Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of
Border Surveillance Technology Program (22-FEB-06, GAO-06-295).
In September 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
established America's Shield Initiative (ASI)--a program that
included a system of sensors, cameras, and databases formerly
known as the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System
(ISIS)--to detect, characterize, and deter illegal breaches to
the northern and southern U.S. borders. The goals of the ASI
program were to address ISIS capability limitations and support
the department's antiterrorism mission. In April 2005, department
officials told GAO that ISIS was subsumed within ASI. By
congressional mandate, GAO reviewed the program to determine (1)
the operational needs that ASI was intended to address and DHS's
plans for ASI, (2) the steps that DHS had taken to ensure that
ASI was aligned with the department's enterprise architecture,
and (3) the actions that DHS had taken to establish the
capability to effectively manage ASI. In written comments, DHS
agreed with a draft of this report, stating that it was factually
correct in virtually all aspects. DHS also commented that it has
ceased work on ASI and redirected resources to its Secure Border
Initiative. It also described program management corrective
actions that it plans to implement.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-295
ACCNO: A47358
TITLE: Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify
Reevaluation of Border Surveillance Technology Program
DATE: 02/22/2006
SUBJECT: Border patrols
Border security
Counterterrorism
Electronic surveillance
Enterprise architecture
Homeland security
Performance measures
Program evaluation
Program management
Strategic planning
Program goals or objectives
INS Integrated Surveillance Intelligence
System
America's Shield Initiative
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GAO-06-295
* Report to Congressional Committees
* February 2006
* BORDER SECURITY
* Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance
Technology Program
* Contents
* Conclusions
* Agency Comments
* Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on Homeland Security, House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations
* Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Report to Congressional Committees
February 2006
BORDER SECURITY
Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance
Technology Program
Contents
February 22, 2006 Letter
The Honorable Judd Gregg Chairman The Honorable Robert C. Byrd Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on
Appropriations United States Senate
The Honorable Harold Rogers Chairman The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on
Appropriations The House of Representatives
In 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deployed the
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)-a system of sensors,
cameras, and databases designed to prevent smugglers and illegal aliens
from entering the United States along its northern and southern borders.
Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 INS was absorbed into the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the ISIS program was
subsequently moved into the department's Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) component. In September 2004, CBP established the America's Shield
Initiative (ASI) program. The goals of the program were to address ISIS
capability limitations and support the department's antiterrorism mission.
In April 2005, DHS officials told us that ISIS was subsumed within ASI. In
September 2005, we were told that the Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security directed that proposed plans for the program be reevaluated.
The conference report for the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2005, directed us to review ISIS.2 Since ISIS was
subsequently subsumed into ASI, we agreed to the following objectives: (1)
determine the operational needs that ASI is intended to address and the
department's plans for ASI, (2) determine the steps that the department
has taken to ensure that ASI is aligned with the department's enterprise
architecture, and (3) determine the actions that the department has taken
to establish the capability to effectively manage ASI.
On October 27, 2005, we briefed your staff on the results of our review.
This report transmits these results. The full briefing, including our
scope and methodology, is reprinted as appendix I. In summary, we made
three major points:
o First, the program had defined ASI operational needs and developed
planning documents for approval by DHS's Investment Review Board.
Operational needs included both addressing known limitations in ISIS
capabilities and supporting CBP counterterrorism efforts through enhanced
border surveillance capabilities. Planning documents included a program
management plan, acquisition plan, and a preliminary operational
requirements document. The review board did not approve these planning
documents.
o Second, while DHS's Investment Review Board found that the ASI program
was aligned with the department's enterprise architecture, it also found
that the program had not adequately identified its dependencies and
relationships with other department components. The board also determined
that the program needed to be integrated into the department's broader
border and interior enforcement strategy. As a result, the Deputy
Secretary directed that ASI be reevaluated within the context of this
broader strategy, now called the Secure Border Initiative.
o Third, the program had not established key management capabilities
(people and process controls). As of August 2005, it had filled 30 of 47
program office positions and had defined roles and responsibilities for
only 3 of the 47 positions. Further, the program had not defined key
acquisition management processes, such as those for tracking and
overseeing contractors and for developing and implementing project plans.
Contract tracking and oversight is important because inadequate contract
management oversight led to a number of problems in deploying, operating,
and maintaining ISIS technology. Program officials told us they planned to
develop key acquisition processes, however plans and timeframes for doing
so had not been set. To its credit, the program office had defined and
begun implementing a risk management process, which is one key acquisition
process.
