Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal	 
Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists 
(07-FEB-06, GAO-06-247).					 
                                                                 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to  
help ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote.	 
Under HAVA, as of January 1, 2004, states were to create	 
computerized statewide voter registration lists to serve as	 
official rosters of legally registered voters for elections for  
federal office. States, however, were given the option to seek a 
waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions until 2006. 
All but nine states did so. This report discusses the experiences
of the nine states that were subject to the original HAVA	 
deadline--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report	 
describes actions election officials in these states reported	 
taking to meet specific HAVA requirements--as applicable to their
states--for (1) establishing computerized statewide voter	 
registration lists and (2) verifying the accuracy of information 
on voter registration applications and maintaining accurate	 
computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting what states said 
about challenges they faced and lessons learned implementing the 
requirements. Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the 
nine states; the Election Assistance Commission, which was	 
responsible for coordinating HAVA waivers; and the Department of 
Justice. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-247 					        
    ACCNO:   A46417						        
  TITLE:     Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing   
Federal Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter		 
Registration Lists						 
     DATE:   02/07/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Data integrity					 
	     Elections						 
	     Electronic forms					 
	     Federal law					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Mechanization					 
	     Database management systems			 
	     Electronic records management			 
	     Voter eligibility					 
	     Voter registration 				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-247

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computeriz
     * States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Regist
          * States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Voter Registration Ap
          * All States Reported Taking Steps to Perform Required List Ma
          * Four States Reported That Voter List Accuracy Improved as a
     * State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Le
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applicat
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applicat
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
          * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
          * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
          * Challenges and Lessons Learned
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

January 2006

ELECTION REFORM

Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for
Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform

GAO-06-247

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized Statewide
Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such a List Prior
to HAVA 10
States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration
Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists 14
State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons Learned
while Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter
Registration Lists 25
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29
Appendix II EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
Registration List Provisions 31
Appendix III Reported Experiences of Alaska Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 33
Appendix IV Reported Experiences of Arizona Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 35
Appendix V Reported Experiences of Georgia Election Officials Implementing
HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 38
Appendix VI Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election Officials Implementing
HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 41
Appendix VII Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 44
Appendix VIII Reported Experiences of Minnesota Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 47
Appendix IX Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 50
Appendix X Reported Experiences of South Dakota Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 53
Appendix XI Reported Experiences of West Virginia Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 55
Appendix XII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58

Tables

Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or Assigned
by States to Implement HAVA Requirements 15
Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required
Verification of Information on Voter Registration Applications by Matching
with MVA Records 16
Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Duplicate Registration 18
Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names of
Deceased Registrants 19
Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Ineligible Felons 20

Figures

Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could Be
Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide Voter Registration System 9
Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized
Statewide Voter Registration Lists 11

Abbreviations

AAMVA American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

DOJ Department of Justice

EAC Election Assistance Commission

HAVA Help America Vote Act

HAVV Help America Vote Verification

MCD minor civil decision

MVA motor vehicle agency

NASED National Association of State Election Directors

NASS National Association of Secretaries of State

SSA Social Security Administration

VRAZ Voter Registration Arizona

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 7, 2006

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Confidence in the electoral process to produce free and fair elections is
of the utmost importance to a legitimate democratic political system. The
basic goal of an election system is simple to state but not simple to
achieve-enable all eligible voters to register to vote, cast their votes,
and have those votes counted accurately. The Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) was enacted, in part, to help ensure that only eligible persons are
registered to vote.1 This law provides that, among other things, as of
January 1, 2004, states are to create computerized statewide voter
registration lists that serve as official rosters of legally registered
voters for elections for federal office.2 Under this provision, most
states are also to verify the accuracy of information provided on voter
registration applications by matching it with information contained in the
state motor vehicle agency's (MVA) database or the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) records, as appropriate.3 In addition, states are
to perform list maintenance on statewide voter lists by coordinating them
on a regular basis with state records on felony status and deaths, in
order to identify and remove names of ineligible voters.

1Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).

2HAVA in general applies to elections for federal office in the 55 U.S.
states and territories, including the District of Columbia, but for the
purposes of this report, we refer only to the states. North Dakota does
not require voters to register to vote and is, therefore, not subject to
the HAVA requirements to create and maintain a computerized statewide
voter registration list.

3Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter
registration application information by comparing or matching it with MVA
or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states requiring full Social
Security numbers on voter registration applications prior to 1975 in order
to verify the identity of a registrant are not subject to this HAVA
requirement.

Under HAVA, states could apply to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
by January 1, 2004, for a waiver, postponing the effective implementation
date of the statewide voter registration list requirement for 2 years
until January 1, 2006.4 All but nine states exercised the waiver option.
The nine states that were to implement the HAVA requirements described
above, by the original 2004 deadline were Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West
Virginia. This report discusses the experiences of these nine states as
they implemented these HAVA requirements, in particular, the actions that
state election officials reported taking to (1) establish computerized
statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify the accuracy of
information on voter registration applications and maintain accurate
computerized voter lists. In addition, we report what states told us
regarding (3) the challenges they faced and lessons they learned while
implementing these requirements.

In addition to this report, we have issued or plan to issue reports this
year on other specific election issues. These reports, as did our earlier
work issued in 2001,5 in general focus on the people, processes, and
technology associated with the preparation for and administration of
elections. Specifically, in June 2005, we issued a report on the efforts
of selected state and local election officials in seven states to ensure
that voter registration lists are accurate.6 In September 2005, we issued
two reports, one on the efforts of selected local election officials in
these same seven states on managing voter registration and ensuring
eligible citizens can vote7 and the other on significant security and
reliability concerns that have been identified for electronic voting
systems.8 Later this year, we plan to issue a report on the Department of
Defense's implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program to
facilitate absentee voting by military personnel during the November 2004
election. These reports respond to congressional requests made prior to
the November 2004 election. In addition, we are undertaking a broader,
more comprehensive review of election administration processes related to
the November 2004 general election. This comprehensive study, which we
plan to issue in 2006, will address activities and challenges-people,
processes, and technology-associated with each major stage of election
administration to include registration, absentee and early voting,
election day preparation and activities, and vote counting and
certification.

4HAVA established the EAC to provide guidance and manage payments to the
states for the implementation of HAVA's requirements.

5GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

6GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

7GAO, Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing
Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, GAO-05-997
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005).

8GAO, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of
Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be
Completed, GAO-05-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2005).

To meet our objectives for this report, we conducted structured telephone
interviews with state election officials in each of the nine states. We
also interviewed officials with and obtained documents from the EAC and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, which is
responsible for enforcing parts of HAVA. In addition, we reviewed relevant
state and federal laws.

We did not independently verify the responses to questions posed to state
officials during our telephone interviews. However, state election
officials were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their
responses for this report. We also provided relevant sections of the
report to EAC and DOJ officials to verify the accuracy of the information
they provided. Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our
scope and methodology.

We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                Results in Brief

Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of
actions in order to establish the HAVA-required computerized voter
registration lists; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no
actions were taken because, according to the official, prior to HAVA, the
state had a system in place that met the HAVA requirements. With regard to
the other states, officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South Carolina,
and South Dakota reported they had computerized statewide voter
registration systems in place prior to January 2004 that they modified in
order to implement the HAVA requirements; officials from Minnesota said
their state replaced rather than modified the computerized voter
registration system it had in place prior to HAVA. Officials from Arizona
and West Virginia said their states did not have computerized statewide
voter registration lists in place prior to HAVA and created them for the
first time to implement the law. Additionally, election officials from all
states except Alaska, where state officials are responsible for
maintaining the statewide voter registration list, told us that their
states provided some form of support to local election officials to ensure
that they could operate the computerized statewide voter registration
system to enter and update voter registration information.

State election officials reported taking the steps required by HAVA to
verify information provided on voter registration applications and
maintain their voter lists, and some officials reported the accuracy of
the voter lists improved as a result. The steps states took depended on
what HAVA provisions applied to them. Of the states we reviewed, Alaska,
Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia were subject to the
HAVA provision for verifying information provided on voter registration
applications by matching it with SSA and MVA records. These states were in
various stages of implementing the requirement, officials told us. At the
time of our review, four of these five states were matching information
with MVA databases, and two states-Arizona and South Dakota-were matching
information with SSA records, according to officials. Alaska, Minnesota,
and West Virginia officials said they were in the process of making
arrangements with SSA to conduct matches. The requirement to verify
information on voter registration applications by matching it with MVA and
SSA records, in general, is optional for states that collect voters' full
Social Security numbers on these applications.9 Of the states we reviewed,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina fall into this category;
officials from Hawaii reported their state voluntarily matched information
on registration applications with MVA records. Officials from all nine
states also reported conducting the list maintenance activities required
by HAVA; all of the state officials said their states eliminate duplicate
registrations and coordinate the voter list with other state records to
identify and remove names of deceased voters and persons ineligible under
state law to register to vote because of their felony status. Arizona,
Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia officials said that
implementing the HAVA requirements led to some or great improvement in the
accuracy of their voter lists by reducing duplicate registrations or
improving the quality of voter information before it was entered into the
statewide voter list. Officials from the remaining states-Alaska, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina-reported that HAVA had little or no
effect on the accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely occurred,
some of these officials said, because their states had operated
computerized statewide lists for many years prior to HAVA. While HAVA
contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter registration
lists, even after such requirements are implemented, maintaining accurate
computerized lists will likely remain a challenging task for state and
local officials. In part this is because of the inherent risks of managing
a dynamic body of information that is constantly changing as voters move,
change names, come of age to vote, or become ineligible to vote.

9HAVA provides that for those states using full Social Security numbers on
voter registration applications in accordance with Section 7 of the
Privacy Act of 1974, HAVA's voter registration verification requirements
are optional. Of the states we reviewed, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
South Carolina collect the full Social Security number and, therefore,
have not been treated as subject to the HAVA registration information
verification requirement. Georgia's right to this Privacy Act exemption,
however, was in litigation at the time of our review. A district court
order (Schwier v. Cox, Civil No. 1:00-CV-2820, (N.D. Ga. January 31,
2005)) that Georgia does not qualify for this exemption was appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Creating statewide registration lists required by HAVA presented a number
of challenges and lessons learned, officials told us, as they developed
their computerized statewide voter registration systems, made them
operational, and later managed them. Election officials from Minnesota and
West Virginia said that, for example, they adopted project timelines as
they developed their systems that they later found were too compressed.
Officials from Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed that
completing the time-consuming task of converting existing voter
registration data, which often were inaccurate and needed to be corrected,
from old voter registration systems to the new statewide systems was a
challenge. Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Dakota, and West
Virginia officials also told us that as they developed their computerized
systems, they learned that collaborating with local officials to design
and develop the systems was important to the states' ultimate successful
implementation of the systems. Officials also shared challenges and
lessons learned related to making their systems operational. For example,
some officials also told us they learned that prior to putting their
systems into service, it is important to train staff to use the new
system, and officials from Minnesota suggested providing the training
manual online to make the most recent information available to staff.
State officials also shared challenges and learned lessons from managing
the computerized systems. For example, Hawaii officials said one challenge
they faced was updating voter information and using their computerized
system at the same time. Hawaii and Kentucky officials suggested officials
keep in mind that selecting future upgrades to the system will likely
involve negotiations with local jurisdictions that may have competing
needs or administrative and technical constraints.

