Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed  
to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts (31-JAN-06,	 
GAO-06-232).							 
                                                                 
The Air Force is in the process of transforming its force to meet
today's new and emerging threats. Its "Future Total Force"	 
concept is intended to maximize future capabilities by		 
integrating its active, National Guard, and reserve components to
a greater degree. While the Air Force was making force structure 
decisions and developing its 20-year plan, the Air National Guard
embarked on its own "Vanguard" transformation initiative to	 
ensure its role and relevance in the new Air Force. This report  
discusses (1) the processes and events that surrounded the Air	 
Force's development of its 20-year force structure plan,	 
including the involvement of key stakeholders and the development
of the Guard's Vanguard initiative, and (2) the extent to which  
the Air Force is utilizing key results-oriented management tools 
to guide its effort to identify new missions for the Air National
Guard and integrate active and Guard forces as part of its Future
Total Force effort.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-232 					        
    ACCNO:   A46080						        
  TITLE:     Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework 
Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts		 
     DATE:   01/31/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military policies					 
	     National Guard					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Stakeholder consultations				 
	     F-16 Aircraft					 
	     F-35 Aircraft					 
	     F/A-22 Aircraft					 
	     Joint Strike Fighter				 

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GAO-06-232

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * Stakeholder Views on Extent of Input and Transparency of For
          * Force Structure Planning Process Included Iterative Analysis
          * Stakeholder Participation and Perceptions of the Force Struc
          * Air National Guard Vanguard Strategy Initiated to Identify F
     * Air Force Proceeding with Future Total Force Implementation
          * Air Force Has Taken Initial Steps to Implement Future Total
          * The Air Force Has Not Fully Developed a Management Framework
     * Conclusion
     * Recommendations for Executive Action
     * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
     * Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * GAO Contact
          * Acknowledgments
               * Order by Mail or Phone

Defense Management

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Stakeholder Views on Extent of Input and Transparency of Force Structure
Development Process Differ 7
Air Force Proceeding with Future Total Force Implementation without a
Fully Developed Management Framework 18
Conclusion 26
Recommendations for Executive Action 27
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Tables

Table 1: Key Events and Stakeholder Participation in The Force Structure
Development Process 9
Table 2: Future Total Force Initiatives Announced by the Air Force in
December 2004 20
Table 3: Key Results-Oriented Management Tools 23

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 31, 2006 January 31, 2006

The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman Committee on Government
Reform House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Committee on
Government Reform House of Representatives The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The Honorable Frank LoBiondo House of Representatives The Honorable Frank
LoBiondo House of Representatives

The Air Force has developed a 20-year force structure plan that will
require billions of dollars to recapitalize, modernize, and upgrade its
inventory of aging aircraft. This force structure plan could potentially
result in a significant reduction in the number of existing fighter
aircraft-replaced by fewer aircraft that are intended to be more capable
and reliable-along with changes in the roles and missions of the Air
National Guard, and further integration of the active, Guard, and reserve
flying units. The Air Force intends to transform its force to meet new and
emerging threats-while supporting military operations at home and abroad
and preparing to implement changes resulting from the 2005 base closure
and realignment process. Recognizing that future capabilities to meet
these challenges will require a combination of new, more capable aircraft
that will cost billions of dollars, including $63.8 billion currently
estimated for the F/A-22, the Air Force has embarked on developing what it
calls the "Future Total Force" which is intended to integrate the active
and reserve components to a greater degree by using new organizational
constructs and realigning missions. The Air Force has developed a 20-year
force structure plan that will require billions of dollars to
recapitalize, modernize, and upgrade its inventory of aging aircraft. This
force structure plan could potentially result in a significant reduction
in the number of existing fighter aircraft-replaced by fewer aircraft that
are intended to be more capable and reliable-along with changes in the
roles and missions of the Air National Guard, and further integration of
the active, Guard, and reserve flying units. The Air Force intends to
transform its force to meet new and emerging threats-while supporting
military operations at home and abroad and preparing to implement changes
resulting from the 2005 base closure and realignment process. Recognizing
that future capabilities to meet these challenges will require a
combination of new, more capable aircraft that will cost billions of
dollars, including $63.8 billion currently estimated for the F/A-22, the
Air Force has embarked on developing what it calls the "Future Total
Force" which is intended to integrate the active and reserve components to
a greater degree by using new organizational constructs and realigning
missions.

As the Air Force begins to adjust and reduce its current force structure,
the Air National Guard has also recognized that it must be proactive in
helping the Air Force identify new roles and missions best suited for the
Guard so that it can remain a ready, reliable, and relevant component of
the Future Total Force. To prepare for the future, the Air National Guard
embarked on its own transformational effort-called the Vanguard As the Air
Force begins to adjust and reduce its current force structure, the Air
National Guard has also recognized that it must be proactive in helping
the Air Force identify new roles and missions best suited for the Guard so
that it can remain a ready, reliable, and relevant component of the Future
Total Force. To prepare for the future, the Air National Guard embarked on
its own transformational effort-called the Vanguard Engagement Strategy-to
ensure that it would continue its role as a key participant in the Air
Force's expeditionary force and defense of the homeland, as well as in
emerging mission areas.

Because of the significant impact that the Air Force's transformational
efforts could have on the future force structure and basing of the Air
National Guard, you asked us to examine the processes through which the
Air Force developed its force structure plans, its progress in identifying
new missions and organizational constructs for the Air Guard, and the
level of stakeholder involvement in the force structure development
process. Additionally, you expressed interest in the Air National Guard's
Vanguard transformation initiative. This report discusses (1) the
processes and events that surrounded the Air Force's development of its
20-year force structure plan, including the involvement of key
stakeholders and the development of the Guard's Vanguard initiative, and
(2) the extent to which the Air Force is using key results-oriented
management tools to guide its effort to identify new missions for the Air
National Guard and integrate active and Guard forces as part of its Future
Total Force effort.

To describe the processes and events surrounding the Air Force's
development of its 20-year force structure plan, we reviewed Air Force
guidance, directives, and instructions and interviewed current and former
officials of the Air Force Strategic Planning Directorate who led the
force structure development. We also interviewed key stakeholders involved
in this process including the Air National Guard Director and officials of
two major Air Force commands. We discussed the process with 10 adjutants
general1 to obtain their perspectives on the process. To guide our
selection of adjutants general to include in our review, we developed
criteria-including a mix of large and small states, a geographic mix of
states, and states with differing views on the Air Force's force structure
plans and the Guard's Vanguard program-and evaluated each state and
territory against these criteria. We also interviewed Air Force Studies
and Analyses Agency officials to discuss modeling and analyses they
performed to evaluate various force structure options. We reviewed the Air
National Guard's Vanguard Engagement Strategy and held discussions with
senior Air Guard officials, including several adjutants general, to
determine how the strategy was related to the Air Force's force structure
development process. We did not evaluate the Air Force's base closure and
realignment assessment and recommendations process as part of this report,
but did separately report on the overall Department of Defense (DOD) base
closure and realignment process in July 2005.2 To assess the extent to
which the Air Force is using key management tools in developing new
missions for the Air National Guard and integrating the active and reserve
component forces, we reviewed key documents and our prior work on the
management tools consistently found in successful organizations. We also
discussed these tools with senior directorate officials to obtain their
perspectives and discussed their efforts to develop a strategic plan. We
did not evaluate the process the Air Force is using to identify and
validate new missions for the Guard. Although much of the information on
the force structure development process was testimonial from participants
in the process, we assessed this information by comparing it to supporting
documentation, when available, and corroborated it through additional
interviews to determine consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of
these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional information on our
scope and methodology appears in appendix I.

1 We interviewed the adjutants general of 10 states-Colorado, Connecticut,
Maryland, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and
Virginia.

