    Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the
    Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and
    Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor (22-JUN-06, GAO-06-274).

    The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in
    Iraq has led to widespread interest by Congress and the public
    regarding the availability of critical force protection
    equipment. GAO initiated a series of engagements under the
    Comptroller General's authority to address these concerns. In
    March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the production
    and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy trucks.
    This engagement examines issues affecting the production and
    installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy
    trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which
    truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified
    requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to
    provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine
    Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of
    truck armor.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-274
        ACCNO:   A55844
      TITLE:     Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach
    between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production
    and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor
         DATE:   06/22/2006
      SUBJECT:   Armored vehicles
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Logistics
    	     Military land vehicles
    	     Military materiel
    	     Military operations
    	     Protective equipment
    	     Timeliness

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    GAO-06-274

         * Results in Brief
         * Background
              * Deployed U.S. Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
              * Outfitting Marine Corps Trucks with Armor
              * Processes for Developing Wartime Requirements and Solutions
                   * Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
                   * Development of Truck Armor Solutions
         * Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004
              * First Phase Requirement Addressed with Interim Armor
              * Second Phase Requirement Met with Add-On Armor
              * Third Phase Requirements To Be Met with Integrated Armor
         * Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mis
              * Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in
              * Mission Needs Affected Production and Installation of Truck
         * Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Ava
              * Marine Corps Is Taking Short-and Long-Term Actions to Improv
              * DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination of Requirements
         * Conclusions
         * Recommendations for Executive Action
         * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
         * Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Effor
              * Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks
                   * Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identi
              * Logistics Vehicle System
                   * Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identi
              * Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement
                   * Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identi
         * Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
              * GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments
         * Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
              * GAO Contact
              * Acknowledgments
                   * Order by Mail or Phone

    Report to Congressional Committees

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    June 2006

    DEFENSE LOGISTICS

    Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected
    the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor

    GAO-06-274

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 5
    Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004 9
    Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs
    Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces 15
    Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability 17
    Conclusions 19
    Recommendations for Executive Action 20
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24
    Appendix II Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Efforts 26
    Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks 26
    Logistics Vehicle System 29
    Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 32
    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35
    Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 47

    Table

    Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor 8

    Figures

    Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor
    Protection 10
    Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-on
    Armor Protection 12
    Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated Armor 14
    Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck 26
    Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
    Interim and Add-on Armor 28
    Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System 29
    Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and
    Add-on Armor 31
    Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement 32
    Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
    Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor 34

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    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    June 22, 2006 June 22, 2006

    The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate The
    Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority
    Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
    Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi Freedom
    (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization operations
    to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that time, U.S.
    forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using a
    variety of weapons- including improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars,
    and rocket launchers-and there have been numerous attacks on military
    convoys as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. The
    threat of IEDs, in particular, has become increasingly frequent and has
    been ranked as the number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The
    explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of dynamite, land mines, old
    artillery shells, or other types of military ordnance. Many IEDs are
    hidden and disguised along traffic routes, and are remotely detonated
    against unsuspecting military personnel. When combat operations were
    declared over during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition
    forces transitioned to stabilization operations to restore public order
    and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that time, U.S. forces have come under
    frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using a variety of weapons-
    including improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars, and rocket
    launchers-and there have been numerous attacks on military convoys as they
    carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in
    particular, has become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the
    number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs
    consist mainly of dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other
    types of military ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along
    traffic routes, and are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military
    personnel.

    As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
    the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection
    of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of
    new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to
    include such improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks, body
    armor, and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs. As a result of
    experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have
    taken several immediate steps to improve the protection of military forces
    operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of new capabilities
    to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to include such
    improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks, body armor, and
    systems for detecting and defeating IEDs.

    In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public
    regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for
    deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility
    multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated In
    response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public
    regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for
    deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility
    multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated a
    series of engagements under the authority of the Comptroller General of
    the United States to examine this issue. In April 2005 we reported on
    shortages of a number of critical items during OIF, to include certain
    protective items such as body armor and armored HMMWVs.1 We identified a
    number of systemic causes for these shortages, including inaccurate
    requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective distribution processes. As
    a result, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
    calling for actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve
    requirements and developing and exercising deployable distribution
    capabilities, to improve DOD's system for supplying items to U.S. forces.
    In March 2006, we reported on several factors that affected the production
    and installation of Army truck armor during OIF and other current wartime
    operations.2 These factors included the Army's failure to fully capitalize
    on previously identified truck armor requirements and awarding contracts
    for amounts less than total requirements due to increasing needs for truck
    armor and inadequate funding. In our report, we made a recommendation to
    the Secretary of Defense calling for the Army to establish a process for
    documenting and communicating all urgent wartime funding requirements for
    supplies and equipment when they are identified and the disposition of
    funding decisions.

    This current engagement examines issues affecting the production and
    installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Marine Corps
    forces during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.3 Our objectives were to (1) determine
    the extent to which Marine Corps truck armor was produced and installed to
    meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time
    to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and
    DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.

    1 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of
    Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
    (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

    2 GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Procurement and
    Installation of Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations,
    GAO-06-160 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).

    3 CENTCOM is one of DOD's five geographic combatant commands, whose area
    of responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia, South and
    Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. In addition to Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, CENTCOM is involved in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
    The other four geographic combatant commands are U.S. European Command,
    U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command.

    In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical trucks
    used by Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which
    included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 To identify the extent to which
    truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements and
    what factors affected the time to provide armor, we visited Marine Corps
    organizations to obtain data on the requirements, funding, production, and
    installation of truck armor kits. We considered the armor requirement as
    met for each type of truck when the quantity of add-on and integrated
    armor produced and installed on vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on
    the information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to
    provide truck armor to deployed forces. We also identified the Marine
    Corps' short-term and long-term efforts to improve the availability of
    truck armor. We assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and
    determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
    report. We performed our review from April 2005 to March 2006 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more
    detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located in appendix I.

                                    Results in Brief

    The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation
    of add-on truck armor in September 2004-8 months after that requirement
    was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor
    requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first
    phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004
    to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar
    threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
    March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by
    installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor
    did not meet requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection
    from the fragmentation effects of IEDs. Marine Corps officials
    acknowledged that the interim armor provided protection against the
    prevalent ballistic threat at the time but offered only limited protection
    against IEDs. These officials stated that their intent was to field some
    level of protection until a more robust armor solution became available.
    In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to
    1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September
    2004 with add-on armor that provided the required IED protection. In the
    third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading armor protection from add-on
    armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    which were included in the 1,438 trucks armored in the second phase. As of
    March 2006, 803 integrated armor kits have been installed, and the Marine
    Corps expects to complete installation of integrated armor by May 2006.
    The other trucks (5-ton truck and 22-ton bulk hauler) are not receiving
    integrated armor because they are at the end of their economic life cycle
    and will be replaced.