                                   Background

As election officials manage voter registration processes and voter lists,
they must balance two competing goals. On the one hand, officials seek to
minimize the burden on eligible people registering to vote. On the other
hand, they also seek to ensure that the voter lists are accurate, a task
that involves including the name of each eligible voter on the voter list,
removing names of ineligible voters, and having safeguards in place so
that names of voters are not removed in error from the list.

Congress has passed legislation relating to the administration of both
federal and state elections, pursuant to its various constitutional
powers, including processes related to maintaining voter lists. The
constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and federal
roles. States are responsible for the administration of both their own
elections and federal elections. States regulate various aspects of the
election process, including, for example, ballot access, registration
procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places,
provision of election day workers, and counting and certifying the vote.
The states in turn incur the costs associated with these activities.
Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has
authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress' authority
to regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to
federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both
congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to
federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments
authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory
acts.

Most recently, HAVA was enacted in 2002, and among other things, mandated
that each state establish a computerized statewide voter registration list
to serve as the official voter registration list for conducting elections
for federal office in each state.10 The voter registration list is to
serve as a secure, centralized, and interactive database that is
coordinated with other state agency databases and grants state and local
election officials immediate electronic access to enter and update voter
information. States and territories were to implement a computerized
statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2004. States could
apply to EAC by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until
January 1, 2006. Nine states and one territory-Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia,
and Guam-did not apply for a waiver.

10In addition to states, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico are generally subject to HAVA
requirements.

States subject to HAVA must also take steps to ensure that the statewide
voter registration lists are accurate. Under HAVA, states are to perform
list maintenance on a regular basis by removing ineligible voters from the
statewide voter list. States are to coordinate the computerized list with
their state agencies' records on felony status and death to verify voters'
eligibility. For example, states must cross-reference the voter
registration list with their state's records on felons to remove the names
of ineligible voters and records on death to remove deceased registrants.
States are also required to remove duplicate registrants, that is, names
of voters that appear more than once on the statewide voter list. HAVA, in
general, leaves it to the states' discretion to determine the type and
frequency of actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.

In addition to undertaking list maintenance, states are required under
HAVA to verify voter registration application information. For federal
elections, a voter registration application may not be processed or
accepted by a state unless it contains the applicant's driver's license
number or the last four digits of the Social Security number.11 If the
voter has neither of these numbers, the state must assign the voter a
voter identification number. Voter registration information is to be
matched with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records or Social Security
Administration (SSA) records, depending on the information provided by the
applicant. Certain state laws require applicants to provide their full
Social Security number on voter registration applications. HAVA provides
that for those states requiring full Social Security numbers on such
applications, in accordance with Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the
HAVA voter registration verification requirements are optional. Of the
nine states that did not receive waivers, four-Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
and South Carolina-collect the full Social Security number and, therefore,
are not subject to this HAVA requirement, according to state officials.

11With respect to driver's license related information, the REAL ID Act of
2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005)) establishes certain
minimum standards, effective in May 2008, for state issuance of driver's
licenses in order for such licenses to be recognized for any official
purpose by federal agencies. For a state driver's license to be recognized
by a federal agency, the REAL ID Act provides, for example, that states
require applicants to present certain types of information, such as
documentation of a person's name, address of principal residence, and
evidence of a person's U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status prior
to issuance. Federal recognition of state-issued driver's licenses will
also be conditioned upon, among other things, a requirement that documents
presented by an applicant be verified by the state, that states enter into
a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Homeland Security to
verify the legal presence of noncitizen applicants, and that states
provide all other states electronic access to state motor vehicle database
information.

Under HAVA, the state MVA must enter into an agreement with SSA to verify
the applicant information when applicants provide the last four digits of
their Social Security number rather than a driver's license number on
voter registration applications. HAVA additionally requires SSA to develop
methods to verify the accuracy of information on the voter registration
applications by matching the name, date of birth, and the last four digits
of the Social Security number provided on the voter registration
application with SSA records. SSA is to determine whether SSA records
indicate the individual is deceased.

Figure 1 provides an example of how a computerized statewide voter
registration list could verify voter eligibility through matching
registration applications with MVA and SSA, matching the statewide list
with state records on felons and death notices from the state courts and
the state vital statistics agency, and identifying duplicate registrants
in the statewide list.12

12Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are required to give written notice of
felony convictions in federal district courts to the chief state election
official of the offender's state of residence upon conviction of the
offender. The law also requires the state election officials to notify the
election officials of the local jurisdiction in which an offender resides
of federal felony convictions. See 42 U.S.C. S: 1973gg-6(g). This
provision was enacted into law in 1993 in section 8 of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).

Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could Be
Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide Voter Registration System

To assist states with implementing these federal mandates, HAVA authorizes
funding to states for the creation and maintenance of the computerized
statewide voter lists. In turn, HAVA requires states to provide such
support as may be required to local jurisdictions to enable them to use
the computerized voter list. HAVA also established EAC and charged it
with, among other things, providing voluntary technical guidance on the
administration of federal elections, serving as a national clearinghouse
for information on election administration, and providing federal funding
to the states to implement the HAVA provisions. Also, DOJ has enforcement
authority with respect to the uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation
of certain HAVA requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter
registration list and verifying information on voter registration
applications. According to DOJ officials, following the passage of HAVA,
it was unnecessary to take enforcement actions against any of the nine
nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also reported working with the states to
address initial challenges and provide informal guidance while EAC awaited
staff and resources. Appendix II discusses EAC's and DOJ's roles regarding
computerized statewide voter registration lists in greater detail.

 Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter
  Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such a List Prior to HAVA

Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of
actions in order to implement the HAVA computerized voter registration
list requirement; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no
actions were taken because the state had such a system in place prior to
the enactment of HAVA. Officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South
Carolina, and South Dakota reported modifying their existing computerized
statewide voter registration systems; officials from Minnesota said the
existing computerized voter registration system was replaced; and
officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their states created
computerized statewide voter registration systems for the first time.
Although these eight states reported taking different steps to establish
computerized statewide voter registration systems, election officials
reported that all of these systems met the HAVA provisions that called for
computerized statewide voter registration lists. According to officials,
these computerized lists served as centralized and interactive databases
containing the names of all legally registered voters in the state and
granted election officials immediate electronic access to query, update,
and enter voter information. They also said these computerized lists were
capable of generating official voter registration lists. Figure 2
summarizes the actions that eight of the nine states reported taking to
establish computerized voter registration lists.

Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized
Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Election officials from six states, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
South Carolina, and South Dakota, said their states' existing computerized
statewide voter registration systems, in place in some cases for many
years prior to HAVA, allowed state and local election officials to share
and maintain an interactive database of registered voters and generate
official voter registration lists. As a result, officials from Kentucky
reported they were required to make no change to their existing system to
implement the HAVA requirements. Officials from these other states
reported that they were required to only modify their existing systems, in
some cases making only minor changes, in order to implement HAVA. For
example, in Hawaii, election officials reported their state has operated a
computerized statewide voter registration system since 1982 and only made
minor technical changes as a result of HAVA, such as adding the ability to
flag inactive voters. In addition, since Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
South Carolina collect voters' full Social Security numbers on voter
registration applications, they are not subject to the HAVA provisions for
verifying information on voter registration applications by matching it
with MVA and SSA records, officials reported. Accordingly, officials said
they did not have to modify their existing systems to provide this
matching capability. Alaska and South Dakota are subject to HAVA's data
matching provisions. These states also had computerized statewide voter
lists in place prior to HAVA, and their election officials said they
modified them as a result of HAVA. Alaska election officials reported that
they added new data fields to the computerized statewide voter
registration system to capture the last four digits of the voters' Social
Security numbers and to identify first-time voters who registered by mail,
which required little or no effort.13 South Dakota election officials
reported making similar changes as well as adding the capability to match
voter registration applications with MVA and SSA records, actions that
required a moderate level of effort, they said.

In the three remaining states, officials reported creating new systems in
order to implement HAVA. Officials from Minnesota said their state
operated a computerized statewide voter registration system prior to HAVA.
Their state replaced rather than modified this system. Arizona and West
Virginia election officials reported that their states did not have
computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to HAVA and that they
expended a significant level of effort to create such systems. Prior to
HAVA, some counties and local jurisdictions in these states had
computerized voter registration systems in place. However, the systems
were not interconnected to create statewide databases of legally
registered voters. Election officials in Arizona said that creating the
computerized list was also complicated because state and county election
officials lacked the legal authority to access state records they were to
match with the statewide voter list. The state had to pass new statutes
and amend others so that election officials could receive information from
state agencies, such as felony records, according to a senior election
official.

13Individuals who register by mail and have not previously voted in an
election for federal office in the state are, in general, required to
provide identification at the polls the first time they cast a ballot.

Some officials told us that in addition to the capabilities required by
HAVA their states' computerized voter registration systems provide
election management tools that help them prepare for and conduct
elections. For example, West Virginia election officials told us their
computerized voter registration list is also able to identify voters who
wished to serve as poll workers and produce reports on absentee ballots,
early voters, poll workers, and election data statistics. Minnesota state
election officials said that their computerized voter registration list
includes a module that centrally tracks absentee ballots provided to
military personnel or other citizens residing overseas.

Some state officials are planning to enhance their systems' election
management features. For example, Arizona plans to award a contract to
implement an updated version of its current system, which is to include
the ability to track out-of-state moves by voters and manage issues such
as petitions, provisional ballots, poll workers, and poll locations.
Kentucky election officials told us that they wish to upgrade their system
to provide more election management tools to counties, including a new
function to identify poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. See
appendixes III through XI for more information on each state's current
computerized statewide voter registration system and future plans.

