Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations	 
Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and	 
Requirements (08-DEC-05, GAO-06-193).				 
                                                                 
DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces
to conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint	 
training as exercises involving the interaction of joint forces  
and/or joint staffs under a joint headquarters. To guide the	 
services' plans to train forces for urban operations and	 
construct related facilities, in May 2002, the Senate Armed	 
Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility		 
requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to	 
complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for	 
measuring training capabilities within the services and across	 
DOD by November 1, 2005. Due to DOD's focus on joint urban	 
operations and congressional interest in synchronizing service	 
training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority of the	 
Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has	 
developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related 
requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban  
operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned
from ongoing operations into its training.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-193 					        
    ACCNO:   A42837						        
  TITLE:     Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban      
Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound	 
Strategy and Requirements					 
     DATE:   12/08/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military training					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Joint forces					 

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GAO-06-193

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should
Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements

Contents

Tables

Figures

December 8, 2005Letter

Congressional Committees

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the challenges
facing U.S. forces as they conduct military operations in urban
environments, typically referred to as urban operations. These challenges
include the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, a high density of
buildings that complicate the coordination of firing weapons, a diminished
effectiveness of communications equipment, and an increased ability of
insurgents or guerrilla fighters to conceal their whereabouts. Based on
ongoing operations, which often require U.S. forces to conduct urban
operations, military commanders have increasingly called for more training
in this area. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
military services have begun placing a higher priority on urban operations
training. DOD has also increasingly emphasized the importance of joint
training, including exercises to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint
urban operations. DOD defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint
forces or joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to
joint doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational
requirements. DOD has designated the Joint Forces Command as the command
responsible for joint training, and in particular, to act as the executive
agent, for urban operations training.

As the military services continue to develop plans for urban operations
training and to construct or upgrade training facilities, and submit
related funding requests, the Senate Armed Services Committee has directed
DOD to develop requirements to guide the services' plans. Specifically, in
May 2002, Senate Report 107-151, accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, directed DOD to establish facility
requirements and, in May 2005, Senate Report 109-69, accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, directed DOD to
complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring
training capabilities within each service and across DOD by November 1,
2005. In the latter report, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted the
services will continue to address urban operations training requirements
and expend resources independently with minimal coordination and
cooperation until a comprehensive joint training plan and investment
strategy are approved and implemented within the department. In response,
the Joint Forces Command has been working with the military services to
develop an overall training strategy that addresses the need for troops to
train jointly for urban operations, and related facility and training
requirements. According to Joint Forces Command, this strategy and the
related requirements, once complete, is intended to satisfy the baseline
required by Senate Report 109-69.

Because of DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional
interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, we, on the
authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD
has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related
requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations
training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training.

To address these objectives, we interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials,
and analyzed relevant documents including DOD training doctrine, the draft
urban operations training strategy, and the results of joint urban
operations working group meetings. Additionally, we visited several
service training installations and combat training centers in the United
States as well as overseas, observed exercises, and analyzed training
documents to identify the extent of joint participation in exercises and
improvements made to urban operations training as a result of lessons
learned from ongoing operations. We also conducted interviews with
training personnel and troops recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan
to obtain their views on the type of urban operations training needed to
realistically train troops as they will fight. We determined that the data
we analyzed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. We
performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards from January 2005 through September 2005. More details
on our scope and methodology are presented in appendix I.

Results in Brief

Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint
strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training
requirements. In response to congressional direction, the Joint Forces
Command contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify
facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Joint Forces Command
began working with the services to review the study's results and develop
the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis
for a joint training strategy. While the services have identified some
facility needs, Joint Forces Command and service representatives have been
unable to reach consensus on the level or types of joint training
necessary to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, Joint
Forces Command has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility
and joint training requirements that will form the baseline for measuring
capabilities within each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us
they will not be able to deliver the required baseline by November 1,
2005, and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in
evaluating service facility plans. Until Joint Forces Command develops an
overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related
requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have
a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training plans, and
related funding requests. As a result, we are recommending that DOD
finalize development of its joint urban operations training strategy,
including development of training and facility requirements, before
approving service plans to construct or upgrade training facilities to
support urban operations training.

Despite DOD's increased emphasis on the importance of training for joint
urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for
joint urban operations training that places troops from different services
on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service
doctrine both require forces to be prepared to operate as a joint team
across the full range of military operations. Furthermore, DOD guidance
calls for transforming military training to better enable joint force
operations by increasing the level of joint context in military training.
Many existing urban operations training exercises include some joint
aspects, such as training on coordination between ground forces and the
Air Force, and a few exercises have also incorporated the use of a joint
headquarters to train its battle staff on joint command and control.
However, most urban operations training events fall short of the
definition of a joint exercise as articulated in DOD's joint training
policy-the interaction of joint forces or joint staffs conducted under a
joint headquarters in a manner that prepares forces/staffs to respond to
operational requirements. Various factors account for the lack of joint
urban operations training opportunities, such as the services' focus on
service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring
joint urban operations training, specific joint urban operations training
requirements, and a formal mechanism for the services to schedule joint
urban operations training at each other's facilities. Without a strategy,
defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be
assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that it will
maximize the joint usage of training facilities. To increase the
opportunities for joint urban operations training, we are recommending
that DOD establish a mechanism for joint scheduling of joint urban
operations training at major training centers.

While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we
interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is
to train as it expects to fight. On the basis of feedback from ongoing
operations, DOD has made several adjustments to its urban operations
training, including expanding and upgrading its urban training structures
to more closely reflect urban conditions that troops can expect to face in
current operations, using civilian role players to a greater extent to
simulate the presence of urban populations, building convoy operations
training courses, and training troops in techniques to counter emerging
enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. Discussions
held with troops and training personnel revealed additional items that
they believed could further enhance training, such as the need for
additional live-fire capability, a larger number of civilian role players
and more cultural awareness training to prepare troops for the required
interaction with a large civilian populace once in theater, and training
with newly fielded equipment such as the High-Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle, the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight, and the Blue Force
Tracker. While DOD plans additional improvements to current training,
until it develops specific training requirements, it will lack a solid
basis to evaluate suggestions and make improvements and investment
decisions.

