    Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal
    Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
    (07-FEB-06, GAO-06-247).

    The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to
    help ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote.
    Under HAVA, as of January 1, 2004, states were to create
    computerized statewide voter registration lists to serve as
    official rosters of legally registered voters for elections for
    federal office. States, however, were given the option to seek a
    waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions until 2006.
    All but nine states did so. This report discusses the experiences
    of the nine states that were subject to the original HAVA
    deadline--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota,
    South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report
    describes actions election officials in these states reported
    taking to meet specific HAVA requirements--as applicable to their
    states--for (1) establishing computerized statewide voter
    registration lists and (2) verifying the accuracy of information
    on voter registration applications and maintaining accurate
    computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting what states said
    about challenges they faced and lessons learned implementing the
    requirements. Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the
    nine states; the Election Assistance Commission, which was
    responsible for coordinating HAVA waivers; and the Department of
    Justice. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-247
        ACCNO:   A46417
      TITLE:     Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing
    Federal Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter
    Registration Lists
         DATE:   02/07/2006
      SUBJECT:   Data integrity
    	     Elections
    	     Electronic forms
    	     Federal law
    	     Federal/state relations
    	     Mechanization
    	     Database management systems
    	     Electronic records management
    	     Voter eligibility
    	     Voter registration

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    GAO-06-247

         * Results in Brief
         * Background
         * Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computeriz
         * States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Regist
              * States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Voter Registration Ap
              * All States Reported Taking Steps to Perform Required List Ma
              * Four States Reported That Voter List Accuracy Improved as a
         * State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Le
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applicat
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applicat
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Regist
              * Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registra
              * Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
              * Challenges and Lessons Learned
              * Order by Mail or Phone

    Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
    Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    January 2006

    ELECTION REFORM

    Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for
    Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform
    Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election
    Reform Election Reform Election Reform Election Reform

    GAO-06-247

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 6
    Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized Statewide
    Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such a List Prior
    to HAVA 10
    States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration
    Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists 14
    State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons Learned
    while Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter
    Registration Lists 25
    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29
    Appendix II EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
    Registration List Provisions 31
    Appendix III Reported Experiences of Alaska Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 33
    Appendix IV Reported Experiences of Arizona Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 35
    Appendix V Reported Experiences of Georgia Election Officials Implementing
    HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 38
    Appendix VI Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election Officials Implementing
    HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 41
    Appendix VII Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 44
    Appendix VIII Reported Experiences of Minnesota Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 47
    Appendix IX Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 50
    Appendix X Reported Experiences of South Dakota Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 53
    Appendix XI Reported Experiences of West Virginia Election Officials
    Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 55
    Appendix XII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58

    Tables

    Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or Assigned
    by States to Implement HAVA Requirements 15
    Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required
    Verification of Information on Voter Registration Applications by Matching
    with MVA Records 16
    Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
    Duplicate Registration 18
    Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names of
    Deceased Registrants 19
    Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
    Ineligible Felons 20

    Figures

    Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could Be
    Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide Voter Registration System 9
    Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized
    Statewide Voter Registration Lists 11

    Abbreviations

    AAMVA American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

    DOJ Department of Justice

    EAC Election Assistance Commission

    HAVA Help America Vote Act

    HAVV Help America Vote Verification

    MCD minor civil decision

    MVA motor vehicle agency

    NASED National Association of State Election Directors

    NASS National Association of Secretaries of State

    SSA Social Security Administration

    VRAZ Voter Registration Arizona

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    February 7, 2006

    The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman Committee on the
    Judiciary House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    Confidence in the electoral process to produce free and fair elections is
    of the utmost importance to a legitimate democratic political system. The
    basic goal of an election system is simple to state but not simple to
    achieve-enable all eligible voters to register to vote, cast their votes,
    and have those votes counted accurately. The Help America Vote Act of 2002
    (HAVA) was enacted, in part, to help ensure that only eligible persons are
    registered to vote.1 This law provides that, among other things, as of
    January 1, 2004, states are to create computerized statewide voter
    registration lists that serve as official rosters of legally registered
    voters for elections for federal office.2 Under this provision, most
    states are also to verify the accuracy of information provided on voter
    registration applications by matching it with information contained in the
    state motor vehicle agency's (MVA) database or the Social Security
    Administration's (SSA) records, as appropriate.3 In addition, states are
    to perform list maintenance on statewide voter lists by coordinating them
    on a regular basis with state records on felony status and deaths, in
    order to identify and remove names of ineligible voters.

    1Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).

    2HAVA in general applies to elections for federal office in the 55 U.S.
    states and territories, including the District of Columbia, but for the
    purposes of this report, we refer only to the states. North Dakota does
    not require voters to register to vote and is, therefore, not subject to
    the HAVA requirements to create and maintain a computerized statewide
    voter registration list.

    3Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter
    registration application information by comparing or matching it with MVA
    or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states requiring full Social
    Security numbers on voter registration applications prior to 1975 in order
    to verify the identity of a registrant are not subject to this HAVA
    requirement.

    Under HAVA, states could apply to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
    by January 1, 2004, for a waiver, postponing the effective implementation
    date of the statewide voter registration list requirement for 2 years
    until January 1, 2006.4 All but nine states exercised the waiver option.
    The nine states that were to implement the HAVA requirements described
    above, by the original 2004 deadline were Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
    Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West
    Virginia. This report discusses the experiences of these nine states as
    they implemented these HAVA requirements, in particular, the actions that
    state election officials reported taking to (1) establish computerized
    statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify the accuracy of
    information on voter registration applications and maintain accurate
    computerized voter lists. In addition, we report what states told us
    regarding (3) the challenges they faced and lessons they learned while
    implementing these requirements.

    In addition to this report, we have issued or plan to issue reports this
    year on other specific election issues. These reports, as did our earlier
    work issued in 2001,5 in general focus on the people, processes, and
    technology associated with the preparation for and administration of
    elections. Specifically, in June 2005, we issued a report on the efforts
    of selected state and local election officials in seven states to ensure
    that voter registration lists are accurate.6 In September 2005, we issued
    two reports, one on the efforts of selected local election officials in
    these same seven states on managing voter registration and ensuring
    eligible citizens can vote7 and the other on significant security and
    reliability concerns that have been identified for electronic voting
    systems.8 Later this year, we plan to issue a report on the Department of
    Defense's implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program to
    facilitate absentee voting by military personnel during the November 2004
    election. These reports respond to congressional requests made prior to
    the November 2004 election. In addition, we are undertaking a broader,
    more comprehensive review of election administration processes related to
    the November 2004 general election. This comprehensive study, which we
    plan to issue in 2006, will address activities and challenges-people,
    processes, and technology-associated with each major stage of election
    administration to include registration, absentee and early voting,
    election day preparation and activities, and vote counting and
    certification.

    4HAVA established the EAC to provide guidance and manage payments to the
    states for the implementation of HAVA's requirements.

    5GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
    Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    6GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections
    Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
    (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

    7GAO, Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing
    Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, GAO-05-997
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005).

    8GAO, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of
    Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be
    Completed, GAO-05-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2005).

    To meet our objectives for this report, we conducted structured telephone
    interviews with state election officials in each of the nine states. We
    also interviewed officials with and obtained documents from the EAC and
    the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, which is
    responsible for enforcing parts of HAVA. In addition, we reviewed relevant
    state and federal laws.

    We did not independently verify the responses to questions posed to state
    officials during our telephone interviews. However, state election
    officials were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their
    responses for this report. We also provided relevant sections of the
    report to EAC and DOJ officials to verify the accuracy of the information
    they provided. Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our
    scope and methodology.

    We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                    Results in Brief

    Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of
    actions in order to establish the HAVA-required computerized voter
    registration lists; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no
    actions were taken because, according to the official, prior to HAVA, the
    state had a system in place that met the HAVA requirements. With regard to
    the other states, officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South Carolina,
    and South Dakota reported they had computerized statewide voter
    registration systems in place prior to January 2004 that they modified in
    order to implement the HAVA requirements; officials from Minnesota said
    their state replaced rather than modified the computerized voter
    registration system it had in place prior to HAVA. Officials from Arizona
    and West Virginia said their states did not have computerized statewide
    voter registration lists in place prior to HAVA and created them for the
    first time to implement the law. Additionally, election officials from all
    states except Alaska, where state officials are responsible for
    maintaining the statewide voter registration list, told us that their
    states provided some form of support to local election officials to ensure
    that they could operate the computerized statewide voter registration
    system to enter and update voter registration information.

    State election officials reported taking the steps required by HAVA to
    verify information provided on voter registration applications and
    maintain their voter lists, and some officials reported the accuracy of
    the voter lists improved as a result. The steps states took depended on
    what HAVA provisions applied to them. Of the states we reviewed, Alaska,
    Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia were subject to the
    HAVA provision for verifying information provided on voter registration
    applications by matching it with SSA and MVA records. These states were in
    various stages of implementing the requirement, officials told us. At the
    time of our review, four of these five states were matching information
    with MVA databases, and two states-Arizona and South Dakota-were matching
    information with SSA records, according to officials. Alaska, Minnesota,
    and West Virginia officials said they were in the process of making
    arrangements with SSA to conduct matches. The requirement to verify
    information on voter registration applications by matching it with MVA and
    SSA records, in general, is optional for states that collect voters' full
    Social Security numbers on these applications.9 Of the states we reviewed,
    Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina fall into this category;
    officials from Hawaii reported their state voluntarily matched information
    on registration applications with MVA records. Officials from all nine
    states also reported conducting the list maintenance activities required
    by HAVA; all of the state officials said their states eliminate duplicate
    registrations and coordinate the voter list with other state records to
    identify and remove names of deceased voters and persons ineligible under
    state law to register to vote because of their felony status. Arizona,
    Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia officials said that
    implementing the HAVA requirements led to some or great improvement in the
    accuracy of their voter lists by reducing duplicate registrations or
    improving the quality of voter information before it was entered into the
    statewide voter list. Officials from the remaining states-Alaska, Georgia,
    Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina-reported that HAVA had little or no
    effect on the accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely occurred,
    some of these officials said, because their states had operated
    computerized statewide lists for many years prior to HAVA. While HAVA
    contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter registration
    lists, even after such requirements are implemented, maintaining accurate
    computerized lists will likely remain a challenging task for state and
    local officials. In part this is because of the inherent risks of managing
    a dynamic body of information that is constantly changing as voters move,
    change names, come of age to vote, or become ineligible to vote.