We conducted our review from September 2004 through November 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                Results in Brief

The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force
structure plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level DOD and
Air Force officials, and a complex process of modeling and analysis;
however, stakeholders have different views on the transparency of the
process and the extent to which the Air Force sought and addressed input
from process participants. Moreover, the adjutants general were not
directly involved because the Air Force relied on the Air National Guard
to represent the states' perspectives. The force structure plan developed
by the Air Force included a reduction in the legacy fighter fleet-which
resides largely within the Air National Guard-and the acquisition of new
aircraft such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In late 2004,
following completion of the Air Force's process to develop the 20-year
force structure plan, a departmentwide shift in funding priorities by the
Secretary of Defense reduced the number of F/A-22 aircraft to be acquired.
This decision resulted in changes to the Air Force's 20-year force
structure plan as the Air Force delayed retirement plans for some of its
F-16 aircraft to accommodate F/A-22 reductions. This revised force
structure plan was provided to the Air Force's base closure team and was
used to develop base realignment and closure recommendations. Significant
modifications to those recommendations were subsequently made by the
congressionally chartered Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which
issued its own recommendations to the President on September 8, 2005.
However, the Quadrennial Defense Review, expected to be completed in
February 2006, may require further changes to the Air Force's force
structure plan. Perspectives on how well the Air Force's force structure
development process worked vary depending on the role and level of
involvement of each organization. For example, Air Force officials viewed
the process as participatory and noted that the Air National Guard Bureau
and the Air Force's major commands had direct representation on the force
structure development team. In contrast, Air National Guard officials and
officials from one major Air Force command expressed concerns about their
ability to influence decisions and 7 of the 10 adjutants general that we
contacted believed that they did not have sufficient opportunity to
influence the force structure decisions. Because documentation of the
proceedings and issues discussed at key meetings attended by the Air
Force, the Air National Guard, and the adjutants general was limited, we
were unable to evaluate the extent to which stakeholders were able to
influence the force structure development process. To prepare Air National
Guard units in each state to respond to anticipated force structure
reductions, the Air National Guard began a separate effort, referred to as
the Vanguard Engagement Strategy, to begin transforming the Guard and
solicit input from the states on future roles and missions for the Guard
to keep it relevant and ready to support future Air Force requirements.
The Vanguard Strategy remains the framework through which the Air Guard
develops and refines its input to the Air Force's transformation efforts.

2 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

The Air Force has taken steps to identify some new missions for the Air
National Guard and test new ways of integrating active, Guard, and reserve
units as part of its Future Total Force transformational effort, but lacks
a fully developed management framework to guide the process and evaluate
the results. The Air Force has taken two important steps in implementing
its Future Total Force concept. First, in December 2004, the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force announced test initiatives in six states to test
new Air Guard missions and new ways to integrate the active and reserve
components. The Air Force has continued to evaluate and prioritize
additional initiatives over the past several months. Second, in March
2005, the Air Force established the Future Total Force Directorate, with a
2-year term, to guide the implementation of the Future Total Force
concept. Driven by recent force structure and base closure decisions, this
new directorate has focused largely on identifying new missions and
implementing new constructs to integrate active, Guard, and reserve
forces. Our prior work and the work of others show that organizations
undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of
success by adopting a results-oriented management framework, which
includes key management practices and a strategy that includes
results-oriented management tools, to guide implementation efforts and
achieve desired program outcomes.3 Although the Future Total Force
Directorate has drafted a strategic plan that according to directorate
officials would address many of these results-oriented management tools,
the plan is not yet approved. Consequently, until the strategic plan is
approved, there is no requirement that those involved in implementing the
Future Total Force concept-including the Air Staff, Air Combat Command,
and Air National Guard-use the plan to guide their efforts. The
directorate has also established some steps to evaluate the six test
initiatives, but these steps do not provide a comprehensive, methodical,
and readily evident approach to evaluate the success of the new
organizational constructs being tested so that the Air Force can determine
the most cost effective ways to organize active and reserve forces to
carry out the National Defense Strategy. By moving ahead with its efforts
to implement the Future Total Force concept without a comprehensive
results-oriented management framework, the Air Force may not be able to
efficiently and effectively achieve the transformation to the Future Total
Force, adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding transformation, or
fully evaluate its test initiatives and overall program results.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Air Force to strengthen the recently established Future Total Force
Directorate's management efforts by completing a strategic plan that fully
reflects results-oriented management principles, setting specific time
frames to accelerate the plan's approval, and developing an evaluation
plan for assessing the success or failure of its initiatives designed to
test new organizational constructs. In written comments on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with our recommendations and provided information on
the actions it plans to take to address them. The Air Force completed and
approved the Future Total Force strategic plan and stated that it is
aggressively working toward its goal of having a clear and comprehensive
plan for evaluating Future Total Force alternatives.

3 GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

                                   Background

The Air Force's aircraft fleet is currently the oldest in the service's
history. The average age of the service's aircraft is 23 years, and many
tankers and bombers are more than 40 years old. The service has stated
that the biggest challenge it faces over the next two decades is replacing
its aging aircraft. Accordingly, the Air Force plans to retire some of its
older fighters such as the F-16 and has begun purchasing new aircraft such
as the F/A-22, currently being fielded, and the F-35 Joint Strike fighter,
which is currently under development. At the same time it modernizes and
recapitalizes, the Air Force anticipates facing changing and harder to
define adversaries; an increased demand for support to combat operations;
and affordability challenges.

The Air National Guard is a reserve component of the United States Air
Force. It performs both federal and state missions, consists of about
107,000 members, and makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force. The
Air National Guard plays a key role in the Air Force's Aerospace
Expeditionary Force,4 including providing 100 percent of the air
sovereignty missions, 49 percent of theater airlifts, and 45 percent of
tanker missions. Since September 11, 2001, Air National Guard pilots and
aircraft have played a key role in worldwide Air Force operations,
participating in Operation Noble Eagle defending the skies over the United
States; Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; and Operation Iraqi
Freedom in Iraq. In their state role, Air National Guard units report to
the governor of their respective state, territory (Puerto Rico, Guam,
Virgin Islands), or the commanding general of the District of Columbia
National Guard and participate in emergency relief support during natural
disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue
operations; support to civil authorities; maintenance of vital public
services; and counter-drug operations. Most recently, the Air National
Guard was involved in the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in
September 2005.

4 The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as the Air
and Space Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve, and Guard
into one component that trains, deploys, and operates together. This force
is comprised of fighters, bombers, tankers, and tactical air lifters.

The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each have
a role in the management of the Air National Guard. The Air Force and its
major commands play a key role in determining the Air National Guard's
force structure, approving new missions, and equipping the Guard to
perform its missions. In addition, the Air National Guard largely relies
on the Air Force to provide its funding through the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution process. The National Guard Bureau administers
the federal functions of the Air National Guard and works with the Air
Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate programs that directly affect
the Guard. The Bureau also formulates and administers programs for
training, development, and maintenance of Air National Guard units. In
accordance with Title 10 of the United States Code, the National Guard
Bureau also acts as the channel of communication between the Air Force and
the 54 states and territories where National Guard units are located.5

Additionally, National Guard units in each of the 54 states and
territories are commanded by an Air Force or Army officer known as the
adjutant general. The adjutants general are, for the most part, state or
territory employees and work for the governor. The adjutants general are
responsible for overseeing Guard units' federal and state missions and may
also serve as state emergency management directors. The adjutants general
are advocates for the views of their state and work closely with the
National Guard Bureau, Air Force, and Army to ensure the National Guard is
ready to respond to the nation's needs both overseas and domestically.

    Stakeholder Views on Extent of Input and Transparency of Force Structure
                           Development Process Differ

From November 2002 through September 2004, the Air Force developed a
20-year force structure plan through a multistep, iterative process that
included periodic review and oversight by senior-level Air Force, Air
National Guard, and DOD officials and a complex process of modeling and
analysis; however, stakeholders have different views on the transparency
of the process and the extent to which the Air Force sought and addressed
input from process participants. Moreover, the adjutants general were not
directly involved because the Air Force relied on the Air National Guard
to represent the states' perspectives. A wide range of perspectives exist
on how well this process worked, depending on the role and level of
involvement of each organization. Limited documentation exists to show the
various organizations represented at planning meetings and briefings, but
the documentation does not indicate what issues were discussed or whether
input was sought from all participants. Therefore, we were unable to
evaluate the extent to which stakeholder interests influenced the Air
Force's proposed force structure, which was referred to as the Beacon
Force. To prepare the Air National Guard units in each state for the
anticipated force structure reductions, the Director, Air National Guard,
began a separate effort known as the Vanguard Engagement Strategy to
solicit input from the states on future roles and missions for the Air
National Guard to support future Air Force requirements within whatever
force structure emerged from the force structure planning process.
Although this effort also met with some resistance from participants, it
continues to be the framework through which the Air National Guard
provides input to the Air Force's Future Total Force initiative.

5 10 U.S.C. S:10501.