DOD concurred with our recommendation on finalizing the joint urban
operations training strategy and related requirements. DOD did not concur
with our recommendation for establishing a mechanism to schedule joint
urban operations training at major training centers. Our report shows that
the lack of a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations
training at major training centers is one of the key factors accounting
for the limited number of joint urban operations training opportunities.
Our recommendation is intended to facilitate increased multi-service
participation in urban operations training events. Without implementing
this recommendation, DOD will continue to rely on the current
service-centric scheduling systems that have resulted in few joint urban
operations training opportunities that meet DOD's definition of a joint
exercise. Therefore, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit.
The department also provided technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate.

Background

Half the world's population lives in urban areas, and the trend towards
global urbanization is continuing. Within the last 40 years, the United
States military has conducted urban operations in locations such as
Saigon, Hue, Beirut, Panama City, Kuwait City, Mogadishu, and the villages
of the Balkans. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted
the trend towards urban operations and the many challenges they present
U.S. forces. Military planners recognize this trend and acknowledge the
likelihood that enemies will continue to draw U.S. forces into cities to
degrade U.S. military advantages. According to DOD, in the future, U.S.
forces will likely conduct military operations in urban areas, which are
characterized by multiple structures, numerous noncombatants, and complex
infrastructure. These areas are also political, cultural, and economic
centers, as well as hubs for transportation, information, and
manufacturing. Thus, the urban environment constrains many of the
advantages that U.S. forces currently enjoy in open environments,
increasing the risks of high casualties to friendly forces and
noncombatants, and extensive collateral damage.

Moreover, once deployed, forces generally find themselves part of joint
operations. In testimony the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Readiness reiterated comments made earlier by the Secretary of Defense:

As part of its Training Transformation Program, DOD is attempting to
provide more of a joint context to its training.2 DOD defines a joint
exercise as the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs conducted
under a joint headquarters according to joint doctrine that prepares
forces/staffs to respond to operational requirements. To develop a
stronger program of joint training, DOD designated the Joint Forces
Command as the joint trainer for DOD to support the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as well as senior commanders worldwide in meeting joint
training objectives. In 2002, DOD published its Doctrine for Joint Urban
Operations3 and, recognizing the need to place a stronger emphasis on
urban operations training, assigned the role of joint urban operations
executive agent for training to Joint Forces Command. While the Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall
responsibility for training policies, Joint Forces Command, as DOD's
executive agent, is the "primary DOD point of contact and proponent for
joint urban operations doctrine, training, and equipment," and is to lead,
coordinate, and integrate the activities of the other DOD components on
such matters. In this role, Joint Forces Command has conducted experiments
on concepts of operations for joint urban operations and monitored lessons
learned from ongoing urban operations.

The training of U.S. forces for urban operations is primarily the
responsibility of the services. Both the Army and Marine Corps, the
services that conduct most urban operations, have developed fairly robust
urban operations training programs for their ground forces. Figure 1 shows
an Army training facility at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with structures
built to train troops in conducting urban operations.

Figure 1: Army Urban Operations Training Site at Fort Campbell, Kentucky

The services train ground forces for urban operations based on a
building-block approach beginning with specialty-focused individual
training at their assigned installation, which normally focuses on
individual basic skills needed to successfully conduct operations in urban
terrain. Then they progress through collective training that sometimes
includes other services on a limited basis. Training ends with a
culminating exercise at a major training center, such as the Joint
Readiness Training Center or Twenty-Nine Palms, and is based on real-time
scenarios that troops may encounter in the urban environment. The Army and
Marine Corps currently have plans to construct new or upgrade existing
facilities to support urban operations training.

Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD's Joint Urban Operations Training
Strategy

Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint
strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training
requirements. In response to direction from the Senate Armed Services
Committee in May 2002, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD's executive
agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, completed in
early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005,
the committee directed DOD to establish joint urban operations facility
requirements and a training requirements baseline by November 1, 2005. In
May 2005, Joint Forces Command began working with the services to review
the study's results and develop the detailed facility and training
requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While
the services have identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command and
service representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the level
or types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban
operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to finalize
the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will
form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and
across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the
baseline as required by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to provide
criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans.
Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban
operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of
Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service
facility and training plans, and related funding requests.

DOD Directed to Develop Urban Operations Training and Facility
Requirements

In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act,4 the Senate Armed Services Committee required a report
by the Secretary of Defense that would establish requirements for
facilities that support urban operations training within DOD. In response
to the committee's direction, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the joint urban operations executive agent, Joint Forces Command,
contracted for a study that would examine urban operations training
requirements and the resulting facilities that would be needed to conduct
the necessary training.

The study was completed in early 2005. According to DOD officials, while
the study results have helped to inform the process, the detailed training
and facility requirements contained in the study have not been formally
adopted because there was not enough agreement among the services as to
the usefulness or veracity of the identified urban operations training
requirements in that study. Consequently, in May 2005 Joint Forces Command
convened a working group to develop joint urban operations training and
facilities requirements on which to base a joint urban operations training
strategy.

In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act,5 the Senate Armed Services committee directed DOD to
complete its efforts to establish the requirements for facilities and also
directed it to establish, by November 1, 2005, a training requirements
baseline against which the ability to train for urban operations within
the services and across DOD could be measured. In the report, the
committee expressed concern that the services would otherwise continue to
address urban operations training requirements and expend resources
independently with minimal coordination and that a critical opportunity to
develop capabilities for joint training in urban operations was not being
effectively pursued. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces
Command began working with the services to develop an overall strategy for
joint urban operations and related facility and training requirements.
According to DOD, this effort is intended to meet the congressional
directive for a requirements baseline.

