Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug  
Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations (15-NOV-05, GAO-06-200).		 
                                                                 
One of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priorities is to
disrupt the illicit drug market. To this end, the Departments of 
Defense and Homeland Security provide ships and aircraft to	 
disrupt the flow of illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, shipped	 
from South America through the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific 
Ocean--an area known as the transit zone. The Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the U.S. anti-drug strategy.
The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) directs most
transit zone operations. We examined U.S. efforts to interdict	 
maritime movements of cocaine. We analyzed the (1) changes in	 
cocaine seizures and disruptions since calendar year 2000, (2)	 
trends in interdiction assets provided since fiscal year 2000,	 
(3) challenges to maintaining transit zone interdiction 	 
operations, and (4) performance measures the agencies use to	 
assess their progress.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-200 					        
    ACCNO:   A41577						        
  TITLE:     Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines  
in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance	 
Measures for Transit Zone Operations				 
     DATE:   11/15/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft						 
	     Controlled substances				 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Search and seizure 				 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Drugs						 
	     HC-130 Aircraft					 
	     National Drug Control Strategy			 
	     P-3 Aircraft					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-200

     

     * Report to Congressional Committees
          * November 2005
     * DRUG CONTROL
          * Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction
            Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone
            Operations
     * Contents
          * Results in Brief
          * Background
          * Several Factors Have Contributed to the Increase in Cocaine
            Seizures and Disruptions
               * Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Have Increased
               * Factors Contributing to Increases
                    * Better Intelligence
                    * Armed Helicopters Have Been Added
                    * Increased Cooperation from Nations in the Transit Zone
          * Availability of Assets Provided for Interdiction Operations Have
            Varied Since Fiscal Year 2000
               * On-Station Ship Days Generally Declined
               * On-Station Flight Hours Generally Declined in Recent Years
               * Increasing Number of Known Actionable Maritime Events
                 Challenges JIATF- South's Detection Capability
          * Challenges in Maintaining Interdiction Operations
               * Declining Availability of P-3 Aircraft Will Degrade JIATF-
                 South's Maritime Detection Capability
               * Readiness Rates for Aging Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft
                 Have Declined
               * Drug Traffickers Have Changed Tactics
               * Capability of Nations in the Transit Zone to Assist with
                 Interdiction Is Limited
          * Agencies' Performance Measures Vary and Data for Assessing
            Performance Are Problematic
               * Transit Zone Performance Measures Vary
               * Data for Assessing Transit Zone Interdiction Operations and
                 Drug Use in the United States Are Problematic
                    * Annual Cocaine Flow Assessment Is Not Useful for
                      Assessing Performance
                    * Tracking Illicit Drug Use in the United States Is
                      Difficult
               * ONDCP Has Not Fully Addressed Prior Recommendations for
                 Improving Drug Data Collection and Analysis
          * Conclusions
          * Recommendations for Executive Action
          * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * Scope and Methodology
     * Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements
     * Comments from the Department of Defense
     * Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
     * Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2005

DRUG CONTROL

Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and
Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations

Contents

Tables

Figures

November 15, 2005Letter

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Caucus on International
Narcotics Control United States Senate

The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The Honorable Mark Souder Chairman Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The 2002 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy set two goals: (1) to lower
the rate of illicit drug use by 10 percent over 2 years among both youth
and adults and (2) to lower the rate by 25 percent over 5 years in the
United States. One of the strategy's three priorities for achieving these
goals is to disrupt the illicit drug market in order to reduce the
profitability of the drug trade.1 To this end, during fiscal years
2000-2005, the United States has provided more than $6 billion to Colombia
and other countries in the region for counternarcotics, alternative
development, and judicial reform efforts. In addition, the United States
and certain allies have devoted assets-ships and aircraft-to disrupt the
flow of illicit narcotics, primarily cocaine, shipped to the United States
through a 6 million square mile area known as the transit zone.2

Between calendar years 2001 and 2004, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) reported that cocaine production was reduced by almost

one-third and seizures and disruptions3 of cocaine in the transit zone
increased by over 40 percent to almost 200 metric tons. Despite these
reported successes in disrupting cocaine trafficking, a study commissioned
by ONDCP indicates that the retail price of cocaine in the United States
continued to decline through the second quarter of 2003-the latest
available data-while retail purity remained relatively high, indicating
that the supply of cocaine had not been reduced.4 Further, a 2004 survey
on drug use estimated that the number of cocaine users in the United
States had remained roughly constant at about 2 million users from 2002 to
2004.5 Other sources estimate the number of chronic and occasional cocaine
users may be as high as 6 million.

The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) in Key West, Florida,
under the U.S. Southern Command, has primary responsibility for U.S.
detection and monitoring of drug trafficking activities in the transit
zone.6 The Coast Guard has primary operational control for most
interdiction operations. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides
maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and ships; the Department of
Homeland Security (Homeland Security)-primarily, the Coast Guard and the
Bureau for Customs and Border Protection (CBP)7-provides maritime patrol
aircraft, ships, and law enforcement assistance; and the Department of
Justice (Justice) provides prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance.
JIATF-South also receives some operational support from various countries
within the transit zone, and France, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom also provide air and maritime assistance in the eastern Caribbean
Sea.

To address your interest in U.S. drug interdiction operations in the
transit zone, we examined (1) the changes in the amounts of cocaine seized
and disrupted since calendar year 2000 and the factors that have
contributed to these changes, (2) trends in the assets provided by the
United States and other nations since fiscal year 2000 to support cocaine
interdiction in the transit zone, (3) the challenges facing these agencies
in maintaining current levels of transit zone interdiction operations, and
(4) how the principal agencies involved in interdiction operations assess
their performance.

To address these objectives, we focused on cocaine because nearly all the
cocaine entering the United States comes from South America through the
transit zone. Furthermore, we focused on maritime movements of cocaine
through the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because
the United States has positioned most of its interdiction assets in these
areas. We reviewed relevant planning and resource documents and related
reports. We also met with cognizant officials at Defense, Homeland
Security, and Justice in Washington, D.C.; law enforcement officers
involved in interdiction efforts based in Jacksonville, Miami, Tampa, and
Sarasota, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas; and cognizant officials at
JIATF-South in Key West, Florida. We obtained and analyzed data on (1)
cocaine seizures and disruptions for calendar years 2000 through 2004
provided by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and (2) ship days and
flight hours spent on interdiction missions during fiscal years 2000-2005,
provided by JIATF-South and JIATF-West. Through comparisons with similar
data compiled by the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense, and discussions with
JIATF-South and JIATF-West officials primarily responsible for compiling
the data, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. We performed our work from August 2004 through
October 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. (See appendix I for a more complete discussion of our scope and
methodology.)

Results in Brief

Based on data managed by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, reported
seizures and disruptions of cocaine in the transit zone increased over
two-thirds from 117 metric tons in calendar year 2000 to a record amount
of 196 metric tons in calendar year 2004. Most of the seizures and
disruptions occurred in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific
Ocean where the United States has positioned most of its ships and
aircraft for interdiction purposes. Overall, according to JIATF-South and
other cognizant officials, improved interagency cooperation and
intelligence, the use of armed helicopters to assist in interdiction
efforts, and improved international cooperation contributed to the
increased seizures and disruptions. Specifically,

o Through the cooperation of several U.S. law enforcement agencies,
specific information about cocaine movements has been provided to
JIATF-South. This has permitted JIATF-South to direct operations at more
certain targets, rather than searching wide expanses of the transit zone
for suspicious movements of boats and small aircraft.

o Beginning in calendar year 2000, the Coast Guard began deploying
helicopters equipped with machine guns and 50 caliber sniper rifles to
help interdiction efforts, in particular, pursuing and stopping speed
boats (called "go-fast" boats) that are a principal mode of transporting
cocaine through the transit zone.

o Several nations in the region have increased their cooperation with U.S.
efforts to deploy and service aircraft in their countries. For example,
the United States has agreements to deploy aircraft in Ecuador, El
Salvador, Aruba, and Curacao, and uses facilities in Costa Rica and Panama
to support surveillance aircraft, expanding the duration and range of
interdiction efforts.

Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets spent
on interdiction operations in the transit zone-as measured in on-station
ship days and flight hours8-has varied. U.S. and allied on-station ship
days decreased from approximately 3,600 days in fiscal year 2000 to about
3,300 in fiscal year 2005, and U.S. and allied on-station flight hours
increased from approximately 10,500 hours in fiscal year 2000 to almost
12,900 in fiscal year 2005. However, on-station ship days peaked in fiscal
year 2001 and flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have
generally declined since then, primarily because Defense has provided
fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets were largely offset by the Coast
Guard, CBP, and several allied European nations-France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, with the assets available in recent
years, JIATF-South reports that it detected (made visual contact with)
less than one-third of the known maritime drug movements.

Several challenges raise concerns about the ability of the United States
to sustain its level of interdiction operations in the transit zone.
Primarily, the availability of some key U.S. assets for interdiction
operations, such as maritime patrol aircraft, is declining. Through fiscal
year 2005, the number of hours flown by U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol
aircraft on interdiction missions had decreased nearly 60 percent since
fiscal year 2000 (from about 3,560 hours to about 1,490) primarily because
of structural problems in the aircraft's wings. In addition, the
Netherlands removed its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft from the transit zone
in December 2004. According to JIATF-South and other cognizant officials,
the declining availability of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft is the most
critical challenge to the success of future interdiction operations.
Further, the readiness rates for older Coast Guard vessels and maritime
patrol aircraft have declined, and the surface radar system used to detect
and monitor drug trafficking  activities on its aircraft is often
inoperable. While some short-term remedies have been taken, cognizant
officials expressed concern that the longer-term implications of likely
declines in transit zone monitoring and interdiction asset availability
have not been addressed. Moreover, officials were concerned that:

o Drug traffickers have changed tactics. In particular, traffickers have
taken routes further south and west into the Pacific Ocean before
continuing on to Central America or Mexico. This is a much larger area to
patrol and makes detection and interdiction more difficult.

o Although most nations in the transit zone, especially countries in
Central America and the eastern Caribbean Sea, cooperate with U.S.
interdiction efforts, these countries lack the capability and resources to
compensate for any decline in U.S. and European allies' assets.

Agencies' performance measures for transit zone interdiction operations
vary and data for assessing their performance are problematic. While the
Coast Guard has developed performance measures to assess their activities
in the transit zone, Defense is currently developing them. CBP has not
developed performance measures specifically related to its drug
interdiction mission in the transit zone. In our previous work, we noted
that the lack of clear measurable goals makes it difficult to link
day-to-day efforts to achieving an agency's intended mission.9
Additionally, data to assess whether operations in the transit zone
contribute to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priority of
disrupting the illicit drug market or the overall goal of reducing the
rate of drug usage in the United States are problematic. For example,
ONDCP's annual assessment of cocaine movement for 2004 reported that
between 325 to 675 metric tons of cocaine may be moving towards the United
States. This wide range is not useful for assessing interdiction efforts.
Data on drug availability and use in the United States are difficult to
obtain, often cannot be generalized to the entire country, and takes a
year or more to collect and analyze. As a result, even under the best of
circumstances, several years of drug usage data are needed to show the
effects of a change in drug policy. In a 2001 report prepared for ONDCP,
the National Research Council concluded that the United States had neither
the data systems nor the research infrastructure needed to assess the
effectiveness of drug control enforcement policies. In particular, the
Council highlighted the absence of adequate, reliable data on illicit drug
prices and use. The Council made numerous recommendations to improve data
collection and analysis; eight were addressed in full or in part to ONDCP,
but ONDCP has not fully addressed the Council's recommendations.

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (1)
plan for the likely decline in the future availability of ships and
aircraft for transit zone interdiction operations; and (2) develop and
coordinate performance measures, in conjunction with ONDCP, that take
advantage of available data (such as the number of detections, seizures,
and disruptions) to provide a basis for deciding how to deploy
increasingly limited assets. We also recommend that the Director of ONDCP
address each of the recommendations made by the National Research Council
and report to Congress the actions taken, or that still need to be taken,
to address them; or document why it should not do so. Overall, in
commenting on a draft of this report, Defense, Homeland Security, and
ONDCP stated that they generally concurred with the recommendations that
applied to them, but did not detail when and how they will address them.

Background

ONDCP expects that disrupting the illicit drug market will reduce the
availability of illicit drugs, increase their cost, and, eventually,
reduce the rate of drug usage. To disrupt the cocaine market, the U.S.
National Drug Control Strategy calls for, among other things, seizing
"enormous and unsustainable" amounts of cocaine from traffickers. One part
of the strategy to disrupt the market focuses U.S. interdiction efforts on
seizing cocaine and other illicit drugs bound for the United States from
South America in the transit zone. The transit zone is a six million
square mile area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean
Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1).
Typically, drug traffickers use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to
smuggle cocaine from Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to
the United States. Go-fast boats are capable of traveling over 40 knots
and are difficult to detect in open water. Moreover, the go-fast boats
often travel at night. When they travel in daylight, the boats are often
painted blue, or the crew can cover the boat with a blue tarpaulin,
thereby becoming virtually impossible to see. Even when detected, go-fast
boats can often outrun conventional ships deployed in the transit zone.

Figure 1: The Transit Zone

The primary departments supporting interdiction operations in the transit
zone are Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. Defense provides
surveillance aircraft, helicopters, and maritime vessels; Justice provides
prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance; and Homeland
Security-primarily, the Coast Guard and CBP-provides surveillance
aircraft, maritime vessels, and law enforcement assistance. JIATF-South
also receives some operational support from various countries in the
transit zone; and France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom provide
air and maritime detection and monitoring assistance in the eastern
Caribbean Sea. Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Attorney's Office provide intelligence
for operations and investigate and prosecute drug traffickers. Other
organizations help guide and support interdiction efforts in the transit
zone:

o ONDCP oversees and coordinates implementation of the U.S. National Drug
Control Strategy and reviews department and agency budget proposals for
anti-drug programs, including interdiction efforts in the transit zone.

o The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator reports to the Director, ONDCP, and
provides strategic advice and oversight of U.S. agencies' interdiction
efforts in the transit zone. It also manages the Consolidated Counterdrug
Database that records drug trafficking events, including detections,
seizures, and disruptions. The database is vetted quarterly by members of
the interagency counterdrug community to minimize duplicate or
questionable reported drug movements.

o JIATF-South, under the U.S. Southern Command, is the primary operations
center and coordinator for detecting and monitoring suspect air and
maritime drug trafficking events in the transit zone. JIATF-South includes
representatives from Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and others;
nations such as France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; and
several nations in the transit and source10 zones.

The Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense do not routinely track funds obligated
and expended, ship days, or flight hours provided for drug interdiction in
the transit zone.11 However, during fiscal years 2000-2005, the United
States provided about $6.2 billion to support counternarcotics and related
programs in the source and transit zones (see table 1).12 In the source
zone, U.S. assistance supports eradication and interdiction efforts and
related programs for alternative development and judicial reform,
primarily in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In the transit zone, the United
States provided about $365 million in assistance-primarily to El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, and Mexico -to support interdiction and other law
enforcement programs.

Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Countries in the Source and
Transit Zones, Fiscal Years 2000-2005

                                        

     Dollars in                                       
      millions                                        
                     Fiscal        
                      year         
Region                2000 2001 2002   2003   2004            2005   Total 
                                                           (estimated) 
Source zonea        $1,604 $345 $774 $1,123   $964           $1,016 $5,826 
Transit zone            41   41   56     52     92               83    365 
Total               $1,645 $386 $821 $1,175 $1,056           $1,099 $6,182 

Sources: Congressional Research Service and the State Department.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

aSource zone funding includes the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and
related Defense and Foreign Military Financing programs. The table does
not include Defense assistance for activities that cannot be directly tied
to a nation, such as the operation of ground-based radars.

Several Factors Have Contributed to the Increase in Cocaine Seizures and
Disruptions

Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased over
two-thirds from calendar year 2000 to calendar year 2004. JIATF-South and
other cognizant agency officials pointed to a number of factors that
contributed to the increases, such as better intelligence on cocaine
movements that allow JIATF-South to target specific cocaine shipments; the
introduction of armed helicopters increasing the capability to interdict
cocaine shipments on go-fast boats; and increased cooperation from nations
in the region, which has led to more efficient use of resources.

Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Have Increased

Cocaine seizures and disruptions have increased about 68 percent since
calendar year 2000. As shown in table 2, the United States and its allies
seized or disrupted 157 metric tons of cocaine in calendar year 2003 and
196 metric tons in 2004, a record amount. During this period, about
two-thirds of all the cocaine seized or disrupted was in the eastern
Pacific Ocean and western Caribbean Sea, where according to JIATF-South
officials, the United States has positioned most of its ships and aircraft
for interdiction and other purposes.

Table 2: Metric Tons of Cocaine Seized and Disrupted in the Transit Zone
by Region, Calendar Years 2000-2004

                                        

                                            Calendar year 
Region                                            2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Eastern Pacific Ocean and western                   70   88   92   91  143 
Caribbean Sea                                                         
Eastern Caribbean Sea                               14   23   20   26    6 
Mexico and Central America                          33   28   26   40   47 
Total for transit zone                             117  139  138  157  196 

Source: ONDCP's Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement based on the
Consolidated Counterdrug Database.

Factors Contributing to Increases

Improved intelligence on cocaine shipments gained from law enforcement
operations has allowed JIATF-South to more often target suspected drug
shipments rather than searching wide expanses of the transit zone for
suspicious movements of boats and small aircraft. In addition, in calendar
year 2000, the Coast Guard began deploying armed helicopters, which has
greatly increased the U.S. capability to stop go-fast boats. Further,
several nations in the region have increased their cooperation with U.S.
efforts through bilateral maritime agreements, as well as agreements to
allow the United States to deploy and re-supply U.S. aircraft and ships on
their territory.

Better Intelligence

An interagency law enforcement investigation operation known as "Panama
Express" has increased the amount of intelligence on drug trafficking
activities. Panama Express is a multi-agency investigation that was
initiated in 1995 and is jointly managed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, DEA, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement but also
includes officials from several federal,13 state, and local law
enforcement agencies. The U.S. Attorney's Office in Tampa, Florida,
provides prosecution support for all Panama Express investigations.
According to the U.S. Attorney's office, Panama Express investigations
have contributed to the successful prosecution of around 700 individuals,
and the seizure and disruption of about 380 metric tons of cocaine since
2000 (or about 51 percent of all the cocaine seized and disrupted).

In addition, a JIATF-South official told us that, as of September 2005, 16
embassies and consulates throughout the region had tactical analysis
teams. These teams analyze information on drug trafficking activities and
provide the information to JIATF-South, DEA, and other operational
organizations for use in interdiction missions.

Armed Helicopters Have Been Added

Interdiction efforts have been strengthened by the addition of armed
helicopters. Beginning in calendar year 2000, the Coast Guard began
deploying MH-68A helicopters equipped with 7.62 millimeter machine guns
and 50 caliber sniper rifles from its base in Jacksonville, Florida.14 The
helicopters' main value is their capability to pursue and stop go-fast
boats, which can travel over 40 knots-often outrunning U.S. and allied
surface ships. According to Coast Guard officials, since November 2002 the
armed helicopters have successfully stopped every go-fast boat that they
have engaged and contributed to 77 maritime drug interdictions and the
seizure of approximately 94 metric tons of cocaine.

In addition, the U.S. Navy plans to deploy armed helicopters to pursue and
stop go-fast boats in fiscal year 2006. According to Defense officials,
these helicopters will have specialized equipment similar to the Coast
Guard helicopters. According to the Coast Guard, it will have personnel on
board for law enforcement purposes.

Increased Cooperation from Nations in the Transit Zone

Since 2000, the number of countries in the transit zone that have signed
all or parts of bilateral maritime agreements increased from 21 to 25.
These agreements permit, among other things, ship boarding rights for U.S.
law enforcement officials and pursuit and entry into these countries'
territorial waters to interdict drug traffickers. In addition, several
countries have agreed to additional provisions in the maritime agreements,
in particular, the International Maritime Interdiction Support Clause,
which allows the United States to fly suspected drug traffickers detained
on U.S. ships directly to the United States for prosecution. As a result,
these surface ships can resume patrols in the transit zone rather than
transporting the suspects directly to the United States, or waiting in a
foreign port for the suspects to be extradited. Coast Guard officials told
us that, in many cases, this saves up to a week of ship time. (See app. II
for a list of countries that have signed all or parts of the bilateral
maritime agreements and the interdiction support clause.)

Moreover, to offset the closing of Howard Air Force Base in Panama in
1999, the United States has reached agreements with other nations in the
region to station U.S. military and civilian aircraft. In return, the
United States has upgraded the facilities at these airbases. The
facilities at Manta, Ecuador; Comalapa, El Salvador; and Curacao are used
by U.S. civilian and military aircraft, while the facilities in Aruba;
Liberia; Costa Rica; and Panama are used by the Coast Guard and CBP.
Access to these facilities allows aircraft to spend more time monitoring
and interdicting drug trafficking activities and also allows them to range
further west into the Pacific Ocean.

Availability of Assets Provided for Interdiction Operations Have Varied
Since Fiscal Year 2000

Overall, since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied
assets provided for detecting and disrupting drug trafficking activities
in the transit zone has varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year
2001 and flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have declined
since then, primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines
in Defense assets in recent years were mostly offset by additional ship
days and aircraft hours provided by the Coast Guard, CBP, and allied
nations. However, the ship days and flight hours provided by the allied
nations are primarily in the eastern Caribbean Sea where the United States
does not usually conduct monitoring and detection activities.
Nevertheless, according to JIATF-South, it cannot detect many of the known
maritime cocaine movements reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the
eastern Pacific Ocean because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the
suspected movement in time.

On-Station Ship Days Generally Declined

Despite a rise in fiscal year 2001, the total number of ship days spent on
interdiction missions in the transit zone has generally decreased since
fiscal year 200015 from about 3,600 ship days to about 3,300 ship days (or
about 8 percent) in fiscal year 2005. U.S. Navy ship days declined from
about 1,980 in fiscal year 2000 to about 890 in fiscal year 2005. Defense
officials said that the Navy reduced its ship days because of other
national security concerns; in particular, the need to provide support for
the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The reduction in U.S. Navy ship days was partly offset by increases in
ship days by the Coast Guard. After a decline to about 1,160 ship days in
fiscal year 2003 (compared to 1,330 days in 2002), the Coast Guard
increased its ship days to about 1,660 in 2004 and almost 1,700 in
2005-becoming the primary provider of maritime surface vessels in the
transit zone. Figure 2 illustrates the total on-station ship days in the
transit zone by provider for fiscal years 2000-2005.

Figure 2: On-Station Ship Days for Interdiction in the Transit Zone,
Fiscal Years 2000-2005

On-Station Flight Hours Generally Declined in Recent Years

On-station flight hours for counternarcotics activities in the transit
zone increased about 35 percent between fiscal years 2000-2002-from about
10,500 hours to about 14,200-but have generally declined since then to
about 12,870 hours in 2005. Declines in the availability of Defense
maritime patrol aircraft over the period were offset by increased support
from the Coast Guard, CBP, and several allied nations-France, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

o The Coast Guard's on-station flight hours in the transit zone decreased
from about 2,440 in fiscal year 2000 to less than 1,300 hours in fiscal
year 2002. According to Coast Guard officials, the decline was due, in
part, to resources being diverted to other Coast Guard missions. But the
Coast Guard has since increased its flight hours to over 2,780 hours in
fiscal year 2005.

o CBP has increased its on-station flight hours for interdiction
operations in the transit zone since fiscal year 2000-from about 180 hours
in fiscal year 2000 to nearly 4,385 hours in fiscal year 2005. However, in
fiscal year 2003, its flight hours declined to about 2,040 due to the
diversion of resources for other homeland security missions.

o Defense on-station flight hours for interdiction in the transit zone
gradually declined from about 6,860 in fiscal year 2000 to 6,500 in fiscal
year 2002, but declined more rapidly since then to about 2,940 flight
hours in fiscal year 2005. JIATF-South officials attribute the recent
declines primarily to the reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 maritime
patrol aircraft because of structural problems. In addition, U.S. Air
Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were diverted
to support homeland security missions and the armed conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq.16

o Allied nations steadily increased their flight hours in support of
interdiction operations from about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2000 to
4,070 hours in fiscal year 2004. However, in fiscal year 2005, the allies'
total hours declined to about 2,760. According to JIATF-South and U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator officials, most of the allies' surveillance
operations are in the eastern Caribbean Sea where the United States does
not usually conduct interdiction operations.

Figure 3 illustrates the total on-station flight hours by provider for
fiscal years 2000-2005.

