    Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
    Improved Planning and Controls (28-NOV-05, GAO-06-203).

    The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a
    number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from
    the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005
    transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air
    marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through
    airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening
    checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's
    (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its
    return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents
    that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-203
        ACCNO:   A42117
      TITLE:     Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could
    Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls
         DATE:   11/28/2005
      SUBJECT:   Air marshals
    	     Airport security
    	     Aviation security
    	     Employee training
    	     Federal agency reorganization
    	     Homeland security
    	     Internal controls
    	     Performance measures
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Training utilization
    	     Agency missions
    	     Policies and procedures

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    GAO-06-203

    Report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, House of Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    November 2005

    AVIATION SECURITY

    Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and
    Controls

    Aviation Security

    GAO-06-203

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 4
    Background 6
    DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving its Stated Objectives in
    Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation
    Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA 8
    FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal Air
    Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly 15
    Conclusions 18
    Recommendations for Executive Action 19
    Agency Comments 19
    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22
    Appendix II Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
    Organizational Transformations 25
    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 26
    Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28
    Related GAO Products 29

    Abbreviations

    ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act BTS Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate DHS Department of Homeland Security
    DOT Department of Transportation FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAMS
    Federal Air Marshal Service GS General Schedule ICE U.S. Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement Bureau OPM Office of Personnel Management SAC Special
    Agent-in-Charge TSA Transportation Security Administration

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548

    November 28, 2005

    The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. DeFazio:

    With approximately 25,000 flights arriving or departing the United States
    each day, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) plays a critical role in
    securing our nation's commercial aviation system by detecting, deterring,
    and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports,
    passengers, and crews. In recent years, FAMS has undergone a number of
    significant changes to its organizational structure, workforce, and
    mission. In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FAMS
    was faced with the formidable task of ramping up its workforce-from an
    agency with fewer than 50 federal air marshals to thousands-and expanding
    its mission to include the protection of both domestic and international
    flights.1 Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
    (ATSA)-enacted in November 2001-authority over FAMS shifted from the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT).2 Over
    the next 2 years, FAMS transferred two more times. FAMS's most recent
    transfer during that timeframe3 occurred in November 2003, when FAMS moved
    from TSA to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE)-the
    largest law enforcement component within the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS).4

    1The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.

    2Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    3In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FAMS, along
    with TSA, was transferred from the Department of Transportation to the
    Department of Homeland Security. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

    4FAMS was formerly located within DHS's Border and Transportation Security
    Directorate (BTS), one of five operational directorates within the
    department. As part of his July 2005 reorganization announcement, the
    Secretary of DHS proposed the dissolution of BTS, pending the enactment of
    legislation to effect this change. With the passage of the fiscal year
    2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No.
    109-90), signed into law on October 18, 2005, the functions of BTS have
    been merged into other offices and component agencies throughout DHS.

    There were two stated objectives related to FAMS's transfer to ICE.
    According to the then-Secretary of Homeland Security, the first objective
    involved cross-training customs agents and immigration officers to
    function as federal air marshals during heightened threat levels, thereby
    providing a "surge" capability that could be deployed in response to an
    increased threat. In announcing the second objective, the Secretary stated
    that the transfer would also provide federal air marshals a greater range
    of law enforcement career options within a single agency. That is, because
    of the limited number of nonairborne (i.e., ground-based) positions within
    FAMS, federal air marshals had few career opportunities, which, if left
    unaddressed, could lead to morale and retention issues. Nearly 2 years
    after FAMS transferred to ICE-in July 2005-the newly appointed Secretary
    of DHS announced that FAMS would be transferred back to TSA to increase
    operational coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of
    aviation security. This transfer became effective in October 2005.

    To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys specially trained and armed federal
    air marshals on board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and aircraft
    from terrorist activities. According to FAMS's mission deployment
    procedures, federal air marshals are to operate as "discreet" (semicovert)
    professionals when checking-in at airports, passing through security
    screening checkpoints, and boarding the aircraft during their missions. In
    doing so, federal air marshals are to blend in with passengers while
    covering high-risk domestic and international flights on U.S. aircraft.
    While FAMS's procedures focus on discretion, there are times when federal
    air marshals encounter mission-related situations (i.e., incidents) that
    affect their ability to conduct their missions discreetly. Such incidents
    may include miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline
    staff regarding the manner in which the federal air marshal can board the
    aircraft.

    In this report, we address: (1) the progress DHS made in achieving its
    stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and the key practices that
    could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA and (2) the extent to
    which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that
    affect federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. Some
    information related to FAMS and federal air marshals' ability to operate
    discreetly is considered sensitive security information. Accordingly, we
    issued a separate restricted version of this report containing that
    information.5

    To answer these questions, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations,
    operational policies and procedures, and other relevant documentation. We
    also interviewed officials from DHS, ICE, BTS, TSA, and FAMS to discuss
    FAMS's transfer to ICE. Additionally, we considered our prior work on key
    practices used by public and private sector organizations that have
    undergone successful mergers and transformations.6 The nine key practices
    are described in greater detail in appendix II. We did not conduct an
    in-depth analysis comparing all of these practices with the transfer of
    FAMS to ICE. However, using the documentation provided and interviews we
    conducted, we examined the information gathered in light of two of the
    nine transformation practices to determine the extent to which the agency
    (1) established an overall strategy with implementation goals and a
    timeline to guide the integration effort into ICE, and (2) employed a
    communication strategy to keep employees informed of the progress of the
    integration. We selected these two practices as criteria for this review
    because they are especially important to ensuring that DHS has the
    planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its transformation
    efforts-which we have also underscored in our previous work on DHS.

