Defense Acquisitions: Joint Forces Command's Limited Acquisition
Authority (22-NOV-05, GAO-06-240R).
In recent years, Congress has expressed concern that urgent joint
warfighting requirements are not always met in the most
expeditious manner, particularly command and control and
blue-force-tracking capabilities that reduce the chances of
friendly-fire casualties. In the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136), Congress gave the U.S.
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA)
to address these and other joint-warfighting challenges. LAA is
an authority aimed at ensuring that measures to meet urgent,
unanticipated joint warfighting needs are conceived, developed,
and fielded in an expeditious manner. Enacted for a 3-year
period, LAA will expire after September 30, 2006. The Act
required GAO to determine the extent to which LAA has been used.
Specifically, we focused on (1) how JFCOM used the authority
during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, (2) the processes and
procedures JFCOM developed to implement the authority, and (3)
the challenges of implementing it. In covering these areas, we
did not evaluate the quality of the projects undertaken or the
value added of the equipment provided to the warfighter under
LAA.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-240R
ACCNO: A41957
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Joint Forces Command's Limited
Acquisition Authority
DATE: 11/22/2005
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Financial analysis
Financial management
Military policies
Military procurement
Policy evaluation
Program evaluation
Program implementation
Policies and procedures
******************************************************************
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GAO-06-240R
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
November 22, 2005
The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Subject: Defense Acquisitions: Joint Forces Command's Limited Acquisition
Authority
In recent years, Congress has expressed concern that urgent joint
warfighting requirements are not always met in the most expeditious
manner, particularly command and control and blue-force-tracking
capabilities that reduce the chances of friendly-fire casualties. In the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136),
Congress gave the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Limited Acquisition
Authority (LAA) to address these and other joint-warfighting challenges.
LAA is an authority aimed at ensuring that measures to meet urgent,
unanticipated joint warfighting needs are conceived, developed, and
fielded in an expeditious manner. Enacted for a 3-year period, LAA will
expire after September 30, 2006. The Act required GAO to determine the
extent to which LAA has been used. Specifically, we focused on (1) how
JFCOM used the authority during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, (2) the
processes and procedures JFCOM developed to implement the authority, and
(3) the challenges of implementing it. In covering these areas, we did not
evaluate the quality of the projects undertaken or the value added of the
equipment provided to the warfighter under LAA.
Summary
During the first 2 years, fiscal years 2004 and 2005, JFCOM used LAA for
six projects. Five were completed 2 to 17 months after being approved,
while the sixth is not yet complete. Fielded capabilities include a
precision air drop system for small (e.g., 2,000 pounds) logistics
packages; a system designed to identify and locate improvised explosive
devices; a system to improve blue-force-tracking to prevent friendly-fire
casualties; and advanced, mobile, command and control systems for
commanders. According to JFCOM, these projects accelerated capabilities to
the warfighter by providing 60- to 80-percent interim solutions rather
than waiting years for a 100-percent solution. The Command leverages
existing technologies, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, and
on-going agency research and development efforts for its LAA projects.
Funding for completed projects has totaled about $9 million in research,
development, test, and evaluation funds, ranging from about $500,000 to $3
million per project. No procurement funding has been used. Funding has
mostly come from JFCOM. The sixth project is a hands-free two-way
translator that seeks to provide real-time translation between spoken
English and other spoken languages, particularly Iraqi Arabic.
For the six projects, JFCOM has been following a set of policies and
practices, which it formalized in July 2005. To use the LAA, JFCOM can
only consider those requests that are to meet a combatant command's needs.
Once a request is received, JFCOM follows a process to define, fund, and
execute a project to satisfy the request. In general, the process consists
of multiple phases, including concept development; proposal review using
specified criteria, including checks for duplication of effort;
feasibility studies and final approval by the JFCOM commander; finding
project funding; arranging for contracting; and executing the project.
JFCOM has decided to manage its process with a staff of generally 2
part-time people. For contracting, JFCOM mostly relies on other
organizations, including five Department of Defense (DOD) organizations
that have been directed by the DOD to assist with the LAA. Finally, while
the JFCOM LAA staff brokers the LAA process and facilitates the projects,
it does not actually execute them. Execution is mostly handled by
traditional acquisition organizations, such as service development
organizations.
