Background	The dramatic expansion in computer interconnectivity and the
rapid increase in the use of the Internet are changing the way our
government, the nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct
business. Because of the concern about attacks from individuals and
groups, protecting the computer systems that support critical operations
and infrastructures has never been more important. These concerns are well
founded for a number of reasons, such as escalating threats of computer
security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, the
steady advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack
technology, and the emergence of new and more destructive attacks.
According to experts from government and industry, during the first
quarter of 2005, more than 600 new Internet security vulnerabilities were
discovered, thereby placing organizations that use the Internet at risk.

Computer-supported federal operations are likewise at risk. IBM recently
reported that there were over 54 million attacks against government
computers from January 2005 to June 2005.5 Without proper safeguards,
there is risk that individuals and groups with malicious intent may
intrude into inadequately protected systems and use this access to obtain
sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks
against other computer systems and networks. How well federal agencies are
addressing these risks is a topic of increasing interest in both Congress
and the executive branch. This is evidenced by recent hearings on
information security intended to strengthen information security.6

DLA Is a Major Defense DLA is an agency of the Department of Defense
(DOD). As DOD's supply

Supplier	chain manager, DLA provides food, fuel, medical supplies,
clothing, spare parts for weapon systems, and construction materials to
sustain DOD military operations and combat readiness. To fulfill its
mission, DLA relies extensively on interconnected computer systems to
perform various functions, such as managing about 5.2 million supply items
and processing

5IBM, Security Threats and Attack Trends Report: January 2005 to June
2005.

6GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing
Cybersecurity, GAO05-827T (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005); GAO, Internet
Protocol Version 6: Federal Agencies Need to Plan for Transition and
Manage Security Risks, GAO-05-845T (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2005); and
GAO, Information Security: Continued Efforts Needed to Sustain Progress in
Implementing Statutory Requirements, GAO-05-483T (Washington, D.C.: April
7, 2005).

about 54,000 requisition actions per day for goods and services. DLA
employs about 22,575 civilian and military workers, located at about 500
field locations in 48 states and 28 countries.

In accordance with DOD policy,7 DLA has developed an agencywide
information security program to provide information security for its
operations and assets. The DLA Director is responsible for ensuring the
security of the information and information systems that support the
agency's operations. In carrying out this responsibility, the Director has
delegated to DLA's chief information officer the authority to ensure that
the agency complies with FISMA and with other information security
requirements.

DLA's chief information officer has also designated a senior agency
official to serve as Director of Information Assurance-the agency's senior
information security officer-and to head the central security management
group, commonly referred to as the information assurance program office.
This group carries out specific responsibilities, including the following:

o 	documenting and maintaining an agencywide security framework to assess
the agency's security posture, identify vulnerabilities, and allocate
resources;

o 	establishing and managing security awareness and specialized
professional security training for employees who have significant security
responsibilities;

o 	ensuring that all systems are certified and accredited in accordance
with both federal and DOD processes;

o 	providing personnel at headquarters and the DLA locations with guidance
on, and assistance in preparing, system security authorization
agreements-single source data packages for all information pertaining to
the certification and accreditation of a system in order to, among other
things, guide actions, document decisions, specify information security
requirements, and maintain operational systems security; and

7DOD Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance (Washington, D.C.: October
2002); and DOD Instruction 8500.2, Information Assurance Implementation,
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003).

o 	ensuring that field site personnel accurately assess their locations'
security postures.

Information assurance managers at the various DLA locations directly
report to the information technology chief at their location and are
expected to assist the Director of Information Assurance by coordinating
security activities, establishing and maintaining a repository for
documenting and reporting system certification and accreditation
activities, maintaining and updating system security authorization
agreements, and notifying the designated approving authority8 of any
changes that could affect system security.

Information assurance officers at the various DLA locations assist the
information assurance managers through the following activities: ensuring
that appropriate information security controls are implemented for an
information system, notifying the information assurance manager when
system changes that might affect certification and accreditation are
requested or planned, and conducting annual validation testing of systems.
Figure 1 below shows a simplified overview of DLA's information assurance
management and reporting structure.