Figure 3: On-Station Flight Hours for Interdiction in the Transit Zone,
Fiscal Years 2000-2005

Increasing Number of Known Actionable Maritime Events Challenges
JIATF-South's Detection Capability

Since calendar year 2000, JIATF-South officials report that they had
information about more maritime drug movements than they could detect

(make visual contact with). The number of "known actionable"17 maritime
events in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean more
than doubled from 154 in 2000 to 330 in 2004. According to JIATF-South
officials, in many cases, the maritime event is too far away for available
ships and aircraft to go to the area and visually locate the suspected
drug movement. However, once JIATF-South locates a suspect movement, the
disruption rate has significantly increased since 2000-from less than 60
percent in 2000 and 2001 to over 80 percent in 2003 to 2005 (see table 3).

Table 3: Detection and Disruption of Known Actionable Maritime Drug
Movements in the Western Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean, Calendar
Year 2000 through June 2005

                                        

                             Calendar      
                              years        
                                 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (through Total 
                                                             June 2005) 
Known actionable maritime      154  160  178  253  330           184 1,259 
events                                                               
Detections                      59   56   77   65   92            48   397 
Seizures and disruptions        35   30   53   55   80            39   292 
Percentage of known             38   35   43   26   28            26  31.5 
events detected                                                      
Percentage of detected          59   54   69   85   87            81  73.6 
events disrupted                                                     

Source: JIATF-South based on the Consolidated Counterdrug Database.

Note: The Consolidated Counterdrug Database is managed by the U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator's office. Beginning with 2004, the Coordinator's
office began implementing stricter rules in vetting the data on drug
movements, detections, and seizures and disruptions in quarterly meetings
with the interagency drug community. The intent was to minimize potential
duplication and the counting of events that may not have occurred.
According to the database manager, however, the more careful review of the
data did not materially affect the number of maritime drug movements
counted. The primary differences were in the number of suspect aircraft
flights.

Challenges in Maintaining Interdiction Operations

While the United States has increased the number of seizures and
disruptions in the transit zone since 2000, the Coast Guard, CBP, and
Defense face several challenges in maintaining the current level of assets
provided for transit zone interdiction operations. JIATF-South officials
expressed concern that continued declines in U.S. on-station ship days and
on-station flight hours will limit their ability to monitor the transit
zone and detect illicit drug trafficking. Specifically, according to
JIATF-South and other Defense officials, the reduced availability of the
U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol aircraft will degrade JIATF-South's ability
to detect maritime movements. In addition, the readiness rates of older
Coast Guard ships, which support interdiction operations in the transit
zone, have declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system
on its long-range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. JIATF-South,
Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator officials stated that,
while some short-term fixes have been made, the longer-term implications
of the likely continued declines in monitoring and interdiction assets for
the transit zone have not been addressed.

Moreover, in response to increases in cocaine seizures and disruptions,
drug traffickers have adjusted their tactics for transporting cocaine
through the transit zone. Finally, nations in the region lack the
resources to offset any decline in assets.

Declining Availability of P-3 Aircraft Will Degrade JIATF-South's Maritime
Detection Capability

According to cognizant officials with JIATF-South and U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator officials, compensating for the reduced availability of P-3
maritime patrol aircraft is the most critical challenge to the future
success of interdiction operations. According to these officials, because
of its longer range, the P-3 aircraft can monitor a much larger surface
area than other maritime patrol aircraft and can provide covert
surveillance until other assets arrive.

The availability of the P-3 aircraft has declined for several reasons. In
fiscal years 2000-2003, the U.S. Navy provided the majority of P-3
maritime patrol flying hours in support of interdiction efforts-about 60
percent of the on-station flight hours (or over 3,900 hours per year).
However, in fiscal year 2004, the Navy began limiting the use of its P-3
maritime patrol aircraft for transit zone interdiction missions because of
structural problems in its wings18 and other worldwide commitments. Since
fiscal year 2000, the number of hours flown by U.S. Navy P-3s has
decreased nearly 60 percent to about 1,500 hours in fiscal year 2005. In
addition, in December 2004, the Netherlands removed the P-3 aircraft it
used to fly interdiction missions in the transit zone. According to the
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the P-3s flown by the Netherlands were
vital to interdiction efforts in the Caribbean Sea, averaging over 1,300
flight hours per year-or about 20 percent of all P-3 flight hours-during
fiscal years 2000-2004. In April 2005, the Netherlands began using the
Fokker F-60, a shorter-range twin engine aircraft, to fly interdiction
missions; but, according to Defense officials, these aircraft are less
capable than the P-3.

To help compensate for the reduction in the P-3 availability, CBP has
increased its P-3 maritime patrol on-station flight hours in the transit
zone-from about 180 flight hours in fiscal year 2000 to over 4,300 hours
in 2005. However, CBP officials told us that their aircraft cannot totally
compensate for the loss of the Navy's and Netherlands' P-3 flying hours.
Further, these officials are unsure how long CBP will be able to continue
to provide the additional flying hours, which has been more than its
allotted budget, because of other homeland security priorities.

Figure 4 illustrates the recent decline in P-3 flight hours.

Figure 4: Total P-3 On-Station Flight Hours in the Transit Zone, Fiscal
Years 2000-2005

In August 2004, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator established a working
group to evaluate the problem of the reduction in maritime patrol aircraft
flying hours and identify possible solutions. The group identified several
possible alternatives, including:

o redeploying AWACS to support an aerial interdiction program in Colombia,

o substituting other Defense aircraft for the Navy P-3s,

o extending the amount of time aircraft are deployed to forward operating
locations throughout the region,

o increasing the number of hours flown by the Coast Guard HC-130
surveillance aircraft in support of interdiction,

o upgrading the sensors on existing aircraft to improve their
capabilities,

o deploying aircraft to locations closer to the suspected trafficking
routes, and

o requesting additional funding to support the deployment of United
Kingdom maritime patrol aircraft in the transit zone.

According to JIATF-South officials, several of these proposals have been
implemented. AWACS have begun flying missions in support of the aerial
interdiction program in Colombia (also known as the "Air Bridge Denial"
program)19-relieving CBP of much of this burden. The Coast Guard and CBP
have deployed aircraft to locations in Costa Rica and Ecuador, and the
Coast Guard has received funding to upgrade some of its detection and
monitoring equipment with improved sensors. Finally, Defense is providing
housing for United Kingdom aircrews (relieving them of the financial
burden) that provide surveillance in the Caribbean Sea while flying
training missions. But, JIATF-South, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator,
and other cognizant officials noted that the longer term prospect of
further declines in U.S. P-3 or other maritime patrol assets for
interdiction operations has not been addressed.

Readiness Rates for Aging Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft Have Declined

During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the readiness rates of the Coast
Guard's older ships and aircraft showed a general decline, although the
rates fluctuated from year to year.20 For example, ships used to monitor
drug trafficking activities and carry the helicopters that disable and
stop go-fast boats were below their target levels for time free of major
deficiencies or loss of at least one primary mission. Further, the
percentage of time that HC-130 surveillance aircraft were available to
perform missions was below the target level in fiscal year 2004, and the
surface radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent failures. In
some instances, mission flight crews had to look out the windows of the
aircraft for targets because the radar systems were inoperable.

The Coast Guard has taken several actions to keep its assets operational.
These include establishing a compendium of information for making
decisions regarding maintenance and upgrades; performing more extensive
maintenance between deployments; and exploring strategies for prioritizing
the maintenance and capability enhancement projects needed to provide more
objective data on where to spend budget dollars and enhance mission
capabilities. However, these additional efforts, while helpful in
preventing a more rapid decline in the condition of existing assets, are
unlikely to solve the problem. For fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard's
estimated cost of deferred maintenance for these assets totaled
approximately $28 million.21

Drug Traffickers Have Changed Tactics

Interdiction operations are further challenged by the changing tactics of
the drug traffickers. In the eastern Pacific Ocean, JIATF-South in recent
years has detected suspect fishing vessels and go-fast boats traveling
further south and about 300 miles southwest of the Galapagos Islands
before turning towards Central America and Mexico. This change in tactics
has greatly increased the ocean surface area that must be monitored and,
because of the distances to travel, has made it more difficult for U.S.
surface ships and aircraft to respond to suspected cocaine movements. In
addition:

o Drug traffickers have begun using larger go-fast boats. In the past,
go-fast boats typically transported 2 to 4 metric tons of cocaine, but
some are now capable of carrying up to 8 metric tons.

o Drug traffickers in the eastern Pacific Ocean have increasingly used
vessels registered to countries, such as Ecuador and Mexico, with which
the United States has no maritime boarding agreements. The use of these
vessels complicates the process of boarding and searching for illicit
drugs.

