Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the	 
Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and	 
Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor (22-JUN-06, GAO-06-274).
                                                                 
The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in	 
Iraq has led to widespread interest by Congress and the public	 
regarding the availability of critical force protection 	 
equipment. GAO initiated a series of engagements under the	 
Comptroller General's authority to address these concerns. In	 
March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the production 
and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy trucks.
This engagement examines issues affecting the production and	 
installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy	 
trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which 
truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified	 
requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to	 
provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine	 
Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of	 
truck armor.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-274 					        
    ACCNO:   A55844						        
  TITLE:     Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach       
between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production 
and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor			 
     DATE:   06/22/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Armored vehicles					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military land vehicles				 
	     Military materiel					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Protective equipment				 
	     Timeliness 					 

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GAO-06-274

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
          * Deployed U.S. Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
          * Outfitting Marine Corps Trucks with Armor
          * Processes for Developing Wartime Requirements and Solutions
               * Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
               * Development of Truck Armor Solutions
     * Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004
          * First Phase Requirement Addressed with Interim Armor
          * Second Phase Requirement Met with Add-On Armor
          * Third Phase Requirements To Be Met with Integrated Armor
     * Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mis
          * Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in
          * Mission Needs Affected Production and Installation of Truck
     * Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Ava
          * Marine Corps Is Taking Short-and Long-Term Actions to Improv
          * DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination of Requirements
     * Conclusions
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Effor
          * Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks
               * Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identi
          * Logistics Vehicle System
               * Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identi
          * Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement
               * Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identi
     * Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
          * GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments
     * Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

June 2006

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected
the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor


GAO-06-274

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 5
Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004 9
Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs
Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces 15
Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability 17
Conclusions 19
Recommendations for Executive Action 20
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24
Appendix II Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Efforts 26
Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks 26
Logistics Vehicle System 29
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 32
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35
Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 47

Table

Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor 8

Figures

Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor
Protection 10
Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-on
Armor Protection 12
Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated Armor 14
Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck 26
Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim and Add-on Armor 28
Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System 29
Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and
Add-on Armor 31
Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement 32
Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor 34

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

June 22, 2006 June 22, 2006

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate The
Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization operations
to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that time, U.S.
forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using a
variety of weapons- including improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars,
and rocket launchers-and there have been numerous attacks on military
convoys as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. The
threat of IEDs, in particular, has become increasingly frequent and has
been ranked as the number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The
explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of dynamite, land mines, old
artillery shells, or other types of military ordnance. Many IEDs are
hidden and disguised along traffic routes, and are remotely detonated
against unsuspecting military personnel. When combat operations were
declared over during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition
forces transitioned to stabilization operations to restore public order
and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that time, U.S. forces have come under
frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using a variety of weapons-
including improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars, and rocket
launchers-and there have been numerous attacks on military convoys as they
carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in
particular, has become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the
number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs
consist mainly of dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other
types of military ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along
traffic routes, and are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military
personnel.

As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection
of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of
new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to
include such improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks, body
armor, and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs. As a result of
experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have
taken several immediate steps to improve the protection of military forces
operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of new capabilities
to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to include such
improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks, body armor, and
systems for detecting and defeating IEDs.

In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public
regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for
deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated In
response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public
regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for
deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated a
series of engagements under the authority of the Comptroller General of
the United States to examine this issue. In April 2005 we reported on
shortages of a number of critical items during OIF, to include certain
protective items such as body armor and armored HMMWVs.1 We identified a
number of systemic causes for these shortages, including inaccurate
requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective distribution processes. As
a result, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
calling for actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve
requirements and developing and exercising deployable distribution
capabilities, to improve DOD's system for supplying items to U.S. forces.
In March 2006, we reported on several factors that affected the production
and installation of Army truck armor during OIF and other current wartime
operations.2 These factors included the Army's failure to fully capitalize
on previously identified truck armor requirements and awarding contracts
for amounts less than total requirements due to increasing needs for truck
armor and inadequate funding. In our report, we made a recommendation to
the Secretary of Defense calling for the Army to establish a process for
documenting and communicating all urgent wartime funding requirements for
supplies and equipment when they are identified and the disposition of
funding decisions.

This current engagement examines issues affecting the production and
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Marine Corps
forces during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility.3 Our objectives were to (1) determine
the extent to which Marine Corps truck armor was produced and installed to
meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time
to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and
DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.

1 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of
Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

2 GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Procurement and
Installation of Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations,
GAO-06-160 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).

3 CENTCOM is one of DOD's five geographic combatant commands, whose area
of responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia, South and
Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. In addition to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, CENTCOM is involved in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
The other four geographic combatant commands are U.S. European Command,
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command.

In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical trucks
used by Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which
included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 To identify the extent to which
truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements and
what factors affected the time to provide armor, we visited Marine Corps
organizations to obtain data on the requirements, funding, production, and
installation of truck armor kits. We considered the armor requirement as
met for each type of truck when the quantity of add-on and integrated
armor produced and installed on vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on
the information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to
provide truck armor to deployed forces. We also identified the Marine
Corps' short-term and long-term efforts to improve the availability of
truck armor. We assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and
determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We performed our review from April 2005 to March 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located in appendix I.

                                Results in Brief

The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation
of add-on truck armor in September 2004-8 months after that requirement
was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor
requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first
phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004
to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar
threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by
installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor
did not meet requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection
from the fragmentation effects of IEDs. Marine Corps officials
acknowledged that the interim armor provided protection against the
prevalent ballistic threat at the time but offered only limited protection
against IEDs. These officials stated that their intent was to field some
level of protection until a more robust armor solution became available.
In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to
1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September
2004 with add-on armor that provided the required IED protection. In the
third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading armor protection from add-on
armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which were included in the 1,438 trucks armored in the second phase. As of
March 2006, 803 integrated armor kits have been installed, and the Marine
Corps expects to complete installation of integrated armor by May 2006.
The other trucks (5-ton truck and 22-ton bulk hauler) are not receiving
integrated armor because they are at the end of their economic life cycle
and will be replaced.

4 The Marine Corps also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical
wheeled vehicle. We examined availability of armor for HMMWVs in our prior
report on wartime supply availability, so we did not include them in this
review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the
Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations,
GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor
requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army.
This delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim
armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may
have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed
Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not
officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin
seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004. According to
Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED
protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine
Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps
fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. However, the
Army identified its initial truck armor requirement in November 2003 and
begun developing armor kits using the preferred type of steel at this
time. Had the Marine Corps began seeking armor solutions in November 2003,
it might have been able to acquire the preferred type of steel in time for
its March 2004 deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this
steel during this time and the willingness of industry to work with the
Marine Corps to expedite the availability. Second, mission needs
restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim
armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor. As a result, the
fielding of add-on armor and integrated armor was stretched out over a
longer period, placing troops at greater risk as they conducted wartime
operations in vehicles without the preferred level of protection.