    4 The Marine Corps also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical
    wheeled vehicle. We examined availability of armor for HMMWVs in our prior
    report on wartime supply availability, so we did not include them in this
    review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the
    Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations,
    GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

    Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
    Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
    Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
    solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor
    requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army.
    This delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim
    armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may
    have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed
    Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not
    officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin
    seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004. According to
    Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED
    protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine
    Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps
    fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. However, the
    Army identified its initial truck armor requirement in November 2003 and
    begun developing armor kits using the preferred type of steel at this
    time. Had the Marine Corps began seeking armor solutions in November 2003,
    it might have been able to acquire the preferred type of steel in time for
    its March 2004 deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this
    steel during this time and the willingness of industry to work with the
    Marine Corps to expedite the availability. Second, mission needs
    restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim
    armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor. As a result, the
    fielding of add-on armor and integrated armor was stretched out over a
    longer period, placing troops at greater risk as they conducted wartime
    operations in vehicles without the preferred level of protection.

    The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the timely
    availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
    example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
    integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine
    Corps also is taking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to
    address the availability of truck armor for future operations. While we
    did not evaluate this plan, we did note that it is aimed at identifying
    long-term requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address
    these requirements. In addition, DOD established the Rapid Validation and
    Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) process to improve
    coordination of wartime combatant commander requirements, and to
    accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions that are
    outside the services' established requirement processes. However, it is
    unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor
    because it excludes the development of new technology solutions.

    To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions about
    what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address common
    urgent wartime requirements, we are making recommendations that the
    Secretary of Defense (1) direct the service secretaries to establish a
    process to share information on developed or developing materiel solutions
    and (2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process should be utilized
    when materiel solutions require research and development. In written
    comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the second
    recommendation, but stated it believes that multiple layers of
    communication already exist between the Marine Corps and the Army to
    satisfy the first recommendation. However, as evidenced in our report,
    these various layers of communication were not sufficient to bring the
    services' two truck armor programs together in a more uniform and
    coordinated approach from the beginning to ensure that requirements were
    identified and solutions developed for both services at the same time. DOD
    also provided additional comments related to the context and accuracy of
    the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. The department's written
    comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in appendix III.

                                       Background

    Marine Corps convoys carrying supplies and equipment in CENTCOM's area of
    responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents using
    IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Marine Corps has
    undertaken several force protection measures, such as adding armor to a
    number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    other CENTCOM locations. The Marine Corps fielded truck armor after
    identifying requirements and then designing and procuring three different
    levels of armor and fielding that armor in three different phases.

    Deployed U.S. Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs

    Military convoys operating in CENTCOM's area of responsibility have been
    subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in
    Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at
    tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the
    region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization
    operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since that time, the
    United States has incurred more casualties than during major combat
    operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating
    in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar
    rounds, to multiple explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In
    the spring of 2004, nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a
    coalition casualty. In particular, U.S. military convoys have been the
    targets of these types of attacks. In addition to Iraq, U.S. forces
    operating in Afghanistan also have been subjected to IED attacks.

    IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a number
    of different ways. They can contain commercial or military explosives,
    homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. For
    example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been employed as IEDs in
    Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many vehicles-from small
    sedans to large cargo trucks-stationed along the roadways. Furthermore,
    "person-borne" suicide bombs have also been used, with explosives
    contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is specifically modified to
    conceal and carry this material.

    Outfitting Marine Corps Trucks with Armor

    In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars
    and rocket launchers, the Marine Corps has undertaken several force
    protection measures, including adding armor to a number of medium and
    heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM locations.5
    The trucks being armored by the Marine Corps include the Medium Tactical
    Vehicle Replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck), the multipurpose 5-ton truck,
    and the 22-ton Logistics Vehicle System (LVS). The MTVR and 5-ton are
    multipurpose medium trucks that transport all types of supplies. The LVS
    is a heavy truck that transports a variety of supplies and equipment such
    as bulk liquids (fuel and water), ammunition, bulk and palletized cargo,
    and bridging equipment. Appendix II contains a detailed description of
    each Marine Corps vehicle and a discussion of armor production and
    installation.

    5 Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of personal
    body armor and electronic IED countermeasures, as well as changes to
    unit-level training.

    Processes for Developing Wartime Requirements and Solutions

    The Marine Corps identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated
    a procurement program to develop armor solutions, which involved seeking
    funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting with
    suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and testing armor
    solutions, and installing armor onto trucks.

      Process for Developing Wartime Requirements

    When a need for new equipment is identified by Marine Corps warfighters,
    units make official requests through the Marine Corps' requirements
    process by submitting a universal needs statement, which acts as a "work
    request" for current and future wartime capabilities. For example, the
    universal needs statements for truck armor described an urgent need to
    protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects of IEDs
    and other threats and specified the numbers and types of trucks to be
    armored. Universal needs statements are forwarded from units to the Marine
    Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, where they are
    validated and approved for funding by the Marine Requirements Oversight
    Council.6 Upon validation, the statements are forwarded to the Program and
    Review office at Marine Corps headquarters to obtain funding and to Marine
    Corps Systems Command for procurement. The Marine Corps validated its
    first requirement for truck armor in January 2004 prior to the deployment
    of the First Marine Expeditionary Force to Southwest Asia.

      Development of Truck Armor Solutions

    To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Marine Corps
    initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions for its
    deployed trucks. The Marine Corps obtained funding for its armor program
    from a variety of sources. While the services can reprogram a small amount
    of funds from one program budget to another, the majority of funding had
    to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller) and, in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to obtain
    funding for truck armor, the Marine Corps sought approval from the DOD
    Comptroller and Congress to reprogram funding from other procurement or
    appropriations accounts,7 requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi
    Freedom Fund,8 and requested funding through supplemental appropriations.

    6 The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force structure, and
    requirements validation. It is chaired by the Assistant Commandant of the
    Marine Corps and is composed of permanent and associate members. At the
    direction of the Commandant, the council is to: (1) conduct comprehensive
    reviews of critical issues and programs to develop optimal, balanced
    Marine Corps positions by considering current operational needs, desired
    future capabilities, and feasible alternatives based on resource
    constraints; (2) review, prioritize, and approve Mission Need Statements,
    Operational Requirements Documents, and force structure recommendations;
    and (3) develop recommendations for Marine Corps requirements, related
    strategies, and positions that are supported and funded by external
    agencies and other services.

    The Marine Corps Systems Command was the activity responsible for
    developing truck armor solutions to address validated Marine Corps
    requirements. Systems Command's armoring efforts consisted of a phased
    approach to develop and field three distinct levels of armor: interim
    armor components, add-on armor kits, and integrated armor. Table 1 shows
    the Marine Corps' armoring phases with the type of armor used in each
    phase.

    Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor

    Phase I                            Phase II          Phase III
    Interim armor                      Add-on armor      Integrated armor
    Kevlar/ceramic and 3/16-inch high  3/8-inch rolled   Armor integrated into
    hard steel (HHS)                   homogeneous armor the body of the
                                          (RHA)             vehicle

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.