    9HAVA provides that for those states using full Social Security numbers on
    voter registration applications in accordance with Section 7 of the
    Privacy Act of 1974, HAVA's voter registration verification requirements
    are optional. Of the states we reviewed, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
    South Carolina collect the full Social Security number and, therefore,
    have not been treated as subject to the HAVA registration information
    verification requirement. Georgia's right to this Privacy Act exemption,
    however, was in litigation at the time of our review. A district court
    order (Schwier v. Cox, Civil No. 1:00-CV-2820, (N.D. Ga. January 31,
    2005)) that Georgia does not qualify for this exemption was appealed to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

    Creating statewide registration lists required by HAVA presented a number
    of challenges and lessons learned, officials told us, as they developed
    their computerized statewide voter registration systems, made them
    operational, and later managed them. Election officials from Minnesota and
    West Virginia said that, for example, they adopted project timelines as
    they developed their systems that they later found were too compressed.
    Officials from Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed that
    completing the time-consuming task of converting existing voter
    registration data, which often were inaccurate and needed to be corrected,
    from old voter registration systems to the new statewide systems was a
    challenge. Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Dakota, and West
    Virginia officials also told us that as they developed their computerized
    systems, they learned that collaborating with local officials to design
    and develop the systems was important to the states' ultimate successful
    implementation of the systems. Officials also shared challenges and
    lessons learned related to making their systems operational. For example,
    some officials also told us they learned that prior to putting their
    systems into service, it is important to train staff to use the new
    system, and officials from Minnesota suggested providing the training
    manual online to make the most recent information available to staff.
    State officials also shared challenges and learned lessons from managing
    the computerized systems. For example, Hawaii officials said one challenge
    they faced was updating voter information and using their computerized
    system at the same time. Hawaii and Kentucky officials suggested officials
    keep in mind that selecting future upgrades to the system will likely
    involve negotiations with local jurisdictions that may have competing
    needs or administrative and technical constraints.

                                       Background

    As election officials manage voter registration processes and voter lists,
    they must balance two competing goals. On the one hand, officials seek to
    minimize the burden on eligible people registering to vote. On the other
    hand, they also seek to ensure that the voter lists are accurate, a task
    that involves including the name of each eligible voter on the voter list,
    removing names of ineligible voters, and having safeguards in place so
    that names of voters are not removed in error from the list.

    Congress has passed legislation relating to the administration of both
    federal and state elections, pursuant to its various constitutional
    powers, including processes related to maintaining voter lists. The
    constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and federal
    roles. States are responsible for the administration of both their own
    elections and federal elections. States regulate various aspects of the
    election process, including, for example, ballot access, registration
    procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places,
    provision of election day workers, and counting and certifying the vote.
    The states in turn incur the costs associated with these activities.
    Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has
    authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress' authority
    to regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to
    federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both
    congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to
    federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments
    authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory
    acts.

    Most recently, HAVA was enacted in 2002, and among other things, mandated
    that each state establish a computerized statewide voter registration list
    to serve as the official voter registration list for conducting elections
    for federal office in each state.10 The voter registration list is to
    serve as a secure, centralized, and interactive database that is
    coordinated with other state agency databases and grants state and local
    election officials immediate electronic access to enter and update voter
    information. States and territories were to implement a computerized
    statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2004. States could
    apply to EAC by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until
    January 1, 2006. Nine states and one territory-Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
    Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia,
    and Guam-did not apply for a waiver.

    10In addition to states, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa,
    the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico are generally subject to HAVA
    requirements.

    States subject to HAVA must also take steps to ensure that the statewide
    voter registration lists are accurate. Under HAVA, states are to perform
    list maintenance on a regular basis by removing ineligible voters from the
    statewide voter list. States are to coordinate the computerized list with
    their state agencies' records on felony status and death to verify voters'
    eligibility. For example, states must cross-reference the voter
    registration list with their state's records on felons to remove the names
    of ineligible voters and records on death to remove deceased registrants.
    States are also required to remove duplicate registrants, that is, names
    of voters that appear more than once on the statewide voter list. HAVA, in
    general, leaves it to the states' discretion to determine the type and
    frequency of actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.

    In addition to undertaking list maintenance, states are required under
    HAVA to verify voter registration application information. For federal
    elections, a voter registration application may not be processed or
    accepted by a state unless it contains the applicant's driver's license
    number or the last four digits of the Social Security number.11 If the
    voter has neither of these numbers, the state must assign the voter a
    voter identification number. Voter registration information is to be
    matched with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records or Social Security
    Administration (SSA) records, depending on the information provided by the
    applicant. Certain state laws require applicants to provide their full
    Social Security number on voter registration applications. HAVA provides
    that for those states requiring full Social Security numbers on such
    applications, in accordance with Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the
    HAVA voter registration verification requirements are optional. Of the
    nine states that did not receive waivers, four-Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
    and South Carolina-collect the full Social Security number and, therefore,
    are not subject to this HAVA requirement, according to state officials.

    11With respect to driver's license related information, the REAL ID Act of
    2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005)) establishes certain
    minimum standards, effective in May 2008, for state issuance of driver's
    licenses in order for such licenses to be recognized for any official
    purpose by federal agencies. For a state driver's license to be recognized
    by a federal agency, the REAL ID Act provides, for example, that states
    require applicants to present certain types of information, such as
    documentation of a person's name, address of principal residence, and
    evidence of a person's U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status prior
    to issuance. Federal recognition of state-issued driver's licenses will
    also be conditioned upon, among other things, a requirement that documents
    presented by an applicant be verified by the state, that states enter into
    a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Homeland Security to
    verify the legal presence of noncitizen applicants, and that states
    provide all other states electronic access to state motor vehicle database
    information.

    Under HAVA, the state MVA must enter into an agreement with SSA to verify
    the applicant information when applicants provide the last four digits of
    their Social Security number rather than a driver's license number on
    voter registration applications. HAVA additionally requires SSA to develop
    methods to verify the accuracy of information on the voter registration
    applications by matching the name, date of birth, and the last four digits
    of the Social Security number provided on the voter registration
    application with SSA records. SSA is to determine whether SSA records
    indicate the individual is deceased.

    Figure 1 provides an example of how a computerized statewide voter
    registration list could verify voter eligibility through matching
    registration applications with MVA and SSA, matching the statewide list
    with state records on felons and death notices from the state courts and
    the state vital statistics agency, and identifying duplicate registrants
    in the statewide list.12

    12Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are required to give written notice of
    felony convictions in federal district courts to the chief state election
    official of the offender's state of residence upon conviction of the
    offender. The law also requires the state election officials to notify the
    election officials of the local jurisdiction in which an offender resides
    of federal felony convictions. See 42 U.S.C. S: 1973gg-6(g). This
    provision was enacted into law in 1993 in section 8 of the National Voter
    Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).

    Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could Be
    Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide Voter Registration System

    To assist states with implementing these federal mandates, HAVA authorizes
    funding to states for the creation and maintenance of the computerized
    statewide voter lists. In turn, HAVA requires states to provide such
    support as may be required to local jurisdictions to enable them to use
    the computerized voter list. HAVA also established EAC and charged it
    with, among other things, providing voluntary technical guidance on the
    administration of federal elections, serving as a national clearinghouse
    for information on election administration, and providing federal funding
    to the states to implement the HAVA provisions. Also, DOJ has enforcement
    authority with respect to the uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation
    of certain HAVA requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter
    registration list and verifying information on voter registration
    applications. According to DOJ officials, following the passage of HAVA,
    it was unnecessary to take enforcement actions against any of the nine
    nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also reported working with the states to
    address initial challenges and provide informal guidance while EAC awaited
    staff and resources. Appendix II discusses EAC's and DOJ's roles regarding
    computerized statewide voter registration lists in greater detail.

     Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter
      Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such a List Prior to HAVA

    Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of
    actions in order to implement the HAVA computerized voter registration
    list requirement; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no
    actions were taken because the state had such a system in place prior to
    the enactment of HAVA. Officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South
    Carolina, and South Dakota reported modifying their existing computerized
    statewide voter registration systems; officials from Minnesota said the
    existing computerized voter registration system was replaced; and
    officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their states created
    computerized statewide voter registration systems for the first time.
    Although these eight states reported taking different steps to establish
    computerized statewide voter registration systems, election officials
    reported that all of these systems met the HAVA provisions that called for
    computerized statewide voter registration lists. According to officials,
    these computerized lists served as centralized and interactive databases
    containing the names of all legally registered voters in the state and
    granted election officials immediate electronic access to query, update,
    and enter voter information. They also said these computerized lists were
    capable of generating official voter registration lists. Figure 2
    summarizes the actions that eight of the nine states reported taking to
    establish computerized voter registration lists.

    Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized
    Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Election officials from six states, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
    South Carolina, and South Dakota, said their states' existing computerized
    statewide voter registration systems, in place in some cases for many
    years prior to HAVA, allowed state and local election officials to share
    and maintain an interactive database of registered voters and generate
    official voter registration lists. As a result, officials from Kentucky
    reported they were required to make no change to their existing system to
    implement the HAVA requirements. Officials from these other states
    reported that they were required to only modify their existing systems, in
    some cases making only minor changes, in order to implement HAVA. For
    example, in Hawaii, election officials reported their state has operated a
    computerized statewide voter registration system since 1982 and only made
    minor technical changes as a result of HAVA, such as adding the ability to
    flag inactive voters. In addition, since Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
    South Carolina collect voters' full Social Security numbers on voter
    registration applications, they are not subject to the HAVA provisions for
    verifying information on voter registration applications by matching it
    with MVA and SSA records, officials reported. Accordingly, officials said
    they did not have to modify their existing systems to provide this
    matching capability. Alaska and South Dakota are subject to HAVA's data
    matching provisions. These states also had computerized statewide voter
    lists in place prior to HAVA, and their election officials said they
    modified them as a result of HAVA. Alaska election officials reported that
    they added new data fields to the computerized statewide voter
    registration system to capture the last four digits of the voters' Social
    Security numbers and to identify first-time voters who registered by mail,
    which required little or no effort.13 South Dakota election officials
    reported making similar changes as well as adding the capability to match
    voter registration applications with MVA and SSA records, actions that
    required a moderate level of effort, they said.

    In the three remaining states, officials reported creating new systems in
    order to implement HAVA. Officials from Minnesota said their state
    operated a computerized statewide voter registration system prior to HAVA.
    Their state replaced rather than modified this system. Arizona and West
    Virginia election officials reported that their states did not have
    computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to HAVA and that they
    expended a significant level of effort to create such systems. Prior to
    HAVA, some counties and local jurisdictions in these states had
    computerized voter registration systems in place. However, the systems
    were not interconnected to create statewide databases of legally
    registered voters. Election officials in Arizona said that creating the
    computerized list was also complicated because state and county election
    officials lacked the legal authority to access state records they were to
    match with the statewide voter list. The state had to pass new statutes
    and amend others so that election officials could receive information from
    state agencies, such as felony records, according to a senior election
    official.

    13Individuals who register by mail and have not previously voted in an
    election for federal office in the state are, in general, required to
    provide identification at the polls the first time they cast a ballot.