8A designated approving authority is a senior management official or
executive with the authority to formally assume responsibility for
operating an information system at an acceptable level of risk to agency
operations, assets, or individuals.

Figure 1: Simplified Overview of the Defense Logistics Agency's
Information Assurance Management and Reporting Structure

Congress enacted FISMA to strengthen the security of information and
information systems within federal agencies. FISMA requires each agency to
develop, document, and implement an agencywide information security
program to protect the information and information systems that support
the operations and assets of the agency-including those that are provided
or managed by another agency, a contractor, or some other source. The
program must include the following:

o 	periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could
result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification,
disruption, or destruction of information or information systems;

o 	training of personnel who have significant responsibility for
information security and security awareness training to educate personnel-
including contractors and other users of the agency's information
systems-about information security risks and their responsibilities to
comply with the agency's security policies and procedures;

              Source: GAO analysis of information provided by DLA.

  Federal and Departmental Requirements Are to Guide DLA Information Security
  Activities

o 	periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of the agency's
information security policies, procedures, and practices; and

o 	a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting plans
of action and milestones that are taken to address any deficiencies in the
agency's information security policies, procedures, and practices.

To support agencies in conducting their information security programs, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is publishing
mandatory standards and guidelines for providing information security all
agency operations, assets, and information systems other than national
security systems.9 The standards and guidelines include, at a minimum, (1)
standards to be used by all agencies to categorize their information and
information systems based on the objectives of providing appropriate
levels of information security according to a range of risk levels, (2)
guidelines recommending the types of information and information systems
that are to be included in each category, and (3) minimum information
security requirements for information and information systems in each
category.

In addition, DOD has developed and published various directives and
instructions that comprise an information assurance policy framework that
is intended to meet the information security requirements specified in
FISMA and NIST standards and publications. This framework applies to all
of DOD's systems-both national and non-national security systems-
including those operated by or on behalf of DLA. DLA's policies and
procedures for implementing its agency information security program are
contained in DLA's One Book policy and agency handbook.

944 U.S.C. 3542(b)(2).

  DLA Has Not Yet Fully Implemented Its Security Program

DLA has implemented important elements of an information security
program-including establishing a central security management group,
appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program,
and providing security awareness training for its employees. However, DLA
has not yet fully implemented other essential elements of an effective
information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of its information and information systems that support
its mission. Collectively, these weaknesses place DLA's information and
information systems at risk. Key underlying reasons for the weaknesses
pertain to DLA's management and oversight of its security program.

  DLA Has Implemented Important Elements of Its Security Program

In carrying out their information security responsibilities, both the
Chief Information Officer and the Director of Information Assurance have
taken several steps to implement important elements of DLA's security
program, including the following:

o 	ensuring employees and contractors receive information security
awareness training;

o 	developing information security procedures and guidance for use in
implementing the requirements of the program;

o 	deploying information system security engineers to assist headquarters
and field staff in implementing security policies and procedures
consistently across the agency;

o 	developing an agencywide management tool-known as the Comprehensive
Information Assurance Knowledgebase-to centrally manage and report on key
performance measures, such as the status of security training, plans of
action and milestones, and certification and accreditation activities; and

o 	developing and implementing various automated information technology
initiatives to assist information assurance managers and information
assurance officers in improving DLA's security posture.

  Weaknesses Place DLA's Information and Information Systems at Risk

Weaknesses in information security practices and controls place DLA's
information and information systems at risk. Our analysis of information
security activities for selected systems at 10 DLA locations showed that
the agency had not fully or consistently implemented important elements of
its program. Specifically, risks that could result from the unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, or destruction of information or information
systems were not consistently assessed; employees who had significant
information security responsibilities did not receive sufficient training,
and security training plans were sometimes not adequately completed;
testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of management and operational
security controls were not adequately performed; and plans of action and
milestones for mitigating known information security deficiencies were not
sufficiently completed. Table 1 indicates with an "X" weaknesses in the
implementation of key information security practices and controls for
selected systems.