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the timely
availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine
Corps also is taking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to
address the availability of truck armor for future operations. While we
did not evaluate this plan, we did note that it is aimed at identifying
long-term requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address
these requirements. In addition, DOD established the Rapid Validation and
Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) process to improve
coordination of wartime combatant commander requirements, and to
accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions that are
outside the services' established requirement processes. However, it is
unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor
because it excludes the development of new technology solutions.

To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions about
what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address common
urgent wartime requirements, we are making recommendations that the
Secretary of Defense (1) direct the service secretaries to establish a
process to share information on developed or developing materiel solutions
and (2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process should be utilized
when materiel solutions require research and development. In written
comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the second
recommendation, but stated it believes that multiple layers of
communication already exist between the Marine Corps and the Army to
satisfy the first recommendation. However, as evidenced in our report,
these various layers of communication were not sufficient to bring the
services' two truck armor programs together in a more uniform and
coordinated approach from the beginning to ensure that requirements were
identified and solutions developed for both services at the same time. DOD
also provided additional comments related to the context and accuracy of
the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. The department's written
comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in appendix III.

                                   Background

Marine Corps convoys carrying supplies and equipment in CENTCOM's area of
responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents using
IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Marine Corps has
undertaken several force protection measures, such as adding armor to a
number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other CENTCOM locations. The Marine Corps fielded truck armor after
identifying requirements and then designing and procuring three different
levels of armor and fielding that armor in three different phases.

Deployed U.S. Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs

Military convoys operating in CENTCOM's area of responsibility have been
subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in
Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at
tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the
region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization
operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since that time, the
United States has incurred more casualties than during major combat
operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating
in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar
rounds, to multiple explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In
the spring of 2004, nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a
coalition casualty. In particular, U.S. military convoys have been the
targets of these types of attacks. In addition to Iraq, U.S. forces
operating in Afghanistan also have been subjected to IED attacks.

IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a number
of different ways. They can contain commercial or military explosives,
homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. For
example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been employed as IEDs in
Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many vehicles-from small
sedans to large cargo trucks-stationed along the roadways. Furthermore,
"person-borne" suicide bombs have also been used, with explosives
contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is specifically modified to
conceal and carry this material.

Outfitting Marine Corps Trucks with Armor

In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars
and rocket launchers, the Marine Corps has undertaken several force
protection measures, including adding armor to a number of medium and
heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM locations.5
The trucks being armored by the Marine Corps include the Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck), the multipurpose 5-ton truck,
and the 22-ton Logistics Vehicle System (LVS). The MTVR and 5-ton are
multipurpose medium trucks that transport all types of supplies. The LVS
is a heavy truck that transports a variety of supplies and equipment such
as bulk liquids (fuel and water), ammunition, bulk and palletized cargo,
and bridging equipment. Appendix II contains a detailed description of
each Marine Corps vehicle and a discussion of armor production and
installation.

5 Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of personal
body armor and electronic IED countermeasures, as well as changes to
unit-level training.

Processes for Developing Wartime Requirements and Solutions

The Marine Corps identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated
a procurement program to develop armor solutions, which involved seeking
funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting with
suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and testing armor
solutions, and installing armor onto trucks.

  Process for Developing Wartime Requirements

When a need for new equipment is identified by Marine Corps warfighters,
units make official requests through the Marine Corps' requirements
process by submitting a universal needs statement, which acts as a "work
request" for current and future wartime capabilities. For example, the
universal needs statements for truck armor described an urgent need to
protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects of IEDs
and other threats and specified the numbers and types of trucks to be
armored. Universal needs statements are forwarded from units to the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, where they are
validated and approved for funding by the Marine Requirements Oversight
Council.6 Upon validation, the statements are forwarded to the Program and
Review office at Marine Corps headquarters to obtain funding and to Marine
Corps Systems Command for procurement. The Marine Corps validated its
first requirement for truck armor in January 2004 prior to the deployment
of the First Marine Expeditionary Force to Southwest Asia.

  Development of Truck Armor Solutions

To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Marine Corps
initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions for its
deployed trucks. The Marine Corps obtained funding for its armor program
from a variety of sources. While the services can reprogram a small amount
of funds from one program budget to another, the majority of funding had
to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and, in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to obtain
funding for truck armor, the Marine Corps sought approval from the DOD
Comptroller and Congress to reprogram funding from other procurement or
appropriations accounts,7 requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi
Freedom Fund,8 and requested funding through supplemental appropriations.

6 The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of the
Marine Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force structure, and
requirements validation. It is chaired by the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps and is composed of permanent and associate members. At the
direction of the Commandant, the council is to: (1) conduct comprehensive
reviews of critical issues and programs to develop optimal, balanced
Marine Corps positions by considering current operational needs, desired
future capabilities, and feasible alternatives based on resource
constraints; (2) review, prioritize, and approve Mission Need Statements,
Operational Requirements Documents, and force structure recommendations;
and (3) develop recommendations for Marine Corps requirements, related
strategies, and positions that are supported and funded by external
agencies and other services.

The Marine Corps Systems Command was the activity responsible for
developing truck armor solutions to address validated Marine Corps
requirements. Systems Command's armoring efforts consisted of a phased
approach to develop and field three distinct levels of armor: interim
armor components, add-on armor kits, and integrated armor. Table 1 shows
the Marine Corps' armoring phases with the type of armor used in each
phase.

Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor

Phase I                            Phase II          Phase III             
Interim armor                      Add-on armor      Integrated armor      
Kevlar/ceramic and 3/16-inch high  3/8-inch rolled   Armor integrated into 
hard steel (HHS)                   homogeneous armor the body of the       
                                      (RHA)             vehicle               

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.

The phase one interim armor consisted of commercial off-the-shelf and
Marine Corps depot-produced armor components, such as 3/16-inch high hard
steel (HHS)9 armor doors, ballistic blankets, and Kevlar/ceramic panels.
Recognizing that the interim armor provided limited protection from IED
fragments, the Marine Corps subsequently produced a more robust solution
of add-on armor for phase two that provided greater protection against
IEDs and roadside bombs. This add-on armor initially included 3/8-inch
rolled homogeneous armor (RHA)10 steel doors and side panels, and
ballistic glass. Later, as the threat became more lethal, the Marine Corps
began producing and installing additional add-on armor coverage for phase
two that included underbodies, roofs, tailgates, rear cab plates, and
gunner shields. To produce add-on armor kits, Systems Command used its own
Logistics Command to produce and ship the add-on armor kits. The Logistics
Command obtained the armor panels and components directly from suppliers
and manufactured some parts in its depot, and shipped kits directly to
CENTCOM's area of responsibility for installation.