Current Strategy Focuses on Need for Facilities

To date, the draft Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy, as currently
drafted, primarily focuses on the need to enhance training facilities to
accommodate larger, more realistic joint urban operations training events.
The current draft strategy's focus is to identify the necessary locations
for joint urban operations training for two audiences: (1) troops
executing urban operations at the tactical level and (2) officers serving
on the staffs of commanders conducting urban operations. As envisioned,
the troops that execute the operations would undergo training that places
members of different services together to learn to operate together and to
overcome differences in standard practices, terms, and organizational
cultures that can limit the effectiveness of operations. The draft
strategy also envisions using three training range complexes comprised of
existing training facilities in the western, central, and eastern United
States, as well as improvements and expansions planned for some of these
training facilities.

For its second audience, the strategy suggested building new facilities in
order to train staff officers in the skills associated with serving on a
joint staff of a commander conducting urban operations. According to DOD,
officers serving on a joint staff rarely receive significant and realistic
training for this complex role in which they are called upon to make
recommendations to the joint task force commander based on a myriad of
facts and assumptions in a limited time frame. The draft strategy notes
that many officers often spend more time in the course of their careers
working on command staffs than they do in command of troops. In order to
establish staff training, the strategy proposes building four new joint
staff training centers large enough to handle battalion or
combatant-command-level staffs to replicate the sort of command and
control arrangements and joint staff processes they will encounter while
serving as staff officers under a joint force commander. According to a
Joint Forces Command official, these centers can provide adequate
throughput for staff training if used in conjunction with the current
Joint Operations Centers in Grafenwoehr, Germany, and at Joint Forces
Command in Suffolk, Virginia.

Lack of Consensus on Joint Training Requirements Stalls Strategy

The services have identified their respective facility needs to support
urban operations training. However, the Joint Forces Command has not been
able to finalize a draft joint urban operations training strategy because
command officials and service representatives have not been able to agree
upon joint urban operations training requirements. Specifically, there is
a lack of agreement on the need for joint urban operations training events
that place significant numbers of troops from different services together
in urban settings. As Joint Forces Command officials continue to develop
the draft strategy, they have pledged to continue working with the
services and combatant commands to develop the joint urban operations
training requirements through the working group process. To date, Joint
Forces Command has provided only a very broad, overarching statement of
the tasks that are unique to or significantly challenged by urban
environments, with a focus on conducting joint urban operations at the
operational level.

Representatives from the Army and Marine Corps in attendance at the second
session of the joint urban operations training strategy working group in
August 2005 repeatedly emphasized the need for more specifically defined
training requirements for joint urban operations before they could
evaluate the draft joint urban operations training strategy and assess
their services' commitment to it. Given the key role the services and
combatant commands play in training forces-both troops on the ground and
staff personnel-consensus on joint urban operations training requirements
is necessary for the implementation of a joint urban operations training
strategy.

Because of the lack of consensus in the draft joint urban operations
training strategy and related requirements, DOD has not yet developed
joint training requirements to use as a baseline against which to measure
capabilities within and across the services. As a result, DOD officials
told us they will not be able to deliver the requirements baseline to the
Congress by the November 1, 2005, deadline. DOD officials stated that,
instead, they plan to provide a set of questions for the Congress to use
as interim criteria in considering service funding requests for urban
operations training facilities. These questions are intended to assist the
Congress in evaluating the potential for joint usage of proposed
facilities. Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for
joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the
Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for
evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding
requests.

Despite DOD's Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train Together
for Joint Urban Operations

Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint
urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for
joint urban operations training that places troops from different services
on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Various factors account
for the lack of joint urban operations training, such as the services'
focus on training service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall
strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific joint urban
operations training requirements, and a formal mechanism for scheduling
joint urban operations training at service-owned facilities. Without a
training strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism,
DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or
that DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training
facilities.

Few Urban Operations Training Opportunities Exist that Meet DOD's
Definition of Joint Training

DOD's Joint Training Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3500.01B, defines a joint exercise as a joint military
maneuver, simulated wartime operation, or other Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff/combatant commander-designated event involving planning,
preparation, execution, and evaluation in which forces of two or more
services interact as joint forces and/or joint staffs and the event is
conducted based on approved joint doctrine that prepares joint forces or
staffs to respond to operational requirements established by the combatant
commander. Although there is often some level of jointness incorporated
into Marine Corps and Army urban operations training events, these efforts
fall short of DOD's definition of a joint training event because they do
not include a joint headquarters and focus on service, rather than joint,
training objectives. Marine Corps officials said that the Marine Corps
includes some joint scenarios in its events and incorporates to some
extent other service participation in performing certain specialty roles,
such as air-ground coordination. The Army simulates some of the joint
aspects of a battlefield in its training as well, such as the joint
command and control structures troops are expected to encounter in
theater, and it incorporates special operations forces when possible.
According to Joint Forces Command officials, the Joint Operations Center
at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia, and the Joint Multinational
Training Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany,6 are used to provide some
officers with the type of joint staff officer training called for in the
draft strategy. We observed the Joint Operations Center, which is used to
provide officers with command and control training, at the Joint
Multinational Training Center. Officers we spoke with stated that this was
a great addition that increased the level of joint urban operations
training.

Although the services are taking these actions to increase jointness,
training exercises are still primarily focused on service-derived, rather
than joint, training objectives and for the most part do not include a
joint headquarters to command the exercise. For example, an Air Force
representative who was involved in supporting the Army's Air Warrior II
training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, which was designed to prepare
troops for urban operations before they deployed, stated that the value of
the training was limited for the Air Force because the training was
designed around the accomplishment of Army training objectives.
Additionally, an Air Force representative in Germany experienced similar
difficulties in getting Air Force training objectives added to Army
exercises. Furthermore, the troops and training personnel we interviewed,
many of whom had recent operational experience in ongoing operations,
emphasized the importance of training jointly for urban operations in
order to maximize familiarity with the services' respective ways of
operating and overall interoperability.

