Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls (28-NOV-05, GAO-06-203).
The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a
number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005
transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air
marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through
airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening
checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's
(1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its
return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents
that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-203
ACCNO: A42117
TITLE: Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could
Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls
DATE: 11/28/2005
SUBJECT: Air marshals
Airport security
Aviation security
Employee training
Federal agency reorganization
Homeland security
Internal controls
Performance measures
Strategic planning
Training utilization
Agency missions
Policies and procedures
******************************************************************
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GAO-06-203
Report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
November 2005
AVIATION SECURITY
Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and
Controls
Aviation Security
GAO-06-203
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 6
DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving its Stated Objectives in
Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation
Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA 8
FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal Air
Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly 15
Conclusions 18
Recommendations for Executive Action 19
Agency Comments 19
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22
Appendix II Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations 25
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 26
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28
Related GAO Products 29
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act BTS Border and
Transportation Security Directorate DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOT Department of Transportation FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAMS
Federal Air Marshal Service GS General Schedule ICE U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Bureau OPM Office of Personnel Management SAC Special
Agent-in-Charge TSA Transportation Security Administration
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
November 28, 2005
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio House of Representatives
Dear Mr. DeFazio:
With approximately 25,000 flights arriving or departing the United States
each day, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) plays a critical role in
securing our nation's commercial aviation system by detecting, deterring,
and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports,
passengers, and crews. In recent years, FAMS has undergone a number of
significant changes to its organizational structure, workforce, and
mission. In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FAMS
was faced with the formidable task of ramping up its workforce-from an
agency with fewer than 50 federal air marshals to thousands-and expanding
its mission to include the protection of both domestic and international
flights.1 Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA)-enacted in November 2001-authority over FAMS shifted from the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT).2 Over
the next 2 years, FAMS transferred two more times. FAMS's most recent
transfer during that timeframe3 occurred in November 2003, when FAMS moved
from TSA to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE)-the
largest law enforcement component within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).4
1The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.
2Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597 (2001).
3In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FAMS, along
with TSA, was transferred from the Department of Transportation to the
Department of Homeland Security. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
4FAMS was formerly located within DHS's Border and Transportation Security
Directorate (BTS), one of five operational directorates within the
department. As part of his July 2005 reorganization announcement, the
Secretary of DHS proposed the dissolution of BTS, pending the enactment of
legislation to effect this change. With the passage of the fiscal year
2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No.
109-90), signed into law on October 18, 2005, the functions of BTS have
been merged into other offices and component agencies throughout DHS.
There were two stated objectives related to FAMS's transfer to ICE.
According to the then-Secretary of Homeland Security, the first objective
involved cross-training customs agents and immigration officers to
function as federal air marshals during heightened threat levels, thereby
providing a "surge" capability that could be deployed in response to an
increased threat. In announcing the second objective, the Secretary stated
that the transfer would also provide federal air marshals a greater range
of law enforcement career options within a single agency. That is, because
of the limited number of nonairborne (i.e., ground-based) positions within
FAMS, federal air marshals had few career opportunities, which, if left
unaddressed, could lead to morale and retention issues. Nearly 2 years
after FAMS transferred to ICE-in July 2005-the newly appointed Secretary
of DHS announced that FAMS would be transferred back to TSA to increase
operational coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of
aviation security. This transfer became effective in October 2005.
To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys specially trained and armed federal
air marshals on board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and aircraft
from terrorist activities. According to FAMS's mission deployment
procedures, federal air marshals are to operate as "discreet" (semicovert)
professionals when checking-in at airports, passing through security
screening checkpoints, and boarding the aircraft during their missions. In
doing so, federal air marshals are to blend in with passengers while
covering high-risk domestic and international flights on U.S. aircraft.
While FAMS's procedures focus on discretion, there are times when federal
air marshals encounter mission-related situations (i.e., incidents) that
affect their ability to conduct their missions discreetly. Such incidents
may include miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline
staff regarding the manner in which the federal air marshal can board the
aircraft.
In this report, we address: (1) the progress DHS made in achieving its
stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and the key practices that
could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA and (2) the extent to
which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that
affect federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. Some
information related to FAMS and federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly is considered sensitive security information. Accordingly, we
issued a separate restricted version of this report containing that
information.5
To answer these questions, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations,
operational policies and procedures, and other relevant documentation. We
also interviewed officials from DHS, ICE, BTS, TSA, and FAMS to discuss
FAMS's transfer to ICE. Additionally, we considered our prior work on key
practices used by public and private sector organizations that have
undergone successful mergers and transformations.6 The nine key practices
are described in greater detail in appendix II. We did not conduct an
in-depth analysis comparing all of these practices with the transfer of
FAMS to ICE. However, using the documentation provided and interviews we
conducted, we examined the information gathered in light of two of the
nine transformation practices to determine the extent to which the agency
(1) established an overall strategy with implementation goals and a
timeline to guide the integration effort into ICE, and (2) employed a
communication strategy to keep employees informed of the progress of the
integration. We selected these two practices as criteria for this review
because they are especially important to ensuring that DHS has the
planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its transformation
efforts-which we have also underscored in our previous work on DHS.