Federal funds are available to states to assist them as they implement the
HAVA provisions.14 In turn, HAVA requires states to provide such support
as may be required to local jurisdictions to help them use the
computerized voter lists. Officials from six states we interviewed-Alaska,
Arizona, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West
Virginia-reported receiving federal funds to establish computerized voter
lists; these states said they spent a combination of federal and state
funds totaling about $8.4 million to establish their computerized lists.
As required by HAVA, each of the nine states, except Alaska, where the
state is solely responsible for entering and maintaining voter
registration information, provided some type of support to local
jurisdictions to help them operate the computerized statewide voter
registration systems, according to officials. For example, South Carolina
election officials told us that they provided personal computers and
software to local jurisdictions, as well as training for staff.

14To be eligible to receive federal payments to implement this and other
HAVA provisions, states must comply with certain requirements such as
appropriating state funds equal to 5 percent of the total funding to be
spent on implementing HAVA.

States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration Applications
            and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists

State election officials reported taking required steps to verify
information provided on voter registration applications and to maintain
accurate computerized voter lists. Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South
Dakota, and West Virginia-the states subject to the HAVA provisions to
verify information provided on voter registration applications-took steps
to do so by collecting the required unique identifying information from
voters, officials told us. As of November 2005, Arizona and South Dakota
were matching information on the applications with state MVA or SSA
records, according to election officials. The remaining states were in
various stages of implementing the matching requirement. All nine states
conducted regular voter list maintenance activities to purge duplicates
and remove names of persons ineligible to vote, such as deceased
registrants, as required by HAVA, officials also reported. Officials from
four of the nine states we reviewed said that implementing the HAVA
requirements led to some or great improvement in the accuracy of their
voter lists. While HAVA contains requirements that should help states
maintain accurate voter registration lists, maintaining accurate voter
lists will likely remain a challenge for election officials, in part
because lists are dynamic and constantly changing as voters move, change
names, or become ineligible to vote.

States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Voter Registration Applications with MVAs
and SSA

Under HAVA, most states are to verify the accuracy of information on voter
registration applications by matching information, such as the name and
date of birth, with MVA or SSA records, depending on the information
provided by the applicant. As noted earlier, HAVA also requires that voter
registration applicants for federal elections provide or be assigned one
of several types of unique identifying information that can be matched
with other records for verification. For matching purposes, applicants are
to be asked for their state driver's license number or, if an applicant
has not been issued a driver's license, the last four digits of the
voter's Social Security number. An eligible applicant who has not been
issued a state driver's license or a Social Security number can still
register to vote. In those cases, election officials are required to
assign the registrant an identification number.

Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter
registration application information by comparing or matching the
information with MVA or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states
requiring full Social Security numbers on voter registration applications
prior to 1975 in order to verify the identity of a registrant are not
subject to the HAVA requirement that application information be matched
with MVA or SSA records. HAVA provides that for those states the voter
registration verification requirement is optional. Four of the nine states
we reviewed-Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina-collect the full
Social Security number on voter registration applications and, therefore,
according to state officials, are not subject to this provision. Five of
the nine states we reviewed-Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and
West Virginia-are subject to this HAVA provision to collect or assign a
unique identifying numbers and then verify voter information by matching
it with MVA or SSA information.

Officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA provision
reported their systems collected or assigned the required unique
identifying numbers for registered voters, as indicated in table 1.

Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or Assigned
by States to Implement HAVA Requirements

                 Driver's license Last four digits of      Voter registration 
State         number           Social Security number   numbera            
Alaskab              X                    X                     X          
Arizona              X                    X                     X          
Minnesota            X                    X                     X          
South Dakota         X                    X                     X          
West Virginia        X                    X                     X          

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

aHAVA requires that for those applicants who have not been issued a
driver's license or a Social Security number, states shall assign them a
voter registration number.

bIn addition to this information, Alaska's voter registration application
allows voters to provide their full Social Security number or an Alaska
state identification card number.

Officials from four of the five states also reported taking steps to match
information on voter registration applications with state MVA records and
provided the date by which MVA matching became available, as indicated in
table 2.

Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required
Verification of Information on Voter Registration Applications by Matching
with MVA Records

                Match applications with MVA Date matching capability became   
State        records                     operational                       
Alaska                    X                        January 2004            
Arizona                   X                        January 2004            
Minnesota                 X                        January 2004            
South Dakota              X                        January 2004            

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

In West Virginia, officials said that their state was not yet conducting
these required matches because they were still in the process of
developing an agreement with the MVA to verify information on
applications. They also reported difficulty conducting data matches
because the MVA lacked the ability to interface with the statewide voter
list. They expected this issue to be resolved by 2006. Although not
required to do so, Hawaii voluntarily implemented this HAVA requirement,
election officials said.

In addition, officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA
provision reported taking steps to match information on voter registration
applications with SSA records. As noted earlier, if voter registration
applicants provide the last four digits of their Social Security number on
the registration applications rather than their driver's license numbers,
states are to verify information on the application by matching it with
SSA records. Officials from two states-Arizona and South Dakota-reported
that their states were currently conducting the required matches. They
were not able to conduct these matches by the January 1, 2004, deadline
because SSA's computer program to process these matches was not
operational until 8 months after the deadline had passed, in August
2004.15 Election officials from three states-Alaska, Minnesota, and West
Virginia-said their states were not yet conducting these required matches
because they were still in the process of developing an agreement with SSA
to verify information on applications. Minnesota officials also said they
encountered technical difficulties electronically sharing data with SSA
but anticipated the agreement and the technological issues would be
resolved so that they could conduct matches by 2006. Alaska and West
Virginia officials could not provide an estimated date by which the
agreement would be completed and the required matches conducted.

15GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

All States Reported Taking Steps to Perform Required List Maintenance on a
Regular Basis

In addition to requiring most states to verify information on voter
registration applications, HAVA provides that all states, including the
nine states discussed in this report, are to perform list maintenance on
the HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists on a regular basis.16
In general, list maintenance activities include adding new voters to the
voter list; updating voter information if a voter moves within the state;
and removing the names of ineligible voters from the voter list, such as
persons who are deceased or convicted of a felony that, under state law,
makes them ineligible to be registered to vote. HAVA requires that the
computerized list be coordinated with state agency records on felony
status and death to remove the names of ineligible voters. Duplicate
registrations, that is, names of voters that appear more than once on the
statewide voter list, are also to be eliminated.

Election officials in all nine states reported taking the required actions
to perform list maintenance on a regular basis to identify and remove
duplicates and names of registrants ineligible to vote. The sections below
identify the type and frequency of actions states reported taking to
implement the HAVA-required list maintenance activities in accordance with
state and local procedures. These procedures for maintaining the statewide
voter list varied from state to state, as detailed in appendixes III-XI.

Identifying duplicate voter registrations. HAVA requires that states are
to remove duplicate registrations, that is, names of voters that appear
more than once, from the statewide voter list. Duplicate registrations may
occur in the statewide lists when, for example, voters move within a
state, reregister, and then fail to notify the county in which they were
previously registered to vote. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states'
discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement
this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported
that their systems check for duplicate registrants to ensure that voters
are not listed in the statewide voter list more than once. When
applications are entered into the statewide database of registered voters,
some states' systems automatically screen the applications on a real-time
basis, that is, as the data are entered, to ensure that they do not
duplicate an existing registration; other states screen the entire list on
a regular basis. Table 3 shows the variation by state in the reported type
and frequency of actions taken to identify duplicate registrations.

16HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the administration
of elections. The National Voter Registration Act, for example, was
enacted, in part to establish registration procedures designed to
"increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in
elections for Federal office," "protect the integrity of the electoral
process," and "ensure that accurate and current voter registration lists
are maintained."

Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Duplicate Registration

             Applications                                                     
             screened to                                                      
             identify      Frequency of Voter registration list     Frequency 
             duplicate     application  checked for duplicate       of list
State     registrations screening    registrations               checks
Alaska    X             Real time    X                           Annual    
Arizona   X             Daily        X                           Periodic  
Georgia   X             Real time    X                           Monthly   
Hawaii    X             Real time    N/Aa                        N/Aa      
Kentucky  X             Real time    X                           Periodic  
Minnesota X             Daily        X                           Annual    
South     X             Real time    X                           Quarterly 
Carolina                                                         
South     N/Ab          N/Ab         X                           Annual    
Dakota                                                           
West      X             Real time    X                           Periodic  
Virginia                                                         

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

aNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration
applications, not the entire database of registered voters, are checked on
a real-time basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states' discretion
to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list
maintenance requirement.

bNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter
registration applications, is checked annually. HAVA, in general, leaves
it to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of
actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.

Identifying names of deceased voters. HAVA requires that states are to
coordinate the voter list with their state agencies' death records to
verify voters' eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states'
discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement
this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported
that they or local officials regularly matched state agency death records
with the statewide voter lists to ensure that names of deceased
registrants do not remain on the rolls. Most of these matches were based
on electronic or paper records. Table 4 shows the variation by state in
the reported type and frequency of actions taken to identify deceased
registrations.

Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names of
Deceased Registrants

                Applications                                                  
                screened to                    Voter registration             
                identify names of Frequency of list checked for     Frequency 
                deceased          application  names of deceased    of list
State        registrants       screening    registrants          checks
Alaska       X                 Real time    X                    Monthly   
Arizona      N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
Georgia      X                 Real time    X                    Monthly   
Hawaii       N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Biweekly  
Kentucky     N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
Minnesota    N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
South        X                 N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
Carolina                                                         
South Dakota X                 Daily        X                    Weekly    
West         N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
Virginia                                                         

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

aNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter
registration applications, is checked. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the
states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to
implement this list maintenance requirement.

Identifying persons convicted of a disqualifying felony. HAVA requires
states to coordinate the voter list with their state agencies' records on
felony status to verify voters' eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it
to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions
to implement this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine
states reported that their states matched state court records with the
statewide lists to identify persons ineligible under state law to vote
because of a disqualifying felony conviction. These matches were based on
electronic or paper records. Table 5 shows the variation by state in the
reported type and frequency of actions taken to identify voters ineligible
to register because of a felony conviction.

Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Ineligible Felons

                Applications                   Voter registration             
                screened to       Frequency of list checked for     Frequency 
                identify names of application  names of ineligible  of list   
State        ineligible felons screening    felons               checks
Alaska       X                 Real time    X                    Monthly   
Arizona      N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Periodic  
Georgia      X                 Real time    X                    Monthly   
Hawaii       N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Biweekly  
Kentucky     N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
Minnesota    N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly   
South        X                 Monthly      X                    Monthly   
Carolina                                                         
South Dakota X                 Daily        N/Ab                 N/Ab      
West         N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Periodic  
Virginia                                                         

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

aNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter
registration applications, is checked. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the
states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to
implement this list maintenance requirement.

bNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration
applications, not the entire database of registered voters, are checked a
daily basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states' discretion to
determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list
maintenance requirement.

Identifying individuals ineligible to vote because of mental incompetence.
The voter eligibility requirements in the nine states we reviewed provided
that applicants declared mentally incompetent to vote are not eligible to
register to vote. Officials in eight states reported they have procedures
in place to identify registrants ineligible to vote because of court
orders of mental incompetence. All reported that removing registrants for
this reason was a rare occurrence. The ninth state, West Virginia, did not
report such procedures are in place.17

17West Virginia election officials told us that while state law provides
that a person found mentally incompetent is ineligible to register to
vote, they have not received such information from courts.

Four States Reported That Voter List Accuracy Improved as a Result of HAVA, but
Managing Inherent Risks to Voter List Accuracy Remains a Challenge

Officials from four states-Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West
Virginia-reported that implementing the HAVA requirements improved the
accuracy of their voter lists somewhat or to a great extent. South Dakota
officials reported that verifying applications has helped identify
inaccurate information on applications and that matching applications with
the MVA helped reduce the number of duplicate registrations. Officials
from Minnesota, which replaced its existing computerized voter
registration with a new one in order to implement HAVA, also reported that
implementing the HAVA requirements reduced the incidence of duplicate
registrations. And officials in the states of Arizona and West Virginia,
which built entirely new systems to comply with HAVA, reported a great
improvement in the accuracy of their voter rolls.

Officials from the remaining states-Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
South Carolina-reported that HAVA had little or no effect on the accuracy
of their voter lists. This result likely occurred, some of these officials
said, because their states have had well-established computerized
statewide lists, similar to those required by HAVA, in place for many
years prior to HAVA. Officials from Georgia, Hawaii, and Kentucky also
attributed this result to their states' ability to require the full Social
Security number on voter registration applications. Having this unique
identifier provided a means to identify and remove duplicate registrants
from voter lists, they stated.

While HAVA contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter
registration lists, even after such requirements are implemented,
maintaining accurate computerized lists will likely remain a challenging
task for state and local officials. In part this is because of the
inherent risks of managing a dynamic body of information that is
constantly changing as voters move, change names, come of age to vote, or
become ineligible to vote. Managing these risks has challenged election
officials across the country for some time, as we have documented in a
series of past reports. In October 2001 we issued a report that described
the operations and challenges associated with each stage of the election
process, including list maintenance. We reported that, judging from our
national survey of local election officials, officials were challenged by
continually updating and deleting information from voter registration
lists and had concerns related to obtaining accurate and timely
information to keep voter lists accurate.18 In June 2005 we reported on
the processes 14 local voting jurisdictions from seven states used to
verify voter registration eligibility and the challenges officials faced
in maintaining accurate voter lists.19 We reported that while some of
these challenges, such as reducing duplicate registrations among
jurisdictions within the state, may be resolved when HAVA is fully
implemented, others may continue to be issues. Problems identifying voters
who are registered concurrently in more than one state and problems using
incomplete, untimely, or hard-to-decipher felony, death, and other
information could also continue to hinder efforts to maintain accurate
voter lists. In September 2005 we issued a report that described the
experiences of selected local election officials in the same seven states
as they processed voter registration applications.20 We reported that
officials in these jurisdictions face a number of challenges, such as
processing incomplete or inaccurate applications received from voter
registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations.

18 GAO-02-3 .

Some of the concerns highlighted in our October 2001, June 2005, and
September 2005 reports remain issues in states we discussed in this
report, even after these nine states implemented the HAVA-required
computerized lists. For example:

Duplicate voter registrants. Echoing concerns reported in our previous
work, the majority of state election officials interviewed for this report
said that their states might not receive information about residents who
leave the state and reregister to vote in another state.21 As a result,
voters could be registered and vote in two states concurrently. One senior
election official described this type of duplicate registration as a
"universal" problem affecting all states. States are not required to share
information that would allow them to identify persons registered in more
than one state,22 although some states voluntarily notify other states
when a voter relocates and reregisters in that state, officials said.
Officials from Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia told us they notify other states
of voters who relocate and then reregister. However, such notifications
are possible only if voters disclose on their voter registration
application they have relocated from another state, officials also told
us. This issue, caused in part by a lack of consistently available
information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of voter lists and may
not be resolved solely by implementing the HAVA-required computerized list
requirement.

19 GAO-05-478 .

20 GAO-05-997 .

21 GAO-05-478 .

22As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005 federal recognition
of state-issued driver's licenses will be conditioned upon, among other
things, a requirement that states provide all other states electronic
access to state motor vehicle database information.

Deceased registrants. We previously reported that concerns regarding
timeliness and completeness of vital statistics data on deceased persons
used to match against voter lists may continue to be an issue, even after
the HAVA requirements for a computerized list are implemented.23 However,
the election officials we interviewed in most of the states did not share
concerns about the timeliness of information their offices receive on
deceased persons from the vital statistics office. One official observed
that the vital statistics office may not receive timely information from
coroners or funeral home directors. Officials in a majority of the states
we reviewed observed that data on deceased persons may not be complete
because states are not able consistently to identify and remove names of
deceased registrants if the deaths occur out of state. According to an
official in South Dakota, some states are prohibited by state laws from
sharing information on deaths, a fact that has, in part, prevented this
issue from being resolved. Even in states that share such information,
unless officials are aware that the deceased was registered to vote in a
certain state, officials are not able to pass the information to the
appropriate election office. This issue, related in part to the
unavailability of information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of
voter lists and is not resolved by implementing the HAVA-required
computerized list requirement.

Felons. While HAVA requires coordinating the voter list with state
information on persons convicted of a felony, election officials we
interviewed in several of the states expressed concerns similar to those
reported in our previous work that the criminal information they receive
is incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher.24 This issue, similar
to concerns related to the availability, timeliness, and quality of other
types of voter registration information, poses an inherent risk to the
accuracy of lists because it could limit the ability of officials to
identify and remove names of felons ineligible to register to vote from
the computerized voter lists.

23 GAO-05-478 .

24 GAO-05-478 .

U.S. citizenship. In addition to having concerns regarding felony status,
election officials from two states also expressed concerns regarding the
willingness of registrants to self-attest that they were U.S. citizens and
therefore eligible to vote under state eligibility requirements, concerns
that are consistent with those documented in our previous work.25 The
HAVA-required unique identifying numbers, such as driver's license numbers
or Social Security numbers, are not useful for this purpose because
neither is generally accepted as evidence of U.S. citizenship. This lack
of information poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of lists, as
illustrated by an example from Minnesota.26 Officials told us that they
discovered 30 noncitizens on the Minnesota voter list during the November
2004 general election despite having the HAVA-required computerized
statewide voter list in place. Minnesota's MVA has since added visa
expiration dates to the driver's licenses of noncitizens to indicate their
citizenship status. South Dakota officials reported their MVA provides
similar information on driver's licenses. To address this concern, Arizona
officials told us that their state no longer accepts the registration
applicants' self-attestation of citizenship; all voter registration
applicants are now required to provide proof of citizenship. As we
reported in our June 2005 report, federal jury administrators could
identify possible noncitizens on the basis of information that potential
jurors provide when identifying themselves as noncitizens on their jury
service questionnaire.27 We recommended that the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts determine the feasibility and steps necessary for U.S.
district court jury administrators to provide notice to state election
officials of potential jurors who identify themselves as noncitizens.
Officials from Hawaii reported that their state periodically checks the
voter list with this type of information and other citizenship indexes.

Receiving voter registration applications. Officials from Georgia, South
Carolina, and South Dakota said that their state received voter
registration applications from registration drives that contained
inaccuracies such as fictitious names, a problem that we had identified in
past reports.28 South Carolina officials also said that only a small
number of such applications are generally received. Officials from a
majority of the nine states we reviewed reported that they received a
small number of complaints from voters who said that they had registered
through a registration drive but that their names did not appear on the
voter list on Election Day.

25 GAO-05-478 .

26As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005, federal recognition
of state-issued driver's licenses will be conditioned upon, among other
things, a state requirement that applicants provide certain information
relating to their U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status prior to
issuance. Federal recognition is also to be conditioned upon, among other
things, a requirement that states enter into a memorandum of understanding
with the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the legal presence of
noncitizen applicants.

27 GAO-05-478 .

State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons Learned while
  Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Creating statewide computerized lists required by HAVA presented a number
of challenges and resulted in lessons learned, officials told us, as they
developed their computerized statewide voter registration systems, made
them operational, and later managed them. The challenges and lessons
learned they shared are consistent with those that our past research has
shown to be important to effectively acquiring, developing, and
implementing information systems in public and private sector
organizations.29 Officials shared their experiences as they developed
their systems, for example:

           o  Election officials from Minnesota and West Virginia reported
           that meeting the time frames they established for developing their
           computerized lists was challenging, in part because of limited
           staff available to complete the work.

           o  Designing a system with the appropriate scope was an issue
           raised by Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Minnesota officials. This
           challenge involved determining the functional requirements of the
           system, for instance, the number of election management features
           the system should provide, if any, in addition to the capabilities
           required by HAVA. A senior Minnesota official reported Minnesota
           reduced the scope of its new system from what it had initially
           planned because of resource and time constraints, keeping the
           necessary elements but eliminating some election administration
           functions. Officials said this experience taught them that the
           functional requirements of the system should be prioritized as
           early as possible to differentiate features that are necessary
           from those that would be nice to have. Arizona officials addressed
           this design challenge by initially implementing a system that
           performed only the basic tasks required under the HAVA provisions,
           they reported. In the near term, they told us, local officials
           used the computerized statewide system to manage voter
           registration information while continuing to use their local
           computerized systems to manage elections. This decision minimized
           changes to the way counties historically managed elections,
           officials said. The state plans to expand the scope of its new
           statewide system in the future, providing counties with additional
           election management capabilities, an official told us. Their plan,
           officials said, is to draw upon local and state officials'
           experiences with the statewide system to identify and prioritize
           what additional features to add to their system. The Kentucky
           official offered a lesson learned as well, suggesting that
           election officials, as they define the capabilities the system is
           to offer, should be mindful of selecting a system that the state
           can afford now and in the future.

           o  Converting data on registered voters from the old system to the
           new system was time-consuming and required processes to ensure
           that data were accurately entered into the new system, election
           officials from Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed.
           This work was complicated, in part, because of inaccurate
           information in existing records such as misspelled street
           addresses or duplicate registrations that needed to be resolved
           before inputting the corrected data into the new systems'
           databases. Minnesota officials said that to help local officials
           with this work, they developed a tool that allowed them to compare
           old records of voter information with the new ones on a
           case-by-case basis.