    In addition, we interviewed 19 federal air marshals and 5 FAMS Special
    Agents in Charge (SAC) in 5 selected field locations around the country.
    Generally, we chose these locations on the basis of geographical
    dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; New York, New
    York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Federal air
    marshals at these locations fly throughout the nation so their experiences
    potentially cover airports throughout the United States. During these
    interviews, we obtained information on a range of issues related to the
    transfer of FAMS to ICE. Through these interviews, we also gained a more
    complete understanding of federal air marshals' mission deployment
    procedures and their experiences regarding incidents that affect their
    ability to operate discreetly during their mission. However, the
    information we obtained during these interviews cannot be generalized to
    all federal air marshals. A more detailed description of our scope and
    methodology is contained in appendix I. We conducted our work from June
    2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    5The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation
    Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From Improved Planning
    and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).

    6GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
    and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
    2003), and GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation:
    Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
    Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

    In July 2005, after we had completed most of this review, the Secretary of
    Homeland Security announced that FAMS would be transferred back to TSA.
    This transfer became effective in October 2005. We believe that DHS's
    prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful
    information in identifying key practices for DHS to consider in effecting
    a successful transition to TSA. Accordingly, this report addresses key
    lessons learned from the earlier transition to help facilitate FAMS's
    movement back to TSA.

                                    Results in Brief

    In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited
    progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity
    through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals'
    career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity
    by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in
    October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training
    was an ineffective use of resources and training.7 DHS indicated that it
    would continue to support the surge effort but had not determined whether
    and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.
    Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career
    opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by
    providing additional opportunities through investigative or other duties.
    Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives
    would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include
    implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance
    shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed
    adjustments to future goals and milestones-a key practice for a successful
    merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not developed a
    communication strategy to create shared expectations within the
    organization and report related progress on the transition to employees
    and other stakeholders-another key practice. Our previous reports have
    underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar practices to
    facilitate its transformation efforts.8 With its return of FAMS to TSA,
    DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including how these
    key practices can help to facilitate FAMS's transfer back to TSA.

    7The exact number of ICE agents who received cross-training is considered
    sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted version of
    this report, GAO-05-884SU.

    In addition, FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that
    mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate
    discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not
    developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how
    federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they
    encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls
    to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents are
    communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not
    providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals
    from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS
    lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports
    and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.

    To help the department in its efforts to achieve a successful
    transformation effort in returning FAMS to TSA, we are recommending that
    the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security adopt, for this
    transformation, key practices for successful mergers and transformations
    that we have previously recommended to the department, which include
    developing an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to
    build momentum and show progress as well as a communication strategy to
    share expectations and report related progress. We are also recommending
    that the Secretary take four actions to establish better management
    controls related to recording, tracking, and addressing mission incidents
    as well as communicating the outcome of actions taken to address these
    incidents.

    We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
    written comments, agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
    report. The full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix III.

    8See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
    Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and
    Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

                                       Background

    Originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to counter
    hijackers, FAMS was expanded in response to the September 11, 2001,
    terrorist attacks through the passage of ATSA. This law required a
    dramatic increase in FAMS's mission and workforce and mandated the
    deployment of federal air marshals on all high security risk flights.9 To
    create an expanded workforce, FAA began an intensive effort on September
    17, 2001, to recruit federal air marshals in unprecedented numbers. Until
    FAA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of federal air
    marshals, other federal agencies made law enforcement officers available
    to augment FAMS. Since that time, FAMS has grown from a relatively
    centralized organization with one office to a highly decentralized agency
    with thousands of federal air marshals assigned to 21 field offices-each
    headed by a Special Agent in Charge, or SAC-throughout the United States.

    In addition to changes in its size and mission, FAMS has also undergone
    several organizational transformations since September 11, 2001, moving
    from FAA to TSA in November 2001, and from DOT to DHS in March 2003.
    Several months later-in November 2003-FAMS was transferred from TSA to
    ICE, based, in part, on the conclusions reached by a BTS-commissioned
    internal working group.10 Tasked with determining the merits of a
    potential transfer, the working group concluded that transferring FAMS to
    ICE could improve the security of the nation's aviation system by
    providing a surge capability during times of increased aviation threats by
    augmenting federal air marshals with ICE agents. The working group also
    concluded that FAMS's transfer to ICE could provide federal air marshals
    with the same type of law enforcement career options that were available
    to ICE agents. In July 2005-nearly 2 years after its transfer of FAMS from
    TSA to ICE-DHS announced that FAMS would be returned to TSA to increase
    operational coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of
    aviation security. This transfer became effective in October 2005.

    To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys federal air marshals on board
    flights either destined for or originating in the United States, based on
    FAMS's Concept of Operations. Deployed to passenger flights, federal air
    marshals dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers and
    perform their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue
    attention to themselves. Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS
    procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security
    screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft.11 According to FAMS, these
    procedures were designed to enable federal air marshals to carry out their
    missions in a discreet manner in order to help protect their identities,
    while facilitating coordination and communication with crew and airline
    staff.

    9S: 105 of ATSA amended title 49 of the United States Code by inserting S:
    44917 into chapter 449.

    10Members of the working group included the Director of FAMS and
    representatives from BTS, DHS, TSA, and ICE.

    While FAMS's mission deployment procedures focus on discretion, federal
    air marshals may encounter mission-related incidents that affect their
    ability to conduct their missions discreetly.12 FAMS has directed that, in
    the event that federal air marshals encounter such incidents, they should
    contact the FAMS Mission Operations Center,13 to the extent they believe
    that the incident could be evidence of a systemic problem. As we discuss
    later in this report, federal air marshals are not required to file a
    "mission report" for every incident they encounter. That is, the Mission
    Operations Center staff may or may not request that the federal air
    marshal who encountered the incident file a written mission report.