In addition, we interviewed 19 federal air marshals and 5 FAMS Special
Agents in Charge (SAC) in 5 selected field locations around the country.
Generally, we chose these locations on the basis of geographical
dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; New York, New
York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Federal air
marshals at these locations fly throughout the nation so their experiences
potentially cover airports throughout the United States. During these
interviews, we obtained information on a range of issues related to the
transfer of FAMS to ICE. Through these interviews, we also gained a more
complete understanding of federal air marshals' mission deployment
procedures and their experiences regarding incidents that affect their
ability to operate discreetly during their mission. However, the
information we obtained during these interviews cannot be generalized to
all federal air marshals. A more detailed description of our scope and
methodology is contained in appendix I. We conducted our work from June
2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
5The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation
Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From Improved Planning
and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).
6GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003), and GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation:
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
In July 2005, after we had completed most of this review, the Secretary of
Homeland Security announced that FAMS would be transferred back to TSA.
This transfer became effective in October 2005. We believe that DHS's
prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful
information in identifying key practices for DHS to consider in effecting
a successful transition to TSA. Accordingly, this report addresses key
lessons learned from the earlier transition to help facilitate FAMS's
movement back to TSA.
Results in Brief
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited
progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity
through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals'
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity
by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in
October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training
was an ineffective use of resources and training.7 DHS indicated that it
would continue to support the surge effort but had not determined whether
and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.
Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career
opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by
providing additional opportunities through investigative or other duties.
Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives
would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include
implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance
shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed
adjustments to future goals and milestones-a key practice for a successful
merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not developed a
communication strategy to create shared expectations within the
organization and report related progress on the transition to employees
and other stakeholders-another key practice. Our previous reports have
underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar practices to
facilitate its transformation efforts.8 With its return of FAMS to TSA,
DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including how these
key practices can help to facilitate FAMS's transfer back to TSA.
7The exact number of ICE agents who received cross-training is considered
sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted version of
this report, GAO-05-884SU.
In addition, FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that
mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not
developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how
federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they
encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls
to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents are
communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not
providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals
from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS
lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports
and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.
To help the department in its efforts to achieve a successful
transformation effort in returning FAMS to TSA, we are recommending that
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security adopt, for this
transformation, key practices for successful mergers and transformations
that we have previously recommended to the department, which include
developing an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to
build momentum and show progress as well as a communication strategy to
share expectations and report related progress. We are also recommending
that the Secretary take four actions to establish better management
controls related to recording, tracking, and addressing mission incidents
as well as communicating the outcome of actions taken to address these
incidents.
We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
written comments, agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
report. The full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix III.
8See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and
Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
Background
Originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to counter
hijackers, FAMS was expanded in response to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks through the passage of ATSA. This law required a
dramatic increase in FAMS's mission and workforce and mandated the
deployment of federal air marshals on all high security risk flights.9 To
create an expanded workforce, FAA began an intensive effort on September
17, 2001, to recruit federal air marshals in unprecedented numbers. Until
FAA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of federal air
marshals, other federal agencies made law enforcement officers available
to augment FAMS. Since that time, FAMS has grown from a relatively
centralized organization with one office to a highly decentralized agency
with thousands of federal air marshals assigned to 21 field offices-each
headed by a Special Agent in Charge, or SAC-throughout the United States.
In addition to changes in its size and mission, FAMS has also undergone
several organizational transformations since September 11, 2001, moving
from FAA to TSA in November 2001, and from DOT to DHS in March 2003.
Several months later-in November 2003-FAMS was transferred from TSA to
ICE, based, in part, on the conclusions reached by a BTS-commissioned
internal working group.10 Tasked with determining the merits of a
potential transfer, the working group concluded that transferring FAMS to
ICE could improve the security of the nation's aviation system by
providing a surge capability during times of increased aviation threats by
augmenting federal air marshals with ICE agents. The working group also
concluded that FAMS's transfer to ICE could provide federal air marshals
with the same type of law enforcement career options that were available
to ICE agents. In July 2005-nearly 2 years after its transfer of FAMS from
TSA to ICE-DHS announced that FAMS would be returned to TSA to increase
operational coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of
aviation security. This transfer became effective in October 2005.
To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys federal air marshals on board
flights either destined for or originating in the United States, based on
FAMS's Concept of Operations. Deployed to passenger flights, federal air
marshals dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers and
perform their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue
attention to themselves. Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS
procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security
screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft.11 According to FAMS, these
procedures were designed to enable federal air marshals to carry out their
missions in a discreet manner in order to help protect their identities,
while facilitating coordination and communication with crew and airline
staff.
9S: 105 of ATSA amended title 49 of the United States Code by inserting S:
44917 into chapter 449.
10Members of the working group included the Director of FAMS and
representatives from BTS, DHS, TSA, and ICE.