    The phase one interim armor consisted of commercial off-the-shelf and
    Marine Corps depot-produced armor components, such as 3/16-inch high hard
    steel (HHS)9 armor doors, ballistic blankets, and Kevlar/ceramic panels.
    Recognizing that the interim armor provided limited protection from IED
    fragments, the Marine Corps subsequently produced a more robust solution
    of add-on armor for phase two that provided greater protection against
    IEDs and roadside bombs. This add-on armor initially included 3/8-inch
    rolled homogeneous armor (RHA)10 steel doors and side panels, and
    ballistic glass. Later, as the threat became more lethal, the Marine Corps
    began producing and installing additional add-on armor coverage for phase
    two that included underbodies, roofs, tailgates, rear cab plates, and
    gunner shields. To produce add-on armor kits, Systems Command used its own
    Logistics Command to produce and ship the add-on armor kits. The Logistics
    Command obtained the armor panels and components directly from suppliers
    and manufactured some parts in its depot, and shipped kits directly to
    CENTCOM's area of responsibility for installation.

    7 The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a total of
    up to $20 million per year into the procurement account that includes
    armor kits. However, because the funding needed for armor kits exceeded
    this amount, the services had to request approval from the DOD Comptroller
    for any reprogramming of funds in excess of the $20 million, which in turn
    had to be approved by Congress.

    8 The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for use of
    military forces in Iraq and those operations authorized by Pub. L. No.
    107-40 (2001), Authorization for use of Military Force, and other
    operations and related activities in support of the global war on
    terrorism.

    9 High hard steel has a high surface hardness level which provides good
    protection against projectiles.

    As an improvement over add-on armor already fielded, in phase three the
    Marine Corps is currently installing an integrated armor kit for the MTVR.
    Unlike add-on armor, integrated armor is a permanent modification and is
    designed for the life of the vehicle. Integrated armor provides the
    greatest level of protection through more comprehensive coverage. The
    integrated truck armor kits are produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation.
    Installing integrated armor is much more complex than add-on armor because
    it requires stripping the truck to its frame and rebuilding. It takes a
    five-person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to complete the
    installation of integrated armor.

              Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004

    The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation of
    add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after that initial
    requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor
    requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first
    phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004
    to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar
    threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
    March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by
    installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor
    did not meet requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection
    from the fragmentation effects of IEDs. In the second phase, the Marine
    Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and
    fully met that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that
    provided the required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps
    is upgrading armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for
    900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438
    trucks armored during the second phase.

    10 Rolled homogeneous steel has a lower surface hardness than high hard
    steel and provides good protection against both projectiles and the
    fragmentation effects of IEDs.

    First Phase Requirement Addressed with Interim Armor

    In its first phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps validated its
    initial requirement to armor 1,169 trucks in January 2004. However, they
    addressed the requirement by installing interim armor that did not provide
    sufficient protection against IED fragments. Figure 1 shows Marine Corps
    production and installation of the interim armor protection over the
    2-month period taken to address the initial requirement.

    Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor
    Protection

    Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
    unavailable, so the line in the graph simply indicates that sufficient
    purchase, production, and installation occurred to meet the requirements.

    Due to the immediacy of the need for armor and because forces were
    preparing to deploy in 2 months, in January 2004 Marine Corps officials
    purchased truck armor that was readily available, could be quickly shipped
    to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, and was easily installed. This
    interim solution consisted of a mix of Kevlar/ceramic armor plates
    purchased off the shelf from commercial companies to protect doors, and
    3/16-inch HHS armor plates produced by a Marine Corps depot to protect
    doors and cargo areas. Officials said the interim armor protected against
    the prevalent ballistic threat at the time and was readily available off
    the shelf from industry. However, this interim armor did not meet the
    validated requirements. Part of this requirement was to address an urgent
    need to protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects
    of IEDs. Marine Corps officials said an integral part of the Marine Corps'
    armoring strategy was to procure and install armor on all vehicles prior
    to going to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, using the best materials
    readily available at the time. According to congressional testimony by the
    Systems Command's Commanding General, the Marine Corps always made clear
    the fact that they would pursue a more robust solution as better raw
    material steel became available.11 As a result, the interim armor fielded
    by the Marine Corps offered limited protection from IEDs and troops were
    placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles equipped
    with insufficient protection.

    Second Phase Requirement Met with Add-On Armor

    The second phase of truck armoring began in April 2004, when a second
    requirement to armor 1,438 trucks with 3/8-inch RHA steel was validated
    and then met 5 months later using add-on armor that provided the required
    IED protection. To meet this requirement, the Marine Corps had to re-armor
    the existing 1,169 trucks that had interim armor, plus armor an additional
    269 trucks with the required IED protection. Installation of add-on armor
    on the trucks was completed in September 2004, 5 months after
    establishment of the April requirement and 8 months after establishment of
    the initial requirement. Figure 2 shows Marine Corps production and
    installation of the add-on armor protection over the 5-month period needed
    to meet the April requirement.

    11 "Marine Corps Vehicle Armoring," Testimony Before the House Armed
    Services Committee by Major General (Sel) William D. Catto, Commanding
    General, Marine Corps Systems Command, May 5, 2005.

    Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-on
    Armor Protection

    Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
    unavailable, so the line in the graph simply indicates that sufficient
    production and installation occurred to meet the requirements. Dotted line
    over the graph indicates some overproduction occurred.

    Since the time the Marine Corps met its second phase armor requirement
    with the installation of 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor, it continued to make
    improvements to that armor during the second phase to better protect
    against IED fragments. According to officials, the upgrades included
    expanding armor coverage to the underbodies, tailgates, roofs, and gunner
    shields of the trucks. For example, the Marine Corps installed underbodies
    on 87 of the 5-ton trucks12 and underbodies on all 235 LVS trucks.
    Upgraded add-on armor has also been installed on the MTVRs until the MTVRs
    with integrated armor could be fielded. According to Marine Corps
    officials, this improved add-on armor offers significant protection of
    vehicles, including coverage for the seams to better shield against
    explosive blasts and fragments.

    12 The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks, but because the 5-ton trucks are
    being phased out of theater operations, 87 will receive upgraded
    protection, such as underbody kits, because the remaining trucks will not
    be used outside the forward operating bases.

    Third Phase Requirements To Be Met with Integrated Armor

    In the third phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps established two
    requirements to armor MTVRs with integrated armor. The first requirement
    to armor 1,018 MTVRs was validated in October 2004, but was reduced to 900
    in June 2005 primarily due to the rotation of fewer troops and trucks in
    and out of CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The Marine Corps plans to
    install armor on 900 MTVRs for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by May 2006.
    As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had completed installation of
    integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. Figure 3 shows Marine Corps production and
    installation of the integrated armor protection.

    Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated Armor

    Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
    unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates the amount
    of armor produced by March 2006 to meet the requirements.

    According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning of
    its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this truck with
    armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Marine Corps
    officials said that only the MTVR trucks will receive the integrated armor
    because both of the other types of trucks used (the 5-ton and 22-ton bulk
    hauler) are at the end of their economic life cycle and are expected to be
    replaced over the next 5 years by the MTVRs and the Logistics Vehicle
    System Replacement (LVSR).

    Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs Affected
                 the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces

    Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
    Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
    Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions
    resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and
    seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Second, mission
    needs also affected the Marine Corp's ability to replace its interim armor
    with add-on armor and to install integrated armor. As a result, the total
    length of time to field add-on armor and integrated armor was stretched
    out over a longer period, placing troops at greater risk as they conducted
    wartime operations in vehicles without the preferred level of protection.

    Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in Identifying Truck
    Armor Requirements and Developing Solutions May Have Affected Armor Availability
    For Deploying Units

    A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in identifying
    truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution from industry
    may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim armor that met
    IED protection requirements and may have contributed to the time to
    provide the second phase armor protection to deployed Marine Corps forces.
    The Marine Corps began procuring 3/8-inch RHA armor for effective
    protection against IED fragments in late February 2004-3 months after the
    Army identified this armor as a solution for IED protection in November
    2003. After testing many types of armor materials to protect against IEDs,
    the Army subsequently issued armor protection guidance in December 2003
    recognizing HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates, which the Marine Corps
    purchased for its interim armor solution in January 2004, as ineffective
    against IED fragments. The guidance also stated that 3/8-inch RHA steel
    offered good protection against IED blasts and fragments. Marine Corps
    officials said they were aware of the Army's armor protection guidance and
    had pursued acquiring 3/8-inch RHA steel in January, but it was not
    available from industry to meet their needs. As a result, as an interim
    solution to meet deployment deadlines, they purchased the best armor steel
    available, although it did not provide sufficient IED protection.

    To verify whether a shortage of 3/8-inch RHA steel occurred during the
    January and March 2004 time frame, we asked several steel suppliers who
    had supplied steel to an Army and Marine Corps steel distributor whether
    3/8-inch RHA was in short supply. Industry officials told us that if the
    Marine Corps had requested 3/8-inch RHA steel directly from them, they
    could have made it available sooner despite a lead time that varied from
    30 days to 4 months. In fact, according to industry officials, both the
    3/16-inch HHS and 3/8-inch RHA steel required the same amount of lead
    time. Ultimately, in early February 2004, the Marine Corps approached
    industry with the assistance of congressional staff, and by the end of
    February, 3/8-inch RHA steel became available. By March 2004, the Marine
    Corps began producing 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor for their second phase
    armor effort.

    A formal process did not exist to require the military services to
    coordinate when developing common wartime requirements, such as truck
    armor, or share information on research, development, and procurement
    efforts supporting solutions to those requirements. Both the Marine Corps
    and Army have separate and distinct requirements determination processes
    to address their warfighters' urgent needs. The two services share
    information only through informal communication channels, which may not
    always occur in the timeliest manner. For example, the Marine Corps
    validated its first requirement to armor vehicles against IEDs and other
    explosive devices in January 2004, 2 months after the Army had validated a
    similar requirement in November 2003. In addition, in November 2003, the
    Army had built a prototype armor kit for production made out of 3/8-inch
    RHA steel, which is what the Marine Corps officials said they began
    seeking 2 months later but were unable to obtain. If both the Marine Corps
    and Army had coordinated requirements earlier and had worked together to
    purchase 3/8-inch RHA steel from industry in November 2003, the Marine
    Corps might have had 3/8-inch RHA available for its first armor phase
    instead of the 3/16-inch HHS it used for interim armor, or might have
    completed its second armor phase sooner than September 2004. Without a
    formal process for coordinating common urgent wartime requirements and the
    development of materiel solutions across military services, the Army and
    Marine Corps could continue to develop different solutions with varying
    degrees of effectiveness in response to the same warfighter needs.

    Mission Needs Affected Production and Installation of Truck Armor

    The production and installation of truck armor was also affected by
    mission needs. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which
    armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations.
    According to Marine Corps officials, the need to install armor without
    jeopardizing theater missions limited the number of vehicles that could be
    taken out of action at any one time. As a result, installation rates for
    the Marine Corps' add-on and integrated armor were paced with the rotation
    of trucks into the maintenance area as they returned from missions. In
    addition, the installation of integrated armor on the MTVR trucks also has
    been constrained by lengthy installation times-on average it takes a
    five-person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to install a single kit.
    As a result of these constraints, the installation of add-on and
    integrated truck armor was stretched out over a longer period, and the
    Marine Corps provided funding and set production rates for add-on armor
    components to match the limited rate of installation. Consequently, troops
    were placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles that
    were equipped with the interim armor that provided limited protection from
    IEDs.

         Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability

    The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the timely
    availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
    example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
    integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine
    Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to address the availability of
    truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established the Rapid
    Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS)
    process to improve coordination of combatant commander wartime
    requirements common to multiple services and to accelerate the process of
    fielding urgent wartime solutions that are outside the services'
    established requirements processes. However, it is unclear whether this
    policy applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes
    the development of new technology solutions.

    Marine Corps Is Taking Short-and Long-Term Actions to Improve Armor Availability

    The Marine Corps is taking short-term and long-term actions to improve the
    availability of truck armor. In the short term, to address current armor
    needs for deployed forces in Iraq and other CENTCOM locations, the Marine
    Corps accelerated the rate of installation by increasing the number of
    installation sites for integrated armor kits. For example, as of August
    2005, the Marine Corps had installed integrated armor on 41 MTVRs using
    one installation site in Iraq, and as of October 2005 it had installed
    armor on 177 MTVRs using two sites-one in Iraq and one in Kuwait. The
    Marine Corps opened a third site in November 2005 at the Marine Corps
    Logistics Command in Albany, Georgia to further increase installation
    rates. As a result of the increased number of installation sites, total
    installation of integrated armor increased to 803 MTVRs as of March 2006.

    The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the
    availability of truck armor for future operations. For example, the Marine
    Corps has developed a strategic plan for tactical wheeled vehicles that
    addresses future truck armor needs. According to Marine Corps officials,
    the plan involves ongoing assessments of the Marine Expeditionary Force
    concept of warfare-the need to stay light and expeditionary-and
    limitations of available airlift and seabasing that impact the amount of
    armor applied to a vehicle. In addition, the Marine Corps is also
    investigating future kit-armoring strategies with the Army using the "A"
    kit and "B" kit concept identified in the Army's long-term strategy. Under
    this strategy, the Army's plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two
    kits. The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks
    ready to accept armor and includes hard-to-install parts and permanent
    mounting provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to
    be applied to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular
    components that can be installed and removed by two people. The Marine
    Corps currently plans to incorporate this A kit/B kit armor concept onto
    its LVSR and MTVR as new vehicles are produced. Marine Corps officials
    told us that this concept addresses some of the concerns raised by Marine
    Corps officials, such as wear and tear on the vehicles due to the
    additional weight of the armor. Other long-term Marine Corps efforts
    underway include studies on future armoring needs and solutions. These
    studies are evaluating the ground transportation needs of the Marine Corps
    in an expeditionary context and will make recommendations regarding the
    value of current vehicle systems and necessary changes to develop and
    maintain a tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that meets Marine Corps
    requirements through 2020. While we did not evaluate these studies, we did
    note that they are aimed at identifying longer-term requirements for truck
    armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.

    DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination of Requirements across Services

    DOD has taken steps to improve coordination of urgent wartime needs across
    the services by developing the JUONS process. DOD established the JUONS
    process in July 2005 to improve coordination of combatant commanders'
    urgent wartime requirements that are outside the services' established
    processes to accelerate the fielding of wartime solutions that may be
    purchased off the shelf or warrant minor modification. However, according
    to Army officials, it is not clear whether the JUONS process addresses
    urgent wartime needs that may emerge in the same fashion as armor. The
    acquisition of an armor solution was in part an off-the-shelf purchase
    combined with some level of research and development of new technology.
    According to the JUONS instructions, solutions that involve the
    development of a new technology or capability should not be processed
    under the instruction's procedures. However, the instruction also allows
    the minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar
    mission. Army officials said they were unclear whether urgent wartime
    requirements such as armor should be processed under JUONS given that the
    armor solution can be described as both an off-the-shelf solution with
    minor modification and a solution that required the development of new
    technology. For example, according to Army officials, the recently fielded
    armor solutions were readily available off the shelf and required some
    modification. However, officials also said that the armor solutions can be
    described as new and developing technology because research was needed to
    identify effective armor protection standards and new technology was
    necessary to integrate and apply armor onto vehicles. As a result, it is
    not clear if similar future requirements are to be processed under JUONS
    or other requirements generation processes. Until the types of solutions
    about which the JUONS process applies are more clearly defined, it is
    uncertain whether this process would apply to joint urgent wartime
    requirements for items needing some level of research and development,
    such as truck armor.

                                      Conclusions

    The results of our work on Marine Corps truck armor indicate a broader
    systemic problem with a lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps
    and Army in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and developing
    solutions to those requirements. Because there was no formal process
    requiring a synchronized approach between the two services for identifying
    requirements or developing solutions, the Marine Corps did not identify a
    requirement for truck armor or begin developing armor solutions until 2
    months after the Army had done so. A more unified and coordinated approach
    between the Marine Corps and the Army might have allowed the Marine Corps
    to field a better interim armor solution that provided sufficient
    protection against IEDs. In addition, earlier coordination may also have
    enabled the Marine Corps to begin developing and fielding its second phase
    of armor, which provided the required IED protection, sooner. Further, due
    to the lack of a formal process for sharing requirements information
    between the services, official documentation was not available to
    determine whether the Marine Corps made informed decisions about the
    materials it selected for its interim armor or to assess the basis for
    these decisions. While the work we performed focused on the Marine Corps
    and Army, the lack of a DOD-wide framework for coordinating wartime
    requirements and solutions impacts on all of the military services.

    Subsequent to the procurement and installation of Marine Corps add-on
    truck armor, DOD established a new joint process, called JUONS, to ensure
    that the development of wartime requirements common to the Marine Corps,
    Army, and other services are coordinated. However, because this new
    process does not apply to the development of new technologies, it is not
    clear whether it will improve interservice coordination when solutions
    involve some level of research and development, like truck armor. Without
    a formal process for coordinating all common wartime requirements and the
    development of materiel solutions across military services, the Army,
    Marine Corps, and other services could continue to develop different
    solutions with varying degrees of effectiveness in response to the same
    warfighter needs. It is likely that DOD will again face urgent wartime
    requirements common to multiple services to rapidly develop materiel
    solutions to improve force capability or protection of deployed forces.
    The effective coordination of common requirements and sharing of
    information on materiel solutions in development are critical to ensure
    the needs of the warfighter are met in the timeliest and most effective
    manner possible. Without improved coordination, deployed military
    personnel and their missions may be placed at significant risk because
    they lack the appropriate equipment at the critical times it may be
    needed. Furthermore, until a formal process for coordinating and sharing
    information on all common urgent wartime requirements and solutions is
    established, Congress and the Secretary of Defense may be unable to
    exercise effective oversight of decisions made to address urgent wartime
    requirements.

                          Recommendations for Executive Action

    To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions about
    what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address common
    urgent wartime requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
    take the following two actions: (1) direct the service secretaries to
    establish a process to share information between the Marine Corps and the
    Army on developed or developing materiel solutions, and (2) clarify the
    point at which the JUONS process should be utilized when materiel
    solutions require research and development.

                           Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with
    our recommendations. Regarding the first recommendation that DOD direct
    the services to establish a process to share information between the
    services on materiel solutions in development, DOD partially concurred,
    and stated that it believes that multiple layers of communication already
    exist between the Marine Corps and the Army. For example, DOD cited the
    Marine Corps' participation in the Army's armor kit working group. DOD
    also noted that the Marine Corps coordinated with the Army Research Lab
    and the Army's Aberdeen Test Center on armor kit design and testing. While
    we agree that the coordination between the Marine Corps and Army on truck
    armoring was beneficial to the Marine Corps' program, these processes were
    generally informal in nature. As evidenced in our report, these various
    layers of communication were not sufficient to bring the services' two
    truck armor programs together in a more uniform and coordinated approach
    from the beginning to ensure that requirements were identified and
    solutions developed for both services at the same time. Instead, the Army
    identified its first truck armor requirements and began developing
    solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not begin its
    program until January 2004. As we reported, had the Marine Corps began
    seeking truck armor solutions in November 2003, if might have been able to
    acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its March 2004 deployment
    to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel during this time
    period and the willingness of industry to work with the Marine Corps to
    expedite its availability.

    DOD further stated that it believes it met the intent of our
    recommendation with the creation of the Army-Marine Corps Board and the
    Navy-Marine Corps Board. As noted by DOD, these Boards address issues at
    the 3-star level and provide a means to share information between the
    services. According to DOD, the Army-Marine Corps Board was not mature
    enough to influence the initial development of truck armor, but in 2005 it
    was used to coordinate production delivery priority between the Army and
    Marine Corps for the up-armored HMMWV. While we agree that these Boards
    enhance the coordination between the two services, they represent an
    agreement between the services, initiated by the services. The intent of
    our recommendation is for DOD to develop a more comprehensive DOD-wide
    process that requires synchronization and coordination between the
    services in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and developing
    solutions to those requirements.

    In response to our second recommendation to clarify the point at which the
    JUONS process should be utilized, DOD concurred, stating that the Joint
    Staff is working on an update to the JOUNS process instruction. According
    to DOD, this update will clarify when and if the JOUNS process can be used
    when materiel solutions require development of a new technology or
    capability. The update is expected to be completed by September 2006.

    DOD provided additional comments related to the context of the report.
    Specifically, DOD noted that it believes the Marine Corps exhibited due
    diligence in providing armor protection for its deployed tactical wheeled
    vehicle fleet. It further described in detail the Marine Corps' approach
    to first develop an interim solution using commercially available
    materials, including 3/16-inch HHS, to ensure all vehicles entering Iraq
    would have at least some protection until armor with a better level of
    protection could be fielded. We agree that the Marine Corps exercised
    diligence in armoring its trucks for Iraq and other deployed locations
    given the circumstances and we believe this information is accurately
    presented in the report. However, as noted in the report, a more unified
    and synchronized approach between the Army and the Marine Corps may have
    improved the availability of the preferred 3/8-inch RHA for the Marine
    Corps' interim armor.