In implementing LAA, JFCOM has faced challenges in finding funding for and
sustaining LAA projects. Our work has shown that assessing the
effectiveness and utility of the capabilities after they have been fielded
has also been a challenge. Because LAA is an authority, not a program, it
does not have budgeted funds. To implement an LAA project, JFCOM LAA staff
must find a source for the funds, such as from a service, existing program
of record, or defense agency. This keeps the projects austere, but adds to
the time it takes to get a new capability to the field. In some cases,
JFCOM has taken funds from its own programs to pay for LAA projects. After
a capability has been acquired, an obligation for sustainment is created,
which LAA does not cover. JFCOM tries to identify a Service, defense
agency, or other entity's program of record to adopt it for long-term
sustainment. Finally, JFCOM has not had a systematic process to assess the
effectiveness and utility of the LAA capabilities after fielding. JFCOM
officials informed us that they are currently changing LAA processes and
procedures to require effectiveness assessment plans as part of LAA
proposals.
Background
LAA is intended to allow JFCOM to rapidly provide battle management,
command and control, communications, and intelligence equipment, and any
other equipment the JFCOM commander determines is necessary to facilitate
the use of joint forces in military operations or enhance the
interoperability of equipment used by joint forces. The law limits the
size of LAA projects to those with estimated costs per system of less than
$10 million for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and
less than $50 million for procurement.
JFCOM is one of the nine combatant commands in DOD and provides
joint-capable forces and joint capabilities that support the Global War on
Terrorism and combatant commanders' operational needs. Also, JFCOM is
DOD's joint-force integrator and interoperability advocate for the
combatant commands, leads joint-force transformation and joint
experimentation in DOD, and produces joint concepts and capabilities.
LAA is one of several authorities for rapid acquisition that has been
created to try to put improved warfighting capabilities in the field
faster than the conventional acquisition processes typically allow. One
such authority is the Secretary of Defense's Rapid Acquisition Authority
(RAA), which allows the Secretary to identify equipment as urgently needed
to eliminate a combat-capability deficiency that has resulted in combat
fatalities. LAA is broader than RAA authority. RAA allows the acquisition
of only specific equipment that eliminates a capability deficiency that
has already caused combat fatalities, and RAA projects must be approved by
the Secretary of Defense. LAA allows the acquisition of many types of
equipment before and after combat fatalities occur, and LAA projects are
approved by the JFCOM commander. According to JFCOM officials, it is only
through LAA that JFCOM has the authority to satisfy the unanticipated,
unbudgeted, urgent mission needs of other combatant commands.
JFCOM Has Used LAA for Six Projects
Since its enactment, JFCOM has used LAA for six projects. Five were
completed and deployed-primarily to warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan-2
to 17 months after being approved. A sixth project is ongoing. According
to JFCOM, these completed projects accelerated capabilities to the
warfighter by providing 60- to 80-percent interim solutions to battlefield
problems, rather than waiting years for a 100-percent solution. Total cost
for the five completed projects has been about $9 million in RDT&E funds.
Procurement funds have not been used so far. Details are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Description of the Six LAA Projects
Number of
months to
complete
LAA cost project
after
($ in request Deployment
Project name Capability provided millions) approved dates
Change Detection Detect landmines and $0.55 5 - 11 November
Work Station improvised explosive 2004 -
devices along convoy
routes by using May 2005
visual imagery to
identify and locate
changes in terrain.
Command and Improved $1.95 11 - 14 April 2005
Control on the communication package - July 2005
Move for commanders,
allowing broadband
reach-back to
information while on
the move over rough
terrain or dismounted
from a vehicle.
Joint Precision High-altitude $2.19 16 - 17 September
Air Drop System precision air drop of 2005 -
2,000 Pounds logistics support
packages for forces October
where ground delivery 2005
or an airfield is not
available.
Joint Task Force For joint task force $0.85 4 - 15 September
Commander commanders, remote 2004 -
Executive Command access to classified
and Control and unclassified August 2005
networks while away
from the headquarters
compound.