           Officials from Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Carolina,
           South Dakota, and West Virginia also said that as states develop
           their computerized systems, they should adopt a collaborative
           approach, working with local officials to design, develop, or
           implement the systems in order to obtain local officials'
           cooperation. The state officials provided various reasons for
           emphasizing the importance of maintaining cooperative
           relationships with local officials. For example, West Virginia
           officials told us local officials resisted moving from their
           county-based systems to the statewide system, which made
           implementing the system more difficult. Local officials resisted
           in part because many of them viewed the new statewide system as an
           intrusion into a domain of election administration that had been a
           local-not a state-responsibility, state officials told us.
           Involving county officials in designing and implementing the
           system, the state officials said, might have addressed this issue
           and simplified implementation of the new system. Arizona and South
           Carolina officials said they involved local officials by convening
           a working group composed of both local and state officials that
           was responsible for developing the system. Hawaii state officials
           told us that frequent, regular communication helped their state
           maintain a cooperative relationship with local officials; for
           instance, this state holds quarterly meetings with county
           officials in order to coordinate activities such as completing
           list maintenance and data entry before poll books and voter lists
           are printed. Kentucky officials said the key to their success was
           the cooperative working relationship they cultivated with local
           officials by keeping them involved.

           Officials also shared challenges and lessons learned while making
           their systems operational. For example, West Virginia officials
           said that their system became operational in every county on the
           same day. However, it may have been beneficial for their state,
           they stated, to introduce the system incrementally county by
           county rather than bringing every election jurisdiction online the
           same day. They reasoned that such a staggered rollout schedule
           might have been easier on the state election officials, given
           their staffing constraints. Officials from some states also told
           us that prior to putting systems into service, it is important to
           train staff to use the new system. In order to provide local
           officials access to the most current information, Minnesota
           officials said they provide the user's manual online.

           State election officials also shared their lessons learned from
           their experience managing computerized voter registration systems
           once they were operational. Officials from Hawaii and Kentucky,
           two states that have managed computerized voter registrations
           systems for some years, observed that as technology develops,
           officials may decide to enhance their systems, as both of their
           states have done over the years. These officials offered lessons
           to keep in mind as states contemplate system upgrades: be mindful
           that selecting upgrades to the system may require compromises
           among local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or
           different administrative or technical constraints and that changes
           to the system affect all local jurisdictions equally. Hawaii
           officials shared another issue they encountered while managing
           their system; they could not use the computerized system while
           updating voter information. To address this issue, officials from
           Hawaii said their staff created a shadow system so that the system
           could be updated and available at the same time. Hawaii officials
           also recommended that states establish uniform processing
           procedures among their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions
           function as one.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           until 30 days after the report date. At that time we will make
           copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
           will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
           please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected] . Contact
           points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
           Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
           contributors are listed in appendix XII.

           Sincerely yours,

           William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
           Issues

           This report describes the experiences of election officials in
           Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, South
           Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia implementing the Help
           America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requirements pertaining to the
           establishment of computerized statewide voter registration lists
           and steps to verify and maintain the accuracy of those lists.
           Specifically, our objectives were to describe the actions election
           officials from nine states reported taking to (1) establish
           computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify
           information provided on voter registration applications and
           maintain the statewide voter lists. In addition, we describe what
           these state officials told us regarding (3) the challenges they
           faced and lessons they learned while implementing these
           requirements. Most states obtained a waiver from the Election
           Assistance Commission (EAC) to postpone implementation of this
           HAVA requirement until January 1, 2006. However, these nine states
           did not obtain a waiver and, therefore, were to implement these
           HAVA requirements by the original deadline, January 1, 2004.

           To meet our objectives, we reviewed HAVA provisions related to the
           establishment of statewide computerized voter registration list
           requirements. We then identified the proper points of contact
           within each state and conducted telephone interviews using a
           structured interview format. Among other things, we asked election
           officials in the nine states to describe when their computerized
           systems had been developed; the capabilities of their systems;
           what actions, if any, their states took to implement the HAVA
           requirements for a computerized list; what level of effort was
           required to make any HAVA-related modifications; what effect
           implementing these changes, if any, might have had on the accuracy
           of their statewide voter lists; and what challenges they faced and
           lessons they learned while implementing these HAVA requirements.
           We did not independently verify the accuracy of state election
           officials' responses. However, state election officials were
           provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses
           for this report, and on the basis of the comments we received, we
           made technical changes where appropriate. As part of our
           interviews, we also asked state officials how much federal and
           state money was spent on their computerized statewide systems in
           order to implement the HAVA requirements. We did not independently
           verify the amounts they reported to us. However, we attempted to
           compare the amounts of money the states reported that they spent
           with data reported by them to EAC on the implementation of all
           HAVA requirements. Because of variations in the way these amounts
           were reported by the states, we could not identify the amounts
           spent solely on implementation of the computerized list
           requirement.

           Our work focused primarily on the states, since most of the
           responsibilities for implementing HAVA statewide computerized list
           provisions took place at the state level. We did, however,
           communicate with officials from the EAC and Department of Justice
           (DOJ) Civil Rights Division to obtain information about and
           documentation on their roles and responsibilities related to the
           HAVA statewide computerized list provisions. We also provided
           sections of the report discussing EAC and DOJ to officials with
           those organizations to verify the accuracy of the information they
           provided and, on the basis of their comments, made technical
           changes where appropriate. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO
           reports on elections, including voter registration issues.

           We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

           The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provides that the Election
           Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
           are to have specific roles in states' efforts to implement the
           Help America Vote Act's statewide voter registration list
           provisions. HAVA established EAC to, among other things, serve as
           a national clearinghouse for information on election
           administration and provide information and guidance with respect
           to laws, procedures, and technologies affecting the administration
           of federal elections.

           On August 4, 2005, EAC released its final version of the Voluntary
           Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists .
           The purpose of the voluntary guidance was to assist states in
           their efforts to develop and maintain a statewide voter
           registration list pursuant to HAVA Section 303(a). The guidance
           describes a set of specifications and requirements states may use
           to implement the HAVA provisions, such as establishing real-time
           access to all registration data, securing the registration list,
           synchronizing the statewide list with local databases at least
           every 24 hours, and coordinating with other databases for the
           purpose of performing voter registration verification and list
           maintenance. EAC's guidance also contains recommendations on
           dealing with outcomes that may result from the verification
           process, the type of voting history information states should
           track, and the type of system that is most closely aligned with
           HAVA requirements. In addition to the voluntary guidance, EAC has
           also created and posted on its Web site two best practices
           documents-"Best Practices in Administration, Management, and
           Security in Voting Systems and Provisional Voting" and "Best
           Practices for Facilitating Voting by U.S. Citizens Covered by the
           Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act"-and other
           information on election administration. According to EAC
           officials, EAC expects that the clearinghouse will be fully
           operational during 2006.

           HAVA also provides enforcement authority to DOJ with respect to
           the uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA
           requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter
           registration list and voter eligibility verification provisions.
           Officials with DOJ's Civil Rights Division told us that in
           addition to monitoring states' compliance with HAVA, DOJ has
           promoted pre-enforcement compliance, which includes working with
           states to identify what actions are reasonable to expect them to
           take, educating state and local officials, and responding to
           states' inquiries. According to DOJ officials, at the time of our
           review, DOJ had not taken enforcement actions against any of the
           nine nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also said that they worked
           with the states following the passage of HAVA to address initial
           challenges and provide informal guidance while EAC began
           operations and hired staff.

           This appendix describes steps Alaska election officials reported
           taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
           Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
           establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
           verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
           applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
           addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
           election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
           requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
           responses to our telephone interviews with Alaska election
           officials and were not independently verified by us.

           Alaska had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
           system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created a
           mainframe-based system in 1985. To implement the provisions of
           HAVA, minor modifications were made to the system to allow
           election officials to record driver's license numbers and the last
           four digits of the voter's Social Security number. These
           modifications cost approximately $5,000 in state and federal funds
           to implement. Alaska state officials awarded a contract to upgrade
           its statewide voter registration system, in order to include
           additional election management capabilities, such as poll worker
           management and Internet voter registration, at a cost of $2.6
           million.

           To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements,
           the state's four regional election supervisors, who function as
           state employees,1 verified application information by comparing
           voter eligibility information (full name; date of birth; and
           either a driver's license number, full Social Security number, the
           last four digits of the Social Security number, or a unique
           identifier assigned by the state if the individual lacks a Social
           Security number and a driver's license) with state motor vehicle
           agency records to verify identity, age, and duplicate
           registrations. At the time of our review, Alaska was not comparing
           information with the Social Security Administration (SSA) because
           the state did not have a signed memorandum of understanding with
           SSA.

           To implement HAVA, Alaska has taken steps to maintain the accuracy
           of its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other
           state agency records, as described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. State officials perform an electronic
           check on the entire statewide voter registration list for
           duplicates once a year and on an as-needed basis.

           o  Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly
           electronic updates of vital statistics death records by checking
           name, date of birth and either the full Social Security number or
           the last four digits.

           o  Disqualified felons. State officials update court system
           records on a monthly basis. Specifically, court system records
           from the Department of Corrections and Bureau of Vital Statistics
           are checked against the voter registration list, comparing name,
           date of birth, and full Social Security number.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the
           event of a court declaration of mental incompetence, the court
           would notify state officials of the judgment and the Division of
           Elections would inactivate the voter's registration. Officials
           reported that disqualification because of mental incompetence does
           not occur often.

           To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from
           the state voter registration list, election officials send letters
           notifying individuals of their pending removal from the statewide
           voter registration list. These letters are sent to those who have
           not voted in the most recent two federal elections and those who
           have disqualifying felony convictions, as allowed under state law.
           Alaska officials reported that they removed the names of
           ineligible voters in 2004.