    DOD also provided additional comments related to the accuracy of the
    report which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate. The
    department's specific comments and our responses to them are discussed in
    detail in appendix III. In summary, the department disagreed with our
    statements regarding the (1) lack of coordination between the Marine Corps
    and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions, (2)
    lack of a formal departmentwide process to ensure interservice
    coordination, and (3) delays in the Marine Corps' identification of the
    requirement for 3/8-inch RHA and its attempts to acquire and install this
    improved armor. While we acknowledge that the Marine Corps made attempts
    to coordinate with the Army through various informal processes, evidence
    showed that the lack of a synchronized approach between the services led
    to differing processes within the services for generating armor
    requirements and solutions. Similarly, while we agree that the department
    had a number of interservice working groups and committees designed to
    enhance interservice coordination, we continue to believe that the lack of
    a more formal interservice coordination process precluded the Marine Corps
    and the Army from identifying armor requirements and solutions for both
    services at the same time. Lastly, while the department refuted our
    evidence that the Marine Corps did not identify a requirement for 3/8-inch
    RHA until April 2004, it was unable to adequately document its position.
    See appendix III for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

    We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
    committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army and the
    Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the
    Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to
    others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
    please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

    the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to
    this report are listed in appendix IV.

    William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    To address our objectives, we examined the Marine Corps' programs to
    provide armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles,
    or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
    responsibility.1 The Marine Corps trucks we examined included the 5-ton,
    Logistics Vehicle System, and Marine Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement.
    Descriptions of each of these trucks along with detailed information on
    the availability of armor for each truck are included in appendix II.

    To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to
    meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time to
    provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in
    identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck
    armor for deployed forces. We conducted interviews at the Marine Corps
    Systems Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico,
    Virginia; the Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany, Georgia; Army
    headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and the U.S. Army Development Test
    Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We also collected and
    analyzed armor supply data such as requirements, funding levels,
    production levels, and installations for the period between January 2004
    (when truck armor requirements were first formally identified) and March
    2006, which we obtained from Marine Corps bases or source documents. We
    considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck when the
    quantity of add-on or integrated armor produced and installed on vehicles
    equaled the requirement. We did not, however, visit CENTCOM's area of
    responsibility to validate the extent to which armor had been installed
    and was actually in use by trucks. Based on the information gathered, we
    identified factors that affected the time to provide truck armor to
    deployed forces.

    To determine what actions the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense
    took to improve the availability of truck armor for current and future
    operations, we interviewed Marine Corps and Joint Staff personnel to
    identify short- and long-term efforts. We also reviewed the service's
    studies related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, we did
    not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for success.

    1 The Marine Corps also developed armor for the high mobility multipurpose
    wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), a light tactical wheeled vehicle. We examined
    availability of armor for HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply
    availability, so we did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense
    Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items
    during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
    8, 2005).

    We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for
    this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data
    and corroborating them with other information gathered from other Marine
    Corps organizations. We determined that the data were sufficiently
    reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our audit from
    April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring
    Efforts

    We examined the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to
    meet identified requirements for the following vehicles: the multipurpose
    5-ton truck, the logistics vehicle system (LVS), and the medium tactical
    vehicle replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck). This appendix provides an
    assessment for each of these three truck types. Each assessment presents a
    general description of each truck and our evaluation of the extent to
    which armor kits were produced and installed when required.

                               Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks

    The Marine Corps multipurpose 5-ton trucks provide transportation,
    hauling, and towing of just about everything in the equipment inventory.
    These trucks transport troops, supplies, ammunition, construction
    materials, and other items. These trucks also tow many types of trailers,
    artillery guns, and vans. Almost all Marine Corps units are equipped with
    5-ton trucks. As the primary truck transport asset of the Marine Corps, it
    is available in cargo, dump, tractor, and wrecker configurations. Figure 4
    shows an example of the 5-ton truck in a cargo configuration.

    Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck

    To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the
    5-ton trucks in two phases. The first phase of armoring used interim
    armor, which included 3/16-inch HHS doors, Kevlar/ceramic panels, and
    ballistic blankets, and offered limited protection against improvised
    explosive devices (IEDs). The second phase of armoring used add-on armor,
    which offered better protection against IEDs because it included a better
    grade steel (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous steel), ballistic glass, and
    additional protection for the underbody, tailgate, roof, and other
    components. There is also an additional type of armor protection used by
    the Marine Corps, called integrated armor. However, integrated armor
    requirements were not established for the 5-ton truck because the 5-ton
    truck is at the end of its life cycle and is being replaced by MTVRs, or
    7-ton trucks. In addition, according to Marine Corps officials, the 5-ton
    trucks make poor candidates for integrated armor because the added weight
    of the armor significantly reduces the payload capacity and usefulness of
    the trucks.

    Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements

    The Marine Corps armored its 5-ton trucks in two phases, responding to two
    validated requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to
    armor 171 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials
    said they met this requirement 2 months later, in March 2004, by
    installing an interim armor solution before the First Marine Expeditionary
    Force was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to
    provide monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our
    analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 123 door
    sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistics
    Command Maintenance Center in Albany, Georgia, and procured 3,830
    Kevlar/ceramic panels from commercial sources to address the requirement.
    According to Marine Corps officials, some of these Kevlar/ceramic panels
    were used to armor the 5-ton trucks. Due to the immediate need for armor
    prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met armor needs with the best
    available materials at the time-3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates.
    However, the armor did not provide sufficient IED protection.

    The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 185 5-ton trucks
    (including re-armoring the 171 trucks with interim armor), was validated
    in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5
    months later, in September 2004, by installing add-on armor kits that met
    requirements for IED protection, but they were unable to provide monthly
    data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that,
    at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 199 5-ton armored door sets
    between April and September 2004 to meet the requirement. Figure 5 shows
    the requirements and installation levels for both interim armor and add-on
    armor for the 5-ton truck over time. As of September 2005, the Marine
    Corps had 123 add-on armored 5-ton trucks operating outside forward bases
    in CENTCOM's area of responsibility. Eighty-seven of them also received
    underbody armor.1

    Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
    Interim and Add-on Armor

    Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
    unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
    sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements,
    but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points
    in time. Dotted line over the graph also indicates some overproduction
    occurred.

    1 The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks in theater, but because the 5-ton
    trucks are being phased out of theater operations, 87 received upgraded
    protection such as underbody kits while the rest will not be used off the
    forward operating bases.

                                Logistics Vehicle System

    The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) is a heavy tactical transport vehicle
    system for fuels and bulk cargos that was first fielded in the mid-1980s.
    It is a modular system consisting of a front power unit (cab) that is
    designed to have interchangeable rear body units. The truck has an
    off-road payload of 12.5-tons and an on-road payload of 22.5-tons. Figure
    6 shows the front body unit, which can tow five different rear body units.
    Rear body units include a wrecker, a fifth-wheel semitrailer adapter, a
    dropside cargo unit, a self-loading container, and bridge transporter.

    Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System

    The Marine Corps installed armor protection on the LVS in two phases to
    meet requirements. The first phase of armoring used interim armor, which
    included Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic
    blankets, and offered limited protection against IEDs. The second phase of
    armoring used add-on armor, which offered better protection against IEDs
    because it included a better grade (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous) steel,
    ballistic glass, and additional protection for the underbody, tailgate,
    roof, and other components. There is an additional type of armor
    protection established by the Marine Corps, called integrated armor, but,
    as with the 5-ton truck, a requirement for this type of protection was not
    established for the LVS because it will ultimately be replaced by a new
    truck called the Logistic Vehicle System Replacement during the 2008-2009
    time frame.

    Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements

    The Marine Corps armored the LVS in two phases, responding to two
    requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 204
    trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corp officials said they met
    this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months later,
    in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was deployed to
    Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide monthly data
    on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that, at a
    minimum, the Marine Corps produced 105 armored door sets at the Marine
    Corps Logistic Command Maintenance Center between April and September 2004
    and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a commercial company, some
    of which were used to armor the LVS. Due to the immediate need for armor
    prior to deployment, the Marine Corps met armor needs with the best
    available materials at the time-3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates.
    However, this armor did not provide sufficient protection against the
    fragmentation effects of IEDs.

    The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 221 trucks (including
    re-armoring the 204 trucks with interim armor), was established in April
    2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 months
    later, in September 2004, with add-on armor kits that met the validated
    requirements for protection from IEDs, but they were unable to provide
    monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed
    that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 261 armored door sets
    between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistic Command
    Maintenance Center and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a
    commercial company to meet the requirement. According to Marine Corps
    officials, some of the Kevlar/ceramic doors were used to armor the LVS. As
    of January 2006, Marine Corps fielding data revealed that 235 LVS trucks
    operating outside forward bases in CENTCOM's area of responsibility had
    add-on armor. Figure 7 shows the requirements, production, and
    installation levels for both interim armor and add-on armor for the LVS
    over time.

    Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and
    Add-on Armor

    Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
    unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
    sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements,
    but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points
    in time. Dotted line over the graph indicates some overproduction
    occurred.

                          Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

    The Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is designed to
    replace the existing fleet of 5-ton trucks with a new and more robust
    fleet of 7-ton trucks. Figure 8 shows the MTVR as a troop carrier;
    however, it is also used as a wrecker, dump truck, cargo carrier, and
    convoy escort. According to a Marine Corps official, the service needed to
    replace its existing medium 5-ton truck fleet with a vehicle capable of
    carrying larger payloads, at a faster speed, over more difficult terrain,
    and that can be airlifted. A contract was awarded to Oshkosh Truck
    Corporation in December 1998, and production is underway.

    Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement

    To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the
    MTVR in three phases. The first phase used interim armor, which includes
    Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic blankets, and
    offers limited protection against IEDs. The second phase used add-on
    armor, which provides greater protection from IEDs than the interim armor
    because it included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor, ballistic glass,
    and additional protection for the underbody, side panels, tailgate, and
    other components. The Marine Corps continues to design and produce
    improvements to this add-on armor. The final armor phase used integrated
    armor that is installed on the vehicle chassis and provides overlapping
    seams that prevent penetration from ballistics and IEDs. Figure 9 shows
    the requirements, production, and installation of each type of armor on
    the MTVR.

    Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements

    The Marine Corps is armoring the MTVR in three phases, responding to four
    requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 794
    trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials said they
    met this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months
    later, in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was
    deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide
    data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that,
    at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 174 doors between April and
    September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a commercial
    company for the requirement. An unspecified number of these Kevlar/ceramic
    panels were used to armor the MTVR. Due to the immediate need for armor
    prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met armor needs with the best
    available materials at the time-3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates.
    However, this armor did not provide sufficient protection against the
    fragmentation effects of IEDs.

    The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 1,032 MTVRs (including
    re-armoring the 794 trucks armored with interim armor), was validated in
    April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 months
    later, in September 2005, by installing add-on armor kits that met the
    validated requirements for protection from IEDs. However, they were unable
    to provide data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis
    showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 1,966 armored doors
    between April and September 2004 to meet the requirement. The Marine Corps
    also produced 962 cargo panel sets (i.e., which were steel plated to
    protect the sides of the cargo unit) to protect transported troops.

    The armor protection installed in the third phase had two requirements.
    The first requirement, to armor 1,018 MTVRs (trucks that were already
    provided with add-on armor) with integrated armor, was validated in
    October 2004. However, in June 2005 this requirement was reduced to
    installing integrated kits on 900 MTVRs by May 2006, because fewer trucks
    than initially anticipated will be rotated into theater in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Since the MTVR is at the beginning of its economic life
    cycle, the Marine Corps made the decision to armor this truck with armor
    that was integrated into the body of the truck. Integrated armor is a
    permanent modification that requires stripping the truck to its frame and
    rebuilding. It takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours to complete a
    single installation. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps has installed 803
    integrated kits on the MTVRs.

    Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
    Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor

    Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
    unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
    sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements,
    but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points
    in time. Dotted line over the graph indicates some overproduction
    occurred.

    Appendix III:  Comments from the Department of Defense

    See comment 3.

    See comment 2.

    See comment 1.

    See comment 4.

    See comment 8.

    See comment 7.

    See comment 6.

    See comment 5.

    See comment 13.

    See comment 12.

    See comment 11.

    See comment 10.

    See comment 9.