Several Factors Contribute to the Lack of Joint Urban Operations Training

One important factor contributing to the lack of joint urban operations
training is the services' focus on service-specific skills training. The
two services that perform the bulk of urban operations training, the Army
and Marine Corps, are proactively working to ensure that their troops are
trained in the individual skills needed for operations in urban terrain.
Soldiers and Marines are exposed to individual urban tasks in their basic
training and specialty schools. The Army and Marine Corps primarily
concentrate their urban operations training on enhancing the capabilities
of individual soldiers and small units-primarily squads, platoons, and
companies. As noted in our June 2005 report,7 historically, service
training has focused on individual service competencies or
mission-essential tasks, with less emphasis on joint operations. While
this has allowed the services to meet their core training
responsibilities, it has also contributed to the problem of forces often
entering combat without prior experience or training in joint urban
operations.

Second, in the absence of a joint urban operations training strategy,
there is currently no specific requirement for the services to train
jointly for urban operations. While it is not urban-specific, the DOD
Directive 1322.18, which advocates joint training, states: "To the maximum
extent possible, the DOD components shall conduct joint training in
accredited events at certified facilities, and shall synchronize schedules
to integrate training events." However, the directive does not define what
is meant by "to the maximum extent possible" and therefore provides the
services much leeway in how much they participate in joint training.
Absent a directive requiring the services to train for joint urban
operations tasks at a specified level and specific joint urban operations
training requirements, the services are likely to continue to focus their
training on service-specific skills and tasks for which they are held
accountable. As discussed earlier, Joint Forces Command expects the joint
urban operations training strategy it is developing to include such
requirements.

Lastly, the services own the facilities used to conduct urban operations
training and are currently using them primarily for service-specific
training requirements. While the services agree that joint urban
operations training is needed, there is no formal mechanism in place to
ensure that joint training requirements are incorporated into the
different services' training schedules. Urban training that involves
placing two or more battalions together is usually reserved for the combat
training centers and these training centers are limited in throughput
capacity. For example, the Joint Readiness Training Center normally
sponsors 10 training rotations per year and is limited in its ability to
expand the amount of rotations it can host per year to increase joint
usage. Even though Joint Forces Command is the executive agent for joint
urban operations, it does not have the authority to direct the services or
combatant commands to modify their training plans to accommodate joint
urban operations training. It is the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness that has overall authority over DOD training
policies. Table 1 lists those facilities that can currently support large
joint urban operations training exercises and staff officer training.

Table 1: Current Training Facilities that Can Support Joint Urban
Operations Training

                                        

                                              Facilitates joint  Facilitates  
                                              urban operations      urban     
        Facility             Location        training for troops  operations  
                                              (battalions from   training for 
                                             different services) officers on  
                                                                 joint staffs 
Joint Readiness    Fort Polk, Louisiana   Yes                 Yes          
Training Center                                               
Twenty-Nine Palms  Twenty-Nine Palms,     Yes                 Yes          
                      California                                 
National Training  Fort Irwin, California Yes                 Yes          
Center                                                        
Joint              Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels,                                  
Multinational      Germany                Yes                 Yes
Training Center                                               
Joint Warfighting  Suffolk, Virginia      No                  Yes          
Center                                                        
Sites with ability                                                         
to link into Joint Various service                            
Training and       installations          No                  Yes
Experimentation                                               
Network                                                       

Source: Joint Forces Command.

Note: We are using the definition of Joint Training from DOD's joint
training policy-the training event includes two or more forces and/or
joint staffs, is conducted according to joint doctrine, and is run by a
joint headquarters.

In a June 2002 report,8 we recommended that DOD create a database that
identifies all ranges available to the department and what they offer,
regardless of service ownership, so that commanders can schedule the best
available resources to provide required training. Without a mechanism to
schedule joint urban operations training at each other's facilities, DOD
cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that
DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities.

While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training Personnel
Suggested Further Training Enhancements

While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we
interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is
to train as it expects to fight. The services have been using both formal
and informal means to collect and disseminate lessons learned from ongoing
operations to be incorporated into their training events. Based on this
feedback, during the site visits we made, we observed that the services
have made many improvements in their urban operations training such as:
expanding and upgrading their urban training structures, using role
players to a greater extent to simulate the presence of urban populations,
building convoy operations training courses, and training troops in
techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics such as the use of improvised
explosive devices. Our discussions held with troops and training personnel
revealed additional items that they believed could further enhance
training to better reflect current operating conditions such as the need
for additional live-fire capability, adding larger numbers of role players
and providing more cultural awareness training to adequately prepare
troops for the required interaction with a large civilian populace once in
theater, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans
additional improvements to current training, until it develops a strategy
and specific facility and training requirements as discussed previously,
it will lack a solid basis to guide its improvement efforts.

The Services Use Both Formal and Informal Means to Collect and Disseminate
Lessons Learned from Ongoing Operations

The Army and Marine Corps utilize both formal and informal means for
capturing and disseminating lessons learned. According to service
officials, to obtain information from ongoing operations, they send
subject matter experts into theater with deploying units and capture
lessons learned from troops returning from recent ongoing operations. Both
services maintain databases, which are used to disseminate lessons learned
information within and among the services. These databases include
numerous lessons learned related to ongoing urban operations. For example,
the Marine Corps database contains lessons learned on urban operations
including basic Arabic language training, information on convoy operations
tactics, and search techniques. Additionally, Joint Forces Command also
sends subject matter experts into theater and its Joint Center for
Operational Analysis maintains a database of lessons learned and helps
facilitate the sharing of joint lessons among the services. Both the Army
and Marine Corps formally disseminated the information collected through
publications such as handbooks, newsletters, and official Web sites. For
example, the Army's Center for Lessons Learned issued a tactical convoy
operations handbook that was also used by the Marine Corps and the Special
Operations Command, according to Army Center for Lessons Learned
officials. Another formal method the Army uses to disseminate information
is the "smart card," which is a compact card that easily fits in a
soldier's pocket, thus providing quick access to information. The Army
recently issued a smart card that served as a guide for knowledge about
Iraqi culture.

The services also utilize informal mechanisms for capturing and
disseminating lessons learned. Officials we spoke with from the Army's
Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany indicated that they rely
more heavily on informal mechanisms, such as electronic messages from
troops in the field and the "right seat/left seat" transition program.
Under this program, incoming commanders learn the latest urban tactics by
shadowing outbound individuals conducting urban operations. For example,
incoming company commanders shadow outgoing commanders to learn about the
intricacies of the local operating area and what practices have proved
useful in conducting missions. Further, training center officials and
troops we talked with indicated that they shared information on ongoing
operations via available DOD databases.