Force Structure Planning Process Included Iterative Analysis and Periodic
Oversight

The Air Force used a multistep, iterative process to develop its 20-year
force structure plan-also referred to as the 2025 force structure plan.
The Air Force began to develop its long-term plan in response to a
provision in the Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended through
2003, which required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress a
20-year force structure plan beginning with fiscal year 2005.6 According
to current and former Air Force officials, as the service began projecting
its existing force structure plans over the 20-year period, it believed
that the existing plan it had in place would be unaffordable in the longer
term and took several steps to develop a more affordable plan that would
still provide required capabilities.

The Air Force's Strategic Planning Directorate led this 2-year effort-from
November 2002 through September 2004-to develop a more affordable
long-term force structure plan with the intention of using the 2025 force
structure plan as the basis for both base realignment and closure
decisions and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.7 Table 1 provides a
chronology of the key events surrounding the force structure development
and summarizes stakeholder participation in the process.

6 Pub. L. No. 107-107, section 2912(a) (1) (A) required DOD to develop a
20-year force structure plan as the basis for its base closure and
realignment analysis. The plan was to begin with fiscal year 2005 and be
based on an assessment of the (1) probable threats to U.S. national
security during the 20-year period, (2) the probable end-strength levels
and major force units needed to meet the threats, and (3) the anticipated
level of funding available for national defense.

Table 1: Key Events and Stakeholder Participation in The Force Structure
Development Process

                                                        Stakeholders          
                                                        participating and     
Time frame     Key events                            providing input       
November 2002-    o  Air Force Strategic Planning       o  Chief of Staff  
April 2003        Directorate began planning for        of the Air Force   
                     development of affordable 20-year     o  Air Force       
                     force structure plan to meet Base     four-star generals 
                     Closure and Realignment Act           o  Director, Air   
                     requirements                          National Guard     
                     o  Initial meetings held to           o  Chief, Air      
                     solicit stakeholder input on          Force Reserve      
                     current and future force structure    o  Major commands  
                     plans                                 o  Air Force       
                     o  CORONAa and Chief of Staff         Studies and        
                     briefed on the current plan/broad     Analyses Agency    
                     options                            
May 2003          o  Stakeholders asked to provide      o  Chief of Staff  
                     current, future unconstrained, and    of the Air Force   
                     future constrained force structure    o  Major commands  
                     plans                                 o  Air Force       
                     o  Strategic Planning Directorate     Studies and        
                     determined that an integrated         Analyses Agency    
                     long-term force structure plan        o  Air National    
                     does not exist and, projected over    Guard              
                     the long-term, current major          o  Air Force       
                     command plans are unaffordable        Reserve Command    
                     o  Chief of Staff briefed on       
                     results                            
June 2003         o  CORONA members briefed on          o  Air Force       
                     current, constrained, and             four-star generals 
                     "strawman" force structure based      o  Director, Air   
                     on initial plans from major           National Guard     
                     commands                              o  Chief, Air      
                     o  CORONA members approved            Force Reserve      
                     follow-on briefings to major       
                     commands                           
July - August     o  "Strawman" force structure         o  Major commands  
2003              briefed to major commands, Air        o  Air Force       
                     National Guard, and Air Force         Studies and        
                     Reserve Command to inform and         Analyses Agency    
                     obtain input                          o  Air National    
                     o  Developed consolidated             Guard              
                     long-term force structure plan to     o  Air Force       
                     balance competing priorities of       Reserve Command    
                     all major commands                 
September 2003    o  Chief of Staff and Air Force       o  Secretary of    
                     Secretary briefed on long-term        the Air Force      
                     force structure plan                  o  Chief of Staff  
                     o  Four-star generals and Air         of the Air Force   
                     National Guard Director briefed on    o  Air Force       
                     force structure plan; including       four-star generals 
                     specific reductions to legacy         o  Director, Air   
                     fleet and need to consolidate         National Guard     
                     active and reserve components      
                     o  Force structure plan submitted  
                     to Joint Staff as initial          
                     submission for base realignment    
                     and closure process                
November 2003     o  CORONA members briefed on force    o  Air Force       
                     structure plan; questions arose on    four-star generals 
                     "optimum" force structure option      o  Director, Air   
                                                           National Guard     
                                                           o  Chief, Air      
                                                           Force Reserve      
January -         o  Air Force "Tiger Team" formed      o  Air Staff       
February 2004     to address CORONA concerns and        o  Air Force       
                     validate long-term force structure    Studies and        
                     plan; efforts focused on the          Analyses Agency    
                     combat air force (i.e., fighters,     o  Major commands  
                     bombers) and verifying                o  Air National    
                     capabilities provided                 Guard              
                     o  Air Force Studies and Analyses  
                     Agency evaluated options to        
                     optimize combat force capabilities 
                     within anticipated funding levels  
                     o  Periodic briefings provided to  
                     stakeholders including major       
                     commands and Air National Guard    
                     o  Air Force "optimal" option      
                     became known as the Beacon Force   
                     o  Detailed plans developed for    
                     fiscal year 2006 budget submission 
                     based on Beacon Force              
May 2004          o  Air Force Secretary and Chief      o  Secretary of    
                     of Staff and then CORONA members      the Air Force      
                     briefed on the Beacon Force           o  Chief of Staff  
                     o  Beacon Force approved as Air       of the Air Force   
                     Force 2025 force structure plan       o  Air Force       
                                                           four-star generals 
                                                           o  Director, Air   
                                                           National Guard     
                                                           o  Chief, Air      
                                                           Force Reserve      
June 2004         o  2025 force structure plan          o  Deputy          
                     briefed to Deputy Secretary of        Secretary of       
                     Defense                               Defense            
                                                           o  Secretary of    
                                                           the Air Force      
                                                           o  Chief of Staff  
                                                           of the Air Force   
                                                           o  Air Staff       
July 2004         o  2025 force structure plan          o  Secretary of    
                     briefed to adjutants general          the Air Force      
                     conference                            o  Chief of Staff  
                                                           of the Air Force   
                                                           o  Air Staff       
                                                           o  Director, Air   
                                                           National Guard     
                                                           o  Adjutants       
                                                           general            
September 2004    o  The Secretary of Defense and       o  Secretary of    
                     senior leadership briefed on the      Defense            
                     2025 force structure plan             o  Senior          
                     o  Secretary of Defense approved      Leadership Review  
                     the Air Force's proposed 2025         Group              
                     force structure plan                  o  Air Force       
                                                           Senior Leadership  
December 2004     o  Office of the Secretary of         o  Secretary of    
                     Defense issued Program Budget         Defense            
                     Decision 753 which reduced funding    o  Air Staff       
                     for the F/A-22 and ended           
                     procurement in 2008 rather than    
                     2011                               
                     o  Air Force adjusted its approved 
                     force structure plan to slow       
                     retirement of F-16 aircraft to     
                     compensate for F/A-22 reduction    
March 2005        o  In accordance with the Base        o  Secretary of    
                     Closure and Realignment Act, the      Defense            
                     Secretary of Defense submitted the 
                     Air Force's revised 20-year force  
                     structure plan to the Congress as  
                     part of DOD's submission           

7 The congressionally mandated 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, scheduled
for publication in February 2006, is a DOD-wide, comprehensive review
intended to provide a basic strategy for addressing critical issues such
as budget and acquisition priorities, emerging threats, force
modernization, and the force structure required for the next 20 years.

Source: GAO's analysis of Air Force information.

aCORONA is a term the Air Force uses for meetings of its four-star
generals and senior leadership held three times a year to discuss
servicewide issues.

As shown in table 1, between November 2002 and April 2003, the directorate
held a series of meetings with subject matter experts from across the
service, including representatives from the Air Staff, major commands
(e.g., Air Combat Command), Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command,
and Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, to identify the existing
long-term force structure plan and solicit input on the future plan. The
directorate determined that while episodic attempts had been made at
establishing a long-term plan in the past, an integrated, comprehensive,
and fiscally realistic plan simply did not exist.8

As the directorate developed the 2025 force structure plan, the major
commands, the Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command were asked
to provide input to the process, according to Air Force officials. The
directorate provided periodic briefings to the senior leadership of the
Air Force, the major commands, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force
Reserve Command throughout the force structure development process.
According to the former Deputy Director of the Strategic Planning
Directorate who led the development effort, the directorate adjusted the
force structure plan several times based on input from stakeholders and
guidance from senior Air Force leadership, before reaching agreement on a
consolidated long-term force structure plan that balanced the competing
priorities of all of the major commands across the Air Force. He further
noted that when the Air Force four-star generals and the Air National
Guard Director were briefed on and approved the consolidated force
structure plan in September 2003, the participants recognized that the
smaller force structure would require the Air Force to integrate its
active and reserve components to a greater extent. This consolidated
20-year force structure plan served as the Air Force's initial submission
to the Joint Staff as part of the base realignment and closure process in
late September 2003.