    11Federal air marshals are also subject to certain TSA operating
    procedures-which vary by airport-and to airline procedures in boarding
    aircraft, which differ by air carrier. In this regard, federal air
    marshals must interact, to varying degrees, with airline and airport
    personnel and TSA staff during the course of their daily mission.

    12More specific information regarding the nature of these incidents is
    considered sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted
    version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.

    13The Mission Operations Center controls daily operations and monitors
    ongoing missions by, among other things, tracking federal air marshal
    teams that are in the aviation domain worldwide.

      DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in Transferring
      FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation Practices in Returning
                                      FAMS to TSA

    In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited
    progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity
    through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals'
    career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity
    by cross-training a number of ICE agents,14 but suspended these efforts in
    October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training
    was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it
    would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether
    and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.
    Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career
    opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by
    providing additional opportunities through investigative or other duties.
    Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives
    would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include
    implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance
    shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed
    adjustments to future goals and milestones-a key practice for a successful
    merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not developed a
    communication strategy to create shared expectations within the
    organization and report related progress on the transition to employees
    and other stakeholders-another key practice. Our previous reports have
    underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar practices to
    facilitate its transformation efforts.15 With its return of FAMS to TSA,
    DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including how these
    key practices can facilitate FAMS's transfer back to TSA.

    Some Surge Capacity Had Been Developed, but DHS Suspended Efforts to Cross-Train
    ICE Agents

    One of DHS's objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE was to create a "surge
    capacity;" that is, strengthening aviation security in a heightened threat
    environment by tactically deploying ICE agents to supplement FAMS's
    existing deployments of federal air marshals on U.S. aircraft. The
    Secretary of DHS announced in December 2003 that this surge capacity would
    be achieved through training the over 5,000 ICE agents from ICE's Office
    of Investigations.16 Specifically, these agents, who typically conduct
    immigration and customs-related investigations, could also be deployed to
    supplement federal air marshals on commercial airlines, thereby providing
    a manpower reserve from which DHS could draw upon when heightened threat
    conditions warranted increased flight coverage. In March 2004, the
    Assistant Secretary for ICE testified before the Appropriations Committees
    that ICE anticipated providing this cross-training to no less than 800 ICE
    agents by the end of fiscal year 2004.17

    14As we noted earlier, the exact number of ICE agents who received
    cross-training is considered sensitive security information and discussed
    in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU.

    15See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
    Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and
    Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

    Between December 2003 and October 2004, a number of ICE agents received
    cross-training in the skills necessary to supplement federal air marshals
    during a heightened threat level. Some of those agents were deployed and
    temporarily assigned to augment federal air marshals on flights in
    response to a heightened threat alert.18 According to FAMS, these ICE
    agents were chosen for surge deployment based on their previous FAMS
    training-including extensive firearms training-and flying experience as
    temporary federal air marshals.19 That is, these agents, employees of the
    former U.S. Customs Service, had been among the law enforcement officers
    who had previously flown as temporary federal air marshals to augment FAMS
    following the September 11, 2001, attacks, from October 2001 through May
    2002.20 To prepare for the surge deployment, these ICE agents received a
    3-day refresher training in current FAMS's procedures, policies, and
    updated firearms techniques.

    16With agents located in 27 field offices throughout the United States,
    ICE's Office of Investigations enforces trade and immigration laws through
    the investigation of activities, persons, and incidents that may pose a
    threat to U.S. safety and security. These include the illegal trafficking
    in weapons, narcotics and contraband smuggling, human smuggling and
    trafficking, violations of the immigration system, money laundering and
    other financial crimes, fraudulent trade practices, child pornography, and
    child sex tourism. Its key missions are strengthening national security,
    combating smuggling and promoting public safety, and securing the nation's
    economic system from terrorist and criminal exploitation.

    17For example, see Statement of Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary,
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,
    before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland
    Security, March 30, 2004.

    18The exact number of ICE agents who were deployed is considered sensitive
    security information and discussed in the restricted version of this
    report, GAO-05-884SU.

    19Once these agents completed FAMS's 40-hour training program, they were
    temporarily assigned to the FAA's air marshal program to augment their
    security mission.

    20These agents were among the federal law enforcement officers used from
    various agencies who had been trained and deployed as temporary air
    marshals to augment the small number of federal air marshals employed at
    that time. These officers acted as a stopgap measure, while FAMS selected,
    hired, trained, and deployed permanent air marshals.

    Following the surge deployment in January 2004, FAMS developed and
    implemented a 40-hour cross-training curriculum for ICE agents so they
    could supplement federal air marshals during a surge deployment. This
    training was substantially similar to the training provided to federal air
    marshals, which included instruction in areas such as the use of firearms
    and boarding procedures.

    In October 2004, ICE suspended its cross-training efforts in response to
    congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of
    resources and training. Specifically, in a June 2004 House Appropriations
    Committee report, the Committee expressed concerns regarding how ICE
    agents would maintain their skills as federal air marshals since they did
    not regularly perform federal air marshal duties. The Committee directed
    that each cross-trained ICE agent fly missions with a federal air marshal
    for a minimum of 24 hours per quarter, beginning October 1, 2004.21
    However, in the October 2004 report that accompanied the fiscal year 2005
    DHS Appropriations Act, the Conference Committee suggested that the
    cross-training provided to ICE agents was an ineffective use of
    resources.22 The Committee further suggested that the training of ICE
    agents to serve as federal air marshals in a surge capacity be
    discontinued. In response, DHS suspended its cross-training efforts at
    that time. ICE later stated that it would continue to support the surge
    effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume
    cross-training to support this initiative. With DHS's transfer of FAMS to
    TSA, it is unclear whether or how cross-training will be used to augment
    federal air marshals during heightened threat levels.