Table 1: Weaknesses in Information Security Practices and Controls

                                       a
The 10 systems selected consist of local area networks and Web sites that
    support a DLA location; production systems, such as those that form the
     bulk of the computing environment at a DLA location; or an information
system that have been replicated with the same configuration and have been
                        deployed at multiple locations.
               training Security                       Plans     DLA                                   and                                                                                             
  Security     and      test       Risk awareness and     of systema assessment plan evaluation milestones 1 X  X X 2    X 3 X X X X 4 X  X X 5 X  X X 6 X X X X 7 X  X X 8 X  X X 9 X  X X          
                                                      action                                                                                                                                10 X X X X

Source: GAO analysis of information security documentation contained in
system certification and accreditation packages.

DLA Did Not Assess Risks FISMA requires that agencies' information
security programs include Consistently periodic assessments of the risk
and magnitude of the harm that could

result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information and information systems that
support the operations and assets of the agency. Identifying and assessing
information security risks are essential steps in order to determine what
controls are required and what level of resources should be expended on
these controls. NIST has developed guidance to help organizations protect
their information and information systems by using security controls that
are selected through a risk-based process.

DOD established a set of baseline security controls10 for each of three
mission assurance categories11 that determine what security controls
should be implemented. These controls are adjusted based on an assessment
of risk including specific threat information, vulnerabilities, and
countermeasures relative to the system. Vulnerabilities that are not
mitigated are referred to as residual risk. The designated approving
authority considers the residual risks in determining whether to accredit
a system. Such risk assessments, as part of the requirement to reaccredit
systems, are to be performed prior to a significant change in processing,
but at least every 3 years.

Although DLA categorized its systems in accordance with DOD guidance, we
found that it did not consistently assess the residual risk for 9 of the
10 systems we selected for review. For example:

o 	nine did not use the established baseline security controls to assess
the residual risk;

o 	three did not clearly identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and
countermeasures;

o 	two did not state how the threats and vulnerabilities would affect the
mission that the system supports;

10DOD Instruction 5200.40, DOD Information Technology Security
Certification and Accreditation Process (December 30, 1997); DOD 8510.1-M,
DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation
Process Application Manual (July 31, 2000); and DOD Instruction 8500.1,
Information Assurance (October 24, 2002).

11Mission assurance category (MAC) I are systems designated as vital to
the operational readiness or mission effectiveness and their loss would be
unacceptable. MAC II are systems designated as important in the support of
deployed or contingency forces and their loss are unacceptable. MAC III
are systems designated as necessary for the conduct of dayto-day business
and their loss could be tolerated or overcome without significant impact.

Employees Did Not Receive Sufficient Training and Security Training Plans
Were Sometimes Incomplete

o 	one only referenced the security controls as the threat or
vulnerability; and

o  one had not been updated since 2001.

Unless DLA performs risk assessments consistently and assesses them
against the appropriate set of controls, it will not have assurance that
it has implemented appropriate controls that cost-effectively reduce risk
to an acceptable level.

FISMA mandates that all federal employees and contractors who are involved
in the use of agency information systems be provided training in
information security awareness and that agency heads ensure that employees
with significant information security responsibilities are provided
sufficient training with respect to such responsibilities. An effective
information security program should promote awareness and provide training
so that employees who use computer resources in their day-to-day
operations understand security risks and their roles in implementing
related policies and controls to mitigate those risks. DOD guidance
requires that individuals receive the necessary training to ensure that
they are capable of conducting their security duties and that each
component establish and implement information assurance training and
professional certification programs. DOD also requires that security
awareness and training plans be documented for each system as part of the
certification and accreditation process. These security training plans
specify that training for individuals associated with a system's operation
be appropriate to an individual's level and area of responsibility. This
training should provide information about the security policy governing
the information being processed, as well as potential threats and the
nature of the appropriate countermeasures.

DLA provided annual security awareness training for employees and
contractors for whom it was appropriate. However, employees with
significant information security responsibilities did not receive
sufficient training. For example, of the 17 information assurance managers
and information assurance officers located where we reviewed selected
systems:

o 	eleven reported having received some form of training, although eight
of them had received training on only one of their security
responsibilities-developing security documentation;

o  six reported never having received any security training; and

o  two reported having received no security training for 2 or more years.