While FAMS's mission deployment procedures focus on discretion, federal
air marshals may encounter mission-related incidents that affect their
ability to conduct their missions discreetly.12 FAMS has directed that, in
the event that federal air marshals encounter such incidents, they should
contact the FAMS Mission Operations Center,13 to the extent they believe
that the incident could be evidence of a systemic problem. As we discuss
later in this report, federal air marshals are not required to file a
"mission report" for every incident they encounter. That is, the Mission
Operations Center staff may or may not request that the federal air
marshal who encountered the incident file a written mission report.
11Federal air marshals are also subject to certain TSA operating
procedures-which vary by airport-and to airline procedures in boarding
aircraft, which differ by air carrier. In this regard, federal air
marshals must interact, to varying degrees, with airline and airport
personnel and TSA staff during the course of their daily mission.
12More specific information regarding the nature of these incidents is
considered sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted
version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.
13The Mission Operations Center controls daily operations and monitors
ongoing missions by, among other things, tracking federal air marshal
teams that are in the aviation domain worldwide.
DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in Transferring
FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation Practices in Returning
FAMS to TSA
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited
progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity
through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals'
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity
by cross-training a number of ICE agents,14 but suspended these efforts in
October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training
was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it
would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether
and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.
Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career
opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by
providing additional opportunities through investigative or other duties.
Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives
would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include
implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance
shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed
adjustments to future goals and milestones-a key practice for a successful
merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not developed a
communication strategy to create shared expectations within the
organization and report related progress on the transition to employees
and other stakeholders-another key practice. Our previous reports have
underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar practices to
facilitate its transformation efforts.15 With its return of FAMS to TSA,
DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including how these
key practices can facilitate FAMS's transfer back to TSA.
Some Surge Capacity Had Been Developed, but DHS Suspended Efforts to Cross-Train
ICE Agents
One of DHS's objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE was to create a "surge
capacity;" that is, strengthening aviation security in a heightened threat
environment by tactically deploying ICE agents to supplement FAMS's
existing deployments of federal air marshals on U.S. aircraft. The
Secretary of DHS announced in December 2003 that this surge capacity would
be achieved through training the over 5,000 ICE agents from ICE's Office
of Investigations.16 Specifically, these agents, who typically conduct
immigration and customs-related investigations, could also be deployed to
supplement federal air marshals on commercial airlines, thereby providing
a manpower reserve from which DHS could draw upon when heightened threat
conditions warranted increased flight coverage. In March 2004, the
Assistant Secretary for ICE testified before the Appropriations Committees
that ICE anticipated providing this cross-training to no less than 800 ICE
agents by the end of fiscal year 2004.17
14As we noted earlier, the exact number of ICE agents who received
cross-training is considered sensitive security information and discussed
in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.
15See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and
Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
Between December 2003 and October 2004, a number of ICE agents received
cross-training in the skills necessary to supplement federal air marshals
during a heightened threat level. Some of those agents were deployed and
temporarily assigned to augment federal air marshals on flights in
response to a heightened threat alert.18 According to FAMS, these ICE
agents were chosen for surge deployment based on their previous FAMS
training-including extensive firearms training-and flying experience as
temporary federal air marshals.19 That is, these agents, employees of the
former U.S. Customs Service, had been among the law enforcement officers
who had previously flown as temporary federal air marshals to augment FAMS
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, from October 2001 through May
2002.20 To prepare for the surge deployment, these ICE agents received a
3-day refresher training in current FAMS's procedures, policies, and
updated firearms techniques.
16With agents located in 27 field offices throughout the United States,
ICE's Office of Investigations enforces trade and immigration laws through
the investigation of activities, persons, and incidents that may pose a
threat to U.S. safety and security. These include the illegal trafficking
in weapons, narcotics and contraband smuggling, human smuggling and
trafficking, violations of the immigration system, money laundering and
other financial crimes, fraudulent trade practices, child pornography, and
child sex tourism. Its key missions are strengthening national security,
combating smuggling and promoting public safety, and securing the nation's
economic system from terrorist and criminal exploitation.
17For example, see Statement of Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,
before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland
Security, March 30, 2004.
18The exact number of ICE agents who were deployed is considered sensitive
security information and discussed in the restricted version of this
report, GAO-05-884SU.
19Once these agents completed FAMS's 40-hour training program, they were
temporarily assigned to the FAA's air marshal program to augment their
security mission.
20These agents were among the federal law enforcement officers used from
various agencies who had been trained and deployed as temporary air
marshals to augment the small number of federal air marshals employed at
that time. These officers acted as a stopgap measure, while FAMS selected,
hired, trained, and deployed permanent air marshals.
Following the surge deployment in January 2004, FAMS developed and
implemented a 40-hour cross-training curriculum for ICE agents so they
could supplement federal air marshals during a surge deployment. This
training was substantially similar to the training provided to federal air
marshals, which included instruction in areas such as the use of firearms
and boarding procedures.