    21H.R. Rep. No. 108-541, at 32, 36 (June 15, 2004).

    22H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-774, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2004).

    DHS Recognized That Federal Air Marshals' Career Opportunities Were Limited but
    Had Not Developed Plans to Expand Them

    Another of DHS's objectives in its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE was to
    expand career opportunities for federal air marshals. Both FAMS and ICE
    officials have stated that the transfer was intended to provide federal
    air marshals with ground-based assignments, such as nonflying supervisory
    or other positions and thus establish additional career opportunities for
    federal air marshals. These officials told us that federal air marshals
    cannot sustain a career in an airborne position, based on such factors as
    the frequency of flying, their irregular schedules, and the monotony of
    flying repetitive assignments.

    A study commissioned by ICE in March 2004 reflected concerns over federal
    air marshals' limited career opportunities. Specifically, ICE commissioned
    IBM to determine, among other things, the current status of federal air
    marshals' career development and advancement opportunities. The study
    found that the overwhelming majority of federal air marshals were expected
    to reach the highest pay level in their job position by August 2004, and
    that FAMS had only a limited number of supervisory opportunities beyond
    that pay level. The study concluded that without career development and
    promotion opportunities, FAMS could experience a decline in employee
    morale and an increase in attrition rates.

    As a means of providing expanded career opportunities, FAMS management has
    advocated that federal air marshals' current position as a "civil aviation
    security specialist" be re-classified to that of a criminal
    investigator.23 Recognizing that career paths for criminal investigators
    provide greater opportunity for movement than civil aviation security
    specialists, FAMS commissioned a study by a private contractor to
    determine the feasibility of such a conversion. Among other things, the
    study concluded that because the mission of air marshals had changed after
    September 11, 2001-from enforcing FAA regulations onboard aircraft, to
    detecting, deterring, and defeating criminal acts in the aviation
    domain-federal air marshals satisfied the requirements of a criminal
    investigator position. The study further stated that career opportunities
    were more prevalent for those qualified as criminal investigators because
    these positions possess knowledge, skills, and abilities that are
    interchangeable across different agencies. In addition, the study found
    that criminal investigators could more successfully compete for similar
    positions in other law enforcement agencies and enjoyed greater
    opportunities for advancement and higher compensation in the federal
    government.

    23Under OPM's position classification standards, aviation security
    specialists are classified within the general inspection, investigation,
    and compliance occupational series (referred to as a GS-1801), which
    involves ensuring compliance with federal laws, regulations, or mandatory
    guidelines. Criminal investigator positions are classified within the
    "criminal" investigation occupational series (referred to as a GS-1811),
    which involves planning and investigating alleged or suspected criminal
    violations.

    In January 2005, FAMS presented the results of the study to the management
    of DHS's Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate for their
    consideration. In reviewing the study's findings and additional research
    conducted by ICE's legal and human resources staff, BTS, along with ICE
    management, concluded that the reclassification of federal air marshals
    from an aviation security specialist position to a criminal investigator
    position was not an appropriate course of action. In addressing the
    study's conclusions, officials maintained that the primary duties of a
    federal air marshal-to protect passengers, crews, and aircraft from
    terrorist activities-were "not investigative in nature" and were
    inconsistent with the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM)
    classification standards for the criminal investigator series. DHS also
    concluded that without any significant changes in the duties of federal
    air marshals, it did not see a basis for the conversion.

    In January 2005, ICE formed an Advisory Board to address issues related to
    FAMS's transfer to ICE, including expanding federal air marshals' career
    opportunities.24 ICE senior management officials, who served as members of
    the board, stated that they would have liked to expand career
    opportunities for federal air marshals if FAMS were to continue to reside
    in ICE, such as creating additional ground-based mission assignments. One
    of these officials said that federal air marshals could have potentially
    assumed a limited intelligence and surveillance role, such as assessing
    aircraft vulnerability and interdicting drugs and/or contraband aboard
    aircraft. As of June 2005, however, ICE had not developed any plans for
    doing so. With FAMS's transition to TSA, it is unclear whether or how
    federal air marshals' career opportunities may be expanded.

    24Board members included ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the senior
    advisor to ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the special counsel to ICE's
    Assistant Secretary, FAMS's Deputy Director, and two FAMS field senior
    executives.

    Key Practices Could Facilitate FAMS's Return to TSA

    In light of its announcement to return FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity
    to learn from its experience in transferring FAMS to ICE, including the
    importance that key practices can have in leading to successful
    transformation efforts within public and private sector organizations. Our
    July 2003 report on implementation steps to assist mergers and
    transformations identified nine key practices followed by public and
    private sector organizations that have led to successful
    transformations.25 All nine key practices and associated implementation
    steps are shown in appendix II. While all nine practices are important, we
    identified two practices that, in our view, could have enhanced DHS's
    efforts to meet its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE. These
    practices are (1) developing an overall strategy with implementation goals
    and a timeline to build momentum and show progress, and (2) establishing a
    communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
    progress. We believe these practices would be particularly helpful for DHS
    and could increase its likelihood for a successful transformation effort
    in returning FAMS to TSA.

    As we discussed earlier, one of DHS's stated objectives in transferring
    FAMS to ICE was to create a surge capacity during heightened threat
    levels. However, while DHS had indicated that it would train no less than
    800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004, it did not have an overall
    strategy to identify how it would sustain a surge capacity. Such a
    strategy could have contained implementation goals, measures, and
    milestones to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse
    corrections. Another of DHS's stated objectives was to expand career
    opportunities for federal air marshals. However, DHS had not identified
    any implementation goals nor time frames for how and when it planned to
    develop these career opportunities, such as the types of opportunities to
    be provided or when federal air marshals could expect these opportunities
    to become available.