In November 2003, during a subsequent briefing to senior Air Force
leaders-in a meeting known as CORONA-questions arose about whether the
force structure plan submitted to the Joint Staff in September was the
"best possible" force structure option.9 The senior leadership was
particularly concerned about the adequacy of the combat air force included
in the proposed plan. To address these questions, the Air Staff formed a
"Tiger Team" to evaluate the proposed force structure plan. The team
worked with the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency10 to evaluate the
proposed force structure plan against other possible options. The Air
Force Studies and Analyses Agency used modeling and analyses to evaluate
the September 2003 submission to the Joint Staff against 17 other options
to identify the option that would, in their words, "optimize" capabilities
required to meet the National Defense Strategy11 within anticipated budget
levels.12 According to senior Studies and Analyses Agency officials, at
the direction of the Tiger Team, their analysis focused on the combat air
force-in other words, fighter and bomber aircraft-and on determining the
number of those aircraft required to provide desired capabilities.13
Studies and Analyses Agency officials also stated that the analysis did
not consider whether the aircraft would be flown by the active or reserve
component force. Further, they stated that the methodology included first
setting aside the number of aircraft required to meet the U.S. Northern
Command's existing homeland defense requirements14 and then distributing
the remainder of the aircraft to meet the other requirements of the
National Defense Strategy. Upon completion of the analysis, the Studies
and Analyses Agency determined that the force structure plan submitted to
the Joint Staff in September 2003 was, in fact, the best option.

8 Previous Air Force efforts had focused primarily on the 6-year defense
plan used in the Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
process.

9 CORONA is a term the Air Force uses for meetings of its four-star
generals and senior leadership held three times a year to discuss
servicewide issues.

10 The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency reports directly to the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force and provides analysis to the Chief of
Staff and Secretary that is intended to enhance the quality of defense
reviews, force structure and resource allocation processes, and air
expeditionary force actions.

11 As set out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense
Strategy provides strategic-level guidance for developing force structure.
The strategy calls for defending the United States while serving as a
deterrent in four critical regions and swiftly defeating adversaries in
two overlapping major conflicts with the capability of winning decisively
in one of them for an enduring result. At the same time, the capability
should exist to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency
operations. This is commonly referred to as "1-4-2-1."

12 The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency used its Combat Force
Assessment Model to compare the Strategic Planning Directorate's 20-year
force structure plan to 17 alternative options to measure the effect that
increases or decreases in the availability of particular weapon systems
would have on both effectiveness and cost.

13 According to Studies and Analyses Agency officials, for this analysis
the mobility air force-those aircraft that provide airlift and refueling
capability-was only considered in terms of how the refueling capabilities
might affect the capabilities of the combat air force.

14 The U.S. Northern Command is responsible for executing homeland defense
activities and supporting civilian authorities when requested.

The Air Staff formally briefed the plan-now known as the Beacon Force-to
the adjutants general for the first time in July 2004. Prior to that time,
the Air Force had primarily relied on the Air National Guard to represent
the adjutants generals' views in the force structure development
process.15 The plan included the acquisition of new aircraft, such as the
F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, and a steep reduction in the F-16
fleet, which comprises a significant portion of the Air National Guard
fighter fleet, and it was expected that some Air National Guard units
would lose their aircraft and associated flying missions as a result. Both
Air National Guard and Air Combat Command officials told us that they had
concerns about the Beacon Force plan and its effect on their ability to
perform the homeland defense mission while meeting Air Expeditionary Force
commitments. To address their respective concerns, Air Combat Command and
Air National Guard officials worked together to develop an alternative
proposal that would allow the Air Force to retain a larger portion of the
F-16 fleet. Representatives of the Air Guard and Air Combat Command
presented their proposal to the Air Staff in October 2004, but according
to Command and Guard officials, they were told the proposal could not be
considered because the Beacon Force plan had already been approved by the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense.

In December 2004, 3 months after approving the Air Force's Beacon Force
plan, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued Program Budget
Decision 753, which reduced the Air Force budget and shifted funds to the
Army.16 This budget reduction drove the Air Force to alter its 20-year
force structure plan. The budget decision reduced funding for the F/A-22
by $10.5 billion and cut 96 aircraft from the planned procurement
quantity, leaving a total of 178 aircraft to be procured.17 To adjust to
this reduction in the number of F/A-22s to be purchased, the Air Force
adopted an alternative force structure plan-1 of the 17 previously
evaluated by the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency-that slowed the
retirement of its F-16 fleet. According to Air National Guard and Air
Combat Command officials, the revised force structure plan alleviated some
of their concerns because it slowed the reduction of the F-16 fleet and
allowed the Guard to retain a greater number of flying units in the near
term.

15 Air Force officials cited the Title 10 authority (10 U.S.C. S:10501) of
the National Guard Bureau to act as the channel of communication between
the Department of the Air Force and the states.

16 Program Budget Decision 753 was DOD's reaction to an Office of
Management and Budget mandate to cut $55 billion from its Fiscal Years
2006-2011 Future Years Defense Program and, at the same time, add $25
billion to the fiscal years 2007-2011 Army budget to cover the cost of the
ongoing reorganization known as Army Modularity. The net result was a
reduction of $30 billion in DOD's budget over a 6-year period.

17 Program Budget Decision 753 nominally reduced the procurement quantity
to 179 aircraft. Subsequently, the Air Force transferred one production
aircraft to be dedicated to testing, thus reducing the procurement
quantity to 178.

The revised 20-year force structure plan was submitted to the Congress in
March 2005. The plan was also used by the Air Force's base closure and
realignment team to reorganize the fleet by determining where the planned
force structure (i.e., aircraft) would be located and who would operate it
(i.e., the active or reserve components). We did not evaluate the Air
Force's base closure and realignment assessment and recommendations
process for this report. However, we separately reported on the overall
DOD base closure and realignment process in July 2005.18 The
congressionally chartered Base Closure and Realignment Commission made
significant modifications to DOD's recommendations-particularly with
respect to Air National Guard units-in its recommendations to the
President on September 8, 2005.

The force structure plan may continue to evolve as a result of the 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review. This review is an ongoing, congressionally
mandated study conducted by DOD that is expected to result in new guidance
on strategy, forces, and risks derived from extensive deliberations and
consultation. The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense Review is to provide
a basic strategy for addressing critical issues such as budget and
acquisition priorities, emerging threats, types and levels of force
structure, and capabilities, for the next 20 years. Results of the review
are scheduled for publication in February 2006 and may result in changes
to the Air Force's 20-year force structure plan.

Stakeholder Participation and Perceptions of the Force Structure Development
Process Vary

As shown in table 1, many key stakeholders participated directly in the
force structure development process, including representatives of the Air
Staff, the major commands, the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, the
Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. The force structure
development team also provided numerous briefings throughout the process
to audiences that included the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
senior Air Force leadership, major commands, Air Force Reserve Command,
Air National Guard, and state adjutants general. Although periodically
briefed by the Air Staff and the Guard Bureau on the Air Force's overall
plans to adjust the force structure, the adjutants general did not
participate directly in the process.

18 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

Through our discussions with Air Force Air staff, major command, and Air
National Guard officials, as well as 10 adjutants general, we found that
key stakeholders included in and affected by the force structure
development process have varying, and sometimes disparate, perceptions of
the process depending on their role and involvement. We requested minutes
or other documentation of key meetings, but Air Force and Air National
Guard officials told us that this documentation did not exist. Therefore,
we were unable to assess the exact nature and extent of stakeholder
involvement or evaluate the perceptions and views of key participants. The
following summaries describe the perspectives provided by the Air Staff,
Major Commands, Air National Guard, and adjutants general officials we
interviewed.