Integration of Lessons Learned Is Improving Urban Operations Training

The Army and the Marine Corps have recently made significant improvements
in urban operations training curriculum and facilities based on lessons
learned from ongoing operations and training events. Specifically, these
services have adjusted their training curriculum to place greater emphasis
on urban operations. While the Marine Corps introduced its revised
combined arms exercise and security and stabilization operations training
in 2003, it was not mandatory predeployment training until the summer of
2005, according to Marine Corps officials. The Army recently incorporated
urban operations tasks into its Advanced Individual Training Program to
ensure that soldiers receive predeployment training on warrior tasks and
battle drills regardless of their occupational specialties, according to
officials from the Army's Collective Training Directorate. Further, in
June 2004, the Army issued guidance stating that it intends to provide all
deploying brigade and battalion commanders and staff training on urban
stability and support operations through its Battle Command Training
Program.

At training sites in Germany we visited, we found that Army trainers
incorporated real-time scenarios from ongoing operations in their
exercises to provide troops with training that realistically reflects the
urban environment. For example, they incorporated Iraqi elections into the
mission rehearsal exercise in July 2005 in anticipation of the conditions
they would face once deployed. Other examples of curriculum changes that
services had made to provide troops with more of the skills necessary to
effectively face urban challenges included:

o developing mobile training teams that deploy to training sites to
provide instruction to Marines on the handling of detainees at detention
operations;

o placing more emphasis on search procedures related to dwellings, caves,
and vehicles to locate insurgents or weapons;

o delivering training on how to respond to improvised explosive device
incidents;9 and

o training troops on how to conduct convoy operations.

During our visits to training sites, we also observed that the facilities
used for urban operations training had been expanded and upgraded to more
closely reflect urban conditions troops can expect to face in current
operations. For example, we observed small towns that had been enhanced to
replicate urban terrain by including mosques, open markets, and
flat-roofed dwellings. Figure 2 depicts Marines practicing raid procedures
on flat-top roofs to simulate the type of buildings they would encounter
in current urban operational environments.

Figure 2: Marines Execute a Helicopter-Borne Raid Exercise Using Flat-Top
Roofs

Both services have populated these urban training facilities with role
players that portray government officials, tribal leaders, religious
leaders, and officials from interagency organizations. For example, the
Joint Multinational Training Center has increased the total number of
civilian role players to up to 600 participants, though not all are used
in each training event. Our discussions with soldiers who had returned
from operations in Iraq, however, stated that exercises need to include a
larger number of role players to more realistically represent the urban
environment. We noted that the Joint Readiness Training Center replicates
the media and incorporates nongovernmental organizations and civilian role
players in its training. Figure 3 shows an Army exercise that incorporates
civilian role players to simulate local inhabitants in a Middle Eastern
environment.

Figure 3: Army Troops Practice Communicating with Role Players as Part of
Their Training Exercise in Hohenfels, Germany

Furthermore, we observed that the Marine Corps and Army have included
newly built live-fire or simulated convoy courses in some of their urban
operations facilities. Those with live-fire courses are emphasizing the
importance of training troops on them at night and in adverse weather.
Figure 4 shows training on a live-fire convoy operations training course
in Germany. The services are also updating training to reflect changes to
enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. We saw
incorporation of simulated improvised explosive devices at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, and observed the newly developed training site for explosive
devices at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany.

Figure 4: Army Live-Fire Convoy Training Exercise in Germany

In addition to recent improvements, the services are currently planning
further enhancements to existing training facilities. For instance, the
Marine Corps is requesting funds to construct a large-scale urban training
facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The new facility will have up
to 1,500 buildings, including live-fire capability, and outlying
components such as an airfield, port, and villages. According to Marine
officials, the facility will be large enough to accommodate joint training
exercises with the Army. It is also expected to provide a venue from which
to experiment, develop, and exercise joint/interagency urban operations
with the Joint National Training Capability. The Marine Corps also plans
to add a night driving course to pre-deployment training. Additionally,
the Marines plan to add shoot houses at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and
Marine Corps Base Quantico. Likewise, the Army is in the process of
improving its combat training centers by adding more buildings and
instrumentation, and its major installations by providing shoot houses,
urban assault courses, breach facilities, and combined arms collective
training facilities. Army officials at the Joint Multinational Training
Center have initiated an effort to enhance training through the
development of an Expeditionary Instrumentation System, which is a new
mobile instrumentation capability that provides feedback to the battalion
at any training site that lacks instrumentation. According to its
developers, the mobile nature of the system will also help alleviate
capacity concerns throughout the Army, turning any location into an
instrumented range. See appendix II for a description of major ongoing and
planned urban operations training facility enhancements.

Troops and Training Personnel Identified Further Training Enhancements
That They Believe Would Better Reflect Current Operating Conditions

One of DOD's training goals is to train as it expects to fight and
discussions held with troops and training personnel revealed additional
items that they believe could further enhance training to better reflect
current operating conditions. Personnel identified enhancements such as
the need for additional live-fire capability, adding more civilian role
players in exercises and providing additional information gathering and
cultural awareness training, and having newly fielded equipment available
to train with at the training centers.

Additional Live-Fire Training

The troops we spoke with stated that the live-fire training they received
prior to deployment was infrequent and did not sufficiently prepare them
to use their weapons in an urban setting. Training personnel at facilities
we visited stated that the facilities' live-fire capability is limited due
to environmental issues and concerns about safety when training in urban
operations training sites with role players. In lieu of live-fire
training, urban operations facilities have simulated shooting drills,
including video and target instrumentation, to provide the experience of
live-fire urban operations.