    Establishing implementation goals and associated timelines are critical to
    ensuring a successful integration as well as pinpointing performance
    shortfalls and gaps and suggesting midcourse corrections. Such goals and
    timelines could be contained in an overall integration strategy for a
    merger or transformation effort. Further, such a strategy typically goes
    beyond what is contained in an agency strategic plan and provides more
    specific operational and tactical information to manage a sustained
    effort. Our previous work has also underscored the importance of DHS
    adopting similar practices to help guide its overall management
    integration effort.26

    25GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
    and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
    2003).

    Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create shared
    expectations within the organization and report related progress on FAMS's
    transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders-another key
    practice of a successful merger or transformation. ICE officials shared
    with us various forms of communications they had issued to employees over
    the period of a few months, between September and December 2003. Those
    communications included e-mails, broadcast messages, and agency press
    releases. Officials also provided us with an agenda for a televised
    roundtable discussion that had been broadcast to ICE employees at various
    times in October 2003 regarding aspects of the transition. The discussion
    centered on an exchange between the Director of FAMS and the Acting
    Assistant Secretary of ICE to address, among other things, issues related
    to personnel and the cross-training of ICE agents and federal air
    marshals. Beyond these efforts, ICE could not identify any subsequent
    communications made to keep ICE employees informed about the progress of
    the transition-specifically, what employees could expect and by when.
    Further, 14 of the 19 federal air marshals we interviewed during our
    review felt that ICE management had not kept them adequately informed
    about the progress of the transition. Also, 13 of the 19 federal air
    marshals said they were unclear or confused about how they would become
    integrated into ICE.

    Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to
    implementing a merger or transformation. Organizations should develop a
    communication strategy that reaches out to employees and seeks to
    genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process and not
    just "push the message out." For example, communication should help
    employees understand how the changes from the transformation will affect
    them and how their responsibilities might change with the new
    organization. In addition, a communication strategy is especially crucial
    in the public sector where policy-making and program management demands
    transparency. For example, such a strategy should include not only what
    results are to be achieved, but also which processes are to be used to
    achieve those results.

    26For example, see GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive
    and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration,
    GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005) and GAO, Homeland Security:
    Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.:
    July 17, 2002).

        FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal Air
                        Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly

    FAMS lacks adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that
    affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. Internal controls
    comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet organizations'
    missions, goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control
    define the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in the
    federal government. Accordingly, these standards provide that: (1)
    internal controls and all transactions and other significant events be
    clearly documented, (2) controls be generally designed to ensure that
    ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal operations, and (3)
    pertinent information be communicated throughout an organization to allow
    employees to perform their duties efficiently.27 Our review of FAMS's
    mission reporting process noted weaknesses in each of these control areas.

    FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air
    marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are
    recorded. Specifically, FAMS officials stated that FAMS does not maintain
    a record of these types of incidents unless a mission report is filed.
    Standards for internal control in the federal government require that all
    transactions and other significant events be clearly documented in a
    manner that is complete, accurate, and useful to managers and others
    involved in evaluating operations. FAMS has directed that, in the event
    that federal air marshals encounter incidents affecting their ability to
    operate discreetly, they are to contact the Mission Operations Center to
    the extent the air marshals believe that the incident could be evidence of
    a systemic problem.28 In contacting the Operations Center, the federal air
    marshal is to request guidance for resolving the incident. The Operations
    Center may then ask the federal air marshal to submit a mission report to
    FAMS's Office of Field Operations (Field Operations) to describe the
    incident in greater detail.29 However, if the federal air marshal does not
    submit a mission report, FAMS does not maintain a record of the incident.
    In addition, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes
    criteria for when and how mission reports are to be completed and filed.
    According to FAMS, instruction in the use and completion of mission
    reports is communicated orally through FAMS training and not through
    formal written guidance. Without a means for ensuring that all incidents
    are recorded, and absent written criteria that defines when and how
    mission reports are to be completed, FAMS cannot provide reasonable
    assurance that it is aware of the full extent of incidents that federal
    air marshals encounter.

    27GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
    GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

    28Specifically, the federal air marshal contacts a designated controller
    at the Mission Operations Center to describe the details of the incident.
    The controller then attempts to provide guidance to the federal air
    marshal to help resolve the incident. If the controller cannot resolve the
    situation at that point in time, he/she refers the federal air marshal to
    a designated watch officer at the Operations Center who will attempt to
    resolve the incident directly or provide guidance to the federal air
    marshal for resolving the issue.

    29According to FAMS, mission reports do not include incidents that present
    a direct or imminent threat to aircraft, passengers, crew, or other
    persons or property. In the event that federal air marshals encounter
    incidents that pose such threats, they can file an "incident report."

    FAMS also lacks controls to help ensure that reported incidents are
    systematically tracked so that it can retrieve and analyze data on
    reported incidents, thereby ensuring ongoing monitoring of incidents.
    Federal standards for internal control require that controls generally be
    designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of
    normal operations. FAMS has acknowledged that it lacks a tool to capture
    and retrieve data on mission reports. The absence of such a tool limits
    FAMS's ability to track and analyze relevant information and monitor
    trends to identify operational areas in need of improvement based on the
    reported incidents and thereby preventing potential incidents.