    Some officials told us that in addition to the capabilities required by
    HAVA their states' computerized voter registration systems provide
    election management tools that help them prepare for and conduct
    elections. For example, West Virginia election officials told us their
    computerized voter registration list is also able to identify voters who
    wished to serve as poll workers and produce reports on absentee ballots,
    early voters, poll workers, and election data statistics. Minnesota state
    election officials said that their computerized voter registration list
    includes a module that centrally tracks absentee ballots provided to
    military personnel or other citizens residing overseas.

    Some state officials are planning to enhance their systems' election
    management features. For example, Arizona plans to award a contract to
    implement an updated version of its current system, which is to include
    the ability to track out-of-state moves by voters and manage issues such
    as petitions, provisional ballots, poll workers, and poll locations.
    Kentucky election officials told us that they wish to upgrade their system
    to provide more election management tools to counties, including a new
    function to identify poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. See
    appendixes III through XI for more information on each state's current
    computerized statewide voter registration system and future plans.

    Federal funds are available to states to assist them as they implement the
    HAVA provisions.14 In turn, HAVA requires states to provide such support
    as may be required to local jurisdictions to help them use the
    computerized voter lists. Officials from six states we interviewed-Alaska,
    Arizona, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West
    Virginia-reported receiving federal funds to establish computerized voter
    lists; these states said they spent a combination of federal and state
    funds totaling about $8.4 million to establish their computerized lists.
    As required by HAVA, each of the nine states, except Alaska, where the
    state is solely responsible for entering and maintaining voter
    registration information, provided some type of support to local
    jurisdictions to help them operate the computerized statewide voter
    registration systems, according to officials. For example, South Carolina
    election officials told us that they provided personal computers and
    software to local jurisdictions, as well as training for staff.

    14To be eligible to receive federal payments to implement this and other
    HAVA provisions, states must comply with certain requirements such as
    appropriating state funds equal to 5 percent of the total funding to be
    spent on implementing HAVA.

    States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration Applications
                and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists

    State election officials reported taking required steps to verify
    information provided on voter registration applications and to maintain
    accurate computerized voter lists. Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South
    Dakota, and West Virginia-the states subject to the HAVA provisions to
    verify information provided on voter registration applications-took steps
    to do so by collecting the required unique identifying information from
    voters, officials told us. As of November 2005, Arizona and South Dakota
    were matching information on the applications with state MVA or SSA
    records, according to election officials. The remaining states were in
    various stages of implementing the matching requirement. All nine states
    conducted regular voter list maintenance activities to purge duplicates
    and remove names of persons ineligible to vote, such as deceased
    registrants, as required by HAVA, officials also reported. Officials from
    four of the nine states we reviewed said that implementing the HAVA
    requirements led to some or great improvement in the accuracy of their
    voter lists. While HAVA contains requirements that should help states
    maintain accurate voter registration lists, maintaining accurate voter
    lists will likely remain a challenge for election officials, in part
    because lists are dynamic and constantly changing as voters move, change
    names, or become ineligible to vote.

    States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Voter Registration Applications with MVAs
    and SSA

    Under HAVA, most states are to verify the accuracy of information on voter
    registration applications by matching information, such as the name and
    date of birth, with MVA or SSA records, depending on the information
    provided by the applicant. As noted earlier, HAVA also requires that voter
    registration applicants for federal elections provide or be assigned one
    of several types of unique identifying information that can be matched
    with other records for verification. For matching purposes, applicants are
    to be asked for their state driver's license number or, if an applicant
    has not been issued a driver's license, the last four digits of the
    voter's Social Security number. An eligible applicant who has not been
    issued a state driver's license or a Social Security number can still
    register to vote. In those cases, election officials are required to
    assign the registrant an identification number.

    Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter
    registration application information by comparing or matching the
    information with MVA or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states
    requiring full Social Security numbers on voter registration applications
    prior to 1975 in order to verify the identity of a registrant are not
    subject to the HAVA requirement that application information be matched
    with MVA or SSA records. HAVA provides that for those states the voter
    registration verification requirement is optional. Four of the nine states
    we reviewed-Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina-collect the full
    Social Security number on voter registration applications and, therefore,
    according to state officials, are not subject to this provision. Five of
    the nine states we reviewed-Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and
    West Virginia-are subject to this HAVA provision to collect or assign a
    unique identifying numbers and then verify voter information by matching
    it with MVA or SSA information.

    Officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA provision
    reported their systems collected or assigned the required unique
    identifying numbers for registered voters, as indicated in table 1.

    Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or Assigned
    by States to Implement HAVA Requirements

                     Driver's license Last four digits of      Voter registration
    State         number           Social Security number   numbera
    Alaskab              X                    X                     X
    Arizona              X                    X                     X
    Minnesota            X                    X                     X
    South Dakota         X                    X                     X
    West Virginia        X                    X                     X

    Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

    aHAVA requires that for those applicants who have not been issued a
    driver's license or a Social Security number, states shall assign them a
    voter registration number.

    bIn addition to this information, Alaska's voter registration application
    allows voters to provide their full Social Security number or an Alaska
    state identification card number.

    Officials from four of the five states also reported taking steps to match
    information on voter registration applications with state MVA records and
    provided the date by which MVA matching became available, as indicated in
    table 2.

    Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required
    Verification of Information on Voter Registration Applications by Matching
    with MVA Records

                    Match applications with MVA Date matching capability became
    State        records                     operational
    Alaska                    X                        January 2004
    Arizona                   X                        January 2004
    Minnesota                 X                        January 2004
    South Dakota              X                        January 2004

    Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

    In West Virginia, officials said that their state was not yet conducting
    these required matches because they were still in the process of
    developing an agreement with the MVA to verify information on
    applications. They also reported difficulty conducting data matches
    because the MVA lacked the ability to interface with the statewide voter
    list. They expected this issue to be resolved by 2006. Although not
    required to do so, Hawaii voluntarily implemented this HAVA requirement,
    election officials said.

    In addition, officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA
    provision reported taking steps to match information on voter registration
    applications with SSA records. As noted earlier, if voter registration
    applicants provide the last four digits of their Social Security number on
    the registration applications rather than their driver's license numbers,
    states are to verify information on the application by matching it with
    SSA records. Officials from two states-Arizona and South Dakota-reported
    that their states were currently conducting the required matches. They
    were not able to conduct these matches by the January 1, 2004, deadline
    because SSA's computer program to process these matches was not
    operational until 8 months after the deadline had passed, in August
    2004.15 Election officials from three states-Alaska, Minnesota, and West
    Virginia-said their states were not yet conducting these required matches
    because they were still in the process of developing an agreement with SSA
    to verify information on applications. Minnesota officials also said they
    encountered technical difficulties electronically sharing data with SSA
    but anticipated the agreement and the technological issues would be
    resolved so that they could conduct matches by 2006. Alaska and West
    Virginia officials could not provide an estimated date by which the
    agreement would be completed and the required matches conducted.

    15GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections
    Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
    (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

    All States Reported Taking Steps to Perform Required List Maintenance on a
    Regular Basis

    In addition to requiring most states to verify information on voter
    registration applications, HAVA provides that all states, including the
    nine states discussed in this report, are to perform list maintenance on
    the HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists on a regular basis.16
    In general, list maintenance activities include adding new voters to the
    voter list; updating voter information if a voter moves within the state;
    and removing the names of ineligible voters from the voter list, such as
    persons who are deceased or convicted of a felony that, under state law,
    makes them ineligible to be registered to vote. HAVA requires that the
    computerized list be coordinated with state agency records on felony
    status and death to remove the names of ineligible voters. Duplicate
    registrations, that is, names of voters that appear more than once on the
    statewide voter list, are also to be eliminated.

    Election officials in all nine states reported taking the required actions
    to perform list maintenance on a regular basis to identify and remove
    duplicates and names of registrants ineligible to vote. The sections below
    identify the type and frequency of actions states reported taking to
    implement the HAVA-required list maintenance activities in accordance with
    state and local procedures. These procedures for maintaining the statewide
    voter list varied from state to state, as detailed in appendixes III-XI.

    Identifying duplicate voter registrations. HAVA requires that states are
    to remove duplicate registrations, that is, names of voters that appear
    more than once, from the statewide voter list. Duplicate registrations may
    occur in the statewide lists when, for example, voters move within a
    state, reregister, and then fail to notify the county in which they were
    previously registered to vote. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states'
    discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement
    this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported
    that their systems check for duplicate registrants to ensure that voters
    are not listed in the statewide voter list more than once. When
    applications are entered into the statewide database of registered voters,
    some states' systems automatically screen the applications on a real-time
    basis, that is, as the data are entered, to ensure that they do not
    duplicate an existing registration; other states screen the entire list on
    a regular basis. Table 3 shows the variation by state in the reported type
    and frequency of actions taken to identify duplicate registrations.

    16HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the administration
    of elections. The National Voter Registration Act, for example, was
    enacted, in part to establish registration procedures designed to
    "increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in
    elections for Federal office," "protect the integrity of the electoral
    process," and "ensure that accurate and current voter registration lists
    are maintained."

    Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
    Duplicate Registration

                 Applications
                 screened to
                 identify      Frequency of Voter registration list     Frequency
                 duplicate     application  checked for duplicate       of list
    State     registrations screening    registrations               checks
    Alaska    X             Real time    X                           Annual
    Arizona   X             Daily        X                           Periodic
    Georgia   X             Real time    X                           Monthly
    Hawaii    X             Real time    N/Aa                        N/Aa
    Kentucky  X             Real time    X                           Periodic
    Minnesota X             Daily        X                           Annual
    South     X             Real time    X                           Quarterly
    Carolina
    South     N/Ab          N/Ab         X                           Annual
    Dakota
    West      X             Real time    X                           Periodic
    Virginia

    Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

    aNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration
    applications, not the entire database of registered voters, are checked on
    a real-time basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states' discretion
    to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list
    maintenance requirement.

    bNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter
    registration applications, is checked annually. HAVA, in general, leaves
    it to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of
    actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.

    Identifying names of deceased voters. HAVA requires that states are to
    coordinate the voter list with their state agencies' death records to
    verify voters' eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states'
    discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement
    this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported
    that they or local officials regularly matched state agency death records
    with the statewide voter lists to ensure that names of deceased
    registrants do not remain on the rolls. Most of these matches were based
    on electronic or paper records. Table 4 shows the variation by state in
    the reported type and frequency of actions taken to identify deceased
    registrations.

    Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names of
    Deceased Registrants

                    Applications
                    screened to                    Voter registration
                    identify names of Frequency of list checked for     Frequency
                    deceased          application  names of deceased    of list
    State        registrants       screening    registrants          checks
    Alaska       X                 Real time    X                    Monthly
    Arizona      N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    Georgia      X                 Real time    X                    Monthly
    Hawaii       N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Biweekly
    Kentucky     N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    Minnesota    N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    South        X                 N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    Carolina
    South Dakota X                 Daily        X                    Weekly
    West         N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    Virginia

    Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

    aNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter
    registration applications, is checked. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the
    states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to
    implement this list maintenance requirement.