Air Staff. The Air Staff officials we spoke with told us that they used a
process based on the Air Force Corporate Structure, which formalizes
review and decision making by bringing together representatives from
across the Air Force to discuss issues and develop recommended courses of
action. Air Staff officials noted that key stakeholders, including the Air
National Guard and major commands, were invited to attend and were present
at many of the meetings and briefings over the 2-year period during which
the force structure was being developed. During these meetings, it was the
Air Staff's expectation that Air National Guard participants would (1)
raise concerns about the force structure plan and (2) represent the views
of the adjutants general in the discussions in accordance with Title 10 of
the United States Code, which establishes the National Guard Bureau as the
channel of communication between the Air Force and the states. According
to the Director, Future Total Force Directorate, these meetings provided
the opportunity for all involved to raise concerns and have them openly
discussed. However, in the opinion of this official, this opportunity is
dependent upon the representative to make and defend the position of his
or her organization. In the absence of objections, the group as a whole
assumes that all are in agreement. With respect to the adjutants general,
the former Deputy Director of the Air Force Strategic Planning Directorate
told us that in addition to the formal briefings, the directorate staff
provided several briefings to individual adjutants general throughout the
force structure development process. However, available documentation we
obtained did not indicate how many briefings were given or to whom.
Directorate staff viewed these meetings as opportunities for the adjutants
general to share their views, provide direct input, and influence the
force structure development process.

Major Commands. Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command officials told
us that they were consulted about force structure options and that they
had several opportunities to provide input into the process. However, Air
Combat Command officials noted that while they were included in the
process through various briefings and meetings, they often did not know
how their input was used. Further, Air Combat Command officials noted that
when they submitted an alternative proposal to the force structure plan in
October 2004, prepared in conjunction with the Air National Guard, it was
met with resistance from Air Staff officials because the Air Force's force
structure plan had already been approved by the Secretary of the Air Force
and the Secretary of Defense.

Air National Guard. Air National Guard officials told us that while they
participated in numerous meetings and briefings held by the Air Staff,
they did not believe that their views, opinions, and input were being
sought. Air Guard officials often viewed these meetings as informational
in nature because the Air Staff described overall anticipated force
structure cuts without details on where the cuts would be made and how the
reductions would affect the Air National Guard. The Air National Guard
officials whom we talked with noted that the Guard representatives were
frequently outranked at these meetings and, as a result, did not feel that
the environment was conducive to raising their concerns and consequently
remained silent. Several Guard officials told us that on the occasions
when they raised concerns or objections, their input was met with negative
reactions from the Air Staff and on at least one occasion they were told
that the decision had already been approved by the Air Force senior
leadership and their input was too late. Overall, as previously discussed,
the Air National Guard believed that the Beacon Force plan would reduce
its F-16 fleet too quickly and that the Guard would absorb a
disproportionately high portion of the cuts. DOD's December 2004 budget
decision that limited the F-A/22 acquisition and slowed the retirement of
the F-16 fleet resolved these concerns to some extent.

Adjutants general. For the most part, the adjutants general we interviewed
(7 of 10) were in agreement in their belief that they did not have
sufficient opportunity to provide input or to influence the force
structure development process. Three of the 10 adjutants general that we
interviewed told us that they viewed the briefings and information they
received on the force structure development process to be "big picture"
options under consideration, with few specific details. Half of the
adjutants general noted that despite their efforts to engage the Air Force
in discussion about specific force structure issues, in their opinion, the
Air Staff was not receptive to their input. Six of the adjutants general
we met with specifically noted their belief that the Air Force did not
adequately consider the Guard's responsibility for homeland security or
the Guard's requirements to participate in other state missions in making
its force structure decisions. For example, three adjutants general
expressed concern that if some or all of the aircraft in their states were
retired, they would also lose associated personnel whose state role is to
perform security or firefighting missions.

Air National Guard Vanguard Strategy Initiated to Identify Future Roles and
Missions

During the same period that the force structure plan was being developed,
the Air National Guard developed its Vanguard Engagement Strategy to
establish a forum to ensure that the Guard remains ready, reliable, and
relevant as the Air Force adjusts its current force structure, by
providing input into the Air Force's decision-making processes. The
strategy encouraged the state adjutants general and units to begin
identifying new roles and missions that they could support in the future.
Although under way at the same time as the force structure was being
developed, the Guard's Vanguard strategy was not formally linked to the
force structure development process, according to Air Force and Air
National Guard officials.

As noted previously, the Air National Guard used its Vanguard strategy as
a means of involving the adjutants general in thinking about and planning
for the future. Over the period from December 2002 through late 2004, Air
National Guard officials engaged in a variety of efforts to encourage
state Guard officials to begin thinking about the future of their units
and identifying possible new missions that would be appropriate for their
state. Outreach efforts by senior Air National Guard leaders included
presentations to the Adjutants General Association of the United States
and senior leadership conferences. During these meetings, Air National
Guard and on some occasions senior Air Force leaders discussed the overall
force structure planning process and expected results. Additionally, one
senior Air National Guard official told us that he made personal contact
with the adjutants general of most of the 54 states and territories to
discuss potential force structure reductions and the Vanguard initiative.
During these individual meetings, the official discussed the overall force
structure plan, specific changes that could affect each state, and
possible ideas for new missions.

According to Air National Guard officials, the Vanguard Strategy was met
with a variety of reactions from the adjutants general. Many state
organizations responded to the Air National Guard's request for new
mission proposals by offering ideas and proposals of their own. As of
November 2005, 46 of the 54 states and territories-about 85 percent-had
submitted proposals through the Vanguard process. Additionally, according
to Air National Guard officials, some states submitted proposals for new
missions directly to the Air Staff, rather than through the Vanguard
process, and some states organizations chose not to submit any new mission
ideas for their state at all.

According to senior Air National Guard officials, the Vanguard Engagement
Strategy remains the framework through which the Air National Guard
develops and refines its input to the Air Force's Future Total Force
transformation effort. In addition, Future Total Force Directorate
officials told us that all proposals from state organizations must now be
funneled through the Air National Guard process and that they no longer
accept proposals directly from state organizations.

  Air Force Proceeding with Future Total Force Implementation without a Fully
                         Developed Management Framework

The Air Force is proceeding with implementation of its Future Total Force
transformation concept-which is centered on new ways of using and
organizing the active, Guard, and reserve components-without a fully
developed management framework to guide its efforts and facilitate
evaluation of the new organizational constructs currently being tested. As
the Air Force developed its 20-year force structure plan and prepared its
base closure and realignment recommendations, it concluded that new ways
of operating would be required in the future and embarked on implementing
its Future Total Force concept. Specifically, the Air Force announced
initiatives to begin testing some new organizational constructs for
integrating active, reserve, and Guard units, and also established a
temporary office to initiate and manage implementation of these efforts.
Implementing organizational changes, such as those the Air Force is
attempting, are difficult and require concentrated effort and a management
framework that sets forth a clear strategy that includes results-oriented
management tools-such as long-term goals, strategies and performance
measures-to guide implementation efforts and evaluate new concepts.
However, the directorate is still in the process of developing a strategic
plan to guide the Future Total Force transformation effort, and specific
time frames have not been set for approving the plan. Without a management
framework that includes a strategic plan and a comprehensive plan for
evaluating its test initiatives, the Air Force's ability to implement the
Future Total Force effort efficiently and effectively may be limited, and
the overall progress and success of its efforts will be more difficult for
DOD managers and the Congress to assess.

Air Force Has Taken Initial Steps to Implement Future Total Force Concept

The Air Force is facing significant challenges that could ultimately
affect its combat capabilities: an aging fleet of aircraft that needs to
be replaced or modernized, adversaries that are increasingly hard to
define, and affordability challenges. These challenges combined with
anticipated reductions in its force structure have driven the Air Force to
embark on an effort to transform its force to better integrate active and
reserve forces. The resultant Future Total Force concept, if fully
implemented, could have a substantial impact on the way the Air Force and
its reserve components operate and are organized. The Future Total Force
concept consists of two components: (1) creating a long-term plan for a
smaller, more capable and affordable force structure that is capable of
addressing future threats and (2) using new organizational arrangements
that allow the Air Force to better use the personnel in all its components
by integrating its active and reserve component forces into mixed units.
For example, the Air Force asserts that its new aircraft, such as the
F/A-22 fighter, will be more capable and more reliable than current
aircraft, thus providing an opportunity to use a higher number of crews
per aircraft to take advantage of the aircraft's capabilities. The Air
Force plans to increase the number of crew members available by combining
active and reserve component forces into co-located active, Guard, and
reserve units that share aircraft. In addition, the service plans to meet
increasing demand for certain new and emerging missions, such as operating
unmanned aerial vehicles and analyzing intelligence, by assigning more of
those missions to Guard and reserve units. According to Air Force
officials, these efforts will also allow the Air Force to respond to
changes brought about by base closure and realignment decisions, including
18 Air National Guard units that will lose their aircraft and flying
missions.