Further, security training and awareness plans for 3 of the 10 systems we
reviewed were either not system-specific or lacked detailed information.
For example, training plans for 2 systems did not specify, for each level
and area of responsibility, the system operations appropriate for a given
user. The third lacked detailed information about training objectives,
goals, and requirements.

A key reason for these weaknesses is that the individual responsible for
monitoring the agency's security training program had other significant
responsibilities and was not able to effectively ensure that employees
received the required training. As a result, DLA does not have assurance
that employees with significant security responsibilities are equipped
with the knowledge and skills they need to understand information security
risks and their roles and responsibilities in implementing related
policies and controls to mitigate those risks.

Security Testing and Evaluation Another key element that FISMA requires of
an information security of Management and Operational program is periodic
testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of

Controls Were Not Annually Performed

information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed
with a frequency based on risk, but not less than annually. FISMA requires
that such testing and evaluation activities shall include the management,
operational, and technical controls12 of every system identified in an
agency's information systems inventory.13

DOD policy requires periodic reviews of operational systems at predefined
intervals.14 Such reviews include testing and evaluating the technical

12Management controls focus on the management of the system and the risk
of harm to a system. Operational controls address security methods,
implemented and executed by people (as opposed to systems), to improve the
security of a particular system or group of systems. They often require
technical or specialized expertise and often rely on management activities
as well as technical controls. Technical controls focus on security
controls that the computer system executes. These controls can provide
automated protection for unauthorized access or misuse, facilitate
detection of security violations, and support security requirements for
applications and data.

13Section U.S.C. 3544(b)(5).

14DOD Instruction 5200.40, December 30, 1997.

implementation of the security design of a system and ascertaining that
security software, hardware, and firmware features affecting the
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability of
information and information systems have been implemented and documented.
The results of testing and evaluation of security controls are to be used
in the decisionmaking process for authorizing systems to operate. Further,
DLA's One Book policy requires information assurance managers and
information assurance officers to use the security test and evaluations as
the method for validating the adequacy of management, operational, and
technical controls, at least annually.

DLA did not annually test and evaluate the management and operational
security controls of its systems. According to DLA officials,
vulnerability scans15 and information assurance program reviews16
collectively satisfied the annual requirement for testing and evaluating
management, operational, and technical controls. However, the combination
of the vulnerability scans and the program reviews did not satisfy the
annual requirement. Although DLA generally assessed technical controls by
conducting annual vulnerability scans on its systems, it did not annually
assess the management and operational controls for each of its systems.
While the program reviews are intended to satisfy the requirement for
testing and evaluating the management and operational controls, DLA does
not conduct these reviews annually on every system. For example, less than
half of DLA's locations and systems have undergone program reviews in the
last 3 years, as shown in table 2.

15Vulnerability scans assess certain technical controls, such as
vulnerable services, and are conducted annually to identify the weaknesses
of computing systems in order to determine whether and where a system can
be exploited and/or threatened.

16Information assurance program reviews are generally conducted on a
3-year cycle to evaluate the effectiveness of management, operational, and
technical controls agencywide through assessment of security program
management certification and accreditation information, network security
policies and practices, vulnerability assessment, compliance and
configuration, and incident response reporting and handling.

Table 2: Percentage of DLA Locations and Systems Subjected to Program
Reviews During the Last 3 Years

                            System category Percent

Vital to operations

Important in support of military forces

Necessary for day-to-day operations

Source: GAO analysis of DLA data.

Until DLA tests and evaluates management and operational controls
annually, critical systems may contain vulnerabilities that have not been
identified or appropriately considered in decisions to authorize systems
to operate. Moreover, DLA may not be able to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the sensitive data that its systems
process, store, and transmit.