    Identifying persons convicted of a disqualifying felony. HAVA requires
    states to coordinate the voter list with their state agencies' records on
    felony status to verify voters' eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it
    to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions
    to implement this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine
    states reported that their states matched state court records with the
    statewide lists to identify persons ineligible under state law to vote
    because of a disqualifying felony conviction. These matches were based on
    electronic or paper records. Table 5 shows the variation by state in the
    reported type and frequency of actions taken to identify voters ineligible
    to register because of a felony conviction.

    Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
    Ineligible Felons

                    Applications                   Voter registration
                    screened to       Frequency of list checked for     Frequency
                    identify names of application  names of ineligible  of list
    State        ineligible felons screening    felons               checks
    Alaska       X                 Real time    X                    Monthly
    Arizona      N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Periodic
    Georgia      X                 Real time    X                    Monthly
    Hawaii       N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Biweekly
    Kentucky     N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    Minnesota    N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Monthly
    South        X                 Monthly      X                    Monthly
    Carolina
    South Dakota X                 Daily        N/Ab                 N/Ab
    West         N/Aa              N/Aa         X                    Periodic
    Virginia

    Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.

    aNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter
    registration applications, is checked. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the
    states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to
    implement this list maintenance requirement.

    bNot applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration
    applications, not the entire database of registered voters, are checked a
    daily basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states' discretion to
    determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list
    maintenance requirement.

    Identifying individuals ineligible to vote because of mental incompetence.
    The voter eligibility requirements in the nine states we reviewed provided
    that applicants declared mentally incompetent to vote are not eligible to
    register to vote. Officials in eight states reported they have procedures
    in place to identify registrants ineligible to vote because of court
    orders of mental incompetence. All reported that removing registrants for
    this reason was a rare occurrence. The ninth state, West Virginia, did not
    report such procedures are in place.17

    17West Virginia election officials told us that while state law provides
    that a person found mentally incompetent is ineligible to register to
    vote, they have not received such information from courts.

    Four States Reported That Voter List Accuracy Improved as a Result of HAVA, but
    Managing Inherent Risks to Voter List Accuracy Remains a Challenge

    Officials from four states-Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West
    Virginia-reported that implementing the HAVA requirements improved the
    accuracy of their voter lists somewhat or to a great extent. South Dakota
    officials reported that verifying applications has helped identify
    inaccurate information on applications and that matching applications with
    the MVA helped reduce the number of duplicate registrations. Officials
    from Minnesota, which replaced its existing computerized voter
    registration with a new one in order to implement HAVA, also reported that
    implementing the HAVA requirements reduced the incidence of duplicate
    registrations. And officials in the states of Arizona and West Virginia,
    which built entirely new systems to comply with HAVA, reported a great
    improvement in the accuracy of their voter rolls.

    Officials from the remaining states-Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
    South Carolina-reported that HAVA had little or no effect on the accuracy
    of their voter lists. This result likely occurred, some of these officials
    said, because their states have had well-established computerized
    statewide lists, similar to those required by HAVA, in place for many
    years prior to HAVA. Officials from Georgia, Hawaii, and Kentucky also
    attributed this result to their states' ability to require the full Social
    Security number on voter registration applications. Having this unique
    identifier provided a means to identify and remove duplicate registrants
    from voter lists, they stated.

    While HAVA contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter
    registration lists, even after such requirements are implemented,
    maintaining accurate computerized lists will likely remain a challenging
    task for state and local officials. In part this is because of the
    inherent risks of managing a dynamic body of information that is
    constantly changing as voters move, change names, come of age to vote, or
    become ineligible to vote. Managing these risks has challenged election
    officials across the country for some time, as we have documented in a
    series of past reports. In October 2001 we issued a report that described
    the operations and challenges associated with each stage of the election
    process, including list maintenance. We reported that, judging from our
    national survey of local election officials, officials were challenged by
    continually updating and deleting information from voter registration
    lists and had concerns related to obtaining accurate and timely
    information to keep voter lists accurate.18 In June 2005 we reported on
    the processes 14 local voting jurisdictions from seven states used to
    verify voter registration eligibility and the challenges officials faced
    in maintaining accurate voter lists.19 We reported that while some of
    these challenges, such as reducing duplicate registrations among
    jurisdictions within the state, may be resolved when HAVA is fully
    implemented, others may continue to be issues. Problems identifying voters
    who are registered concurrently in more than one state and problems using
    incomplete, untimely, or hard-to-decipher felony, death, and other
    information could also continue to hinder efforts to maintain accurate
    voter lists. In September 2005 we issued a report that described the
    experiences of selected local election officials in the same seven states
    as they processed voter registration applications.20 We reported that
    officials in these jurisdictions face a number of challenges, such as
    processing incomplete or inaccurate applications received from voter
    registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations.

    18 GAO-02-3 .

    Some of the concerns highlighted in our October 2001, June 2005, and
    September 2005 reports remain issues in states we discussed in this
    report, even after these nine states implemented the HAVA-required
    computerized lists. For example:

    Duplicate voter registrants. Echoing concerns reported in our previous
    work, the majority of state election officials interviewed for this report
    said that their states might not receive information about residents who
    leave the state and reregister to vote in another state.21 As a result,
    voters could be registered and vote in two states concurrently. One senior
    election official described this type of duplicate registration as a
    "universal" problem affecting all states. States are not required to share
    information that would allow them to identify persons registered in more
    than one state,22 although some states voluntarily notify other states
    when a voter relocates and reregisters in that state, officials said.
    Officials from Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, South
    Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia told us they notify other states
    of voters who relocate and then reregister. However, such notifications
    are possible only if voters disclose on their voter registration
    application they have relocated from another state, officials also told
    us. This issue, caused in part by a lack of consistently available
    information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of voter lists and may
    not be resolved solely by implementing the HAVA-required computerized list
    requirement.

    19 GAO-05-478 .

    20 GAO-05-997 .

    21 GAO-05-478 .

    22As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005 federal recognition
    of state-issued driver's licenses will be conditioned upon, among other
    things, a requirement that states provide all other states electronic
    access to state motor vehicle database information.

    Deceased registrants. We previously reported that concerns regarding
    timeliness and completeness of vital statistics data on deceased persons
    used to match against voter lists may continue to be an issue, even after
    the HAVA requirements for a computerized list are implemented.23 However,
    the election officials we interviewed in most of the states did not share
    concerns about the timeliness of information their offices receive on
    deceased persons from the vital statistics office. One official observed
    that the vital statistics office may not receive timely information from
    coroners or funeral home directors. Officials in a majority of the states
    we reviewed observed that data on deceased persons may not be complete
    because states are not able consistently to identify and remove names of
    deceased registrants if the deaths occur out of state. According to an
    official in South Dakota, some states are prohibited by state laws from
    sharing information on deaths, a fact that has, in part, prevented this
    issue from being resolved. Even in states that share such information,
    unless officials are aware that the deceased was registered to vote in a
    certain state, officials are not able to pass the information to the
    appropriate election office. This issue, related in part to the
    unavailability of information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of
    voter lists and is not resolved by implementing the HAVA-required
    computerized list requirement.

    Felons. While HAVA requires coordinating the voter list with state
    information on persons convicted of a felony, election officials we
    interviewed in several of the states expressed concerns similar to those
    reported in our previous work that the criminal information they receive
    is incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher.24 This issue, similar
    to concerns related to the availability, timeliness, and quality of other
    types of voter registration information, poses an inherent risk to the
    accuracy of lists because it could limit the ability of officials to
    identify and remove names of felons ineligible to register to vote from
    the computerized voter lists.

    23 GAO-05-478 .

    24 GAO-05-478 .

    U.S. citizenship. In addition to having concerns regarding felony status,
    election officials from two states also expressed concerns regarding the
    willingness of registrants to self-attest that they were U.S. citizens and
    therefore eligible to vote under state eligibility requirements, concerns
    that are consistent with those documented in our previous work.25 The
    HAVA-required unique identifying numbers, such as driver's license numbers
    or Social Security numbers, are not useful for this purpose because
    neither is generally accepted as evidence of U.S. citizenship. This lack
    of information poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of lists, as
    illustrated by an example from Minnesota.26 Officials told us that they
    discovered 30 noncitizens on the Minnesota voter list during the November
    2004 general election despite having the HAVA-required computerized
    statewide voter list in place. Minnesota's MVA has since added visa
    expiration dates to the driver's licenses of noncitizens to indicate their
    citizenship status. South Dakota officials reported their MVA provides
    similar information on driver's licenses. To address this concern, Arizona
    officials told us that their state no longer accepts the registration
    applicants' self-attestation of citizenship; all voter registration
    applicants are now required to provide proof of citizenship. As we
    reported in our June 2005 report, federal jury administrators could
    identify possible noncitizens on the basis of information that potential
    jurors provide when identifying themselves as noncitizens on their jury
    service questionnaire.27 We recommended that the Administrative Office of
    the U.S. Courts determine the feasibility and steps necessary for U.S.
    district court jury administrators to provide notice to state election
    officials of potential jurors who identify themselves as noncitizens.
    Officials from Hawaii reported that their state periodically checks the
    voter list with this type of information and other citizenship indexes.

    Receiving voter registration applications. Officials from Georgia, South
    Carolina, and South Dakota said that their state received voter
    registration applications from registration drives that contained
    inaccuracies such as fictitious names, a problem that we had identified in
    past reports.28 South Carolina officials also said that only a small
    number of such applications are generally received. Officials from a
    majority of the nine states we reviewed reported that they received a
    small number of complaints from voters who said that they had registered
    through a registration drive but that their names did not appear on the
    voter list on Election Day.

    25 GAO-05-478 .

    26As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005, federal recognition
    of state-issued driver's licenses will be conditioned upon, among other
    things, a state requirement that applicants provide certain information
    relating to their U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status prior to
    issuance. Federal recognition is also to be conditioned upon, among other
    things, a requirement that states enter into a memorandum of understanding
    with the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the legal presence of
    noncitizen applicants.