Over the last year, the Air Force has taken two important steps toward
implementing the Future Total Force concept. First, in December 2004, the
Secretary of the Air Force announced six test initiatives-four focused on
integrating active, Guard, and reserve units through the use of new
organizational constructs and two that assigned emerging missions to Guard
and reserve units. The initiatives included the first Air National Guard
units that will operate Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, the first
"community-based" unit where the Air Force will station active duty
personnel at a Guard unit, and the first active duty and Guard units to
fly the F/A-22 fighter aircraft as integrated "associate" units.19 Table 2
lists the Future Total Force test initiatives and provides a brief
description of each.

Table 2: Future Total Force Initiatives Announced by the Air Force in
December 2004

Initiative           Description                                           
Richmond to Langley  The Virginia Air National Guard's Richmond-based      
Integration          192nd Fighter Wing will join the 1st Fighter Wing at  
                        Langley Air Force Base in an associate unit to        
                        operate the F/A-22 fighter aircraft. Guard pilots and 
                        maintenance personnel have begun training for the new 
                        mission.                                              
Vermont Community    The Air Force will station active duty personnel at   
Basing               Vermont Air National Guard's 158th Fighter Wing in an 
                        associate unit to use experienced Guard personnel to  
                        train inexperienced active duty personnel and to test 
                        whether the personnel services normally provided on   
                        an active Air Force base can be obtained from the     
                        local community. The first of 12 active duty          
                        personnel reported for duty in Vermont in June 2005.  
Arizona and Texas    Arizona and Texas Air National Guard members will     
Predator Missions    operate Predator unmanned aerial vehicles in their    
                        respective states. Six crews were in training as of   
                        October 2005. Air Force analysis to determine         
                        appropriate unit size and location is under way.      
New York Distributed Initially, the Air Force planned for the New York Air 
Ground Station       National Guard to process global intelligence         
                        information; however, subsequent increased demand for 
                        unmanned aerial vehicles caused the Air Force, after  
                        discussions with state officials, to change the       
                        proposed new mission from the Ground Station to a     
                        Predator mission. Plans for establishing the Predator 
                        unit are under development.                           
Nevada Air Warfare   The Air Force plans to integrate Nevada Air National  
Center               Guard personnel into Predator operations and Air      
                        Force Reserve personnel into most missions at the Air 
                        Warfare Center.                                       
Hill Air Force Base, The Air Force Reserve's 419th Fighter Wing will       
Utah Integration     integrate with the active duty's 388th Fighter Wing   
                        in an associate unit, both units currently operate    
                        F-16 fighters at Hill Air Force base. Agreements on   
                        how the units will operate were being coordinated as  
                        of October 2005.                                      

Source: GAO, developed from Air Force data.

At the time of our review, the initiatives were in varying stages of
development. For example, some of the initiatives including the Richmond
to Langley integration and the Vermont Community Basing had been under
development prior to the announcement and formalized implementation plans
have been finalized and agreed to by the Air Combat Command, the Air
National Guard, and the state adjutants general. As shown in table 2,
training of those involved in these integration initiatives has already
begun. In other cases, such as the Texas Predator and New York Distributed
Ground Station initiatives, little planning was done in advance and, in
fact, according to state officials, little notice was provided to the
affected states prior to the public announcement. For several of the
initiatives, much planning remains to be done before implementation can be
completed. In addition, as discussed later, the Air Force has identified
several hundred other potential initiatives, which it has prioritized for
future implementation.

19 Associate units combine active and reserve component units in an
integrated work environment to share aircraft and perform support,
maintenance, instruction, and day-to-day missions. The Air Force has used
the associate unit organizational construct in the past in the mobility
community where active and Air Force Reserve Command units frequently
share mobility aircraft, such as the C-130 and KC-135.

The second step taken by the Air Force to implement the Future Total Force
concept was to establish a new directorate in March 2005 to provide a
focal point for managing the transformational initiatives that promote the
Future Total Force concept; the new directorate also assumed
responsibility for overseeing implementation of the test initiatives.20
The Air Force established the directorate on a 2-year temporary basis,
with the intention of incorporating the Future Total Force concept into
usual Air Force practices and thus ultimately eliminating the need for an
office dedicated to promoting and managing these ideas. The directorate is
staffed with representatives from stakeholder organizations including the
Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and several
states. In addition, the Air Force has established two working groups to
provide support and guidance to the directorate. These working groups also
involve representatives from the Air Staff, major commands, reserve
components, and adjutants general. Several stakeholders we interviewed
told us that their inclusion in the Future Total Force Directorate and its
working groups has improved communication between the Air Force and the
Air Guard and that they have recently had more opportunity to provide
input to key decisions.

Since its inception, the Future Total Force Directorate has continued to
oversee development of the Future Total Force test initiatives, but has
largely focused its efforts on identifying additional new missions and
integration opportunities for Guard and reserve units, particularly those
affected by the base closure and realignment decisions. First, the
directorate evaluated the impact of base closure recommendations and other
planned actions on active, Guard, and reserve units. Second, the
directorate, working with key stakeholder organizations, identified and
prioritized a list of about 300 potential new missions and integration
opportunities into four categories ranging from highest to lowest
priority, at times combining new missions with integration
opportunities-such as an associate Predator unit operated by an integrated
active and Guard unit.21 Third, the directorate plans to use this list to
evaluate and match potential missions with 18 units affected by 2005 base
closure decisions. Once missions have been determined for these units, the
directorate plans to begin assigning the remaining missions to other
units. The Air Force indicates that it plans to complete implementation of
about 60 percent of the highest priority initiatives by fiscal year 2007
and about 87 percent of all initiatives by fiscal year 2009.

20 Although the Future Total Force concept has been in development for
several years, previous efforts had been carried out at a lower
organizational level within the Air Force's Strategic Planning
Directorate. The new directorate was established in order to devote the
full-time effort believed necessary to fully implement the concept.

The Air Force Has Not Fully Developed a Management Framework Needed to Guide
Implementation Efforts and Fully Test Initiatives

Implementing significant transformational changes, such as those the Air
Force is attempting under the Future Total Force concept, are difficult
and require concentrated effort to accomplish established goals. Our prior
work and the work of others show that organizations undertaking complex
transformations can increase their likelihood of success by adopting a
results-oriented management framework, which includes key management
practices and a strategy that includes results-oriented management tools,
to guide implementation efforts and achieve desired program outcomes.22
Key management practices include leadership that defines and articulates a
compelling reason for change; sets the direction, pace, and tone for
transforming; assigns accountability for results; and is supported by a
dedicated implementation team, which, in turn, can provide the focused,
day-to-day direction needed for success.23 The Air Force has taken steps
that address several of these key management practices and provide certain
aspects of a framework to guide its overall Future Total Force effort. For
example, the Air Force has developed the Future Total Force concept over a
period of several years and has described the needs and reasons for change
in its policies and guidance to subordinate organizations. The Air Force,
as previously discussed, has also recently established the Future Total
Force Directorate to provide day-to-day management, accountability, and an
increased emphasis on this transformation effort.

21 With input from the major commands, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve Command, the directorate prioritized the missions list by grouping
missions into one of four bands: Band 1, the highest priority, contains
those the Air Force "must do" to satisfy congressional mandates, existing
laws, etc.; Band 2 missions are considered "mission critical" to the Air
Force achieving its objectives; Band 3 missions are "mission significant,"
meaning that failing to perform the tasks could negatively affect overall
effectiveness; and Band 4 missions are "mission enhancing," meaning that
they would be nice to do if resources are available. In addition, some
missions were not included in the bands because they were added to the
list after the prioritization process was complete.

22 GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

23 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).

An effective management framework also includes a clear strategy that
articulates a mission and vision and incorporates the use of specific
results-oriented management tools, such as those embodied by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,24 to provide organizations
with a way to effectively implement and manage transformation efforts.
This framework can shift the focus of organizations from measuring
activities and processes to identifying and measuring desired results.
Table 3 lists and describes the results-oriented management tools used in
our analysis.

Table 3: Key Results-Oriented Management Tools

Long-term goals           Long-term goals identify overall expected        
                             results and when to expect such results.         
Strategies to be used     General methods the agency plans to use to       
                             effectively and efficiently accomplish long-term 
                             goals.                                           
Performance goals         Derived from long-term goals, should establish   
                             intended performance and focus on results        
                             required.                                        
Performance measures      Specific, objective indicators used to measure   
                             progress toward achieving goals.                 
Evaluation and corrective An evaluation plan is an objective and formal    
action plans              assessment of the results of a major effort; a   
                             corrective action plan describes how evaluation  
                             findings will be used to improve performance or  
                             revise unmet goals.                              