           Election officials did not report any challenges or lessons
           learned while implementing these HAVA requirements.

           This appendix describes steps Arizona election officials reported
           taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
           Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
           establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
           verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
           applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
           addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
           election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
           requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
           responses to our telephone interviews with Arizona election
           officials and were not independently verified by us.

           Prior to HAVA, Arizona did not have a computerized statewide voter
           registration system in place, although several counties operated
           computerized voter registration systems. Arizona created an
           interconnected, statewide Web-based voter registration system
           called Voter Registration Arizona (VRAZ) to implement the
           requirements of HAVA. VRAZ became operational by the HAVA deadline
           of January 1, 2004. VRAZ had an initial development cost of $1
           million and was jointly funded by state and federal sources. The
           system took approximately 6 months to develop. The state had to
           pass new statutes and amend others so that election officials
           could receive information from state agencies, such as felony
           records. In addition to carrying out the required functions of the
           voter registration system, election officials can query all state
           voter registration records on Election Day if their polling place
           has an Internet connection.

           A new version of VRAZ is under development and is expected to
           replace voter registration systems in 13 of 15 counties. The new
           version of VRAZ, called VRAZ II, is expected to reflect
           reciprocity agreements with other states whereby officials will be
           alerted when a voter moves from state to state and registers to
           vote in those states covered by the agreement. In addition, the
           new system is expected to contain additional election management
           capabilities beyond those required by HAVA, including the ability
           to retrieve data on election administration issues such as voter
           petitions, provisional ballots, training of poll workers, and
           polling locations. The estimated cost for VRAZ II is $10 million.
           At the time of our review, Arizona officials were anticipating
           that VRAZ II would go online in 2007.

           To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements,
           Arizona compared the applicant's name, date of birth, driver's
           license number, or the last four digits of the Social Security
           number with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records to identify
           potentially inaccurate applications. In addition, Arizona's
           Web-based voter registration software, EZ Voter-which allows
           Arizona citizens to register to vote via the
           Internet-electronically verified the accuracy of the voter
           registration applications filed online by matching the applicant's
           name, date of birth, driver's license number, or last four digits
           of the Social Security number with MVA records. EZ Voter
           registrations were then entered at the county level daily and
           submitted to the statewide voter registration list.

           At the time of our review, Arizona had completed a memorandum of
           understanding with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and
           was verifying information on voter registration applications by
           matching it with SSA records as required by HAVA.

           As state officials developed the VRAZ system, they identified and
           corrected inaccurate voter registration data prior to entering the
           data into the new system; through this process they were also able
           to eliminate duplicate registrants from the statewide list.
           Election officials also took steps to maintain the accuracy of the
           voter registration list by coordinating the list with other state
           agency records, as described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. State officials electronically identify
           duplicate matches by checking name, address, driver's license
           number, and the last four digits of the Social Security number on
           voter registration applications on a daily basis. The entire list
           is screened once a month to identify duplicate registrants.

           o  Deceased registrants. The Secretary of State's office receives
           an electronic file of recent deaths from the Department of Health
           Services once a month. Officials identify any matches by checking
           name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the Social
           Security number.

           o  Disqualifying felons. State officials receive information on
           felony convictions from Arizona courts on a varying basis-weekly
           or monthly in the case of the state's superior courts and on an
           ongoing basis from U.S. district courts. Once a felon's sentence
           has been completed, voting rights are reinstated and the
           individual may register to vote by submitting a new voter
           registration application. Officials identify any matches by
           checking name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the
           Social Security number. This is a paper-based process in smaller
           courts and an electronic process in larger courts.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. As
           with information on felons, courts submit information in an
           electronic or paper format to state officials on individuals
           declared mentally incompetent at different times for comparison
           with the statewide voter registration list.

           To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from
           voter registration lists, local officials send a letter to voters
           to notify them of their impending removal from the statewide voter
           registration list. For example, letters are sent to individuals
           with a disqualifying felony conviction.

           One challenge Arizona election officials faced was designing a
           system with the appropriate scope. Election officials said they
           addressed this design challenge by initially implementing a system
           that performed only the basic tasks required under the HAVA
           provisions. To minimize changes to the way counties historically
           managed elections, local officials used the computerized statewide
           system to manage voter registration information while continuing
           to use their local computerized systems to manage elections. The
           state plans to expand the scope of its new statewide system in the
           future, providing counties with additional election management
           capabilities. Another challenge reported by Arizona election
           officials was the conversion of data on registered voters from the
           old system to the new system. Officials said it was time-consuming
           and required processes to ensure that data were accurately entered
           into the new system.

           Election officials also reported on the importance of
           collaboration among state and local officials. The state convened
           a working group composed of both local and state officials that
           was responsible for developing its statewide computerized system.
           Arizona officials stated that a communications plan that allows
           information about the voter list management process to be shared
           among state and county officials can help lessen political
           resistance and facilitate buy-in by state and county officials.
           The implementation of VRAZ in stages was another way state
           officials gained the trust of the counties.

           This appendix describes steps Georgia election officials reported
           taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
           Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
           establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
           verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
           applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
           addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
           election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
           requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
           responses to our telephone interviews with Georgia election
           officials and were not independently verified by us.

           Georgia had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
           system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this
           mainframe-based system in 1995. To implement HAVA, state officials
           made one minor modification to their voter registration
           system-adding the capability to identify whether a voter had
           registered for the first time by mail. Officials have plans to
           enhance the current system in order to provide election
           administration management capabilities, such as identifying
           potential poll workers and giving election officials on Election
           Day immediate electronic access to the voter list so they can
           verify where voters are registered to vote. At the time of our
           review, officials were planning to conduct a pilot program to test
           the enhanced system.

           In Georgia, voter registration applicants were required to provide
           their full Social Security number on voter registration
           applications as a unique identifier. Since Georgia collected the
           full Social Security number, the state was not subject to the HAVA
           requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to verify
           information on voter registration applications with motor vehicle
           agency or Social Security Administration records. Georgia elected
           not to verify information with these agencies, as HAVA allows.
           However, the state had processes in place to conduct real-time
           checks of voter registration applications to ensure they did not
           duplicate an existing registration and that the application
           information did not match the records of deceased persons. The
           state procedures also provide for verifying voter eligibility by
           comparing voter registration applications with state court records
           on felony lists to identify persons ineligible to vote because of
           a disqualifying felony conviction.

           Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Georgia has maintained
           the accuracy of its voter registration list by coordinating the
           list with other state agency records, as described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. On a monthly basis, state officials
           check the statewide voter list to identify duplicate registrants
           and transmit the list of duplicates to the counties for updating.

           o  Deceased registrants. Every month, county officials receive
           electronic files on deceased persons from the Department of Vital
           Statistics. Officials identify any matches with the statewide
           voter registration list by checking name, date of birth, full
           Social Security number, and address. On a quarterly basis, the
           state receives an electronic report from the Department of Vital
           Statistics and verifies that the counties have made the changes
           and checks for errors. The information is compiled into a
           quarterly report that verifies that the counties have made the
           necessary changes and that an error report is generated showing
           the records that did not match.

           o  Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, the state receives a
           paper list of felony convictions from state courts. The felony
           list is then sent to counties for updating. County officials
           identify any matches with the statewide voter registration list by
           checking name, date of birth, full Social Security number, and
           address.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the
           case of mental incompetence, a court order must specify that a
           person is barred from voting; otherwise, the person may continue
           to vote. As with information on felons, on a monthly basis, the
           state receives from state courts a paper list of individuals
           declared mentally incompetent. The list is then sent to counties
           for updating. County officials identify any matches with the
           statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of birth,
           full Social Security number, and address.

           To ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently
           removed from the statewide voter registration list, county
           officials send a letter to voters to notify them of their
           impending removal from the voter registration rolls. These letters
           are sent to individuals who have requested to be removed, those
           with a disqualifying felony conviction, and those who have been
           declared mentally incompetent. Georgia officials reported that
           they removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004.

           Although Georgia has had a statewide computerized voter list in
           place for 10 years, officials reported that a challenge they
           continue to face is training employees on how to use the system.
           Officials said that one lesson learned is that states need to get
           buy-in from county officials early on in the process of developing
           a statewide voter registration system. They suggested that one way
           to accomplish this may be to form a task force, composed of state
           and local officials, to review system development issues and
           design.

           This appendix describes steps Hawaii election officials reported
           taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
           Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
           establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
           verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
           applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
           addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
           election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
           requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
           responses to our telephone interviews by Hawaii election officials
           and were not independently verified by us.

           Hawaii has had a computerized voter registration system since the
           1970s and developed a statewide interactive system in 1982.
           Hawaii's system provides election officials with immediate access
           to the computerized statewide voter list whereby they can enter
           new or update existing voter registration information and query
           all state voter registration records. To implement HAVA, election
           officials made minor technical changes to the statewide voter
           registration system, such as adding the ability to flag inactive
           voters. At the time of our review, Hawaii was making additional
           arrangements to enhance its current computerized voter
           registration system by modifying the absentee voting component of
           the system.

           In Hawaii, voter registration applicants were required to provide
           their full Social Security number on voter registration
           applications as a unique identifier. Since Hawaii collected the
           full Social Security number, the state was not subject to the HAVA
           requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to verify
           information on voter registration applications with motor vehicle
           agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration records. Hawaii
           voluntarily matched information on voter registration forms with
           MVA records, comparing information such as the individual's name,
           driver's license number, and full Social Security number. The
           computerized voter registration system conducted real-time checks
           for duplicate registrations and age requirements prior to
           accepting the new application into the statewide voter
           registration system.

           Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Hawaii officials have
           maintained the accuracy of Hawaii's statewide voter registration
           list by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
           described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter
           registration system automatically checks for duplicate
           registrations as soon as an application is processed.

           o  Deceased registrants. Twice a month, county officials check
           paper death records from the Department of Vital Statistics to
           identify deceased registrants by checking the name, date of birth,
           and the full Social Security number.

           o  Disqualified felons. Twice a month, county clerks receive paper
           records from circuit court officials. These records are then
           checked against the information in the statewide voter
           registration list by comparing name, date of birth, and the full
           Social Security number.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent.
           Officials reported that disqualification because of mental
           incompetence does not occur often in Hawaii. The courts are the
           only entity that can make a judgment regarding mental incompetence
           that would disqualify a person from being registered to vote.