More Role Players and Greater Emphasis on Cultural Awareness Training

Further, although we observed role players included in the training
exercises we visited, troops noted that more were needed and additional
cultural awareness training would be beneficial. They noted operating in
an urban environment, against an elusive enemy with the ability to hide
among the civilian population, requires troops to be able to work more
closely with local people, in many cases on an individual basis, to
conduct stability and support operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian
missions, and the gathering of information. Troops we spoke with indicated
that the number of role players included in exercises is not sufficient to
adequately prepare them for the density and level of persistent contact
that is typical of noncombatants in the urban environment. In addition,
troops and training personnel we interviewed wanted the role players to
more actively engage the troops during the exercises to better replicate
operational conditions. The troops and trainers also indicated that more
cultural awareness training, which would include basic language training,
would be helpful to establish and maintain communication with local
civilians so that they could better interact with civilians and minimize
civilian interference with military operations. Currently, training
exercises contain some level of cultural awareness and civil affairs
training by including role players that interact with troops, and
exercises that we observed emphasized the use of translators when working
with the local population. However, access to translators in training is
limited, and officials and troops agreed that translators were not often
available for everyday interaction with civilians and so further training
would be beneficial. Both the Marine Corps and Army have taken steps to
improve this training; the Marine Corps has established an advanced
cultural awareness center and according to an Army official, the Army
continually updates its cultural awareness training to reflect conditions
in current operations.

New Equipment Available for Training Prior to Deployment

Troops and training personnel identified a third area for further
enhancement: the ability to train with newly fielded equipment prior to
deployment. Troops we interviewed who had returned from ongoing operations
stated that there were several pieces of equipment that they used in
theater that had not been available to train with prior to deployment.
These items had been developed to help alleviate the difficulties of
conducting urban operations by addressing the adversaries' tactics, such
as improvised explosive devices, and the adversaries' ability to conceal
themselves in an urban environment. According to training personnel and
DOD officials, limited production quantities and the need for the items in
theater to respond to rapidly changing operational environments makes it
difficult for the training centers to initially have the items. Some
examples of newly fielded equipment that are in limited supply but DOD
believes will improve troops' ability to conduct urban operations include
the following.

o Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). These
vehicles are not available at some training facilities and only the
soft-top HMMWVs were on hand for training exercises, according to
officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels and
Twenty-Nine Palms. Traveling in the up-armored HMMWVs provides greater
protection from improvised explosive devices while maintaining transport
mobility for forces, civil affairs teams, and engineers operating in urban
areas. However, Army and Marine Corps officials and troops that we
interviewed stated that the up-armored HMMWVs used in theater were
top-heavy, difficult to maneuver, and required different tactical
procedures from the soft-top HMMWVs when used in combat.

o The Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight. This gunsight is another piece of
equipment used in conducting urban operations that has been quickly
fielded into theater, but limited quantities prevented its use in training
prior to deployment. Officials stated that this item greatly enhanced
troops' ability to precisely target long-distance hostile forces in all
lighting conditions, which is critical to an urban setting where lighting
plays a key role.

o New improvised explosive device detection and disabling equipment. These
devices were not at some training facilities we visited, and some troops
noted that their absence hampered the troops' use of the items in theater
because the instructions were difficult to understand. Officials at the
Joint Readiness Training Center, Joint Multinational Training Center, and
Camp Lejeune stated that more specific training on the use of improvised
explosive device detection equipment would facilitate its use in theater.

o Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System, also known as Blue
Force Tracker. Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and
communication system that gives an all-weather, near real-time picture of
the battlefield. Troops we interviewed stated that they were not exposed
to Blue Force Tracker in training, although it has been essential in
conducting urban operations in Iraq because of its ability to distinguish
friendly forces from adversaries.

Officials and troops agreed that exposure to these items before arriving
in theater would have better prepared them to operate in the urban
environment. Training center and other DOD officials stated that they
would like to see a greater priority given to placing high-demand items
like the ones mentioned at the training centers to increase the troops'
level of exposure to this equipment before deployment. While DOD plans
additional improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific
facility and training requirements, it will lack a solid basis to evaluate
suggestions and make improvements and investment decisions.

Conclusions

DOD has continually emphasized the importance of joint training, including
to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations in urban
environments. The inherent complexities of operating in urban
environments, DOD's expectation that urban environments will play a
significant role in future military operations, and that most of these
operations will be conducted jointly, coupled with the combatant
commanders' interest in ensuring U.S. forces are sufficiently prepared,
are significant incentives for Joint Forces Command and services to
develop and implement an overall joint training strategy and related
requirements. In addition, the fact that U.S. forces are currently
involved in urban operations adds a tangible sense of urgency for joint
training. Notwithstanding these incentives, current training exercises
offer few opportunities for U.S. forces to train jointly for urban
operations. An overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training
and clearly defined facility and training requirements, and a mechanism
for scheduling joint training at training facilities, would provide a
framework to assign accountability, synchronize the services' training
efforts to ensure they include joint training, and maximize the joint
usage of training facilities. In the absence of this framework, DOD risks
that the services will continue to pursue their respective
service-specific training and facility plans. Until DOD develops an
overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related
requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have
a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans, and
related funding requests. To its credit, DOD and the services have
actively sought to incorporate lessons learned during ongoing operations
and made several adjustments to make the training environment more
reflective of operational conditions. To further enhance training, the
troops and training personnel we interviewed identified several additional
adjustments that they believed would further enhance urban operations
training. However, until DOD develops a strategy and related requirements,
it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and make improvements and
investment decisions.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve DOD's approach to joint urban operations training, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, Joint
Forces Command to:

o Finalize development of the joint urban operations training strategy and
related requirements including joint training tasks and standards, level
and types of joint training exercises to be conducted, and facility needs.
Once established, we envision this framework would be used to guide the
review and approval of service training and facility plans, and to guide
efforts to make additional improvements to existing urban operations
training curriculum, including evaluating any suggestions from training
and troop personnel.