In October 2004, ICE suspended its cross-training efforts in response to
congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of
resources and training. Specifically, in a June 2004 House Appropriations
Committee report, the Committee expressed concerns regarding how ICE
agents would maintain their skills as federal air marshals since they did
not regularly perform federal air marshal duties. The Committee directed
that each cross-trained ICE agent fly missions with a federal air marshal
for a minimum of 24 hours per quarter, beginning October 1, 2004.21
However, in the October 2004 report that accompanied the fiscal year 2005
DHS Appropriations Act, the Conference Committee suggested that the
cross-training provided to ICE agents was an ineffective use of
resources.22 The Committee further suggested that the training of ICE
agents to serve as federal air marshals in a surge capacity be
discontinued. In response, DHS suspended its cross-training efforts at
that time. ICE later stated that it would continue to support the surge
effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume
cross-training to support this initiative. With DHS's transfer of FAMS to
TSA, it is unclear whether or how cross-training will be used to augment
federal air marshals during heightened threat levels.
21H.R. Rep. No. 108-541, at 32, 36 (June 15, 2004).
22H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-774, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2004).
DHS Recognized That Federal Air Marshals' Career Opportunities Were Limited but
Had Not Developed Plans to Expand Them
Another of DHS's objectives in its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE was to
expand career opportunities for federal air marshals. Both FAMS and ICE
officials have stated that the transfer was intended to provide federal
air marshals with ground-based assignments, such as nonflying supervisory
or other positions and thus establish additional career opportunities for
federal air marshals. These officials told us that federal air marshals
cannot sustain a career in an airborne position, based on such factors as
the frequency of flying, their irregular schedules, and the monotony of
flying repetitive assignments.
A study commissioned by ICE in March 2004 reflected concerns over federal
air marshals' limited career opportunities. Specifically, ICE commissioned
IBM to determine, among other things, the current status of federal air
marshals' career development and advancement opportunities. The study
found that the overwhelming majority of federal air marshals were expected
to reach the highest pay level in their job position by August 2004, and
that FAMS had only a limited number of supervisory opportunities beyond
that pay level. The study concluded that without career development and
promotion opportunities, FAMS could experience a decline in employee
morale and an increase in attrition rates.
As a means of providing expanded career opportunities, FAMS management has
advocated that federal air marshals' current position as a "civil aviation
security specialist" be re-classified to that of a criminal
investigator.23 Recognizing that career paths for criminal investigators
provide greater opportunity for movement than civil aviation security
specialists, FAMS commissioned a study by a private contractor to
determine the feasibility of such a conversion. Among other things, the
study concluded that because the mission of air marshals had changed after
September 11, 2001-from enforcing FAA regulations onboard aircraft, to
detecting, deterring, and defeating criminal acts in the aviation
domain-federal air marshals satisfied the requirements of a criminal
investigator position. The study further stated that career opportunities
were more prevalent for those qualified as criminal investigators because
these positions possess knowledge, skills, and abilities that are
interchangeable across different agencies. In addition, the study found
that criminal investigators could more successfully compete for similar
positions in other law enforcement agencies and enjoyed greater
opportunities for advancement and higher compensation in the federal
government.
23Under OPM's position classification standards, aviation security
specialists are classified within the general inspection, investigation,
and compliance occupational series (referred to as a GS-1801), which
involves ensuring compliance with federal laws, regulations, or mandatory
guidelines. Criminal investigator positions are classified within the
"criminal" investigation occupational series (referred to as a GS-1811),
which involves planning and investigating alleged or suspected criminal
violations.
In January 2005, FAMS presented the results of the study to the management
of DHS's Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate for their
consideration. In reviewing the study's findings and additional research
conducted by ICE's legal and human resources staff, BTS, along with ICE
management, concluded that the reclassification of federal air marshals
from an aviation security specialist position to a criminal investigator
position was not an appropriate course of action. In addressing the
study's conclusions, officials maintained that the primary duties of a
federal air marshal-to protect passengers, crews, and aircraft from
terrorist activities-were "not investigative in nature" and were
inconsistent with the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM)
classification standards for the criminal investigator series. DHS also
concluded that without any significant changes in the duties of federal
air marshals, it did not see a basis for the conversion.
In January 2005, ICE formed an Advisory Board to address issues related to
FAMS's transfer to ICE, including expanding federal air marshals' career
opportunities.24 ICE senior management officials, who served as members of
the board, stated that they would have liked to expand career
opportunities for federal air marshals if FAMS were to continue to reside
in ICE, such as creating additional ground-based mission assignments. One
of these officials said that federal air marshals could have potentially
assumed a limited intelligence and surveillance role, such as assessing
aircraft vulnerability and interdicting drugs and/or contraband aboard
aircraft. As of June 2005, however, ICE had not developed any plans for
doing so. With FAMS's transition to TSA, it is unclear whether or how
federal air marshals' career opportunities may be expanded.
24Board members included ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the senior
advisor to ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the special counsel to ICE's
Assistant Secretary, FAMS's Deputy Director, and two FAMS field senior
executives.
Key Practices Could Facilitate FAMS's Return to TSA
In light of its announcement to return FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity
to learn from its experience in transferring FAMS to ICE, including the
importance that key practices can have in leading to successful
transformation efforts within public and private sector organizations. Our
July 2003 report on implementation steps to assist mergers and
transformations identified nine key practices followed by public and
private sector organizations that have led to successful
transformations.25 All nine key practices and associated implementation
steps are shown in appendix II. While all nine practices are important, we
identified two practices that, in our view, could have enhanced DHS's
efforts to meet its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE. These
practices are (1) developing an overall strategy with implementation goals
and a timeline to build momentum and show progress, and (2) establishing a
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
progress. We believe these practices would be particularly helpful for DHS
and could increase its likelihood for a successful transformation effort
in returning FAMS to TSA.