7 The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a total of
up to $20 million per year into the procurement account that includes
armor kits. However, because the funding needed for armor kits exceeded
this amount, the services had to request approval from the DOD Comptroller
for any reprogramming of funds in excess of the $20 million, which in turn
had to be approved by Congress.

8 The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for use of
military forces in Iraq and those operations authorized by Pub. L. No.
107-40 (2001), Authorization for use of Military Force, and other
operations and related activities in support of the global war on
terrorism.

9 High hard steel has a high surface hardness level which provides good
protection against projectiles.

As an improvement over add-on armor already fielded, in phase three the
Marine Corps is currently installing an integrated armor kit for the MTVR.
Unlike add-on armor, integrated armor is a permanent modification and is
designed for the life of the vehicle. Integrated armor provides the
greatest level of protection through more comprehensive coverage. The
integrated truck armor kits are produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation.
Installing integrated armor is much more complex than add-on armor because
it requires stripping the truck to its frame and rebuilding. It takes a
five-person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to complete the
installation of integrated armor.

          Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004

The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation of
add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after that initial
requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor
requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first
phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004
to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar
threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by
installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor
did not meet requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection
from the fragmentation effects of IEDs. In the second phase, the Marine
Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and
fully met that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that
provided the required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps
is upgrading armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for
900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438
trucks armored during the second phase.

10 Rolled homogeneous steel has a lower surface hardness than high hard
steel and provides good protection against both projectiles and the
fragmentation effects of IEDs.

First Phase Requirement Addressed with Interim Armor

In its first phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps validated its
initial requirement to armor 1,169 trucks in January 2004. However, they
addressed the requirement by installing interim armor that did not provide
sufficient protection against IED fragments. Figure 1 shows Marine Corps
production and installation of the interim armor protection over the
2-month period taken to address the initial requirement.

Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor
Protection

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the line in the graph simply indicates that sufficient
purchase, production, and installation occurred to meet the requirements.

Due to the immediacy of the need for armor and because forces were
preparing to deploy in 2 months, in January 2004 Marine Corps officials
purchased truck armor that was readily available, could be quickly shipped
to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, and was easily installed. This
interim solution consisted of a mix of Kevlar/ceramic armor plates
purchased off the shelf from commercial companies to protect doors, and
3/16-inch HHS armor plates produced by a Marine Corps depot to protect
doors and cargo areas. Officials said the interim armor protected against
the prevalent ballistic threat at the time and was readily available off
the shelf from industry. However, this interim armor did not meet the
validated requirements. Part of this requirement was to address an urgent
need to protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects
of IEDs. Marine Corps officials said an integral part of the Marine Corps'
armoring strategy was to procure and install armor on all vehicles prior
to going to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, using the best materials
readily available at the time. According to congressional testimony by the
Systems Command's Commanding General, the Marine Corps always made clear
the fact that they would pursue a more robust solution as better raw
material steel became available.11 As a result, the interim armor fielded
by the Marine Corps offered limited protection from IEDs and troops were
placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles equipped
with insufficient protection.

Second Phase Requirement Met with Add-On Armor

The second phase of truck armoring began in April 2004, when a second
requirement to armor 1,438 trucks with 3/8-inch RHA steel was validated
and then met 5 months later using add-on armor that provided the required
IED protection. To meet this requirement, the Marine Corps had to re-armor
the existing 1,169 trucks that had interim armor, plus armor an additional
269 trucks with the required IED protection. Installation of add-on armor
on the trucks was completed in September 2004, 5 months after
establishment of the April requirement and 8 months after establishment of
the initial requirement. Figure 2 shows Marine Corps production and
installation of the add-on armor protection over the 5-month period needed
to meet the April requirement.

11 "Marine Corps Vehicle Armoring," Testimony Before the House Armed
Services Committee by Major General (Sel) William D. Catto, Commanding
General, Marine Corps Systems Command, May 5, 2005.

Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-on
Armor Protection

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the line in the graph simply indicates that sufficient
production and installation occurred to meet the requirements. Dotted line
over the graph indicates some overproduction occurred.

Since the time the Marine Corps met its second phase armor requirement
with the installation of 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor, it continued to make
improvements to that armor during the second phase to better protect
against IED fragments. According to officials, the upgrades included
expanding armor coverage to the underbodies, tailgates, roofs, and gunner
shields of the trucks. For example, the Marine Corps installed underbodies
on 87 of the 5-ton trucks12 and underbodies on all 235 LVS trucks.
Upgraded add-on armor has also been installed on the MTVRs until the MTVRs
with integrated armor could be fielded. According to Marine Corps
officials, this improved add-on armor offers significant protection of
vehicles, including coverage for the seams to better shield against
explosive blasts and fragments.

12 The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks, but because the 5-ton trucks are
being phased out of theater operations, 87 will receive upgraded
protection, such as underbody kits, because the remaining trucks will not
be used outside the forward operating bases.

Third Phase Requirements To Be Met with Integrated Armor

In the third phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps established two
requirements to armor MTVRs with integrated armor. The first requirement
to armor 1,018 MTVRs was validated in October 2004, but was reduced to 900
in June 2005 primarily due to the rotation of fewer troops and trucks in
and out of CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The Marine Corps plans to
install armor on 900 MTVRs for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by May 2006.
As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had completed installation of
integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. Figure 3 shows Marine Corps production and
installation of the integrated armor protection.

Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated Armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates the amount
of armor produced by March 2006 to meet the requirements.

According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning of
its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this truck with
armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Marine Corps
officials said that only the MTVR trucks will receive the integrated armor
because both of the other types of trucks used (the 5-ton and 22-ton bulk
hauler) are at the end of their economic life cycle and are expected to be
replaced over the next 5 years by the MTVRs and the Logistics Vehicle
System Replacement (LVSR).

Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs Affected
             the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces

Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions
resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and
seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Second, mission
needs also affected the Marine Corp's ability to replace its interim armor
with add-on armor and to install integrated armor. As a result, the total
length of time to field add-on armor and integrated armor was stretched
out over a longer period, placing troops at greater risk as they conducted
wartime operations in vehicles without the preferred level of protection.

Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in Identifying Truck
Armor Requirements and Developing Solutions May Have Affected Armor Availability
For Deploying Units

A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in identifying
truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution from industry
may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim armor that met
IED protection requirements and may have contributed to the time to
provide the second phase armor protection to deployed Marine Corps forces.
The Marine Corps began procuring 3/8-inch RHA armor for effective
protection against IED fragments in late February 2004-3 months after the
Army identified this armor as a solution for IED protection in November
2003. After testing many types of armor materials to protect against IEDs,
the Army subsequently issued armor protection guidance in December 2003
recognizing HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates, which the Marine Corps
purchased for its interim armor solution in January 2004, as ineffective
against IED fragments. The guidance also stated that 3/8-inch RHA steel
offered good protection against IED blasts and fragments. Marine Corps
officials said they were aware of the Army's armor protection guidance and
had pursued acquiring 3/8-inch RHA steel in January, but it was not
available from industry to meet their needs. As a result, as an interim
solution to meet deployment deadlines, they purchased the best armor steel
available, although it did not provide sufficient IED protection.

To verify whether a shortage of 3/8-inch RHA steel occurred during the
January and March 2004 time frame, we asked several steel suppliers who
had supplied steel to an Army and Marine Corps steel distributor whether
3/8-inch RHA was in short supply. Industry officials told us that if the
Marine Corps had requested 3/8-inch RHA steel directly from them, they
could have made it available sooner despite a lead time that varied from
30 days to 4 months. In fact, according to industry officials, both the
3/16-inch HHS and 3/8-inch RHA steel required the same amount of lead
time. Ultimately, in early February 2004, the Marine Corps approached
industry with the assistance of congressional staff, and by the end of
February, 3/8-inch RHA steel became available. By March 2004, the Marine
Corps began producing 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor for their second phase
armor effort.

A formal process did not exist to require the military services to
coordinate when developing common wartime requirements, such as truck
armor, or share information on research, development, and procurement
efforts supporting solutions to those requirements. Both the Marine Corps
and Army have separate and distinct requirements determination processes
to address their warfighters' urgent needs. The two services share
information only through informal communication channels, which may not
always occur in the timeliest manner. For example, the Marine Corps
validated its first requirement to armor vehicles against IEDs and other
explosive devices in January 2004, 2 months after the Army had validated a
similar requirement in November 2003. In addition, in November 2003, the
Army had built a prototype armor kit for production made out of 3/8-inch
RHA steel, which is what the Marine Corps officials said they began
seeking 2 months later but were unable to obtain. If both the Marine Corps
and Army had coordinated requirements earlier and had worked together to
purchase 3/8-inch RHA steel from industry in November 2003, the Marine
Corps might have had 3/8-inch RHA available for its first armor phase
instead of the 3/16-inch HHS it used for interim armor, or might have
completed its second armor phase sooner than September 2004. Without a
formal process for coordinating common urgent wartime requirements and the
development of materiel solutions across military services, the Army and
Marine Corps could continue to develop different solutions with varying
degrees of effectiveness in response to the same warfighter needs.

Mission Needs Affected Production and Installation of Truck Armor

The production and installation of truck armor was also affected by
mission needs. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which
armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations.
According to Marine Corps officials, the need to install armor without
jeopardizing theater missions limited the number of vehicles that could be
taken out of action at any one time. As a result, installation rates for
the Marine Corps' add-on and integrated armor were paced with the rotation
of trucks into the maintenance area as they returned from missions. In
addition, the installation of integrated armor on the MTVR trucks also has
been constrained by lengthy installation times-on average it takes a
five-person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to install a single kit.
As a result of these constraints, the installation of add-on and
integrated truck armor was stretched out over a longer period, and the
Marine Corps provided funding and set production rates for add-on armor
components to match the limited rate of installation. Consequently, troops
were placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles that
were equipped with the interim armor that provided limited protection from
IEDs.

     Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the timely
availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine
Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to address the availability of
truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established the Rapid
Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS)
process to improve coordination of combatant commander wartime
requirements common to multiple services and to accelerate the process of
fielding urgent wartime solutions that are outside the services'
established requirements processes. However, it is unclear whether this
policy applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes
the development of new technology solutions.

Marine Corps Is Taking Short-and Long-Term Actions to Improve Armor Availability

The Marine Corps is taking short-term and long-term actions to improve the
availability of truck armor. In the short term, to address current armor
needs for deployed forces in Iraq and other CENTCOM locations, the Marine
Corps accelerated the rate of installation by increasing the number of
installation sites for integrated armor kits. For example, as of August
2005, the Marine Corps had installed integrated armor on 41 MTVRs using
one installation site in Iraq, and as of October 2005 it had installed
armor on 177 MTVRs using two sites-one in Iraq and one in Kuwait. The
Marine Corps opened a third site in November 2005 at the Marine Corps
Logistics Command in Albany, Georgia to further increase installation
rates. As a result of the increased number of installation sites, total
installation of integrated armor increased to 803 MTVRs as of March 2006.

The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the
availability of truck armor for future operations. For example, the Marine
Corps has developed a strategic plan for tactical wheeled vehicles that
addresses future truck armor needs. According to Marine Corps officials,
the plan involves ongoing assessments of the Marine Expeditionary Force
concept of warfare-the need to stay light and expeditionary-and
limitations of available airlift and seabasing that impact the amount of
armor applied to a vehicle. In addition, the Marine Corps is also
investigating future kit-armoring strategies with the Army using the "A"
kit and "B" kit concept identified in the Army's long-term strategy. Under
this strategy, the Army's plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two
kits. The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks
ready to accept armor and includes hard-to-install parts and permanent
mounting provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to
be applied to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular
components that can be installed and removed by two people. The Marine
Corps currently plans to incorporate this A kit/B kit armor concept onto
its LVSR and MTVR as new vehicles are produced. Marine Corps officials
told us that this concept addresses some of the concerns raised by Marine
Corps officials, such as wear and tear on the vehicles due to the
additional weight of the armor. Other long-term Marine Corps efforts
underway include studies on future armoring needs and solutions. These
studies are evaluating the ground transportation needs of the Marine Corps
in an expeditionary context and will make recommendations regarding the
value of current vehicle systems and necessary changes to develop and
maintain a tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that meets Marine Corps
requirements through 2020. While we did not evaluate these studies, we did
note that they are aimed at identifying longer-term requirements for truck
armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.

DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination of Requirements across Services

DOD has taken steps to improve coordination of urgent wartime needs across
the services by developing the JUONS process. DOD established the JUONS
process in July 2005 to improve coordination of combatant commanders'
urgent wartime requirements that are outside the services' established
processes to accelerate the fielding of wartime solutions that may be
purchased off the shelf or warrant minor modification. However, according
to Army officials, it is not clear whether the JUONS process addresses
urgent wartime needs that may emerge in the same fashion as armor. The
acquisition of an armor solution was in part an off-the-shelf purchase
combined with some level of research and development of new technology.
According to the JUONS instructions, solutions that involve the
development of a new technology or capability should not be processed
under the instruction's procedures. However, the instruction also allows
the minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar
mission. Army officials said they were unclear whether urgent wartime
requirements such as armor should be processed under JUONS given that the
armor solution can be described as both an off-the-shelf solution with
minor modification and a solution that required the development of new
technology. For example, according to Army officials, the recently fielded
armor solutions were readily available off the shelf and required some
modification. However, officials also said that the armor solutions can be
described as new and developing technology because research was needed to
identify effective armor protection standards and new technology was
necessary to integrate and apply armor onto vehicles. As a result, it is
not clear if similar future requirements are to be processed under JUONS
or other requirements generation processes. Until the types of solutions
about which the JUONS process applies are more clearly defined, it is
uncertain whether this process would apply to joint urgent wartime
requirements for items needing some level of research and development,
such as truck armor.

                                  Conclusions

The results of our work on Marine Corps truck armor indicate a broader
systemic problem with a lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps
and Army in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and developing
solutions to those requirements. Because there was no formal process
requiring a synchronized approach between the two services for identifying
requirements or developing solutions, the Marine Corps did not identify a
requirement for truck armor or begin developing armor solutions until 2
months after the Army had done so. A more unified and coordinated approach
between the Marine Corps and the Army might have allowed the Marine Corps
to field a better interim armor solution that provided sufficient
protection against IEDs. In addition, earlier coordination may also have
enabled the Marine Corps to begin developing and fielding its second phase
of armor, which provided the required IED protection, sooner. Further, due
to the lack of a formal process for sharing requirements information
between the services, official documentation was not available to
determine whether the Marine Corps made informed decisions about the
materials it selected for its interim armor or to assess the basis for
these decisions. While the work we performed focused on the Marine Corps
and Army, the lack of a DOD-wide framework for coordinating wartime
requirements and solutions impacts on all of the military services.

Subsequent to the procurement and installation of Marine Corps add-on
truck armor, DOD established a new joint process, called JUONS, to ensure
that the development of wartime requirements common to the Marine Corps,
Army, and other services are coordinated. However, because this new
process does not apply to the development of new technologies, it is not
clear whether it will improve interservice coordination when solutions
involve some level of research and development, like truck armor. Without
a formal process for coordinating all common wartime requirements and the
development of materiel solutions across military services, the Army,
Marine Corps, and other services could continue to develop different
solutions with varying degrees of effectiveness in response to the same
warfighter needs. It is likely that DOD will again face urgent wartime
requirements common to multiple services to rapidly develop materiel
solutions to improve force capability or protection of deployed forces.
The effective coordination of common requirements and sharing of
information on materiel solutions in development are critical to ensure
the needs of the warfighter are met in the timeliest and most effective
manner possible. Without improved coordination, deployed military
personnel and their missions may be placed at significant risk because
they lack the appropriate equipment at the critical times it may be
needed. Furthermore, until a formal process for coordinating and sharing
information on all common urgent wartime requirements and solutions is
established, Congress and the Secretary of Defense may be unable to
exercise effective oversight of decisions made to address urgent wartime
requirements.

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions about
what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address common
urgent wartime requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
take the following two actions: (1) direct the service secretaries to
establish a process to share information between the Marine Corps and the
Army on developed or developing materiel solutions, and (2) clarify the
point at which the JUONS process should be utilized when materiel
solutions require research and development.

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with
our recommendations. Regarding the first recommendation that DOD direct
the services to establish a process to share information between the
services on materiel solutions in development, DOD partially concurred,
and stated that it believes that multiple layers of communication already
exist between the Marine Corps and the Army. For example, DOD cited the
Marine Corps' participation in the Army's armor kit working group. DOD
also noted that the Marine Corps coordinated with the Army Research Lab
and the Army's Aberdeen Test Center on armor kit design and testing. While
we agree that the coordination between the Marine Corps and Army on truck
armoring was beneficial to the Marine Corps' program, these processes were
generally informal in nature. As evidenced in our report, these various
layers of communication were not sufficient to bring the services' two
truck armor programs together in a more uniform and coordinated approach
from the beginning to ensure that requirements were identified and
solutions developed for both services at the same time. Instead, the Army
identified its first truck armor requirements and began developing
solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not begin its
program until January 2004. As we reported, had the Marine Corps began
seeking truck armor solutions in November 2003, if might have been able to
acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its March 2004 deployment
to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel during this time
period and the willingness of industry to work with the Marine Corps to
expedite its availability.

DOD further stated that it believes it met the intent of our
recommendation with the creation of the Army-Marine Corps Board and the
Navy-Marine Corps Board. As noted by DOD, these Boards address issues at
the 3-star level and provide a means to share information between the
services. According to DOD, the Army-Marine Corps Board was not mature
enough to influence the initial development of truck armor, but in 2005 it
was used to coordinate production delivery priority between the Army and
Marine Corps for the up-armored HMMWV. While we agree that these Boards
enhance the coordination between the two services, they represent an
agreement between the services, initiated by the services. The intent of
our recommendation is for DOD to develop a more comprehensive DOD-wide
process that requires synchronization and coordination between the
services in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and developing
solutions to those requirements.

In response to our second recommendation to clarify the point at which the
JUONS process should be utilized, DOD concurred, stating that the Joint
Staff is working on an update to the JOUNS process instruction. According
to DOD, this update will clarify when and if the JOUNS process can be used
when materiel solutions require development of a new technology or
capability. The update is expected to be completed by September 2006.

DOD provided additional comments related to the context of the report.
Specifically, DOD noted that it believes the Marine Corps exhibited due
diligence in providing armor protection for its deployed tactical wheeled
vehicle fleet. It further described in detail the Marine Corps' approach
to first develop an interim solution using commercially available
materials, including 3/16-inch HHS, to ensure all vehicles entering Iraq
would have at least some protection until armor with a better level of
protection could be fielded. We agree that the Marine Corps exercised
diligence in armoring its trucks for Iraq and other deployed locations
given the circumstances and we believe this information is accurately
presented in the report. However, as noted in the report, a more unified
and synchronized approach between the Army and the Marine Corps may have
improved the availability of the preferred 3/8-inch RHA for the Marine
Corps' interim armor.