Plans of Action and Milestones FISMA requires each agency to develop a
process for planning,

Were Incomplete	implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action
plans to address any deficiencies in its information security policies,
procedures, and practices. Developing effective corrective action plans is
key to ensuring that remedial action is taken to address significant
deficiencies. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires agency
chief information officers to document and report all agency information
assurance weaknesses and remedial actions in plans of action and
milestones. The plans should list each security weakness and the tasks,
resources, milestones, and scheduled completion dates for remedying each
weakness.

The plans of action and milestones associated with the 10 systems we
selected for review were incomplete. For example:

o 	none of the plans clearly documented and reported the nature of the
weakness being addressed;

o 	seven did not identify the start or completion dates for addressing the
weakness;

o  none specified the resources necessary to complete the action plan;

o  nine did not list the risk associated with the security weakness;

o  six were not based on the correct set of baseline security controls;
and

o 	one plan contained steps to identify vulnerabilities rather than the
steps required to remedy vulnerabilities.

A key reason for these weaknesses is that information assurance managers
and information assurance officers reported that they did not understand
the requirements for reporting system security vulnerabilities because DLA
had not provided specific criteria or instructions on what-or how-to
document and report plans of action and milestones for system
deficiencies. Having reliable plans of action and milestones is not only
vital to ensuring that DLA's information and information systems receive
adequate protection, but it is also important for accurately managing and
reporting progress on them. Without reliable plans, DLA does not have
assurance that all information security weaknesses have been reported and
that corrective actions will be taken to appropriately address the
weaknesses.

Certification and Accreditation OMB requires that agencies establish a
certification and accreditation

Process Was Not Fully Effective process for formally authorizing systems
to operate. Certification and

for Authorizing Systems	accreditation is the requirement that agency
management officials formally authorize their information systems to
process information, thereby accepting the risk associated with their
operation. This management authorization (accreditation) is to be
supported by a formal technical evaluation (certification) of the
management, operational, and technical controls established in an
information system's security plan. The accreditation decision results in
(1) a full authorization to operate,17 (2) an interim authorization to
operate,18 or (3) no authorization to operate. DOD instructions19 and
DLA's agency handbook provides guidance on the certification and
accreditation process.

17A full authorization to operate means a system has been properly
certified and accredited and any significant vulnerability identified
either has been or is actively in the process of being effectively
mitigated.

18An interim authorization to operate provides a limited authorization to
operate the information system under specific terms and conditions and
acknowledges greater risk to the agency for a specified, limited time.

19DOD Instruction 5200.40, DOD Information Technology Security
Certification and Accreditation Process (December 30, 1997); DOD 8510.1-M,
DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation
Process Application Manual (July 31, 2000); and DOD Instruction 8500.1,
Information Assurance (October 24, 2002).

According to DLA officials, the agency has implemented the practice of
issuing authorization to operate decisions on a "time-limited" basis-
regardless if certification tasks have been completed because of concern
that OMB might not support funding for systems that received an interim
authorization to operate decision. However, OMB, DOD, and DLA policies and
procedures do not allow for the practice of issuing "time-limited"
authorizations; they require interim authorization to operate decisions
when all certification tasks have not been completed. To illustrate, the
designated approving authority for one of the ten systems we reviewed
changed the system's status from an interim authorization to operate to a
"time-limited" authorization to operate even though several action items
for such authorization had not been met, and this type of authorization is
not allowed under current guidance. For example, information assurance
personnel had not updated the security plan or completed a risk
assessment. Unless DLA complies with the requirements for issuing
accreditation decisions, it will not have assurance that its information
systems are operating as intended and meeting security requirements.

In addition, DLA did not effectively implement controls to verify the
completion of certification tasks. As designed and implemented, DLA
divides the responsibilities of the system certifier among the information
assurance personnel at its locations and a central review team within the
information assurance program office. To help ensure quality over the
certification process, the central review team established a DLA quality
review checklist to verify the certification tasks performed by the
information assurance personnel. However, under the current process, the
central review team did not interview information assurance personnel at
the locations or conduct on-site visits to verify that certification tasks
were performed. Instead, the central review team relies on documentation
submitted to them by the information assurance personnel who performed the
certification tasks. However, this documentation was not always adequate.
For example, the checklist contained questions about whether physical
access controls were adequate to protect all facilities housing user
workstations, but for the central review team to verify such a task,
either an on-site inspection or a diagram of the facility or other
documentation to demonstrate the physical access controls in place would
have been needed. As a result, the certification process may not provide
the authorizing official with objective or sufficient information that is
necessary to make credible, risk-based decisions on whether to place an
information system into operation.