As we discussed earlier, one of DHS's stated objectives in transferring
FAMS to ICE was to create a surge capacity during heightened threat
levels. However, while DHS had indicated that it would train no less than
800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004, it did not have an overall
strategy to identify how it would sustain a surge capacity. Such a
strategy could have contained implementation goals, measures, and
milestones to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse
corrections. Another of DHS's stated objectives was to expand career
opportunities for federal air marshals. However, DHS had not identified
any implementation goals nor time frames for how and when it planned to
develop these career opportunities, such as the types of opportunities to
be provided or when federal air marshals could expect these opportunities
to become available.
Establishing implementation goals and associated timelines are critical to
ensuring a successful integration as well as pinpointing performance
shortfalls and gaps and suggesting midcourse corrections. Such goals and
timelines could be contained in an overall integration strategy for a
merger or transformation effort. Further, such a strategy typically goes
beyond what is contained in an agency strategic plan and provides more
specific operational and tactical information to manage a sustained
effort. Our previous work has also underscored the importance of DHS
adopting similar practices to help guide its overall management
integration effort.26
25GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create shared
expectations within the organization and report related progress on FAMS's
transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders-another key
practice of a successful merger or transformation. ICE officials shared
with us various forms of communications they had issued to employees over
the period of a few months, between September and December 2003. Those
communications included e-mails, broadcast messages, and agency press
releases. Officials also provided us with an agenda for a televised
roundtable discussion that had been broadcast to ICE employees at various
times in October 2003 regarding aspects of the transition. The discussion
centered on an exchange between the Director of FAMS and the Acting
Assistant Secretary of ICE to address, among other things, issues related
to personnel and the cross-training of ICE agents and federal air
marshals. Beyond these efforts, ICE could not identify any subsequent
communications made to keep ICE employees informed about the progress of
the transition-specifically, what employees could expect and by when.
Further, 14 of the 19 federal air marshals we interviewed during our
review felt that ICE management had not kept them adequately informed
about the progress of the transition. Also, 13 of the 19 federal air
marshals said they were unclear or confused about how they would become
integrated into ICE.
Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to
implementing a merger or transformation. Organizations should develop a
communication strategy that reaches out to employees and seeks to
genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process and not
just "push the message out." For example, communication should help
employees understand how the changes from the transformation will affect
them and how their responsibilities might change with the new
organization. In addition, a communication strategy is especially crucial
in the public sector where policy-making and program management demands
transparency. For example, such a strategy should include not only what
results are to be achieved, but also which processes are to be used to
achieve those results.
26For example, see GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive
and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration,
GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005) and GAO, Homeland Security:
Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.:
July 17, 2002).
FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal Air
Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly
FAMS lacks adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that
affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. Internal controls
comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet organizations'
missions, goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control
define the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in the
federal government. Accordingly, these standards provide that: (1)
internal controls and all transactions and other significant events be
clearly documented, (2) controls be generally designed to ensure that
ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal operations, and (3)
pertinent information be communicated throughout an organization to allow
employees to perform their duties efficiently.27 Our review of FAMS's
mission reporting process noted weaknesses in each of these control areas.
FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air
marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are
recorded. Specifically, FAMS officials stated that FAMS does not maintain
a record of these types of incidents unless a mission report is filed.
Standards for internal control in the federal government require that all
transactions and other significant events be clearly documented in a
manner that is complete, accurate, and useful to managers and others
involved in evaluating operations. FAMS has directed that, in the event
that federal air marshals encounter incidents affecting their ability to
operate discreetly, they are to contact the Mission Operations Center to
the extent the air marshals believe that the incident could be evidence of
a systemic problem.28 In contacting the Operations Center, the federal air
marshal is to request guidance for resolving the incident. The Operations
Center may then ask the federal air marshal to submit a mission report to
FAMS's Office of Field Operations (Field Operations) to describe the
incident in greater detail.29 However, if the federal air marshal does not
submit a mission report, FAMS does not maintain a record of the incident.
In addition, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes
criteria for when and how mission reports are to be completed and filed.
According to FAMS, instruction in the use and completion of mission
reports is communicated orally through FAMS training and not through
formal written guidance. Without a means for ensuring that all incidents
are recorded, and absent written criteria that defines when and how
mission reports are to be completed, FAMS cannot provide reasonable
assurance that it is aware of the full extent of incidents that federal
air marshals encounter.
27GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
28Specifically, the federal air marshal contacts a designated controller
at the Mission Operations Center to describe the details of the incident.
The controller then attempts to provide guidance to the federal air
marshal to help resolve the incident. If the controller cannot resolve the
situation at that point in time, he/she refers the federal air marshal to
a designated watch officer at the Operations Center who will attempt to
resolve the incident directly or provide guidance to the federal air
marshal for resolving the issue.
29According to FAMS, mission reports do not include incidents that present
a direct or imminent threat to aircraft, passengers, crew, or other
persons or property. In the event that federal air marshals encounter
incidents that pose such threats, they can file an "incident report."