DOD also provided additional comments related to the accuracy of the
report which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate. The
department's specific comments and our responses to them are discussed in
detail in appendix III. In summary, the department disagreed with our
statements regarding the (1) lack of coordination between the Marine Corps
and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions, (2)
lack of a formal departmentwide process to ensure interservice
coordination, and (3) delays in the Marine Corps' identification of the
requirement for 3/8-inch RHA and its attempts to acquire and install this
improved armor. While we acknowledge that the Marine Corps made attempts
to coordinate with the Army through various informal processes, evidence
showed that the lack of a synchronized approach between the services led
to differing processes within the services for generating armor
requirements and solutions. Similarly, while we agree that the department
had a number of interservice working groups and committees designed to
enhance interservice coordination, we continue to believe that the lack of
a more formal interservice coordination process precluded the Marine Corps
and the Army from identifying armor requirements and solutions for both
services at the same time. Lastly, while the department refuted our
evidence that the Marine Corps did not identify a requirement for 3/8-inch
RHA until April 2004, it was unable to adequately document its position.
See appendix III for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army and the
Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.

William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To address our objectives, we examined the Marine Corps' programs to
provide armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles,
or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility.1 The Marine Corps trucks we examined included the 5-ton,
Logistics Vehicle System, and Marine Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement.
Descriptions of each of these trucks along with detailed information on
the availability of armor for each truck are included in appendix II.

To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to
meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time to
provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in
identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck
armor for deployed forces. We conducted interviews at the Marine Corps
Systems Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico,
Virginia; the Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany, Georgia; Army
headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and the U.S. Army Development Test
Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We also collected and
analyzed armor supply data such as requirements, funding levels,
production levels, and installations for the period between January 2004
(when truck armor requirements were first formally identified) and March
2006, which we obtained from Marine Corps bases or source documents. We
considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck when the
quantity of add-on or integrated armor produced and installed on vehicles
equaled the requirement. We did not, however, visit CENTCOM's area of
responsibility to validate the extent to which armor had been installed
and was actually in use by trucks. Based on the information gathered, we
identified factors that affected the time to provide truck armor to
deployed forces.

To determine what actions the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense
took to improve the availability of truck armor for current and future
operations, we interviewed Marine Corps and Joint Staff personnel to
identify short- and long-term efforts. We also reviewed the service's
studies related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, we did
not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for success.

1 The Marine Corps also developed armor for the high mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), a light tactical wheeled vehicle. We examined
availability of armor for HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply
availability, so we did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense
Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items
during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
8, 2005).

We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for
this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data
and corroborating them with other information gathered from other Marine
Corps organizations. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our audit from
April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring
Efforts

We examined the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to
meet identified requirements for the following vehicles: the multipurpose
5-ton truck, the logistics vehicle system (LVS), and the medium tactical
vehicle replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck). This appendix provides an
assessment for each of these three truck types. Each assessment presents a
general description of each truck and our evaluation of the extent to
which armor kits were produced and installed when required.

                           Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks

The Marine Corps multipurpose 5-ton trucks provide transportation,
hauling, and towing of just about everything in the equipment inventory.
These trucks transport troops, supplies, ammunition, construction
materials, and other items. These trucks also tow many types of trailers,
artillery guns, and vans. Almost all Marine Corps units are equipped with
5-ton trucks. As the primary truck transport asset of the Marine Corps, it
is available in cargo, dump, tractor, and wrecker configurations. Figure 4
shows an example of the 5-ton truck in a cargo configuration.

Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck

To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the
5-ton trucks in two phases. The first phase of armoring used interim
armor, which included 3/16-inch HHS doors, Kevlar/ceramic panels, and
ballistic blankets, and offered limited protection against improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). The second phase of armoring used add-on armor,
which offered better protection against IEDs because it included a better
grade steel (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous steel), ballistic glass, and
additional protection for the underbody, tailgate, roof, and other
components. There is also an additional type of armor protection used by
the Marine Corps, called integrated armor. However, integrated armor
requirements were not established for the 5-ton truck because the 5-ton
truck is at the end of its life cycle and is being replaced by MTVRs, or
7-ton trucks. In addition, according to Marine Corps officials, the 5-ton
trucks make poor candidates for integrated armor because the added weight
of the armor significantly reduces the payload capacity and usefulness of
the trucks.

Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements

The Marine Corps armored its 5-ton trucks in two phases, responding to two
validated requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to
armor 171 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials
said they met this requirement 2 months later, in March 2004, by
installing an interim armor solution before the First Marine Expeditionary
Force was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to
provide monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our
analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 123 door
sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistics
Command Maintenance Center in Albany, Georgia, and procured 3,830
Kevlar/ceramic panels from commercial sources to address the requirement.
According to Marine Corps officials, some of these Kevlar/ceramic panels
were used to armor the 5-ton trucks. Due to the immediate need for armor
prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met armor needs with the best
available materials at the time-3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates.
However, the armor did not provide sufficient IED protection.

The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 185 5-ton trucks
(including re-armoring the 171 trucks with interim armor), was validated
in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5
months later, in September 2004, by installing add-on armor kits that met
requirements for IED protection, but they were unable to provide monthly
data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that,
at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 199 5-ton armored door sets
between April and September 2004 to meet the requirement. Figure 5 shows
the requirements and installation levels for both interim armor and add-on
armor for the 5-ton truck over time. As of September 2005, the Marine
Corps had 123 add-on armored 5-ton trucks operating outside forward bases
in CENTCOM's area of responsibility. Eighty-seven of them also received
underbody armor.1

Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim and Add-on Armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements,
but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points
in time. Dotted line over the graph also indicates some overproduction
occurred.

1 The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks in theater, but because the 5-ton
trucks are being phased out of theater operations, 87 received upgraded
protection such as underbody kits while the rest will not be used off the
forward operating bases.

                            Logistics Vehicle System

The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) is a heavy tactical transport vehicle
system for fuels and bulk cargos that was first fielded in the mid-1980s.
It is a modular system consisting of a front power unit (cab) that is
designed to have interchangeable rear body units. The truck has an
off-road payload of 12.5-tons and an on-road payload of 22.5-tons. Figure
6 shows the front body unit, which can tow five different rear body units.
Rear body units include a wrecker, a fifth-wheel semitrailer adapter, a
dropside cargo unit, a self-loading container, and bridge transporter.

Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System

The Marine Corps installed armor protection on the LVS in two phases to
meet requirements. The first phase of armoring used interim armor, which
included Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic
blankets, and offered limited protection against IEDs. The second phase of
armoring used add-on armor, which offered better protection against IEDs
because it included a better grade (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous) steel,
ballistic glass, and additional protection for the underbody, tailgate,
roof, and other components. There is an additional type of armor
protection established by the Marine Corps, called integrated armor, but,
as with the 5-ton truck, a requirement for this type of protection was not
established for the LVS because it will ultimately be replaced by a new
truck called the Logistic Vehicle System Replacement during the 2008-2009
time frame.

Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements

The Marine Corps armored the LVS in two phases, responding to two
requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 204
trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corp officials said they met
this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months later,
in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was deployed to
Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide monthly data
on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that, at a
minimum, the Marine Corps produced 105 armored door sets at the Marine
Corps Logistic Command Maintenance Center between April and September 2004
and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a commercial company, some
of which were used to armor the LVS. Due to the immediate need for armor
prior to deployment, the Marine Corps met armor needs with the best
available materials at the time-3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates.
However, this armor did not provide sufficient protection against the
fragmentation effects of IEDs.

The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 221 trucks (including
re-armoring the 204 trucks with interim armor), was established in April
2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 months
later, in September 2004, with add-on armor kits that met the validated
requirements for protection from IEDs, but they were unable to provide
monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed
that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 261 armored door sets
between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistic Command
Maintenance Center and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a
commercial company to meet the requirement. According to Marine Corps
officials, some of the Kevlar/ceramic doors were used to armor the LVS. As
of January 2006, Marine Corps fielding data revealed that 235 LVS trucks
operating outside forward bases in CENTCOM's area of responsibility had
add-on armor. Figure 7 shows the requirements, production, and
installation levels for both interim armor and add-on armor for the LVS
over time.

Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and
Add-on Armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements,
but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points
in time. Dotted line over the graph indicates some overproduction
occurred.

                      Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

The Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is designed to
replace the existing fleet of 5-ton trucks with a new and more robust
fleet of 7-ton trucks. Figure 8 shows the MTVR as a troop carrier;
however, it is also used as a wrecker, dump truck, cargo carrier, and
convoy escort. According to a Marine Corps official, the service needed to
replace its existing medium 5-ton truck fleet with a vehicle capable of
carrying larger payloads, at a faster speed, over more difficult terrain,
and that can be airlifted. A contract was awarded to Oshkosh Truck
Corporation in December 1998, and production is underway.

Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement

To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the
MTVR in three phases. The first phase used interim armor, which includes
Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic blankets, and
offers limited protection against IEDs. The second phase used add-on
armor, which provides greater protection from IEDs than the interim armor
because it included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor, ballistic glass,
and additional protection for the underbody, side panels, tailgate, and
other components. The Marine Corps continues to design and produce
improvements to this add-on armor. The final armor phase used integrated
armor that is installed on the vehicle chassis and provides overlapping
seams that prevent penetration from ballistics and IEDs. Figure 9 shows
the requirements, production, and installation of each type of armor on
the MTVR.

Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements

The Marine Corps is armoring the MTVR in three phases, responding to four
requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 794
trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials said they
met this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months
later, in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was
deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide
data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that,
at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 174 doors between April and
September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a commercial
company for the requirement. An unspecified number of these Kevlar/ceramic
panels were used to armor the MTVR. Due to the immediate need for armor
prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met armor needs with the best
available materials at the time-3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates.
However, this armor did not provide sufficient protection against the
fragmentation effects of IEDs.

The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 1,032 MTVRs (including
re-armoring the 794 trucks armored with interim armor), was validated in
April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 months
later, in September 2005, by installing add-on armor kits that met the
validated requirements for protection from IEDs. However, they were unable
to provide data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis
showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 1,966 armored doors
between April and September 2004 to meet the requirement. The Marine Corps
also produced 962 cargo panel sets (i.e., which were steel plated to
protect the sides of the cargo unit) to protect transported troops.

The armor protection installed in the third phase had two requirements.
The first requirement, to armor 1,018 MTVRs (trucks that were already
provided with add-on armor) with integrated armor, was validated in
October 2004. However, in June 2005 this requirement was reduced to
installing integrated kits on 900 MTVRs by May 2006, because fewer trucks
than initially anticipated will be rotated into theater in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Since the MTVR is at the beginning of its economic life
cycle, the Marine Corps made the decision to armor this truck with armor
that was integrated into the body of the truck. Integrated armor is a
permanent modification that requires stripping the truck to its frame and
rebuilding. It takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours to complete a
single installation. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps has installed 803
integrated kits on the MTVRs.

Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements,
but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points
in time. Dotted line over the graph indicates some overproduction
occurred.

Appendix III:  Comments from the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 4.

See comment 8.

See comment 7.

See comment 6.

See comment 5.

See comment 13.

See comment 12.

See comment 11.

See comment 10.

See comment 9.