Conclusions
DHS's decision to reevaluate the ASI program demonstrates that its
investment review process is based on relevant considerations, such as
dependencies with and impacts on related border security programs that the
department's enterprise architecture should explicitly define and the
architecture alignment analysis should demonstrate. The limitations in the
program office's people and process capabilities are another issue
supporting the department's decision to reevaluate the program.
Accordingly, the department's decision to reevaluate the program was
justified by the existence of unresolved key issues that, if not
addressed, would have introduced unnecessary and unacceptable risk. It is
thus important that this reevaluation include consideration of all issues
that could affect program success.
Agency Comments
In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director,
Department GAO/OIG Liaison Office, DHS stated that it agreed with the
overall thrust and that the report is factually correct in virtually all
aspects. The department also stated that it had decided to cease work on
ASI and that it has dismantled the ASI program office and a subset of its
personnel has been assigned to the SBI program. Further, the department
stated that in establishing SBI, it intends to implement corrective
program management measures to address the problems that occurred on ISIS.
The DHS comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chair and Ranking Minority
Members of other Senate and House committees that have authorization and
oversight responsibilities for homeland security. We are also sending a
copy to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies of
this report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3439 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Randolph C. Hite Director, Information Technology Architecture and
Systems Issues
Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on Homeland Security, House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations Appendix I
Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Appendix II
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix III
Randolph C. HIte (202) 512-3439 or [email protected]
In addition to the contact named above, Deborah A. Davis, Assistant
Director; Barbara S. Collier; Neil J. Doherty; Sairah R. Ijaz; B. Scott
Pettis; Amos A. Tevelow; and Daniel K. Wexler made key contributions to
this report.
(310611)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-295 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Randolph C. Hite, (202) 512-3439,
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-295 , a report to the House and Senate Subcommittees
on Homeland Security, Committees on Appropriations
February 2006
BORDER SECURITY
Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance
Technology Program
In September 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established
America's Shield Initiative (ASI)-a program that included a system of
sensors, cameras, and databases formerly known as the Integrated
Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)-to detect, characterize, and deter
illegal breaches to the northern and southern U.S. borders. The goals of
the ASI program were to address ISIS capability limitations and support
the department's antiterrorism mission. In April 2005, department
officials told GAO that ISIS was subsumed within ASI.
By congressional mandate, GAO reviewed the program to determine (1) the
operational needs that ASI was intended to address and DHS's plans for
ASI, (2) the steps that DHS had taken to ensure that ASI was aligned with
the department's enterprise architecture, and (3) the actions that DHS had
taken to establish the capability to effectively manage ASI.
In written comments, DHS agreed with a draft of this report, stating that
it was factually correct in virtually all aspects. DHS also commented that
it has ceased work on ASI and redirected resources to its Secure Border
Initiative. It also described program management corrective actions that
it plans to implement.
The ASI program defined the operational needs it expected ASI to meet,
including addressing both known limitations in the ISIS and supporting
counterterrorism efforts. The program also developed key planning
documents for approval by the DHS Investment Review Board that were
intended to meet these needs, including a program management plan,
acquisition plan, and preliminary operational requirements document.
However, these plans were not approved.
The Review Board recently reviewed the ASI program and found, among other
things, that it was aligned with the department's enterprise architecture.
However, the reviews also determined that the program had not adequately
defined its relationships and dependencies with other department programs.
Subsequently, the DHS Deputy Secretary directed that the program be
reevaluated within the department's broader border and interior
enforcement strategy, now referred to as the Secure Border Initiative.
The ASI program had not established the people and process capabilities
required for effective program management. As of August 2005, it had
filled 30 of its 47 program office positions, and it had defined roles and
responsibilities for only 3 of them. In addition, while the program had
defined and begun implementing a plan to manage program risks, it had not
yet defined key acquisition management processes, such as effective
project planning, and contract tracking and oversight. As a result, the
program risked repeating the inadequate contract management oversight that
led to a number of problems in deploying, and operating and maintaining
ISIS technology.
DHS's decision to reevaluate ASI was justified by the existence of
unresolved key issues cited above (addressing its impact on other
programs, and establishing people and process capabilities required for
effective program management). These issues, if not addressed, would have
introduced unnecessary risk. It is important that the department's
reevaluation consider all such issues that could affect program success.
*** End of document. ***