FAMS also lacks controls to help ensure that reported incidents are
systematically tracked so that it can retrieve and analyze data on
reported incidents, thereby ensuring ongoing monitoring of incidents.
Federal standards for internal control require that controls generally be
designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of
normal operations. FAMS has acknowledged that it lacks a tool to capture
and retrieve data on mission reports. The absence of such a tool limits
FAMS's ability to track and analyze relevant information and monitor
trends to identify operational areas in need of improvement based on the
reported incidents and thereby preventing potential incidents.
In addition, while FAMS has developed a process for reviewing and
addressing incidents identified in mission reports once filed, and issued
guidance to its field offices that outlines this process, it has not
established formal written policies and procedures to document the
process. Federal standards for internal control require that internal
controls are to be documented and the documentation be readily available
for examination. According to FAMS, its process for reviewing and
addressing incidents identified in mission reports involves Field
Operations' review of the mission reports to determine if further action
is warranted on the incident. FAMS officials stated that, as part of this
review, Field Operations may deem some incidents as "local issues;" for
example, miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline
staff regarding the manner in which the air marshal can board the
aircraft. Mission reports involving local issues are forwarded to the
relevant FAMS field office and may be resolved through the on-site airport
liaisons or the local Special Agent in Charge for the airport where the
incident occurred.30 Field Operations may also deem some incidents as
"national issues;" that is, incidents that are not unique to a specific
airport, such as an incident involving the flight crew of a particular
airline. These types of incidents are forwarded to FAMS's Liaison Division
(located within the Office of Flight Operations). In attempting to address
the issue, the Liaison Division may contact TSA or the airline's corporate
security office, depending on whether the incident involved check-in,
security checkpoint, or boarding procedures.
Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of
actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are
communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the reports.
Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air
marshals from submitting future reports. Standards for internal control
state that pertinent information should be communicated throughout an
organization to allow employees to perform their duties efficiently.
According to FAMS, Field Operations provides feedback to the relevant
field office SAC on actions taken to resolve incidents in the mission
reports. The SAC's communication of these results to the federal air
marshals in the particular office is discretionary. Of the 15 federal air
marshals we interviewed who said they had filed a mission report, 12 said
they had not received feedback on the outcome of the report. Some federal
air marshals identified the importance of having feedback on the outcome
of the reports, noting that not having feedback discourages them from
filing future reports. For example, one federal air marshal stated that he
and other federal air marshals in his office had stopped filing mission
reports because they did not receive feedback on the outcome of the
reports they had previously filed. Another federal air marshal said that
federal air marshals in his field office were generally dissatisfied with
the lack of feedback on the mission reports they had filed.
30FAMS field offices have assigned federal air marshal supervisors to
serve as on-site airport liaisons at various airports that are within
their geographical location. In general, these liaisons assist in
establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with airport,
law enforcement, and private industry officials. Liaison duties include,
among other things, addressing with the local Federal Security Director at
their assigned airport various incidents identified in mission reports,
providing a consistent federal air marshal presence at airports,
performing surveillance detection and counter-surveillance in their
airport, and following up on suspicious individuals and activities
reported by federal air marshals while carrying out their mission.
FAMS officials stated that they recognize the importance of written
policies to govern the use and management of these reports, and stated
that FAMS is in the process of developing such policies to include how
FAMS will review and address incidents identified in the reports and
provide feedback on the outcome of these incidents in a timely manner.
Although FAMS identified plans to strengthen controls over the management
of these incidents, they did not identify time frames for when these would
be completed.
Conclusions
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS made only limited
progress in achieving its stated transition objectives of creating a surge
capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career opportunities. With
its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its
experiences and adopt key practices for successful mergers and
transformations to assist its efforts to transfer FAMS back into TSA. Such
key practices include developing an overall strategy to include
implementation goals, measures, and milestones to track the organization's
progress in achieving its goals. By showing progress towards these goals,
DHS could build momentum and demonstrate that real progress is being made.
In addition, having a strategy with implementation goals and milestones
could help target performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse
corrections, including any needed adjustments to future goals and
milestones. In addition, developing a communication strategy would help to
inform employees about the status of the transition and provide
transparency about specific actions to be taken and time frames for their
completion. In light of the number of transformations FAMS has undergone
in recent years, providing open communication to create shared
expectations among all staff and stakeholders takes on added significance.
Further, with its critical role in helping to secure the nation's
commercial aviation system, it is important that FAMS has adequate
controls to manage information regarding incidents federal air marshals
encounter during their missions that could compromise their mission. Such
controls take on added importance in light of FAMS's growth from a small,
centralized organization with only one office and the ability to cover a
few missions to a larger decentralized organization with thousands of
federal air marshals and a capacity to provide significantly expanded
coverage. Absent adequate management controls, FAMS does not have a full
account of reported incidents or a means for tracking, analyzing, and
monitoring these incidents. Such information is necessary for identifying
the full extent of reported incidents and for determining the operational
areas in need of improvement. In addition, such controls would help to
ensure that actions taken to resolve these incidents are reported to the
federal air marshals who filed them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has the planning
framework necessary to guide and monitor its efforts to merge the Federal
Air Marshal Service with the Transportation Security Administration, we
are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
adopt key practices that have led to successful transformation efforts
within public and private sector organizations by taking the following two
actions:
o Develop an overall strategy with implementation goals and a
timeline to build momentum and show progress.
o Develop a communication strategy to share expectations and
report related progress.