Moreover, Ecuador has declared that its territorial waters extend 200
miles from its coastline and around the Galapagos Islands (most nations,
including the United States set a 12-mile territorial limit). Although the
United States does not recognize Ecuador's claim, U.S. ships and aircraft
generally do not enter this area for interdiction missions to avoid the
potentially politically sensitive issue of having to deal with the
Government of Ecuador.

Capability of Nations in the Transit Zone to Assist with Interdiction Is
Limited

Although most nations in the transit zone-especially countries in Central
America and the eastern Caribbean Sea-cooperate with U.S. interdiction
efforts, JIATF-South and other officials told us that these countries lack
the capability and resources to compensate for any decline in U.S. and
allies' assets. Most countries in the transit zone are able to provide
only a few vessels or aircraft to intercept drug traffickers or lack
secure communications equipment needed to coordinate with U.S. law
enforcement counterparts during interdiction missions. Also, many of these
countries do not have a civilian law enforcement or military presence in
the coastal areas where drug traffickers work with local criminal
organizations to offload cocaine shipments and deliver them to the United
States. In addition, U.S. agencies are reluctant to work with law
enforcement officials in some countries because of widespread corruption.

From fiscal year 2000 through 2005, the United States provided about
$365 million in assistance to countries in the transit zone. Of this,
Mexico received approximately $115 million to support its efforts to
eradicate opium poppy and marijuana, and improve surveillance and
intelligence capabilities. The transit zone countries in Central America
and the Caribbean received the remainder, with most of this assistance for
programs to assist civilian law enforcement and military agencies in El
Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Panama.

Assistance provided to transit zone countries in Central America and the
Caribbean from State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs increased from approximately $18 million in fiscal
year 2000 to about $25 million in fiscal year 2002 but has since declined
to about $7 million in fiscal year 2005. A State official attributed the
decline in assistance to commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. State
assistance has been used for helicopter airlift support to Guatemala's
police counternarcotics units and interceptor boats for the Bahamas, among
other things.

Assistance for transit zone countries in Central America and the Caribbean
provided through the Foreign Military Finance and International Military
Education and Training programs has increased from about $19 million in
fiscal year 2000 to about $36 million in fiscal year 2005. This assistance
has been used to train host country personnel and provide equipment such
as helicopters, spare parts, and fuel to support counternarcotics training
and missions.

Agencies' Performance Measures Vary and Data for Assessing Performance Are
Problematic

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal
agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving
their goals, and to communicate their results to the Congress.22 The act
requires agencies to set multiyear strategic goals in their strategic
plans and corresponding annual goals in their performance plans, measure
performance toward the achievement of those goals, and report on their
progress in their annual performance reports. These reports are intended
to provide important information to agency managers, policymakers, and the
public on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was given.
Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals that are
objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish performance
measures that adequately indicate progress toward achieving those goals.
Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear measurable goals makes
it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-to-day
efforts to achieving the agency's intended mission.23

When multiple agencies are involved in achieving the desired results, as
with transit zone interdiction operations, agencies should coordinate the
development of performance measures to ensure that they are complementary.
In the case of the transit zone, performance measures and approaches for
assessing transit zone operations vary among the Coast Guard, CBP, and
Defense. In addition, basic information about cocaine production and
trafficking and cocaine usage in the United States that would help in
assessing transit zone interdiction operations is problematic. Further,
ONDCP and other agencies involved have not fully addressed recommendations
for improving illicit drug data collection and analysis.

Transit Zone Performance Measures Vary

According to the 2005 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy update, the 2002
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy "clearly laid out a plan for
accountable results in achieving a single goal-reducing drug use." Yet
specific measures of performance in the transit zone linking interdiction
operations to the Strategy's priority of disrupting the illicit drug
market were not included in the 2002 strategy, nor subsequently developed
across the agencies in conjunction with ONDCP. The performance measures
developed by the Coast Guard, and the measures being developed by CBP and
Defense, vary in their emphasis and may not be helpful in assessing
progress in disrupting the illicit drug market.

o The Coast Guard's performance measures related to the transit zone set
specific goals to reduce the flow of cocaine. For fiscal year 2004, the
goal was to remove 15 percent of the cocaine flowing through the transit
zone; according to Coast Guard officials, the removal goal increases to 35
percent in 2011.

o CBP is developing performance measures related to operational readiness
rates (a measure of its ability to respond when requested), but these
rates are not specific to the transit zone or to counternarcotics
activities and do not measure results.

o Defense is developing performance measures that focus on the number of
disruptions of cocaine trafficking events, but it has not yet set any
targets or goals to assess its progress.

Data for Assessing Transit Zone Interdiction Operations and Drug Use in
the United States Are Problematic

Data for assessing U.S. interdiction operations in the transit zone and
relating the results to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priority
of disrupting the illicit drug market and to its overall goal of reducing
drug usage in the United States are problematic. Specifically, the data
for estimating the cocaine flowing through the transit zone towards the
United States has been called into question, and data to demonstrate
progress in reducing drug use are difficult to obtain in ways that can be
generalized to the United States.

Annual Cocaine Flow Assessment Is Not Useful for Assessing Performance

The principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone
is ONDCP's Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). The IACM is
prepared annually for ONDCP by an interagency group representing
departments and agencies involved in U.S. counternarcotics

efforts.24 The assessment is intended to advise policymakers and resource
planners whose responsibilities involve detecting, monitoring, and
interdicting illicit drug shipments. It draws on other studies and several
datasets to estimate cocaine supply (that is, how much cocaine is produced
and available for export to the United States) and demand (that is, how
much cocaine is used in the United States and elsewhere). In the past, the
IACM's estimates of cocaine supply were close to the estimated demand in
the United States and other world markets plus estimated losses in
transit, source, and arrival zones. But for calendar years 2003 and 2004,
according to the interagency group, the IACM's estimate of the amount of
cocaine available for export was too low in relation to estimated U.S. and
non-U.S. demand for cocaine after taking into account seizures and
disruptions.

The interagency assessment noted that the increasing difference between
supply and demand estimates may be the result of several different
scenarios, a combination of which points to potential shortfalls in some
or many of the data sets. For example:

o Production and consumption estimates could be widely off the mark.
Production estimates are not designed to capture dynamic activities such
as eradication, replanting, or changing processing efficiencies.

o Worldwide consumption estimates are several years old (for example, the
U.S. estimate was developed in 2002) and may not yet show the effects of
record eradication and interdiction efforts in recent years.

o Time lags in estimating aspects inherent to the cocaine trade-including
price, purity, and demand-could delay the apparent effects and
documentation of a shortage.

As a result of the disparity between the estimated cocaine supply and
demand, the interagency group stated that a precise estimate of cocaine
flow was not possible for 2004, and that "a range of possible amounts was
more intellectually and analytically honest." The group estimated that
between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine flowed towards the United
States in 2004, but such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit
zone interdiction efforts.

ONDCP and other interagency group officials agreed that the wide range
reflects the difficulty in obtaining specific information about the
production of cocaine and how it gets to the United States. According to
ONDCP, the Director of ONDCP has established a working group to identify
and, where possible, quantify the uncertainties with the IACM, and
identify ways to improve the data and reduce uncertainty.

Tracking Illicit Drug Use in the United States Is Difficult

ONDCP uses several surveys and databases to help it assess the
availability and rate of illicit drug use in the United States and changes
in those measures over time, but a variety of issues affect their
reliability and validity. According to several studies and ONDCP
officials, a large portion of major cocaine (and other drug) users are
members of generally hard-to-survey populations, such as the homeless or
incarcerated, and those who are questioned about illicit drug use may be
inclined to provide a socially acceptable, and legal, response to survey
questions. In addition, typical survey response problems, such as low
response rates and failure of respondents to accurately recall past
events, also apply.

Moreover, according to ONDCP officials, obtaining information from and
about persons engaged in an illegal activity is difficult at best, much of
the available information about illicit drug use cannot be generalized to
the United States, and the logistics of collecting meaningful data means
that a time lag will always exist between the data collection period and
the time when the data are available for public policy purposes. Thus,
under the best of circumstances, the effect of a drug policy change may
take a number of years to demonstrate.