    In addition, while FAMS has developed a process for reviewing and
    addressing incidents identified in mission reports once filed, and issued
    guidance to its field offices that outlines this process, it has not
    established formal written policies and procedures to document the
    process. Federal standards for internal control require that internal
    controls are to be documented and the documentation be readily available
    for examination. According to FAMS, its process for reviewing and
    addressing incidents identified in mission reports involves Field
    Operations' review of the mission reports to determine if further action
    is warranted on the incident. FAMS officials stated that, as part of this
    review, Field Operations may deem some incidents as "local issues;" for
    example, miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline
    staff regarding the manner in which the air marshal can board the
    aircraft. Mission reports involving local issues are forwarded to the
    relevant FAMS field office and may be resolved through the on-site airport
    liaisons or the local Special Agent in Charge for the airport where the
    incident occurred.30 Field Operations may also deem some incidents as
    "national issues;" that is, incidents that are not unique to a specific
    airport, such as an incident involving the flight crew of a particular
    airline. These types of incidents are forwarded to FAMS's Liaison Division
    (located within the Office of Flight Operations). In attempting to address
    the issue, the Liaison Division may contact TSA or the airline's corporate
    security office, depending on whether the incident involved check-in,
    security checkpoint, or boarding procedures.

    Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of
    actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are
    communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the reports.
    Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air
    marshals from submitting future reports. Standards for internal control
    state that pertinent information should be communicated throughout an
    organization to allow employees to perform their duties efficiently.
    According to FAMS, Field Operations provides feedback to the relevant
    field office SAC on actions taken to resolve incidents in the mission
    reports. The SAC's communication of these results to the federal air
    marshals in the particular office is discretionary. Of the 15 federal air
    marshals we interviewed who said they had filed a mission report, 12 said
    they had not received feedback on the outcome of the report. Some federal
    air marshals identified the importance of having feedback on the outcome
    of the reports, noting that not having feedback discourages them from
    filing future reports. For example, one federal air marshal stated that he
    and other federal air marshals in his office had stopped filing mission
    reports because they did not receive feedback on the outcome of the
    reports they had previously filed. Another federal air marshal said that
    federal air marshals in his field office were generally dissatisfied with
    the lack of feedback on the mission reports they had filed.

    30FAMS field offices have assigned federal air marshal supervisors to
    serve as on-site airport liaisons at various airports that are within
    their geographical location. In general, these liaisons assist in
    establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with airport,
    law enforcement, and private industry officials. Liaison duties include,
    among other things, addressing with the local Federal Security Director at
    their assigned airport various incidents identified in mission reports,
    providing a consistent federal air marshal presence at airports,
    performing surveillance detection and counter-surveillance in their
    airport, and following up on suspicious individuals and activities
    reported by federal air marshals while carrying out their mission.

    FAMS officials stated that they recognize the importance of written
    policies to govern the use and management of these reports, and stated
    that FAMS is in the process of developing such policies to include how
    FAMS will review and address incidents identified in the reports and
    provide feedback on the outcome of these incidents in a timely manner.
    Although FAMS identified plans to strengthen controls over the management
    of these incidents, they did not identify time frames for when these would
    be completed.

                                      Conclusions

    In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS made only limited
    progress in achieving its stated transition objectives of creating a surge
    capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career opportunities. With
    its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its
    experiences and adopt key practices for successful mergers and
    transformations to assist its efforts to transfer FAMS back into TSA. Such
    key practices include developing an overall strategy to include
    implementation goals, measures, and milestones to track the organization's
    progress in achieving its goals. By showing progress towards these goals,
    DHS could build momentum and demonstrate that real progress is being made.
    In addition, having a strategy with implementation goals and milestones
    could help target performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse
    corrections, including any needed adjustments to future goals and
    milestones. In addition, developing a communication strategy would help to
    inform employees about the status of the transition and provide
    transparency about specific actions to be taken and time frames for their
    completion. In light of the number of transformations FAMS has undergone
    in recent years, providing open communication to create shared
    expectations among all staff and stakeholders takes on added significance.

    Further, with its critical role in helping to secure the nation's
    commercial aviation system, it is important that FAMS has adequate
    controls to manage information regarding incidents federal air marshals
    encounter during their missions that could compromise their mission. Such
    controls take on added importance in light of FAMS's growth from a small,
    centralized organization with only one office and the ability to cover a
    few missions to a larger decentralized organization with thousands of
    federal air marshals and a capacity to provide significantly expanded
    coverage. Absent adequate management controls, FAMS does not have a full
    account of reported incidents or a means for tracking, analyzing, and
    monitoring these incidents. Such information is necessary for identifying
    the full extent of reported incidents and for determining the operational
    areas in need of improvement. In addition, such controls would help to
    ensure that actions taken to resolve these incidents are reported to the
    federal air marshals who filed them.

                          Recommendations for Executive Action

    To help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has the planning
    framework necessary to guide and monitor its efforts to merge the Federal
    Air Marshal Service with the Transportation Security Administration, we
    are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
    adopt key practices that have led to successful transformation efforts
    within public and private sector organizations by taking the following two
    actions:

               o  Develop an overall strategy with implementation goals and a
               timeline to build momentum and show progress.

               o  Develop a communication strategy to share expectations and
               report related progress.

               In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service's
               management of incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability
               to operate discreetly during their missions, we are recommending
               that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct
               the Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service to take the
               following four actions:

               o  Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the
               Mission Operations Center that affect federal air marshals'
               ability to operate discreetly and criteria for determining which
               incidents require federal air marshals to complete a mission
               report.

               o  Develop a means for tracking and retrieving data on mission
               reports to enable FAMS to analyze and monitor reported and
               systemic incidents.

               o  Establish written policies and procedures for reviewing and
               addressing reported incidents.

               o  Establish a means for providing feedback on the status and
               outcome of FAMS mission reports to the federal air marshals who
               submit them.