                  GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments

           1. DOD stated that our statement identifying a number of systemic
           causes for shortages in armor such as inaccurate requirements is
           misleading and that it implies that the Marine Corps did not
           consider the current threat analysis. However, this statement does
           not refer to the Marine Corps's truck armor program. Rather, the
           statement is from the introduction of the report, where we
           discussed our prior work leading up to this review. Specifically,
           we noted that in April 2005 we reported on a number of critical
           supply shortages during OIF-including armored HMMWVs, body armor,
           and other items-and inaccurate requirements was one of the
           systemic causes identified in the April 2005 report.
           2. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps' interim
           armor did not meet requirements, noting that armor protection
           requirements changed quickly over time and migrated from a small
           arms ballistic focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of
           IEDs encountered increased. However, the December 2003 requirement
           document that the Marine Corps provided to us during our review
           clearly stated the need to protect all vehicles from improvised
           explosive devices, mines, and other explosive ordnances. Documents
           we obtained from both the Marine Corps and Army recognized IEDs as
           a significant threat at the time. In fact, in DOD's comments to
           this report, it noted that "in December 2003, both the Army and
           Marine Corps recognized that IEDs, RPGs, 7.62mm projectiles, and
           mines were the predominate threats." Further, in November 2003,
           the Army had identified a requirement to protect vehicles from
           IEDs and recognized a need to purchase rolled homogenous armor
           (RHA), a type of armor that proved effective against both the
           ballistic and IED threat after testing many armor types.
           3. DOD disagreed with our statement that a lack of coordination
           between the Marine Corps and Army on addressing truck armor
           requirements and solutions caused the Marine Corps to make
           decisions about the types of armor to use without having all the
           information that was available on protective capabilities of
           various armor types. We acknowledge that the Marine Corps made
           attempts to coordinate through various informal processes, such as
           the Armor Kit Working Group Integrated Process Team. However,
           evidence showed that a lack of a synchronized approach among the
           services was due to each service having separate and distinct
           processes that generated the requirements to armor vehicles. The
           individual requirements processes led to the Marine Corps
           validating a requirement to armor vehicles 2 months after the Army
           validated a similar requirement to armor its vehicles. Ultimately,
           the Marine Corps began seeking RHA armor in February 2004-3 months
           after the Army began producing armor kits made out of RHA armor.
           Marine Corps officials told us that they began seeking RHA armor
           from industry earlier-in January 2004-but were told it was in
           short supply. However, Marine Corps officials have not provided
           documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. For example, in
           DOD's comments to this report, it stated that the first purchase
           order for 3/8-inch RHA was on January 12, 2004. However, when we
           subsequently requested to see the purchase order, the Marine Corps
           noted that it was actually an Army purchase order. According to
           the Marine Corps, they made a phone inquiry to a steel vendor in
           January 2004, but have not provided documentation to support this
           assertion. In addition, we spoke with other steel suppliers about
           the availability of RHA during the January and March 2004 time
           frame. These industry officials told us that despite lead times
           for RHA that ranged from 30 days to 4 months, they could have made
           RHA available to the Marine Corps quicker if the Marine Corps had
           approached them directly. Moreover, although we agree that formal
           processes are in place for the Marine Corps to test armor types
           through the Army's Testing Center (ATC), the Marine Corps
           coordination with the Army to install RHA armor kits on vehicles
           did not occur until the Marine Corps' second phase of armoring.
           Furthermore, while the Marine Corps cited the Army-Marine Corps
           Board (AMCB) and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) as
           other examples of Army and Marine Corps coordination in the
           development of armor solutions, these additional avenues for
           communication were not sufficient to bring the services' two truck
           armor programs together in a synchronized approach to ensure that
           requirements were identified and solutions developed for both
           services at the same time. We further clarified this position in
           the report.
           4. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps did not
           identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004. It
           stated that the need for RHA armor was identified earlier but was
           in short supply from industry. While some Marine Corps officials
           told us that the Marine Corps was not seeking 3/8-inch RHA for its
           interim armor, other Marine Corps officials subsequently told us
           they became aware of the need for 3/8-inch RHA in December 2003
           and first inquired about the availability of RHA steel with
           industry in January 2004. However, these officials have not
           provided adequate documentation to support the assertion or that
           RHA was not available from industry (see note (3) above). Further,
           a Marine Corps Logistics Command report on its armoring efforts
           indicated that the Marine Corps did not make the decision to use
           3/8-inch RHA until March 2004. However, it was not until April
           2004 that the Marine Corps officially identified a need for
           3/8-inch RHA when it validated the requirement for the second
           armor phase. Due to the conflicting information, it remains
           unclear exactly when the Marine Corps became aware of the need for
           RHA.
           5. DOD disagreed with our statement that no formal process was in
           place to ensure interservice coordination. DOD acknowledged that
           there was no standing joint activity that addressed specific
           servicewide vehicle hardening requirements at the time, and cited
           participation in and coordination with the AKWG IPT, ATC, AMCB and
           JIEDDO as instrumental in developing the Marine Corps' truck armor
           solutions. While we agree that these organizations may have
           provided valuable information to the Marine Corps, as stated
           previously, this coordination was not sufficient to bring the
           services together to identify requirements and develop solutions
           for both services at the same time.
           6. DOD disagreed with our statement that troops were placed at
           greater risk as a result of the time required to replace the
           interim armor with add-on RHA armor and integrated armor. It noted
           that to accelerate the replacement of interim armor by taking a
           larger amount of vehicles out of service would create inherent
           risk to the operational commanders. We did not intend to suggest
           that the Marine Corps should have made this decision or that it
           could have done anything different given the operational
           conditions in the theater. Rather, we were simply stating that
           because of the time needed to replace the interim armor with the
           second generation RHA armor coupled with mission requirements, the
           vehicles were operating with less than the preferred armor
           solution.
           7. See note (1) and note (2).
           8. See note (6).
           9. See note (3) and note (5).
           10. See note (3) and note (4).
           11. We agree that attempts were made to share information between
           the Army and Marine Corps, but we recommended a DOD-wide formal
           process to require interservice coordination (see also note 5).
           12. See note (4).
           13. In response to our discussion on the Marine Corps'
           investigating future-kit armoring strategies using the "A" kit and
           "B" kit concept for armor kits, DOD added that the Marine Corps is
           now planning to incorporate this concept on its Logistics Vehicle
           Replacement (LVSR) and the MTVR. DOD further noted that the LVSR
           will be the first military vehicle to incorporate the A and B kit
           concept. We incorporated the current status of this program into
           the report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

                                  GAO Contact

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]

                                Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director;
Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne,
Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell, Patricia
Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, John D. Strong, and Gerald Winterlin also made
key contributions to this report.

(350785)

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Highlights of GAO-06-274 , a report to congressional committees

June 2006

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected
the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor

The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has
led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the
availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a
series of engagements under the Comptroller General's authority to address
these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the
production and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy
trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the production and
installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy trucks. The
objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was
produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what
factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what
actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely
availability of truck armor.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD (1) establish a process for sharing
information on developing materiel solutions and (2) clarify the point at
which the joint requirements process should be utilized. DOD concurred
with the second recommendation but believes communication is sufficient to
satisfy the first recommendation. GAO disagrees. DOD also provided
comments related to the context and accuracy of the report, which we
incorporated as appropriate.

The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation
of add-on truck armor in September 2004---8 months after the requirements
were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor
requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first
phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004
to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar
threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
March 2004, the Marine Corps installed interim armor that did not provide
sufficient IED protection, which Marine Corps officials acknowledged,
stating that their intent was to field some level of protection until a
more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the
Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004
and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided
enhanced IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading
to integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved
protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle. They
expect to complete installation by May 2006.

Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor
requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army.
Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to
field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first
phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor
to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did
not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin
seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004-2 months
after the Army began its truck armor program in November 2003. According
to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED
protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine
Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps
fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. Second,
mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace
its interim armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor.

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely
availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine
Corps is alsotaking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to
address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In
addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve
coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime
solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to urgent
wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new
technology solutions.
*** End of document. ***