Table 4 lists the primary sources of information ONDCP uses to track
illicit drug trends in the United States and highlights the latest date of
data collection, ONDCP's primary purpose, and selected issues about the
information source. In some cases, the survey or database was designed for
other purposes and ONDCP officials have adapted it for their use.

Table 4: ONDCP's Primary Sources of Information on Illicit Drug
Availability and Use in the United States

                                        

     Data source    End of most   ONDCP's primary        Selected issues      
                    recent data       purpose       
                    collection                      
System to       June 2003     Assess price and   o Data cannot be          
Retrieve                      purity of cocaine  generalized to the United 
Information                   in the United      States.                   
from Drug                     States.                                      
Evidence                                         o Designed as an          
(STRIDE)                                         inventory system for      
                                                    drugs turned into DEA by  
                                                    its agents and informants 
                                                    and other law enforcement 
                                                    agencies.                 
                                                                              
                                                    o Trends could reflect    
                                                    law enforcement patterns  
                                                    rather than drug          
                                                    availability patterns.    
Drug Abuse      December 2003 Assess             o Data cannot be          
Warning Network               drug-related       generalized to the United 
(DAWN)                        hospital emergency States.                   
                                 department visits                            
                                 and deaths         o Intended to identify    
                                 investigated by    new drug trends, not drug 
                                 medical examiners  consumption.              
                                 and coroners.                                
                                                    o Coverage depends on     
                                                    emergency departments and 
                                                    medical examiners         
                                                    identifying and reporting 
                                                    drug-related incidents.   
Arrestee Drug   March 2004    Assess drug and    o Data cannot be          
Abuse                         alcohol use among  generalized to the United 
Monitoring                    arrestees in 39    States.                   
                                 cities and                                   
(ADAM)                        counties. This     o Cancelled in January    
                                 population is      2004. ONDCP is attempting 
                                 typically composed to restore funding for    
                                 of hard-core drug  fiscal year 2006, but a   
                                 users.             new survey cannot be      
                                                    completed until 2008.     
Monitoring the  December 2004 Track drug use     o Survey does not include 
Future (MTF)                  rates among 8th,   school dropouts and       
                                 10th, and 12th     absentees, or others who  
                                 grade students;    may be institutionalized. 
                                 college students;                            
                                 and young adults.  o Relies on               
                                                    self-reporting.           
National Survey December 2004 Track incidence    o The survey generally    
on Drug Use and               and prevalence of  does not cover hard-core  
Health (NSDUH)                substance abuse in drug users because it     
                                 the general        excludes homeless persons 
                                 population by      not in shelters and       
                                 surveying          individuals in jails,     
                                 individuals over   detention centers, and    
                                 12 years old       drug treatment centers.   
                                 living in                                    
                                 households.        o Relies on               
                                                    self-reporting.           

Source: GAO analysis of data sources.

ONDCP Has Not Fully Addressed Prior Recommendations for Improving Drug
Data Collection and Analysis

In a 2001 report prepared for ONDCP, the National Research Council
concluded that the United States had neither the data systems nor the
research infrastructure needed to assess the effectiveness of drug control
enforcement policies.25 In particular, the Council highlighted the absence
of adequate, reliable data on illicit drug prices and use. The Council
made numerous recommendations to improve data collection and
analysis-eight were addressed in full or in part to ONDCP. Regarding
interdiction, the Council recommended that research be done to address the
following:

o to what extent traffickers can limit the effect of interdiction
operations by shifting their routes and modes of transportation;

o how the deterrent effects of supply-reduction programs can be measured
and the size of these effects; and

o how quickly drug production and trafficking adapt to supply-reduction
activities, what happens to supply and price during the period of
adaptation, and how long the deterrent effects of supply-reduction
operations last before new supply sources emerge.

ONDCP officials told us these recommendations have not been fully
addressed. They noted that the illicit and secretive nature of the illicit
drug market precludes the systematic collection of cultivation,
production, and trafficking information. Furthermore, these officials
emphasized that the economics of cocaine production and trafficking may
not follow typical supply and demand relationships-profit margins likely
remain high despite record coca eradiation and cocaine interdiction
efforts, and drug traffickers can quickly react to changing interdiction
tactics and circumstances.

Conclusions

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion for
counternarcotics and related programs in South and Central America and
throughout the transit zone, primarily to reduce the amount of illicit
drugs produced and transported to the United States. While the number of
on-station ship days and on-station flight hours provided for monitoring
and interdiction operations in the transit zone has varied since 2000,
they have generally declined in recent years. JIATF-South, Coast Guard,
and CBP officials are concerned that the current level of operations
cannot be sustained. Defense on-station ship days and flight hours have
already declined due to operational priorities in other parts of the
world, primarily Afghanistan and Iraq, and structural limitations on the
U.S. Navy's primary maritime patrol aircraft-the P-3. The reduced
availability of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft will degrade JIATF-South's
ability to detect and monitor go-fast boats and other vessels suspected of
transporting illicit drugs. JIATF-South, Coast Guard, and CBP officials
are concerned that this problem is likely to worsen as budget constraints
and other homeland security priorities arise that limit the assets
available for interdiction operations. While some short-term fixes have
been taken, the longer-term implications of further declines in the
availability of monitoring and interdiction assets have not been
addressed.

Developing performance measures-linking interdiction operations in the
transit zone to disrupting the illicit drug market, specifically the
cocaine market-is difficult. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard, CBP, and
Defense, in conjunction with ONDCP, should develop and coordinate
performance measures that more directly relate to transit zone operations.
Data compiled by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and vetted by the
principal agencies involved in transit zone interdiction efforts -data
primarily documenting detections of drug movements and seizures and
disruptions of illicit drugs-could serve as benchmarks for assessing
progress until data more directly related to disrupting the illicit drug
market can be developed.

Collecting relevant data to assess the effect of interdiction operations
on the cocaine market and drug usage in the United States is problematic.
Assessing how much cocaine is produced and moves towards the United States
is not easy-as the 2004 IACM demonstrates. Most other readily available
data on cocaine price, purity, and availability-indicators of U.S.
demand-cannot be generalized to the United States. More systematic surveys
on drug usage take time-sometimes several years-to complete. Thus, a
number of years is often needed to show the effect of a drug policy
change. The National Research Council reported similar issues in 2001.
However, until ONDCP and other cognizant agencies fully address the
Council's recommendations, data to help assess U.S. drug usage will remain
problematic.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security plan
for the likely decline in the future availability of ships and aircraft
for transit zone interdiction operations and, specifically, determine how
they will compensate for the decline in P-3 maritime patrol aircraft
availability.

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security develop
and coordinate, in conjunction with the Director of ONDCP, performance
measures for transit zone interdiction operations that take advantage of
available drug interdiction data (such as detections, seizures, and
disruptions) to provide a basis for (1) assessing transit zone
interdiction performance and (2) deciding how to deploy increasingly
limited assets, such as the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft.

We also recommend that the Director of ONDCP address each of the
recommendations made by the National Research Council and report to the
Congress what departments and agencies need to take action, what remains
to be done, and when action is expected to be completed. In those
instances where ONDCP reports that action is not necessary, we recommend
that it document the reasons why.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Defense, Homeland Security, and ONDCP provided written comments on a draft
of this report. See appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. Justice and
State did not provide written comments. However, we discussed the draft
report with cognizant officials at each of the departments. Overall, the
departments and ONDCP stated that they generally concurred with the
recommendations that applied to them, but none detailed when and how they
will address them.

Defense and Homeland Security noted that they already have taken or are in
the process of taking appropriate action regarding planning for drug
interdiction asset requirements and developing relevant performance
measures.

o Defense specifically noted that the U.S. Navy has developed a Fleet
Response Plan designed to transition from the P-3 to its replacement
aircraft-the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, which is scheduled to be
introduced into the fleet in fiscal year 2011. Defense added that it will
continue to coordinate with all maritime patrol asset providers in the
transit zone. Regarding performance measures, Defense stated that it has
appropriate mechanisms in place to assess its efforts. Yet, Defense also
noted that during the past year it has coordinated with its commands to
develop performance goals, measures, and targets for the transit zone and
continues to work with them as they prepare their submissions. During the
course of this engagement, cognizant Defense officials stated on several
occasions that they had not finalized performance measures.26

o Homeland Security stated it develops asset requirements as part of an
interagency process where asset commitment is based on threat level and
the availability of funding. While it remains committed to "robust
support" of maritime transit zone interdiction efforts, unforeseen
events-Hurricane Katrina, for example-can affect asset availability.
Regarding performance measures, Homeland Security noted that as a result
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,27 it has
undertaken an effort to develop and coordinate a performance measurement
system to better assess Homeland Security's counternarcotics' activities,
including transit zone interdiction operations. Homeland Security did not
state when it will complete this effort.