               We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.
               On November 7, 2005, we received written comments on the draft
               report, which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS agreed
               with the findings and recommendations in the report and described
               actions it had started or planned to take to implement them. With
               regard to our two recommendations related to key practices that
               have led to successful transformation efforts, DHS stated that
               FAMS and TSA will work closely with DHS's Under Secretary for
               Policy and Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning to develop a
               comprehensive strategy with achievable goals and a timeline to
               assure progress. DHS also stated that FAMS will work with TSA and
               DHS leadership to develop a communication strategy intended to
               facilitate shared expectations and report progress. In addition,
               regarding our recommendations related to FAMS's management of
               incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
               discreetly during their missions, DHS stated that FAMS is in the
               process of drafting a written directive to establish policies and
               procedures for reporting and managing mission incidents. The
               directive is intended to restructure FAMS's management of mission
               reports to enable timely dissemination of and access to
               information, including feedback to management and employees. The
               directive will also establish a formalized tracking system for
               reporting incidents. Shortly after receiving comments from DHS,
               FAMS provided us with an official written directive that
               establishes policies and procedures for reporting and managing
               mission incidents. We reviewed this directive and believe that it
               addresses our recommendations related to (1) developing a means
               for recording all incidents reported to the Mission Operations
               Center that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate
               discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require
               federal air marshals to complete a mission report and (2)
               establishing written policies and procedures for reviewing and
               addressing reported incidents.

               In addition to commenting on our findings and recommendations, DHS
               provided technical comments on the report under separate cover,
               and we revised the draft report where appropriate.

               We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
               Security, the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional
               committees as appropriate. We will also make copies available to
               others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no
               charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

               If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish
               to discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
               berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
               Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
               report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
               listed in appendix IV.

               Sincerely yours,

               Cathleen A. Berrick Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

               The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) the progress
               DHS made in achieving its stated objectives in transferring FAMS
               to ICE and the key practices that could facilitate its efforts to
               return FAMS to TSA; and (2) the extent to which FAMS has adequate
               controls to manage mission-related incidents that affect federal
               air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. To address these
               objectives, we reviewed relevant regulations, internal planning
               documents, agency policies and procedures, and federal air marshal
               mission reports, and interviewed a variety of federal officials
               and federal air marshals in selected field office locations. Some
               information related to FAMS and federal air marshals' ability to
               operate discreetly is considered Sensitive Security Information.
               Accordingly, we issued a separate restricted version of this
               report.1

               To determine the progress DHS made in achieving its stated
               objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE, we reviewed and analyzed
               key documents about the transition effort as well as interviewed
               key officials from BTS, FAMS, and ICE management. Key documents
               included, but were not limited to, agency memorandums, various
               transition documents, materials from offices involved with
               implementing the transition effort, and studies that addressed
               issues related to career opportunities for federal air marshals.
               We also analyzed surge training information on the number of ICE
               agents cross-trained between December 2003 and October 2004 by
               geographical location. In addition, we spoke with officials at
               DHS, BTS, ICE, and FAMS to discuss the purpose and progress
               related to the transition of FAMS to ICE, including creating a
               surge capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career
               opportunities. Further, we assessed DHS's progress in meeting its
               stated objectives by using key practices consistently found at the
               center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.
               These practices were identified to assist DHS in its consolidation
               before the department was created and were based on useful
               practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector
               organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.2 We
               selected two of these nine key practices as criteria for this
               review because they are especially important to ensuring that DHS
               has the planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its
               efforts-which we have also underscored in our previous work on
               DHS-and to facilitating trust and transparency within the
               organization. The two selected practices were: setting
               implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show
               progress from day one and establishing a communication strategy
               that will serve to create shared expectations within the
               organization and at the same time report related progress on the
               merger.

               In addition, we interviewed FAMS officials at their headquarters
               offices in Reston, Virginia, and their Mission Operations Center
               in Herndon, Virginia. Specifically, we spoke with officials in
               FAMS' Mission Support, Flight Operations, Training and
               Development, and Field Operations offices to discuss the types of
               mission-related incidents that federal air marshals encounter
               during the course of their mission and how FAMS manages these
               incidents. Further, to determine the extent to which FAMS has
               adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that affect
               federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly, we used our
               Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government and
               Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool.3

               Furthermore, in accomplishing our objectives, we conducted
               structured interviews with FAMS officials-including 5 SACS-and 19
               federal air marshals in 5 of FAMS's 21 field offices. Generally,
               we chose these offices on the basis of geographical dispersion.
               They included: Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; New York, New
               York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Among
               other things, we asked questions about the federal air marshals'
               understanding of the transition of FAMS to ICE, including whether
               their roles and mission had changed as a result of the transition.
               We also asked the federal air marshals in these interviews a
               series of questions related to their mission experience at various
               airports. For example, we asked about the check-in, screening, and
               boarding practices that they have experienced while carrying out
               their missions. The results of these interviews provide examples
               of FAMS officials' and federal air marshals' experiences and
               perspectives and cannot be generalized beyond those we interviewed
               because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in
               selecting the field offices, officials, and federal air marshals.
               We conducted these interviews between October and November 2004
               and in April 2005. We also made some follow-up calls in May and
               July of 2005. We conducted our work from June 2004 through August
               2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
               standards.

               Source: GAO.

               Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777

               In addition to the individual named above, Leo Barbour, Steve
               Caldwell, Grace Coleman, Joel Grossman, Wilfred Holloway, Charles
               Johnson, Thomas Lombardi, Brenda Rabinowitz, Minette Richardson,
               Jack Schulze, Angela Thomas, Sarah Veale, and Keith Wandtke made
               key contributions to this report.

               Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
               Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight
               Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently Taken
               Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington,
               D.C.: July 22, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment
               of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington,
               D.C.: July 13, 2005.