Joint Translator Provides $3.38 2 - 5 June 2005 -
Forwarder-Rapid machine-to-machine
Attack transfer of September
Information blue-force-tracking 2005
Dissemination data from battle
Execution management, command
Relay-Joint Blue and control systems
Force Situational to strike aircraft by
Awareness integrating
blue-force-tracking
capabilities across
the theater.
Simultaneous Expected to provide a $15.0: $6.4 On-going On-going
2-Way Speech hands-free device for RDT&E + $8.6
Translation simultaneous procurement
translation of (estimated)
American English to
Iraqi Arabic and vice
versa.
JFCOM has drawn on extant, mature technologies for its LAA projects. In
addition, JFCOM has used parts of existing service or defense-agency
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and other efforts to rapidly
develop and/or acquire a new, joint capability for the warfighter. For
example, the Change Detection Work Station project originated from an
extant Joint Area Clearance Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration that
uses visual imagery to detect land mines by detecting changes in terrain.
Using LAA, this technology was modified to detect improvised explosive
devices along convoy routes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the Joint
Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds project originated from an extant
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration focused on developing precision
air-drop systems for 10,000- and 30,000-pound loads. Using LAA, this
technology was modified to handle much smaller loads for re-supplying
Special Operations teams operating in Iraq. Half of the LAA projects
originated from existing, joint technology demonstration programs.
According to JFCOM, LAA projects also can originate from commercial- and
government-off-the-shelf products and one of JFCOM's subordinate
commands-the Joint Systems Integration Command.
Processes and Procedures Used By JFCOM to Manage LAA
JFCOM has adopted a number of processes and procedures to manage LAA.
These include processes and criteria for screening requests for LAA
projects. JFCOM uses a small staff to manage the LAA process, and
leverages and partners with a variety of other organizations to fund,
contract for, and execute LAA projects.
JFCOM Uses a Process to Screen Requests for LAA Projects
For the six projects undertaken so far, JFCOM has been following a
process, which it formalized in July 2005. The LAA process consists of
multiple phases, which can be tailored to meet requests as expeditiously
as possible. The phases are:
o Proposal Receipt - JFCOM can only consider those requests or
proposals that come from or are validated by a combatant command.
A request or proposal may come directly from a combatant command,
or may be submitted by a component commander or service. However,
in the latter case, JFCOM cannot consider the request unless a
combatant command validates it as an urgent operational need in
its assigned area of responsibility.
o Feasibility Assessment - the requested capability must be
readily obtainable or have a reasonable expectation of being
developed in a year. The assessment includes a technical
evaluation; value versus cost determination; ascertaining if
parallel or competing initiatives are underway; assessing materiel
and non-materiel approaches to resolve the shortfall or
interoperability deficiency; and determination of whether a proof
of concept evaluation is required and what pass/fail criteria
should be applied. Exploratory testing of various system elements
or of the entire system is conducted if necessary as part of this
feasibility assessment.
o Proposal Review and Approval - the JFCOM Judge Advocate's
Office reviews the proposed project to make sure it complies with
the LAA statute. The JFCOM commander has final approval authority.
o Locating and Obtaining Funding - JFCOM develops a plan of
action for the project, and finds funding. The JFCOM comptroller
reviews each project's funding to make sure the proper
appropriation is used and that total costs stay within LAA
statutory limits.
o Contracting - any new contracts or modifications to existing
contracts required for the project are obtained.
o Project Execution - the product is developed and/or acquired
and the capability delivered to the warfighter. JFCOM's oversight
and accountability for LAA capabilities ends within two years of
the approval of an LAA request.
The desired capability must not duplicate capabilities under development
elsewhere in DOD or that are part of an existing program of record or
program objective memorandum. The requested capability can, however,
accelerate such capabilities. To avoid duplication, according to JFCOM, it
coordinates with Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and
engineering and systems acquisition commands across DOD to determine if
the requested capability already exists. One effort to avoid duplication
involves the JFCOM science advisors. Each of the services has a science
advisor located at JFCOM who checks with the Defense Technical Information
Center, a repository of technical information in DOD. Another effort
involves a JFCOM official who coordinates with the Program Executive
Office Interchange-an initiative that supports Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps command and control program executive offices-to find out if
any similar efforts exist in the services.
Based on its screening process, JFCOM does not accept all requests made to
use LAA. For example, JFCOM rejected two requests during fiscal year 2004.