Source: GAO guidelines.

Long-term goals should explain what results are expected, should be
results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that allows them to be
assessed in terms of achievement. Goals can help an organization
communicate what it intends to accomplish. Performance measures should be
objective and results oriented with specific target levels to meet
performance goals. Measuring performance allows organizations to track
progress toward goals and provides crucial information on which to base
organizational and management decisions. Organizations use evaluation and
corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to improve
performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those goals that
were not met. An evaluation plan is a particularly important management
tool for implementing the Future Total Force concept because of the new
organizational constructs that will be required and the complex challenges
that they present. For example, integrating active and Guard units may
require changes to how those forces are employed, their organizational
structures and cultures, personnel policies and career progression, how
they are trained, and the unit command structure.

24 Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).

At the time of our review, the Air Force had not yet fully developed these
elements. The Future Total Force Directorate was developing a strategic
plan that directorate officials said would address many of the
results-oriented management tools we described above. In addition, the
officials said that the plan would include the directorate's
organizational vision and mission; lay out its strategic goals and
objectives, and identify specific steps to achieve them; and provide for
an annual review using specific performance measures to gauge success in
achieving each goal. As of November 2005, however, the strategic plan was
still in draft form and had not yet been approved, nor had specific time
frames been set for approving the plan. Furthermore, directorate officials
said that approval of their strategic plan is dependent upon approval of
the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs' (their parent
organization) strategic plan, which is not expected to be finalized until
early 2006.

Also, as of November 2005, the Air Force had developed implementation
plans for two of the Air Force initiatives designed to test new
organizational constructs that will integrate active, Guard and reserve
units, which are the foundation of the Future Total Force concept.
However, these two implementation plans lacked comprehensive methods to
evaluate and assess the results of the initiatives. For example, the
approved implementation plan for the Vermont initiative describes to a
limited extent some metrics that will be used to evaluate both mission and
non-mission-related activities such as the skill progression of active
duty maintenance personnel as a result of training with more experienced
Air National Guard personnel and the satisfaction of active duty personnel
in obtaining support from the local community. The Virginia initiative
implementation plan describes metrics for crew ratios and utilization
rates that the Air Force intends to use to measure the effectiveness of
that initiative, but does not address other metrics. Also, the Director of
the Future Total Force Directorate told us that other steps will be taken
to evaluate the test initiatives, including (1) the test units will be
continuously monitored so that implementation issues may be addressed as
they arise, (2) implementation obstacles and lessons learned are discussed
at monthly meetings of the Future Total Force working groups, and (3) the
directorate's strategic plan, once approved, will set out several other
indicators that can suggest whether the Future Total Force concept is
producing the desired results. According to directorate officials, these
indicators will include

           o  traditional Air Force measurements of unit effectiveness such
           as readiness, crew ratios and utilization rates, and sortie
           generation rates;
           o  reserve component volunteerism compared to involuntary
           mobilization;
           o  trends in the number of deployable active, Guard, and reserve
           personnel for the Air Expeditionary Force; and
           o  progress toward implementing the 20-year force structure plan.

           Taken as a whole, the compilation of metrics contained in the
           approved implementation plans for two of the test initiatives and
           the other measures that Future Total Force Directorate officials
           have described as being contained in the draft strategic plan are
           good first steps, but do not provide a comprehensive, methodical,
           and readily evident approach to evaluating the success of the new
           organizational constructs being tested. As we have previously
           reported, such a formal study process can provide a rigorous
           framework for data evaluation, development of lessons learned, and
           increase the visibility of the process to outside organizations.
           For example, best practices by other governmental organizations
           and the private sector rely on detailed study plans, or data
           collection and analysis plans, to guide the development of studies
           and experiments and the collection and analysis of data, and to
           provide a feedback loop that links the outcomes of the study or
           event and subsequent analysis to the original goals and objectives
           of the test.25

           When we discussed the benefits of such an evaluation plan with
           directorate officials, they stated their concern that a lengthy
           evaluation of the test initiatives could delay implementation of
           the new organizational constructs beyond the time frames in which
           they will be needed to support Future Total Force goals and
           objectives. We agree that the evaluation should not be drawn out
           to the point that the Air Force's goals for implementing the
           Future Total Force are not achieved. However, the absence of a
           comprehensive and readily evident plan to evaluate the initiatives
           can itself create an environment in which delays may occur.
           Further, without a sound evaluation plan, the Air Force will not
           have a good basis for determining the extent to which the new
           organizational constructs should be applied, a basis for
           identifying and applying lessons learned, or a method for gaining
           acceptance of the conclusions reached, and increasing the
           transparency of the process for decision makers and outside
           organizations.

           The Air Force has developed a force structure plan for the next 20
           years with a vision of a smaller, but more agile and capable
           force. This plan calls for billions of dollars to be invested in
           new aircraft while some legacy aircraft are retired, new roles and
           missions, and the physical and operational integration of more
           active, Guard, and reserve units to form the "Future Total Force."
           The changes that will be required to achieve these objectives
           present significant challenges to the Air Force, such as the need
           to develop new doctrine, training, personnel policies, and command
           structures for the integrated units, which will require the
           support of all affected organizations to develop effective
           solutions and achieve success. While the Air Force has recognized
           these challenges and has taken several steps to address them, it
           has not yet completed development of a management framework that
           fully reflects results-oriented management principles and no
           specific time frame has been established for putting such a
           framework in place. Until the framework is completely developed
           and approved, no requirement exists for those responsible for
           implementing the Future Total Force concept to use the draft
           strategy and the management tools it contains to guide the
           transformation and provide visibility over its results. Similarly,
           the Air Force has not fully developed a clear and comprehensive
           plan to evaluate the test initiatives announced in December 2004
           and expand these new constructs as appropriate. Without an
           approved comprehensive evaluation plan that includes metrics and
           milestones for assessing results, the Air Force may be unable to
           fully evaluate the new organizational constructs and determine the
           most cost effective way to organize active and reserve forces to
           carry out the defense strategy. Moreover, without a comprehensive
           management framework that includes an approved strategic plan and
           a clear plan to evaluate the test initiatives, the Air Force may
           be limited in its ability to adjust to the many uncertainties
           surrounding this transformation process, measure the success of
           its efforts, and receive the full support of all the affected
           organizations, including the state adjutants general and the
           Congress.

           To establish a results-oriented management framework that can be
           used to guide the implementation of the Future Total Force
           transformation process, measure effectiveness and overall results,
           and clearly communicate plans for implementing and evaluating the
           concept to all key stakeholders and decision makers within the Air
           Force and DOD, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
           the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following two actions:

           o  Require the Future Total Force Directorate to fully develop a
           comprehensive, results-oriented management framework to guide the
           Future Total Force transformation effort and measure overall
           results. Specifically, the management framework should include a
           strategic plan that contains, but is not limited to

                        o  long-term goals and objectives,
                        o  strategies to be used to accomplish goals,
                        o  performance goals,
                        o  performance criteria for measuring progress, and
                        o  evaluation and corrective action plans.

           o  Set a specific time frame to accelerate the approval of the
           Future Total Force Directorate's strategic plan.

           Further, to establish a clear understanding of the approach and
           mechanisms to be used to evaluate the Future Total Force
           initiatives to test new organizational constructs, we recommend
           that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air
           Force to take the following action:

           o  Establish a stand-alone, comprehensive, and clearly articulated
           plan for evaluating the Future Total Force test initiatives to
           measure results, identify and apply lessons learned, and build on
           current efforts to increase the transparency of the process for
           Air Force and DOD decision makers and outside organizations.

           In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
           recommendations and provided information on the actions it plans
           to take to address them. The Air Force completed and approved the
           Future Total Force strategic plan and stated that it is
           aggressively working toward its goal of having a clear and
           comprehensive plan for evaluating Future Total Force alternatives.
           Although we have not fully evaluated the recently approved
           strategic plan, our initial review indicates that it contains many
           of the elements that we believe are important to guide a
           transformation effort of this magnitude. Specifically, the plan
           describes the organizational vision, mission, strategic goals and
           objectives, key initiatives, and some general performance measures
           for the initial implementation of the Future Total Force concept.
           However, as the department noted in its comments, the strategic
           plan is a "living document" that should be reviewed and improved
           over time to reflect progress toward achieving the goals and
           objectives it describes. The department also agreed that a
           stand-alone, comprehensive, and clearly articulated plan for
           evaluating the Future Total Force test initiatives is needed and
           noted that it is working to develop such a plan, including working
           to identify new metrics specifically for evaluating its
           integration initiatives. Once this evaluation plan is completed
           and approved, and if it provides a comprehensive and readily
           evident plan to evaluate the test initiatives, we believe that the
           Air Force actions would be responsive to our recommendation. DOD's
           comments are reprinted in appendix II.