    27 GAO-05-478 .

    State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons Learned while
      Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Creating statewide computerized lists required by HAVA presented a number
    of challenges and resulted in lessons learned, officials told us, as they
    developed their computerized statewide voter registration systems, made
    them operational, and later managed them. The challenges and lessons
    learned they shared are consistent with those that our past research has
    shown to be important to effectively acquiring, developing, and
    implementing information systems in public and private sector
    organizations.29 Officials shared their experiences as they developed
    their systems, for example:

               o  Election officials from Minnesota and West Virginia reported
               that meeting the time frames they established for developing their
               computerized lists was challenging, in part because of limited
               staff available to complete the work.

               o  Designing a system with the appropriate scope was an issue
               raised by Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Minnesota officials. This
               challenge involved determining the functional requirements of the
               system, for instance, the number of election management features
               the system should provide, if any, in addition to the capabilities
               required by HAVA. A senior Minnesota official reported Minnesota
               reduced the scope of its new system from what it had initially
               planned because of resource and time constraints, keeping the
               necessary elements but eliminating some election administration
               functions. Officials said this experience taught them that the
               functional requirements of the system should be prioritized as
               early as possible to differentiate features that are necessary
               from those that would be nice to have. Arizona officials addressed
               this design challenge by initially implementing a system that
               performed only the basic tasks required under the HAVA provisions,
               they reported. In the near term, they told us, local officials
               used the computerized statewide system to manage voter
               registration information while continuing to use their local
               computerized systems to manage elections. This decision minimized
               changes to the way counties historically managed elections,
               officials said. The state plans to expand the scope of its new
               statewide system in the future, providing counties with additional
               election management capabilities, an official told us. Their plan,
               officials said, is to draw upon local and state officials'
               experiences with the statewide system to identify and prioritize
               what additional features to add to their system. The Kentucky
               official offered a lesson learned as well, suggesting that
               election officials, as they define the capabilities the system is
               to offer, should be mindful of selecting a system that the state
               can afford now and in the future.

               o  Converting data on registered voters from the old system to the
               new system was time-consuming and required processes to ensure
               that data were accurately entered into the new system, election
               officials from Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed.
               This work was complicated, in part, because of inaccurate
               information in existing records such as misspelled street
               addresses or duplicate registrations that needed to be resolved
               before inputting the corrected data into the new systems'
               databases. Minnesota officials said that to help local officials
               with this work, they developed a tool that allowed them to compare
               old records of voter information with the new ones on a
               case-by-case basis.

               Officials from Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Carolina,
               South Dakota, and West Virginia also said that as states develop
               their computerized systems, they should adopt a collaborative
               approach, working with local officials to design, develop, or
               implement the systems in order to obtain local officials'
               cooperation. The state officials provided various reasons for
               emphasizing the importance of maintaining cooperative
               relationships with local officials. For example, West Virginia
               officials told us local officials resisted moving from their
               county-based systems to the statewide system, which made
               implementing the system more difficult. Local officials resisted
               in part because many of them viewed the new statewide system as an
               intrusion into a domain of election administration that had been a
               local-not a state-responsibility, state officials told us.
               Involving county officials in designing and implementing the
               system, the state officials said, might have addressed this issue
               and simplified implementation of the new system. Arizona and South
               Carolina officials said they involved local officials by convening
               a working group composed of both local and state officials that
               was responsible for developing the system. Hawaii state officials
               told us that frequent, regular communication helped their state
               maintain a cooperative relationship with local officials; for
               instance, this state holds quarterly meetings with county
               officials in order to coordinate activities such as completing
               list maintenance and data entry before poll books and voter lists
               are printed. Kentucky officials said the key to their success was
               the cooperative working relationship they cultivated with local
               officials by keeping them involved.

               Officials also shared challenges and lessons learned while making
               their systems operational. For example, West Virginia officials
               said that their system became operational in every county on the
               same day. However, it may have been beneficial for their state,
               they stated, to introduce the system incrementally county by
               county rather than bringing every election jurisdiction online the
               same day. They reasoned that such a staggered rollout schedule
               might have been easier on the state election officials, given
               their staffing constraints. Officials from some states also told
               us that prior to putting systems into service, it is important to
               train staff to use the new system. In order to provide local
               officials access to the most current information, Minnesota
               officials said they provide the user's manual online.

               State election officials also shared their lessons learned from
               their experience managing computerized voter registration systems
               once they were operational. Officials from Hawaii and Kentucky,
               two states that have managed computerized voter registrations
               systems for some years, observed that as technology develops,
               officials may decide to enhance their systems, as both of their
               states have done over the years. These officials offered lessons
               to keep in mind as states contemplate system upgrades: be mindful
               that selecting upgrades to the system may require compromises
               among local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or
               different administrative or technical constraints and that changes
               to the system affect all local jurisdictions equally. Hawaii
               officials shared another issue they encountered while managing
               their system; they could not use the computerized system while
               updating voter information. To address this issue, officials from
               Hawaii said their staff created a shadow system so that the system
               could be updated and available at the same time. Hawaii officials
               also recommended that states establish uniform processing
               procedures among their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions
               function as one.

               As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
               contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
               until 30 days after the report date. At that time we will make
               copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
               will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
               http://www.gao.gov .

               If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
               please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov . Contact
               points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
               Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
               contributors are listed in appendix XII.

               Sincerely yours,

               William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
               Issues

               This report describes the experiences of election officials in
               Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, South
               Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia implementing the Help
               America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requirements pertaining to the
               establishment of computerized statewide voter registration lists
               and steps to verify and maintain the accuracy of those lists.
               Specifically, our objectives were to describe the actions election
               officials from nine states reported taking to (1) establish
               computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify
               information provided on voter registration applications and
               maintain the statewide voter lists. In addition, we describe what
               these state officials told us regarding (3) the challenges they
               faced and lessons they learned while implementing these
               requirements. Most states obtained a waiver from the Election
               Assistance Commission (EAC) to postpone implementation of this
               HAVA requirement until January 1, 2006. However, these nine states
               did not obtain a waiver and, therefore, were to implement these
               HAVA requirements by the original deadline, January 1, 2004.

               To meet our objectives, we reviewed HAVA provisions related to the
               establishment of statewide computerized voter registration list
               requirements. We then identified the proper points of contact
               within each state and conducted telephone interviews using a
               structured interview format. Among other things, we asked election
               officials in the nine states to describe when their computerized
               systems had been developed; the capabilities of their systems;
               what actions, if any, their states took to implement the HAVA
               requirements for a computerized list; what level of effort was
               required to make any HAVA-related modifications; what effect
               implementing these changes, if any, might have had on the accuracy
               of their statewide voter lists; and what challenges they faced and
               lessons they learned while implementing these HAVA requirements.
               We did not independently verify the accuracy of state election
               officials' responses. However, state election officials were
               provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses
               for this report, and on the basis of the comments we received, we
               made technical changes where appropriate. As part of our
               interviews, we also asked state officials how much federal and
               state money was spent on their computerized statewide systems in
               order to implement the HAVA requirements. We did not independently
               verify the amounts they reported to us. However, we attempted to
               compare the amounts of money the states reported that they spent
               with data reported by them to EAC on the implementation of all
               HAVA requirements. Because of variations in the way these amounts
               were reported by the states, we could not identify the amounts
               spent solely on implementation of the computerized list
               requirement.

               Our work focused primarily on the states, since most of the
               responsibilities for implementing HAVA statewide computerized list
               provisions took place at the state level. We did, however,
               communicate with officials from the EAC and Department of Justice
               (DOJ) Civil Rights Division to obtain information about and
               documentation on their roles and responsibilities related to the
               HAVA statewide computerized list provisions. We also provided
               sections of the report discussing EAC and DOJ to officials with
               those organizations to verify the accuracy of the information they
               provided and, on the basis of their comments, made technical
               changes where appropriate. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO
               reports on elections, including voter registration issues.

               We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in
               accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

               The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provides that the Election
               Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
               are to have specific roles in states' efforts to implement the
               Help America Vote Act's statewide voter registration list
               provisions. HAVA established EAC to, among other things, serve as
               a national clearinghouse for information on election
               administration and provide information and guidance with respect
               to laws, procedures, and technologies affecting the administration
               of federal elections.

               On August 4, 2005, EAC released its final version of the Voluntary
               Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists .
               The purpose of the voluntary guidance was to assist states in
               their efforts to develop and maintain a statewide voter
               registration list pursuant to HAVA Section 303(a). The guidance
               describes a set of specifications and requirements states may use
               to implement the HAVA provisions, such as establishing real-time
               access to all registration data, securing the registration list,
               synchronizing the statewide list with local databases at least
               every 24 hours, and coordinating with other databases for the
               purpose of performing voter registration verification and list
               maintenance. EAC's guidance also contains recommendations on
               dealing with outcomes that may result from the verification
               process, the type of voting history information states should
               track, and the type of system that is most closely aligned with
               HAVA requirements. In addition to the voluntary guidance, EAC has
               also created and posted on its Web site two best practices
               documents-"Best Practices in Administration, Management, and
               Security in Voting Systems and Provisional Voting" and "Best
               Practices for Facilitating Voting by U.S. Citizens Covered by the
               Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act"-and other
               information on election administration. According to EAC
               officials, EAC expects that the clearinghouse will be fully
               operational during 2006.

               HAVA also provides enforcement authority to DOJ with respect to
               the uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA
               requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter
               registration list and voter eligibility verification provisions.
               Officials with DOJ's Civil Rights Division told us that in
               addition to monitoring states' compliance with HAVA, DOJ has
               promoted pre-enforcement compliance, which includes working with
               states to identify what actions are reasonable to expect them to
               take, educating state and local officials, and responding to
               states' inquiries. According to DOJ officials, at the time of our
               review, DOJ had not taken enforcement actions against any of the
               nine nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also said that they worked
               with the states following the passage of HAVA to address initial
               challenges and provide informal guidance while EAC began
               operations and hired staff.

               This appendix describes steps Alaska election officials reported
               taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
               Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
               establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
               verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
               applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
               addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
               election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
               requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
               responses to our telephone interviews with Alaska election
               officials and were not independently verified by us.

               Alaska had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
               system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created a
               mainframe-based system in 1985. To implement the provisions of
               HAVA, minor modifications were made to the system to allow
               election officials to record driver's license numbers and the last
               four digits of the voter's Social Security number. These
               modifications cost approximately $5,000 in state and federal funds
               to implement. Alaska state officials awarded a contract to upgrade
               its statewide voter registration system, in order to include
               additional election management capabilities, such as poll worker
               management and Internet voter registration, at a cost of $2.6
               million.

               To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements,
               the state's four regional election supervisors, who function as
               state employees,1 verified application information by comparing
               voter eligibility information (full name; date of birth; and
               either a driver's license number, full Social Security number, the
               last four digits of the Social Security number, or a unique
               identifier assigned by the state if the individual lacks a Social
               Security number and a driver's license) with state motor vehicle
               agency records to verify identity, age, and duplicate
               registrations. At the time of our review, Alaska was not comparing
               information with the Social Security Administration (SSA) because
               the state did not have a signed memorandum of understanding with
               SSA.