ONDCP did not comment directly on interdiction asset availability, but
overall, ONDCP agreed that developing performance measures that link
interdiction operations to disrupting the cocaine market is difficult but
necessary, and stated that it will work with Defense and Homeland Security
within the framework of the Government Performance and Results Act to
develop appropriate measures.

Our recommendation regarding planning for the likely decline in
interdiction asset availability was intended to have Defense and Homeland
Security work together to address asset availability; in particular, the
decline in maritime patrol aircraft hours. However, the departments do not
address in their comments when or how their planning efforts have been
coordinated nor when their on-going efforts will be completed. We continue
to believe that such a coordinated planning effort is both appropriate and
necessary to ensure that the departments' limited assets are used in the
most effective manner, and encourage the departments to follow through
with one another.

Concerning the National Research Council's recommendations, ONDCP did not
specifically address our recommendation to report to Congress on what
actions have been taken or still need to be taken. Rather, ONDCP referred
to a 2001 study-Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations
on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999-that it published as one of several steps it
has taken to address the Council's recommendations. We note that the ONDCP
study was published the same year the Council published its report, and
that it does not refer to the Council's report or its recommendations. The
ONDCP study's primary objective was to "measure the impact of drug
enforcement operations on the cocaine smuggling industry." Among other
things and related to this report, the study concludes that better data
was available on what drug traffickers were doing than on the activities
of U.S. drug interdiction assets. According to the study's authors, "this
was most notably the case with the interdiction activities of the
Department of Defense." In addition, to address the Council's
recommendations, ONDCP also noted that it has established two operational
priorities focused on (a) understanding the drug market and (b) enhancing
the data sets ONDCP relies on. These priorities were initiated during the
course of our engagement. According to ONDCP officials, they have not been
completed.

As we note in this report, collecting relevant data for assessing the
effect of interdiction operations on the cocaine market and U.S. illicit
drug usage is problematic. But more than three years after the National
Research Council's report addressing the illicit drug data issue was
finalized, ONDCP cannot point to any specific action it has completed to
address the Council's recommendations for improving the collection of
illicit drug trafficking and usage data. Given the importance of the
illicit drug problem and the on-going controversy in the United States
about how best to confront it, better data for evaluating alternative drug
control policies is paramount. We continue to urge ONDCP to follow up on
the Council's findings and recommendations and take the steps necessary to
address the continuing shortcomings in its illicit drug data and report to
Congress the status of its efforts.

In commenting on the IACM, Homeland Security stated that the decision by
the interagency group to report a range for cocaine movement was a wise
one because it acknowledged the lack of precision inherent in the data
that is currently available. We agree, and did not intend to imply
anything else. We also agree with Homeland Security that greater efforts
need to be made to improve the methodology and integrity of data
instruments in order to gain a better and more useful understanding of
drug production and consumption.

Finally, all the departments and ONDCP provided additional information on
various aspects of their roles regarding drug interdiction in the transit
zone. Defense, in particular, emphasized that it is not authorized to
conduct law enforcement operations but can support them. In addition, all
the departments and ONDCP provided us technical comments and updates that
we have incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and State, and the Director of ONDCP. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Al
Huntington, Joe Carney, J.J. Marzullo, Jose Pena, and Jim Strus.

Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

Scope and Methodology Appendix I

Overall, to examine the status of U.S. interdiction assets and progress
made in disrupting drug trafficking in the transit zone, we focused on
U.S. (1) efforts to interdict cocaine because nearly all the cocaine
entering the United States comes from South America and (2) operations in
the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because the United
States has positioned most of its interdiction assets in these areas. We
also agreed with the requesters to limit the scope of this engagement by
examining U.S. operations to interdict cocaine before it reaches
intermediate staging points in the Caribbean Sea, Central America, and
Mexico on the way to the United States. We further narrowed our
examination to U.S. efforts to detect and disrupt unscheduled maritime
movements of cocaine-primarily go-fast boats, but also fishing and other
types of ocean-going vessels. Although drug traffickers use small aircraft
to transport cocaine and other drugs, the United States essentially relies
on the law enforcement authorities in the countries where they land to
interdict them.

To track the changes in the amounts of cocaine seized and disrupted since
calendar year 2000, we relied on the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement (IACM). While the data sets used to prepare the IACM have been
called into question by the interagency group that prepares it, the IACM
data on cocaine seizures and disruptions are based on the Consolidated
Counterdrug Database, which is managed by the Office of the U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator. Beginning with 2004, the Coordinator's Office
began using stricter rules to vet the data on drug movements, detections,
seizures, and disruptions in quarterly meetings with the interagency drug
community. The intent was to minimize duplicate or questionable reported
drug movements. According to the database manager, however, the more
careful review of the data did not materially affect the categorization or
number of maritime drug movements-our primary emphasis. Rather, many
suspect aircraft are no longer counted as drug movement events unless
corroborating information strongly suggests drugs were aboard the
aircraft. We observed a quarterly vetting session and discussed the
process for determining whether reported drug events can be "confirmed and
substantiated" based on intelligence and other sources with several
members of the interagency group that participate, including the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA); the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence,
Crime and Narcotics Center; the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South); the Coast Guard; and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Based on the foregoing, we determined
that the cocaine seizure and disruption data provided to us were
sufficiently reliable for describing and documenting trends in the transit
zone.

To determine the factors that have contributed to the changes in cocaine
seizures and disruptions, we reviewed the IACMs for calendar years 2000
through 2004. We discussed the observations made in the IACMs and reported
operational changes since 2000 with cognizant officials in the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Department of Defense's
(Defense) Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, and other members
of the interagency counternarcotics community-namely, DIA, the Crime and
Narcotics Center, DEA, JIATF-South, and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.

To analyze the trends in the assets provided by the United States and its
allies since fiscal year 2000 to support illicit drug interdiction in the
transit zone, we relied on data provided by JIATF-South and JIATF-West
that tabulates on-station ship days and flight hours spent on interdiction
missions by the provider and the type of ship or aircraft.1 Until fiscal
year 2004, JIATF-West had responsibility for U.S. drug detection and
monitoring activities in the eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of
Mexico.2 We analyzed data for fiscal years 2000 through 2005, although
JIATF-West could not provide information about on-station ship days for
the first quarter of fiscal year 2000 (September-December 1999).3 Compared
to the first quarter of 2001, JIAFT-West's contribution was about 5.4
percent of the total ship days on station. To determine the reliability of
the JIATF-South and JIATF-West data, we discussed how the respective data
was compiled with cognizant officials and compared it to available-albeit,
less specific-data from the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense. Through these
efforts, we determined that the data provided to us were sufficiently
reliable for describing the trends in asset availability during fiscal
years 2000 through 2005.

To determine the challenges facing the departments and agencies in
maintaining current levels of transit zone interdiction operations, we
reviewed issues raised in the IACM and other department and agency
planning and budgeting documents. We discussed these matters with
cognizant law enforcement and military authorities at Defense, Department
of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and headquarters in
Washington, D.C. We also discussed operational challenges with

o Coast Guard officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where the
Coast Guard stations armed helicopters used in interdiction operations;

o CBP officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where CPB stations
P-3 maritime patrol aircraft used in interdiction operations;

o DEA officials in Miami, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas, who manage an
ongoing drug interdiction program in the waters around the Bahamas called
"Operation Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos;"

o JIATF-South officials in Key West, Florida, including the Commander;
representatives from the Coast Guard, CBP, Defense, and other U.S.
agencies; as well as the liaison officers from France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom; and

o Justice officials with the U.S. Attorney's offices in Tampa and
Sarasota, Florida, directly involved in the Panama Express operation.