           To ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently
           removed from the statewide voter registration list, local
           officials send a letter to every voter prior to the general
           election before removing voters' names from the list, in
           accordance with the National Voter Registration Act provisions for
           removing voters' names from lists.

           Although Hawaii had a statewide voter registration system in place
           prior to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on
           implementing voter registration systems. Hawaii election officials
           said that one of the biggest challenges can be coordinating with
           counties and developing a rapport with county officials. To assist
           in coordination efforts, the state holds quarterly meetings with
           county officials. In these meetings, state and local officials
           coordinate activities such as completing list maintenance and data
           entry prior to the printing of poll books and voter lists. Another
           issue raised by Hawaii officials was designing a system with the
           appropriate scope. These officials also shared lessons learned
           about managing a computerized voter registration system. They
           stated that technological developments will require compromise
           among local jurisdictions that have different administrative and
           technological constraints. Officials also recommended that states
           establish uniform processing procedures among their jurisdictions
           so that all jurisdictions function as one. Finally, Hawaii created
           a shadow system so that the system could be both updated and
           available for use at the same time.

           This appendix describes steps Kentucky election officials reported
           taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
           Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
           establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
           verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
           applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
           addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
           election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
           requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
           responses to our telephone interviews by Kentucky election
           officials and were not independently verified by us.

           Kentucky had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
           system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this
           mainframe-based system in 1973. Kentucky's current system allows
           all local election officials immediate access to enter new or
           update existing voter registration information in their
           jurisdiction, and immediate access to query all state voter
           registration records. In addition, election officials provided a
           toll-free number for precinct officers to access an interactive
           voice response phone system to check voter eligibility. As a
           result, Kentucky did not have to take any additional steps to
           implement HAVA statewide computerized list requirements.

           Election officials planned to upgrade their computerized statewide
           voter registration system in the future to provide more election
           management tools to counties, such as including a function to
           track poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. The state
           has developed the absentee ballot application and expects it to be
           used by its counties in the 2006 elections.

           In Kentucky, voter registration applicants were required to
           provide their full Social Security number on voter registration
           applications as a unique identifier. Since Kentucky collected the
           full Social Security number, the state was not subject to the HAVA
           requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to verify
           information on voter registration applications with motor vehicle
           agency or Social Security Administration records. Kentucky elected
           not to verify information with these agencies, as HAVA allows. To
           verify information on voter registration applications, Kentucky's
           computerized statewide voter registration automatically checked
           for duplicate registrations before new registrants were added to
           the statewide list.

           Kentucky currently has processes in place to maintain the accuracy
           of the statewide voter registration list by comparing the
           statewide voter registration list with state agency records, as
           described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter
           registration system automatically checks for duplicate
           registrations as soon as a new application is entered into the
           system.

           o  Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, election officials
           check the computerized statewide voter registration list against
           the records from the Department of Vital Statistics to identify
           deceased registrants by comparing name, date of birth, and full
           Social Security number.

           o  Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, court records are
           electronically checked against the computerized statewide voter
           registration list to identify persons convicted of a disqualifying
           felony by comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security
           number.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent.
           Officials use court records to identify voters ineligible because
           of mental incompetence by comparing applicant's name, date of
           birth, and full Social Security number with the computerized
           statewide voter registration list.

           To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently
           removed from the statewide voter registration list, state
           officials match voters' identifying information with U.S. Postal
           Service, felony, mental competency, and death records. State
           officials also send letters to voters to notify them of pending
           removal based on a disqualifying felony conviction.

           Since Kentucky had a computerized statewide voter registration
           system in place prior to HAVA, election officials did not report
           any challenges. However, Kentucky election officials provided
           examples of lessons learned while maintaining their current
           computerized statewide voter registration system. They said it is
           important to develop a computerized statewide voter registration
           system that will be sustainable now and in the future. Officials
           suggested that as states contemplate system upgrades, they be
           mindful that changes to the system affect all jurisdictions,
           despite their differing needs and constraints. A key to their
           success has been the cooperative working relationship they
           cultivated with local officials by keeping them involved. Election
           officials also recommended that states "think outside the box"
           when designing ways to use the voter registration database. For
           example, they utilized their statewide computerized system to
           established voter information centers on Kentucky's state Web site
           to assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process.

           This appendix describes steps Minnesota election officials
           reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
           America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
           with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
           registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
           on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
           lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
           lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
           implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
           reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by Minnesota
           election officials and were not independently verified by us.

           Minnesota is unique in the way election administration functions
           are structured and can vary by jurisdiction. In this state, the
           county auditor has certain election responsibilities and can
           choose to delegate other election responsibilities to minor civil
           division-level (MCD) government-townships and cities. For example,
           while counties manage voter registration, county auditors may
           delegate other functions, such as absentee voting to MCDs. There
           are some functions that MCDs are responsible for handling, such as
           polling place matters.

           Minnesota had a computerized statewide voter registration system
           in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this
           mainframe-based system in 1988. To comply with the provisions of
           HAVA, the state amended its election laws and replaced its
           existing computerized statewide voter registration system in 2004.
           The system included new election management capabilities, such as
           providing election officials with immediate access to enter and
           update applicant information and creating electronic matching
           capabilities with state agencies to verify voter eligibility. The
           system also centrally tracked absentee ballots provided to
           military personnel or other citizens residing overseas. The
           project was completed in 11 months at a reported cost of about
           $5.3 million.

           To implement HAVA, Minnesota verifies voter registration
           application information by comparing name, date of birth, driver's
           license number, or the last four digits of the voter's Social
           Security number with motor vehicle agency records to identify
           potentially ineligible applications. Since Minnesota is a same-day
           registration state, checks for duplicates are automatically run on
           voter applications on a daily basis. In addition, the Department
           of Public Service tracks visas issued to ensure that noncitizens
           are unable to vote.

           At the time of our review, Minnesota was in the process of
           completing a memorandum of understanding with the Social Security
           Administration (SSA) to allow verification of information on voter
           registration applications by comparing it with SSA records.
           Officials anticipated that they would begin conducting matches by
           2006.

           To implement HAVA, Minnesota election officials took steps to
           maintain the accuracy of the voter registration list by
           coordinating with other state agency records, as described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. The statewide voter registration system
           produces maintenance reports to identify potential duplicates. In
           addition, checks for duplicates are run on an annual basis.

           o  Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, county officials
           conduct manual checks of oral and paper death records from the
           Department of Vital Statistics by checking the name, date of
           birth, and the full Social Security number.

           o  Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, officials receive
           paper records from the courts to check for those persons convicted
           of a disqualifying felony. Once the court computer system is in
           place, this process will have the capability to provide electronic
           matching by comparing the applicant's name, date of birth,
           driver's license, identification card, full Social Security
           number, and last four digits of the Social Security number.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. On a
           monthly basis, officials receive paper records from the courts to
           check for those declared mentally incompetent.

           To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently
           removed from the statewide voter registration list, state
           officials send notices to voters prior to removing their names
           from the list.

           Minnesota election officials reported that one of the major
           challenges they faced was replacing the existing voter
           registration system in an 11-month time frame. Also, officials
           told us that conducting elections while updating their voter
           registration system further complicated their efforts. Another
           challenge that election officials reported was converting data on
           registered voters from the old system database to the new system.
           Minnesota officials said that to help local officials with this
           work they developed a tool that allowed them to compare old
           records of voter information with the new ones on a case-by-case
           basis.

           In addition, Minnesota election officials discussed various
           lessons learned while implementing the HAVA requirements. The
           first lesson learned was the importance of identifying and
           prioritizing the functional requirements for the computerized
           statewide voter registration system. In order to manage the scope
           of replacing a computerized statewide voter registration system,
           election officials told us they had to separate the "nice to have"
           features from the features required by HAVA. This step assisted
           election officials in managing the scope and cost of their
           project.

           Second, Minnesota election officials reported using in-house
           resources to replace the existing computerized statewide voter
           registration system. According to election officials, it is best
           to use in-house resources to establish a computerized statewide
           voter registration system when there are sufficient in-house
           resources and staff expertise.

           Third, Minnesota election officials said that it was useful to
           create an online user's manual for the computerized statewide
           voter registration system. Election officials reported that by
           having the user's manual online, staff at all levels had immediate
           access to information on how to operate the computerized statewide
           voter registration system.

           This appendix describes steps South Carolina election officials
           reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
           America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
           with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
           registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
           on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
           lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
           lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
           implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
           reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by South
           Carolina election officials and were not independently verified by
           us.

           South Carolina had an interactive computerized statewide voter
           registration system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The
           state created this mainframe-based system in the late 1960s and
           modified it in 1992. Election officials made minor modifications
           to its system by adding additional data fields in order to
           implement the provisions of HAVA. The system also has election
           management capabilities beyond HAVA, including the ability to
           track absentee voters and poll managers. The state reportedly
           spent about $67,000 in federal funds for the most current system
           modifications.

           Election officials began work on a new Web-based, menu-driven
           system in 2000. The system is expected to be more flexible and is
           to allow election officials to perform election administration
           tasks such as signature verification. The new system is also
           expected to have the capability to run checks with the motor
           vehicle agency database. Officials reported that the
           implementation of the new system will not take place until after
           the 2006 elections.

           South Carolina required voter registration applicants to provide
           their full Social Security number on voter registration
           applications as a unique identifier. Since South Carolina collects
           the full Social Security number, the state is not subject to the
           HAVA requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to
           verify information on voter registration applications with the
           motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration. South
           Carolina elected not to verify information with these agencies, as
           HAVA allows. Prior to entering applicants into the statewide list,
           county officials check to ensure the application does not
           duplicate an existing registration. State officials compare voter
           registration applications with records on deceased persons and
           persons ineligible to register to vote because of a disqualifying
           felony conviction, as allowed under state law.

           Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, South Carolina officials
           maintain the accuracy of the state's voter registration list by
           coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
           described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. South Carolina produces a report on
           duplicates quarterly. The voter registration system identifies
           duplicate registrants using the full Social Security number and
           date of birth. County officials make the necessary changes.

           o  Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly
           electronic comparisons with state agency death records. Officials
           identify any matches by checking name, date of birth, and full
           Social Security number and remove names of ineligible registrants.

           o  Disqualified felons. State officials conduct monthly electronic
           comparisons with state agency felony records. Officials identify
           any matches based on name, address, date of birth, and full Social
           Security number and remove names of ineligible registrants.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The
           counties maintain paper records on the mentally incompetent. Upon
           receipt of a written court order, county officials identify and
           remove ineligible voters.