In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service's
management of incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability
to operate discreetly during their missions, we are recommending
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct
the Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service to take the
following four actions:
o Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the
Mission Operations Center that affect federal air marshals'
ability to operate discreetly and criteria for determining which
incidents require federal air marshals to complete a mission
report.
o Develop a means for tracking and retrieving data on mission
reports to enable FAMS to analyze and monitor reported and
systemic incidents.
o Establish written policies and procedures for reviewing and
addressing reported incidents.
o Establish a means for providing feedback on the status and
outcome of FAMS mission reports to the federal air marshals who
submit them.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.
On November 7, 2005, we received written comments on the draft
report, which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS agreed
with the findings and recommendations in the report and described
actions it had started or planned to take to implement them. With
regard to our two recommendations related to key practices that
have led to successful transformation efforts, DHS stated that
FAMS and TSA will work closely with DHS's Under Secretary for
Policy and Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning to develop a
comprehensive strategy with achievable goals and a timeline to
assure progress. DHS also stated that FAMS will work with TSA and
DHS leadership to develop a communication strategy intended to
facilitate shared expectations and report progress. In addition,
regarding our recommendations related to FAMS's management of
incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly during their missions, DHS stated that FAMS is in the
process of drafting a written directive to establish policies and
procedures for reporting and managing mission incidents. The
directive is intended to restructure FAMS's management of mission
reports to enable timely dissemination of and access to
information, including feedback to management and employees. The
directive will also establish a formalized tracking system for
reporting incidents. Shortly after receiving comments from DHS,
FAMS provided us with an official written directive that
establishes policies and procedures for reporting and managing
mission incidents. We reviewed this directive and believe that it
addresses our recommendations related to (1) developing a means
for recording all incidents reported to the Mission Operations
Center that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require
federal air marshals to complete a mission report and (2)
establishing written policies and procedures for reviewing and
addressing reported incidents.
In addition to commenting on our findings and recommendations, DHS
provided technical comments on the report under separate cover,
and we revised the draft report where appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional
committees as appropriate. We will also make copies available to
others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish
to discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
[email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) the progress
DHS made in achieving its stated objectives in transferring FAMS
to ICE and the key practices that could facilitate its efforts to
return FAMS to TSA; and (2) the extent to which FAMS has adequate
controls to manage mission-related incidents that affect federal
air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. To address these
objectives, we reviewed relevant regulations, internal planning
documents, agency policies and procedures, and federal air marshal
mission reports, and interviewed a variety of federal officials
and federal air marshals in selected field office locations. Some
information related to FAMS and federal air marshals' ability to
operate discreetly is considered Sensitive Security Information.
Accordingly, we issued a separate restricted version of this
report.1
To determine the progress DHS made in achieving its stated
objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE, we reviewed and analyzed
key documents about the transition effort as well as interviewed
key officials from BTS, FAMS, and ICE management. Key documents
included, but were not limited to, agency memorandums, various
transition documents, materials from offices involved with
implementing the transition effort, and studies that addressed
issues related to career opportunities for federal air marshals.
We also analyzed surge training information on the number of ICE
agents cross-trained between December 2003 and October 2004 by
geographical location. In addition, we spoke with officials at
DHS, BTS, ICE, and FAMS to discuss the purpose and progress
related to the transition of FAMS to ICE, including creating a
surge capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career
opportunities. Further, we assessed DHS's progress in meeting its
stated objectives by using key practices consistently found at the
center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.
These practices were identified to assist DHS in its consolidation
before the department was created and were based on useful
practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector
organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.2 We
selected two of these nine key practices as criteria for this
review because they are especially important to ensuring that DHS
has the planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its
efforts-which we have also underscored in our previous work on
DHS-and to facilitating trust and transparency within the
organization. The two selected practices were: setting
implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show
progress from day one and establishing a communication strategy
that will serve to create shared expectations within the
organization and at the same time report related progress on the
merger.
In addition, we interviewed FAMS officials at their headquarters
offices in Reston, Virginia, and their Mission Operations Center
in Herndon, Virginia. Specifically, we spoke with officials in
FAMS' Mission Support, Flight Operations, Training and
Development, and Field Operations offices to discuss the types of
mission-related incidents that federal air marshals encounter
during the course of their mission and how FAMS manages these
incidents. Further, to determine the extent to which FAMS has
adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that affect
federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly, we used our
Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government and
Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool.3
Furthermore, in accomplishing our objectives, we conducted
structured interviews with FAMS officials-including 5 SACS-and 19
federal air marshals in 5 of FAMS's 21 field offices. Generally,
we chose these offices on the basis of geographical dispersion.
They included: Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; New York, New
York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Among
other things, we asked questions about the federal air marshals'
understanding of the transition of FAMS to ICE, including whether
their roles and mission had changed as a result of the transition.