The Collaborative Information Environment was rejected because no
combatant command would validate it as an urgent operational need and the
cost exceeded LAA statutory limits. Another request, for the Joint
Extended Collaborative Environment, was rejected because again no
combatant command would validate it as an urgent operational need and the
Army was already developing a capability that met the need, according to
JFCOM.
Testing for LAA projects can be limited and is sometimes conducted by the
warfighter upon receipt of the capabilities. However, field operational
tests are conducted for all LAA capabilities, and training plans are
prepared before the capabilities are fielded, according to JFCOM
officials. Prior to the field operational tests, requirements for testing
LAA projects can vary depending on the equipment involved. For example, if
the LAA capability consists of commercial- or government-off-the-shelf
products that are already configured for military use, no hardware testing
would be required. On the other hand, if the LAA capability required new
software to be developed, it would have to be tested prior to delivery to
the warfighter.
JFCOM Uses a Small Staff to Manage LAA Process
JFCOM leverages and partners with a variety of other organizations to
fund, contract for, and execute LAA projects. This enables JFCOM to keep
its LAA staff small-generally 2 part-time people. Their primary role is to
identify and work with various organizations to leverage and form
partnerships for LAA projects. JFCOM officials commented that such
leveraging and partnering help to promote the concept of jointness. For
example, JFCOM has sought and obtained funds from the Naval Air Warfare
Center Weapons Division, China Lake, Calif., for the Change Detection Work
Station.
JFCOM, by choice, does not have dedicated acquisition staff for LAA
projects. For contracting services, JFCOM mostly relies on other
acquisition organizations in the services and defense agencies. For
example, Army and Navy acquisition organizations have provided contracting
services for various LAA projects. DOD has directed five acquisition
organizations to provide acquisition services for LAA on a priority basis;
however, JFCOM is not limited to using only these five. Similarly, staff
from a JFCOM subordinate command has directed or accomplished LAA
projects, but mostly the project execution staff is part of the service or
entity that is actually conducting the project. For example, the work for
the Change Detection Work Station was conducted at the Army Communications
and Electronics Command's Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate,
and the work on the Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds was
conducted at the Army Natick Soldier Center and at the Air Force Air
Mobility Command. A project's execution staff is part of JFCOM only if the
project is actually being executed by a JFCOM organization. For example,
the Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control project was
fully executed by a JFCOM subordinate command, the Joint Systems
Integration Command, and the Command and Control on the Move project was
partially executed by this command as well.
Challenges in Implementing LAA
JFCOM has experienced two challenges in implementing LAA: locating and
obtaining funding to move the project through the process, and arranging
for the sustainment of the LAA products once they have been fielded. Our
work has shown that assessing the effectiveness and utility of the
capabilities after they have been fielded has also been a challenge.
Funding LAA Projects and Sustaining LAA Products
Since LAA is an authority, not a program, it does not have budgeted funds.
After an LAA proposal is evaluated and approved by the JFCOM commander,
JFCOM LAA staff must locate and obtain funding in order to execute the
project. According to JFCOM officials, this is accomplished by contacting
various organizations to determine if they are able to provide funds to
support it.
While the search for funding provides incentives for coordination and
keeping projects austere, it also increases the length of time it takes to
field the capability. For example, it took about 17 months to field the
Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds. Seven months (40 percent) of
this time were required to locate and obtain the funding. It also took
several months to locate and obtain funding for the Joint Translator
Forwarder-Rapid Attack Information Dissemination Execution Relay-Joint
Blue Force Situational Awareness project. The proposal for this project
was originally submitted in fiscal year 2004, and two funding sources were
identified. However, one of these sources was unable to provide its share
of the funding in fiscal year 2004 as initially planned. Consequently, the
project was put on hold for about a year until fiscal year 2005 when it
could be fully funded. The capability was fielded about 6 months after
funding was obtained. Similarly, the Simultaneous 2-Way Speech Translation
project is now on-going, but it has not been funded. JFCOM staff is
searching for funding to execute it.
When locating funding for an LAA project proved especially difficult,
JFCOM funded all or part of the LAA project itself by offsetting funds
from its own programs. For example, JFCOM contributed funds to the Change
Detection Work Station, and fully funded the Command and Control on the
Move and Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control
projects. JFCOM officials commented that the loss of funds had a negative
impact on the donor programs.