To determine how the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense assess their
performance, we met with cognizant officials in their respective planning
and budgeting offices and reviewed relevant reports and related documents.
Since only the Coast Guard had completed developing performance measures,
we relied on discussions with the key officials to document what CBP and
Defense were developing. To determine what data are available for
assessing transit zone performance, we met with the principals involved in
preparing the IACM. We discussed issues that have arisen concerning
cultivation and production estimates (primarily, officials with the Crime
and Narcotics Center and DEA), as well as interdiction amounts (primarily,
the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's Consolidated Counterdrug Database
manager). In addressing usage and demand estimates in the United States,
we asked ONDCP officials what they used to measure progress against the
National Drug Control Strategy's goal of reducing drug usage in the United
States. These officials cited the data sources we refer to in the body of
the report (see table 4) and described how they used the information. We
also reviewed the scope and methodology statements for each data source,
and in the cases of the National Survey on Drug Use and Health and
Monitoring the Future, we spoke with the current project directors to
obtain their views.

Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements Appendix II

The United States has signed Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement
agreements with 25 countries in the transit and source zones-three since
2000 after the United States closed its military installations in Panama.
According to Coast Guard officials, these agreements have improved
cooperation with nations in the region and increased U.S. and, in
particular, the Coast Guard's capability to board suspect vessels and
detain suspected drug traffickers. These officials added that these
agreements are one of the primary reasons for increased interdictions of
cocaine shipments in the transit zone. These bilateral agreements
typically have six provisions to them. The United States and the countries
negotiate each provision separately, which means that some countries may
agree to some provisions and not others. The six parts provide for the
following:

o Shipboarding provisions allow U.S. agencies under certain conditions to
stop, board, and search suspicious vessels registered in that country
without having specific permission.

o Shiprider provisions permit countries to place law enforcement officials
on another's vessels.

o Pursuit provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very
limited circumstances, to pursue aircraft and vessels in a country's
airspace and territorial waters. In particular, the provisions permit U.S.
law enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the
country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond
immediately.

o Entry-to-investigate provisions allow the U.S. law enforcement agencies,
under very limited circumstances, to enter a country's airspace or
territorial waters to investigate aircraft or vessels suspected of illicit
drug trafficking. Specifically, the provisions permit U.S. law enforcement
agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the country does not have
a vessel or aircraft available to respond immediately.

o Overflight provisions permit the U.S. law enforcement aircraft to fly
over the country's territorial waters, with appropriate notice to the
country's coastal authorities.

o Relay order-to-land provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to
relay an order to land from the host country to the suspect aircraft.

Moreover, an additional International Maritime Interdiction Support clause
permits U.S. law enforcement agencies, principally the Coast Guard, to
transport suspected drug traffickers through that country to the United
States for prosecution and provides for expedited access to that country's
dockside facility to search suspect vessels. Since 2000, the United States
has entered into support clauses with eight additional countries.

The following table lists the law enforcement agreements, including the
international maritime interdiction support clause that the United States
has negotiated with countries in the transit and source zones.

Table 5: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements with
Countries in the Source and Transit Zones

    

Country     Shipboarding Shiprider Pursuit   Entry-to- Overflight         Relay International 
                                                                                              
                                           Investigate            order-to-land      Maritime 
                                                                                              
                                                                                 Interdiction 
                                                                                              
                                                                                      Support 
                                                                                       clause 
1. Antigua             X         X       X           X          X             X             * 
and Barbuda                                                                     
2. Bahamas                       X                              X             X 
3. Barbados            X         X       X           X          X             X 
4. Belize              X         X       X           X          X             X 
5. Colombia            X                                                        
6. Costa               X         X       X           X          X             X             * 
Rica                                                                            
7. Dominica            X         X       X           X                          
8.                     X         X       X           X          *             *             * 
Dominican                                                                       
Republic                                                                        
9. Ecuador                                                      X               
10. El                                                          X                           * 
Salvador                                                                        
11. Grenada            X         X       X           X          X             X 
12.                    *         *       *           *          *             *             * 
Guatemala                                                                       
13. Haiti              *         *       X           X          X             * 
14.                    *         *       *           *          *             *             * 
Honduras                                                                        
15. Jamaica            X         X       X           X          X             X 
16.                              X       X           X          X               
Netherlands                                                                     
Antilles                                                                        
                                                                                
 and Aruba                                                                      
17.                    *         *       *           *          *             *             * 
Nicaragua                                                                       
18. Panama             *         X       *           *          *             *             * 
19. St.                X         X       X           X          X             X 
Kitts and                                                                       
Nevis                                                                           
20. St.                X         X       X           X          X             X 
Lucia                                                                           
21. St.                X         X       X           X                          
Vincent and                                                                     
                                                                                
 Grenadines                                                                     
Country     Shipboarding Shiprider Pursuit   Entry-to- Overflight         Relay International 
                                                                                              
                                           Investigate            order-to-land      Maritime 
                                                                                              
                                                                                 Interdiction 
                                                                                              
                                                                                      Support 
                                                                                       clause 
22.                    X         X       X           X          X             X 
Suriname                                                                        
23.                    X         X       X           X          X             X 
Trinidad                                                                        
and Tobago                                                                      
24. Turks                        X                                              
and Caicos                                                                      
25.                    X                 X                                      
Venezuela                                                                       

Source: JIATF-South.

*Indicates that the provision or clause was agreed to since July 2000.

Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Appendix IV

Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy Appendix V

(320307)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-200 .

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4268 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-200 , a report to congressional committees

November 2005

DRUG CONTROL

Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and
Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations

One of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priorities is to disrupt
the illicit drug market. To this end, the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security provide ships and aircraft to disrupt the flow of
illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, shipped from South America through the
Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean-an area known as the transit zone.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the U.S.
anti-drug strategy. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South)
directs most transit zone operations. We examined U.S. efforts to
interdict maritime movements of cocaine. We analyzed the (1) changes in
cocaine seizures and disruptions since calendar year 2000, (2) trends in
interdiction assets provided since fiscal year 2000, (3) challenges to
maintaining transit zone interdiction operations, and (4) performance
measures the agencies use to assess their progress.

What GAO Recommends

We recommend that Defense and Homeland Security (1) plan for likely
declines in interdiction assets and (2) develop measures with ONDCP to
better assess interdiction operations. We also recommend that ONDCP
address prior recommendations to improve drug data. The agencies generally
agreed, but did not detail when and how they will address these
recommendations.

Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased about
68 percent since calendar year 2000-from 117 metric tons in 2000 to 196
metric tons in 2004. About two-thirds of the disruptions were in the
western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean where the United States
has most of its interdiction assets. JIATF-South and other cognizant
officials attribute the increase to improved interagency cooperation and
intelligence, the introduction of armed helicopters to stop go-fast boats,
and increased cooperation from nations in the region.

Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of assets-ships and aircraft-to
disrupt drug trafficking in the transit zone have varied. On-station ship
days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in 2002, but both
have generally declined since then, primarily because the Department of
Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets have been
largely offset by the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
and certain allied nations. Nevertheless, in recent years, JIATF-South has
detected less than one-third of the "known and actionable" maritime
illicit drug movements in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific
Ocean. Yet, once detected, over 80 percent of the drug movements were
disrupted.

Various factors pose challenges to maintaining the current level of
transit zone interdiction operations. The reduced availability of the U.S.
Navy's P-3 maritime patrol aircraft due to structural problems will
degrade the U.S. capability to detect suspect maritime movements,
readiness rates of older Coast Guard ships have declined since fiscal year
2000, and the surface radar system on the Coast Guard's long-range
surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. Coast Guard and CBP officials
also noted that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in
light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities that
may arise. These officials expressed concern that the long-term
implications of likely declines in transit zone assets have not been
addressed.

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to
develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals.
The Coast Guard's measures relate to reducing cocaine flow through the
transit zone, CBP's planned measures are not specific to the transit zone,
and Defense's planned measures focus on the number of disruptions of
cocaine movements. But data that would help in assessing transit zone
interdiction operations are problematic. For instance, in its assessment
for 2004, ONDCP reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons
of cocaine may be moving towards the United States. Such a wide range is
not useful for assessing transit zone interdiction operations. In
addition, data on U.S. drug usage are difficult to obtain and often cannot
be generalized to the United States. In a 2001 report for ONDCP, the
National Research Council made similar observations and recommended ways
to improve the collection and analysis of illicit drug data, but ONDCP has
not fully addressed them.
*** End of document. ***