We also asked the federal air marshals in these interviews a
series of questions related to their mission experience at various
airports. For example, we asked about the check-in, screening, and
boarding practices that they have experienced while carrying out
their missions. The results of these interviews provide examples
of FAMS officials' and federal air marshals' experiences and
perspectives and cannot be generalized beyond those we interviewed
because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in
selecting the field offices, officials, and federal air marshals.
We conducted these interviews between October and November 2004
and in April 2005. We also made some follow-up calls in May and
July of 2005. We conducted our work from June 2004 through August
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Source: GAO.
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777
In addition to the individual named above, Leo Barbour, Steve
Caldwell, Grace Coleman, Joel Grossman, Wilfred Holloway, Charles
Johnson, Thomas Lombardi, Brenda Rabinowitz, Minette Richardson,
Jack Schulze, Angela Thomas, Sarah Veale, and Keith Wandtke made
key contributions to this report.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight
Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently Taken
Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington,
D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington,
D.C.: July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: TSA Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457.
Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under
Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.
GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using
Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324.
Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to
Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening
Services. GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector is Critical to
Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10,
2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention
Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington,
D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Budget Issues: Reprogramming of Federal Air Marshal Service Funds
in Fiscal Year 2003. GAO-04-577R. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5,
2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385.
Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T.
Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a
Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development
Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20,
2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing
Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional
Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:
September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9,
2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides
Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and
Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to
Cover Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T.
Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Action and Plans to Build
a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January
17, 2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
DOT's Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January
10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20,
2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22,
2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects
Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington,
D.C.: October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses
Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2,
2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:
July 25, 2002.
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for,
Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington,
D.C.: September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington,
D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's
Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to
Improve Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T.
Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20,
2001.
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Agency Comments
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
1The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation
Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From Improved Planning
and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).
2GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum, Mergers and Transformations: Lessons
Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies,
GAO-03-292SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
3GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal government as
required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. See 31
U.S.C. S: 3512(c). GAO first issued the standards in 1983. GAO revised the
standards and reissued them as Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
These standards provide the overall framework for establishing and
maintaining internal control and for identifying and addressing major
performance challenges and areas at greatest risk for fraud, waste and
abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued its Internal Control Management and
Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist
agencies in maintaining or implementing effective internal control and,
when needed, to help determine what, where, and how improvements can be
implemented.
Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations
Practice Implementation step
Ensure top leadership drives the o Define and articulate a succinct
transformation. and compelling reason for change.
o Balance continued delivery of
services with merger and
transformation activities.
Establish a coherent mission and o Adopt leading practices for
integrated strategic goals to results-oriented strategic planning
guide the transformation. and reporting.
Focus on a key set of principles o Embed core values in every aspect
and priorities at the outset of of the organization to reinforce the
the transformation. new culture.
Set implementation goals and a o Make public implementation goals
timeline to build momentum and and timeline.
show progress from day one. o Seek and monitor employee
attitudes and take appropriate
follow-up actions.
o Identify cultural features of
merging organizations to increase
understanding of former work
environments.
o Attract and retain key talent.
o Establish an organizationwide
knowledge and skills inventory to
allow knowledge exchange among
merging organizations.
Dedicate an implementation team to o Establish networks to support
manage the transformation process. implementation team.
o Select high-performing team
members.
Use the performance management o Adopt leading practices to
system to define the implement effective performance
responsibility and assure management systems with adequate
accountability for change. safeguards.
Establish a communication strategy o Communicate early and often to
to create shared expectations and build trust.
report related progress. o Ensure consistency of message.
o Encourage two-way communication.
o Provide information to meet
specific needs of employees.
Involve employees to obtain their o Use employee teams.
ideas and gain ownership for the o Involve employees in planning and
transformation. sharing performance information.
o Incorporate employee feedback
into new policies and procedures.
o Delegate authority to appropriate
organizational levels.
Build a world-class organization. o Adopt leading practices to build
a world-class organization.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
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Highlights of GAO-06-203, a report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio,
House of Representatives
November 2005
AVIATION SECURITY
Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and
Controls
The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of
changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key
aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet
movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit
screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses
FAMS's
(1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to
TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air
marshals' ability to operate discreetly.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) adopt key practices for successful mergers and transformations, to
include developing an overall strategy with implementation goals and
milestones and a communication strategy. GAO is also recommending that the
Secretary direct FAMS to improve management controls for recording,
tracking, and addressing mission incidents and communicating the outcome
of actions taken to address them.
DHS reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAO's findings and
recommendations.
DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its
transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a "surge" capacity
through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals'
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity
by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in
October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training
was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it
would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether
and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.
Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career
opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them
through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined
how these transition objectives would be met because it had not developed
an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a
timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse
corrections-a key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had
not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
report related progress on the transition to employees and other
stakeholders-another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS's
prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful
information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful
transition.
FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that
mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate
discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not
developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how
federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they
encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls
to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was
communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not
providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals
from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS
lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports
and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.
Federal Air Marshals Protect Passengers, Crew, and Aircraft
*** End of document. ***