LAA does not provide the authority for product sustainment after
deployment, yet capabilities fielded under LAA nonetheless must be
sustained in the field. According to JFCOM, product sustainment is covered
by operations and maintenance authority, which LAA does not include.
Therefore, once a capability has been acquired under LAA, JFCOM tries to
find an organization--such as a combatant command, service, defense
agency, or program of record-to adopt it for short- and long-term
sustainment. Although a system fielded under LAA typically belongs to the
combatant command that took custody of it, the command may not have funds
readily available to pay for the sustainment costs. JFCOM officials
commented that the timing of the DOD budget cycle is a primary factor for
organizations dealing with the sustainment issue. LAA capabilities are
acquired rapidly in response to urgent and emergent needs, and typically
fall outside the timeframes of the normal DOD budgeting cycle. As a
result, organizations usually have not budgeted for an LAA project or
sustainment of an LAA product. There is often a waiting period until
sustainment of the product can be included in the organization's next
budget cycle.
Thus far, JFCOM has used its own operations and maintenance funding
authority and funds to provide short-term sustainment during the "bridge"
period while LAA projects are awaiting adoption by another organization.
For example, in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Systems Integration
Command-one of JFCOM's subordinate commands-funded the sustainment costs
of the Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control project as
well as the Command and Control on the Move project. JFCOM has negotiated
long-term sustainment plans in place for four of the five fielded LAA
capabilities. For example, the Change Detection Work Station will be
integrated into a service program of record in fiscal year 2009 and the
Command and Control on the Move project in fiscal year 2006. However,
JFCOM is still searching for a program or organization to adopt the Joint
Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control capability in fiscal
year 2006.
Assessing the Effectiveness and Utility of LAA Projects
Capabilities provided by LAA projects are expected to provide tangible
benefits to the warfighter. For the six LAA projects, the expected
benefits include saving lives, vehicles, aircraft, and equipment;
improving command and control communication; reducing command and control
network and information-connection costs; and helping overcome shortages
of skilled linguists. Expected benefits also include providing information
on the performance of fielded capabilities to related programs of record.
However, JFCOM has not had a process in place to systematically and
routinely assess the effectiveness and utility of capabilities after they
have been fielded, or to capture performance information that can be
provided to other projects and programs. JFCOM has received some positive
feedback from warfighters about fielded capabilities, but it has been
largely limited and anecdotal. For example, positive email messages have
been received from recipients of two LAA products. In some cases more
concrete, albeit incomplete, performance data have been available. For
example, according to JFCOM, use of the Joint Task Force Commander
Executive Command and Control capability substantially reduced connection
costs. Also, indications are that the new blue-force-tracking capability
has significantly reduced the time needed to determine red targets.
JFCOM is currently in the process of revising the LAA process and
procedures to require that LAA proposals include a plan to assess the
effectiveness of the fielded capabilities. LAA projects will also be
required to provide that assessment to JFCOM.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of Defense had no comments on a draft of this report.
Scope and Methodology
To determine how JFCOM has used LAA during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we
obtained information on and documentation for all LAA projects from JFCOM,
located in Norfolk, Va. We also interviewed JFCOM officials, and officials
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy; and in the Joint
Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8), both
located in Arlington, Va. To describe the policies, processes, and
procedures for LAA, we obtained and analyzed the LAA directive and
instruction that JFCOM developed and issued in July 2005, and interviewed
JFCOM officials about them. We also obtained and analyzed information on
how these policies and processes are actually implemented. To identify the
challenges that JFCOM has faced in implementing LAA, we interviewed JFCOM
officials and analyzed documentary information. We did not obtain
information from other organizations significantly involved in JFCOM's use
of its LAA, such as the various organizations that JFCOM has leveraged and
partnered with for LAA projects or combatant commands receiving LAA
products.
We conducted our work from June to November 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Commander of JFCOM; and interested congressional committees. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov. If
you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4841. Key contributors to the report include D. Catherine
Baltzell, Joseph E. Dewechter, Bonita J.P. Oden, Sylvia Schatz, and Greg
Campbell.
Paul L. Francis Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Paul L. Francis Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management
(120469)
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