To increase opportunities for joint training and maximize the joint usage
of training facilities, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense

o direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at
major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice participation
in urban operations training.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our first
recommendation and did not concur with the second. DOD concurred with our
first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander,
Joint Forces Command, to finalize development of the joint urban
operations training strategy and related requirements including joint
training tasks and standards, levels, and types of joint training
exercises to be conducted. DOD stated that current efforts, when
completed, will adequately address this recommendation without further
direction from the Secretary of Defense. DOD also noted its view that we
seemed to blur the distinction between what it characterized as two
separate actions-Joint Forces Command's efforts to develop a joint
training strategy for urban operations and DOD's efforts to develop
criteria for evaluating service plans to construct training facilities. We
note that efforts to develop the joint strategy have been underway for
some time and continue to believe that the lack of consensus within DOD
regarding the draft strategy may delay the completion of this effort
without further emphasis and monitoring from the Secretary of Defense.
Furthermore, we believe that the strategy and evaluation criteria should
not be viewed as separate actions, but rather must be clearly linked. As
discussed in our report, until Joint Forces Command develops an overall
strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements,
neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis
for evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding
requests.

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
to establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at
major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice participation
in urban operations training. In its response, DOD stated that it remains
strongly committed to a decentralized training ranges and facilities
management solution in supporting the services' Title 10 responsibilities.
DOD also noted the Office of the Secretary of Defense is providing
planning support, oversight, and policy guidance to ensure all its
training resources support service, cross-service, and joint needs and
goals. DOD further stated that it is committed to maximizing system
integration, sharing of data, and facilitation of the services' scheduling
processes to better leverage all assets for the full benefit of military
readiness. However, we note that, to date, DOD has not given sufficient
leadership attention to ensuring necessary coordinated action among the
services to accomplish these goals. We believe the lack of progress is
more an issue of leadership to ensure coordinated action among the key
stakeholders than an issue of usurping the services' Title 10
responsibilities. Our report shows that the lack of a formal mechanism for
scheduling joint urban operations training at major training centers is
one of the key factors accounting for the limited number of joint urban
operations training opportunities. Our recommendation is intended to
facilitate increased multiservice participation in urban operations
training events. Without focused leadership efforts on the part of DOD to
ensure coordinated action among the services to establish a mechanism to
schedule joint training, we believe that DOD will perpetuate the current
situation in which few exercises are joint according to its definition.
Therefore, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit.

DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9619. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Sharon L. Pickup, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Scope and Methodology Appendix I

To determine DOD's overall approach to training for urban operations, we
reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies, and guidance, and other
documentation related to urban operations training. We discussed urban
operations training with a variety of officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, Joint Forces Command,
operational units of the Army and Marine Corps, training organizations,
and other related organizations. Specifically, we did the following:

o To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in establishing a
strategy for joint urban operations training, we discussed with officials
at Joint Forces Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense the
process and associated timelines for strategy development and approval. We
attended meetings of the joint urban operations training working group and
reviewed the draft strategy as it evolved to monitor progress towards
strategy development and gaining buy-in from the services and combatant
commanders. Further, we analyzed DOD's draft strategy and assessed to what
extent it included defined joint urban operations training requirements
and identified who needed to accomplish the requirements. Lastly, we
reviewed legislation pertaining to this issue and determined whether DOD's
draft strategy would address the congressional directive that DOD
establish joint urban operations facility requirements and a training
requirements baseline by November 1, 2005.

o To determine the extent to which current exercises provide opportunities
for joint urban operations training, we analyzed joint and service urban
operations training doctrine and policy to determine how joint urban
operations training exercises are defined, and the level of joint training
that is required by those documents. We interviewed officials from Joint
Forces Command and Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the
number of joint urban operations training exercises that have occurred
this year. In addition, we interviewed troops who had returned from
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine how much joint urban
training they receiving before deploying and how they felt the training
prepared them for conducting urban operations they took part in. Lastly,
we interviewed service trainers and observed some exercises to determine
the level of joint urban operations training incorporated into current
training events.

o To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated lessons learned
into its urban operations training to reflect current operational
conditions, we observed Army and Marine Corps urban operations training,
reviewed changes made to course curriculum to incorporate real-time
scenarios troops could expect to encounter in theater, discussed with
officials from the Army and Marine Corps lessons learned offices and
training centers the means of collecting and disseminating lessons
learned, and obtained documentation on changes made to training curriculum
and facilities based on these lessons. Further, we reviewed lessons
learned publications and databases to assess the type and amount of
information dealing with urban operations that are readily available to
troops. Lastly, we interviewed troops who had returned from operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, many of whom were readying for a second deployment,
to assess how lessons learned were shared in theater and the extent to
which training had been updated since their first deployment.

Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment

                                        

      Organizations                          Locations                        
Army                Headquarters, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.              
                       Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA         
                       Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA       
                       Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS  
                       Combat Training Center Directorate, Fort Leavenworth,  
                       KS                                                     
                       Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS  
                       1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX                    
                       101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY             
                       10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY                  
                       Joint Multinational Command Training Center,           
                       Grafenwoehr, Germany                                   
                       Joint Multinational Readiness Group, Hohenfels,        
                       Germany                                                
Marine Corps        Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education 
                       Command, Quantico, VA                                  
                       Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA  
                       Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, VA      
                       Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA  
                       March Air Reserve Base, CAa                            
                       Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, CA               
                       2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC       
Air Force           Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA         
Joint Organizations The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Programs and   
                       Readiness                                              
                       Joint Training and Ranges Office, Washington, D.C.     
                       Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA                      
                                                                              
                       o Joint Urban Operations Office                        
                                                                              
                       o Joint Warfighting Center, Capabilities Group         
                                                                              
                       o Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons    
                       Learned                                                

Source: GAO.

aAs of September 2005, Marine Corps training at March Air Reserve Base was
moved to Twenty-Nine Palms.

Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations Training Facility
Enhancements Appendix II

                                        

             ARMY           
         Enhancement                           Description                    
                            The shoot house is a single story, multiroom      
Shoot housea             building with multiple points of entry designed   
                            for individual, squad, and platoon live-fire      
                            training.                                         
                            The urban assault course is a five-station        
                            training facility that is designed to train       
                            individuals, squads, and platoons. It includes a  
Urban assault coursea    two-story offense/defense building, grenadier     
                            gunnery, an underground trainer, and two          
                            individual-through-platoon task/technique         
                            training ranges.                                  
                            The breach facility includes wall, door, and      
Breach facilitya         window breach locations and provides training for 
                            individuals, teams, and squads in breaching       
                            techniques and procedures.                        
                            A complex of 20 - 26 buildings that provides      
Combined arms collective combined arms collective training for platoon and 
training facilitya       company situational exercises and battalion task  
                            force field training exercises.                   
                            Shoot houses and urban assault courses have       
                            limited video capture and targetry control        
                            capability for enhanced safety monitoring and     
Instrumentation          rapid training feedback (after action reviews).   
                            Combined arms collective training facilities have 
                            limited exterior and interior video, targetry     
                            control, and a more comprehensive after action    
                            review capability.                                
                            Installations plan to add structures (shanty      
                            towns) and debris (salvage cars) to the combined  
                            arms collective training facility for increased   
Additional buildings     realism. These are added at little or no          
                            additional cost and require no sustainment. There 
                            is no dedicated funding for additional buildings  
                            at this time.                                     

Source: U.S. Army.

aThe Army plans to have these structures at every Brigade Combat Team home
station, at the Combat Training Centers, and at installations identified
as Power Projection Platforms and Power Support Platforms as prioritized
by the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

                                        

              Marine Corps             
               Enhancement                          Description               
                                       The Marine Corps is installing shoot   
                                       houses to provide Marines with         
                                       training on tactics, techniques, and   
Shoot houses                        procedures involved with urban         
                                       shooting. The shoot houses will be     
                                       installed at Camp Lejeune, Camp        
                                       Pendleton, and Quantico Marine Corps   
                                       bases.                                 
                                       The live-fire convoy operations range  
                                       is designed to simulate and provide    
                                       live-fire convoy and counter-ambush    
Convoy operations range             training. The Marine Corps has         
                                       installed a live-fire convoy range at  
                                       Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune     
                                       Marine Corps bases.                    
                                       The non-live-fire urban operations     
                                       training facilities are designed to    
                                       support maneuver training, basic urban 
                                       skills training, and security and      
Non-live-fire urban operations      stability training for battalion-sized 
training facilities                 units and below. The Marine Corps      
                                       plans to install live-fire urban       
                                       operations training facilities at      
                                       Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune     
                                       Marine Corps bases.                    
                                       The live-fire urban operations         
                                       training facility is designed to       
                                       provide live-fire and maneuver         
Live-fire urban operations training training for company-sized units and   
facility                            below. The Marine Corps plans to       
                                       install a live-fire urban operations   
                                       training facility, consisting of 15 -  
                                       30 buildings, at Camp Lejeune Marine   
                                       Corps base.                            
                                       Adding capability at training sites to 
                                       capture and record training events and 
Instrumentation                     to use the data for after action       
                                       reviews, enabling the review of        
                                       training events and the capture of     
                                       lessons learned.                       
                                       Increasing the number of buildings at  
                                       training sites to more realistically   
Additional buildings                replicate the urban environment where  
                                       density of buildings complicates       
                                       military maneuver.                     

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix IV

Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619

In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director,
John Beauchamp, Jonathan Clark, Gina Ruidera, Susan Tindall, Cheryl A.
Weissman, and Tracy Whitaker made key contributions to this report.

Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes
is Largely Untapped. GAO/NSIAD-95-152. Washington, D.C.: August 9, 1995.

(350617)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-193.

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-193, a report to congressional committees

December 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should
Be Based on a Sound Strategy and Requirements

DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces to
conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint training as
exercises involving the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs
under a joint headquarters. To guide the services' plans to train forces
for urban operations and construct related facilities, in May 2002, the
Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility
requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to complete its
efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring training
capabilities within the services and across DOD by November 1, 2005. Due
to DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional interest in
synchronizing service training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority
of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has
developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related
requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations
training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to improve DOD's approach to joint urban
operations training. In written comments on a draft report, DOD did not
concur with one of GAO's two recommendations. After reviewing DOD's
comments, GAO continues to believe that both its recommendations are still
valid.

Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint
strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training
requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces
Command, designated as DOD's executive agent for urban operations
training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify
facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Command began working
with the services to review the study's results and to develop the
detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for a
joint training strategy. While the draft strategy identifies some facility
needs, as of October 2005, the Command and services have not reached
consensus on the level or types of joint training exercises needed to
prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, the Command has been
unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training
requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within
each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able
to deliver the required baseline on time and instead plan to provide
criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans.
Until the Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations
training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor
the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and
facility plans, and related funding requests.

Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint
urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for
training that places troops from different services on the ground working
under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine both require forces
to be prepared to operate jointly across the full range of military
operations. Various factors account for the lack of joint training
opportunities, such as the services' focus on service-specific skills, and
the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training,
specific training requirements, and a formal mechanism to schedule joint
training at service facilities. Without a strategy, defined requirements,
and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban
operations training will occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of
training facilities.

While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO
interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is
to train as it expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing
operations, DOD has made several adjustments, including constructing urban
structures, using civilian role players, and adding training on techniques
to counter emerging enemy tactics. Persons GAO interviewed cited the need
for more live-fire capability, larger numbers of role players, information
gathering and cultural awareness training, and training with newly fielded
equipment. While DOD plans more improvements, until it develops a strategy
and specific requirements as discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to
evaluate suggestions, and guide its improvement efforts and investment
decisions.

Related GAO Products

Military Training: Some Improvements Have Been Made in DOD's Annual
Training Range Reporting but It Still Fails to Fully Address Congressional
Requirements. GAO-06-29R. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2005.

Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform
Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and
Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556. Washington,
D.C.: June 15, 2005.

Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve
Conditions of Military Training Ranges. GAO-05-534. Washington, D.C.: June
10, 2005.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish
Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers.
GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management
Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.

Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can
Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning.
GAO-04-855. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2004.

Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address
Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. Washington, D.C.: June
4, 2004.

Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment
on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002.

Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces for
Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.: February 25,
2000.
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