  Improvements Are Needed in Managing and Overseeing the Security Program

Key underlying reasons for the weaknesses in DLA's information security
program were that the responsibilities of information assurance managers
and information assurance officers were not consistently understood or
communicated across the 10 DLA locations we reviewed and the information
assurance program office did not maintain the accuracy and completeness of
the data contained in the agency's primary reporting tool for managing and
overseeing the agencywide information security program. The information
assurance program office-as the agency's central security management group
for managing and overseeing the security program-is responsible for
providing overall security policy and guidance, along with oversight to
ensure information assurance managers and information assurance officers
adequately perform or execute required information security activities
such as those related to performing risk assessments, satisfying security
training requirements, testing and evaluating the effectiveness of
controls, documenting and reporting plans of action and milestones, and
certifying and accrediting systems.

Although the information assurance program office developed information
security policies and procedures, it did not maintain them to ensure
information assurance personnel had current and sufficient documentation
to carry out their responsibilities. For example, of the 17 information
assurance managers and information assurance officers at the 10 locations
we reviewed:

o 	nine were unaware of the requirement for security training specific to
an employee's information security responsibilities; and

o 	three were unaware of the requirement to perform annual self
assessments, while ten others had varying understandings of how this
requirement was to be met.

In addition, data on key information security activities contained in the
primary reporting tool were inaccurate or incomplete. For example,

o 	for a year, the information assurance program office had not entered
weaknesses that had been identified during information assurance program
reviews into the primary reporting tool;

o 	information assurance personnel at DLA locations used personal
discretion for determining whether or not to report a system deficiency to
the information assurance program office for entry and compilation

in the primary reporting tool, thereby potentially underreporting agency
level plans of action and milestones; and

o 	information assurance personnel at both headquarters and the DLA
locations did not consistently enter key performance metrics related to
plans of action and milestones and security training, thereby potentially
underreporting important information used to gauge the health of the
security program.

A key reason for these weaknesses was that DLA had no documentation on the
system design or its intended use and, therefore, had no instructional
material to guide users. As a result, the data in the primary reporting
tool were not reliable or effective for reporting metrics to DOD and OMB
for FISMA evaluation reporting. Moreover, because the key information had
not been entered into the database, the agency did not readily have all
the information about the deficiencies of its program and, therefore, did
not have complete information about the security posture of its program.

DLA senior officials recognize that the agency's primary reporting tool
has not been effectively implemented and used to manage and oversee the
security program. Therefore, the agency developed an ad hoc process of
data calls to the DLA locations to aggregate the performance data.
However, continuation of this ad hoc process will likely not provide the
reliable data needed to consistently satisfy FISMA reporting requirements.
Until agencywide policies and procedures are sufficiently documented and
implemented and are consistently understood and used across the agency,
DLA's ability to protect the information and information systems that
support its mission will be limited.

Conclusions	DLA has not fully implemented its agencywide information
security program, thereby jeopardizing the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the information and information systems that it relies on
to accomplish its mission. Specifically, DLA has not consistently
implemented important information security practices and controls,
including consistently assessing risk; ensuring that training is provided
for employees who have significant responsibilities for information
security, and that security training plans are updated and maintained;
annually testing and evaluating the effectiveness of management,
operational and technical controls; documenting and reporting complete
plans of action and milestones; implementing a fully effective
certification and accreditation process; and maintaining the accuracy and
completeness of the data contained in the

primary reporting tool. Although DLA's efforts in developing and
implementing its information security program have merit, it has not taken
all the necessary steps to ensure the security of the information and
information systems that support its operations. Ensuring that the agency
implements key information security practices and controls requires top
management support and leadership and consistent and effective management
oversight and monitoring. Until DLA takes steps to address these
weaknesses and fully implements its information security program, it will
have limited assurance that agency operations and assets are adequately
protected.