                      GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments

               1. DOD stated that our statement identifying a number of systemic
               causes for shortages in armor such as inaccurate requirements is
               misleading and that it implies that the Marine Corps did not
               consider the current threat analysis. However, this statement does
               not refer to the Marine Corps's truck armor program. Rather, the
               statement is from the introduction of the report, where we
               discussed our prior work leading up to this review. Specifically,
               we noted that in April 2005 we reported on a number of critical
               supply shortages during OIF-including armored HMMWVs, body armor,
               and other items-and inaccurate requirements was one of the
               systemic causes identified in the April 2005 report.
               2. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps' interim
               armor did not meet requirements, noting that armor protection
               requirements changed quickly over time and migrated from a small
               arms ballistic focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of
               IEDs encountered increased. However, the December 2003 requirement
               document that the Marine Corps provided to us during our review
               clearly stated the need to protect all vehicles from improvised
               explosive devices, mines, and other explosive ordnances. Documents
               we obtained from both the Marine Corps and Army recognized IEDs as
               a significant threat at the time. In fact, in DOD's comments to
               this report, it noted that "in December 2003, both the Army and
               Marine Corps recognized that IEDs, RPGs, 7.62mm projectiles, and
               mines were the predominate threats." Further, in November 2003,
               the Army had identified a requirement to protect vehicles from
               IEDs and recognized a need to purchase rolled homogenous armor
               (RHA), a type of armor that proved effective against both the
               ballistic and IED threat after testing many armor types.
               3. DOD disagreed with our statement that a lack of coordination
               between the Marine Corps and Army on addressing truck armor
               requirements and solutions caused the Marine Corps to make
               decisions about the types of armor to use without having all the
               information that was available on protective capabilities of
               various armor types. We acknowledge that the Marine Corps made
               attempts to coordinate through various informal processes, such as
               the Armor Kit Working Group Integrated Process Team. However,
               evidence showed that a lack of a synchronized approach among the
               services was due to each service having separate and distinct
               processes that generated the requirements to armor vehicles. The
               individual requirements processes led to the Marine Corps
               validating a requirement to armor vehicles 2 months after the Army
               validated a similar requirement to armor its vehicles. Ultimately,
               the Marine Corps began seeking RHA armor in February 2004-3 months
               after the Army began producing armor kits made out of RHA armor.
               Marine Corps officials told us that they began seeking RHA armor
               from industry earlier-in January 2004-but were told it was in
               short supply. However, Marine Corps officials have not provided
               documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. For example, in
               DOD's comments to this report, it stated that the first purchase
               order for 3/8-inch RHA was on January 12, 2004. However, when we
               subsequently requested to see the purchase order, the Marine Corps
               noted that it was actually an Army purchase order. According to
               the Marine Corps, they made a phone inquiry to a steel vendor in
               January 2004, but have not provided documentation to support this
               assertion. In addition, we spoke with other steel suppliers about
               the availability of RHA during the January and March 2004 time
               frame. These industry officials told us that despite lead times
               for RHA that ranged from 30 days to 4 months, they could have made
               RHA available to the Marine Corps quicker if the Marine Corps had
               approached them directly. Moreover, although we agree that formal
               processes are in place for the Marine Corps to test armor types
               through the Army's Testing Center (ATC), the Marine Corps
               coordination with the Army to install RHA armor kits on vehicles
               did not occur until the Marine Corps' second phase of armoring.
               Furthermore, while the Marine Corps cited the Army-Marine Corps
               Board (AMCB) and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) as
               other examples of Army and Marine Corps coordination in the
               development of armor solutions, these additional avenues for
               communication were not sufficient to bring the services' two truck
               armor programs together in a synchronized approach to ensure that
               requirements were identified and solutions developed for both
               services at the same time. We further clarified this position in
               the report.
               4. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps did not
               identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004. It
               stated that the need for RHA armor was identified earlier but was
               in short supply from industry. While some Marine Corps officials
               told us that the Marine Corps was not seeking 3/8-inch RHA for its
               interim armor, other Marine Corps officials subsequently told us
               they became aware of the need for 3/8-inch RHA in December 2003
               and first inquired about the availability of RHA steel with
               industry in January 2004. However, these officials have not
               provided adequate documentation to support the assertion or that
               RHA was not available from industry (see note (3) above). Further,
               a Marine Corps Logistics Command report on its armoring efforts
               indicated that the Marine Corps did not make the decision to use
               3/8-inch RHA until March 2004. However, it was not until April
               2004 that the Marine Corps officially identified a need for
               3/8-inch RHA when it validated the requirement for the second
               armor phase. Due to the conflicting information, it remains
               unclear exactly when the Marine Corps became aware of the need for
               RHA.
               5. DOD disagreed with our statement that no formal process was in
               place to ensure interservice coordination. DOD acknowledged that
               there was no standing joint activity that addressed specific
               servicewide vehicle hardening requirements at the time, and cited
               participation in and coordination with the AKWG IPT, ATC, AMCB and
               JIEDDO as instrumental in developing the Marine Corps' truck armor
               solutions. While we agree that these organizations may have
               provided valuable information to the Marine Corps, as stated
               previously, this coordination was not sufficient to bring the
               services together to identify requirements and develop solutions
               for both services at the same time.
               6. DOD disagreed with our statement that troops were placed at
               greater risk as a result of the time required to replace the
               interim armor with add-on RHA armor and integrated armor. It noted
               that to accelerate the replacement of interim armor by taking a
               larger amount of vehicles out of service would create inherent
               risk to the operational commanders. We did not intend to suggest
               that the Marine Corps should have made this decision or that it
               could have done anything different given the operational
               conditions in the theater. Rather, we were simply stating that
               because of the time needed to replace the interim armor with the
               second generation RHA armor coupled with mission requirements, the
               vehicles were operating with less than the preferred armor
               solution.
               7. See note (1) and note (2).
               8. See note (6).
               9. See note (3) and note (5).
               10. See note (3) and note (4).
               11. We agree that attempts were made to share information between
               the Army and Marine Corps, but we recommended a DOD-wide formal
               process to require interservice coordination (see also note 5).
               12. See note (4).
               13. In response to our discussion on the Marine Corps'
               investigating future-kit armoring strategies using the "A" kit and
               "B" kit concept for armor kits, DOD added that the Marine Corps is
               now planning to incorporate this concept on its Logistics Vehicle
               Replacement (LVSR) and the MTVR. DOD further noted that the LVSR
               will be the first military vehicle to incorporate the A and B kit
               concept. We incorporated the current status of this program into
               the report.

    Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

                                      GAO Contact

    William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

                                    Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director;
    Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne,
    Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell, Patricia
    Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, John D. Strong, and Gerald Winterlin also made
    key contributions to this report.

    (350785)

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    Highlights of GAO-06-274 , a report to congressional committees

    June 2006

    DEFENSE LOGISTICS

    Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected
    the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor

    The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has
    led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the
    availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a
    series of engagements under the Comptroller General's authority to address
    these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the
    production and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy
    trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the production and
    installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy trucks. The
    objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was
    produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what
    factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what
    actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely
    availability of truck armor.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO is recommending that DOD (1) establish a process for sharing
    information on developing materiel solutions and (2) clarify the point at
    which the joint requirements process should be utilized. DOD concurred
    with the second recommendation but believes communication is sufficient to
    satisfy the first recommendation. GAO disagrees. DOD also provided
    comments related to the context and accuracy of the report, which we
    incorporated as appropriate.

    The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation
    of add-on truck armor in September 2004---8 months after the requirements
    were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor
    requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first
    phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004
    to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar
    threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
    March 2004, the Marine Corps installed interim armor that did not provide
    sufficient IED protection, which Marine Corps officials acknowledged,
    stating that their intent was to field some level of protection until a
    more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the
    Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004
    and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided
    enhanced IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading
    to integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved
    protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle. They
    expect to complete installation by May 2006.

    Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
    Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
    Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
    solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor
    requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army.
    Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to
    field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first
    phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor
    to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did
    not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin
    seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004-2 months
    after the Army began its truck armor program in November 2003. According
    to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED
    protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine
    Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps
    fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. Second,
    mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace
    its interim armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor.

    The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely
    availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
    example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
    integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine
    Corps is alsotaking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to
    address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In
    addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve
    coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime
    solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to urgent
    wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new
    technology solutions.
    *** End of document. ***