               To implement HAVA, Alaska has taken steps to maintain the accuracy
               of its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other
               state agency records, as described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. State officials perform an electronic
               check on the entire statewide voter registration list for
               duplicates once a year and on an as-needed basis.

               o  Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly
               electronic updates of vital statistics death records by checking
               name, date of birth and either the full Social Security number or
               the last four digits.

               o  Disqualified felons. State officials update court system
               records on a monthly basis. Specifically, court system records
               from the Department of Corrections and Bureau of Vital Statistics
               are checked against the voter registration list, comparing name,
               date of birth, and full Social Security number.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the
               event of a court declaration of mental incompetence, the court
               would notify state officials of the judgment and the Division of
               Elections would inactivate the voter's registration. Officials
               reported that disqualification because of mental incompetence does
               not occur often.

               To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from
               the state voter registration list, election officials send letters
               notifying individuals of their pending removal from the statewide
               voter registration list. These letters are sent to those who have
               not voted in the most recent two federal elections and those who
               have disqualifying felony convictions, as allowed under state law.
               Alaska officials reported that they removed the names of
               ineligible voters in 2004.

               Election officials did not report any challenges or lessons
               learned while implementing these HAVA requirements.

               This appendix describes steps Arizona election officials reported
               taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
               Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
               establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
               verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
               applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
               addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
               election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
               requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
               responses to our telephone interviews with Arizona election
               officials and were not independently verified by us.

               Prior to HAVA, Arizona did not have a computerized statewide voter
               registration system in place, although several counties operated
               computerized voter registration systems. Arizona created an
               interconnected, statewide Web-based voter registration system
               called Voter Registration Arizona (VRAZ) to implement the
               requirements of HAVA. VRAZ became operational by the HAVA deadline
               of January 1, 2004. VRAZ had an initial development cost of $1
               million and was jointly funded by state and federal sources. The
               system took approximately 6 months to develop. The state had to
               pass new statutes and amend others so that election officials
               could receive information from state agencies, such as felony
               records. In addition to carrying out the required functions of the
               voter registration system, election officials can query all state
               voter registration records on Election Day if their polling place
               has an Internet connection.

               A new version of VRAZ is under development and is expected to
               replace voter registration systems in 13 of 15 counties. The new
               version of VRAZ, called VRAZ II, is expected to reflect
               reciprocity agreements with other states whereby officials will be
               alerted when a voter moves from state to state and registers to
               vote in those states covered by the agreement. In addition, the
               new system is expected to contain additional election management
               capabilities beyond those required by HAVA, including the ability
               to retrieve data on election administration issues such as voter
               petitions, provisional ballots, training of poll workers, and
               polling locations. The estimated cost for VRAZ II is $10 million.
               At the time of our review, Arizona officials were anticipating
               that VRAZ II would go online in 2007.

               To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements,
               Arizona compared the applicant's name, date of birth, driver's
               license number, or the last four digits of the Social Security
               number with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records to identify
               potentially inaccurate applications. In addition, Arizona's
               Web-based voter registration software, EZ Voter-which allows
               Arizona citizens to register to vote via the
               Internet-electronically verified the accuracy of the voter
               registration applications filed online by matching the applicant's
               name, date of birth, driver's license number, or last four digits
               of the Social Security number with MVA records. EZ Voter
               registrations were then entered at the county level daily and
               submitted to the statewide voter registration list.

               At the time of our review, Arizona had completed a memorandum of
               understanding with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and
               was verifying information on voter registration applications by
               matching it with SSA records as required by HAVA.

               As state officials developed the VRAZ system, they identified and
               corrected inaccurate voter registration data prior to entering the
               data into the new system; through this process they were also able
               to eliminate duplicate registrants from the statewide list.
               Election officials also took steps to maintain the accuracy of the
               voter registration list by coordinating the list with other state
               agency records, as described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. State officials electronically identify
               duplicate matches by checking name, address, driver's license
               number, and the last four digits of the Social Security number on
               voter registration applications on a daily basis. The entire list
               is screened once a month to identify duplicate registrants.

               o  Deceased registrants. The Secretary of State's office receives
               an electronic file of recent deaths from the Department of Health
               Services once a month. Officials identify any matches by checking
               name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the Social
               Security number.

               o  Disqualifying felons. State officials receive information on
               felony convictions from Arizona courts on a varying basis-weekly
               or monthly in the case of the state's superior courts and on an
               ongoing basis from U.S. district courts. Once a felon's sentence
               has been completed, voting rights are reinstated and the
               individual may register to vote by submitting a new voter
               registration application. Officials identify any matches by
               checking name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the
               Social Security number. This is a paper-based process in smaller
               courts and an electronic process in larger courts.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. As
               with information on felons, courts submit information in an
               electronic or paper format to state officials on individuals
               declared mentally incompetent at different times for comparison
               with the statewide voter registration list.

               To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from
               voter registration lists, local officials send a letter to voters
               to notify them of their impending removal from the statewide voter
               registration list. For example, letters are sent to individuals
               with a disqualifying felony conviction.

               One challenge Arizona election officials faced was designing a
               system with the appropriate scope. Election officials said they
               addressed this design challenge by initially implementing a system
               that performed only the basic tasks required under the HAVA
               provisions. To minimize changes to the way counties historically
               managed elections, local officials used the computerized statewide
               system to manage voter registration information while continuing
               to use their local computerized systems to manage elections. The
               state plans to expand the scope of its new statewide system in the
               future, providing counties with additional election management
               capabilities. Another challenge reported by Arizona election
               officials was the conversion of data on registered voters from the
               old system to the new system. Officials said it was time-consuming
               and required processes to ensure that data were accurately entered
               into the new system.

               Election officials also reported on the importance of
               collaboration among state and local officials. The state convened
               a working group composed of both local and state officials that
               was responsible for developing its statewide computerized system.
               Arizona officials stated that a communications plan that allows
               information about the voter list management process to be shared
               among state and county officials can help lessen political
               resistance and facilitate buy-in by state and county officials.
               The implementation of VRAZ in stages was another way state
               officials gained the trust of the counties.

               This appendix describes steps Georgia election officials reported
               taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
               Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
               establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
               verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
               applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
               addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
               election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
               requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
               responses to our telephone interviews with Georgia election
               officials and were not independently verified by us.

               Georgia had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
               system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this
               mainframe-based system in 1995. To implement HAVA, state officials
               made one minor modification to their voter registration
               system-adding the capability to identify whether a voter had
               registered for the first time by mail. Officials have plans to
               enhance the current system in order to provide election
               administration management capabilities, such as identifying
               potential poll workers and giving election officials on Election
               Day immediate electronic access to the voter list so they can
               verify where voters are registered to vote. At the time of our
               review, officials were planning to conduct a pilot program to test
               the enhanced system.

               In Georgia, voter registration applicants were required to provide
               their full Social Security number on voter registration
               applications as a unique identifier. Since Georgia collected the
               full Social Security number, the state was not subject to the HAVA
               requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to verify
               information on voter registration applications with motor vehicle
               agency or Social Security Administration records. Georgia elected
               not to verify information with these agencies, as HAVA allows.
               However, the state had processes in place to conduct real-time
               checks of voter registration applications to ensure they did not
               duplicate an existing registration and that the application
               information did not match the records of deceased persons. The
               state procedures also provide for verifying voter eligibility by
               comparing voter registration applications with state court records
               on felony lists to identify persons ineligible to vote because of
               a disqualifying felony conviction.

               Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Georgia has maintained
               the accuracy of its voter registration list by coordinating the
               list with other state agency records, as described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. On a monthly basis, state officials
               check the statewide voter list to identify duplicate registrants
               and transmit the list of duplicates to the counties for updating.

               o  Deceased registrants. Every month, county officials receive
               electronic files on deceased persons from the Department of Vital
               Statistics. Officials identify any matches with the statewide
               voter registration list by checking name, date of birth, full
               Social Security number, and address. On a quarterly basis, the
               state receives an electronic report from the Department of Vital
               Statistics and verifies that the counties have made the changes
               and checks for errors. The information is compiled into a
               quarterly report that verifies that the counties have made the
               necessary changes and that an error report is generated showing
               the records that did not match.

               o  Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, the state receives a
               paper list of felony convictions from state courts. The felony
               list is then sent to counties for updating. County officials
               identify any matches with the statewide voter registration list by
               checking name, date of birth, full Social Security number, and
               address.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the
               case of mental incompetence, a court order must specify that a
               person is barred from voting; otherwise, the person may continue
               to vote. As with information on felons, on a monthly basis, the
               state receives from state courts a paper list of individuals
               declared mentally incompetent. The list is then sent to counties
               for updating. County officials identify any matches with the
               statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of birth,
               full Social Security number, and address.

               To ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently
               removed from the statewide voter registration list, county
               officials send a letter to voters to notify them of their
               impending removal from the voter registration rolls. These letters
               are sent to individuals who have requested to be removed, those
               with a disqualifying felony conviction, and those who have been
               declared mentally incompetent. Georgia officials reported that
               they removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004.

               Although Georgia has had a statewide computerized voter list in
               place for 10 years, officials reported that a challenge they
               continue to face is training employees on how to use the system.
               Officials said that one lesson learned is that states need to get
               buy-in from county officials early on in the process of developing
               a statewide voter registration system. They suggested that one way
               to accomplish this may be to form a task force, composed of state
               and local officials, to review system development issues and
               design.

               This appendix describes steps Hawaii election officials reported
               taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
               Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
               establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
               verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
               applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
               addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
               election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
               requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
               responses to our telephone interviews by Hawaii election officials
               and were not independently verified by us.

               Hawaii has had a computerized voter registration system since the
               1970s and developed a statewide interactive system in 1982.
               Hawaii's system provides election officials with immediate access
               to the computerized statewide voter list whereby they can enter
               new or update existing voter registration information and query
               all state voter registration records. To implement HAVA, election
               officials made minor technical changes to the statewide voter
               registration system, such as adding the ability to flag inactive
               voters. At the time of our review, Hawaii was making additional
               arrangements to enhance its current computerized voter
               registration system by modifying the absentee voting component of
               the system.

               In Hawaii, voter registration applicants were required to provide
               their full Social Security number on voter registration
               applications as a unique identifier. Since Hawaii collected the
               full Social Security number, the state was not subject to the HAVA
               requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to verify
               information on voter registration applications with motor vehicle
               agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration records. Hawaii
               voluntarily matched information on voter registration forms with
               MVA records, comparing information such as the individual's name,
               driver's license number, and full Social Security number. The
               computerized voter registration system conducted real-time checks
               for duplicate registrations and age requirements prior to
               accepting the new application into the statewide voter
               registration system.

               Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Hawaii officials have
               maintained the accuracy of Hawaii's statewide voter registration
               list by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
               described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter
               registration system automatically checks for duplicate
               registrations as soon as an application is processed.

               o  Deceased registrants. Twice a month, county officials check
               paper death records from the Department of Vital Statistics to
               identify deceased registrants by checking the name, date of birth,
               and the full Social Security number.

               o  Disqualified felons. Twice a month, county clerks receive paper
               records from circuit court officials. These records are then
               checked against the information in the statewide voter
               registration list by comparing name, date of birth, and the full
               Social Security number.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent.
               Officials reported that disqualification because of mental
               incompetence does not occur often in Hawaii. The courts are the
               only entity that can make a judgment regarding mental incompetence
               that would disqualify a person from being registered to vote.

               To ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently
               removed from the statewide voter registration list, local
               officials send a letter to every voter prior to the general
               election before removing voters' names from the list, in
               accordance with the National Voter Registration Act provisions for
               removing voters' names from lists.

               Although Hawaii had a statewide voter registration system in place
               prior to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on
               implementing voter registration systems. Hawaii election officials
               said that one of the biggest challenges can be coordinating with
               counties and developing a rapport with county officials. To assist
               in coordination efforts, the state holds quarterly meetings with
               county officials. In these meetings, state and local officials
               coordinate activities such as completing list maintenance and data
               entry prior to the printing of poll books and voter lists. Another
               issue raised by Hawaii officials was designing a system with the
               appropriate scope. These officials also shared lessons learned
               about managing a computerized voter registration system. They
               stated that technological developments will require compromise
               among local jurisdictions that have different administrative and
               technological constraints. Officials also recommended that states
               establish uniform processing procedures among their jurisdictions
               so that all jurisdictions function as one. Finally, Hawaii created
               a shadow system so that the system could be both updated and
               available for use at the same time.

               This appendix describes steps Kentucky election officials reported
               taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote
               Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
               establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists,
               verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter
               applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In
               addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and lessons learned
               election officials reported with respect to implementing HAVA
               requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the
               responses to our telephone interviews by Kentucky election
               officials and were not independently verified by us.

               Kentucky had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
               system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this
               mainframe-based system in 1973. Kentucky's current system allows
               all local election officials immediate access to enter new or
               update existing voter registration information in their
               jurisdiction, and immediate access to query all state voter
               registration records. In addition, election officials provided a
               toll-free number for precinct officers to access an interactive
               voice response phone system to check voter eligibility. As a
               result, Kentucky did not have to take any additional steps to
               implement HAVA statewide computerized list requirements.

               Election officials planned to upgrade their computerized statewide
               voter registration system in the future to provide more election
               management tools to counties, such as including a function to
               track poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. The state
               has developed the absentee ballot application and expects it to be
               used by its counties in the 2006 elections.

               In Kentucky, voter registration applicants were required to
               provide their full Social Security number on voter registration
               applications as a unique identifier. Since Kentucky collected the
               full Social Security number, the state was not subject to the HAVA
               requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to verify
               information on voter registration applications with motor vehicle
               agency or Social Security Administration records. Kentucky elected
               not to verify information with these agencies, as HAVA allows. To
               verify information on voter registration applications, Kentucky's
               computerized statewide voter registration automatically checked
               for duplicate registrations before new registrants were added to
               the statewide list.

               Kentucky currently has processes in place to maintain the accuracy
               of the statewide voter registration list by comparing the
               statewide voter registration list with state agency records, as
               described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter
               registration system automatically checks for duplicate
               registrations as soon as a new application is entered into the
               system.

               o  Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, election officials
               check the computerized statewide voter registration list against
               the records from the Department of Vital Statistics to identify
               deceased registrants by comparing name, date of birth, and full
               Social Security number.

               o  Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, court records are
               electronically checked against the computerized statewide voter
               registration list to identify persons convicted of a disqualifying
               felony by comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security
               number.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent.
               Officials use court records to identify voters ineligible because
               of mental incompetence by comparing applicant's name, date of
               birth, and full Social Security number with the computerized
               statewide voter registration list.

               To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently
               removed from the statewide voter registration list, state
               officials match voters' identifying information with U.S. Postal
               Service, felony, mental competency, and death records. State
               officials also send letters to voters to notify them of pending
               removal based on a disqualifying felony conviction.

               Since Kentucky had a computerized statewide voter registration
               system in place prior to HAVA, election officials did not report
               any challenges. However, Kentucky election officials provided
               examples of lessons learned while maintaining their current
               computerized statewide voter registration system. They said it is
               important to develop a computerized statewide voter registration
               system that will be sustainable now and in the future. Officials
               suggested that as states contemplate system upgrades, they be
               mindful that changes to the system affect all jurisdictions,
               despite their differing needs and constraints. A key to their
               success has been the cooperative working relationship they
               cultivated with local officials by keeping them involved. Election
               officials also recommended that states "think outside the box"
               when designing ways to use the voter registration database. For
               example, they utilized their statewide computerized system to
               established voter information centers on Kentucky's state Web site
               to assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process.

               This appendix describes steps Minnesota election officials
               reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
               America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
               with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
               registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
               on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
               lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
               lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
               implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
               reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by Minnesota
               election officials and were not independently verified by us.

               Minnesota is unique in the way election administration functions
               are structured and can vary by jurisdiction. In this state, the
               county auditor has certain election responsibilities and can
               choose to delegate other election responsibilities to minor civil
               division-level (MCD) government-townships and cities. For example,
               while counties manage voter registration, county auditors may
               delegate other functions, such as absentee voting to MCDs. There
               are some functions that MCDs are responsible for handling, such as
               polling place matters.

               Minnesota had a computerized statewide voter registration system
               in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this
               mainframe-based system in 1988. To comply with the provisions of
               HAVA, the state amended its election laws and replaced its
               existing computerized statewide voter registration system in 2004.
               The system included new election management capabilities, such as
               providing election officials with immediate access to enter and
               update applicant information and creating electronic matching
               capabilities with state agencies to verify voter eligibility. The
               system also centrally tracked absentee ballots provided to
               military personnel or other citizens residing overseas. The
               project was completed in 11 months at a reported cost of about
               $5.3 million.

               To implement HAVA, Minnesota verifies voter registration
               application information by comparing name, date of birth, driver's
               license number, or the last four digits of the voter's Social
               Security number with motor vehicle agency records to identify
               potentially ineligible applications. Since Minnesota is a same-day
               registration state, checks for duplicates are automatically run on
               voter applications on a daily basis. In addition, the Department
               of Public Service tracks visas issued to ensure that noncitizens
               are unable to vote.

               At the time of our review, Minnesota was in the process of
               completing a memorandum of understanding with the Social Security
               Administration (SSA) to allow verification of information on voter
               registration applications by comparing it with SSA records.
               Officials anticipated that they would begin conducting matches by
               2006.

               To implement HAVA, Minnesota election officials took steps to
               maintain the accuracy of the voter registration list by
               coordinating with other state agency records, as described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. The statewide voter registration system
               produces maintenance reports to identify potential duplicates. In
               addition, checks for duplicates are run on an annual basis.

               o  Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, county officials
               conduct manual checks of oral and paper death records from the
               Department of Vital Statistics by checking the name, date of
               birth, and the full Social Security number.

               o  Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, officials receive
               paper records from the courts to check for those persons convicted
               of a disqualifying felony. Once the court computer system is in
               place, this process will have the capability to provide electronic
               matching by comparing the applicant's name, date of birth,
               driver's license, identification card, full Social Security
               number, and last four digits of the Social Security number.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. On a
               monthly basis, officials receive paper records from the courts to
               check for those declared mentally incompetent.

               To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently
               removed from the statewide voter registration list, state
               officials send notices to voters prior to removing their names
               from the list.

               Minnesota election officials reported that one of the major
               challenges they faced was replacing the existing voter
               registration system in an 11-month time frame. Also, officials
               told us that conducting elections while updating their voter
               registration system further complicated their efforts. Another
               challenge that election officials reported was converting data on
               registered voters from the old system database to the new system.
               Minnesota officials said that to help local officials with this
               work they developed a tool that allowed them to compare old
               records of voter information with the new ones on a case-by-case
               basis.

               In addition, Minnesota election officials discussed various
               lessons learned while implementing the HAVA requirements. The
               first lesson learned was the importance of identifying and
               prioritizing the functional requirements for the computerized
               statewide voter registration system. In order to manage the scope
               of replacing a computerized statewide voter registration system,
               election officials told us they had to separate the "nice to have"
               features from the features required by HAVA. This step assisted
               election officials in managing the scope and cost of their
               project.

               Second, Minnesota election officials reported using in-house
               resources to replace the existing computerized statewide voter
               registration system. According to election officials, it is best
               to use in-house resources to establish a computerized statewide
               voter registration system when there are sufficient in-house
               resources and staff expertise.

               Third, Minnesota election officials said that it was useful to
               create an online user's manual for the computerized statewide
               voter registration system. Election officials reported that by
               having the user's manual online, staff at all levels had immediate
               access to information on how to operate the computerized statewide
               voter registration system.

               This appendix describes steps South Carolina election officials
               reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
               America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
               with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
               registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
               on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
               lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
               lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
               implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
               reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by South
               Carolina election officials and were not independently verified by
               us.

               South Carolina had an interactive computerized statewide voter
               registration system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The
               state created this mainframe-based system in the late 1960s and
               modified it in 1992. Election officials made minor modifications
               to its system by adding additional data fields in order to
               implement the provisions of HAVA. The system also has election
               management capabilities beyond HAVA, including the ability to
               track absentee voters and poll managers. The state reportedly
               spent about $67,000 in federal funds for the most current system
               modifications.

               Election officials began work on a new Web-based, menu-driven
               system in 2000. The system is expected to be more flexible and is
               to allow election officials to perform election administration
               tasks such as signature verification. The new system is also
               expected to have the capability to run checks with the motor
               vehicle agency database. Officials reported that the
               implementation of the new system will not take place until after
               the 2006 elections.

               South Carolina required voter registration applicants to provide
               their full Social Security number on voter registration
               applications as a unique identifier. Since South Carolina collects
               the full Social Security number, the state is not subject to the
               HAVA requirements to collect a unique identifying number or to
               verify information on voter registration applications with the
               motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration. South
               Carolina elected not to verify information with these agencies, as
               HAVA allows. Prior to entering applicants into the statewide list,
               county officials check to ensure the application does not
               duplicate an existing registration. State officials compare voter
               registration applications with records on deceased persons and
               persons ineligible to register to vote because of a disqualifying
               felony conviction, as allowed under state law.

               Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, South Carolina officials
               maintain the accuracy of the state's voter registration list by
               coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
               described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. South Carolina produces a report on
               duplicates quarterly. The voter registration system identifies
               duplicate registrants using the full Social Security number and
               date of birth. County officials make the necessary changes.

               o  Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly
               electronic comparisons with state agency death records. Officials
               identify any matches by checking name, date of birth, and full
               Social Security number and remove names of ineligible registrants.

               o  Disqualified felons. State officials conduct monthly electronic
               comparisons with state agency felony records. Officials identify
               any matches based on name, address, date of birth, and full Social
               Security number and remove names of ineligible registrants.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The
               counties maintain paper records on the mentally incompetent. Upon
               receipt of a written court order, county officials identify and
               remove ineligible voters.

               In order to ensure that eligible voters' names are not
               inadvertently removed, state officials send a letter to voters to
               notify them of their impending removal from the statewide voter
               registration list. Letters are sent to individuals who have filed
               a change-of-address with the U.S. Postal Service, failed to appear
               in the most recent two federal elections, or have a disqualifying
               felony conviction. South Carolina officials reported that they
               removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004.

               Although South Carolina had a statewide voter registration system
               in place prior to HAVA, officials shared their general
               perspectives on implementing voter registration systems. Officials
               stated that forming a working group composed of state and local
               officials helped to ensure stakeholder buy-in. State officials
               also reported that the updated system that they are in the process
               of creating is proving challenging because they are developing it
               in-house instead of purchasing the system from a vendor. Officials
               reported that states should assess their available resources and
               skills before deciding to develop a system on their own.

               This appendix describes steps South Dakota election officials
               reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
               America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
               with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
               registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
               on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
               lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
               lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
               implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
               reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by South Dakota
               election officials and were not independently verified by us.

               South Dakota had a computerized statewide voter registration
               system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created
               the system in 2002. Election officials added new data fields and
               data matching capability to the existing computerized list in
               order to implement the provisions of HAVA. The modifications cost
               $302,004, of which $103,598 came from federal funds and $198,406
               from state funds.

               To implement HAVA, county election officials verified voter
               registration application information by comparing name, date of
               birth, and driver's license number, or the last four digits of the
               voter's Social Security number, with state motor vehicle agency
               records to identify potentially inaccurate applications. These
               officials also compared applications with records on the deceased
               and persons convicted of a disqualifying felony prior to adding
               them to the statewide voter list. South Dakota local election
               officials verified voter registration information by comparing it
               with the Social Security Administration's records beginning in
               August 2005.

               As required to implement HAVA, election officials have taken steps
               to maintain the accuracy of South Dakota's voter registration list
               by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
               described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. State officials check the statewide list
               for duplicates at least annually and more often during an election
               cycle. State officials identify duplicate registrants by checking
               for voters with the same name, driver's license number, and the
               last four digits of the Social Security number and forward the
               names of ineligible registrants to county officials for
               processing.
               o  Deceased registrants. Local officials match name, date of
               birth, and the last four digits of the Social Security number on
               voter registration applications with the state vital statistics
               agency's death records through weekly electronic batch
               comparisons.

               o  Disqualified felons. Local officials electronically compare
               voter registration applications with records of persons convicted
               of a disqualifying felony that makes them ineligible to register
               to vote. Officials identify persons ineligible to register to vote
               based on name, date of birth, driver's license number, and last
               four digits of the Social Security number.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the
               event that a court issues a declaration of mental incompetence,
               the court provides the written declaration to the county election
               official who removes the ineligible registrant from the voter
               list.

               In South Dakota, local officials are responsible for updating
               voter information and removing names from the voter registration
               list. To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed
               from the state voter registration list, local election officials
               send letters notifying individuals of their pending removal from
               the statewide voter registration list.

               State officials reported that working as a team and maintaining a
               positive working relationship with the counties enabled South
               Dakota to implement HAVA by the deadline.

               This appendix describes steps West Virginia election officials
               reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help
               America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process
               with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter
               registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided
               on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter
               lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and
               lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
               implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix
               reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by West Virginia
               election officials and were not independently verified by us.

               With regard to the HAVA statewide computerized list provisions,
               West Virginia created an interactive, computerized statewide voter
               registration system. According to state election officials, some
               counties had computerized voter registration systems prior to the
               enactment of HAVA, but they were not interconnected through a
               statewide computer system. Election officials hired a vendor to
               create the new statewide system, which went into service in
               January 2004 at a reported cost of approximately $1.9 million in
               federal funds. The new system also has election management
               capabilities beyond the requirements of HAVA, including the
               ability to produce reports on absentee ballots, early voters, poll
               workers, and election data statistics. It also provides a separate
               database to track poll workers.

               To implement HAVA, West Virginia developed the capability to
               verify voter registration application information by comparing
               name, date of birth, and driver's license number or the last four
               digits of the voter's Social Security number with motor vehicle
               agency (MVA) records. However, officials reported that the state
               had difficulty conducting data matches with MVA because MVA lacked
               the ability to interface with the statewide voter list. Officials
               said that they expected this problem to be resolved by 2006. Since
               the enactment of HAVA, the state system checks new applications
               for duplicates, automatically flags duplicates, and notifies
               county officials to eliminate them.

               West Virginia is in the process of finalizing the agreement with
               the Social Security Administration (SSA) to allow a comparison
               between voter eligibility information and SSA data as required by
               HAVA. This agreement will enable state officials to compare the
               last four digits of a voter's Social Security number with SSA
               records. Officials reported that they expected the agreement to be
               completed by December 2005.

               Prior to HAVA, county voter registration systems could only check
               for duplicates within the county, and local officials could only
               check felony and death lists using paper records. Since the
               enactment of HAVA, election officials have taken steps to maintain
               the accuracy of the statewide voter registration list by
               coordinating the list with other state agency records, as
               described below.

               o  Duplicate registrants. West Virginia checked the entire
               database for duplicates during the implementation of its new
               statewide system. The county clerks also periodically check the
               system for duplicate registrants.

               o  Deceased registrants. County officials maintain the voter
               registration list through a monthly comparison of the list with
               state death records. At the time of this report, officials rely on
               oral and paper records to identify any matches by checking name,
               address, date of birth, and the last four digits of the Social
               Security number. Officials said they expected in the future to
               conduct these comparisons electronically.

               o  Disqualified felons. County officials receive paper records
               from federal and state courts on disqualifying felony convictions.

               o  Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The
               state does not conduct list maintenance based on this information.

               Local officials are responsible for updating voter information and
               for removing voter records; state officials said that they follow
               the National Voter Registration Act provisions for removing names
               from the list. In general, section 8 of NVRA provides that, in the
               administration of voter registration for federal elections, states
               may not remove names of registrants for non-voting and that names
               of registrants may be removed only for certain specified reasons.

               West Virginia officials also said that meeting the time frames
               they established for developing their computerized lists was
               challenging, in part because of limited staff available to
               complete the work. The officials stated that it might have been
               better to introduce the system incrementally. West Virginia
               officials also reported that the counties resisted moving from
               county-based systems to the statewide system in part because many
               of them viewed the new statewide system as an intrusion into a
               domain of election administration that had been a local-not a
               state-responsibility. Involving county officials in designing and
               implementing the system, the state officials said, might have
               simplified implementation of the new system. Other challenges
               reported by West Virginia officials included data conversion,
               obtaining timely approvals for purchases, changing necessary
               provisions of state law, and overcoming technology problems.

               William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777, or jenkinswo@gao.gov

               In addition to the contact person named above, John Mortin,
               Assistant Director; David Alexander; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein;
               Michelle Fejfar; Geoff Hamilton; E. Anne Laffoon; Jean Orland; Dan
               Rodriguez; Miquel Salas: Stephanie Sand; and Ashanta Williams made
               key contributions to this report.

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    28We reported in the past that state election officials we interviewed
    expressed concerns regarding (1) the receipt of inaccurate voter
    registration applications from voter registration drives sponsored by
    nongovernmental organizations and (2) failure of these organizations to
    submit completed applications to election officials. See GAO-05-997 .

    29For additional information on best practices associated with acquiring
    and implementing vote systems, see GAO-05-956 .

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix I: Objectives,
    Scope, and Methodology

    Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
    Registration List Provisions Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in
    Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter Registration List Provisions

    Appendix III: Reported ExperiencElecReg Appendix III: Reported Experiences
    of Alaska Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List
    Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications

    1Alaska does not have counties; instead, there are four election regions
    responsible for administering elections. The state director of elections
    appoints the regional election supervisors.

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix IV: RAri H Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Arizona Election
    Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix V: ReElecReg Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia Election
    Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix VI: RElecReg Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election
    Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix VII: Ke H Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election
    Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix VIII: Minne H Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Minnesota
    Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix IX: R C H Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South Carolina
    Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix X: ReDakota EVoter Reg Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South
    Dakota Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List
    Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix XI: RVirginia Ele H Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West
    Virginia Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List
    Provisions

    Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications

    Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists

    Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Appendix XII: A Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    Acknowledgments

    (440369)

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    For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8777
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    Highlights of GAO-06-247 , a report to the Chairman, Committee on the
    Judiciary, House of Representatives

    February 2006

    ELECTION REFORM

    Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for
    Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists

    The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to help
    ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote. Under HAVA, as
    of January 1, 2004, states were to create computerized statewide voter
    registration lists to serve as official rosters of legally registered
    voters for elections for federal office. States, however, were given the
    option to seek a waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions
    until 2006. All but nine states did so.

    This report discusses the experiences of the nine states that were subject
    to the original HAVA deadline-Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
    Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report
    describes actions election officials in these states reported taking to
    meet specific HAVA requirements-as applicable to their states-for (1)
    establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2)
    verifying the accuracy of information on voter registration applications
    and maintaining accurate computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting
    what states said about challenges they faced and lessons learned
    implementing the requirements.

    Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the nine states; the
    Election Assistance Commission, which was responsible for coordinating
    HAVA waivers; and the Department of Justice. GAO incorporated technical
    comments, as appropriate.

    To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified
    existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state
    replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created statewide
    voter registration systems for the first time, according to election
    officials (see below). Officials from the ninth state reported no actions
    were taken because the state had such a registration list in place prior
    to HAVA.

    State election officials reported they took steps to verify information
    provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter lists
    as required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the process of
    completing the required matches of voter registration information with
    state motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration records.
    Officials from all nine states reported conducting the list maintenance
    activities required by HAVA: eliminating duplicate registrations and
    coordinating the voter list with state agency records on felons and the
    deceased to identify and remove the names of ineligible registrants.
    According to officials from four states, implementing HAVA improved the
    accuracy of the voter lists, for example, by correcting errors in voter
    information before they were entered into the statewide list. Officials
    from the other five states reported little to no improvements to the
    accuracy of their lists in part, some said, because they had established
    systems similar to those required by HAVA prior to the enactment of the
    law.

    State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned
    lessons while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example, officials
    from seven states reported their experiences taught them that
    collaborating with local officials to develop the computerized statewide
    systems later helped them successfully implement the systems.

    States GAO Contacted Regarding Implementation of Required Registration
    Lists
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