  Recommendations for Executive Actions

To assist DLA in fully implementing its information security program, we
are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the DLA
Director to implement key information security practices and controls by:

o 	consistently assessing risks that could result from the unauthorized
access, use, disclosure or destruction of information and information;

o 	ensuring that training is provided for employees who have significant
responsibilities for information security;

o  ensuring that security training plans are updated and maintained;

o 	ensuring appropriate monitoring of the agency's security training
program;

o 	ensuring that annual security test and evaluation activities include
management, operational, and technical controls of every information
system in DLA's inventory;

o  documenting and reporting complete plans of action and milestones;

o 	establishing specific guidance or instructions to information assurance
managers and information assurance officers on what-or how-to document and
report plans of action and milestones for system deficiencies;

o 	discontinuing the practice of issuing "time-limited" authorization to
operate accreditation decisions when certification tasks have not been
completed;

o 	ensuring that the DLA central review team verifies that certification
tasks have been completed; and

o 	maintaining the accuracy and completeness of the data contained in the
agency's primary reporting tool for recording, tracking, and reporting
performance metrics on information security practices and controls.

  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In providing written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in app.
II), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation)
concurred with most of our recommendations and described ongoing and
planned efforts to address them. Specifically, he stated that DLA has
taken several actions to fully implement an effective agencywide
information security program, including publishing a DOD manual that will
soon be released to provide detailed guidance on training for employees
who have significant information security responsibility. He also stated
that DLA is issuing an interim mandatory guide that will soon be released
to assist users in documenting and preparing plans of action and
milestones, and reinforcing policy requirements for making accreditation
decisions.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense disagreed with our draft
recommendation to ensure the testing and evaluation of the effectiveness
of security controls for all systems annually. He stated that this
recommendation would require all information assurance controls for all
systems be tested and evaluated every year, which essentially amounts to
annual recertification. The department further stated that the level of
test and evaluation is neither practical nor cost-effective and that the
combination of DLA's assessments, tests, and reviews allow them to ensure
compliance of their controls in accordance with DOD Instruction 8500.2.

The intent of our draft recommendation was not to require that all
information assurance controls for all systems be tested and evaluated
annually. Rather, the intent of our draft recommendation, consistent with
FISMA requirements, was to ensure that DLA's annual security test and
evaluation activities include management, operational, and technical
controls of every information system in its inventory. As stated in our
report, while DLA generally assessed technical controls annually of every
system in its inventory, it did not annually test and evaluate management
and operational controls of those systems. We agree that testing and
evaluating all controls for every system annually may not be
cost-effective. However, unless DLA's annual testing and evaluation
activities include management and operational controls, as well as the
technical controls of

its systems, it may not be able to ensure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of its information and information systems. Accordingly,
we have clarified our recommendation to state that the Secretary of
Defense direct the DLA Director to ensure that annual security test and
evaluation activities include management, operational, and technical
controls of every information system in DLA's inventory.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense also disagreed with our draft
recommendation to document procedures for performing certification
responsibilities that include specific responsibilities related to using
the checklist. He stated that the Secretary of Defense provided sufficient
direction to agency directors on the certification and accreditation
process through DOD Instruction 5200.40, and that additional guidelines on
the certification and accreditation process are provided in DOD 8510.1-M.
He further stated that DOD 8510.1-M contains a "minimum activities
checklist" that all DOD Components are expected to follow when conducting
certifications and that DLA's information assurance One Book policy
includes roles and responsibilities for performing security certification
and accreditation.