               Aviation Security: TSA Screener Training and Performance
               Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457.
               Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under
               Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.
               GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
               Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
               Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using
               Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324.
               Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

               Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
               Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.

               Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to
               Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening
               Services. GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.

               General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
               but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector is Critical to
               Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10,
               2004.

               Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
               of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
               Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.

               Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention
               Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington,
               D.C.: May 28, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
               GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.

               Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
               Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.
               Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
               Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
               Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.

               Budget Issues: Reprogramming of Federal Air Marshal Service Funds
               in Fiscal Year 2003. GAO-04-577R. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
               2004.

               Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
               Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of
               Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T.
               Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
               Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
               Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5,
               2004.

               Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
               Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385.
               Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
               Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T.
               Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.

               The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a
               Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development
               Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.

               Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
               Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20,
               2003.

               Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing
               Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional
               Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.

               Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
               Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.

               Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
               Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:
               September 24, 2003.

               Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
               Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9,
               2003.

               Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
               Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.

               Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
               Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

               Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides
               Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.
               Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.

               Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and
               Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
               2003.

               Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to
               Cover Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T.
               Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2003.

               Transportation Security Administration: Action and Plans to Build
               a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January
               17, 2003.

               Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
               DOT's Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January
               10, 2003.

               Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
               the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20,
               2002.

               Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
               Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22,
               2002.

               Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects
               Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington,
               D.C.: October 15, 2002.

               Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses
               Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2,
               2002.

               Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
               Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:
               July 25, 2002.

               Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
               GAO-02-822R.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.

               Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for,
               Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington,
               D.C.: September 25, 2001.

               Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
               Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington,
               D.C.: September 21, 2001.

               Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's
               Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

               Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to
               Improve Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T.
               Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

               Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
               Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20,
               2001.

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                                    Agency Comments

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    1The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation
    Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From Improved Planning
    and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).

    2GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum, Mergers and Transformations: Lessons
    Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies,
    GAO-03-292SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

    3GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal government as
    required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. See 31
    U.S.C. S: 3512(c). GAO first issued the standards in 1983. GAO revised the
    standards and reissued them as Standards for Internal Control in the
    Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
    These standards provide the overall framework for establishing and
    maintaining internal control and for identifying and addressing major
    performance challenges and areas at greatest risk for fraud, waste and
    abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued its Internal Control Management and
    Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist
    agencies in maintaining or implementing effective internal control and,
    when needed, to help determine what, where, and how improvements can be
    implemented.

    Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
    Organizational Transformations

    Practice                           Implementation step
    Ensure top leadership drives the      o  Define and articulate a succinct
    transformation.                       and compelling reason for change.
                                             o  Balance continued delivery of
                                             services with merger and
                                             transformation activities.
    Establish a coherent mission and      o  Adopt leading practices for
    integrated strategic goals to         results-oriented strategic planning
    guide the transformation.             and reporting.
    Focus on a key set of principles      o  Embed core values in every aspect
    and priorities at the outset of       of the organization to reinforce the
    the transformation.                   new culture.
    Set implementation goals and a        o  Make public implementation goals
    timeline to build momentum and        and timeline.
    show progress from day one.           o  Seek and monitor employee
                                             attitudes and take appropriate
                                             follow-up actions.
                                             o  Identify cultural features of
                                             merging organizations to increase
                                             understanding of former work
                                             environments.
                                             o  Attract and retain key talent.
                                             o  Establish an organizationwide
                                             knowledge and skills inventory to
                                             allow knowledge exchange among
                                             merging organizations.
    Dedicate an implementation team to    o  Establish networks to support
    manage the transformation process.    implementation team.
                                             o  Select high-performing team
                                             members.
    Use the performance management        o  Adopt leading practices to
    system to define the                  implement effective performance
    responsibility and assure             management systems with adequate
    accountability for change.            safeguards.
    Establish a communication strategy    o  Communicate early and often to
    to create shared expectations and     build trust.
    report related progress.              o  Ensure consistency of message.
                                             o  Encourage two-way communication.
                                             o  Provide information to meet
                                             specific needs of employees.
    Involve employees to obtain their     o  Use employee teams.
    ideas and gain ownership for the      o  Involve employees in planning and
    transformation.                       sharing performance information.
                                             o  Incorporate employee feedback
                                             into new policies and procedures.
                                             o  Delegate authority to appropriate
                                             organizational levels.
    Build a world-class organization.     o  Adopt leading practices to build
                                             a world-class organization.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    Staff Acknowledgments

    Related GAO Products

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    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-203.

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    Highlights of GAO-06-203, a report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio,
    House of Representatives

    November 2005

    AVIATION SECURITY

    Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and
    Controls

    The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of
    changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key
    aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet
    movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit
    screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses
    FAMS's

    (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to
    TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air
    marshals' ability to operate discreetly.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) adopt key practices for successful mergers and transformations, to
    include developing an overall strategy with implementation goals and
    milestones and a communication strategy. GAO is also recommending that the
    Secretary direct FAMS to improve management controls for recording,
    tracking, and addressing mission incidents and communicating the outcome
    of actions taken to address them.

    DHS reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAO's findings and
    recommendations.

    DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its
    transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a "surge" capacity
    through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals'
    career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity
    by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in
    October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training
    was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it
    would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether
    and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.
    Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career
    opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them
    through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined
    how these transition objectives would be met because it had not developed
    an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a
    timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse
    corrections-a key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had
    not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
    report related progress on the transition to employees and other
    stakeholders-another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS's
    prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful
    information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful
    transition.

    FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that
    mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate
    discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not
    developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how
    federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they
    encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls
    to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was
    communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not
    providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals
    from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS
    lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports
    and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.

    Federal Air Marshals Protect Passengers, Crew, and Aircraft
    *** End of document. ***