           In order to ensure that eligible voters' names are not
           inadvertently removed, state officials send a letter to voters to
           notify them of their impending removal from the statewide voter
           registration list. Letters are sent to individuals who have filed
           a change-of-address with the U.S. Postal Service, failed to appear
           in the most recent two federal elections, or have a disqualifying
           felony conviction. South Carolina officials reported that they
           removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004.

           Although South Carolina had a statewide voter registration system
           in place prior to HAVA, officials shared their general
           perspectives on implementing voter registration systems. Officials
           stated that forming a working group composed of state and local
           officials helped to ensure stakeholder buy-in. State officials
           also reported that the updated system that they are in the process
           of creating is proving challenging because they are developing it
           in-house instead of purchasing the system from a vendor. Officials
           reported that states should assess their available resources and
           skills before deciding to develop a system on their own.

           This appendix describes steps South Dakota election officials
           reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
           America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
           with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
           registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
           on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
           lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
           lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
           implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
           reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by South Dakota
           election officials and were not independently verified by us.

           South Dakota had a computerized statewide voter registration
           system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created
           the system in 2002. Election officials added new data fields and
           data matching capability to the existing computerized list in
           order to implement the provisions of HAVA. The modifications cost
           $302,004, of which $103,598 came from federal funds and $198,406
           from state funds.

           To implement HAVA, county election officials verified voter
           registration application information by comparing name, date of
           birth, and driver's license number, or the last four digits of the
           voter's Social Security number, with state motor vehicle agency
           records to identify potentially inaccurate applications. These
           officials also compared applications with records on the deceased
           and persons convicted of a disqualifying felony prior to adding
           them to the statewide voter list. South Dakota local election
           officials verified voter registration information by comparing it
           with the Social Security Administration's records beginning in
           August 2005.

           As required to implement HAVA, election officials have taken steps
           to maintain the accuracy of South Dakota's voter registration list
           by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
           described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. State officials check the statewide list
           for duplicates at least annually and more often during an election
           cycle. State officials identify duplicate registrants by checking
           for voters with the same name, driver's license number, and the
           last four digits of the Social Security number and forward the
           names of ineligible registrants to county officials for
           processing.
           o  Deceased registrants. Local officials match name, date of
           birth, and the last four digits of the Social Security number on
           voter registration applications with the state vital statistics
           agency's death records through weekly electronic batch
           comparisons.

           o  Disqualified felons. Local officials electronically compare
           voter registration applications with records of persons convicted
           of a disqualifying felony that makes them ineligible to register
           to vote. Officials identify persons ineligible to register to vote
           based on name, date of birth, driver's license number, and last
           four digits of the Social Security number.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the
           event that a court issues a declaration of mental incompetence,
           the court provides the written declaration to the county election
           official who removes the ineligible registrant from the voter
           list.

           In South Dakota, local officials are responsible for updating
           voter information and removing names from the voter registration
           list. To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed
           from the state voter registration list, local election officials
           send letters notifying individuals of their pending removal from
           the statewide voter registration list.

           State officials reported that working as a team and maintaining a
           positive working relationship with the counties enabled South
           Dakota to implement HAVA by the deadline.

           This appendix describes steps West Virginia election officials
           reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
           America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
           with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
           registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
           on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
           lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
           lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
           implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
           reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by West Virginia
           election officials and were not independently verified by us.

           With regard to the HAVA statewide computerized list provisions,
           West Virginia created an interactive, computerized statewide voter
           registration system. According to state election officials, some
           counties had computerized voter registration systems prior to the
           enactment of HAVA, but they were not interconnected through a
           statewide computer system. Election officials hired a vendor to
           create the new statewide system, which went into service in
           January 2004 at a reported cost of approximately $1.9 million in
           federal funds. The new system also has election management
           capabilities beyond the requirements of HAVA, including the
           ability to produce reports on absentee ballots, early voters, poll
           workers, and election data statistics. It also provides a separate
           database to track poll workers.

           To implement HAVA, West Virginia developed the capability to
           verify voter registration application information by comparing
           name, date of birth, and driver's license number or the last four
           digits of the voter's Social Security number with motor vehicle
           agency (MVA) records. However, officials reported that the state
           had difficulty conducting data matches with MVA because MVA lacked
           the ability to interface with the statewide voter list. Officials
           said that they expected this problem to be resolved by 2006. Since
           the enactment of HAVA, the state system checks new applications
           for duplicates, automatically flags duplicates, and notifies
           county officials to eliminate them.

           West Virginia is in the process of finalizing the agreement with
           the Social Security Administration (SSA) to allow a comparison
           between voter eligibility information and SSA data as required by
           HAVA. This agreement will enable state officials to compare the
           last four digits of a voter's Social Security number with SSA
           records. Officials reported that they expected the agreement to be
           completed by December 2005.

           Prior to HAVA, county voter registration systems could only check
           for duplicates within the county, and local officials could only
           check felony and death lists using paper records. Since the
           enactment of HAVA, election officials have taken steps to maintain
           the accuracy of the statewide voter registration list by
           coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
           described below.

           o  Duplicate registrants. West Virginia checked the entire
           database for duplicates during the implementation of its new
           statewide system. The county clerks also periodically check the
           system for duplicate registrants.

           o  Deceased registrants. County officials maintain the voter
           registration list through a monthly comparison of the list with
           state death records. At the time of this report, officials rely on
           oral and paper records to identify any matches by checking name,
           address, date of birth, and the last four digits of the Social
           Security number. Officials said they expected in the future to
           conduct these comparisons electronically.

           o  Disqualified felons. County officials receive paper records
           from federal and state courts on disqualifying felony convictions.

           o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The
           state does not conduct list maintenance based on this information.

           Local officials are responsible for updating voter information and
           for removing voter records; state officials said that they follow
           the National Voter Registration Act provisions for removing names
           from the list. In general, section 8 of NVRA provides that, in the
           administration of voter registration for federal elections, states
           may not remove names of registrants for non-voting and that names
           of registrants may be removed only for certain specified reasons.

           West Virginia officials also said that meeting the time frames
           they established for developing their computerized lists was
           challenging, in part because of limited staff available to
           complete the work. The officials stated that it might have been
           better to introduce the system incrementally. West Virginia
           officials also reported that the counties resisted moving from
           county-based systems to the statewide system in part because many
           of them viewed the new statewide system as an intrusion into a
           domain of election administration that had been a local-not a
           state-responsibility. Involving county officials in designing and
           implementing the system, the state officials said, might have
           simplified implementation of the new system. Other challenges
           reported by West Virginia officials included data conversion,
           obtaining timely approvals for purchases, changing necessary
           provisions of state law, and overcoming technology problems.

           William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777, or [email protected]

           In addition to the contact person named above, John Mortin,
           Assistant Director; David Alexander; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein;
           Michelle Fejfar; Geoff Hamilton; E. Anne Laffoon; Jean Orland; Dan
           Rodriguez; Miquel Salas: Stephanie Sand; and Ashanta Williams made
           key contributions to this report.

           The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
           investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
           meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
           the performance and accountability of the federal government for
           the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
           evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
           recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
           informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
           commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
           accountability, integrity, and reliability.

           The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
           no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday,
           GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on
           its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted
           products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe
           to Updates."

           The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
           are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
           Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
           Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
           discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

           U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
           (202) 512-6061

           Contact:

           Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
           [email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
           (202) 512-7470

           Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400
           U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
           512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
           Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

28We reported in the past that state election officials we interviewed
expressed concerns regarding (1) the receipt of inaccurate voter
registration applications from voter registration drives sponsored by
nongovernmental organizations and (2) failure of these organizations to
submit completed applications to election officials. See GAO-05-997 .

29For additional information on best practices associated with acquiring
and implementing vote systems, see GAO-05-956 .

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix I: Objectives,
Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
Registration List Provisions Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in
Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter Registration List Provisions

Appendix III: Reported ExperiencElecReg Appendix III: Reported Experiences
of Alaska Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List
Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications

1Alaska does not have counties; instead, there are four election regions
responsible for administering elections. The state director of elections
appoints the regional election supervisors.

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix IV: RAri H Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Arizona Election
Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix V: ReElecReg Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia Election
Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix VI: RElecReg Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election
Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix VII: Ke H Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election
Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix VIII: Minne H Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Minnesota
Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix IX: R C H Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South Carolina
Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix X: ReDakota EVoter Reg Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South
Dakota Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List
Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix XI: RVirginia Ele H Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West
Virginia Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List
Provisions

Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Appendix XII: A Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(440369)

GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Congressional Relations

Public Affairs

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-247 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8777
or [email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-247 , a report to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives

February 2006

ELECTION REFORM

Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for
Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to help
ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote. Under HAVA, as
of January 1, 2004, states were to create computerized statewide voter
registration lists to serve as official rosters of legally registered
voters for elections for federal office. States, however, were given the
option to seek a waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions
until 2006. All but nine states did so.

This report discusses the experiences of the nine states that were subject
to the original HAVA deadline-Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report
describes actions election officials in these states reported taking to
meet specific HAVA requirements-as applicable to their states-for (1)
establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2)
verifying the accuracy of information on voter registration applications
and maintaining accurate computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting
what states said about challenges they faced and lessons learned
implementing the requirements.

Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the nine states; the
Election Assistance Commission, which was responsible for coordinating
HAVA waivers; and the Department of Justice. GAO incorporated technical
comments, as appropriate.

To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified
existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state
replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created statewide
voter registration systems for the first time, according to election
officials (see below). Officials from the ninth state reported no actions
were taken because the state had such a registration list in place prior
to HAVA.

State election officials reported they took steps to verify information
provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter lists
as required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the process of
completing the required matches of voter registration information with
state motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration records.
Officials from all nine states reported conducting the list maintenance
activities required by HAVA: eliminating duplicate registrations and
coordinating the voter list with state agency records on felons and the
deceased to identify and remove the names of ineligible registrants.
According to officials from four states, implementing HAVA improved the
accuracy of the voter lists, for example, by correcting errors in voter
information before they were entered into the statewide list. Officials
from the other five states reported little to no improvements to the
accuracy of their lists in part, some said, because they had established
systems similar to those required by HAVA prior to the enactment of the
law.

State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned
lessons while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example, officials
from seven states reported their experiences taught them that
collaborating with local officials to develop the computerized statewide
systems later helped them successfully implement the systems.

States GAO Contacted Regarding Implementation of Required Registration
Lists
*** End of document. ***