Our draft recommendation refers to the DLA quality review checklist used
by the agency's central review team to verify completion of certification
tasks, not to the DOD "minimum activities checklist" described in DOD
8510.1-M. Unless certification tasks performed by information assurance
personnel at the various DLA locations have been verified, the authorizing
official may not have objective or sufficient information that is
necessary to make credible, risk-based decisions on whether to place an
information system into operation. Accordingly, we have clarified our
recommendation to state that the Secretary of Defense direct the DLA
Director to ensure that the DLA central review team verifies that
certification tasks have been completed.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense also disagreed with our draft
recommendation to update and maintain the agency's primary reporting tool
for recording, tracking, and reporting performance metrics on information
security practices and controls. He stated that the primary reporting tool
was developed and maintained by DLA and that responsibility for updating
and sustaining the tool was transferred to an internal application
development team for continued maintenance and support. He also stated
that DLA initiated implementation of enterprise standard DOD solutions
that will replace the functionality currently

provided by the agency reporting tool and that sustainment of the tool
would not be cost effective or efficient.

The intent of our draft recommendation was to update and maintain the
accuracy and completeness of data entered into DLA's primary reporting
tool, not the application programs. While DLA has several initiatives
underway at various stages of development and implementation that are
intended to introduce new functionality or replace some of the existing
functionality in the agency reporting tool, none of these initiatives have
been fully implemented throughout the agency. If DLA continues to use a
tool for managing and overseeing its information assurance program, the
fundamental practice of having accurate and complete data-whether in the
current tool or in a future tool-is important to ensure the data are
reliable for reporting performance metrics on key information security
practices and controls to DOD and OMB for FISMA evaluation reporting.
Accordingly, we have clarified our recommendation to state that the
Secretary of Defense direct the DLA Director to maintain the accuracy and
completeness of the data contained in the agency's primary reporting tool
for recording, tracking, and reporting performance metrics on information
security practices and controls.

We are sending copies of this report to the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Business Transformation); Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Networks and Information Integration; DLA Director; officials within DLA's
Information Operations and Information Assurance office; and the Acting
DOD Inspector General. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-6244 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III.

Gregory C. Wilshusen Director, Information Security Issues

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

To determine whether the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had implemented an
effective agencywide information security program, we reviewed the
Department of Defense (DOD) and agencywide information security policies,
directives, instructions, and handbooks. We also evaluated DLA's
agencywide tool-the Comprehensive Information Assurance Knowledgebase-for
aggregating the agency's performance data on information security
activities that are required by the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), such as the number and percentage of risk
assessments performed, employees with significant information security
responsibilities that received training to perform their duties, and
weaknesses for which the agency had plans of action and milestones. To
gain insight into DLA's certification and accreditation process, we
reviewed the agency's methods and practices for identifying
vulnerabilities and risks and the process for certifying systems and
making accreditation decisions. We assessed whether DLA's information
security program was consistent with relevant DOD policies and procedures,
as well as with the requirements of FISMA, applicable Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) policies,1 and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) guidance.

We also assessed whether selected information security plans and documents
related to risk assessments, testing and evaluation, and plans of action
and milestones were current and complete. To accomplish this, we
non-randomly selected 10 sensitive but unclassified systems.2 The 10
systems came from 10 different DLA locations and included 3 systems, 4
sites, and 3 types.3 We selected these systems to maximize variety in
criticality and geographic locations. We also conducted telephone
interviews with 17 information assurance managers and information
assurance officers from the 10 locations in order to gain insight into
their understanding of FISMA requirements, relevant OMB policies, NIST
guidance, and agencywide and DOD policies and procedures.

1Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security
of Federal Automated Information Resources (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28,
2000).

2The system security authorization agreement is a single source data
package for all information pertaining to the certification and
accreditation of a particular site or system to, among other things, guide
actions, document decisions, specify information security requirements,
and maintain operational systems security.

3A type system security authorization agreement is developed when an
information system has been replicated with the same configuration and has
been deployed at multiple locations.

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

We performed our review at DLA Headquarters, located at Ft. Belvoir,
Virginia; DLA Supply Center, located at Columbus, Ohio; and DLA's Business
Processing Center, located at Denver, Colorado, from September 2004 to
July 2005, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

                                  Appendix II

                    Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Gregory C. Wilshusen (202) 512-6244

Staff 	In addition to the individual named above, Jenniffer Wilson,
Assistant Director, Barbara Collier, Joanne Fiorino, Sharon Kittrell,
Frank Maguire,

Acknowledgments John Ortiz, and Chuck Roney made key contributions to this
report.

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