           We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense;
           the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau;
           the Director, Air National Guard; and the Director, Office of
           Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to others upon
           request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
           on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected] . Contact
           points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
           Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff
           who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix
           III.

           Janet A. St. Laurent Director Defense Capabilities and Management

           To determine the processes and events that surrounded the Air
           Force's development of its 20-year force structure plan, we
           interviewed officials and obtained briefings and other pertinent
           documentation from current and former officials of the Department
           of the Air Force Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility
           Command, Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, and Air National
           Guard. We reviewed the Office of the Secretary of Defense Program
           Budget Decision 753 that reduced the Air Force procurement budget
           for fiscal year 2006 and discussed with Air Force officials the
           subsequent adjustments made to the force structure. Although much
           of the information on the force structure development process was
           testimonial from participants in the process, we assessed this
           information by comparing it to supporting documentation, when
           available, and corroborated it through additional interviews to
           determine consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of these
           efforts, we believe the information we obtained is sufficiently
           reliable for the purposes of this report. We also reviewed DOD's
           draft Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and
           discussed the strategy with officials from the Office of the
           Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. We also interviewed
           officials at the U.S. Northern Command and the North American
           Aerospace Defense Command to understand the Air National Guard's
           role in homeland defense missions. During the same period in which
           the Air Force was developing its force structure plan, the Air
           National Guard implemented its Vanguard Engagement Strategy. To
           describe the Air National Guard's Vanguard Engagement strategy and
           its relationship to the Air Force's force structure development
           process, we reviewed the strategy and interviewed and obtained
           briefings and documentation from Air National Guard and Department
           of the Air Force officials.

           To determine the level of involvement of key stakeholders in the
           force structure development process, we interviewed officials and
           obtained documentation from officials of the Department of the Air
           Force Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and
           the Air National Guard. Also, to determine the level of
           stakeholder involvement in the Guard's Vanguard initiative, we
           interviewed officials from the Department of the Air Force
           Headquarters and the Air National Guard and obtained documentation
           from Air National Guard officials. To gauge the involvement of the
           54 adjutants general, we interviewed a non-probability sample of
           10 adjutants general. To guide our selection of this sample, we
           developed a list of six criteria and evaluated each state and
           territory against these criteria. The state selection criteria
           included (1) a mix of large and small states, with states
           containing three or more flying units being considered large; (2)
           a geographic mix of states; (3) states with differing views on the
           proposed force structure plan or Vanguard changes; (4) states with
           adjutants general who were active in leadership positions in the
           Adjutants General Association of the United States; (5) states
           with adjutants generals serving on an Air Force General Officer
           Steering Committee; and (6) states with Vanguard or Future Total
           Force initiatives. We conducted open-ended interviews with the
           adjutants general of Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska,
           New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia to gain
           their perspectives on the force structure development process and
           the Vanguard engagement strategy and their level of involvement in
           the development and implementation of each. In 6 of the 10 states,
           we also interviewed members of the adjutants generals' command
           staff.

           To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force is utilizing key
           management tools to develop new missions for the Air National
           Guard and to integrate active duty and reserve component forces,
           we identified key management tools consistently found in
           successful organizations through a review of key documents and our
           prior work. We reviewed and analyzed key documents related to the
           Air Force's efforts to implement its Future Total Force concept
           and held discussions with the Director and other officials of the
           newly formed Air Force Future Total Force Directorate to obtain
           their perspectives and discuss their efforts to develop a
           strategic plan incorporating the key management tools to guide
           implementation of the concept. In addition, we interviewed
           directorate and Air Combat Command officials to determine what
           actions they had taken to develop a plan to implement and evaluate
           the six Chief of Staff test initiatives. We also interviewed the
           adjutants general for four of the states slated to participate in
           the test initiatives to determine their involvement and discuss
           their plans for implementing and measuring the success of these
           initiatives. We did not evaluate the process the Air Force is
           using to identify and validate new missions for the Guard.

           We conducted our review from September 2004 through November 2005
           in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
           standards.

           Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]

           In addition to the contact named above, Robert Repasky, Assistant
           Director; Hugh Brady; John Clary; Alissa Czyz; George Delgado;
           Nicole Harms; Penney Harwell; Kenneth Patton; Terry Richardson;
           and Travis Thomson also made key contributions to this report.

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25 GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from
a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, GAO-06-84
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005).

                                   Conclusion

                      Recommendations for Executive Action

                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix II: Comments
from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAOA Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

                                  GAO Contact

                                Acknowledgments

(350583)

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For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 202-512-4402 or
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Highlights of GAO-06-232 , a report to congressional requesters

January 2006

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Future
Total Force Efforts

The Air Force is in the process of transforming its force to meet today's
new and emerging threats. Its "Future Total Force" concept is intended to
maximize future capabilities by integrating its active, National Guard,
and reserve components to a greater degree. While the Air Force was making
force structure decisions and developing its 20-year plan, the Air
National Guard embarked on its own "Vanguard" transformation initiative to
ensure its role and relevance in the new Air Force.

This report discusses (1) the processes and events that surrounded the Air
Force's development of its 20-year force structure plan, including the
involvement of key stakeholders and the development of the Guard's
Vanguard initiative, and (2) the extent to which the Air Force is
utilizing key results-oriented management tools to guide its effort to
identify new missions for the Air National Guard and integrate active and
Guard forces as part of its Future Total Force effort.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force take steps to fully
develop a management framework, accelerate its approval, and establish an
evaluation plan to assess its test initiatives. DOD agreed with the
recommendations in this report and has begun implementing them.

The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force
structure plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level
Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force officials; however, stakeholders
have different views on the extent to which the Air Force sought and
addressed input from process participants. The plan included a reduction
in the legacy fighter fleet-residing largely within the Air National
Guard-and the acquisition of new aircraft such as the F/A-22 and the Joint
Strike Fighter. In late 2004, a departmentwide shift in funding priorities
reduced the number of F/A-22 aircraft to be acquired and resulted in
changes to the Air Force's plan. Perspectives on how well this process
worked vary depending on the role and level of involvement of each
organization. For example, Air Force Air Staff officials viewed the
process as fully participatory and noted that the Air National Guard
Bureau and the Air Force's major commands had direct representation on the
force structure development team. In contrast, Air National Guard
officials expressed concerns about their ability to influence decisions
and 7 of the 10 adjutants general whom GAO contacted believed that they
did not have sufficient opportunity to influence the decisions. Because
documentation of the proceedings of key meetings was limited, GAO was
unable to evaluate the extent to which stakeholders influenced the
process. During the same period, the Air National Guard began a separate
effort-the Vanguard Engagement Strategy-to solicit input from the states
on future roles and missions for the Guard and to prepare its units to
respond to anticipated force structure reductions.

The Air Force has taken steps to identify new missions for the Air
National Guard and test ways to integrate the active, Guard, and reserve
components as part of its Future Total Force transformation, but it has
not fully developed a management framework to guide its efforts or a plan
to evaluate its progress. In December 2004, the Air Force announced
initiatives for six states to test its transformation concepts. In March
2005, the Air Force established a new directorate to guide implementation
of the Future Total Force concept. The new directorate has taken steps to
identify new missions and implement new constructs to integrate
components. As GAO has previously reported, organizations undergoing
transformation increase their likelihood of success if they adopt a
results-oriented management framework to guide their efforts. Although the
directorate has drafted a strategic plan that directorate officials said
includes such tools, as of November 2005, the plan had not been approved
and there is no requirement that it be used to guide implementation
efforts. Moreover, while the Air Force has some metrics to use in
evaluating its test initiatives, it has not developed a comprehensive
evaluation plan to measure results. By moving ahead to implement the
Future Total Force concept without such a framework and evaluation plan,
the Air Force may be unable to successfully transform its culture,
evaluate initiatives and program results, determine the most cost
effective mix of active and reserve forces, and ensure transparency of the
implementation process.
*** End of document. ***